Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita

472 SCRA 587 – Political Law – Commission on Appointment – Ad Interim
Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Law on Public Officers – Modes and Kinds of Appointment

 While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such
appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in
accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only
the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an
acting capacity and not anyone else.
 On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed
one year.
 During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct.

 Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused
hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In
this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when
the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also
proves that the president was in good faith.
 It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary.
She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.
 The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That
 person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
 Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

Commissioner of Customs &

Collector of Customs vs Eastern
Sea Trading

3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements

 Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan
onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs
ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able
to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant
to Executive Order 328.
 On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and
Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import
transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this
case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
 EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement
that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue
was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the
Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.

 Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly
referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions.
 They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
 The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety
of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore
entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
 They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration
of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

Bayan v. Zamora
 The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was
treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President
Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the
Philippine Senate.

 The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines
the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.

 Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
II. THE ISSU: Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

 NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated
petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
 Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
 There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as
a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America
in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

 Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement
is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements
of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally
as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as
 a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution

Beltran vs. Makasiar Case Digest

Due Process of Law, Immunity from Suit, Probable Cause


Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit".
 He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing
of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
 This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
 Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case
to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.

Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation
is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed
a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before
the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time,
also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest
Fitzgerald
Citation. 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 1982 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired
after he testified in front of Congress about cost overruns in certain military
projects. The Defendant, the President of the United States Richard Nixon
(Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President of the United States (President) is

shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official
capacity as President.

Facts. The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the
Air Force as cost-management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors
by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force said he was fired
because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was
passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a “top notch cost
expert”� but with “very low marks of loyalty”� and recommended that they “let
him bleed.”� At a press conference, the Defendant said he personally made
the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement
saying that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee.
The Plaintiff brought suit and the Defendant moved for summary judgment on
the ground of absolute immunity from suit.

Issue. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken
in his official capacity?

Held. Yes, the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public
policy rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power
principle. This immunity stems from the President’s unique position in the constitution
scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the President’s energies to the
concerns related to private lawsuits.

Clinton v. Jones
Citation. 142 F.3d 496, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1660 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent),
filed a complaint containing four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton
(Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards
her when he was the Governor of Arkansas.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does

not automatically grant the President of the United States immunity from civil
lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to his official duties as
President.

Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the
Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the
Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the district court to
dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and to prohibit the
Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The
district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial
would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties
appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted
certiorari.

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency
for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?

Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure
for actions not related to his official duties as President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit
until after the President’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to order a stay
was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever
of the Respondent’s interest in bringing the suit to trial.
Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly
interfere with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that
ordinary case-management principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal
with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based
requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant
interference with the President’s ongoing discharge of his official
responsibilities.

Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity
from civil lawsuits based on the President’s private actions unrelated to his
public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not
require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he
leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the
allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government.
Neri vs Senate
549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department –
Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

 In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various
resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
 Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
 He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
 Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

 The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by

the presidential communications privilege.
 1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power”
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
  2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A.
972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if
he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the
past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of
the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the
S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and
secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise
adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law
is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation
for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in
place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not
included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to
the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated
are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2
of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-
1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from
1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN
Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed
whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer
Citation. 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 1952 U.S. 2625.

Brief Fact Summary. In 1952, after the employees of steel companies threatened to
strike, the President of the United States Harry Truman (President Truman) ordered
the Secretary of Commerce to seize the Nation’s steel companies. The steel
companies sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must stem
from an act of Congress or the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United States steel companies and
their employees. In 1952, the employees union gave notice of a nationwide strike.
Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would jeopardize our national defense,
President Truman issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying the orders under protest, the steel
companies brought suit in District Court. The District Court issued a temporary
restraining order against the government, which the Court of Appeals stayed.

Issue. Did President Truman have the authority to order the seizure of the steel mills?
Held. No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred upon President
Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the Constitution, or
combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President the authority to take possession
of property as he did.

Dissent. Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) argued that we must consider the context in
which the President’s powers were exercised — a national exigency. The President’s power
to seize the steel mills derives from his duty to executive legislative programs the success of
which depends upon the continued production of steel.
Concurrence.
Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) stated that Congress could not have more
emphatically expressed its will that the executive seizure was not authorized than it did in the
Taft Hartley Act of 1947.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) said that when the President takes actions inconsistent
with the will of Congress, his powers are at their lowest level. Then, he can only rely on his
own constitutional powers minus any powers given to Congress on the same matter.
(Justice Douglas) The branch of government with the power to pay for a seizure is the only
one that can authorize one -Congress. If we authorized the President’s act, we would be
expanding his powers under Article Two.

Marbury v. Madison
Citation. 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)

Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of

President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the
District of Columbia, brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President
Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
has constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The
Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United
States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams

attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and
filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by
President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42
new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day
before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including
Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions.
Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver
his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment
has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s
commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when
the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to
direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,”�
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action,
which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the
Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal.

Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable
constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the
Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of
the federal government.

Araneta vs Judge Dinglasan

84 Phil. 368 – Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases

 Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62

which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael
Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62
was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased
to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
 Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by
Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
 L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
[from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
 L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds
to hold the national elections.
  They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE
OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency
Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.

 In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session
which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly.
 In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such
subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to
the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.”
 Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early
repeal.

