[G.R. No. 131541.

October 20, 2000]

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED and JEROME O. CASTRO, petitioners, vs. LEONORA NAVAL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This damage suit arose from a collision of vehicles based on the following facts:

"(O)n May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem[1] was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near
Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far
from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the
direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the
taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver
to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the
said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident." [2]

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the
Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and
ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's
fees and costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City dated September
25, 1995, reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
following:

1. The amount of P47,850.00 as actual damages;

2. The amount of P45,000.00 as compensatory damages for unrealized income;

3. The amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

5. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a quo.[4] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The
petition was denied on February 2, 1998 for failure to submit an explanation why no personal service of copies of certain pleadings
was made as required by Rule 13, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5]Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the
petition was reinstated and private respondent was required to file her Comment in a Resolution dated June 22, 1998.[6] A copy of
the said Resolution was sent by registered mail to private respondent's counsel but the same was returned to sender.[7] In a separate
Resolution issued on the same date, this Court ordered that a copy of the June 22, 1998 Resolution be served personally on private
respondent's counsel.[8] As the said Resolution was also returned unserved, "the Court Resolved to consider the said Resolution as
SERVED."[9] After more than a year, no Comment has been filed. Considering that private respondent was given only ten (10) days to
file her Comment, that period had already lapsed ten days after the June 23, 1999 Resolution which stated that the June 22, 1998
resolution as "served".
Service of notice or other pleadings which are required by the rules to be furnished to the parties must be made on their last
address on record. If they are represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the counsel's last given address on record
in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, [10]unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court.[11] It is the party and his counsel's responsibility to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for
them[12] just as it is the duty of counsel to inform the court of a change in his address. In the case at bar, private respondent's
counsel never notified the Court of any change of his address or whether he no longer holds office in his last address of
record. Neither was the Court informed if his ties with his client has been severed. Insofar as the Court is concerned, the last address
on record is the place where all notices shall be served until the Court is officially informed to the contrary. What is the effect of the
failure of a private respondent to comply with a court order to file Comment?
Courts are given the option to dispense with the filing of the Comment and consider the case as deemed submitted for
decision. Under Rule 46, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [13] when the respondent in an original action filed with the
court fails to file its comment, the case may be decided on the basis of the evidence on record without prejudice to disciplinary
action against the disobedient party. Concomitant thereto is the rule that pursuant to Rule 51, Section 1(B)(1), [14] where no
comment is filed upon the expiration of the period to comment in an original action or a petition for review, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision. Both provisions are applicable to a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court as provided in
Rule 56, Section 2(a) of the Rules.[15] Moreover, a lawyer who fails to submit the required Comment manifests willful disobedience to
a lawful order of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the Canon of Professional Ethics. [16] Counsel must remember that his actions
and omissions are binding on his client.[17] He should not neglect legal matters entrusted to him as his negligence therefrom shall
render him liable.[18]
The petition lacks merit.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. It is a time-honored precept that the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts,[19] although it has authority to review and reverse factual findings of lower courts if these do not conform to evidence. [20] It
is also settled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is binding on the Supreme
Court[21] and generally conclusive,[22] especially if it has not been adequately shown that no significant facts and circumstances were
overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have altered the outcome of the disposition.
The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily
liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and
this should not relieve him of liability.[23] From petitioner Castro's testimonial admissions, it is established that he was driving at a
speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope coming from the Rosario bridge. But as he allegedly
stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently hit the taxicab. The sudden
malfunction of the vehicle's brake system is the usual excuse of drivers involved in collisions which are the result of speedy driving,
particularly when the road is downhill.
Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties
such as commuters, drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know about the conditions of his vehicle and is
duty bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a good father of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the
streets. As petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a downhill drive would naturally
cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision
occurred. This was a disregard of traffic safety rules. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man
of ordinary diligence and prudence and determines liability by that. [24] Even assuming arguendo that loss of brakes is an act of God,
by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering the Nissan driver liable for the ensuing
damages.[25]
As mentioned earlier, the driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularly on major
streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to
have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part,
making him contributorily liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the night when traffic
enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the
driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of
the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision is MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
to private respondent the amount of P23,925.00 as actual damages. All other awards are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval. Gr. No.131541. 20 Oct 2000

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts: On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near
Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far
from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the
direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the
taxicab. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and
its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident. Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit
against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After
trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Issue: Whether or not Castro was Negligent.
Ruling: Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's
taxi.
The Supreme Court held that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab
was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his
own making and this should not relieve him of liability. The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally
advisable particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other
lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously,
there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules
especially during the night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary
concern should be the safety not only of the driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took
her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of
respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boysupported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the
relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do
not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With
respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of
Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of
the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
 The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves
in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.

