Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism

Author(s): Robert Hudson
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 341-358
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/652960 .
Accessed: 06/09/2015 13:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and
Empiricism*
Robert Hudson†

Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap’s conventionalism on the grounds that it relies
on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second
incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel’s
critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel’s admissibility criterion; in
effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the
application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed
committed to an empirical requirement vis-à-vis tolerance, a fact that becomes clear
upon closer scrutiny of Carnap’s relevant writings.

1. Introduction. As is well known, Rudolf Carnap in his “Intellectual

Autobiography” notes that in his philosophical discussions with friends
he is prone to adopt differing philosophical views depending on who he
was talking to, “adapting [himself] to their ways of thinking and speaking”
(1963, 17). For example, with one friend he might be a realist, with another
an idealist. As he continues, some friends apparently called him on this,
pointing to his inconsistent philosophical attitude, and when pressed to
clarify his position he would remark that his view is “closer to that of
physicists and those philosophers who are in contact with scientific work”
(17–18). On further reflection, Carnap realizes that in fact he is neutral
with respect to these differing philosophical forms of language, a neu-
trality based as he explains on the principle that “everyone is free to use
the language most suited to his purpose.” He coins this ‘principle of
tolerance’ in his Logical Syntax of Language (LSL; Carnap 1934/1937).
This neutral attitude, he avers, “has remained the same throughout my
life” (18).
Friedman (2001, 228–35) traces the evolution of the principle of tol-

*Received July 2009; revised January 2010.

†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Sas-
katchewan, 9 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A5, Canada; e-mail: r.hudson@
usask.ca.
Philosophy of Science, 77 (July 2010) pp. 341–358. 0031-8248/2010/7703-0004$10.00
Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

341

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
342 ROBERT HUDSON

erance in Carnap’s thought, starting from Carnap’s doctoral work in the

early 1920s, through the Aufbau period (late 1920s and early 1930s), sub-
sequently to LSL, and up to “Empiricism, Semantic and Ontology” (ESO;
Carnap 1956). In detail, as Friedman’s discussion makes evident, Carnap’s
neutral attitude has not always stayed the same. In his doctoral work,
Carnap expresses neutrality regarding differing notions of space: one can
interpret ‘space’ in different ways—the “formal, intuitive and physical”
(Friedman 2001, 228; italics removed)—and dependimg on the interpre-
tation adopted, one can be led to formulate alternative foundations for
geometry. Nevertheless, no one interpretation is said to have priority over
the others; each is said to contain “part of the truth” (229). The Aufbau
in turn expresses neutrality in two different ways. First, it is neutral with
respect to different possible bases for constitutional systems. One can
legitimately start with an autopsychological, heteropsychological, physi-
cal, or even a cultural basis to a constitutional system—which basis one
prefers depends on one’s methodological perspective. Second, the Aufbau
expresses neutrality about the different epistemological schools of realism,
idealism, and phenomenalism—Carnap expresses no preference for any
of these metaphysical positions. Subsequently, as Friedman describes the
matter (229–30), Carnap’s adoption of the logicist framework that un-
derpins the Aufbau itself became a target for liberalization in light of the
foundational debates in the late 1920s, and as a result in LSL there is a
further move to liberalizing even one’s choice of logic. As Carnap ex-
presses one version of the principle of tolerance, “in logic, there are no
morals” (1934/1937, sec. 17, 52); that is, there is no a priori restriction
on what foundation for logic or mathematics (intuitionist, formalist, or
logicist) one can adopt. When we turn to ESO, Friedman asserts, we find
a kindred liberality, this time in terms of a choice of linguistic frameworks:
in choosing a language, we are faced with an ‘external’ question that is
answered in practical terms, just as the choice of syntax or logic in LSL
is practically motivated (Friedman 2001, 235). Now, despite these vari-
ations, we can say that in general terms Carnap’s attitude of tolerance is
consistent—with regard to a variety of philosophical issues, Carnap re-
serves judgment and refuses to take sides. As he recalls in “Testability
and Meaning” (TM; Carnap 1936/1937), as a member of the Vienna Circle
his reservation was due to his considering numerous philosophical alter-
natives to be simply meaningless (5). With TM his view moderates to
simply regarding alternative philosophical viewpoints as different lin-
guistic ‘proposals’ that possess differing degrees of practical value (Fried-
man 2001, 232–33). This more modest view persists in Carnap’s work
until at least ESO.
A key issue we will be considering here is where one draws the line
between those claims that have no cognitive status other than as ‘pro-

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 343

posals’ and about which our choices are only practically motivated and
those claims that are legitimate assertions. Carnap’s response to this issue,
as I will argue, is to draw the line on empirical grounds, an answer that
is contrary to the received view on how Carnap applies the principle of
tolerance, which regards that principle as binding independently of any
empirical considerations. I plan to defend my interpretation of Carnap
by examining, in the main, relevant passages in LSL, TM, and ESO that
I believe make it clear that it is on empirical grounds that Carnap decides
to be neutral or tolerant on certain theoretical issues. In effect, Carnap’s
position is at once tolerant and conservative: where empirical facts are
uninformative, one is free to offer theoretical proposals regarding syn-
tactical usage or the choice of a linguistic framework on practical grounds;
however, where empirical facts have some bearing, one is to that extent
forced to withdraw one’s tolerant attitude.
The launching pad for my investigation will be discussions by Thomas
Ricketts and Michael Friedman of an objection by Kurt Gödel to Car-
nap’s conventionalism. Ricketts and Friedman independently argue that
Gödel’s objection misrepresents Carnap by wrongly attaching to him ad-
vocacy of an empirical criterion in the application of the principle of
tolerance. I argue in response that Gödel correctly represents Carnap’s
conventionalism and that the reasons Ricketts and Friedman provide for
resisting Gödel’s depiction are misleading. Later on, I discuss and reject
some objections to my empiricist interpretation of Carnap. In the end, I
hope to gain some clarity on how Carnap proposes to apply the principle
of tolerance.

