G.R. No.
176150 June 25, 2008 Meanwhile, by letter of July 17, 2000, the SSS Legal Department
IBARRA P. ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, and SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ibarra P. Ortega assails the Court of Appeals’ August
7, 2006 Decision1 dismissing his petition for review and
upholding the denial by respondent Social Security Commission
(SSC) of his application for total permanent disability benefits,
and the Resolution2 of January 16, 2007 denying his motions for
reconsideration and inhibition.
Petitioner, a member of respondent Social Security System
(SSS), filed claims for partial permanent disability benefits on
account of his condition of Generalized Arthritis and Partial
Ankylosis,3 which claims the SSS granted for a total monthly
pension of 23 months.4
After the expiration of his disability pension, petitioner filed
with the SSS Malabon Branch Office on April 26, 2000 a claim
for total permanent disability benefits.5 His application,
docketed as BO-0000-1755, was denied, however, on the
ground that he was already granted disability benefits for the
same illness and physical examination showed no progression
of illness.6 Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, SSS Malabon Branch senior
physician, observed that petitioner merely had a "slight
limitation of grasping movement for both hands." 7
Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the SSC an unverified Petition
of June 19, 2000,8 alleging that the SSS denied his application
despite the fact that his attending physician, Dr. Rafael Recto,
Jr., diagnosed him to be suffering from Trigger finger 4th (L) and
thumb (L)9 while another private medical practitioner, Dr. Flo
dela Cruz, diagnosed him to be also suffering from Bronchial
Asthma, Hypertension and Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease.10
Further claiming to be afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis of
both hands affecting all fingers and both palms,11petitioner
contended that the medical opinion of the SSS physician who
interviewed him for less than three minutes cannot prevail over
the findings of his physicians who have been treating him over
a long period of time.
Before taking cognizance of his appeal, the SSC directed the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, by letter of June 30,
2000. The matter was thus referred to the SSS Office of the
Medical Program Director for review of petitioner’s disability
claim.12
denied a reconsideration of the denial of his claim,13 prompting
petitioner to submit a letter-opposition of August 15, 2000.14
Upon referral of the SSC, the SSS Medical Program Department,
through Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan and Dr. Jesus S. Tan,
confirmed that, upon examination of petitioner, there was no
progression of his illness,15 prompting petitioner to submit a
letter-opposition of November 11, 2000 charging the SSS
medical officers of issuing fraudulent medical
findings.16 Unperturbed, the SSS Medical Program Department
stood its ground and denied with finality petitioner’s claim, by
letter of November 22, 2000.17
On January 29, 2001, SSC finally docketed petitioner’s June 19,
2000 petition as SSC Case No. 1-15115-2001,18after petitioner
complied with SSC’s directives19 to verify the petition and
submit certain document-annexes. SSS then filed its Answer of
May 31, 2001,20 to which petitioner submitted a Reply of June
25, 2001.21 After the August 10, 2001 pre-hearing
conference,22 the SSS filed its Position Paper of September 7,
2001 while petitioner submitted his Reply of October 19, 2001.
By Resolution of April 3, 2002,23 the SSC denied petitioner’s
claim for entitlement to total permanent disability for lack of
merit. And it opined that, considering that he had reached the
retirement age of 60, on March 19, 1998, with 41 contributions
to his name, petitioner may opt:
(a) [t]o continue paying to the SSS monthly
contributions (including employer’s share) on his own
to complete the required 120 monthly contributions
in order to avail of the retirement pension benefit;
(b) [to] leave his monthly contributions with the SSS
for his and his family’s future benefits; or
(c) [to a]vail of the lump sum retirement benefit.24
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. The
SSC thus directed the SSS to file its comment25 and, by a
subsequent order, to conduct a domiciliary visit and physical
examination on petitioner to ascertain whether he could
already qualify for such benefit.26 In compliance therewith, Dr.
Rebecca Sison, SSS senior physician, examined petitioner on
August 29, 2002 and found no sufficient basis to warrant the
granting of total permanent disability benefits to him.27
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Order28 of January 29, 2003, petitioner appealed via Rule 43 to
the Court of Appeals29 which promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No.
