G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
 appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
 connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession.
If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who
are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily
in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional
context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
— in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and
risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
 Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change
to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma
of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will
he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank
and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before
the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid.,
p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
 (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms

and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos.
3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer

in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly
what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two
or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is
a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

 No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger,
and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________________________________

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of
law while working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix
of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal

complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and
deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April
1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from
Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided
loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression
that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s
statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened
and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof
because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-
examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that
consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without
the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or
for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of
interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-
mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint
was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the
retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file
651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of
Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was
dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-
Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned
to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004
adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty
of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will
require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was
being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov.
Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly
dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt
with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240,
are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the
periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with
Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former
client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything
which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam
v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or
any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable
duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client.
In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously
handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation
of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-
240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.
 xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought
in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved
are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he
was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant
while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government
prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco
70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of
law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil.
461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v.
Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA
210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the
filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a

former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42
Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713
("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent
conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-
client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x
conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented
to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information
acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had
with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any
confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving
the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient
basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a
former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests
only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
 Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he
was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement.
For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of
their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while
working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by
Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent
clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate
violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while
serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule
1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the
Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in
his dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.
56
We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule

1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

__________________________________________________

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a
Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations,
subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao,
La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on
5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1
in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared
by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person
making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by
the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op.,
Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,
46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,
if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my

school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a

notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance

to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic)
the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over
to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period
is not an inflexible rule. We said:
 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He

became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels
as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare
was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in
Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to
have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those

who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an

alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).
 We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us
to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has
only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application
for admission to the Philippine Bar.

_______________________________________________________

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father

Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty.
Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
 In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two
documents committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of

one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book
III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint

of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book
III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel
Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of
the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry
therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty.

Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but
they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal
secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed

by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents
therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed
with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents
Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence
but a clear case of falsification.1[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their
motion.2[2]

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and
Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the
formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino
v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging
the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which
the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article
V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for
revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents

allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to
oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability.
His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly
notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by
the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he
notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the
other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10,
1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book
III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the
questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a
Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly
credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc.
No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingos affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was
withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et
al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein
complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it
appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It
may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10,
1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272
SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated

to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any

misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably
imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or
misconduct in the performance of their duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was

suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for
notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing
the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that
respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a
notary public.
 In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case,
the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the
respondents first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was

disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the
offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months
from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough
penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the

notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be
REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months.3[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the
findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find
Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and
Remigio B. Domingo.
 Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.4[4] The term,
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.5[5]

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a

lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6[6]
wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some
of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act constitutes
misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de
Rosales v. Ramos,7[7] we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G.
Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the
Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he
notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month
suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for
making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we
believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law
upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct

and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.

_______________________________________________________________

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.9[1] Subsequent
thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential
information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge
Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which
he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated
April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)10[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five
criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed
against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No
administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator

(DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the
Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.11[3]
On even date, letters12[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified
true copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against
Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from
the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged
misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.13[5]

In a letter14[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that
respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for
falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of
his claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR

JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain,

Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48,
in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the
Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings

and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated
without respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval
that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The
subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows
his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and
dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly
shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a
public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every
government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the
highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to
the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a
tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the
government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service,
and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of
personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes
untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant

Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.
 Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary15[7]

In a letter16[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge

Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He
alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the
status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan,
and not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also
alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of
A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10)
days from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a
notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and
the fact of his dismissal from the service.17[9]

In his letters18[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent
explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he
resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that
following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from
NAPOLCOM on June 1, 199319[11] which was immediately accepted by the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not
disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no
more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation
amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the
issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he
would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of
a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.

Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court

Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then
DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum20[12] dated September 3, 2004 to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter,
we deemed it necessary to go over the records of the subject administrative case
against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to
Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we
examined the records of said administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM,
Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.

After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the
letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are
reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.
 An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain
with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001,
reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having
answered yes to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was
dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto
are hereunder quoted as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or

otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree,
ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government
office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign
country or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any
administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is Yes to any
of the questions, give particulars.

But all dismissed (acquitted)

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Date of [Dismissal] July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose
the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled
up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he
had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative
Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on the
certified documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following
data were gathered:

1. In compliance with the Summons dated 19 March 1993, signed by

Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the
NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his
Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged against
him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the Notice of

Hearing of even date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal
hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the

service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to
the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily
Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as follows:

Mindanao Times:

Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal

 Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional
director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to those
allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who
was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept
unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from
government service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from

the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of
administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional
employees.

