Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
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G.R. No. 204122
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G.R. No. 204238
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ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
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PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger
M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
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PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November
2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December
2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-
list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift
the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied
by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in
the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who
are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives:
one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization
of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors,
boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that
"the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in
light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list
system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of
the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the
problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats.
In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would
have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students,
professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the
nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the
Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14
sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law
become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the
enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation
in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote.
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list
system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a
sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their
party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has
two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or
organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be
attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the
COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be
a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the
votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be
a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization
or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats
will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the
maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they
then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees
have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end
of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets
10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2
percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats
are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say,
500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that?
When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes
gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a
sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also
means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as
a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the
same time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or
these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They
may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So,
they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives
in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather
than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even
have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list
system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society
through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like
very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put
a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the
50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party
list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party
list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo
ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi
ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this
system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang
labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem
of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he
qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party
is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such
sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in
the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral
organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and
shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are
final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include
not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral
parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral
parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system
exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting
Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner
Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated
to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the
view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt
their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough
to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand,
was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an
electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger
and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for
the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001
elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the
seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the
required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was
an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and
solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the
more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was
outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for
the first three consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the
1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively
for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at
least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative
district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The
commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties
from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and
regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and
regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to
make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for
sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list
system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section
5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list
system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions
for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option
the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section
5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are
not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the
youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined
political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy
of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does
not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the
grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations
after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds:
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list
system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions
of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the
1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar
sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral
party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not
mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or
her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-
defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On
the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise
to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to
the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest
and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions
in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack
"well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are
necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House
of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of
Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline,
that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the
COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties.
BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of
the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition
is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of
major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will
facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-
list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies
to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be
geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving
them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party
that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register
under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the
sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
1âwphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or
she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list
nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of
advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who
desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis
supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in
party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-
list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations
in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list
system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941, must now come to an end.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy
for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and
their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under
the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013
part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission
on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(on leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
EN BANC
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009,
or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts
of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor
and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the
origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until
its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process
progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the
local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the
oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for
such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by
the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the
former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for
inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners
theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created
by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to
form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least
250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a
legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of
additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission
fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred
(200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million
(55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented
by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the
Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from
the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in
the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only
creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
1avvphi1
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of
the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716,
the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over
which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the
petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues
that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their
content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an
important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the
hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the
part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an
issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and
so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the
more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not
a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be
a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor
any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for
a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn,
the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which
was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it
happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which
at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled
to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of
its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon
framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would
be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE
SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the
250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of
legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the
population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan
Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to
be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the
population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor
was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this
manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten
(10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner
Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in
his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are,
in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and
the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection,
with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at
least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first
allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of
at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to
increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this,
the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and
complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than
population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when
it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra,
Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second
District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards
set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats
should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the
legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included
with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from
San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based
on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined
population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron
are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of
Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more
potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo
and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose
inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included
in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments.
He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the
interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto
Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however,
that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity
requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of
Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total
population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no
substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with
the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet
and Baguio City.
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are
placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special
consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be
divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba
could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain
times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially
and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question
that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business
matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are
united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by
passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the
Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated
that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are
not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the
venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of
the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr.
Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the
amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio
City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan,
Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan,
Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based
on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to
be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area,"
because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of
compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were
"political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of
"chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral
leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be
grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that
they should "balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner
that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000
population is not allowed by the Constitution.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000
is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a
province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests
and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more
importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a
new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and
not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion
from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor
but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so
very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.
1avv phi 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
DECISION
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in
the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26,
27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for
even their women did change the natural use into that
which is against nature: And likewise also the men,
leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust
one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense
of their error which was meet.
xxxx
xxxx
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law
of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty
of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This
is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all
unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex
parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May
2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed
a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto
its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19,
2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion.Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the
COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported
violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports
by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and
affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC
claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for
denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of
petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior
to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure;
at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious
violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be
believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang
Ladlads principal place of business.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it
was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a
finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are
committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:
Equal Protection
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada
v. Escritor:[40]
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning
ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports
LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality
does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations
judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and
equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign
and international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is
certainly illuminating. Theseforeign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts
analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to
expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned,
our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion,
even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of
their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections.
Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right
to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in
its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and
groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,
international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
xxxx
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective
of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated
under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective
and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at
will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations.
This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights
language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by
various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.[53]
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This
Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best
as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission
on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
E N B A NC
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and
Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher)in a petition for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-
60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.BANAT filed its petition because [t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted
in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula
in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no intervenors in BANATs
petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety
below:
1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
SO ORDERED.[9]
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.[11]
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
issues in their petition:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties
in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 = 55
.80
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine
the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of
the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice
Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer
formula[21] as an alternative.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for
every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained
by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured
the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-
list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the
total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They
claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for
the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified
parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the
number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified
parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation
is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are
ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this
ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
ILONGGO
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
FILIPINA
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This
clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the
first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all
party-list candidates.
Votes Garnered
Votes over Total Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Party- Seat
List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.[30]
Total 17 55
xxx
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party
list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on
whether he is a farmer or not?
xxxx
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list elections
as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or
form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate
in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee
of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk,
he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior
citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left
the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains
a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice