Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
Section 80 Notice
ANNOTATION
Amendments (ii) after Subsection (3),
The Code of Civil Procedure add the following subsection
(Amendment) Act, 1976 namely :
renumbered the section as "(4) where in a suit or
Subclause (1) and therein proceeding referred to in
substituted "Save as otherwise Rule 3B of Order I, the State
provided in Subsection (2), is joined as a defendant or
no suit shall be instituted", for nonapplicant or where the
"No suit shall be instituted" Court orders joinder of the
State as defendant or non
The Code of Civil Procedure
applicant in exercise of
(Amendment) Act, 1976
powers under Subrule (2) of
inserted Subsections (2) and
Rule 10 of Order I such suit
(3) to the section
or proceeding shall not be
Effective Date of dismissed by reason of
Amendments omission of the plaintiff or
Code of Civil Procedure applicant to issue notice
(Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. under Subsection (1)."
1st February, 1977.
State Amendment
Madhya Pradesh Calcutta
In Section 80 Madhya Pradesh The provisions of Section 80
No. 29 of 1984 amended as of the Code as amended
under: upto 1st January, 1965 are
extended to all suits or
(i) in Subsection (1), for the proceedings in the Court of
words, brackets and figures Small Causes of Calcutta.
"Subsection (2)", the words,
Effective Data of state
brackets and figures
Amendments Madhya
"Subsection (2) or Subsection
Pradesh Act No. 29 of 1984
(4)" shall be substituted:
w.e.f. 14. 08. 1984
Pre 1976 Amendments and Case Cited
1. Vide Act No. 6 of 1948.
2. Omitted by Act No. 6 of 1948.
3. Vide Act No. 26 of 1963.
4. Clause (d) omitted by Act No. 6 of 1948.
5. Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of M. P., AIR 1960 SC 1256; State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies,
MANU/SC/0221/1959: AIR 1960 SC 1309; Amar Nath v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0028/1962: AIR
1963 SC 424.
6. New India Assurance Co. v. D. D. Authority, MANU/DE/0044/1991: AIR 1991 Del 298 at 281.
7. State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd. MANU/SC/0005/1977: AIR1978SC1608.
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8. P.P. Abubacker v. The Union of India MANU/KE/0029/1972: AIR 1972 Ker 103.
9. Lady Dinbai Dinshaw Petit v. The Dominion of India MANU/MH/0048/1951: AIR1951Bom72.
10. State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. Venkata Survanarayana Garu, MANU/SC/0255/1963: AIR 1965 SC
11.
11. Union of India v. Jiwan Ram, (AIR 1958 SC 905; Pratap Narain Sinha v. State of Bihar
MANU/BH/0062/1984: AIR1984Pat212.
Page 397
12. Raghunath Das v. Union of India MANU/SC/0406/1968: AIR 1969 SC 674; State of Punjab v. M/ s.
Geeta Iron and Brass Works Ltd. MANU/SC/0005/1977: AIR 1978 SC 1608; The State of Bihar v. Bera
Colliery Company (P) Ltd. MANU/BH/0021/1991: AIR 1991 Pat 178.
13. Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0284/1969: AIR 1969 SC 1256;
State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, MANU/SC/0221/1959: AIR 1960 SC 1309; Jesraj Subhachand v.
Union of India MANU/WB/0126/1978: AIR1978Cal536.
14. Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India MANU/SC/0006/1984: AIR 1984 SC 1004.
15. Karnataka Board of Wakfs, Bangalore v. B.C. Nagaraja Rao MANU/KA/0060/1991: AIR 1991 Kant
400; State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd. MANU/SC/0005/1977: AIR 1978 SC 1608.
16. Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India MANU/SC/0006/1984: AIR 1984 SC 1004.
17. Laxmi Narain v. State, MANU/BH/0018/1977: AIR 1977 Pat 73; Kanhaiya Lal v. Govt of India,
MANU/BH/0010/1974: AIR 1974 Gau 37.
18. Bihari Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0004/1984: AIR 1984 SC 1043.
19. Sawai Singhai v. Union of India. MANU/SC/0016/1965: AIR 1966 S.C. 1068.
20. State of Bihar v. Jiwan Das Arya MANU/BH/0031/1971: AIR1971Pat141.
21. Amalgamated Electricity Co v. Municipal Committee Ajmer MANU/SC/0372/1968: AIR1969SC227.
22. State of Seraikella v. Union of India (UOI). MANU/SC/0006/1951: AIR 1951 SC 253.
23. Sabhu v. Ramsa MANU/HP/0052/1953: AIR1953HP123.
24. Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0175/1975: AIR 1975 Bom 13.
25. State of A.P. v. G.V. Surya Narayana, MANU/SC/0255/1963: AIR 1965 SC 11.
26. S.S.Velayudham Pillai v. The Governer general in council MANU/TN/0287/1952: AIR1952Mad783.
27. Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of M. P., AIR 1960 SC 1256.
28. Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Gulbarga v. Respondent: Rachawwa, Widow of Lochanappa
Gugwad MANU/SC/0351/1970: AIR 1971 SC 442.
29. V. Padmanabhan v. Kerala S. E. B., MANU/KE/0020/1989: AIR 1989 Ker 86.
30. Bishandayal & Sons v. State, AIR 2001 SC 544.
31. Qamaruddin v. Union of India, MANU/UP/0258/1982: AIR 1982 All 169.
32. State v. Sajal, MANU/GH/0020/1982: AIR 1982 Gau 76.
33. R.Kamalan v. The State of Tamil Nadu AIR1980Mad86.
34. Md Zakiuddin v. District Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property MANU/BH/0003/1963:
AIR1963Pat11.
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35. Smt. Rayabai v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 Bom 59; Rawat Hardeo Singh v. State of
Rajasthan MANU/RH/0059/1981: AIR 1981 Raj 280.
