The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy

Author(s): Michael Mann

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Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jun., 1970), pp. 423-439
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 -

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVI EW

VOLUME 35, No. 3

JUNE, 19 70

THE SOCIALCOHESIONOF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

WIICHAELMANN
University of Cambridge

This paper analyzes the empiricatutility of cossensual and conNictualtheoriesin explaining

the social cohesion of the liberal democraciesof Britasn and the United States. After clari-
fying conceptualproblems of value consensustSleoryand Marxist theory, it examines the
forms and extent of value-commitmentin these countries.The conclusionis that both theories
grossly overstate the amount of both value consensusbetweee individualsand value con-
sistency within individualsthat actually exists. Cohesionin liberal democracydependsrather
on the lack of consistentcommitmentto generalvalues of atrysort and on the "pragmaticac-
ceptance"by subordinateclasses of their limited roles in society. Suggestiveevidence is also
found for the existenceof some "false consciousness"among sgbordanateclasses.

IT iS llOW someyearssinceDahrendorf and tioning smoothly. . ." (Sigel, 1965:1; for a

othersmade their attacks on consensus similar statementsee Rose, 1965:29).
theoryand theirpleas for a "mixedthe-
ory" of social cohesion.But, despiteall the Using such an approach, several well-known
complexitiesof individualsociologists'argu- studies have argued that the stability and
ments, there is still agreementbetweenal- "success" of democratic societies depend on
most aII theoriststhat some minimaldegree the sharing of general political and prepoliti-
of value consensusexists ill liberal demo- cal values. In these studies, Great Britain and
cratic societies,permittingthem to handle the United States are taken as examples of
conflictandremainstable.Whatis especially successful liberal democraciesand often con-
surprisingis that this beliefis at its strongest trasted explicitly or implicitly with "less suc-
amonglatter-dayconflicttheorists,who ad- cessful" democracies(e.g. AlmondandVerba,
mit that value consensusexists but deny its 1963; Lipset, 1964; Easton and Dennis,
"validity"by their use of "false conscious- 1967) . Thus, Dahl ( 1967:329-330), review-
ness."In this paperI will attemptempirical ing previous studies, concludes that "Ameri-
testing of the theoriesof both "consensus" cans ordinarily agree on a great many ques-
and "falseconsciousness" sociologists. tions that in some countries have polarized
The theoretical orthodoxy of those I the citizenry into antagonistic camps. One
loosely term "consensustheorists"is to be consequence of this massive convergence of
foundin this quotatiollfroman editorialin- attitudes is that political contests do not usu-
troductionto an Americansymposiumon po- ally involve serious threats to the way of life
litical socialization: of significant strata in the community,"
while Rose has stated ". . . enduring con-
"Politicalsocializationrefers to the learning sensus is one of the most distinctive features
processby which the politicalnormsand be- of politics in England" (1969:3; see also his
haviors acceptable to an ongoing political
system are transmittedfrom generationto 1965 work).
generation. . . A well-functioningcitizen is We now might ask "what is this consensus
one who accepts (internalizes)society's po- about?" And here different writers would
litical norms . . . NVithouta body politic so
in harmcnywith the ongoingpoliticalvalues, produce different answers. F;rstly, there are
a political system would have trouble func- those who stress the commitment of social
423
424 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
members to ultimate vaZues, of which ex- theorists" accept the force of this argument.
amples might be generalizedbeliefs in equal- Dahl, for example, though concluding that
ity and achievement (Lipset, 1964). Others, the stability of American democracy rests on
however, stress commitment to social norms, consensus about fundamentals, admits that
of which well-known examples are an adher- these are often vague and of doubtful influ-
ence to the "rules of the democratic game' ence on actual behaviour (see also Rose,
and opposition to those who introduce strong 1965:30).
conflictual elements (such as class ideology) (2) Even if a value is stated precisely, it
into politics (Dahl, 1967; McKenzie and may lead to conflict, not cohesion. For while
some values unite men, others necessarily
Silver, 1968) . Finally, there are writers who
stress commitment to beliefs about how so- divide them. An extreme example of this fact
ciety is actually organized, of which there is the consensus among the Dobu people on
the values of suspiciousness and treachery
are two main varieties. The first stresses the
harmonistic structure of society and political (quoted by van der Berghe, 1963) . The
more consensus there is about such values,
elites (against, say, a belief in class conflict),
while the second stresses the essential benev-the greater the ensuing conflict. Clearly it is
only some values which lead to integration,
olence of other individuals within the society,
for example, the trustworthiness of others and we had better stick to safe statements
(see respectively Easton and Dennis, 1967, like "the more widely interpersonal trust is
and Almond and Verba, 1963). According to valued, the greater the social integration"
these writers, widespreadcommitment to any (cf. Almond and Verba, 1963). In short, we
or all of these values, norms and beliefs con-have to specify the content of a value if we
fers legitimacy and stability on present social