2. Gödel’s Critique. Ricketts (1994, 2007) and Friedman (2001) cite and
respond to the following objection raised by Kurt Gödel to Carnap’s
application of the principle of tolerance to the philosophy of mathematics.
According to Gödel’s interpretation of tolerance, one decides among var-
ious candidate foundational positions regarding mathematics, such as
between logicism, intuitionism, or formalism, by conventionally choosing
one or another of these positions subject to an ‘admissibility requirement’.
As Ricketts explains,

the correctness or truth of the valid sentences of a calculus is stip-

ulated by the decision to adopt the calculus as the language for
science. . . . However, the truth of the valid sentences of a language
can be stipulated by adoption of the calculus only if the atomic
observation sentences are independent of the logic of the language.
. . . So, as a prerequisite for stipulating the truth of L-valid [i.e.,
logically valid] sentences of a calculus, we must show, as Gödel puts
it, that the transformation rules [i.e., those governing logical deduc-

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
344 ROBERT HUDSON

tions] are admissible in that they ‘do not imply the truth or falsity
of any proposition expressing an empirical fact’ (2007, 209, quoting
from Gödel 1995, 357; Ricketts’s italics; see also Ricketts 1994, 179;
Friedman 2001, 225).

To show the admissibility of these transformation rules, we need to show

the consistency of the language generated by such rules, specifically, the
consistency of its mathematics, for from an inconsistent language all and
any sentences can be derived, including those expressing empirical facts.
However, Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem dictates that showing
the consistency of a mathematics requires the assumption of a mathe-
matics in the metalanguage that is itself consistent and of equal or greater
strength. It follows, as a result of the admissibility requirement, that the
convention of choosing a language system leads one into a vicious cir-
cularity—the consistency of this system can only be shown by assuming
its consistency. The conclusion is that it is not possible for there to be an
adequate, that is, noncircular, conventional choice of a language system
that abides by the admissibility requirement.
In response, Ricketts and Friedman independently aspire to defend
Carnap from Gödel’s circularity objection by questioning Gödel’s as-
sumption that Carnap is allied to the admissibility requirement. For ex-
ample, Ricketts remarks that “the requirement of an admissibility proof
. . . rests on a language-transcendent notion of empirical fact, of empirical
truth and falsity, a notion that is not tied to a particular calculus” (2007,
210; see also Ricketts 1994, 180; Friedman 2001, 241). But as Ricketts
and Friedman interpret him, Carnap rejects any such notion of an em-
pirical fact and so rejects the correlative admissibility requirement. Here
is how Ricketts explains Carnap’s rejection. To begin with, adopting “such
a language-transcendent notion of empirical fact imposes constraints on
the choice of a calculus, making some choices incorrect because those
choices stipulate sentences to be true which are in fact false” (2007, 210).
Yet, Ricketts contends, because of the principle of tolerance, Carnap’s
position is that there are not any epistemic constraints on the choice of
a language system that depend on the truth or falsity of any assertions—
there are only pragmatic constraints that deem a language choice as val-
uable for this or that practical aim. Thus, the principle of tolerance ef-
fectively undermines the admissibility requirement (Ricketts 1994, 180;
2007, 207). Friedman’s approach, by comparison, emphasizes that for
Carnap one determines which assertions count as analytic and which
count as synthetic (i.e., empirical) by setting up a language system. As
Friedman remarks, “the conventional statements relative to a given for-
mal-logical system are just the sentences that are analytic relative to this
system; the empirical statements relative to a given formal-logical system

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 345

are just those sentences that are synthetic relative to this system” (2001,
228; see also 241). It follows that there is no prelinguistic or language-
transcendent notion of an empirical fact on hand to guide one’s conven-
tional choice of a language system, such as would be needed in applying
the admissibility requirement. Accordingly, for both Ricketts and Fried-
man, Gödel’s requirement of admissibility is asserted to be an unfaithful
representation of Carnap’s conventionalism, and thus Carnap’s conven-
tionalism is insulated from Gödel’s critique.
My plan here is to argue that Carnap does (and should) subscribe to
the fundamentals of Gödel’s admissibility requirement and that in fact
he would (and should) embrace Gödel’s rejection of a pure convention-
alism that seeks to delineate, a priori as it were, the distinction between
the empirical and the analytic. To begin with, it is worthwhile commenting
in support of Gödel’s admissibility constraint. For example, it sounds
right to require that logically valid truths do not have any empirical
implications, for if they did, they could hardly be called logically valid
since they would then be empirically testable. In a sense, then, we have
a partial test for the logical validity of a claim, to wit, does it have any
empirical implications? If so, there is no logical validity to be had. But
still, does an advocacy of Gödel’s requirement not land us squarely in
the circularity problem cited above? One response here, suggested by
Awodey and Carus (2004), is that there is no need to show that a language
is consistent in order for such a language to be admissible—it need only
be the case that a language is consistent and thus is admissible (206–9).
An alternate answer might be that, although there is a need to show that
a stipulated language is consistent on pain of its entailing all sentences,
it is not only noncircularly impossible to satisfy this requirement—it is
also practically unachievable for any but the simplest languages. Partic-
ularly, the proponents of scientific theories would surely demand that their
theories be consistent, but they nevertheless recognize that providing such
consistency proofs would be elusive given the wide scope and explanatory
depth of most worthwhile theories. Thus, the absence of a demonstration
of the consistency of a language (or scientific theory) is not an unexpected
result and is a conundrum we are faced with, Gödel’s result or not.
But let us step back a moment and consider what LSL has to say about
how we determine that we are faced with a logical question (i.e., a syn-
tactical question) as opposed to an object question (a question about
objects in the world). Carnap, in section 74 (286), distinguishes (1) object
sentences, (2) pseudo-object sentences, and (3) syntactical sentences. Ob-
ject sentences, strictly speaking, pose no problems for the logic of science
since they are “concerned with things which . . . occur in the empirical
sciences” (Carnap 1934/1937, sec. 74, 278). Nor do syntactical sentences
pose any problems: they are simply sentences phrased in the ‘formal mode