75653 the assailed issuances affirming in toto the SSC
Resolution and Order.
There is at the outset a need to thresh out procedural issues
attending the petition drafted by petitioner himself, apparently
without the aid of counsel. While the petition was admittedly
filed as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it contains a rider
averring that it was filed also as a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.30
In not granting imprimatur to this type of unorthodox strategy,
the Court ruled, in a similar case,31 that a party should not join
both petitions in one pleading. A petition cannot be subsumed
simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
nor may it delegate upon the court the task of determining
under which rule the petition should fall.32 It is a firm judicial
policy that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.33
Palpably, petitioner crafted this unconventional two-headed
petition under no other pretext but to second-guess at the
appropriate remedy. His apparent bewilderment led him to
later rectify a supposed typographical error in the caption such
that instead of "petition for review," the title be read as a
"petition for certiorari."34 The subsequent filing of the
Correction of Clerical Errors served no redeeming purpose as it
only evinced petitioner’s decision to consider the petition as a
special civil action for certiorari, which is an improper remedy.
It bears stressing that Rule 45 and Rule 65 pertain to different
remedies and have distinct applications.35 It is axiomatic that
the remedy of certiorari is not available where the petitioner
has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law.36 The petition for review
under Rule 45 covers the mode of appeal from a judgment, final
order, resolution or one which completely disposes of the case,
like the herein assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate
court. There being already a final judgment at the time of the
filing of the petition, a petition for review under Rule 45 is the
appropriate remedy.
Petitioner failed to carve out an exception to this rule, as he did
not– and could not– illustrate the inadequacy of an appeal as a
remedy that could promptly relieve him from the injurious
effects of the assailed judgment.37 In fact, by seeking the same
kind of reliefs via two remedies rolled into one pleading, he
implicitly admits that an appeal suffices. Moreover, the
probability of divergent rulings, a scenario transpiring in G & S
Transport Corp. v. CA,38 is far from obtaining in this case since
the assailed issuances emanated from only one court and
cannot be elevated separately in different fora.
While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an
improper remedy,39 it may, in certain instances where a
petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65 and in
the interest of justice, proceed to review the substance of the
petition and treat it as having been filed under Rule 45.40 Either
way, however, the present petition just the same merits
dismissal since it puts to issue questions of fact rather than
questions of law which are appropriate for review under a Rule
45 petition.
It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great
weight to the factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose
function is to resolve factual matters.41 It is not for the Court to
weigh evidence all over again.42Moreover, findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but
finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.43
The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence. In this type
of cases, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.44 In this case, substantial evidence abounds.
The conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to total
permanent disability benefits under the Social Security Law was
reached after petitioner was examined not just by one but four
SSS physicians, namely, Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, Dr. Carlota A.
Cruz-Tutaan, Dr. Jesus S. Tan and Dr. Rebecca Sison.
The initial physical examination and interview revealed that
petitioner had slight limitation of grasping movement for both
hands. According to Dr. Descalzo, this finding was not enough
to grant an extension of benefit since petitioner had already
received benefits equivalent to 30% of the body. Responding to
the allegation that the April 2000 physical examination was
performed in a short period of time, the doctor credibly
explained that petitioner’s movements were already being
monitored and evaluated from a distance as part of the
examination of his extremities in order to minimize malingering
and overacting.45
Meanwhile, the medical findings of Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan
and Dr. Jesus S. Tan in August and September 2000 were
summarized as follows:
Heart:
- manifest regular rhythm
- no murmurs
Lungs:
- on ausculation showed no evidence of
wheezing
- breath sounds are normal and;
- he is not in a state of respiratory distress
Hypertension:
- Blood Pressure is 140/80, hence, under
control
 Extremities: (Hands)
- No deformities noted except for the right
small finger, the distal interphalangeal joint is
bent at about 30°. No abnormal limitation of
movement noted on all the fingers, grasping
has improved.46
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the SSC did not ignore
the certifications of petitioner’s attending physicians as, in fact,
it ordered the SSS in June 2001 to conduct an investigation as
to the medical findings and final diagnosis by his attending
physicians.47 It was surfaced that petitioner’s medical records
in the custody of Dr. Flo dela Cruz could not be found as they
were allegedly destroyed by inundation.48 And it was found that
the July 10, 2001 letter-certification by Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr. only
narrated the recurring condition of petitioner’s trigger finger,
the administration to him of local steroid injections, and the
performance of surgical release on his left 4th trigger finger on
June 16, 1998; and that he was diagnosed on August 28, 2000
with mallet finger (R, 5th), for which he was advised to undergo
reconstructive surgery.49
Adopting a liberal attitude and exercising sound discretion, the
SSC even directed the conduct of another physical examination
on petitioner to judiciously resolve his motion for
reconsideration. Pursuant thereto, Dr. Sison physically
examined petitioner in August 2002, the results of which were
reflected in a medical report, viz:
Physical Examination:
General Survey: well nourished, well
developed, conscious, coherent but talks
with sarcasm and arrogance.
