Cordillera Broad Coalition vs.
Commission on Audit enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
G. R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such
as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground
that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative
powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of
Cordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are
unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of
the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region.
In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly
take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address
the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had
not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the
President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not
yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic
structure of government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court
finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional
government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the
existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies
of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-
governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in
the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite
for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-
creating process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
Facts:
A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and
Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA
6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions
pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite;
and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments
against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into
either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with
the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
Held:
The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes
the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article
XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall
take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one
hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only
the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall
be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous
region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1
(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer
to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent
units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will
readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of
the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores
this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas,
which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner
claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region
which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the
standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute
the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the
ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is
within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground
that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art.
III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and
the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the
Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law.
Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the
Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to
any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the
Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might
be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists.
There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law
resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court
in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived
potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to
merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on
the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
Tano vs Socrates
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted
an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying
that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as
unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and
7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held
that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under
the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that
any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect
the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence
or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the
state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light
of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot
be doubted.
Secretary of Health v. CA
G.R. No. 112243, February 23, 1995
FACTS:
In 1991, administrative complaint was filed against private respondent Fe
Sibbaluca, the Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of
Cagayan, for grave misconduct, dishonesty; etc. The case was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 of the Department of Health,
Manila.
As a consequence of the administrative case, PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
PLACED UNDER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for ninety [90] days per order
dated December 17, 1991, issued by herein petitioner Secretary of Health.
Private respondent sought the lifting of her suspension thru a motion dated
January 8, 1992.
Pending resolution of her said motion, private respondent instituted an
action for prohibition,mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao (Branch 1), docketed as Civil Case
No. 4379 and 4397, seeking the nullification of the order of preventive
suspension and of the entire administrative proceedings. Her action is
anchored on her contention that when the New Local Government Code
took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had LOST HIS
DISCIPLINARY POWER AND AUTHORITY over her, considering that such
power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office is now
vested in the PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR.
Finding merit to the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent, the
Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order on January 15,
1992, restraining the Secretary of Health and his representatives from
enforcing the preventive suspension order and from conducting further
proceedings in the administrative case against private respondent.
On February 3, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed an omnibus MOTION TO
DISMISS private respondent's action and to quash the temporary restraining
order, with opposition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
contending inter alia that private respondent had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and that the New Local Government Code DID NOT
DIVEST the Secretary of Health of his disciplinary jurisdiction over the
private respondent.
On March 25, 1992, the respondent Judge rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent:
Considering, however, that with the enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, the provincial health
board headed by the governor is empowered to create committees which
shall advise local health agencies on matters of grievance and complaints,
personal discipline, it is clear that the Secretary of Health ceases to have
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and consequently the power
and authority to issue the order of suspension (Sec. 102 of the Local
Government Code of 1991).
order of suspension and all other orders emanating thereafter are null and
void and of no further effect" (Annex "B", Petition; p. 40, Rollo).
On April 27, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
March 25, 1992 decision and of the April 14, 1992 order, insisting that the
Secretary of Health HAS JURISDICTION over the administrative case.
Petitioners also contended, among other things, that respondent Judge has
no jurisdiction to nullify all orders issued by the secretary of Health, "they
being of equal rank."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated May
28, 1992 (Annex "A", Petition; p. 58, Rollo).
On the same date of May 28, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed a Notice of
Appeal with the court a quo. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed
another motion to stay the execution of the assailed decision.
Both the notice of appeal and the motion to stay execution WERE DENIED
upon the ground that the NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME and
that the ASSAILED DECISION HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY. The denial was contained in a decision dated June 26, 1992
which CONVICTED co-petitioner Dr. Jose Cabrera of indirect contempt of
court for refusing to comply with the writ of execution (Annex "C", Petition;
p. 41, Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Health exercises jurisdiction over private
respondent?
RULING:
YES, the Secretary of Health exercises jurisdiction over private respondent.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined BY THE STATUTE IN FORCE
AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION (Philippine
Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).
In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged
before petitioner department IN 1991. The case was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was
issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time
of the commencement of the administrative action, the operative laws are
the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119.
Under the said laws, the SECRETARY OF HEALTH EXERCISES control,
direction and supervision over his subordinates, which INCLUDE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it CONTINUES
UNTIL THE FINAL DISPOSITION of the administrative case.
This Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired
by a court over a case remains with it until the full termination of the case,
unless a law provides the contrary (Bueno Industrial and Development
Corporation v. Enage, 104 SCRA 600 [1981]).
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, it cannot be said that the Local
Government Code of 1991 is applicable her case which commenced in 1991.
It is EXPLICIT in the abovestated law that the Local Government Code of
1991 shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of
statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are
not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature
should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v.
Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993]).
Greater Balanga Development Corporation
vs.
Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)
G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994
FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public
market in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in
the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by ISSUE:
the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in
W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.
the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was later subdivided into
certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated. Five buyers of the lot
filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.
HELD:
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the
Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi
partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the
“real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator.” However, the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation
Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of
ownership of the lot caused “anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false
the stallholders and traders in the lot,” and advising the Mayor to revoke statement. Good faith is always presumed.
the permit “to operate a public market.” The Mayor then revoked the permit
In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to
through EO No. 1 s-88.
state the “type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.”
Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's
mandatory injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not
permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of market and entrance justified because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein.
fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus,
Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground
there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed to
for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly
observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market fees is
require two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one
illegal.
place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting,
On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief however, that separate permits are actually required, the application form
executive has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that does not contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the
the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of applicant wishes to engage in.
the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the
The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for
application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse claims
expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't
for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate permits for
the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).
actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate
any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions
under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg.
337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the
stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the
Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.
Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed
petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b)
of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and
neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover,
Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot
collect market fees, which only an owner can do.
Evardone v. Comelec
204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991
Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to
the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately
after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and
Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the
Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a
Resolution approving the recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto
Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone.
Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution,
the Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of
the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was
valid.
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress.
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government
code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor
any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government
officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution
No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to
a local government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets
forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions
of the present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the
existing Local Government Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain
operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided
in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991
will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present
case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No.
2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional.
Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for
recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
Issue 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of
the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held:
No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the
Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced
by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and
determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only
on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of the
COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But
despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the
petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO
on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the
same on the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado.
The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality
of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of
the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar
Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar
or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive
Secretary there is no turning back the
clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is
included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate
must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also
predicated upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public
interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices
are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific
duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal
withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge
his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The
constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus,
the signing process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P.
Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a
synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more
specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of
May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7)
months before the regular local election will be violative of the above
provisions of the applicable Local Government Code
MMDA V. GARIN
GR No. 130230 April 15, 2005
Facts:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his
driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed
a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of
his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in
court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with
application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses,
pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore
unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise
police power.
HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government
Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs."
16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of
the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f)
states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations
of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature,
and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement
of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and
P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose,
the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP,
traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated
certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
[G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005]
FACTS:
This case involves the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, which is a town
that is not supposed to exist yet but is insisted by some as actually alive and
thriving. Andong was created through Executive Order No. 107 issued by
Pres. Macapagal in 1965, which was declared void in the case of Pelaez vs.
Auditor General (1965).
Sultan Camid alleges that Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential
services for the municipality and its constituents.” He however concedes
that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve
any of the elective local government positions in Andong. He also alleges
that the town has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, among
others. According to him, public officials of Andong have been serving their
constituents in their own little ways and means despite absence of public
funds. To bolster his claims, he presented to the Court a DENR-CENRO
Certification of the total land area of the Municipality of Andong. He also
submitted a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi
City concerning Andong’s population (14,059). He also lists several
government agencies and private groups that have allegedly recognized
Andong.
Camid assails the DILG certification of 18 municipalities certified as
“existing” per DILG records. These 18, were among the 33 municipalities
whose creation was voided by the Court in the Pelaez case. He imputes
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG for not classifying Andong
as a regular existing municipality and in not including it in its records and
official database.
Camid also argues that EO 107 remains valid because of the decision of court
in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Hon. Mendez, where the court affirmed
the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto
municipal corporation. He insists that inspite of insurmountable obstacles,
Andong lives on. Hence, its existence should be given judicial affirmation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive fiat, which was
previously voided by the Court, may attain recognition in the absence of any
curative or implementing statute.
RULING:
The Court said that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of
certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of
factual questions. Also, the Pelaez case and its offspring cases ruled that the
President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this
Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in
1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by the
Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative
whatever legal defects these municipalities had labored under.
EO to receive recognition, they must “have their respective set of elective
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the LGC. Andong has
never elected its municipal officers at all. The national government ceased
to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public
funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections in the void municipality.
Andong is not listed as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur in the
Ordinance apportioning the seats of Congress in the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, Andong has not been reestablished through statute. In contrast, the
18 municipalities in the DILG certification, were recognized as such because
subsequent to the ruling in the Pelaez case, legislation was enacted to
reconstitute these municipalities.
Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the
judicially-dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. On the
other hand, the municipalities judicially-dissolved in cases such as Pelaez,
San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18)
municipalities certified by the DILG.

Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal

corporation. This is because there are eminent differences between Andong
and the other municipalities. The most prominent is that, the EO which
created Andong was expressly annulled by the Court in 1965. The court said
that if it would affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged
continued existence despite its nullification, it would in effect condone
defiance of a valid order of the Court. Court decisions cannot lose their
efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code (LGC), as it requires that, for the municipality created by