I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process,

Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind
the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.

Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only

appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my
name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children, Quitain said in his
statement.

It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the

administrative case, he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom

in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of
Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional
director for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

 Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National
Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name in
court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.

Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed

confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against the group
that plotted his ouster from office: He said his only appeal was for
Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his
day in court to answer the charges.

Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven

them, Quitain said.

Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the

only legacy that I can give my children, Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the
NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative Order No.
183 by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally
unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper
clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative
Order.

xxxx

Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC
had he known that he was administratively charged and was consequently
dismissed from the service since he will not be considered. But this may be the
reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare
the administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that
there is no administrative or criminal case that would be filed against him by
reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no
administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to
state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic
dismissal of whatever administrative case filed against him because when he
resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein became moot and
academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of
the administrative case because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to
exonerate himself from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and
material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should
know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any
administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to the
automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance
of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged
administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple
expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain
honestly believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of his
administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the
status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged assurance made by the
NAPOLCOM.
 On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial
and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a clean record and was qualified
to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on
his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of his
concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken
into consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of
dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a
judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct
and dishonesty.

Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against
respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed
from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.21[13]

In compliance with the Courts Resolution respondent filed his

Comment22[14] contending that before he filed his application for RTC Judge
with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from
the NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly heard and decided. He averred
that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the
Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding
provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis T.
Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment
as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Region XI;
 2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the
political followers of his successor, who were the same followers involved in the
chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly pressing for his
(Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;

3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his

detractors went to the extent of filing criminal charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being
convinced to resign in exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but
when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or exiled at the DILG
central office in Manila;

5. Upon his exile in Manila for several months, he realized that even his
immediate superiors cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his removal.
Hence, upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral
congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on condition that all
pending cases filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be
dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case

filed against him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the
Judicial and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he made the
following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative

(including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending
before any court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or
instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending

administrative case filed against him that he knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him
he would have desisted from applying as a judge and would have given his full
attention to the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing embarrassment;
and

8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the

proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered therein, without his
knowledge, could have probably occurred during his exile period when he was
detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative
case are null and void since he was denied due process.
 Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.23[15]
 OCA submitted its Memorandum24[16] dated August 11, 2005 stating
therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its Memorandum dated
September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied that at
the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.
No. 183 dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitains
explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the
previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that Judge
Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any
position in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.

The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the
OCA.

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the

appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office,
including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are
qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution.25[17]

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively

charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183
dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He
insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS
in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No.
183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that since all the
criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17,
2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case
had become moot and academic.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge

Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this
information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by
the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in
the Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,26[18] Judge Quitain stated in one of his
interviews that I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process. It
also reads: Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw,
wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the
government service. Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was
denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA
reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee,
sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative
complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer.27[19]
Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo,
filed an Answer.28[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.29[21] Furthermore, as we have earlier
mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his
resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic.30[22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after
investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the
service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of
the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC
in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,31[23] this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the

appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against
him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the
position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not
contain the important information in question because he deliberately withheld
and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the
suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into
account against him if it had been disclosed.
 Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition
to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.32[24]

Section 8(2), Rule 14033[25] of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a

serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any

of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part

of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other

benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or

3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not

exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,34[26] we

held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service,

which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting
 on his application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him
unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with
his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of
all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.35[27] We have often stressed that
the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the
Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary.36[28]

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave

misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain
addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable
resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the
irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007,
without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case.37[29]

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court
without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative
case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by
his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has
ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its
authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications.38[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government
which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.39[31]

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is

guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the
service had he not resigned during the pendency of this
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he
has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court
likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits
which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitains 201 File.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________________________________________________________

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2984. July 29, 1992.]

RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA,

Respondent.

Pedro S. Castillo for complainant.

Ismael F . Mejia for and in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; PENALTY OF DISBARMENT

IMPOSED UPON LAWYER GUILTY OF MISAPPROPRIATION AND FALSIFICATION. —
The Court is convinced of the correctness of the conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors
finding respondent guilty of misappropriation and conversion of sum of money entrusted to him
to his personal use and falsification of certain documents and thus imposes upon him the penalty
of disbarment. Pending finality of judgment, respondent is suspended from the practice of law.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

By complaint filed with this Court on January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) a part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property
belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in
connection with the registration of the title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision
known as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985 purportedly executed in his favor of
Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant’s affidavit dated October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses, Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in
Bernardo’s favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.