EENT: normocephalic, pinkish conjunctiva, anicteric
sclerae; negative tonsillo-pharyngeal congestion
C/L: clear breath sounds, no wheezes; (-) dyspnea
Heart: normal rate, regular rhythm.
Abdomen: negative tenderness
Extremeties: no neurological and sensory deficit
no gross deformity, (+) scar, 4th finger (L)
no loss of grasping power for large and small
objects
no loss of opposition between thumb and
forefingers
can bend fully to reach toes
can bend both knees fully without pain or
difficulty
can raise both arms above shoulder level
without pain and difficulty
can bend both elbows without limitation
The member was requested to submit recent ECG, x-
rays and other laboratory work-up results but he could
not locate them during visit and would still look for the
said medical documents and mail them to SSS.
He was then advised to come to SSS, Diliman Branch
for ECG and x-ray, however he refused.
He also refused to affix his signature on the medical
field service form to confirm the visit of our Medical
Officer.
Based on these recent physical examination findings
and functional assessment and the medical certificate
(Form MMD 102) with final diagnosis of Trigger
Finger, there is no sufficient basis that warrants the
granting of Total Permanent
disability.50 (Underscoring supplied)
Dr. Sison subsequently noted that petitioner’s
Electrocardiograph, Chest X-ray, Kidney and Urinary Bladder
Ultrasound indicated his condition as normal,51 which
conclusion was arrived at by going through the same medical
documents presented by petitioner following a series of tests
conducted on him by hospitals of his choice.
From the foregoing recital of petitioner’s medical history, the
SSC concluded that petitioner is not entitled to total permanent
disability benefits under the Social Security Law, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
xxxx
(d) The following disabilities shall be deemed
permanent total:
1. Complete loss of sight of both eyes;
2. Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or
wrists;
3. Permanent complete paralysis of two
limbs;
4. Brain injury resulting to incurable
imbecility or insanity; and
5. Such cases as determined and approved by
the SSS.
