G.R. No.

191618
Macalintal vs. PET, June 7, 2011

(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing
the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of
the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the
President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last
paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was
statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes
characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although
not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve,
in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment
found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 191644
Funa vs Agra, February 19, 2013

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo
appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes
VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen
and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the
Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a
different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the
Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run
for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor
General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient
for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold
any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of
Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as
holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in
the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of
the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by
one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13,
supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an
important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations
on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet
Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was
not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being
merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent
designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this
regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official
to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.”
In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a
government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as
long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the
other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
G.R. 203372
Velicaria-Garafil vs Office of the President, (2015)

Facts:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public... service or
endanger public safety.

None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

Issuance of EO 2
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo
which... violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
The only known exceptions to this prohibition are (1)... temporary appointments in the executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety and
in the light of the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of De Castro, et al. vs. JBC and
PGMA, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, (2)... appointments to the Judiciary;
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to
March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office
on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the executive... positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety as may be
determined by the appointing authority.

Effect of the Issuance of EO 2

Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on 9 August 2010 without any knowledge of her
termination. She was made to return the office-issued laptop and cellphone, and was told that
her salary ceased as of 7 August 2010. On 12 August 2010, Atty. Velicaria-Garafil was
informed... that her former secretary at the OSG received a copy of a memorandum on her
behalf. The memorandum, dated 9 August 2010, bore the subject “Implementation of Executive
Order No. 2 dated 30 July 2010” and was addressed to the OSG’s Director of Finance and
Management Service.

Atty. Venturanza received via facsimile transmission an undated copy of DOJ Order No. 556.
DOJ Order No. 556, issued by DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Sec. De Lima), designated
Senior Deputy State Prosecutor Richard Anthony D. Fadullon (Pros. Fadullon) as
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. In a letter to Sec. De Lima
dated 15 September 2010, Atty. Venturanza asked for clarification of his status, duties, and
functions since DOJ Order No. 556 did not address the same.
G.R. No. 209138
The OP withheld the salaries of Villanueva and Rosquita on the basis of EO 2. On 3 August
2010, Villanueva and Rosquita sought to intervene in G.R. No. 192991.[
Atty. Tamondong was removed from the SBMA Board of Directors on 30 July 2010.

Rulings of the CA
Even though the same issues were raised in the different petitions, the CA promulgated
separate Decisions for the petitions. The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is constitutional
In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated that the OP should
consider the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases of Villanueva, Rosquita, and
Atty. Tamondong, the CA explicitly stated that the revocation of their appointments... was proper
because they were midnight appointees.

Issues:
We resolve the following issues in these petitions: (1) whether petitioners’ appointments violate
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and (2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.

Ruling:
The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are
void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.
Midnight Appointments
Constitutionality of EO 2
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes
several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception
provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President...
signing an appointee’s appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the
appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath
of... office or his or her assumption to office.

In its narrow sense, an appointment is not a process, but is only an “executive act that the
President unequivocally exercises pursuant to his discretion.”

In short, the dissent allows an appointment to take effect during the ban, as long as the
President signed and transmitted the appointment before the... ban, even if the appointee never
received the appointment paper before the ban and accepted the appointment only during the
ban.

The dissent’s view will lead to glaring absurdities. Allowing the dissent’s proposal that an
appointment is complete merely upon the signing of an appointment paper and its transmittal,
excluding the appointee’s acceptance from the appointment process, will lead to the absurdity...
that, in case of non-acceptance, the position is considered occupied and nobody else may be
appointed to it. Moreover, an incumbent public official, appointed to another public office by the
President, will automatically be deemed to occupy the new public office and to have...
automatically resigned from his first office upon transmittal of his appointment paper, even if he
refuses to accept the new appointment. This will result in chaos in public service

Even worse, a President who is unhappy with an incumbent public official can simply appoint
him to another public office, effectively removing him from his first office without due process.
The mere transmittal of his appointment paper will remove the public official from office...
without due process and even without cause, in violation of the Constitution.

The dissent’s assertion that appointment should be viewed in its narrow sense (and is not a
process) only during the prohibited period is selective and time-based, and ignores well-settled
jurisprudence. For purposes of complying with the time limit imposed... by the appointment ban,
the dissent’s position cuts short the appointment process to the signing of the appointment
paper and its transmittal, excluding the receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee.