Randolf David vs PGMA

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017
– Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out Power

Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

 In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery
of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is
to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
 Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
 Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized.
On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
 Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.
 In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that
PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.
 Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.

 The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of
the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected
due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same
time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following
way;
 Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
 The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP
1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that
the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed,
judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.
 Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
 First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It
is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally
 unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and
again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
 Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
 On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
 Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
 Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the
assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
 Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
 The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
o There must be a war or other emergency.
o The delegation must be for a limited period only.
o The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
o The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
 o Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
o The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president
by the president.

Julio Lagmay vs Court of

Appeals
199 SCRA 501 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial
Review – Legitimizing Function – Proper Raising of Questions of Law

 Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Julio
Lagmay and 2 others. Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then
sent letters to each of her lessees advising them of her intention to sell the land
and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are occupying.
 Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the rentals
from each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters politely
advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same.
Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3 months and this time they agreed to buy the
parcel of land.
 Tuason however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their
right over the land they’ve been occupying for quite some time as guaranteed by
PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay et al
waived their right under the said PD when they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial
offer.
 Lagmay et al appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the lower court.
The CA additionally pointed out that the parcel of land in question is not declared
as an “urban land” under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that
Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the same
during the trial of merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is ripe for judicial determination in
this case.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in
this case because the controversy can be decided by other means.

 The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be

the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in an
appropriate case and is necessary to its determination.
 Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional
issue considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned
 proclamation there are other grounds by which this case may be resolved on a
non-constitutional determination.

Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

243 SCRA 436 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Corporate Nationality –

Public Utility – Nationality Requirement in Nationalized Areas of Activity

 In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No
bidding was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only
corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed
for this particular undertaking.
 An agreement was then made between the government, through the Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The
agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law
(RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium
shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase
that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for
the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government
shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium
shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
 However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed
the implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium
is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it
cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under
the nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr.
in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification.

 The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will
not become the owner of a public utility hence, the question of its nationality is
misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot own a public utility but in this
case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the facilities that it will be
building for the EDSA railway project.
 There is no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a
public utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one
operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate the railway transit.
DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and
from the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium.
 All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities and receive rent
from the use thereof by the government for 25 years – it will not operate the railway
 transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of
building a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public
utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the
entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that
purpose.

Pascual vs Sec of Public Works and Comm

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
 In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for
the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder
road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity
of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for
private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision.
 The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the
same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that
Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that
his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the
said RA would be upheld.
 Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand,
perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose.
 The subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property
public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed
when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored.
 “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which
the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and
void.

IBP VS ZAMORA

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE: 1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support
to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines

210 SCRA 256 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial
Review – Constitutionality of a Treaty – Warsaw Convention
 Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986,
he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in San
Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to
San Francisco.
 His scheduled flight was in December. A day before his departure he checked with
NOA and NOA said he made no reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next
year, due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA
argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article
 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that complaints against
international carriers can only be instituted in:
o the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA);
o the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);
o the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had
been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco so that’s where the
contract was made);
o the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which
final destination is San Francisco).
 The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of
the Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct
judicial review.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is
bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the Senate.
 Until & unless there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only
remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such
as in San Francisco, USA.
 The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the legislative
and the executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in
this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any compelling argument to
overcome the presumption.

Agbayani vs PNB G.R. No. L-23127 04-29-

71
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan,
defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity.

PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period
from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the
suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration
of Unconstitutionality of a law)

HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:

“The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is

an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.”
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because
of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases
impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order
No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to
May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years,
two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.

Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo

Roxas
17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined
 Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the
1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is
provided in the law that:
 “There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.”
 In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed
the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case.
Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the
constitution.
 Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members
of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that
there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the
SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to
the Supreme Court.
 Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which
body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the
Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to
the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law”
 The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the
judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the
entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers
upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
 Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said
authority requires legislative action:
o defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing
remedies for violations thereof; and
o determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies
or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the
limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
 The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely
added the court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It
merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET.
This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

Santiago vs Commissioner Immigration

7 SCRA 21 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power – Justiciable
Controversy – Citizenship
  Ricardo Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of
registration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino mother
and a Chinese father here in the Philippines.
 He was sent to China when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in 1925
and in his Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he would
like to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau of Immigrations.
In his original petition however in the lower court he was praying for a declaratory
relief for him to be declared as a Filipino.
 He was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratory relief
is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision not stating the
“declaratory statement” but rather focusing on the cancellation of the alien
certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration
of citizenship.
HELD: No. The SC ruled against Santiago.
 Although amended, the proceeding initiated and originally prayed for is a
declaratory relief to have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can
be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted
or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
 As an accident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
 Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to
the effect that a plaintiff or a petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child,
although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given
relief available only to one enjoying said status.
 At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization,
by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a
judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

VARGAS VS RILLORAZA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:49 PM
G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme Court, ]

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which
provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them
necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court
Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
 Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme
Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein
provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members
of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another
Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
 Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those
already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only
arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.

 Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law"
in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of
the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.

 However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of
PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of
the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice
of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not
contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and
Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

Gualberto De La Llana vs
Manuel Alba
112 SCRA 294 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no
question of law involved – BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De
la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he
would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization
and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act,
it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition
of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance.
He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration.
No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to
the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”