VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC VS.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

G.R. NO L-16704
MARCH 17, 1962
ARTICLE:
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all
Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a
previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions.
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the
Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of
publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled
that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.

HELD:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative
body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with
the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the
law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it
has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and
that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity.
The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN VS. CARINO

G.R. NO. L-65894
SEPTEMBER 24, 1987
ARTICLE:
Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as amended by our resolution en banc dated
September 17, 1974, which partly provides that:
"Sec. 5. Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. — It shall be the duty of the
appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the
preceding section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing
of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the court twelve
(12) printed copies of the record on appeal, or twelve (12) typewritten or
mimeographed (on one side of good quality paper, eleven inches in length by eight
and a half inches in width — commonly known as letter size — written double spaced)
copies of said record on appeal, together with proof of service of two (2) printed,
typewritten or mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee."

LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

Facts:
Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a certain space the government then
needed. The clearing of that space would require the demolishment of respondents’ structures.
The case was brought to court. After a series of postponements, a date for the final hearing was set,
during which respondents and their counsel failed to appear.
Upon petitioner’s motion that respondents’ failure to appear be construed as a waiver of their right to
cross-examine petitioners’ witnesses and to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision.
Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on
appeal. Respondents also failed to act on the appellate court’s directive to show cause why their
appeal should not be dismissed.
The resolution dismissing respondents’ appeal became final and executory on September 27,
1982, and a writ of execution issued on February 1, 1983.
BP 129 (Sec. 39): “No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal...”
 Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs. 18): “...the filing of a record on
appeal shall be dispensed with...”
(Sec. 19b): “...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a
record of appeal being required.”
In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents maintained that since, under the
present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, the rule on technicalities should be
relaxed and their right to appeal upheld.
On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution seeking to revive the case.
Held:
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner
provided for by law.
Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, “Statues regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural rules are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.”

DBP VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 118342
JANUARY 5, 1998