36 ROYONG v OBLENA
FACTS:
§ Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter.
§ In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the
incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family.
§ As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
§ Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with
him.
§ The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the
Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances
behind the incident
§ The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person
of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also
has a legal husband in the province
§ Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the
court overruled his petition
§ After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring
any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after
he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar.

ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to
cause Oblena’s disbarment

HELD: YES!
§ Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for
disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to
exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be
exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
§ American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that
as a ground of disbarment.
§ Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar
examination is wrong. One’s own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he other people
thinks he is.
§ His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena
and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
§ Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royong’s
trust on him.
§ Oblena’s contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from
the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the
same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
investigation.
A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.

The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel
regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the
telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and
volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her
legal problems to him: that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the
complainant and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations
between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his
relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to
contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get
married under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in
this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an
application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter,
the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife;
that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that
as a result of their being together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost;
that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said
Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil
marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the
complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had
done nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the
complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an
officer of the courts of justice. 1

In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the complainant.

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation
containing finding that the complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter
of fact they had three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in
Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they
had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels.

ISSUE: W/N respondent Paz may be disbarred on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct as found in Sec. 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: No. The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent.
As the Sol. Gen. said in his report, “From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress
of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully
aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences.

NOTES

 In Arboleda vs Gatchalian, this Court held: that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant
and the charge against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a
case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360 01/30/1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several
pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency
of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were
filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on
the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted
arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law.
Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the
offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27
and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects
of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this Court.
MORENO V. ARANETA
A.C. NO. 1109 (27 APRIL 2005)

FACTS:
 Petitioner is a manager of Philippine Leasing Corporation while Respondent is a lawyer and president of Lira, Inc.;
 On 25 September 1972, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the Supreme Court on two causes of action: (a)
the dishonor of respondent’s endorsement of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 amounting to Php2,177; and (b)
nonpayment of debts amounting to Php11,000 which resulted from respondent’s issuance of checks that were
subsequently dishonored because the account was closed;
 Respondent contended on the first allegation that it was petitioner who borrowed from him the amount of Php2,500 to
which he issued the said Treasury Warrants and additional cash of Php323. On the second allegation he admitted that he
issued undated checks in her favor and warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and
could not be encashed and that to protect himself, he asked petitioner to issue check amounting to Php11,000 to offset the
borrowed checks.
 On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The
case was heard on 22 January 1973 but was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973 due to respondent’s absence;
 On 24 January 1973, an ex-parte hearing was conducted. It was later scheduled on 27 February and 28 May but was
postponed by respondent;
  On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. On 02 November
1988, a hearing was scheduled to which neither of the parties came;
 On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner submitted a decision declaring: (1) The issuance of the Treasury Warrants was an
act of Lira, Inc. and not of respondent and (2) The issuance of the two checks was an act of connivance of the respondent
with the petitioner to make use of useless commercial documents to deceive the public. The commission further stated
that “the act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against exacting standards of morality and decency required of
a member of the Bar.” Respondent was recommended to be suspended for 3 months to take effect upon notice of the
decision. The IBP Board of Governors increased the period from three to six months suspension;
 On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted records of the case to the SC. On 8 July 2003, the office of
the Bar Confidant filed a report attaching Resolution from the SC, indefinitely suspending respondent for having convicted
by final judgment of estafa through falsification of commercial document;

ISSUE: Whether or not issuance of useless commercial documents and falsification constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude?

HELD: Issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interest of the parties directly
involved in the transaction…xxx Thus, the act of a person issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.

xxx…Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of crime involving moral turpitude, thus in the case of
Jaramillo, by his conviction the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

Moreno vs. Araneta, A.C No. 1109, April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were
dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case wasforwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records
of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant
filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case.The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of
moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one year’s suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant
case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously
committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more
severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say
that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administrationof justice.”

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. vs. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO (A.C. No. 8390 [Formerly CBD 06-1641], July 2, 2010)
Atty. Valerio obtained a loan from complainant and secured the payment of the loan obligation by issuing a postdated check.
However, upon its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite
repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation. After repeated demands by
the trial court Atty. Valerio failed to give any response. After an administrative case had been filed by complainant against Atty.
Valerio with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the latter’s mother explained that her daughter had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. IBP-CBD recommended Atty. Valerio be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification of the period of suspension to 1 year.

