BPI vs.
Posadas Case Digest Agapay vs Palang
BPI vs. Posadas
56 Phil 215
Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named
in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada. During the following five years the insured paid the
premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano.
The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed
administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by
an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada,
paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of
P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said
deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano
Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands,
as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of
the testamentary estate, and then returned the money to said widow. The
appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a life-insurance policy
belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured.
Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal
partnership.
Ruling: SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to
the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the
husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the
proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in
part.
That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as
the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as
part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to
the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the
assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in
these Islands or outside.
Case Doctrines:
● Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
● Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
● Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements.
● Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession.
Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months
after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned
for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with
19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A
house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.
Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation
with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of
two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in
favor of Miguel and Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA
erred in not declaring Kristopher as Miguel’s illegitimate son and thus entitled to
inherit from Miguel’s estate. (3) The CA erred “in not finding that there is sufficient
pleading and evidence that Kristoffer should be considered as party-defendant in Civil
Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.
Issues:
1. Who owns the riceland?
2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the
nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal partnership?
4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in
an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession?
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the
earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the
latter’s de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in
the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that
she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact
that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty
years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property,
there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation
not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that
the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would
still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of
the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony
of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the
falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided
the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as
the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly
provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except byjudicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should
not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted
for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is
for recovery of ownership and possession. Kristopher, not having been impleaded,
was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian
ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina
Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).
Edwin N. Tribiana, petitioner vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, respondent
Carpio, J. (September 13, 2004)
Facts:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since
1996, but formalized their union on October 28, 1997. On April 30, 1998, Lourdes filed
a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC, claiming Edwin left their conjugal home
with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of
Khriza, who was 1 year and 4 months old. Later, it was found that Khriza was with
Rosalina Tribiana, Edwin’s mother.
Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that it did not allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing, following FC 151. On
May 20, 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion by stating that there
were prior failed efforts at a compromise. Attached to Lourdes’ opposition was a copy
of the Certification to File Action from their barangay, dated May 1, 1998. On May 18,
1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order
requiring Edwin and Rosalina to bring Khriza to the RTC. Upon denial of his motion
for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and certiorari,
which was denied on July 2, 1998. Edwin’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied by the CA.
Issue: WoN the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under
FC 151
Held: The trial and appellate courts’ resolutions were affirmed.
Ratio:
The petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes indeed failed to allege that
she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her
opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss, she attached a Barangay Certification to File
Action. As Edwin did not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its
contents, this established that the parties tried to compromise, but were unsuccessful.
Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under FC 151. A
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1 (j) is warranted only if there is a failure to comply
with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege
compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal
of the action, but an amendment under Rule 10, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure.
Manalo vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11
children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in
Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and
for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was
set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10 days within
which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts
toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies
herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The
provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the
term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other
in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the
Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the
provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as
such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being
sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced
therein.
 GAYON VS. GAYON No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in article 2035.

FACTS: It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or
maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the
same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint Code, pursuant to which:
against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially
that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was
attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the Family relations shall include those:
sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the
barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
(1) Between husband and wife;
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than
October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre
Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the (2) Between parent and child;
expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso
had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon
improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said
property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a (4) Among brothers and sisters.
judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a
conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or
for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property.
nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said
Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar,
Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's
Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed
"any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to
to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
"employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the
least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff
decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the
"did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be
decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
sentenced to pay damages.
Gayon. It is so ordered.

ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an earnest effort toward
a compromise before the filing of the suit is tenable.

HELD:

As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the

present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a
residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed
to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz &
Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since
1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by
operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does
not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
CASE DIGEST PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 170829 , November
20, 2006
Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived
by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he
left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building
built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao,
Quezon City, (755) square meters
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition.On October 3,
2002, the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the
following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their
bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly
in the aforestated manner.In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and
Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held
that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses
Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the
family home.
Issue: whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Held: To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for
legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall
continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home.
 As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the
family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family
home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents
minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY
COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject
property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following
manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the

family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson
of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies
the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot

demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes
the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially
the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his

grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and
distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided

by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.[16] Legal support has the following
characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor
and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It
cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is
reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.[17]
G.R. No. 183965 Uy vs. Chua Petitioner: JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Respondent: compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise
JOSE NGO CHUA, agreement is a judgment on the merits.

Facts: Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against
respondent. She alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had
an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two
children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at
the birth of the latter instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as
mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the
maiden surname of Irene’s mother.
A contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code,
one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the
Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future Legitime.
The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and
filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.

However, respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even
provided employment for her. SHe and Allan were introduced to each other and
became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as
his representative and Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of
petitioner’s daughter.
Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that
petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented
documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had
already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation
against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the
Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement
was made between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and
acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her
brother Allan on one hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two
Million Pesos each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise
Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future
legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula
v. Advincula. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and
filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack
of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court
to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.

The court ruled in favor of the respondent hence this appeal Decision Reversed and Set Aside.

Issue: Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments

predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines;

Held: Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namelypublic policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. The requisites must alsoconcur:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order
on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. The court rules held that res judicata does
not exist in this case.

The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of
the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial
 Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almontewere married in 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to have
his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged
that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter had married
one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled
that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous.
It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody
of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but
by Mario during his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is
a legitimatechild of Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since
the marriagebetween Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio,
the marriage between Marioand Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time
Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that
Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and Mario.
Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is
strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since
the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning;
he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn
the legitimacy of her child.
The petition was denied.
Andal vs. Macaraig Case Digest
Andal vs. Macaraig
89 Phil 165
Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that
Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that
Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his
mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the
latter in favor of the former.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the
plea that only question of law are involved.
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix,
went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His
sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up
from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the
house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each
other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did
not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal.
Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January
1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was
born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the
husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of
the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband
to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is
patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a
man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation
between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him
the owner of the parcel land.
 CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew
of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of
their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March
5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin
sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a
TCT was issued in the latter’s name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however,
attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the
lone witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners’
filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case
and submitted a written offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on
the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court
of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an
heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
Ruling:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the
legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule
that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed
to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his
heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335)
which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband
or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the
status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a
long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available.
2. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit
the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article
1001.”

“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive

with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.”

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject

property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly
alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property
to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the
Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth
(1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.