xxxx
(f) If the disability is permanent partial and such
disability occurs after thirty-six (36) monthly
contributions have been paid prior to the semester of
disability, the benefit shall be the monthly pension for
 permanent total disability payable not longer than the disabilities or when there is loss of income due to work-
period designated in the following schedule: connected or work-aggravated injury or illness.55 On the other
hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law are intended
COMPLETE AND NUMBER OF to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks
PERMANENT LOSS OF USE MONTHS of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter alia, irrespective
OF of whether they arose from or in the course of the
employment.56 And unlike under the Social Security Law, a
One thumb 10 disability is total and permanent under the Labor Code if as a
One index finger 8 result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to
perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
One middle finger 6
exceeding 120 days regardless of whether he loses the use of
One ring finger 5 any of his body parts.57
One little finger 3
One big toe 6 The Court notes that the main issue petitioner proffers is
whether he is entitled to total permanent disability benefits
One hand 39 from the SSS given his "angioplasty operation of the heart,
One arm 50 coronary artery disease, ischemic heart disease, severe
hypertension and a host of other serious illnesses filed with the
One foot 31
SSS[.]"58
One leg 46
One ear 10 A perusal of the records shows that when the case was already
submitted for decision before the appellate court, petitioner
Both ears 20
manifested that he suffered a heart attack on February 25,
Hearing of one ear 10 2004,59 for which he claimed to have undergone a coronary
Hearing of both ears 50 angiogram on March 9, 2005 and a coronary angioplasty on
September 27, 2005 at the Philippine Heart Center.60
Sight of one eye 25
Unfortunate as these events were, the appellate court correctly
(g) The percentage degree of disability which is ruled that it could not consider such allegation of subsequent
equivalent to the ratio that the designated number of events since "a factual question may not be raised for the first
months of compensability bears to seventy-five (75), time on appeal[,] and documents forming no part of the proofs
rounded to the next higher integer, shall not be before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing
additive for distinct, separate and unrelated of the issues of an action."61
permanent partial disabilities, but shall be additive for
deteriorating and related permanent partial The issues in every case are limited to those presented in the
disabilities to a maximum of one hundred percent pleadings. The object of the pleadings is to draw the lines of
(100%), in which case, the member shall be deemed battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of
as permanently totally disabled.52 the claims or defenses of

Indeed, the evidence indicates that petitioner’s condition at the
time material to the case does not fall under the enumeration
in the above-quoted provisions of the Social Security Law.
Moreover, as correctly held by the appellate court, the proviso
of such provisions on the percentage degree of disability
applies when there is a related deterioration of the illness
previously considered as partial permanent disability. In this
case, there is dearth of evidence on the proposition that
petitioner’s array of illnesses is related to Generalized Arthritis
and Partial Ankylosis of the specific body parts.
Petitioner’s reliance on jurisprudence53 on work-connected
disability claims insofar as it relates to a demonstration of
disability to perform his trade and profession54 is misplaced.
both parties.62 A change of theory on appeal is not allowed.63 In
this case, the matter of petitioner’s serious heart condition was
not raised in his application before the SSS or in his June 19,
2000 petition before the SSC.
Fair play dictates that the SSS be afforded the opportunity to
properly meet the issue64 with respect to the new ailments
besetting petitioner, in line with the actual practice that only
qualified government physicians, by virtue of their oath as civil
service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue
medical certificates which will be used by the government for a
specific official purpose.65 This holds greater significance where
there exist differences or doubts as to the medical condition of
the person.

Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the In this case, the SSS medical examiners are tasked by law to
Social Security Law for benefits are not the same as to their analyze the extent of personal incapacity resulting from disease
nature and purpose. On the one hand, the pertinent provisions or injury. Oftentimes, a physician who is adequately versed in
of the Labor Code govern compensability of work-related
the knowledge of anatomy and physiology will find himself
deficient when called upon to express an opinion on the
permanent changes resulting from a disability. Unlike the
general practitioner who merely concerns himself with the
examination of his patient for purposes of diagnosis and
treatment, the medical examiner has to consider varied factors
and ascertain the claimant’s related history and subjective
complaints.66 The members of this Court cannot strip their
judicial robe and don the physician’s gown, so to speak, in a
pretense to correlate variances in medical findings.
Finding no cogent reason to discuss the ancillary issues, the
Court dismisses the petition, without prejudice to the filing of a
new application by petitioner who is not left without any
recourse in his legal bout respecting his supervening claims
anchored mainly on Coronary Artery Disease 1VD and Diabetes
Mellitus Type 2, these illnesses having been found to be
dissimilar from the subject matter of the present action.67
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
disquisitions, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents;
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant.
J. Ma. Francisco and N. G. Bravo for respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor Camilo
D. Quiason and E. T. Duran for petitioner-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the resolution of the Social Security
Commission declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the
person entitled to receive the death benefits payable for the
death of Petronilo Davac.
The facts of the case as found by the Social Security
Commission, briefly are: The late Petronilo Davac, a former
employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of
the Social Security System (SSS for short) on September 1, 1957.