36. Beohar v. State, MANU/SC/0284/1969: AIR 1969 SC 1256.
37. Union of India v. Sankar Store MANU/OR/0026/1974: AIR1974Ori85.
38. Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India MANU/SC/0016/1965: AIR 1966 SC 1068.
39. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugola Venkata Suryanayanan Garu MANU/SC/0255/1963:
AIR1965SC11; Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0284/1969:
AIR1969SC1256; Hamara Radio and General Industries Ltd. Co., Delhi v. State of Rajasthan
MANU/RH/0052/1964: AIR 1964 Raj 205.
40. Dominion of India v. L. Badu Lal MANU/UP/0115/1962: AIR 1962 All 461.
41. Anath Bandhu Deb v. Dominion of India MANU/WB/0199/1955: AIR 1955 Cal 626.
42. Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India MANU/WB/0069/1959: AIR1959Cal273; Dominion of India v.
Jagadishprosad Pannalal a firm AIR 1949 Cal 622.
43. Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India (UOI) MANU/WB/0069/1959: AIR 1959 Cal 273.
44. Rambrahma Chabri v. The Dominion of India at present Union of India (UOI)
MANU/WB/0040/1958: AIR 1958 Cal 183.
Page 398
45. Dhian Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274; State of West Bengal v. Ajit Kumar Mukherjee
MANU/WB/0071/1977: AIR1977Cal273.
46. Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India MANU/SC/0028/1962: AIR1963SC424.
47. Ghan Shyam Das v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0006/1984: AIR 1984 SC 1004.
48. D. D. Tea v. Union of India, AIR 1982 NOC 155 Mad.
49. Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0284/1969: AIR1969SC1256.
50. S.N. Dutt v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0011/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1449.
51. Union of India, Railway Administration, Madras v. Eastern Match Co., Tirumangalam
MANU/AP/0084/1964: AIR 1964 AP 172.
52. Bommadevara Venkat Narsimha Rao Bahadur Garu v. State of Andhra Pradesh
MANU/AP/0206/1971: AIR1972AP130.
53. Sahu Vanaspati Traders v. Union of India (UOI) MANU/UP/0106/1966: AIR 1966 All 333.
54. Union of India v. B.D. Jhunjhunwala MANU/OR/0070/1988: AIR1988Ori267.
55. Union of India v. Jyotirmoyee Sharma MANU/WB/0114/1967: AIR1967Cal461.
56. Paleti Sivaramkrishnaiah v. Executive Engineer MANU/AP/0097/1978: AIR1978AP389.
57. Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0175/1975: AIR1975Bom13; State v. Girdhari Lal,
AIR 1969 Raj 126; P. SivaramKrishnaiah v. Executive Engineer, MANU/AP/0097/1978: AIR 1978 AP
389; Shauqat Ali v. Supdtt. of Police, MANU/BH/0010/1972: AIR 1972 Assam 29.
58. Sholapur Municipality v. U. S. Bhagwat, MANU/MH/0097/1974: AIR 1974 Bom 174.
59. Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Radharani Dassya, MANU/WB/0197/1930: AIR 1931 Cal 175.
60. Vallayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197.
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61. The District Board, Banaras v. Churu Rai AIR1956All680.
62. Basudeb v. Padmanav, ILR 1959 Cut 258; State v. Bamadeb, AIR 1971 Orissa 227; Dhian Singh v.
Union of India, MANU/SC/0010/1957.
63. State v. Panchratna, MANU/BH/0049/1980: AIR 1980 Pat 212.
64. Istiaq v. Zafarul, MANU/UP/0030/1969: AIR 1969 All 161; Kanakku K. Pillai v. Neel Kantha, AIR
1969 Ker 280.
65. Kanakku Karthiayani Pillai Narayani Pillai. v. Respondent: Neelacanta Pillai Raman Pillai.
MANU/KE/0068/1969: AIR1969Ker280.
66. Vasant v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., MANU/MH/0348/1981: AIR 1981 Bom 394.
67. State v. Orissa Oil Industries Ltd., AIR 1982 Ori 245.
68. Union of India v. Shanker Stores, MANU/OR/0026/1974: AIR 1974 Ori 85.
69. Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India (UOI) MANU/WB/0069/1959: AIR 1959 Cal 273.
70. Bata Shoe Co., Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/MH/0033/1954: AIR 1954 Bom 129.
71. Bai Jilekhabai Aderman v. Competent officer MANU/GJ/0035/1961: AIR1961Guj85; Smt. Shima
Sundari Lekri v. Paltu Hemram MANU/WB/0002/1982: AIR 1982 Cal 5.
72. Mohanta Raghabananda Das v. D.V.A. Naidu MANU/OR/0011/1961: AIR1961Ori31.
73. Mohanta Raghabananda Das v. D.V.A. Naidu MANU/OR/0011/1961: AIR1961Ori31; Sundari
Choudhurani v. Nalini Ranjan Saha, ILR 36 Cal 28; Dakshina Ranjan v. Omar Chand,
MANU/WB/0048/1923: AIR 1924 Cal 145; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sardarmal
MANU/MP/0039/1987: AIR 1987 MP 156.
74. Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, (S) MANU/SC/0071/1955: AIR 1956 SC 44.
75. Amalgamated El. Co. v. Ajmer Municipality, MANU/SC/0372/1968: AIR 1969 SC 227.
76. Sibanand Roy v. Janaki, MANU/OR/0058/1985: AIR 1985 Ori 197.
77. Taru Rani v. Cantt. Board, MANU/BH/0055/1982: AIR 1982 Pat 204; Amalgamated El. Co. v. Ajmer
Municipality, MANU/SC/0372/1968: AIR 1969 SC 227.