The concurrence of all steps in the appointment process is... admittedly required for
appointments outside the appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove
acceptance as a requirement in the appointment process for appointments just before the start
of the appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in appointments... falling within the
exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes no difference in the power of the
President to appoint; it is still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the
appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the appointment... process must be strictly
applied on appointments made just before or during the appointment ban.
Thus, an acceptance is still necessary in order for the appointee to validly assume his post and
discharge the functions of his new office, and thus make the appointment effective.
There can never be an instance where the appointment of an incumbent will... automatically
result in his resignation from his present post and his subsequent assumption of his new
position; or where the President can simply remove an incumbent from his current office by
appointing him to another one. I stress that acceptance through oath or any positive... act is still
indispensable before any assumption of office may occur.[46]

Appointing Authority
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component... of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress)
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power
of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the...
discretion of whom to appoint.

Transmittal
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that
the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment
paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but...
never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper
through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President’s intent of its issuance.
The MRO’s exercise of its mandate does not prohibit the President or the Executive Secretary
from giving the appointment paper directly to the appointee. However, a problem may arise if an
appointment paper is not coursed through the MRO and the appointment paper is lost or the...
appointment is questioned.

The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to authorize an appointee
to assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss of the original appointment paper, which
could be brought about by negligence, accident, fraud, fire or theft, corresponds to a... loss of
the office.[56] However, in case of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment must
be evidenced by a certified true copy issued by the proper office, in this case the MRO.

Vacant Position
An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an
occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly
terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed him.[57]
EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of... the 1987 Constitution: the
outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his
term.

Acceptance by the Qualified Appointee

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath
amount to acceptance of the appointment.[60] An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the... office.[61]
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil which
we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will only
provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion... of
acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the
abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers
and make it appear that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is... more difficult
to simulate the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They
cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of...
office during the appointment ban.
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No.
206290), Irma A. Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared VOID. We DECLARE that Executive Order No. 2
dated 30 July 2010 is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

Principles:

The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the
exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
The Constitution allows the President to exercise the power of... appointment during the period
not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from
exercising the power of appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence
of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and... evidence of the
transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all... these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban.
G.R. No. 88211
Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760, 1989

Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in
the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right
to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.

Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section
1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power”
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power
to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on
the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She
has to uphold the Constitution.
G.R. No. 212426
Saguisag v Ochoa, 2016

Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET -
ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to
this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues
of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to
refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain
meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops,
and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied
the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been
established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate
treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities
shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led
this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the
bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any
additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
Principles:
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial
entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII
of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said
constitutional provision.
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an
absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.
G.R. No. 164978
Pimentel vs. Ermita, October 13, 2005

Facts: Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur Yap (Agriculture),
Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino
Cruz Jr (National Defence), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph Durano (Tourism) and
Michael Defensor (Environment and Natural Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on 15
August 2004. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties. The Congress
commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo Angara,
Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim, Jamby
Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents.
The Senators contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary
shall be designated as acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while
Congress is in session there can be no appointments without first obtaining consent from
Commission on Appointments. When Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the same respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretaries without the consent of
the Commission on Elections while Congress is in session.

Decision: Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the appointment of
Gloria Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of the Congress, the
petition has become moot. However as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide
a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Constantino v Cuisa, GR No. 106064 (2005)

During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce
the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three
restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are
basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The spouses Renato
Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition)
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not
constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the
Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike other powers which
may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein,
Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such
power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity by which the exercise
of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise
this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically
named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence,
they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power
to the respondents.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a
debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate
this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is
made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for
managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its
risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she
would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless
times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary
Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not,
flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person
and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by
any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt
of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
Gudani vs. Senga G.R. 170165 (2006)

Facts:

Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
including General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the discretion of the President, AFP Chief of Staff
Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani and company from appearing
before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, General Gudani
and Colonel Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance with Senator
Biazon.

Issue:

Can the President can prevent military officers from testifying a legislative inquiry?

Court Ruling:

YES. By virtue of her power as a commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has the constitutional authority to
prohibit members of the AFP from attending a Senate hearing.

This is also under her prerogative as the highest official of the AFP. Note that it is not an
invocation of her executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power to control the
actions and speech of the members of the AFP. Non-compliance of the military
subordinates would violate the principle that 'the civilian authority is supreme over the
military authority'.