are to predict its consequences.
strllcture. The "false consciousness" writers (3) The standards embodied in values are
agree that this widespread commitment ex- absolute ones, and it is difficult for such
ists, but deny that it thus confers legitimacyabsolutes to co-exist without conflict. For
on society. Before turning to their arguments,example, the modern Western values of
however, let us examine the conceptual prob- "achievement" and "equality"mphasized
lems arising from the asserted link between by Lipset-each limit the scope of the other.
consensus and social cohesion. There are in Turner ( 1953-54) has noted that such value-
fact four main objections to the statement conflict is ubiquitous in societies, which de-
that shared values integrate and legitimate velop ways of "insulating" values from each
social structures. other. Cohesion is therefore affected by the
( 1) Most general values, norms and socialrelative success of society's insulation proc-
beliefs usually mentioned as integrating so- esses as well as by the nature of the values
cieties are extremely vague, and can be used themselves.
to legitimate any social structure, existing or (4) The final objection is related to the
not. As Parsons (1951:293) notes, conserva- third: where insulation processes operate, co-
tives and revolutionariesalike appeal to com- hesion results precisely because there is no
mon values of "social justice," "democracy," common commitment to core values. For ex-
and "peace." Even the most monolithic of ample, in a society which values achievement,
societies is vulnerable to radical appeals to a lower class is more likely to acquiesce in
its core values. For example, medieval rebels its inequality if it places less stress on
were often clerics appealing to common achievement aspirations than on other val-
Christian values, as did John Ball in the ues. Moreover, the cohesion of any function-
1381 Peasants' Revolt in England: ally differentiated society must partly de-
"When Adam delved and Eve span, pend on the learning of role-specific values.
Who was then a gentleman?" In a business firm, for example, though all
managers may need some degree of commit-
But at the same time respectable,established ment to common organizational goals, they
clerics unwittingly primed their congrega- also need differential commitment to role
tions by emphasizing these "leveling" as- values the engineer to product quality, the
pects of Christianity in their sermons (Owst, accountant to cost, the personnel manager to
1961: Chaps. 5 and 6). Most "consensus industrial peace for the survival and effi-
 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
ciencyof the firm.Thuseitherrole-or class-
specificvaluesmay contributemoreto social
cohesionthan generalcore values.
As I have indicated,these problemshave
beenperceivedby consensustheorists.Their
modificationsof a naive, traditionalview of
consensus (such as Kingsley Davis, 1948,
posited)havebeenparalleledby recentmod-
ificationsto "conflicttheory"which in the
moderecontextmeansMarxisttheory.
Just as no consensustheoristwouldposit
the existenceof completeharmony,no Marx-
ist would claim that completedisharmony
characterizedsociety. He would admit,
firstly,that some formof social cooperation
is necessaryin the pursuitof scarcity,and,
secondly,that subordinateclasseswithin so-
ciety always appearto "accept"their posi-
tion at least to someextent (Giddens,1968:
269). Yet the precisemeaningof this word
"accept"has greatlytroubledMarxists.We
must distinguishtwo types of acceptance:
pragmatic acceptance,where the individual
compliesbecause he perceivesno realistic
alternative,and normative acceptance,where
the individualinternalizesthe moralexpecta-
tions of the rulingclass and views his own
inferiorpositionas legitimate.Thoughprag-
maticacceptanceis easy to accommodateto
Marxism,normativeacceptanceis not, and
the unfortunatepopularityof the latter con-
cept has contributedto the inadequaciesof
muchmodernMarxisttheory.
Writerslike Marcuse(1964) and Hacker
( 1957) have agreedwith the consensusthe-
orists that value consensusdoes exist, and
that normativeacceptancecharacterizesthe
workingclass in present-dayliberaldemoc-
raciesjSucha positioncan be only reconciled
witha Marxistapproachby utilizingthe con-
cept of "false consciousness"and asserting
that normativeacceptanceis "false"in the
sense that it leads workersto ignore their
true interests.Yet false consciousnessis a
dangerousconcept,for if we defineinterests
totally independentlyof the orientationsof
those concerned, "religious mania alone
speakshere"(Geiger,quotedby Dahrendorf,
1959:175). Nevertheless,the conceptof false
consciousnessis tenable if we can demon-
strate two of three things: that an indoctri-
nation process has occurred, palpably
changingworking-class values,or that the in-
doctrinationprocessis incomplete} leavingin-
doctrinatedvaluesin conflictwith "deviant"
425
ones in the mindof the worker;and thirdly,
in bothcaseswe still have to be able to rank
the rivalsets of valuesin orderof their"au-
thenticity"to the workerif we are to decide
which is more "true."This is a formidable
task, barelybegunby Marxists.On the first
point they are in conflictwith the many re-
searchfindingswhich show that it is com-
parativelydifficultfor the mass media and
otherindoctrination agenciesto changeexist-
ing values (to which they might justifiably
reply that as ruling-classvalues are in es-
sence traditional,they do not have to be
taught afresh). The secondpoint they have
obscuredby generaldenunciationsof total
indoctrination.The third problemof "au-
thenticity"has alwaysbeen facedby Marx-
ists, but has been too often solvedby asser-
tion ratherthanby evidence.
We arenowin a positionto derivetestable
propositionsfromeachof the broadtheoreti-
cal positions describedabove. The crucial