78. B. L. Shukla v. Fatimabai, MANU/GJ/0059/1976: AIR 1976 Guj 29.
79. Faizabad Municipality v. E. M. Hall, MANU/UP/0085/1976: AIR 1976 All 349.
80. B. Bhusan v. S. A. Aziz, MANU/BH/0049/1985: AIR 1985 Pat 165.
81. R. H. Singh v. State, MANU/RH/0059/1981: AIR 1981 Raj 280; State v. Mohan Devi, 1977 All LJ
365.
82. Coal Mines Provident Fund Commr. v. Ramesh Chandra, MANU/SC/0119/1990: AIR 1990 SC 648 at
649.
83. P. Padmanabhan v. Kerala SEB, MANU/KE/0020/1989: AIR 1989 Ker 86 at 88.
84. Rajkea Middle School, Daulatpura v. Ram Kumar MANU/RH/0226/1998: AIR1998Raj172.
85. Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0175/1975: AIR1975Bom13.
86. Bihar v. Kamakshya Narain Singh, AIR 1950 Pat 360; Secy. of State v. Sagarmal Marwari, AIR
1941 Pat 517; Lakshmi Narain v. Union of India MANU/BH/0020/1962: AIR1962Pat64.
87. Dahyabhai Patel and Co v. Union of India MANU/KE/0061/1960: AIR1960Ker135.
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88. Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra. MANU/MH/0175/1975: AIR 1975 Bom 13.
89. Jai Charan v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0031/1967: AIR 1968 SC 5.
90. Laxmi Narayan v. State of Bihar, MANU/BH/0018/1977: AIR 1977 Pat 73.
91. See Union of India v. Devanagra C. Mills, AIR 1976 Mad 20; Lakshmi Narain v. Union of India,
MANU/BH/0020/1962: AIR 1962 Pat 64.
92. Bihari Chowdhary v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0004/1984: AIR 1984 SC 1043.
93. T. P. K. Nair v. Union of India, MANU/KE/0016/1991: AIR 1991 Ker 80 at 82.
94. Union of India v. Tamil Nadu Small Scale Industries, MANU/TN/0250/1981: AIR 1981 Mad 316.
95. State of U. P. v. Raja Ram Lal, MANU/UP/0053/1966: AIR 1966 All 159 at 161.
96. B. R. Sinha v. State of M. P., MANU/SC/0284/1969: AIR 1969 SC 1256.
97. Mast Ram v. D. C. Bahraich, MANU/UP/0081/1968: AIR 1968 All 321.
98. K.K. Sharma v. Punjab State AIR1989P&H7.
99. State v. Sajal, MANU/PH/0002/1989: AIR 1982 Gau 76.
100. Islamia Girls High School v. State of U. P., MANU/UP/0189/1986: AIR 1986 All 92.
101. K. K. Sharma v. State of Punjab, MANU/PH/0002/1989: AIR 1989 P&H 7 at 8.
102. State v. Orissa Oil Industries, AIR 1982 Ori 245.
103. Lady Dinbhai Dinshaw v. Dominion of India AIR 1951 Bom 72.
104. Lalchand Chowdhury v. Union of India MANU/WB/0069/1960: AIR1960Cal270.
105. Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India MANU/SC/0028/1962: AIR1963SC424.
106. Bholaram Chowdhury v. Administrator General 8 Cal WN 913.
107. Lal Chand Chowdhury v. Union of India, MANU/WB/0069/1960: AIR 1960 Cal 270.
108. State of Rajasthan v. Associated Stone & Co., MANU/RH/0034/1971: AIR 1971 Raj 128.
109. Bengal Enamel Works v. Apeejay Pvt. Ltd., ILR (1970) 1 Cal 459 : 1968 Cal LJ 32.
110. Smt. Sooraj v. S.D.O., Delhi, MANU/SC/0169/1995: AIR 1995 SC 872 at 873.
111. Union of India v. Gorakhnath, MANU/UP/0158/1964: AIR 1964 All 477.
112. S. P. C. Eng Co. v. Union of India, MANU/WB/0060/1966: AIR 1966 Cal 259.
113. State v. Southern Railways, MANU/SC/0032/1976: AIR 1976 SC 2538.
114. Contra : Kanhaiya Lal v. Government of India, AIR 1975 Gau 37.
SYNOPSIS
1. Object 5. 'Act done in official
.............................................. capacity' ....... 408
401
2. Scope 6. Period of two
............................................... months ....................
402 409
3. Contents of notice and 7. Service of notice
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variance with plaint ............................
.............................................. 410
404
8. Leave of CourtSub
4. Waiver of notice section (2) . 410
............................. 407
9. Amendment of plaint 11. Union Territory
Consequence on Government Requirement
compliance of Section 80 of notice ................ 411
..... 411
10. Notice in arbitration
proceedings and railway
claims if necessary 411
1. Object.
The object of the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, is to give to the Government or
the public servant concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position and if that course is
justified to make amends or settle the claim out of court (Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of M. P.;
State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies; Amar Nath v. Union of India),5 so that the parties may be saved
from unnecessary litigation (New India Assurance Co. v. D. D. Authority)6 or at least have the
courtesy to tell the potential outsider why the claim is being resisted (State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron &
Brass Works Ltd.).7
The legislative intention behind this section is that public money and time should not be wasted on
unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable
opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable
litigations. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in Section 80, Code of Civil
Procedure are not intended to be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons (P.P.