As such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-007137. In SSS
form E-1 (Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed
with the SSS on November 21, 1957, he designated respondent
Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his
relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959
and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac
and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with
the SSS. It appears from their respective claims and the
documents submitted in support thereof, that the deceased
contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes
Tuplano on August 29, 1946, who bore him a child, Romeo
Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18,
1949, with whom he had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac.
Due to their conflicting claims, the processing thereof was held
in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition praying that
respondents be required to interpose and litigate between
themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in
question.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued
the resolution referred to above, Not satisfied with the said
resolution, respondent Lourdes Tuplano brought to us the
present appeal.
The only question to be determined herein is whether or not
the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring
respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive
the death benefits in question.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1792, in force at the time Petronilo Davac's death on April
5, 1959, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or
total and permanent disability under such conditions
as the Commission may define, before becoming
eligible for retirement and if either such death or
disability is not compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, he or, in case of his death, his
beneficiaries, as recorded by his employer shall be
entitled to the following benefit: ... . (emphasis
supplied.)
Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the
employee's employer is the one entitled to the death benefits.
In the case of Tecson vs. Social Security System, (L-15798,
December 28, 1961), this Court, construing said Section 13,
said:
It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under
the Social Security System is protection of the
employee as well as of his family, but this purpose or
intention of the law cannot be enforced to the extent
of contradicting the very provisions of said law as
contained in Section 13, thereof, ... . When the
provision of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can
do nothing but apply its clear and explicit provisions
(Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil, 270; Caminetti vs. U.S., 242
U.S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442).
But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the
person of the second and, therefore, bigamous wife is null and
void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code,
and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal
property as well as of her own and her child's legitime in the
inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under
the Social Security System partakes of the nature of a
beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same
qualifications and disqualifications should be applied.
Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from
receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the
person who cannot make any donation to him
according to said article.
And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes:
ART. 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
xxx xxx xxx
Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the
benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security
System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to
the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a life
insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant
case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739
is not applicable to herein appellee Candelaria Davac because
she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that
she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband
Petronilo.1
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits
accruing from membership in the Social Security System do not
form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
covered member. They are disbursed from a public special fund
created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the
Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which ... shall provide protection against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."2
The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's
contribution (equal to 2-½ per cent of the employee's monthly
compensation);3 the employer's contribution (equivalent to 3-
½ per cent of the monthly compensation of the covered
employee);4 and the Government contribution which consists
in yearly appropriation of public funds to assure the
maintenance of an adequate working balance of the funds of
the System.5 Additionally, Section 21 of the Social Security Act,
as amended by Republic Act 1792, provides:
SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. — The benefits
prescribed in this Act shall not be diminished and to
guarantee said benefits the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines accepts general
responsibility for the solvency of the System.
From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit
receivable under the Act is in the nature of a special privilege or
an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of
the State to provide social security to the workingmen. The
amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as
property earned by the member during his lifetime. His
contribution to the fund, it may be noted, constitutes only an
insignificant portion thereof. Then, the benefits are specifically
declared not transferable,6 and exempted from tax legal
processes, and lien.7Furthermore, in the settlement of claims
thereunder the procedure to be observed is governed not by
the general provisions of law, but by rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is payable
to the estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not
the probate or regular court that determines the person or
persons to whom it is payable.8 that the benefits under the
Social Security Act are not intended by the lawmaking body to
form part of the estate of the covered members may be
gathered from the subsequent amendment made to Section 15
thereof, as follows:
SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. — The system
shall pay the benefits provided for in this Act to such
persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. Such benefits are not
transferable, and no power of attorney or other
document executed by those entitled thereto in favor
of any agent, attorney, or any other individual for the
collection thereof in their behalf shall be recognized
except when they are physically and legally unable to
collect personally such benefits: Provided, however,
That in the case of death benefits, if no beneficiary has
been designated or the designation there of is void,
said benefits shall be paid to the legal heirs in
accordance with the laws of succession. (Rep. Act
2658, amending Rep. Act 1161.)