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
346 ROBERT HUDSON

of speech’ referring to the use of linguistic objects such as terms and

sentences. More problematic are pseudo-object sentences, sentences
phrased in the ‘material mode of speech’ that appear to refer to “extra-
linguistic objects” (sec. 78, 298), such as numbers and things, but in fact
refer (more formally) to linguistic items such as number words and thing
words. Note that the problem with pseudo-object sentences is not so much
that they refer to extra-linguistic objects (object sentences do that un-
problematically) but that they do so illegitimately. The question is what
we mean here by ‘illegitimately’.
Suppose, for example, we have a candidate ‘P-primitive sentence’, where
such a sentence stands for a fundamental physical law (Carnap 1934/1937,
sec. 82, 316). This sentence will presumably make reference to objects—
so is it an object sentence or only a pseudo-object sentence? If the latter,
we need to change it from the material mode of speech to the formal
mode. If the former, no such translation is required since as Carnap
explains, “translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the
touchstone for all philosophical sentences, or, more generally, for all sen-
tences which do not belong to the language of any one of the empirical
sciences” (sec. 81, 313; italics removed). That is, the formal mode of speech
is unneeded for object sentences since they stand as legitimate scientific
sentences. So how can we tell when a candidate P-primitive sentence is a
pseudo-object sentence? Here is Carnap’s answer in LSL: “a newly stated
P-primitive sentence is shown to be a pseudo-sentence if either no sufficient
rules of formation are given by means of which it can be seen to be a
sentence or no sufficient rules of transformation [are given] by means of
which it can . . . be submitted to an empirical test” (sec. 82, 322). In
other words, a P-primitive sentence is a pseudosentence if it is ill formed
or untestable. Conversely, a well-formed sentence counts as an object
sentence if it is empirically testable. So suppose we find some P-primitive
sentence to be untestable. Then we must suppose that its constituent terms
do not refer to any empirical objects, although we might be led to think
they do, if we persist in using the material mode of speech. Consequently,
we need to formulate this sentence in the formal mode of speech to cure
us of the tendency to suppose that the terms in this sentence are genuinely
referring.
A similar, empirical approach to determining what questions count as
pseudoquestions occurs in ESO. In that paper, Carnap considers the ques-
tion of whether there really are numbers, and about those philosophers
who purport to take this as a serious ontological question, he says, “un-
fortunately, [they] have so far not given a formulation of their question
in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must
be that they have not succeeded in giving to the external question and to
the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and until they supply

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 347

a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their

question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in the form of a
theoretical question while in fact it is non-theoretical” (1956, 209). What
does Carnap mean by a “common scientific language” that can “supply
a clear cognitive interpretation” for a question? Consider, for example,
what Carnap says about what constitutes ‘understanding’ a symbol in
physics: such understanding will be generated by providing an interpre-
tation for this symbol “given directly by semantical rules referring to
elementary signs together with the formulas connecting them with [this
symbol]” (1939, 210), where the meanings of “elementary signs” relate
directly to the observable properties of things (204–5). This sort of em-
piricist semantics clearly underpins Carnap’s work in ESO in which his
stated concern is to reconcile language that makes reference to abstract
entities with “empiricism and strictly scientific thinking” (1956, 206). Thus
in ESO, as in LSL, a question becomes a pseudoquestion if answering
this question is detached from empirical data and so lacks cognitive con-
tent, strictly speaking.
Let us now return to Gödel’s admissibility requirement for logically
valid sentences, which demands that such sentences be logically indepen-
dent of “the truth or falsity of any proposition expressing an empirical
fact.” We have just seen that pseudosentences for Carnap have this fea-
ture—this is what makes them ‘pseudo’ sentences. Qua pseudosentences,
Carnap’s view is that they are more properly phrased in the formal mode
of speech, by means of which they become ‘syntactical sentences’, sen-
tences in the ‘logic of science’, and that such sentences are the concern
of philosophical investigation. As it happens, philosophers have substan-
tial liberty concerning which syntactical sentences to adopt if they wish
to construct a language (as opposed, alternatively, to describing an extant
language), as per the principle of tolerance, and their choices here are
solely motivated by practical concerns (see Friedman 2001, 232–33; where
the task is to describe an existing language, one is obviously constrained
by the need for descriptive accuracy). So what would happen if a syn-
tactical question, the answer to which is the stipulation to use language
in a certain away, turned out to have empirical ramifications? It would
turn out that an answer to this question could no longer be construed as
a logically valid sentence (with respect to the language constructed on its
basis), and this sounds like exactly the sort of result we are looking for.
So why do Ricketts and Friedman resist this result? Let us recall their
reasons from above. Ricketts’ concern is that, with admissibility, a “lan-
guage-transcendent notion of empirical fact imposes constraints on the
choice of a calculus,” thus violating tolerance. But here it is worth pointing
out that tolerance is only a constraint on logic. As Carnap says in LSL,
“in logic, there are no morals” (1934/1937, sec. 17, 52), but there certainly