Abubacker v. The Union of India).8 The section is not intended to be an instrument of oppression
against the subject (Lady Dinbai Dinshaw Petit v. The Dominion of India).9 In other words justice
should not be foundered on the rock of mere technicality (State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. Venkata
Survanarayana Garu).10
The primary point for consideration is whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature
of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avoid litigation. So long as the notice substantially
informs the defendant of the nature of the suit and the grounds of complaint, the legal requirement
would stand satisfied (Union of India v. Jiwan Ram; Pratap Narain Sinha v. State of Bihar).11 It is the
duty of the State to receive the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Raghunath
Das v. Union of India; State of Punjab v. M/ s. Geeta Iron and Brass Works Ltd.; The State of Bihar r.
v. Bera Colliery Company (P) Ltd. r.).12 Any error or defect in such a notice could not be permitted to
be treated as an excuse for defeating a just claim (Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of Madhya
Pradesh; State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies; Jesraj Subhachand v. Union of India).13
It is a matter of common experience that in a large majority of cases the Government or the public
officer concerned make no use of the opportunity afforded by the section. In most cases the notice
given under Section 80 remains unanswered till the expiration of two months provided by the section.
It is also clear that in a large number of cases, the Government or the public officer utilised the
section merely to raise technical defences contending either that no notice had been given or that the
notice actually given did not comply with the requirements of the section (Ghanshyam Dass. v.
Dominion of India).14
A litigative policy for the State involves settlement of governmental dispute with citizens in a sense of
conciliation rather than in a fighting mood indeed, it should be a directive on the part of the State to
empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes rather than continue them in Court. Now
Section 80 has become a ritual because the administration is often unresponsive and hardly lives up
to the Parliament's expectation in continuing Section 80 in the Code despite the Central Law
Commission's recommendations for its deletion. Indeed it should be a directive on the part of the
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State to empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes rather than continue them in
Court. This exactly is the object and purpose of giving a notice before suit (Karnataka Board of Wakfs,
Bangalore v. B.C. Nagaraja Rao; State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd.).15
2. Scope.
Section 80 of the Code is but a part of the Procedure Code passed to provide the regulation and
machinery, by means of which the Courts may do justice between the parties. It is therefore merely a
part of the adjective law and deals with procedure alone and must be interpreted in a manner so as
to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it (Ghanshyam Dass. v. Dominion
of India).16 It comes in the category of substantive law (Laxmi Narain v. State; Kanhaiya Lal v.
Government of India).17 This section is mandatory and a suit filed in contravention of the section is
not maintainable (Bihari Chowdhury v. State of Bihar).18
The material words used in Section 80 are wide and unambiguous; they are 'express, explicit and
mandatory (Sawai Singhai v. Union of India).19 There are two parts of the section. One in regard to
the institution of the suit against the Government and the other against a public officer. The inhibition
contained in the Section as to the institution of suit against the Government is unqualified. No suit can
be instituted against the Government or, as a matter of that, against the State or the Union until the
expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been given to the proper authority. It
matters little whether the suit relates to the past action of the Government or is in relation to the
threatened action or injury and the suit is in the nature of a bill quia timet. But if the suit is to be filed
against a public Officer, notice is mandatory only when it is in respect of any act purporting to be
done by such public officer in his official capacity. If the act is not one purporting to be done by the
officer in his official capacity, no notice is necessary (State of Bihar v. Jiwan Das Arya).20 Hence
before Section 80 can be relied on in any suit against a public officer, it must be shown that it is a
suit in respect of an 'act' purporting to be done by him in his official capacity. In view of the
provisions of the General Clauses Act, the expression 'act' also includes illegal omissions. Therefore if
the suit does not relate to any 'act' or 'illegal omission' purporting to be done by a public officer in his
official capacity, Section 80 will not have any application (Amalgamated Electricity Co v. Municipal
Committee Ajmer).21
Section 80 does not define the rights of parties or confer any rights on the parties. It only provides a
mode of procedure for getting the relief in respect of a cause of action. It is a part of the machinery
for obtaining legal rights, i.e., machinery as distinguished from its products (State of Seraikella v.
Union of India (UOI)).22 A notice under Section should be given before the institution of the suit
(Sabhu v. Ramsa).23 The bar under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is against the
institution of the suit itself. Where, therefore, a suit is filed before the expiration of the period of
notice contemplated by Section 80, there is no alternative to the Court but to reject the plaint under
Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code. The question of prejudice to the plaintiff is wholly irrelevant in
view of the imperative words of the section (Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra).24 Similarly where
the notice has not been served as required under the section the Court has no jurisdiction to stay the
proceedings instead the plaint should be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (State of A.P. v. G.V. Surya Narayana).25
The section can obviously have no application to the continuation of a suit properly instituted when at
the time of the institution the Government was not a necessary party. If the Government was a
necessary party against whom the plaintiff sought relief or must be deemed to have sought relief,
then, the fact that the Government was not made at the inception a party, but was subsequently
added as a party would not make any difference in principle. In such cases, the suit must be deemed
to have been instituted against the Government only when the Government is made a party, and
obviously Section 80 would apply to such a case and the Government would be entitled to the two
months' notice. But in a case where on the date of the institution of the suit, the plaintiff could not
have claimed, and did not claim, any relief against the Government and therefore no notice under
Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was necessary, but if it transpires during the pendency of the suit
that the interest of the defendant has devolved on the Government, either by voluntary act of the
Government or by operation of law, there is no fresh institution of the suit as against the
Government. The Government only steps into the shoes of the party whose interest has devolved on