questionsare empirical:to what extent do
tke various classes in society internaZize
norms, values and beliefs which legitimate
the socialorder?And,do suchnorms,values
and beZiefsconstitutetrueor false conscious-
ness, as definedabove? Presentsociological
writingsoffer no coherentanswer to these
questions.Onedistinguishedgroupof writers
has arguedthat a "minimum"legitimating
consensusdoesexist in certainliberaldemoc-
racies, therebycontributingto the stability
of their regimes (e.g. Almondand Verba,
1963; Dahl, 1967; Easton and Dennis,
1967). But other empiricalinvestigationsof
the extentof politicalvalueconsensusin one
of those liberal democracies,the United
States, provide opposite conclusions and,
moreover,providehints that the individual's
own internalbelief systemmay not be con-
sistent (Aggeret al., 1961; McClosky,1964,
Prothroand Grigg, 1960, Converse,1964).
An impassehas beenreached.As Eastonhas
remarked( 1965:191): " . . . the actualspe-
cificationof the degreeof consensus. . . is an
empiricalrather than a theoreticalmatter
andis one that has neverbeenfully facedup
to, muchless resolvedthroughtestingwhole
systems."Such is the intentionof the main
part of this paper.
The Data
The data consistof a variety of findings
from other writers'empiricalinvestigations
 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
426
into value-commitment in Britain and the
sensus."()ne further
United States. The values, norms, and beliefs made:whereclass classificationhas been
analyzed here are all ones supporting, or de- upper classes
differencesemerge,in that
structive of, the present social structure of nificantly
endorse dominantvalues sig-
more, and deviant values signifi-
those countries. Most concentrate on issues cantly
less, thanlowerclasses,this is labeled
regardingthe legitimacy of the social stratifi- "Dissensus
cation system. Following Parkin (1967), I
betweenClasses."2
One importantreservationmust be made
have labeled supporting values dominant, before
we turnto the actualresults:this type
and destructive values deviant. Dominant of
secondaryanalysisof publishedmaterial
values are generally promulgated by ruling suffers
from
groups to legitimate their rule; deviant val- vantages. importantmethodological disad-
One major problemis that the
ues, by groups contesting that legitimacy.
questionsactually used in differentstudies
Nearly all the results used here consist of are rarely
responses to agree-disagree questions. They well know
identical,and as all sociologists
are presented in Tables 1 to 4. The first col-
very slight changesof cue in a
questioncan producemarkedlydifferingre-
umn of these tables contains the investigator's
sults.This difficultywill not be shirked- for
name and reference, together with references
to other studies which produced similar find-
example, the effect on respondentsof the
singleword"class"will be discussed but as
ings. The second column gives brief details
we are
of the sample used, and the third column ings lookingfor consistencybetweenfind-
fromdifferentsurveys,questioIlbiaswill
gives the gist of the question asked. The
usuallybe randomized. The sameshouldalso
fourth column gives details of subsamples apply
to the difficultiesof comparingre-
where available. This paper gives only the
sponsesof samplesof differingcompositions
subsamplescorrespondingto the broad occu- at different
pational stratification hierarchy in liberal ever,it
points of time and place. How-
mustbe emphasizedthat conclusions
democracies,with the groups presented in drawnfrom such
descendingorder.1The term "class" will be only tentative
secondaryanalysiscan be
until cotlfirmedby primary
looselyused in the text to describe the main research.
groups, though the authors of the studies
themselvesuse a variety of terms. The fifth
column shows the percentage agreement Results
amongthe sample to the question. The final In this section we analyze respondents'
columnpresents a classification system de- viewson the legitimacyof social structure
signedto show briefly which, if any, theory andparticularlyclass structure,in Britain
thefinding tends to support. If 7572 or more andthe UnitedStates.As the principalfunc-
ofrespondents agree with a dominant value, tionof a social stratificationsystem is to
thefinal column contains "Dominant Con-
regulate the distributionof scarceresources,
sensus."If 75go agree with a deviant value,
wewill startby observi:ng how muchpeople,
thisis labeled "Deviant Consensus." Obvi-
ously,75So is an arbitrary cutoff point be- particularly working-class people,want those
tweenconsensus and dissensus, but its gen- scarceresources.
erallevel seems not unreasonable. Where a Sociological studies of "achievementmo-
clearmajority of a sample endorses a value, tivation" are our first pieces of evidence.
thismay still be a significant finding, and Severalhave shownthat almostall persons,
thusany agreement of between 60So and of
whateverclass,will agreewith statements
75SO has been labeled either "Dominant" or like
"It is importantto get ahead"(Scanzoni,
"Deviant Dissensus," according to the direc- 1967:456; Mizruchi,1964:95;Veness,1962:
tion
of the majority. Where there is almost 153),and some useful pointersto what re-
complete,i e. between 409 and 60%, disa- spondents mean by this are now emerging.
greement,this has been labeled simply "Dis-
2The reverse trend does not in fact occur. Note
that
no tests of statistical significance are used
1There is no analysis in this paper of racial as- here
the populations sampled by the studies are
pects
of stratification,though these are obviously too
diverse and ill-reportedfor this. "Significant"
extremely
important in the United States, and in- differences
indicates merely "clear" differencesin
creasingly
so in Britain. this
paper.
 LIBERAL DEMOURACY 427