In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is
not invalid (as it is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the
employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they
are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when
there is no designated beneficiaries or when the designation is
void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have
already held that the Social Security Act is not a law of
succession.9
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
resolution of the Social Security Commission appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H.
AGUAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531
and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and
a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving
spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death
benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim
that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who
was born on October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for monthly pension
was settled on February 13, 1997.3
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter4 dated
April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister,
contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that
Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more
than six years before, and lived with another man on whom she
has been dependent for support. She further averred that
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter
had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support
of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the
original birth certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing
that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y.
Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two were
married on November 1, 1990.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and
Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997. It also conducted
an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. In a
Memorandum6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security
Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based
on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin and
neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a neighbor). She learned
that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna;
Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo
C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his
death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with
Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also
confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he
was under treatment.
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a
certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS
denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their
pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days
the amount of ₱10,350.00 representing the total death
benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to
August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month.8
Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a
reconsideration of the said decision.9 However, in its Letter
dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.10
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for
the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security
Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas, who
also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now
joined them as claimant. The case was docketed as SSC Case
No. 3-14769-98.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others,
photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage
certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s
certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn
testimonies and documentary evidence showing the
disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the
claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was
justified in denying their claims.12
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a
legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate
bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted that
Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as
husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they
attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors,
Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that
Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the
latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered
in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father
was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged
infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac
denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an
expert on such matters, and that he treated the deceased only
for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the
information the SSS gathered from the doctor was privileged
communication.14
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured
Confirmation Reports15 signed by clerks from the
corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage
between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact
of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact
of Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s
death on December 8, 1996.
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the
SSS to verify the authenticity of Pablo’s signature as appearing
on Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his claim records, particularly
his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application.16 The SSS
complied with said directive and manifested to the SSC that,
based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature
in the birth certificate was made by the same person who
signed the member’s record and other similar documents
submitted by Pablo.17
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and
Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard
to their respective sworn affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that she
had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years already;
the couple were married and lived in Macabacle, Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the
spouses, but four years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and
her family moved to Sto. Niño Triangulo, San Fernando,
Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially during
Christmas or fiestas; the spouses’ real child was Jeylnn; Janet
was only an adopted child; the spouse later transferred
residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together
with her husband and son, remained in the old house.19
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a
neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the
present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren,
were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of
Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose child Jefren is.20
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and
Rosanna; she was just taken in by the spouses because for a
long time they could not have children;21 however, there were
no legal papers on Janet’s adoption.22Later on, Rosanna got
pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s baptism, there was a
commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was
claiming that he was the father of the child and he got mad
because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got
mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them
away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated;23 she knew about this because at that time their
mother was sick, and she would often visit her at their ancestral
home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna
was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided
therein; she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but
she knew that the latter and Romeo dela Peña were still living
together.24
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also
summoned for clarificatory questions.25 During the hearing,
Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal
certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas,26 child of Pablo Aguas and
Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and that of
Jenelyn H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna
Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.
On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the
claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately
refund to the SSS the amount of ₱10,350.00 erroneously paid
to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The
SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to
qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their
absence, to his legal heirs.28
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary
beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted marriage with
Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to
Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of
Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother, Rosanna, and father,
Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC
declared that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Peña while
she was still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal
certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she was the
child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and that she
was born on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that
Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to
his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC
ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as
her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was
not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that
Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and
concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she
was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave
credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn
was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As for Janet,
the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only
adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision but their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of
merit and for having been filed out of time.30 The claimants
then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered
DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby
REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of computing
the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after
the same was cut and suspended in September 1997.
SO ORDERED.31
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and
Jeylnn showing that they were the children of the deceased.
According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these
records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These
entries made in public documents may only be challenged
through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not
be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As
for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she ceased
to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s
alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven.
In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during
her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void
marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent
for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as
the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her
husband.32
The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision,
which the CA denied for lack of merit.33 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate
court, contending that it
I the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. 39 It is
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS
IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE
MEMBER DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS
PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF
SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF THE SSS
LAW, AS AMENDED.