it. Because in such a case there is no institution of a suit against the Government at the time when it
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is brought on record in the pending suit, Section 80 cannot have any application (S.S.Velayudham
Pillai v. The Governer General in Council).26
The section is not doubt imperative; failure to serve notice complying with the requirements of the
statute will entail dismissal of the suit. But the notice must be reasonably construed. Any unimportant
error or defect cannot be permitted to be treated as an excuse for defeating a just claim. In
considering whether the provisions of the statute are complied with, the Court must take into account
the following matters in each case (1) whether the name, description and residence of the Plaintiff
are given so as to enable the authorities to identify the person serving the notice; (2) whether the
cause of action and the relief which the Plaintiff claims are not set out with sufficient particularity: (3)
whether a notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate authority
mentioned in the section: and (4) whether the suit is instituted after the expiration of two months
next after notice has been served, and the plaint contains a statement that such a notice has been so
delivered or left (Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of M. P.).27
No doubt it would be open to a Court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings
before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law for instance the plaint does
not show that notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming relief was served in
terms of the said section, it would be the duty of the court to reject the plaint recording an Order to
that effect with reason for the order. In such a case the court should not embark upon a trial of all
the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the Plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint
in respect of the same cause of action. But, where the plaint on the face of it does not show that any
relief envisaged by Section 80 of the Code is being claimed, it would be the duty of the court to go
into all the issues which may arise on the pleadings including the question as to whether notice under
Section 80 was necessary. If the court decides the various issues raised on the pleadings, it is difficult
to see why the adjudication of the rights of the parties, apart from the question as to the applicability
of Section 80 of the Code and absence of notice there under should not operate as res judicata in a
subsequent suit where the identical questions arise for determination between same parties
(Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Gulbarga v. Respondent: Rachawwa, Widow of Lochanappa
Gugwad).28
Public sector undertakings are not Government e.g. State Electricity Board is not Government for the
purposes of this section or its officers are public servants (V. Padmanabhan v. Kerala S. E. B.).29 If a
new cause of action is being introduced, a fresh notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure
would be required to be given; the same not having been given, the suit on this cause of action is not
maintainable (Bishandayal & Sons v. State).30 But where validity of notice is challenged or
requirement of notice is doubtful the issue on such point can be decided along with other issues of the
suit. The notice served must accompany the copy of the plaint or at least requisite basis on which
claim is based and the cause of action has arisen (Qamaruddin v. Union of India).31 In case of urgent
or immediate relief against Government, including the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or against
a public officer, a suit without serving the notice under Subsection (1) of Section 80 can be instituted
with the leave of the Court but in that case the Court shall not grant even interim relief without
serving notice to the Government or public officer to show cause why such relief should not be
allowed. The requirement of Subsection (2) cannot be bypassed in this regard (State v. Sajal).32
Where the suit of the Plaintiff is dismissed for want of notice under Section 80, the plaintiff is at
liberty to issue notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure and file a fresh suit, if possible, by
invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act (R.Kamalan v. The State of Tamil Nadu).33
Where, the Union of India, though a proper party, was not a necessary party, even if the suit fails
against Union of India, on account of nonservice of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it will have no effect otherwise on the suit, if, it was maintainable against the other
defendants (Md Zakiuddin v. District Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property).34
Once it is brought to the notice of the proposed defendant that the sender of the notice intended to
terminate the tenancy and that the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure would terminate
subsequent to or along with the termination of the tenancy, then the validity of such a notice cannot
be challenged on the ground that the cause of action for serving a notice under Section 80, Code of
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Civil Procedure had not arisen (Smt. Rayabai v. The State of Maharashtra; Rawat Hardeo Singh v.
State of Rajasthan).35
3. Contents of notice and variance with plaint.
Notice under Section 80 must contain the following facts (i) Name, and sufficient address to identify
the Plaintiff (ii) reasonably sufficient particulars disclosing cause of action and (iii) all reliefs claimed
(Beohar v. State).36 With regard to the requirement (ii) and (iii) it must be admitted that the notice
under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure is not a pleading and need not be a verbatim copy of the
plaint, but having regard to the object for which Section 80 is enacted, it must contain such details of
facts which will be sufficient to inform the parties regarding the nature and basis of the claim and the
relief sought (Union of India v. Sankar Store).37 If the notice is not in full compliance with the
requirement of Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure it becomes invalid. The position then would be as
if no notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure had at all been issued and consequently, the
suit is bound to fail.
While dealing with the applicability of Section 80, the question to ask is it a suit against the
Government or not ? If it is, then Section 80 by the very force of its words must apply (Sawai Singhai
Nirmal Chand v. Union of India).38 But the notice must be reasonably construed. Every venial error or
defect cannot be permitted to be treated as a peg to hang a defence to defeat a just claim. In each
case in considering whether the imperative provisions of the statute are complied with, the Court
must face the following questions:
(1) whether the name, description and residence of the Plaintiff are given so as to enable the
authorities to identify the person serving the notice;
(2) whether the cause of action and the relief which the Plaintiff claims are set out with
sufficient particularity;
(3) whether the notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate
authority mentioned in the section; and
(4) whether the suit is instituted after the expiration of two months next after notice has been
served, and the plaint contains a statement that such a notice has been so delivered or left
(State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugola Venkata Suryanayanan Garu; Beohar Rajendra Sinha v.