Most important,working-classpeople are "ability" and "hard work" while much

morelikely thanmiddle-classpeopleto think smallernumbersendorse"luck,""pull"and
of successas achievedsolely in the occupa- "toohardfora man."Yet thereareslightin-
tionalsphere,andaremorelikelyto conceive dicationsherethat thesebeliefsmightnot be
of it as materialistic,economicsuccess(Miz- of great significancefor the respondents.
ruchi, 1964:77-90). The crucial question Thus the Blaunerand the Mercerand Weir
then is "Can their economicaspirationsbe studiesshowthat respondents aremorelikely
met, given the constraintsof the stratified to be cynical about the opportunity structure
occupationalsystem?"Thereis evidencethat that confrontsthem in their actualworking
the answerto this is "No."In a comparative lives. This kindof interpretation is strength-
analysisof BritishandAmericanschoolboys, ened by the Veness (1962) findings.These
Stephensondemonstratedthat the lowerthe are basedon schoolchildren's essays describ-
socialclass of the boy, the morehis occupa- ing imaginary"successes" in futurelife. Very
tionalaspirationsoutranhis occupationalex- large class differencesemergein the essays.
pectations.Thus, later on it is the working In the essays of the grammarand technical
classpupils". . . who lowermost theiraspi- schoolboys (destinedfor the most part for
rationswhenit comesto consideringplansor occupationalsuccess),successand statusare
expectations"in the occupationalsphere seen as comi;ngfromsteady achievementsin
(Stephenson1958:49; for supportingevi- the occupationalsphere.In thoseof the sec-
dence see Caro and Pihlblad, 1965). This ondary modern boys (the future manual
processseems to continuein the world of workers),however,the idea of cumulative
workitself. It has been a frequentresearch statusis usuallyabsent,and, instead,success
findingin industrialsociologythat,in identi- comesfromeithera quiet,happylife or sud-
cal jobs, older workersare more satisfied den fame in sport and entertainment.From
than youngerones. The most probableex- this, it seems probablethat, though lower
planationof this is Kornhauser's, appliedto classchildrenmay endorsegeneralplatitudes
his own findings:". . . men in the routine aboutthe importanceof ambition,thesehave
types of workcomeover the years to accept little actual relevance for their own life-
andmakethe mostof theirsituation"( 1967: projects. Turner ( 1964), in his study of
77). Froma very early age the lowerclass Americanhigh-schoolseniors,also comesto
person begins to realize that he is at the this conclusion,stressingthat we can only
bottomof a stratificationhierarchy(Bettel- assessthe importanceof valuesin societyby
heimandSylvester,1950; Himmelweitet al., consideringtheir relevanceto peoples'lives.
1952). Probablystartingwith universalistic For furthertests of our theorieswe can
achievementvalues, he graduallyredefines turn to respondents'imagesof the entireso-
his aspirationsin a more and more role- cial structureto see whetherthey holdto the-
specific way, so that his lot can become oriesof harmonyor conflict.Table2 presents
acceptable. the relevantfindings.
The nature of this "acceptance"is, of This massof conflictingresultspermitsno
course,crucialas I arguedearlier.Does this easy generalizations. It is truethat significant
redefinitionof goals lead to normativeor to classdifferencesin the directionpredictedby
pragmaticacceptance?Onetest of this is the Marxist theory emergein several parts of
extent to whichlowerclassesregardas legi- this table. But not even the statement"Big
timate the opportunitystructurewhich has businesshas too muchpower"evokesdeviant
disadvantagedthem. In this respect,domi- consensusamongthe workirlgclass of both
nant valuesare clear:successcomesto those countries.In only two other cases is there
whoseenergiesand abilitiesdeserveit, fail- even a clear majority for a deviant value
ures have only themselvesto blame.Is this among the working class: for "The rich
argumentacceptedby lower class persons? get all the profits"and (probably)for "The
Table 1 providesan answer. laws favour the rich."3 And when we
We can see that, by andlarge,the samples
hold dominantbeliefsaboutthe opportunity 3 Taking note of McClosky's statement that more
the lower occupational groups in his sample have
structure.Thoughthese resultsshowclearly of significantly deviant beliefs than higher groups
the biasingeffects of leadingquestions,aI- ( 1964:3 71) . He does not, however, present these
mostall respondentsendorsethe key cues of differences statistically.
 t \ - - -

TABLE1. THE LEGITIMACY

OFTHEOPPORTUNITY
STRUCTU
Author Sample Statement Subsample
Mizruchi (1964:82) (cf. US. small town adults Ability determines
.e
a) Social ClassesI-I
Berelson et al., 1954:58; who gets ahead b) SocialClassesIV
Lenski, 1963: 165)

Veness (1962:144)
a) English boys and girls Hard work (and not a) Grammar School
aged 13-17, representative luck or influence) b3 Technical School
national sample is how to get on c) Modern School
b) Boys only
Status achieved by a) Grammar School
effort in children's b) Technical School
essays c) Modern School

Kornhauser( 1965:210) U S. male workers Luck and "pull" a) White collar

determineswho b) Nonfactory work
gets ahead c) All factory worke
(including d and
d) Small town facto
workers
e) Routine producti
workers

Blauner ( 1964: 206) U.S. factory workers "cynical" factors determine

national sample promotion in own * )

organization

Mercer & Weir (1969:122) English male clerical and Ditto

technical workers * i

large town

McKenzie & Silver English urban working class. Too hard for a man with
( 1968: 140) Labour and Conservative ambition to get ahad
voters only
 LIBERALDEMOCRACY 429