II
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN
AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT
ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.34
Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a
dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna
forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she engaged
in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and
married the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act
constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to
receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of
adultery is evident from the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela
Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to
Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. Petitioner submits that
Rosanna cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo;
consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary.35
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not
entitled to the pension because, based on the evidence on
record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are
not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the
Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of
respondents’ relationship with the member to determine
whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without
correcting their birth certificates.36
Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to
prove that Rosanna committed acts of adultery or that she
married another man after the death of her husband. They
contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned
only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code,
none of which were proven in this case.37
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn
and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from
the death of Pablo.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by
the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari,
not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine, and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.40 However, the Court may review findings of facts in
some instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or
when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.41 The Court finds these instances present in this case.
At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735.
Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to
death benefits:
Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the
covered employee’s death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents to
the dependent’s pension: Provided, That he has paid at least
thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of death:
Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not
satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent
to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however,
That the death benefit shall not be less than the total
contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor
less than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the covered
employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled
to the minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary
beneficiaries of an SSS member as follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the
following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or
mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent
upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate
descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the
secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing,
any other person designated by the covered employee as
secondary beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact
in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that
level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.42
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that
only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly
pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth
certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was
able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December
4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on
December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born
during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code,
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent
Juan Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption –
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170,44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.46
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.47 In this
case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy
of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a
legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed
by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was
verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of
paternity.48
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can
not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage.49 It should be noted that respondents likewise
submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate.
However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same
probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any
way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without
probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by
the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated
in the certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein.50 Here, the witnesses were
unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that
Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence,
there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the
family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her
a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to
qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was
"the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2)
that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this
case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the
legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by
petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently
established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of
his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife
are obliged to support each other,51 but whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other is something that has to
be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage
alone.
In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS
law, the Court defined a dependent as "one who derives his or
her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject
to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain
oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid
of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise successively to two children in so short a time. x x x The
defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven
dependent for away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the
commotion that was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted
support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Jeylnn to be baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was
Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family again baptized in the Parish of Sto. Niño in San Fernando using
for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They changed her date of birth
other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, also to make it appear in the record of the parish that she is
financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the another child of Rosanna.53
Court denied her claim for death benefits.
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s house even before he
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any present. Mariquita testified as follows:
showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the
husband and wife were still living together at the time of his Hearing Officer:
death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?
the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable Mrs. Dizon:
of providing for herself. Ngayon at kahit na noon.
Hearing Officer:
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory Kailan namatay si Pablo?
requirements have been complied with, particularly her Mrs. Dizon:
dependency on her husband for support at the time of his 1996.
death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence Hearing Officer:
adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Mrs. Dizon:
Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made such Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.
declaration. Hearing Officer:
So, buhay pa si Pablo ……
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their Mrs. Dizon:
testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the categorical …. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who Hearing Officer:
testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare Mrs. Dizon:
assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
was no further statement regarding the witnesses’ assertion in Hearing Officer:
their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablo’s Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?
death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated Mrs. Dizon:
after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an argument regarding Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh,
Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a commotion dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko,
at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Peña was kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung
grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he was the nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.
father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The SSC’s Hearing Officer:
observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe Mrs. Dizon:
Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As Oo.
noted by the SSC: Hearing Officer:
Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo
at Rosanna?
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H.
Mrs. Dizon:
dela Peña are one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.
October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral
Hearing Officer:
of San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child
Saan naman?
of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Peña,
Mrs. Dizon:
on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses
Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and baptized on
February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Peña was
born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only
Aguas. It is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate
child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was
merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers
to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is
likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed
to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she
was still dependent on him for support even if they were
already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is
declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo Aguas.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-20445 February 25, 1967
ANICIA V. MERCED, CANDELARIO V. MERCED, CONCEPCION V.
MERCED,
ATILANO V. MERCED, JR., and JOSEFINA V. MERCED, petitioners,
vs.