State of Madhya Pradesh; Hamara Radio and General Industries Ltd. Co., Delhi v. State of
Rajasthan).39
'Cause of action' in the context of Section 80 Civil Procedure Code must be given a "popular"
meaning, namely, that it is that act by doing which or by not doing which the defendant furnishes the
Plaintiff, so to speak, the motive to file a suit (Dominion of India v. L. Badu Lal).40
Section 80 requires to state the cause of action and the plaint is to contain a statement that notice
has been delivered or left. The service of notice may form a part of the cause of action for the
purpose of jurisdiction (Anath Bandhu Deb v. Dominion of India).41 However, if the delivery of the
notice was part of the cause of action then how the whole cause of action could be stated in the
notice because it would have to be stated before the notice was sent (Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of
India; Dominion of India v. Jagadishprosad Pannalal a firm).42
The facts constituting the cause of action must precede the suit. A notice under Section 80 of the
Code has to specify the cause of action. All that is required under Section 80 after its issue and
service is a statement in the plaint that the notice has been delivered. It is a matter of procedure as
to what the plaint shall contain. Under Order 7, Rule 1 (e) the facts constituting the cause of action
and when it arose are to be stated. The statement in the plaint that notice under Section 80 has been
delivered is therefore something apart from the cause of action. To treat such notice, its issue or its
service as a part of the cause of action would be to enlarge the content of Section 80 itself. If the
cause of action is antecedent to the suit and if cause of action is also antecedent to the notice under
Section 80, that neither the issue nor the service of the notice can form part of the cause of action,
either in its restricted or in its extended sense (Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India (UOI)).43
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Section 80 does not require that the name or any other particular of the Defendant should be
furnished. It only requires that the notice must be delivered to the proper authority or person
mentioned in the section (Rambrahma Chabri v. The Dominion of India at present Union of India
(UOI).).44 Apart from this notice must be served to the proper person at his appropriate office. The
suit must be filed only after expiry of two months of service of notice. The provisions of Section 80
are to be strictly complied with but it does not mean that notice should be scrutinized in pedantic
manner or in the manner divorced from common sense (Dhian Singh v. Union of India; State of West
Bengal v. Ajit Kumar Mukherjee)45 or hyper technical (Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India)46 e.g. if a
person serves a notice under Section 80 and within the period of two months he dies, if his son brings
the suit it cannot be said that notice has not been served by Plaintiff if the right to sue passes to such
plaintiff (Ghan Shyam Das v. Union of India).47 But if the suit is filed by two Plaintiffs but the notice
is given by only one, the notice is bad in law (D. D. Tea v. Union of India).48 Subsection (3) added in
the section makes it clear that suit should not be dismissed merely for minor defect in the notice. The
notice given by the karta was sufficient to sustain the suit brought by the divided coparceners
(Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh).49
Section 80, according to its plain meaning requires that there should be identity of the person who
issues the notice with the person who brings the suit. Where an individual carries on business in some
name and style the notice has to be given by the individual in his own name, for the suit can only be
filed in the name of the individual (S.N. Dutt v. Union of India).50 Where the fact that in the plaint the
names of both the plaintiffs are mentioned, and that both of them sued for the claim would not
warrant our holding that Section 80 has been complied with, when the notice was in fact sent only on
behalf of the first Plaintiff. In such circumstances, it was held that the requirements of Section 80,
Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with (Union of India, Railway Administration, Madras
v. Eastern Match Co., Tirumangalam).51
Where there is no substantial variation in the substance of the claim between the notice and the
plaint. All the necessary information is contained in the registered notice and there is every
opportunity for the Government to consider the claim of the plaintiffs, minor variations between the
notice and the plaint it will not entail the dismissal of the suit (Bommadevara Venkat Narsimha Rao
Bahadur Garu v. State of Andhra Pradesh).52
In case it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to give particulars of negligence or misconduct in the
plaint, it would not be necessary to give such particulars in the notice, and a mere allegation of
negligence or misconduct shall be sufficient and the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure
not containing particulars thereof shall be valid. When it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to give
particulars of negligence or misconduct in the notice, the giving of incomplete or insufficient
particulars shall not invalidate the notice (Sahu Vanaspati Traders v. Union of India (UOI) ).53
Notice to the Central Government relating to Railways, if not given through the General Manager of
the concerned Railway is no notice under the section and hence it is to be regarded as there having
been no compliance with the requirements of Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. As such, the suit is
bound, to fail on such account (Union of India v. B.D. Jhunjhunwala).54
4. Waiver of notice.
A notice under Section 80 can be waived (Union of India v. Jyotirmoyee Sharma).55 Notice under
Section 80 can be waived by the party for whose benefit it is intended (Paleti Sivaramkrishnaiah v.
Executive Engineer).56 There is no doubt that even though the provisions of Section 80 are
mandatory, the provisions are made for the benefit of the party, namely, the State or the public
officer, as the case may be, and in a given case it is open to the party for whose benefit the provision
has been made to waive the compliance with the requirements of such a provision. A waiver is an
intentional relinquishment of a known right. it may be express or implicit (Ebrahimbhai v. State of
Maharashtra; State v. Girdhari Lal; P. SivaramKrishnaiah v. Executive Engineer; Shauqat Ali v.
Supdtt. of Police).57 But there are two limitations (i) by waiver a party cannot confer jurisdiction upon
a Court which does not possess it and (ii) a notice cannot be waived in suits involving public interest
(Sholapur Municipality v. U. S. Bhagwat).58
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The plea of want of notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure, must be taken at the earliest
possible opportunity and must be specifically pleaded. Where such a plea is taken by the defendant at
a very late stage of the suit and at a time when the Plaintiff would be precluded by the law of
limitation from bringing a further suit against the defendant, the Defendant must be deemed to have
waived the privilege of notice (Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Radharani Dassya).59 However, it has been
observed by the Privy Council that merely because an objection with regard to noncompliance with
the provisions of Section 80 has been taken late an inference to waiver cannot be drawn (Vallayan
Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras).60
Where the plea of defect in or want of notice was not raised in Trial Court, memorandum of first
appeal and second appeal to High Court, the right based on ground of notice waived off (The District
Board, Banaras v. Churu Rai).61 Likewise, raising the plea in the written statement and not joining an
issue in the trial Court was held to be waiver (Basudeb v. Padmanav; State v. Bamadeb; Dhian Singh
v. Union of India), 62 and the same cannot be raised for the first time in appeal (State v.