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
348 ROBERT HUDSON

are ‘morals’ when it comes to empirical science, specifically, our duty to

adjust our theories in the face of empirical facts. So let us suppose some
candidate logically valid sentence (contained in a calculus) is found to
have an empirical implication—that is, it implies the truth or falsity of
some proposition expressing a (language-transcendent) empirical fact. It
follows by Gödel’s admissibility requirement that the candidate sentence
is not logically valid. (Indeed, it is not a sentence of logic at all but one
that concerns empirical issues.) It is in this fashion that the choice of a
calculus is empirically constrained. However, it does not follow that we
have found a violation of tolerance here, for tolerance is irrelevant when
it comes to empirical matters. The applicability of tolerance is preserved
since it only applies to those cases in which the admissibility requirement
is satisfied and we have, accordingly, a genuine question of logic.
So what of Friedman’s reason for resisting Gödel’s admissibility con-
straint? Can we really not talk about empirical facts outside of a system
of language? In what way can we talk about empirical facts, or about the
truth or falsity of propositions expressing empirical facts, without pre-
supposing a prior choice of a linguistic framework that sets out what is
to count as an empirical fact in the first place?
When Carnap describes in ESO the sorts of questions philosophers are
prone to ask (e.g., Are numbers real? Are there propositions?) as external
questions, he means that by adopting a language form, say, one stipulating
the reality of numbers, we should not be taken to be asserting the existence
of numbers. Adopting a language form for him is a decision to speak in
a certain way, a proposed language, not the assertion of the reality of this
or that entity. However, once this language form is adopted and we are
in the practice of discoursing in the way stipulated by our chosen linguistic
proposal, there arise legitimate questions of existence, internal questions,
that do have true or false answers and that are decidable, if the questions
are not simply logical, by empirical inquiry (Carnap 1956, 207). This
empirical inquiry, as we indicated above in our discussion of what Carnap
means by a “common scientific language” that supplies “a clear cognitive
interpretation” for a question, relates technical symbols to elementary
signs by means of semantical rules. Clearly, then, the crux to answering
an (empirical) internal question is to identify the observation reports that
form the testing basis for theoretical questions in science and that contain
elementary signs as components. How then does one go about identifying
such reports? As Ricketts explains, Carnap’s approach in TM is to “[char-
acterize] observation predicates in behavioral terms, not semantic terms,”
and in this respect Carnap’s account of observation reports, Ricketts
asserts, coheres with (what Ricketts takes to be) Carnap’s rejection of a
“language-transcendent notion of empirical fact or truth” (2007, 210; see

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 349

also 205 and Carnap [1936/1937, 454], for Carnap’s account of obser-
vation predicates in TM).
At this stage, it is worthwhile spending some time emphasizing Carnap’s
behaviorist perspective on observation reports during the time of his writ-
ing LSL. For instance, Carnap describes observation reports as involving,
simply, human verbalizations prompted under certain physical circum-
stances (1932/1987, 459); as such, they are of a kind with a variety of
repeatable physical processes. Carnap comments, “whether it concerns a
machine which is so built as to given signals, or any other object exhibiting
regular observable reactions under specified conditions, makes no fun-
damental difference. . . . Even here we can use the reaction as a signal
and construct a system of rules for the translation of the signals into
sentences of our language” (459). As such, the identification of observation
reports is an empirical process and not at all a syntactical or logical process
or even a conventional one. Consider further what Carnap says: “Logi-
cally speaking, every group of protocol sentences has equal rights with
every other group. . . . The demarcation of the ‘real, true protocol sen-
tences’ is certainly not possible in pure semantics, involving merely logical
means, but in descriptive semantics with real science, namely, historical
conceptions. ‘True protocols’ are described as spoken utterances or written
records (i.e., physical-historical creations) originating from any person,
especially those scientists of our culture circle” (1932, 179–80; my trans-
lation; see also Hempel 1935, 57). This ‘historicist’ understanding of ob-
servation reports reaches into LSL: “it is not the task of syntax to de-
termine which sentences of the established protocol form are to be actually
laid down as protocol-sentences, for ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not syntactical
terms; the statement of the protocol-sentences is the affair of the physicist
who is observing and making protocols” (Carnap 1934/1937, sec. 17, 317;
square brackets removed).
When we arrive at TM, Carnap reiterates the behaviorist character of
observation reports and entertains the extension of these considerations
to confirmation and testing as well:

The questions of confirming and testing sentences and predicates . . .

belong to a theory of language just as the logical ones do. But while
the logical analysis belongs to an analytic theory of the formal, syn-
tactical structure of language, here we will carry out an empirical
analysis of the application of language. Our considerations belong,
strictly speaking, to a biological or psychological theory of language
as a kind of human behavior, and especially as a kind of reaction to
observations. . . . In order to make clear what is understood by
empirically testing and confirming a sentence and thereby to find out
what is to be required for a sentence or a predicate in a language

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
350 ROBERT HUDSON

having empirical meaning, we can restrict ourselves to using very few

concepts of the field mentioned. (1936/1937, 454)