examinethese most favouredstatementswe Here, the two statementssupportingclass

see that none mentions"class"and all are action (Leggetta andNordlingerb) produce
couchedin what mightbe termedsimplistic dissensus.The statement "Workersshould
"commonman"language.By contrastin Ta- have morecontrolin industry"producesno
ble 2, all the moreabstractand sophisticated consistentmajority.Veryfewof oneworking-
modelsof societyevokeless support,whether class sample want wealth equally divided,
they be basicallydominantor deviantin con- only abouthalf of anothermixed-classsam-
tent.We may1lote,forexample,in thestudies ple think that large inequalitiesare wrong,
of Form and Rytina (1969) and of Manis but in a third,workingclass,samplethereis
and Meltzer (1954) that dissensusresults consensusin favourof reducingclass differ-
frompresentingalternativeabstracttheories entials (one possibleexplanationof the last
of society to working class respondents. findingis that "class"is such an unpopular
Moreover,the single word "class"produces termthat almosteveryoneis in favourof re-
dissensusamong them wheneverit occurs, ducingit). Clearly,if mostsocialgroupshad
exceptsignificantlywhenin the Lewisstudy consistent and meaningfulnormative sys-
it is decisivelyrejectedin favourof nation- tems, the resultswould be less affectedby
ality. This, then, is anotherproblemto be the exactwordingof questio;ns, the composi-
faced later: why is the workingclass able tion of samples,etc.
and willing to produce deviant simplistic A further trend emerges from Table 4
views of society but not deviant abstract whichwe also noticedin Table 1: that devi-
ones? ant valuesare morelikely to be endorsedif
Anothertype of study which enables us they are presentedas relevantto respond-
to perceivemen's imagesof ongoingsocial ents' everyday lives. Thus 607foof Korn-
structure is analyzing "political efficacy," hauser's(1965) samplessay that in disputes
that is a man'sestimateof his ownability to they always side with the union and only
affect the poltical government.A belief in 5So with the company,while all of Sykes'
highefficacyis certainlyconsonantwithwhat (1965) manualworkers,in markedcontrast
we have termeddominantvalues, thougha to his clerks,supportcollectiveratherthan
belief in low efficacyis not necessarilydevi- individualbargining.Note also that in Table
ant to the extent of supportingthe redistri- 2, 557fsof Goldthorpeet als (1968a) manual
bution of politicalpower.The relevantre- samplesaw workstudy engineersas opposed
searchfindingsare set out in Table 3. to workerinterests,though672tohad in gen-
All but one of the questionsproducedis- eral seen worker-management relations in
sensus amongrespondentsAgain, however, harmonisticterms.Again there seems to be
significantclass differencesappear,with at a disjunctionbetweengeneralabstractvalues
least half the working-classrespondents andconcreteexperience.
choosing the mildly deviant alternative. Such a disjunctionis the main theme of
Clearlythen we must considerthe possibil- Freeand Cantril's(1967) studyof American
ity, arguedby ThompsonandHorton( 1960), political attitudes, and their evidence can
that thereis considerable politicalalienation advance our argumentconsiderably.They
among the workingclass. And at the very askedrespondentstwo seriesof questionsto
least, the numerousinconsistenciesin politi- test their liberalism/conservatism, the first
cal beliefs emergingin the McCloskystudy Ollspecificissuesof governmentintervention
indicatethat a person'sattitudesto political in favourof redistribution(whichthey term
authority may have little significancefor the "operational"spectrum),the secondon
him. Again,we have to considernot only a generalissues of individualistversus inter-
person'sstated attitude but also its impor- ventionist philosophies (the "ideological"
tance for him. spectrum).Typicalexamplesare, in the first
From the confusedimagesof society re- spectrum,"Do you approveof Medicare?"
vealedin Tables 2 and 3, we might predict and in the second"We shouldrely moreon
that confusion would also be evident in individualinitiative. . . and not so much
working-classnorms regarditlgpolitical ac- governmentalwelfare programs."Table 5
tion, and this is indeedrevealedin Table 4 presentstheir mainresults.
(see p. 434). As the authorscomment,the results are
 TABLE2. HARMONISTIC
ANDCONFLICTUAL
IMAGES
OFSOCIET
Author Sample Statement Subsample
Form & Rytina ( 1969:23 ) U.S. adults, medium town Holding pluralist models a) Rich
(the "analytic sample") of society rather than b) Middle
class or power elite C) Poor
models

Lewis (1964-65 :176)

U.S. white males, medium Rating U.S. citizenship
town more important than
J

class membership *

U.S. male textile workers, a) Social classes are in-

Manis & Meltzer (1954:
33-35)
medium town with history evitable and desirable * J

of labour disputes b) Social classes are either

enemies or in conflict,
or partners or in
paternalistic relationship

Leggett t 1964:230) U.S. male manual workers, The rich get the profits a) Employed
metropolis b) Unemployed

McClosky ( 1964:370) U.S. national ("general a) The laws are rich man's
electorate") sample aws
b) Poor man doesn't have
a chance in the law
courts

Kornhauser ( 1965:220)
U.S. male workers Big business has too a) White collarwor
cf. Haer, 1956-57:140; much power b) All factory work
Lipsitz, 1964:957)
 TABLE 2.-(continued)
Author Sample Statement Subsample
Nordlinger(1967:1783 English male urban manual Class conflictis impor-
workers1 tant in EngIand

McKenzie&Silver ( 1968:135) English urban workers. Upper class has always

(cf. Cannon,1967:168) Labour and Conservative tried to exploit work-
votersonly ing class

Goldthorpeet al. (1968b:26) English affluent workers The laws favour the rich a) White collar
mediumtown b) Manualworker

Mercer & Weir (1969:121) English male clerical and Management and workers
technicalworkers,large are a team, and not on
town opposite sides