Panchratna).63
A plea of want of notice cannot be taken by codefendant who is a private individual (Istiaq v. Zafar
ul; Kanakku K. Pillai v. Neel Kantha).64 It cannot then be availed of by a private party who is made a
Defendant to the suit along with the State (Kanakku Karthiayani Pillai Narayani Pillai v. Respondent:
Neelacanta Pillai Raman Pillai).65 The notice can be waived by the Government and public officers
(Vasant v. Bombay Municipal Corpn.).66 But where no notice is given on account of suit being of
urgent nature, the leave of Court is mandatory (State v. Orissa Oil Industries Ltd.).67 While gathering
implied waiver, the Court should not forget that there is no estoppel over statute (Union of India v.
Shanker Stores).68
Since a notice under Section 80 can be waived in the suit and the absence of a notice under Section
80 can be a plea taken in the written statement. Therefore, the notice under Section 80 cannot be a
part of the cause of action (Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India (UOI)).69 A notice under this section
follows the cause of action and it merely paves the way for the institution of the suit itself (Bata Shoe
Co., Ltd. v. Union of India).70
5. 'Act done in official capacity'.
It is therefore clear that the words "purporting to be done by such public officer" in Section 80, of
Code of Civil Procedure, refer to some act already done by the public officer. The word 'purporting' in
Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, also makes it clear that that section refers to an act done by a
public officer (Bai Jilekhabai Aderman v. Competent officer; Smt. Shima Sundari Lekri v. Paltu
Hemram).71
'Purport', according to the dictionary meaning, is 'be intended to seem. If the act done cannot be one
within one's official capacity, by merely making it to be so done, cannot give a public officer a
protection under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, if a public officer has
jurisdiction to do certain things and in exercise of that jurisdiction, he does a thing wrongly or even
with mala fides, Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, will apply to his case whereas, if he has at all
no jurisdiction to do the thing, there is no room for application of Section 80. Code of Civil Procedure,
even though he pretends to be doing certain act in his capacity as a public officer (Mohanta
Raghabananda Das v. D.V.A. Naidu).72
When an officer does certain act within his jurisdiction but he exceeds his jurisdiction or acts
irregularly or maliciously, a notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure., is necessary. The
object of the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, is to give the public officer an
opportunity to reconsider his legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised,
without litigation (Mohanta Raghabananda Das v. D.V.A. Naidu; Sundari Choudhurani v. Nalini Ranjan
Saha; Dakshina Ranjan v. Omar Chand; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sardarmal).73
The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related to some
manner, with the discharge of official duty. It must not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly
necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial
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proceeds on the merits. What the court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so
interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of
the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation (Matajog
Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, (S) ).74
Word "act" as defined in the General Clauses Act, includes illegal omissions (Amalgamated El. Co. v.
Ajmer Municipality).75 Therefore, a notice under Section 80 is required to be served on a public
officer against whom a suit is to be filed, whether such officer is made party by name or by official
designation if the act for which suit has been filed purports to have been the act done or to be done in
official capacity (Sibanand Roy v. Janaki).76 Nonservice of notice under the section, on the public
officer is fatal (Taru Rani v. Cantt. Board; Amalgamated El. Co. v. Ajmer Municipality).77 It does not
matter whether the act done by such officer was bona fide or mala fide and in both cases notice
under the section is mandatory (B. L. Shukla v. Fatimabai)78 even if it is a suit for malicious
prosecution. Whether the act purports to have been done in discharge of official duty, depends on the
nature of duty on the basis of which the defendant can defend himself (Faizabad Municipality v. E. M.
Hall).79 Where there is no possible nexus between official duty and the act complained of, notice is
not required (B. Bhusan v. S. A. Aziz).80 Where a house is let out for accommodation of Government
office, combined notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act is a valid notice (R.H. Singh v. State; State v. Mohan Devi).81 Coal Mines
Provident Fund Commissioner is a public officer (Coal Mines Provident Fund Commr. v. Ramesh
Chandra)82 but not the officers of State Electricity Board (P. Padmanabhan v. Kerala SEB).83
Once it is held that the petitioner is a "Public Officer", a notice under Section 80, Code of Civil
Procedure was mandatory before the plaintiff could have filed the present suit (Rajkea Middle School,
Daulatpura v. Ram Kumar).84
6. Period of two months.
The bar under Section 80 is against the institution of the suit itself. Section 80 specifies the period
after which a suit to which Section 80 applies can be instituted. The words "until the expiration of two
months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at' are not without significance. The
effect of these words in Section 80, therefore, clearly is that unless the period of two months next
after the delivery of the notice either to the Government or to the public officer concerned expires,
the section prohibits the institution of the suit. Therefore, filing of a suit before the expiration of two
months next after the notice has been delivered is prohibited by the mandatory provisions of Section
80 of the Code. There does not seem to be any power or jurisdiction in the Court to entertain such a
suit (Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra).85 Thus, it is wellsettled that a suit against the
Government instituted during the currency of notice under Section 80 is not maintainable and must be
dismissed in limine (Bihar v. Kamakshya Narain Singh; Secy. of State v. Sagarmal Marwari; Lakshmi
Narain v. Union of India).86
Where a suit could not be maintained due to a defective notice under Section 80, Code of Civil
Procedure the only order that could be passed is an order dismissing the suit and not rejecting the
plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) (Dahyabhai Patel and Co v. Union of India).87
The words "until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left
at' are not without significance. The effect of these words in Section 80, therefore, clearly is that
unless the period of two months next after the delivery of the notice either to the Government or to
the public officer concerned expires, the section prohibits the institution of the suit. Therefore, filing
of a suit before the expiration of two months next after the notice has been delivered is prohibited by
the mandatory provisions of Section 80 of the Code (Ebrahimbhai v. State of Maharashtra).88
While computing the 'expiration of two months' both the terminal dates are to be excluded (Jai Charan
v. State of U.P.).89 The words 'two months' do not mean 60 days, it may be 61 days or even 59 days
depending upon in which month of Gregorian Calendar year the notice was served (Laxmi Narayan v.