In his defense and in attempted refutation of Bernardo’s averments, respondent Mejia filed an
answer. He subsequently filed no less than thirty-two (32) other pleadings, affidavits and papers
many bearing such quaint titles as "A Blinding Reptilia;" "Fish Caught in the Mouth;" "Society:
Need for Lawyers; "Pains of Wounds;" "House of Law;" "Equal Submission;" "Christmas Star;"
"The Advent: A New Beginning." Withal, he made no clear and categorical denials of the
accusations against him. Bernardo himself filed no small number of pleadings, affidavits and
other papers, numbering sixteen (16) in all.

The matter was in due course referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. There the parties submitted the case for resolution on the basis of
their respective affidavits, amplified by their respective memoranda.
On October 8, 1991 a majority of the IBP Board of Governors rendered a Resolution which was
submitted to this Court on April 6, 1992. In that Resolution the Board found all the accusations
against respondent Mejia to have been fully substantiated by the evidence on record and
recommended respondent’s disbarment. The Governors’ reasoned conclusions are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Anent the First Issue: After considering the various affidavits and pleadings of the parties, it
clearly appears that complainant signed two (2) blank checks; delivered them to respondent and
had authorized him to fill them up in the amounts sufficient to cover the amounts of the real
estate taxes due on the complainant’s property located at 8 Macapuno, Valle Verde I, Pasig,
Metro Manila; that respondent filled up those blank checks as follows: P13,450.00 for TBMC
Check No. 24223700 dated February 1985 and P14,260.00 for TBMC Check No. 24223701 of
even date (Exhibits "A" and "B", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989); the respondent
encashed these checks and received the proceeds therefor (P27,710.00) intended to pay the real
estate taxes of complainant’s property.

When asked to make an accounting of the P27,710.00 the respondent informed the complainant
that he had paid all the real estate taxes due on the land and on the improvements. Respondent
admitted in his written Computation (Annex "C", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989) given
to complainant that he spent P10,010.00 of the amount for his personal use which he expressly
acknowledged and committed to return to the complainant. (Annex "C").

The complainant was however shocked to learn that the real estate taxes were not actually paid
as represented in the written Computation submitted by the Respondent. The non-payment is
established by the Statement of Account on Real Property Tax dated December 27, 1985
obtained from the proper government authority (Exhibit "S", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4,
1985). At this juncture, it must be noted that the Statement was addressed to Adonis Tupaz, the
previous owner from which the property was purchased (See par. I, Affidavit of complainant
attached to Exhibit "U").

There being no payments made, the respondent is presumed to have misappropriated the sum of
P17,710.00 which he did not use for the payment of the taxes he was commissioned to pay by his
client, the complainant. The respondent failed to explain satisfactorily the disappearance of the
money. The presumption that he misappropriated the money stands. (See: In re Bamberger, 49
Phil. 962; Mococo v. Diaz, 70 Phil. 97).

For this act of misappropriation he deserves severe punishment (Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA
304; Capulong v. Alino, Administrative Case No. 381, February 10, 1968).

However, the amount of P10,000.00 which he acknowledged as returnable to the complainant,

will not be considered as having been misappropriated, although, in having used the money
without prior consent of the complainant, he is guilty of misconduct, though not as grave as the
act of misappropriation.

Anent the second and third issues: It appears that in July 1985, the complainant (before the
discovery of the anomaly concerning the first property) also gave the respondent P40,000.00 in
four (4) checks of P10,000.00 each for the purpose of paying the taxes due and to secure the title
of the property which complainant bought from Mr. and Mrs. Tomas Pastor. These checks were
all encashed by Respondent. (Exhibits "E", "F", "G" and "H", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4,
1989).

Respondent was supposed to register the Deed of Sale executed by and between the complainant
and Mr. and Mrs. Tomas Pastor. The deed was prepared and notarized by the Respondent. The
consideration for the sale was P570,000.00 (Exhibit "D", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989).
The respondent kept the original copy of the deed and gave a duplicate copy thereof to each of
the parties.

For the services rendered and to be rendered by the respondent which includes the transfer of the
title of the property to the complainant, he was paid P10,000.00 in check by the complainant.

