WEEK II

Dir. Land vs. CA, 178 SCRA 709

WEEK III

Dir. Of Lands & Dir. Of Forest Dev’t vs. CA, 129 SCRA 689
WEEK VI

1. Republic vs. Herbieto, GR 156117

2. Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)
146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the
complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his
parents, the former owners thereof.

2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended
the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged
ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the
defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they
were still alive.

3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendant’s ownership of the land. On appeal,
the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his
original answer.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already
disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial
admission. While the said pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial
admission, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.
WEEK XXII

Heirs of Maningding vs. CA, 276 SCRA 601

FACTS:
This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs
of Segunda claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.

The Buazons aver that:

1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter
nuptias.
2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-
owned the lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-
ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself… and later on, Juan and
Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R.
Buazon.
3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the
sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both
transactions being evidenced by deeds of sale.

On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers
made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs
sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were
unsuccessful.

The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-
owners in equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had
already executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of
donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of
sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have
validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to
Segunda Maningding and her heirs.

The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court
reversed itself by declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary
requirements. However, it ruled that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue
of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription

RULING:
Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects
when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the
other co-owners.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept
of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was
Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the
benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more
pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the
community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted
therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted
and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias
was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective
shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels
of land to the exclusion of all others.

As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from
1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the
fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce
and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and
allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right.
Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in
1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and
conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that
Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more
than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
WEEK XIII

1. Dir. Of Lands vs. CA and Abistado, 276 SCRA 276

FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in
its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent
Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that
it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented
by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.

HELD: YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of
the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being
so, the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
2. Dir. Of Lands vs. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336

FACTS: Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to register 6 parcels
of land under their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The same was inherited by
them from their parents who acquired the same from Spanish grant. The sisters showed
possessory information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only awarded 4 parcels of
land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet decided upon as there was a separate case involving
one Constancio dela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have lots 1 & 2 be included.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have rights over the other
parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed for by the Director of
Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence
by the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of the original
tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. While a blue print of
survey Plan Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before the trial court, the same falls short of
the mandatory requirement of law.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish title, a possessory information
title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares (but the actual land area being applied for (lot 1) was
7000+ sq m. But the heirs did not submit the original of the possessory information title.
What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to be
the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the
original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not
established thus, rendering admissibility of the said secondary evidence questionable and
dubious. PD 982 was also in effect which mandated Spanish titles to be registered but the
heirs never registered the same (purpose of the law was to avoid falsified titles after the
war).