ARTICLE: Art. 3, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution (Due Process and Equal Protection Clause)
LEGAL PRINCIPLE: Due Process – Opportunity to be heard
FACTS:
In 1968 and 1969, Continental Cement Corp. entered into a loan contract with DBP. In 1979,
CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring its loans. In November 1985, DBP filed for a
foreclosure against the assets of CCC.
In December 1985, CCC petitioned before RTC Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of
Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying further that its loan terms with DBP be restructured
and that the interest rate terms in the promissory note be declared null and void. A TRO was issued
in favor of CCC. In December 1986, PP 502 was issued transferring nonperforming assets of the
gov’t to Asset Privatization Trust. One of those transferred was CCCs account. DBP filed a petition to
dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT.
The trial court denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant
to PP 502 as amended. To determine CCCs indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated JC Laya
(former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact finding commission. He was given 60 days to
come up with a report and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter.
After several months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties then filed their
reactions to the report and during the trial they were given a chance to cross examine each other’s
witnesses. After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their position papers as to their
calculation of the amount of indebtedness. CCC’s computation is at P43.6M, the Commissioner’s
computation is at P61.6M while DBP/APT’s calculation is at P2.6B.
In June 1992, 3 of CCC’s witnesses were scheduled to be cross examined by APT’s counsel
as DBP’s counsel had already done so. APT”s counsel was not able to do so raising the issue that he
just took over the case and needs time to prepare. The cross examination was reset to August 24-26,
1992 but counsel for APT failed to appear due to Dengue. The other counsel, Jaime Cruz, for DBP
was likewise absent; he’s also a witness.
On Aug 25th, the RTC ordered that due to the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for
decision. APT filed for a motion for reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC ruled that the
indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner.
APT appealed before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed
to cross examine the witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC averred
that by the failure of APT’s counsel to appear APT has waived such right. The CA sustained the
RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not APT was denied of due process.
HELD:
The SC sustained the CA’s ruling. Long ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that there
can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings
but did not do so. The withdrawal of APT’s previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be
a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such reason necessitates a
duty, nay an obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel’s failure to turn over the records of the case
to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Mere
demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of
his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel.
The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers, as in this case. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given opportunity to submit
their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered his report. Contained in their
position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. Furthermore, the
parties were also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They
were likewise granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in
APT’s case, they were deemed to have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he
had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. NO. 37914
AUGUST 29, 1932
ARTICLE: Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same."||
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
Retroactive effect of laws for persons guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even though a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
FACTS:
Upon arraignment for the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the petitioner
spontaneously pleaded guilty, whereupon the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, and there
being no circumstance to modify his criminal liability, imposed upon him the minimum of the medium
degree of the penalty ofpresidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 3, article 534 of the old Penal Code, that is, one year, eight months, and
twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.||
In the present case, the trial court could not legally take into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, established in article 13, paragraph 7, of the new
Penal Code, because it did not exist in the old Penal Code under which the petitioner herein was
prosecuted and sentenced.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, above quoted, extends its benefits even to convicts
serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to make use of such benefits is the
writ of habeas corpus, inasmuch as, if the penalty imposed upon them under the former penal law
was decreased by the revised code, and the latter has retroactive effect, the excess has become
illegal. Now then, it appearing from the sentence that there was a voluntary confession of guilt,
and that it has served as the basis of conviction, and taking into consideration that had such
circumstance been classified by the old Penal Code as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court
would have been bound to give it effect, could we now disregard it without failing in our duty in
order to give effect to the positive provisions of the law which make all penal laws retroactive in so
far as they favor the accused, who is not an habitual criminal, there being no necessity to review
the proceeding? In the case before us, the voluntary confession of guilt appears in the sentence
and has served as the basis of the defendant's conviction by the trial court; for which reason we
must take it into account, in order to give retroactive effect to article 22, cited above, of the
Revised Penal Code for the benefit of the petitioner herein.
As we have seen, the aforesaid petitioner was sentenced to one year, eight months, and
twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity ofP647.70, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, which is the minimum of the medium degree (from one year,
eight months, and twenty-one days to two years, eleven months, and ten days) of the
penalty of presidio correccional in the minimum and medium degrees (from six months and one
day to four years and two months), prescribed by article 534, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code,
as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty provided in article 315, paragraph 3,of the Revised
Penal Code for the same crime is arresto mayor in the maximum degree of prision correccional in
the minimum degree, that is, four months, which is more lenient than that provided in the old
Penal Code. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code
 must be imposed in the minimum degree, that is, four months and one day to one year (article 80,
paragraph 2, of the old Penal Code, and article 64 of the Revised Penal Code), and inasmuch as
it is the practice of Courts of First Instance in the exerciseof their discretion (article 81, paragraph
7, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2298) to fix the penalty in the minimum period, and the trial
court having fixed the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the minimum period of the medium
degree, we must also fix it accordingly, that is, four months and one day of arresto mayor, which is
the minimum period of the minimum degree of the penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code.
The herein petitioner having already served seven months and twenty-nine
days of imprisonment, as against the penalty of four months and twenty-one days, with all
possible allowances, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code, he has already more than
served his sentence and is entitled to be released immediately.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Revised Penal Code with reference to the
crime of estafa, of which the petitioner was convicted, are more favorable to him than those
of the old Penal Code.||

2. Whether or not in habeas corpus proceedings the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

confession of guilt established for the first time in article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised
Penal Code, can be taken into consideration.
HELD:
1. Yes. The penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code, article 315, paragraph 3, for the same
offense is arresto mayor in the maximum degree to prision correccional in the minimum
degree, that is, from four months and one day to two years and four months, of which the
medium degree is from one year and one day to one year and eight months, which is more
lenient and hence more favorable to the petitioner than the same degree of the penalty
imposed by article 534, paragraph 3, of the former Penal Code.
2. Yes. The voluntary confession of guilt appears in the sentence and has served as the
basis of the defendant's conviction by the trial court; for which reason we must take it into
account, in order to give retroactive effect to article 22, cited above, of the Revised Penal
Code for the benefit of the petitioner herein.