The definition of ‘confirmable’ occurs shortly thereafter: “a sentence S is

called confirmable (or completely confirmable, or incompletely confirm-
able) if the confirmation of S is reducible (or completely reducible, or
incompletely reducible, respectively) to that of a class of observable pred-
icates” (456; italics removed). Once we reflect on the fact that observation
predicates are behavioristically defined, it follows from this definition that
the confirmability of a sentence is defined in behavioral terms as well. So
if we are concerned to assess a potential pseudo-object sentence and decide
whether it is a genuine object sentence or only a pseudo-object sentence
that deserves to be formulated in the formal mode of speech, what we
can do is ascertain whether this sentence is linked to observation reports
in such a way that these reports either confirm or disconfirm this sentence,
and we can do this without necessarily interpreting either the sentence or
the observation report through a language system. For example, suppose
we hypothesize that “numbers are real” and find that neither the confir-
mation of this stipulation nor its negation is reducible to a class of ob-
servation predicates. It follows that it is a pseudo-object sentence since it
contains content going beyond observational testimony.
At this point, the following objection arises: in assessing whether an
observation report bears on a proposed object sentence, must not this
report be expressible in a language? Moreover, must not this language
contain transformation rules that would express the relevant logical con-
nection between the observation report and the pseudo-object sentence
subject to test? If we answer these questions affirmatively, it follows that
we have not found the language transcendence we seek. Just as Friedman
suggests, the notion of empirical testability would presuppose a language
and with it criteria for when sentences count as either analytic or synthetic.
As such, the sort of language transcendence we are ascribing to Carnap
fails to hold.
It is of interest to note that a recognition of this problem, and a res-
olution sympathetic to Friedman’s interpretation, can be found in Carnap
(1932/1987). In addressing the issue of how one might link observation
reports (e.g., machine signals) standing outside a system language to sen-
tences inside the language, Carnap comments: “the signals of the machine
and the statements of the man are treated like sentences of a language in
that translation rules are constructed for them. We call them therefore
‘protocol sentences’ of the ‘protocol language’ of the machine or of the
foreign man and distinguish this language from the language of our sys-
tem” (459). In other words, observation reports (protocol sentences) are
located in an extrasystematic language containing translation rules that

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 351

link them to sentences in the system language. Accordingly, such reports

could hardly be said to be language transcendent.
Indeed, an analogous problem (needing an analogous solution) argu-
ably afflicts the distinction presented in ESO between external and internal
questions. In addressing the controversy between those who believe in the
reality of numbers and their nominalist opponents, Carnap provides com-
ments that on the surface resonate well with my proposed interpretation:
“I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as rel-
evant by both philosophers, and therefore, if actually found, would decide
the controversy or at least make one of the opposite theses more probable
than the other. . . . Therefore I feel compelled to regard the external
question as a pseudo-question, until both parties to the controversy offer
a common interpretation of the question as a cognitive question; this
would involve an indication of possible evidence regarded as relevant by
both sides” (1956, 219). (Here “possible evidence” could be either em-
pirical or logical, as Carnap notes; see 218). But how can one discuss, in
language, an external question regarding the reality of numbers when the
result of answering this question will be to set up a language system that
guides us on how we are to talk about numbers? This problem can be
put in very general terms as follows: what sense can be made of for-
mulating in language an external question that, by definition, purports
to address an issue that is language transcendent? The appeal of Fried-
man’s approach that eschews language transcendence should be obvious.
However, there is an error in this line of thinking as an interpretation
of what Carnap means when he suggests that a question is a pseudo-
object, external question, the answer to which is a proposal to use language
in a certain kind of way. Our suggestion is that answers to such questions
must meet Gödel’s admissibility condition in that they “do not imply the
truth or falsity of any proposition expressing an empirical fact.” Yet this
condition can be met simply by omission: it might be the case that there
are no translation nor transformation rules at hand to negotiate any
empirical implications, rather than there being such rules that, as it hap-
pens, fail to be instantiated with reference to actual fact. Put another way,
with reference to nominalists and their opponents, we seek, Carnap says,
evidence that would decide the issue between them, and finding none we
call their dispute a pseudoproblem resolved by stipulation to use language
in one way or another. What we mean, though, by ‘finding none’ is not
that we have looked and have failed to turn up any evidence as yet—this
would make the dispute an unresolved empirical matter—but that there
are neither translation nor transformation rules in place that could me-
diate such empirical implications. Similarly, with regard to the general
question of how to formulate language-transcendent external questions,
they are questions that are answered by a pragmatically motivated stip-

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
352 ROBERT HUDSON

ulation to use language in a certain way, to set up ab initio transformation

and translation rules; this is possible so long as there are no extant rules
that are asserted to be binding, such as would be the case if there were
empirical factors bearing on the matter. If there are not, the matter is
turned over to the principle of tolerance, and we are free to use language
in this way or that, depending on our orientation.
We are now in a position to answer Friedman’s objection to Gödel’s
admissibility requirement. Gödel requires that the logically valid sentences
of a calculus (of one’s chosen language system) “not imply the truth or
falsity of any proposition expressing an empirical fact.” Again, the worry
is that to carry out this requirement one needs a prelinguistic or language-
transcendent notion of an empirical fact, which is not to be had since it
is by setting up a language that Carnap apparently determines which
assertions count as analytic and which count as synthetic (empirical) to
begin with. Moreover, because Gödel’s admissibility requirement is found
to be flawed in this way, Friedman asserts it to be an unfaithful repre-
sentation of Carnap’s conventionalism. In turn, we have found that Car-
nap’s notion of an empirical fact is represented, in its first instance, not
as an observation report defined semantically but rather as one defined
pragmatically (i.e., in terms of human behavior). As such, observation
reports can be used to assess the character of a proposed object sentence
as either a pseudo-object sentence, if it lacks empirical implications, or
an object sentence, if it does have empirical implications, and can do so
without implying the truth or falsity of any empirical facts (as Gödel
requires) since such reports, as defined, are uninterpreted. I argued earlier
that there are good intuitive reasons to adopt Gödel’s requirement; we
can now say that there are good reasons to assert that Gödel’s requirement
is faithful to Carnap’s project in the logic of science.