Goldthorpeet al. (1968a:73, Asabove a) Ditto a) White collar

85) b) Manual workers
b) Work study engineers Manual workers onl
are antiworker

Goldthorpe et al. ( 1968b: 26) As above a) Big business has too a) White collar
(cf. Cannon, 1967:168; much power b) Manualworker
McKenzie & Silver, 1968: b) Trade unions have a) White collar
127) too much power b) Manualworker
'As only one-thirdof manual workersvote Conservative,the Conservativebias of this sample has been rem
in all cases.
432 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEMi
positivelyschizophrenic, witha largepropor- a majority of those with only primary educa-
tion of the electorateoperationallyliberal tion in these countries agree with the deviant
but ideologicallyconservative.Significantly, statement "No one is going to care much
white manualworkersare among the most what happens to you, when you get rlght
schizoid groups ( though Negroes are con- down to it," which statement AImond and
sistentlyliberal). Similarfindingshave also Verba think "reflects the most extreme feel-
been reported by Selznick and Steinberg ing of distrust and alienation" (p. 268). Un-
( 1969:220). Such findings have obvious fortunately, the authors do not present the
bearingon the problemof falseconsciousness results of the other questions according to
discussedearlierin this paper:it is interest- educational level, but it would not be unrea-
ing that writersas obviouslynon-Marxistas sonable to assume that the majority of Iower
Free and Cantril ( 1967) should conclude class respondentswould emerge as distrustful
theirstudyby remarkingthatpresentAmeri- on the less extreme questions. Clearly, A1-
can ideologyis out of touchwith American mond and Verba's analysis of the stability of
realities(i.e. false) and shouldthereforebe liberal democracy is at best partial, neglect-
reformulated. ing as it does the lack of value consenslls
Finally, we can examine the suggestion between classes.
that politicaland socialstabilityis in part a From all these findings four trends, which
functionof consensuson pre-politicalvalues. are in need of explanation, clearly emerge:
Many writershave arguedthis, assertingin
particularthat liberal democracy"works" 1. value consensusdoes not exist to any sig-
becauseits memberstrust each other. The nificantextent;
most satisfactoryevidence for this comes 2.there is a greater degree of consensus
among the middle class than among the
fromAlmondand Verba's( 1963) influential workingclass;
study, but even their findingsseem rather 3. the workingclass is more likely to support
suspecton closerexamination.It is indispu- deviantvalues if those values relate either
tablethat theirresultsshowa greaterdegree to concreteeverydaylife or to vaguepopu-
list conceptsthan if they relate to an ab-
of consensuson valuessuch as interpersonal stractpoliticalphilosophy;
trust among British and Americanrespon- 4.working class individualsalso exhibit less
dents than amongrespondentsin the "less internal consistency in their values than
successful"democracies of Italy, Mexico,and middle-classpeople.
West Germany.However,there are equally We can now return to our general theories
significantdifferencesin value-commitment with these trends in mind.
accordingto the only (andindirect)measure
of socialclass used, the formaleducationof Discussion
the respondent.The least educatedgroups
are consistentlythe leastpoliticallyconfident If there is not value consensus, what re-
and trusting.Moreover,when Almondand mains of value consensus theory? Obviously
Verbaproducetheirresultson the extent of the more extreme and generally stated ver-
commitmentto the norm of interpersonal sions of the theory are untenable, but many
trust, they tend to obscureone very signifi- others have been rather more cautious, as-
cantfinding,whichis difficultto fit into their serting merely that some "minimum" level
general theoreticalposition. It is that the of consensus about certain 'scritical"value is
degreeof valuecommitment,even in Britain necessary to social cohesion. As this level is
never precisely specified, we cannot very
and the United States, is still minimal.In easily come to grips with the argument. Let
Table 4 (on page 267) Almondand Verba us approach the problem by asking why
demonstratethat more respondentsin Bri- some measureof consensus is considerednec-
tain and the States than in the other coun- essary for social cohesion. The answer lies in
triesagreewith five similarstatementswhose one of sociology's most sacred tenets: that
tenor is that "peoplecan be trusted."But values are by definition beliefs governing
additionally,on two of the five items in the action. As action itself must be considered
U.S. and on threeof themin Britain,only a nonrandom, and as men do actually cooper-
minorityof respondentsshow themselvesas ate with one another, then it would seem to
"trustful."Also, in Table 5 (on page 269), follow that there is some degree of congru-

Author
l
Thompson & Horton
(1960:1914) (cf. for
white collar, Haer,
1956-7: 140)
McClosky (1964:371)
Nordlinger (1967:97) (cf.
McKenzie & Silver,
1968:124)
Agger et al. (1961:479)
(for b cf. Berelsonet al.
1954:58; Kornhauser
et al., 1956:190)
Nordlinger (1967:105, 109)
TABLE3. IMAGESOF POLITICAL
EFFICACY
Sample Statement Subsample
U.S. adults, small town Neither esercising nor a) Managers and O
believing in possibility b) Professionals
of esercising political c) White collar
control ("politically d) Labour
alienated")
U.S. national "general elec- a) Nothing I do has any
torate"sample effect on. politics
b) No use being inter-
ested in politics
English male urban People like me have no
manual workers ability to influence
>
government *
U.S. adults in metropolitan a) People are very fre-
area quently manipulated
by politicians * >
b) Politicians usually
represent the general
interest
As above Selfish minority groups
control government
Whichgroups?
a) big bllsiness, rich,
upper classes
b) trade uxiions