Issue: whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Held: WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Laarni N.
Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is
hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Ruling: SC sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

“They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. “

The Court, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerio’s justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e.
schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the “medical
certificate” on its face, considering Mrs. Valerio’s failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued
it.

Atty. Valerio’s conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She failed to answer the
complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the
proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her arraignment,
despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

SC deems it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice
of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton
disregard of the IBP’s and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.

Administrative Order No. 322, s. 1960

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 322

REMOVING MR. EDUARDO A. ABESAMIS FROM OFFICE AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF ECHAGUE AND ANGADANAN, ISABELA.

This is an administrative case against Mr. Eduardo A. Abesamis justice of the peace of Echague and Angadanan, Isabela, which is an
offshoot of Criminal Code No. 878 of the Court of First Instance of Isabela against him for swindling through falsification of public
document. He was found guilty of the crime by said court and, on appeal, by the Court of Appeals, and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of from 6 months and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day.

It appears from the administrative investigation conducted by the District Judge that on December 15, 1948, respondent submitted
to, and collected from, the municipal treasurer of Echague a voucher covering his salary for the period from December 1 to 15, 1948,
in the amount of ₱110 at the rate of ₱220 a month. On December 31, 1948, he presented another voucher covering his salary for
the period from December 1 to 31, 1948, and received from the municipal treasurer of Angadanan the sum of ₱220. By the same
process he collected on January 7, 1949, the sum of ₱103.40 (₱6.60 having been deducted as his contribution to the Government
Service Insurance System) as salary for December 16 to 31, 1948, from the municipal treasurer of Echague; and on January 31, 1949,
the sums of ₱213.40 (₱6.60 having been deducted for his insurance contribution) and ₱220 as salary for the month of January 1949
from the municipal treasurer of Echague and Angadanan, respectively.

It is admitted that the respondent received double payment of salary for the months of December 1948 and January 1949. He
claims, however, to have done so by mistake and in good faith. This is untenable. As observed by the District Judge, it is hard to
believe that when he received his salary on December 31, 1948, for the whole month of December 1948 he had forgotten that he
had already received his salary for the first half of that month. It is also incredible that when he collected on January 7, 1949, his
salary for the second half of December 1948 he had again forgotten that he had been paid salary for the whole month of December
only a week before. That there could not have been any honest mistake on his part is best shown by his act of collecting on the same
date, January 31,1949, from the two municipalities of Echague and Angadanan his salary for the same month of January 1949,

His claim that there was no damage caused the Government as the overpayment was refunded even before formal demand was
made upon him is without merit. The refund was made seven months after the commission of the offense and only after a letter of
demand had been sent by the provincial auditor and his attention had been called to the matter by the provincial secretary. Under
the circumstances, damage and prejudice, in the contemplation of law, was caused the Government.

In collecting double salary for two successive months under the circumstances above recited, the respondent is guilty of dishonesty
which renders him unfit for his office.

WHEREFORE, and upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the District Judge, Mr. Eduardo A. Abesamis is hereby
removed from office as justice of the peace of Echague and Angadanan, Isabela, effective as of the date of his preventive
suspension.

Done in the City of Manila, this 19th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty, and of the Independence of
the Philippines, the fourteenth.

Roberto Soriano vs. Atty. Manuel Dizon

AC 6792 January 25, 2006

FACTS: Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when along Abanao Street, Baguio City, a taxi driver
overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt.
To stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door, causing Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the
latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an impending attack. Soriano prevented another attempt
by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver with the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano was
handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the thigh of the
accused, and the latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According
to the doctors who treated him, he would have died if not for the timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord injury
causing the left side of his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation, conditioned on payment of civil liabilities.
However, four years after judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. The Commissioner of the CBD
recommended that respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule.
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their
resolution to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:

1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon
involved moral turpitude. The court defined moral turpitude as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon
shot a taxi driver for no justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was the aggressor
because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending himself when he counterpunched Dizon.
Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with treachery when he shot Soriano when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up, when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to
escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief in order not to leave fingerprints on the gun used.
Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic incident indicated his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon
failed to obey the laws of the land through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect legal
processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his probation.

Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he tried to reach an out-of-court
settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it was the family who
approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two other
persons who mauled him. According to the three doctors who examined Dizon, his injuries were so minor that his allegation
was so improbable.

The court ruled that the appalling treachery and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly showed his unfitness to continue
as a member of the bar. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, which is not only a condition precedent to admission, but also a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
While the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any
lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired, the court held that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with the lofty aspiration that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice. Atty. Dizon was disbarred.

58 CJS 1201