After the lapse of some weeks, complainant tried to communicate with the respondent in order to
find out the status of the property. Complainant meantime negotiated the property and was being
rushed by his buyer, a certain Menandro Cancio, who was allegedly becoming impatient over the
delay in the transfer of the property in his name and which could only be effected after the Deed
of Sale in favor of complainant by the previous owner (Tomas Pastor) shall have been first
registered.

Sensing that respondent was deliberately evading him, the complainant made a personal follow-
up at the BIR office and the Registry of Deeds of Pasig. Thereat, he discovered that respondent
had not paid the taxes he was supposed to pay out of the 40,000.00 he received from the
complainant.

As Menandro Cancio was already threatening the complainant, the latter was constrained to pay
as he did pay the sums of P22,204.00 to cover up registration fee, transfer fee, capital gains tax
and other requirements. Official receipts were duly issued for the payments made by the
complainant. (Exhibits "J", "K", "L", "M" and "N", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989).

After paying the above taxes, complainant was given the various documents which respondent
submitted to the BIR and the Registry of Deeds. It was thus discovered that respondent instead of
submitting the original and genuine Deed of Sale with a consideration of P570,000.00 had
instead submitted a different Deed of Sale with a reduced consideration of P35,000.00 only.

From the evidence on record, including the NBI Report, it appears that complainant and Tomas
Pastor did not sign this Deed of Sale submitted by the Respondent. (Exhibit "O", Complainant’s
Affidavit dated Oct. 4, 1989). This fake deed was notarized by Atty. Apolinar Mangahas, who
however, claimed that the document was brought to him by respondent for notarization with a
person whom he introduced as Rodolfo Bernardo, Jr. However, during the NBI investigation,
when Atty. Mangahas saw the complainant, he admitted that he had not seen him yet before.

It also appears that respondent submitted a falsified Special Power of Attorney purportedly
signed by the complainant. (Exhibit "P", Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989). To this,
respondent counters that complainant himself authorized a woman to sign his name to avoid
delay in the registration and so that the respondent as attorney-in-fact for the complainant might
be able to register then an adverse claim on the title of the property in question. Even assuming
this claim to be true, respondent who is a lawyer, sworn to do no falsehood, must not have
agreed to take any part in such acts of falsification.

It further appears that respondent submitted to the BIR spurious Deed of Assignment purportedly
executed by the Spouses Tomas Pastor and Remedios Pastor in favor of complainant. Again the
parties did not sign this deed.

As a result of the faking of the aforecited documents, the respondent succeeded in reducing the
taxes and fees to be paid. He paid only the sum of P6,885.96 to the BIR and the Registry of
Deed.

Consequently, he gained P33,114.04 out of the P40,000.00 entrusted to him intended for the
payment of taxes due and the expenses for securing the title of the property in the name of the
complainant. Respondent had thus cheated the Government and his client.

In devising schemes through the preparation and submission of spurious deeds to defraud the
Government and his client, respondent is guilty of deceit. (In re Avanceña, 20 SCRA 1012).

Moreover, in receiving the money and pocketing it for his own personal use, respondent has
betrayed his client’s trust and these acts justify the imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon
him. (Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304; Melegrito v. Barba, 58 Phil. 513).

Anent the fourth issue: There is no question that the postdated check in the amount of
P50,000.00 which the respondent issued to complainant had bounced. (Exhibit "P",
Complainant’s Affidavit, Oct. 4, 1989). Upon his supplication, this was later substituted by him
with new checks which however also bounced due to insufficiency of funds. This constitutes also
grave misconduct.

A lawyer must always observe good faith and justice in his dealings whether in the pursuit of his
profession or in his private affairs. (See: In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 569; Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
530). And as recently decided by the Supreme Court, violation of B.P. BLG. 22 is considered a
crime involving moral turpitude.

For all the foregoing, the Board of Governors most respectfully recommends that respondent
Atty. Ismael F. Mejia be disbarred." cralaw virtua1aw library

A thoroughgoing review of the affidavits, pleadings and other papers filed by the parties
convinces this Court of the correctness of the foregoing conclusions of the IBP Board of
Governors. They are consequently hereby adopted and approved.