Author
Kornhauser (1965:213-220) U.S. male workers
Leggett (1964:230)
Nordlinger ( 1967: 178)
Benney et al. ( 1956: 140-141 )
(for b cf. Goldthorpe
et al. 1968a:109)
Nordlinger (1967: 181)
Sykes (1965 :303)
McClosky ( 1964:369)
Lenski (1963 :152) (cf.
Kornhauser, 1965:218)
Key (1965 :124)
1 This figurewas arrivedat by averagingthe percentagesamong Labour and Conservativevoters, who are eq
TABLE4. NORMSRELATING
Sample
U.S. male manual workers,
metropolis
English male urban
manualworkers
English adults, medium
town
As above
Scottish males, nationalized
steelworks
U.S. national "general
electorate"sample
U.S. adults, metropolis
U.S. national sample
TO CLASSACTIONANDEQUALITY
Statement Subsample
a) Workers should have a) White collar
more control of in- b) All factory work
dustry
b) Always side with union All factory workers
against company
a) Supporting working-class a) Employed
action in rent protest b) Unemployed
b) Wanting wealth equally a) Employed
divided b) Unemployed
a) In favour of reducing
class differentials
a) Large inequalities
are wrong
b) Workers should have
more control in
industry
b) Working class should
stick together to
get ahead
Preferring to bargain with a) Clerks
employer collectively b) Workers
a) Government should
give work to unemployed
b) Government should
give everyone good
standard of living
Government should do a) Middle Class
more for housing, unemploy- b) WorkingClass
ment, education, etc.
Ditto a) Nonmanual
b) Manual
 LIBERALDENIOCRACY
ANDOPERATIONAL
5. IDEOLOGICAL
TABLE SPECTRUMS IN AMERICAN
(Source: Free and Cantril, 1967:32)
CompletelyLiberall
PredominantlyLiberal
Middleof the Road
PredominantlyConservative
CompletelyConservative
The scoringsystem is quite complicatedand the readeris referredto Free and Cantril,p. 220 221.
ence between their values. This seems plausi-
ble, for if men cooperate they must come to
some form of agreement, explicit or implicit,
to share power. There is, of course, no such
social contract which does not rest on shared
normativeunderstandings(Durkheim, 1964:
206-19).
But when we consider whole complex so-
cieties, it is not clear that all social members
can be considered as patries to the social
contract. The ordinary participant's social
relations are usually confined to a fairly nar-
row segment of society, and his relations with
society as a whole are mostly indirect,
through a series of overlapping primary and
secondary groups. We may characterize his
meaningful life as being largely on an every-
day level. Thus his normative connections
with the vast majority of fellow citizens may
be extremely tenuous, and his commitment
to general dominant and deviant values may
be irrelevant to his compliance with the ex-
pectations of others. As long as he conforms
to the very specific role behavior expected
of him, the political authorities may not
trouble themselves with his system of beliefs.
If this is so, we might develop the follow-
ing hypothesis: only those actua5Zy sharing
powerneeddevelopconsistentso-
in societaG
cietalvalues.There are two available tests of
this hypothesis and both support it. Firstly,
McClosky (1964) has shown that there is a
far greater internal consistency in the politi-
cal values of political activists in the United
States than in the population at large.4
4See also Converse's (1964) excellent argument
on this point: he maintainsthat it is a tiny minor-
ity consistingof highly educated,political activists
which has an internally consistent,considered,and
stableset of politicalbeliefs.
435
ATTITUDES
POLITICAL
IdeologicalSpectrum OperationalSpectrum
4SOl 44go)
S 16% k 659
12 J 21 J
34 21
20l 71
S 50S7 k 14fto
30J 7J
lOO6yto 100%
Clearly it is the former who daily face the
problems of power-sharing. Secondly, there
are the various class differences demon-
strated earlier in this paper, and obviously,
the middle class is closer to centers of power
than is the working class. Etzioni ( 1964) has
argued persuasively that the normative ori-
entations of lower participants in "utilitar-
ian" organizations like the industrial firm
are largely irrelevant to the quality of their
role-performance.Might this be also true of
the lower classes in liberal democracy?Their
compliance might be more convincingly ex-
plained by their pragmatic acceptance of
specific roles than by any positive normative
commitment to society. There is even evi-
dence that lower class parents and children
are in a similar relationship: Rosen (1967)
shows that the working-class parent disci-
plines his children by "eliciting specific be-
havioral conformitiesX'from them, whereas
the middle-class parellt attempts more to
persuade his children to internalize norms
and to generalize them to a variety of situa-
tions. The attachment of the lower classes to
the distant state may be expected to be far
less normativeand more pragmatic than their
attachment to the primary familial group.
While rejecting more extreme versions of
harmonistic theories, we must also do the
same with Marxist ones. There is little truth
in the claims of some Marxists that the work-
ing class is systematically and successfully
indoctrinated with the values of the ruling
class. Though there is a fair amount of con-
sensus among the rulers, this does not extend
very far down the stratification hiearachy.
Among the working-class there is almost
complete dissensus on most of the general
dominant-deviantpolitical issues we have in-
436 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
vestigated.We have seen that two types of
deviantvaluesare widelyendorsedby work-
ing classpeople:firstly,valueswhichare ex-
pressedin concreteterms correspondingto
everydayreality,and, secondly,vague sim-
plistic divisions of the social world into
"rich"and "poor."Everydaysocial conflict
is experienced, and to someextentis referred
to whatOssowskihas describedas the eternal
strugglebetween"rich"and "poor,""rulers"
and"ruled,""idledrones"and"workerbees"
(Ossowski,1963:19-30). But the one is con-
creteand the otheris vague; thereis no real
politicalphilosophyuniting the two in the
working-classconsciousness.Instead,at the
politicallevelareratherconfusedvalueswith
surprisinglyconservativebiases. How these
politicalvaluescometo be is of crucialtheo-
retical importance,for it is their presence
which keeps the working-classfrom non-
compliancein the politicalorder.It is not
value-consensuswhich keeps the working-
class compliant,but rathera lack of consen-
sus in the crucialarea where concreteex-
periences and vague populism might be
translatedinto radical politics. Whethera
harmonisticor a conflictualtheorycan best
accountfor their compliancenow turns on
whetherthis lack of consensusis "free'2or
"manipulated,"on how it is produced.
Thoughwe need morestudiesof the opera-
tion of socializationprocesses,at least one of
them,the schoolsystem,has beenextensively
studied.
Studiesof the school systemsof Britain
and the United States have generallycon-
cluded that the school is a transmitterof
political conservatism,particularlyto the
working-class. Hess and Torney (1967) find
that the schoolis the most importantpoliti-
cal socializationagencyfor the young child,
and that its effortsare directedtowardthe
cultivationof nationalismand a benevolent
image of established political authority.
Greensteinstressesbenevolence,too, noting