COLOMBINA VDA. DE MERCED, BRICCIO MERCED, JR., and the SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
J. S. Ancheta, Jr. for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
EN BANC
Appeal from a resolution of the Social Security Commission —
hereinafter referred to as the Commission — dismissing the petition
of Anicia Candelario, Concepcion, Atlanto and Josefina, all surnamed,
Merced, to be declared the beneficiaries of their deceased brother
Briccio V. Merced — hereinafter referred to as Briccio — and, as such,
entitled to the corresponding death benefits under Republic Act No.
5181, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1954.
As an employee of the Community Export and Import Corporation, in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental Briccio became, sometime in 1957, a
member of the Social Security System — hereinafter referred to as the
System. As such, he had designated as his beneficiaries his
aforementioned brothers and sisters, the petitioners herein.
Subsequently, or on May 29, 1960, Briccio contracted marriage with
Columbina Merced, who bore him a child, Briccio Jr., hereinafter
referred to as Columbia and Junior, respectively, Briccio died on
February 22, 1961.
Soon later, or on April 5, 1961, petitioners filed with the Commission
their claim for the benefits accruing under Briccio's social security
insurance. However, on April 27, 1961, petitioners were advised by the
System that their designation as beneficiaries of Briccio was null and
void, pursuant to Resolution No. 1620, series of 1960, of the
Commission, and that a claim for the aforementioned benefits had
been filed by Colombina. Still later, or in September, 1961, petitioners
were informed that the Administrator of the System had declared
Colombina and Junior as the legal heirs of Briccio and approved
payment to them of said benefits, amounting to P3,388.34. This
prompted the petitioners to file with the Commission their present
petition, which, after appropriate proceedings, was, by resolution
dated July 20, 1962, dismissed. The Commission, likewise, affirmed the
action taken by the Administrator and ordered that the corresponding
death benefits be paid to Colombina and Junior. Hence, this appeal by
petitioners herein.
They maintain that the designation made in their favor, as
beneficiaries of Briccio remained valid and effective, despite his
subsequent marriage and the birth of Junior, in view of his (Briccio's)
failure to change said designation, and that the choice of beneficiaries
expressly made by Briccio should be respected.
The validity and force of the last part of petitioners' theory is, however,
impaired by the fact that said choice had been made when Briccio was
still single, and that, accordingly, his failure to change the designation
of his beneficiaries may have been, and was probably, due to an
oversight on his part, especially considering that he died less than a
year after his wedding.
At any rate, the benefits accruing under Republic Act No. 1161 could
not have vested until the death of the decedent, on February 22, 1961,
not only because, prior thereto, the rights of the designated
beneficiaries were purely inchoate, but, also, because Section 30 of
said Act — which became Section 31 thereof, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1792, which was in force when Briccio became a member of
the System — expressly reserved to Congress the right to amend, alter
or repeal any provision thereof, and explicitly declares that "no person
shall be or shall be deemed to be vested with any property or other
right by virtue of the enactment or operation of this Act."
In pursuance of said reserved power, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 2658 (approved on June 18, 1960), which was in force at the time
of Briccio's death, amending Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161 (as
amended by Republic Act No. 1792) pursuant to subdivision (k) of
which the beneficiaries shall be "those designated as such by the
covered employee from among the following:
(1) The legitimate spouse, the legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction and the legitimate descendants; .
(2) In default of such spouse and children, the legitimate
parents of the covered employee;
(3) In the absence of any. of the foregoing, any other person
designated by him.1äwphï1.ñët
In other words, the right of choice of the insured is subject to the
foregoing limitations, pursuant to which brothers and sisters may not
be designated as beneficiaries except in default, not only of surviving
spouse and children, but, also, of "legitimate parents of the covered
employee."
It is, accordingly, clear that the Commission was fully justified in
holding that the designation in favor of the brothers and sisters of the
decedent as his beneficiaries was null and void and that Colombina and
Junior are, under the law, the persons entitled to the corresponding
benefits.
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against herein petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.