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the
charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality
of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant’s
Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
____________________________________________________________

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard
de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral
fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de
Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the
third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by
the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency
of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

 The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an
investigation, report and recommendation on subject case,40[1] summarized the
antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez

moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera
based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the

suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of
California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule
enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own

benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco,
State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant
alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to
practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence
necessary to lead the countrys most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called

rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to
IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the
issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact,
according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in
Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
 Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed
following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar
Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant

maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.
Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients
money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the
Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if such was
accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from
liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not
apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against
the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-
request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP
National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this
Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board and the IBP in general.41[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose
from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005.
In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board
approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the
Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-
R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries
of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.42[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the
withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor
and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.43[4]
 On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision
taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his
letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.44[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request
for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently
consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de
Vera.45[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP
Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at
this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to
withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.46[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)

enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.47[8]
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz
a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP
Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the
IBP.48[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront
Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as
member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice
President.49[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that

Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors
and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in

public about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of
Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention
Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the
IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs.
The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R.
165108, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme
Court of the Philippines;
 2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant
lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a
whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others, by making
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the
Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in
Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass

and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and
compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo

I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National
Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the
withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented
him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus
compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.50[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing
the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea
to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to
the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the
Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty.
de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from
Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.51[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having
committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of
an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted
to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the
minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious
injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the
IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1,
2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme
Court even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in

writing. The complaint against me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a

reasonable period of time after receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

 4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the
witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under
oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify
under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera

was my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more

evident because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3
votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he can vote to support his own
complaint and motion to expel me.52[13] (Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of
Atty. de Vera.53[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their
decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to
protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and
elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
 (i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its
decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or
coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the
PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session
at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary
session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the extent of
making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme
Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and
intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to
engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g.,
that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the
withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because nakakahiya
kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga
kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors
approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure
from the Supreme Court.54[15]

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary
Session was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical
to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to
remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of

resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all
condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.55[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a
special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June
2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP
brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.56[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty.

Santiago.57[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP
position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.58[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005,
during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of
IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to
Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.59[20] IBP
National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars
election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the
event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or
should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is
approved by this Court.60[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the
election of Atty. Salazar.61[22]

In his Extended Comment62[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained

that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove
him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for
his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP
Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and
without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious
charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio
Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in
their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in
general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in
disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary
Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to
freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of
this Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such
remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that
the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-
Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President
shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June
of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and
qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and
duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death,
resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as
Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death,
resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President,
the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired
portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and

employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at
the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.63[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the
EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for
the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP
was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the
express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his
replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region,
due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP
By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its
counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority
to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section
44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP
EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards position but
because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board
determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his
constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is
his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the
fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de
Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13
May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the
day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings
Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser,
Gov. Rivera;
 (v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes
under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member
of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern
Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section
47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty.
de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b)
the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable,
possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be
allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.64[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum65[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the

following issues for the consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)

COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE
OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE
PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO
AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE

MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN.

CASE NO. [6052]66[27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the
fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the

present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard
De Vera is grounded on the following:
 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in
California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule
enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October
1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative
case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties
in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision
dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his

clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law,
he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.
He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty
of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on
Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the
accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent

De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he
explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his
license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the
end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a
fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners
have not shown how the administrative complaint affects
respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the

post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of
residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the
PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership
to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP
post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section

19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it

is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter
where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he
will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides
or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one
chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact,

under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long
as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his

IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month
thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter
 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP
PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's
transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de
Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August
2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of
the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be
held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. Between
3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was
done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on
27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No.
2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative
powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid
price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a
complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged
on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect
being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the
first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the
Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a
lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge
William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
 While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would
be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent
judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-
1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the

present administrative case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a

court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation
between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata
is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other
with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not
be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the
rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time,
it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res
judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had
already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants
contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first
administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint
is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to
note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension
and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent
but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President.67[28]

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From
Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election
and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of
Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and
in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues
presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four
essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first
and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action.68[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera
cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject

matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the
qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the
subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case,
complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary
cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first
case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by
complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de
Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous
case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP
By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running
as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed
that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-
laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file
with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Courts
statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that
he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not
allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the
State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years.
We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be
morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses
the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude.69[30]

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case
declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is
presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case.
As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course
pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not
barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for
consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred
under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the

State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of
Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,70[31] we were confronted with the question of
whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney
in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said
foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the
same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de
Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of
California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final
judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a

Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his
suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of
Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:

xxxx
 (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,71[32] we

explained that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to

speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he
must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on
the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a

competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary

agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.72[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.73[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds
for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted.74[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty

committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the
term Malpractice.75[36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary
notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.76[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on

ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.77[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar
of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured
in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the
elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control
the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for
the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a
check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account;78[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that

Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;79[40]
and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California.80[41]
 Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that
he misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave
him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not
consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified
under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact

to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds
for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters
memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and
that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust
account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.81[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.82[43] It means such evidence
which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred.83[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about
this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep84[45] we held that

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such,
it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he
shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even
more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust

property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported
and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property

held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation
of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his

clients money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this
admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which
he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the
elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also
points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before
the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of
California.85[46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find

anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly
authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera86[47] we
declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him.
 Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that
the elder Willis had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the
admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from
relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use
by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that
Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did not speak
well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients
money without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity
and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own
account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself
but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member
of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.87[48] Respondent violated
his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
 Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.88[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,89[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two

years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his
client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v.
Maglaya;90[51] Castillo v. Taguines;91[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,92[53] the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their
clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00,
respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters permission. In
Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,93[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00
representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering
the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of
suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where
the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for
his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the

Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur
IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole
purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de
Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to
another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP
Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months
immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it

cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one
may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein
case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based
on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed
to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from
aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the
following issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of

discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on
13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors

complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de
Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for

just and valid cause.
 II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25
June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for
the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its

removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested
with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse,
by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the
delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the
 members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as
governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be

removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining
members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of
Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied
very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in
administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair
hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the
complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted
as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the
same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited
himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in
the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty.
Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own
motion.
 The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the
plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed
and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute
and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de
Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board
Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of
the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact,
Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process

safeguards life, liberty and property.94[55] It cannot be said that the position of
EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is
no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to
remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted
by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain ones side.95[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due
process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes
due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of
justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one
general statement.96[57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,97[58]
because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.98[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial

process for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or
hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of
due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is
required for hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies
differ.99[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due

process.100[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential101[62] especially under
the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose
shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras
actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against

him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript
of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was
removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend
himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera,
who authored the complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him
accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments
the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this
resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed
to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for
Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including
Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse,
by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a
resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining
members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the
respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested
parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially.
This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off
which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be
counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two
voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP

Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for
the removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal
was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in
particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the
Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid
cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors
and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or
the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental
objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we
hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or
arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if

not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of
the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted
if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the
impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not
and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with
the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted

within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably
arise when internal cleavages are made public.
 The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for
adjusting and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface
conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a
majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can
speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the
authority of the board.102[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera
as the latters actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were
detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When
the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot
effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of
legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the

expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due
discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body
will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.
 Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the
majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the
majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to
disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the

Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso

facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of
the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board
of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of

the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it
was rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive
power of supervision over the IBP,103[64] it is axiomatic that such power should
be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the
IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of
its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its
organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers
and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured
that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts
interference.
 It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the
IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are
elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in
its By-Laws.104[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance
with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of
the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual
members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be
accorded the disputable presumption105[66] of validity, which shall continue,
until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared
invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial
proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with
grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the
Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its
members as provided in Article VI, Section 44106[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue
arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in
resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As
has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP
Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within
the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in
the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as

IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority
granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant
post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same
is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and
implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP
Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP;
thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board
the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the
provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule,107[68] and Section 11
(Vacancies),108[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),109[70] Section 47
(National officers),110[71] Section 48 (other officers),111[72] and Section 49
(Terms of Office)112[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the
removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual,
emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-
Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who
will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority
and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII,
Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President
for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily
implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next
succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-
2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now
IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because
we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP

EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon
the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that,
assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP
EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set
forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be
chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as
much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in
Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER
 xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive

Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the
governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored.
The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to
the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which
was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive

Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president.
The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-
President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-
President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-
President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)
 In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is
actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to
the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP
to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of
IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The
rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De
Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the
rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency.
The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption
by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose
of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic
succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National
President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the
usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting
a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable
preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is
intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for
Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from
among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience
of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a
national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP
for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of
the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May
2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling
and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national
presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he
comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee
would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in
service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance

with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a
succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so,
there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1
July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the
practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of
this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the
personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated

18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the
disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said
Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose

Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-
2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-
Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his

oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with
the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the
IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.