3. Critiques of ‘Carnapian Empiricism’. I have been arguing that the (phil-

osophic) claims about which Carnap says we should be tolerant are those
for which there is no empirical evidence, either for or against, and I have
defended the reference to empirical evidence here on the grounds that
such evidence can be formulated in behavioral terms not requiring se-
mantic interpretation. Let us now consider some further critiques of my
approach.
The first critique is derived from the Alan Richardson who advocates
an approach very similar to the one advanced by Friedman. Richardson’s
perspective places heavy emphasis on the following passage from TM:

It seems to me that it is preferable to formulate the principle of

empiricism not in the form of an assertion—“all knowledge is em-
pirical” or “all synthetic sentences that we can know are based on

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 353

(or connected with) experiences” or the like—but rather in the form

of a proposal or requirement. As empiricists, we require the language
of science to be restricted in a certain way; we require that descriptive
predicates and hence synthetic sentences are not to be admitted unless
they have some connection with possible observations, a connection
which has to be characterized in a suitable way. (Carnap 1936/1937,
33; quoted in Richardson 1997, 156; 2004, 68)

Reflection on this quote might lead one to question my thesis that, for
Carnap, empirical factors bear on the determination that some sentence
is a pseudo-object sentence (and so is best formulated as a syntactic
proposal). For what is being suggested is that the ‘principle’ of empiricism
is (itself ) a syntactic proposal, and my contention is that it is by means
of an empirical inquiry that one arrives at such a description of empiricism
(i.e., the principle of empiricism is a ‘proposal’ if this inquiry reveals that
this principle has no empirical consequences). As such, on my approach,
one arrives at the decision that empiricism is a proposal only after having
assumed empiricism, which seems circular. However, I am not convinced
that there is a circularity here. Where empiricism states that all knowledge
is gained through sensory experience, one can imagine finding empirical
evidence for or against empiricism without having assumed that all knowl-
edge is arrived at in this way. Put another way, the proposal, ‘empiricism’,
is a much more profound sort of thing than the suggestion to try and
find empirical evidence that bears for or against some claim—in no way
am I assuming that for Carnap one needs to assume empiricism in arriving
at the conclusion that empiricism is a proposal.
But there is another way one might take the above quote as challenging
my ‘Carnapian Empiricism’, a way promoted by Richardson. In the
above-quoted formulation of empiricism, it is stated that synthetic sen-
tences must have some connection to observation. But for this formulation
to make sense, one needs to presuppose a distinction between analytic
and synthetic sentences. Thus, the analytic/synthetic distinction comes
before empiricism, and it cannot be the case that one determines empir-
ically the components of this distinction. Richardson expresses this point
as follows: “we see here that an analytic/synthetic distinction is relied
upon in giving content to the proposal to employ empiricist languages—
we seek the suitable relation to experience only for synthetic sentences of
a given language. It is clear that in this sense within Carnap’s philosophy,
a commitment to an analytic/synthetic distinction comes prior to a com-
mitment to empiricism” (1997, 157). Again, reflecting on the TM quote
above, Richardson suggests that “[it] indicates how . . . analyticity serves
to first clarify and make sense of empiricism. . . . Analyticity is not a
dogma but a presupposition of empiricism for Carnap” (2004, 68).

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
354 ROBERT HUDSON

For Richardson, this feature of Carnap’s view sharply distinguishes it

from Quine’s perspective in which, with the assumption of empiricism,
‘analytic’ sentences are defined as those sentences that are impervious to
empirical testimony (which, I might add, would speak to the poverty of
analyticity since any claim can be deemed to have empirical import; see
Richardson 1997, 153–57). However, my impression is that there is a
different way to read the above quote from TM. We should not read it
as starting with a notion of a synthetic sentence and then delimiting what
counts as a synthetic sentence from the perspective of empiricism; rather,
we should read it as defining what counts as a synthetic sentence and
then correlatively defining what counts as an analytic sentence, to wit, as
a sentence that lacks any connection with possible observations. There is
an obvious appeal to such an approach since, alternatively, if one is to
arrive at the analytic/synthetic distinction in advance, one is faced with
the question of how this distinction is motivated. Is it completely arbi-
trary? What practical determinants are relevant or acceptable? Under what
circumstances is the distinction legitimately revisable? These questions are
easy to answer from the empiricist perspective I am attaching to Carnap.
In addition, my interpretive approach coheres better with Carnap’s clear
allegiance to an empiricist’s criterion of meaning in TM. As Carnap says,
“it is not [my] aim . . . to defend the principle of empiricism against
apriorism or anti-empiricist metaphysics. Taking empiricism for granted,
we wish to discuss, the question what is meaningful. The word ‘meaning’
will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has
meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical
facts, either actual or possible ones” (1936/1937, 2). Using such a criterion
of meaning, a meaningful sentence (i.e., a legitimate object sentence) will
be one that has empirical significance, and a meaningless sentence (a
pseudo-object sentence) will lack empirical significance and thus best serve
as a ‘syntactic proposal’. In this respect, there is found to be a clear
synchrony in Carnap’s views as expressed in LSL and TM. Finally, my
approach provides a straightforward, and I think more traditional, per-
spective on the differences between Carnap and Quine on the issue of
analyticity: they simply disagree on whether there are, in fact, sentences
that lack empirical import. It is the key and contentious burden of Quine’s
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to show that there are no such sentences.
As a final point to be made about the above quote from TM, one might
express the concern that Carnap, in expressing empiricism as a proposal,
seems committed to denying that empiricism itself has any empirical sig-
nificance. Presumably, such a result should make empiricism highly un-
attractive to the empiricist. Yet there are other reasons why an empiricist
might nevertheless avow a proposal such as empiricism, and one very
clear reason Carnap gives is his interest to capture “the actual practice