that the child'sview of the worldis deliber-
ately "sugarcoated" by adults: "Bookssuch
as OurFriendthe Farmerand How the Po-
licemanHeUs Us are couchedin language
which closely resemblessome of the pre-
adolescentdescriptionsof the politicallead-
ers reportedin this survey"(1965:46). Both
Zeigler (1967) and Litt (1963) stress how
teachersstrive to keep the conflictualele-
mentsof politicsout of the classroomunless,
paradoxically, they are dealing with upper
class children. As Litt puts it, politics is pre-
sented as a ". . . formal mechanistic set of
government institutions with the emphasis
on its harmonious legitimate nature rather
than as a vehicle for group struggle and
change." ( 1963: 73) . Abrams ( 1963) comes
to a similar conclusion from his review of
textbooks used in British schools: he notes
that they often try to avoid mentioning non-
benevolent occurrences such as economic
slumps or industrial conflict, and where they
cannot avoid them, the events are presented
as "just happening"with no real attempt at
explanation. Other studies have shown that
schools also attempt to inculcate individual-
ism and competitiveness in pupils; e.g., the
child is taught that any form of achierrement
is gained at the expense of others (e.g.
Henry, 1965; Friedenberg, 1963). It is of
especial interest that the domirlant values
thus taught in schools are precisely the ones
we hasre already noted as being present in
adult working-class consciousness. Individ-
ualism we saw expressed strongly in Table 1,
while a strong preference for ties of nation-
ality over class, was also evident in Table 2.
Furthermore,Litt and Zeigler's observations
about teaching on the American political
system enable us to trace back the origin of
another supposedAmericancore-value,belief
in the legitimacy of the Constitution (see
Dahl, 1967, for an assertion of the impor-
tance of this value to Americandemocracy).5
We must be careful to specify the limits of
this indoctrination.It is rarely direct, though
the daily oath to the U.S. flag, or the grant-
ing of holidays to children in Britain if they
will cheer visiting royalty, clearly come into
this category. More usually, dominant-devi-
ant issues are not presentedat all to children.
The essential point is the "the realities of
the political process?' (to use Litt's phrase)
and the populist deviant tradition of the
lower class are ignored in the classroom.
Presumably the working class child learns
the latter from his family and peers; 6 cer-
5Respondents' attitudes on this issue have not
been analyzed here, as there is no comparable
British issue.
6 Though the evidence here is conflicting. Hess
and Torney (1967) state that the families they in-
vestigated also transmit nationalism and political
benevolence,but Carter (1962) finds that British
working class families transmita cynical populism.
 LIBERALDEMOCRACY
tainlyhe experiencessomethingof the former
when he enters the world of work, so his
manipulatedsocializationis only partial.We
may aptly describethese socializationproc-
esses as the mobilizationof bias (the phrase
of Bachrachand Baratz,1962). As the child
gets older,he becomesincreasinglycynicalin
his politicaland social attitudes (Hess and
Easton,1960;Hess, 1963;Greenstein, 1965),
but he has difficultyin putting them into
abstractterms. What has been ignoredin
childhoodis unlikelyto be graspedin adult-
hood, given workingclass difficultieswith
abstractconcepts(ef. Bernstein,1961; find-
ings replicatedby Hess and Shipman,1965).
Hencewe can see agenciesof politicalradi-
calism,like the tradeunionsand the British
LabourParty, strugglingagainst their op-
ponents'ability to mobilizethe nationaland
feudalsymbolsto which the populationhas
beentaughtto respondloyallyin schoolsand
in muchof the mass media (McKenzieand
Silver, 1968:245). Thus the most common
form of manipulativesocializationby the
liberal democraticstate does not seek to
changevalues,but ratherto perpetuateval-
ues that do not aid the workingclassto inter-
pretthe realityit actuallyexperiences.These
values merely deny the existenceof group
and class conflictwithinthe nation-stateso-
ciety and therefore,are demonstrablyfalse.
Thus thereare strongsuggestionsthat the
necessarymixedmodelof social cohesionin
liberaldemocracyshouldbe based more on
WIarxistconflict theory than sociologists
have usuallythought.A significantmeasure
of consensusandnormativeharmonymay be
necessaryamongrulinggroups,but it is the
absence of consensusamong lower classes
whichkeepsthemcompliant.Andif we wish
to explain this lack of consensus,we must
rely to someextent on the Marxisttheories
of pragmatic rote acceptance and manipula-
tive socialization. Of course,the existenceof
contraryharmonisticprocessesis feasible.
Alongsidecoerciveprocessestheremay exist
elementsof voluntarydeference,nationalism,
and othercomponentsof normativeintegra-
tion in liberaldemocracy.It is often difficult
to distinguishthe two. Yet sociologistscan
no longerassertthat theseelementsproduce
valueconsensusbetweensocialmembersand
value consistencywithin them. Thus what-
ever "legitimacy"liberaldemocracypossess
437
is not conferreduponit by value consensus,
forthis doesnot exist.
However,these results do not contradict
all such affirmationsof the legitimacy of
socialstructure.ThoughI havedemonstrated
the existenceof present-dayfalse conscious-
ness, this is insufficientas a total explana-
tion of pragmaticrole acceptance.For the
reason why most working-classpeople do
"accept"(in whateversense) their lot and
do not have consistent deviant ideologies,
we must look back to the historicalincor-
porationof working-classpolitical and in-
dustrial movementsin the 19th and 20th
centurieswithin existing structures.Dahl's
historicalanalysis would lead to the same
conclusionas that of Marcuse,that the in-
stitutionalizationof class conflict has re-
sultedin a closingof the "politicaluniverse."
But, of course, whereas Marcuse stresses
that this process was itself dominatedby
the manipulativepractices of the ruling
class,7 Dahl has stressed its elements of
genuineand voluntarycompromise.Clearly,
the historical as well as the present-day
theorymust be a "mixed"one. Yet one ob-
stacle to the developmentof a moreprecise
mixedtheoryin the past has been the fail-
ure of most sociologiststo take the Marxist
traditionin social theory seriously.In par-
ticular,they have dismissedthe crucialcon-
cept of "false consciousness"as being non-
scientific.Yet in this paper we have seen
fulfilled two of the preconditionsfor an
empirically-grounded theory of false con-
sciousness.Firstly, we saw quite clearly a
conflict between dominant and deviant
values taking place within the individual.
Secondly,we foundsomeevidenceof the al-
ternativeprecondition,the actual indoctri-
nation of dominantvalues. Thus the third
precondition, the ranking of conflicting
valuesby an analysisof "whogainsand who
loses"can be investigated,and somerelevant
suggestionshavebeenmadehere.The central
argumentof this paperis that the debatebe-
tween harmonistic theories and Marxist
theoriesmust be an empiricalone. The way
is open to furtherempiricalinvestigations.
7 For a rather more detailed and better argued
statementof this, see R. Miliband, 1961.
438 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIERV
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