State of Bihar)90 e.g. if the notice is served on 31st March, 1995 and suit is filed on 31st May, 1995,
the notice is bad. Similarly, after serving notice on 11th May, 1995 if the suit is filed on 11th July,
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1995 the notice cannot be said to be a valid notice (Union of India v. Devanagra C. Mills; Lakshmi
Narain v. Union of India)91 and the plaints in such cases are liable to be rejected (Bihari Chowdhary
v. State of Bihar).92 Where in a suit the Government as well as private individuals are parties, period
of two months' time for notice under Section 80, would be excluded in computing the period of
limitation against the private individual also (T. P. K. Nair v. Union of India).93
7. Service of notice.
Personal service is not a condition precedent for the purposes of compliance of provisions of Section
80 (1) (Union of India v. Tamil Nadu Small Scale Industries).94 The notice under the section can be
delivered at the office of the defendant Government. Also, in view of the provisions of Section 27 of
the General Clauses Act, the notice can be served by getting it delivered through registered post.
When the service is being made through the Collector, it should be done to the Collector of the district
where cause of action has arisen (State of U. P. v. Raja Ram Lal).95
The plaint when presented in Court against the Government must contain a statement about the
notice as required being delivered to such Government or left at the appropriate office (B. R. Sinha v.
State of M. P.).96 Once the service of notice is admitted to the Defendant, the burden lies on him to
prove that the notice was not valid (Mast Ram v. D. C. Bahraich).97
8. Leave of CourtSubsection (2).
Subsection (2) provides that a suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government
or any public officer may be instituted with the leave of the Court without serving any notice as
required by Subsection (1) but the Court shall not grant relief in the suit whether interim or
otherwise except after giving to the Government or the public officer, as the case may be, a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit. It is, however,
provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied after hearing the parties that no urgent or immediate
relief need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the
requirement of Subsection (1) (K.K. Sharma v. Punjab State).98
Where the notice under Section 80 is not served on the Government or public officer and matter is
urgent and immediate relief is called for, leave of the Court is necessary as the provisions of sub
section (2) of Section 80 are mandatory (State v. Sajal).99 No temporary injunction can be granted
without compliance of aforesaid subsection (2) (Islamia Girls High School v. State of U. P.).100 While
granting the leave the Court must pass specific order after considering facts and circumstances of the
case about the urgency of relief sought to be obtained (K. K. Sharma v. State of Punjab)101 and in
case the Court feels that case is not one of urgency, the plaint must be returned. A Plaintiff is not
exempted from taking leave in suits in which application for temporary injunction or appointment of
official receiver is made and he must make a request for leave under subsection (2) (State v. Orissa
Oil Industries).102
9. Amendment of plaintConsequence on compliance of Section 80.
Where the plaint is amended by the plaintiff on account of new facts coming to his knowledge, fresh
notice to defendant under Section 80 is not required (Lady Dinbhai Dinshaw v. Dominion of India)103
or where a plaint is amended owing to facts which have arisen subsequent to the institution of the
suit a fresh notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be served by the plaintiff
(Lalchand Chowdhury v. Union of India).104 If the plaint which is being considered by the Court has
been preceded by a notice which satisfied the requirements of section 80, Civil Procedure Code, then
the fact that before the plaint then under consideration, there had been another plaint which had been
filed and withdrawn cannot, on any principle, be held to have exhausted or extinguished the vitality of
the notice issued (Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India).105
The suit may be proceeded with if notice has been given, but the fact of delivery of notice has not
been pleaded, if, subsequently, the plaint is amended by pleading that fact. That was a case where an
amendment was allowed to state in the plaint that notice had been delivered (Bholaram Chowdhury v.
Administrator General).106
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Similarly, no fresh notice is needed, where some more grounds are added for supporting the original
cause of action (Lal Chand Chowdhury v. Union of India).107 Also where some pleas are deleted by
way of amendment it is not necessary to serve a fresh notice on the Government or public officer
(State of Rajasthan v. Associated Stone & Co.).108 However, when a State Government or public
officer is impleaded as party during the pendency of suit the plaintiff must serve on him two months'
notice under Section 80 of the Code (Bengal Enamel Works v. Apeejay Pvt. Ltd.),109 otherwise the
suit becomes not maintainable (Smt. Sooraj v. S.D.O., Delhi).110
10. Notice in arbitration proceedings and railway claims if necessary.
Arbitration proceedings under Section 8 (Union of India v. Gorakhnath)111 and under Section 20 (2) of
the Arbitration Act (S. P. C. Eng Co. v. Union of India)112 are not suits for the purposes of Section 80
of the Code of Civil Procedure as such it is not necessary to serve the notice of two months on the
Government in these proceedings.
In railway claim matters, the disputes which are covered under the Railway Claims Tribunals Act,
1987, there is no necessity of serving notice under Section 80 of the Code as the application before
the tribunal constituted under said Act is not a suit. However, in other suits before Court's notice
under Section 77 of the Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
mandatory and must be given to Union of India through the General Manager of the concerned
railway (State v. Southern Railways).113
11. Union Territory GovernmentRequirement of notice.
Section 55 of the Union Territory Act, 1963 makes it clear that all suits and proceedings in connection
with administration of Union territory are to be instituted against the Government of India. The
expression "Government of India" cannot refer anything else the Central Government as such a notice
under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be given through its Chief Secretary to the
Government of the union territory against whom the suit is filed by impleading Union of India as the
defendant (Contra : Kanhaiya Lal v. Government of India).114
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
By Anupam Srivastava
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