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 355

of science” (1936/1937, 20; see also 26). That is, although empiricism as
a proposal is on an epistemic par with every other proposal, there is for
Carnap a clear practical reason for preferring empiricism, which is that
such a view is more in line with the views of “physicists and those phi-
losophers who are in contact with scientific work” (1963, 17–18).
The second critique of ‘Carnapian Empiricism’ I will consider derives
from comments Carnap himself makes in ESO and LSL, comments that
might be taken to run counter to the empiricist interpretation I am sug-
gesting. In ESO, when considering the dispute between realists and sub-
jective idealists, Carnap notes that the controversy has gone on “for cen-
turies without ever being solved” (1956, 207). In then diagnosing the
problem, he comments, “[the dispute] cannot be solved because it is framed
in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element
of a system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the
system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world
itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation
seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical
decision concerning the structure of our language” (207). In other words,
the realist/subjective idealist debate has reached a stalemate, Carnap seems
to be suggesting, not because of the empirical undecidability of the issue
but because the issue is illegitimately phrased. We are asking, “Is the
external world real?” in a sense that cannot be formulated in a language.
As it were, we are standing outside language and asking about the reality
of our conception of the external world. But how can one formulate a
question, any question, outside a language? A language must be posited
to begin with in advance of formulating a question, and once a language
is posited it will contain in itself the resources for answering whether the
external world is real. So, when it comes to the question of the reality of
something, we may as well admit that the answer we are providing here
is determined by our choice of language. Let us then be explicit about
this fact and talk about the debate between realists and idealists as purely
a matter of differing linguistic stipulations.
This is a compelling picture of how Carnap’s conventionalism works,
and it has a clear connection to Friedman’s perspective on what is wrong
with Gödel’s admissibility constraint. Does it provide a useful interpre-
tation of how the principle of tolerance is applied? If it did, tolerance
would say something like what follows. Language systems can be set up
using any number of linguistic ‘proposals’. To cite some of Carnap’s
examples, we can stipulate the existence of an external world or an ide-
alistic mind-dependent world, a reality with numbers or without, a de-
terministic physics or an indeterministic physics, and so on. It is open to
us to choose any one of these proposals, as guided by our practical aims,
and the proponents of any one of these proposals can vindicate their

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
356 ROBERT HUDSON

approach by citing the reasoning in the above quote from ESO. That is,
a believer in the reality of numbers can say that “to be real in the scientific
sense means to be an element of a system” and can then assert the reality
of numbers in the context of her system. To the critic standing outside
her system, she can claim that the “concept [real] cannot be meaningfully
applied to the system itself,” and thus the extrasystematic skeptic who
denies the existence of numbers is offering an illegitimate criticism. Rather,
the proponent of the real existence of numbers, as dictated by her own
practical goals, is free to set up a language system of her own choosing
that includes and sanctions her proposal that numbers are real.
However, my impression of this picture of Carnap’s conventionalism
is that it leads to an excessive liberality in acceptable language systems.
We find ourselves confronted with an enormous plethora of language
systems, all equal candidates for consideration, pending this or that prac-
tical motivation. Most any language system could be said to constitute
the ‘logic of science’, if we are without a restriction on what constitutes
a legitimate practical aim, and this seems to be a result that is at odds
with typically conservative scientific practice. Nevertheless, it should be
pointed out that Carnap in the above quote from ESO is in fact discussing
the concept ‘real’, as opposed to the concepts ‘observable’ or ‘confirm-
able’. ‘Real’ is clearly a theoretical notion that has meaning only within
a language system; to say that something is real, one needs an idea of its
properties that would be described within this language system. Thus,
there cannot be a completely extralinguistic notion of the ‘real’. However,
observability for Carnap is a semantically neutral notion describing the
behavior of people under certain circumstances and presupposes no par-
ticular language system (assuming we eschew the sort of perspective we
saw Carnap [1932/1987] express). To illustrate the difference, consider
substituting the word ‘real’ with the word ‘observable’ in the above quote,
giving us: “to be observable in the scientific sense means to be an element
of a system.” This statement is manifestly not true for Carnap given the
behavioral criteria he sets forth for observability. Similar comments apply
for the word ‘confirmable’. As I argued above, the confirmability of a
claim, for Carnap, can also be construed purely behavioristically and so
independently of a language system. Thus, “to be confirmable in the
scientific sense” does not mean “to be an element of a system.” In all
fairness, we might acknowledge that to determine the truthfulness of an
observation report or confirmed claim, one needs an interpretation in the
context of a system. But for the purposes of confirmability, all we need
is the identification of such reports and claims; as such, the assessment
of a potential object sentence in terms of whether it is subject to empirical
confirmation or disconfirmation can proceed outside the context of a

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CARNAP, TOLERANCE, AND EMPIRICISM 357

language system, even if its interpretation and the assessment of its truth
value cannot.
As it turns out, the interpretation of conventionalism one can draw
from the above quote from ESO need not make reference to realism. Let
us reformulate our objection to ‘Carnapian Empiricism’ on the basis of
the above quote from ESO in the following way, taking into account
remarks Carnap makes in LSL that “as regards those object-questions
whose objects do not occur in the exact sciences, critical analysis has
revealed that they are pseudo-problems” (1934/1937, sec. 72, 278). This
is a similar approach to the one portrayed in ESO, except that here
something is the topic of a legitimate object question by occurring in a
science instead of, as before, being real by occurring in a language system.
Do we then have a workable, nonempiricist account of pseudo-object
sentences? Whether this alternative approach works depends on what it
means for an object to ‘occur in the exact sciences’. Suppose this means
that scientists are committed to the existence of such things. Scientists,
as we know, are committed to the existence of an external world, but of
course the existence of the external world is not, for Carnap, the topic
of a legitimate object question. So what else can it mean to ‘occur in the
exact sciences’? On the criterion I suggest, for an object to occur in an
exact science is for the existence of this object to have some degree of
empirical support. For to be an ‘exact’ science, it is not enough that a
set of beliefs be logically consistent and clear—if that were enough, all
sorts of ludicrous sets of beliefs could count as exact sciences. Rather, we
thus need some way to sort through the theoretical alternatives and pick
out those that contain genuine object sentences, and my suggestion is that
an empirical criterion is the obvious choice to do this task. So the renewed
interpretation of the above quote from ESO would now go as follows: to
be the topic of a legitimate object question means to be confirmable on
the basis of observations. Of course, such a claim is precisely what I am
defending here as an interpretation of Carnap.
I close the article by emphasizing the need for an empirical criterion
in explaining a characteristic feature of Carnap’s principle of tolerance,
to wit, the fact that a choice of language is only expressible as a ‘pro-
posal’—a recommendation to speak in a certain way—and does not stand
as an assertion. For example, if I choose to be a realist and so stipulate,
which I am allowed to do by tolerance, that “the external world is real”
(and not a figment of my mind), this stipulation for Carnap cannot stand
as an assertion that is either true or false. Yet, one would think, if I choose
to adopt this stipulation as part of my language system, would the doctrine
of realism become not only true for me (and so express an assertion) but
necessarily true with respect to this language system since realism then
expresses the ‘logic’ of this language? The answer to this query is straight-

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
358 ROBERT HUDSON

forward, once we acknowledge an empiricist criterion of meaningfulness.

For the linguistic proposals that are subject to tolerance are claims that
have no distinguishing empirical feature as compared to alternative, com-
peting linguistic proposals. For example, as regards the two alternatives
of realism and idealism, these alternatives are empirically on a par—there
is not, nor can there be, any empirical fact showing realism to be true
and idealism false and vice versa. Thus, since there is no empirical evidence
pointing toward either of these stipulated proposals, and given the em-
piricist criterion of meaning to which Carnap is allied, we are lead to
conclude that each alternative lacks cognitive content (strictly speaking);
neither claim can stand as an assertion, and each can only stand as a
proposed language form. Comparatively, it is difficult to see without such
an empiricist criterion on what grounds Carnap could defend the non-
assertoric nature of linguistic proposals from within a language system.

REFERENCES
Awodey, Steve, and A. W. Carus. 2004. “How Carnap Could Have Replied to Gödel.” In
Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena, ed. Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein, 203–
23. Chicago: Open Court.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1932. “Erwiderung auf die Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker.” Er-
kenntnis 3:177–88.
———. 1932/1987. “On Protocol Sentences.” Trans. Richard Creath and Richard Nollan.
Repr. Noûs 21:457–70.
———. 1934/1937. The Logical Syntax of Language. Trans. Amethe Smeaton. Repr. Chi-
cago: Open Court.
———. 1936/1937. “Testability and Meaning.” Pts. 1 and 2. Philosophy of Science 3:419–
71; 4:1–40.
———. 1939. “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics.” International Encyclopedia of Uni-
fied Science 1:143–212.
———. 1956. “Empiricism, Semantic and Ontology.” In Meaning and Necessity: A Study
in Semantics and Modal Logic, 205–21. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1963. “Intellectual Autobiography.” In The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul
Schilpp, 3–84. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
Friedman, Michael. 2001. “Tolerance and Analyticity in Carnap’s Philosophy of Mathe-
matics.” In Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed.
Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh, 223–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gödel, Kurt. 1995. “Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?” In Collected Works: Unpublished
Essays and Lectures, ed. Solomon Feferman, J. W. Dawson Jr., Warren Goldfarb,
Charles Parsons, and R. M. Solovay, 334–62. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hempel, Carl. 1935. “On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth.” Analysis 2:49–59.
Richardson, Alan. 1997. “Two Dogmas about Logical Empiricism: Carnap and Quine on
Logic, Epistemology, and Empiricism.” Philosophical Topics 25:145–68.
———. 2004. “Tolerating Semantics: Carnap’s Philosophical Point of View.” In Carnap Brought
Home: The View from Jena, ed. Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein, 63–78. Chicago: Open
Court.
Ricketts, Thomas. 1994. “Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance, Empiricism, and Convention-
alism.” In Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale, 176–200. Cambridge:
Blackwell.
———. 2007. “Tolerance and Logicism: Logical Syntax and the Philosophy of Mathe-
matics.” In The Cambridge Companion to Carnap, ed. Michael Friedman and R. Creath,
200–225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 6 Sep 2015 13:44:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions