CONSOLIDATED PLYWOOD INDUSTRIES VS BREVA AND MINDANAO HEMP requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission had rendered
and Exchange Commission had rendered extrajudicial
EXPORT CORPORATION
FACTS:
 The case involves the claim of one of two co-owners for reimbursement from
the other of expenses incurred for the repair and preservation of the common
property.
 The property in question consists of a parcel of land with a warehouse and
office building standing thereon, covered by TCT No. 11679. One of the
registered co-owners is the petitioner, Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc.
(CPII); it had purchased an undivided 1/2 portion of the property from the
Consolidated Bank & Trust Company which, in turn, had acquired that share
at a foreclosure sale. The other registered co-owner is the Mindanao Hemp
Export Corporation (MHEC).
 After having acquired its undivided half share, CPII occupied the property,
using the warehouse to store its products and the nearby building to quarter
its personnel. It also employed guards to secure the premises, made repairs
and improvements on the property.
 Summons was issued to MHEC whose address was stated in the complaint
to be at 413 Jaboneros St., Binondo, Manila but unserved for the reason,
stated in the return of the Sheriff of Manila, that "... MHEC is no longer doing
business at said address (and) (n)obody around the place knows the present
whereabouts of said defendant.
 The Trial Court sought to ascertain the defendant's whereabouts from the
SEC, but that office simply furnished the same address: 413 Jaboneros St.,
Binondo, Manila as the latest address of that corporation in its records.
 Service at that address having already been attempted and failed, CPII moved
for, and the Trial Court ordered on April 28,1987, service of summons by
publication. 5
 Publication was effected in the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, on May
18 and 15,1987 and June 1, 1987. 6Copy of the alias summons was also sent
by registered mail addressed to MHEC at 413 Jaboneros Street, Binondo,
Manila. 7
 No answer being filed within the sixty-day period after last publication
prescribed in the alias summons, MHEC was declared in defaults 8 and CPII
thereafter presented its evidence ex parte.
 The Trial Court also conducted an ocular inspection and found that CPII was
using the entire warehouse as well as the office building standing on the
property. 9
 On March 29, 1988, the Trial Court rendered judgment which, while finding
that CPII had in fact incurred expenses in the amount of P161,951.70 (instead
of the claimed P239,837.21), denied said plaintiff reimbursement of one-half
of that amount and instead dismissed the complaint "for lack of merit,".
PETITIONER: arguing in the main that a co-owner has the right to use the whole of the
property owned in common without obligation for rentals and, hand-in- hand with such
right of use, the right to reimbursement from the other co-owners of their proportionate
share in necessary expenses incurred by him for the preservation of the property.
Petitioner argues further that it is entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
having been compelled to sue because of MHEC's failure to fulfill reportorial
collection well-nigh impossible.
ISSUE: 1. What is the nature of the action. (collection of a sum of money). -personal
action.
2. WON TC acquires jurisdiction over the person of the said defendant. –NO.
HELD:
1.Petitioner's suit is for the collection of a sum of money- personal action, as
distinguished from a real action, i.e., one "... affecting title to, or for recovery of
possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property. 13
It is, too, an action strictly in personam, as to which, in a line of cases starting
with Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 14 this Court laid down and consistently hewed to the
rule that ... personal service of summons within the forum, is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by
publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights
confer upon the Court jurisdiction over said defendant," and that "... (t)he proper
recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties,
real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause
them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f) in which case, the attachment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by
publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective." 15
2. That MHEC may no longer be found at 413 Jaboneros St., Binondo, Manila, is made
more apparent by the fact that the copy of this Court's resolution of May 2, 1988
requiring its comment on CPII's petition, which was sent by registered mail to said
address, was returned unclaimed after three notices. 12 While from the foregoing it may
appear that resolution of the appeal is a simple and straightforward matter of applying
law and precedent to the facts established by the evidence, such a result is precluded
by the circumstance that due to a failure to effect proper service of summons on MHEC,
the Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of said defendant and
therefore could not lawfully render valid judgment thereon.
Accordingly, and service of summons by publication here not having been preceeded
by attachment of property of MHEC, it did not confer on the Trial Court jurisdiction over
the person of said defendant, and it is on this score that petitioner's action must be, as
it is hereby, DISMISSED.
In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is hereby directed that in the not
unlikely event that the petitioner pursue its claim for reimbursement against its co-
owner by filing a second action therefor, efforts be exerted, prior to effecting service of
summons by publication, to cause personal service on respondent corporation on its
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors, at such of their
individual addresses as may become known to the petitioner from an examination of
the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission or such others as may be or
become otherwise available, failure of this latter mode of service being hereby made a
condition precedent to summons by publication.
EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP VS CA
FACTS:
 The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals,1granting respondent's petition for certiorari
and dismissing the complaint below on the ground of improper venue.
 Traders Royal Bank (TRB) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan
Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI) a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin,
Baguio City for P500,000.00.2
 At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property
was a vacant residential lot valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per square meter,
with a usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters (approximately 75% of the
land area of 1,525 sq.m.) without any illegal occupants or squatters, when it
truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square
meters usable area.
 ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property,
demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the
property. TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao, Branch 17, a complaint for annulment of sale
and damages against TRB.3
 TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss4 the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
On September 18, 1996 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
 TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. 8
Court of Appeals: ANNULED and SET ASIDE Civil Case No. 24,317-96 is
hereby DISMISSED on ground of improper venue."
was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the
Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km.
3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the
territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies. 14 An
action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on
real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the area where the real property or any part thereof lies. 15
Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial
Court has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue.
Side issue:
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory
order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action of
certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. 12
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose
as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case
of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However,
the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is
considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in
excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an
appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently
mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant
needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another
futile case."13

Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals alleging that the
determination of whether the venue of an action was improperly laid was a question of
law, thus, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari
and prohibition, which involved pure questions of law.

Petitioners further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in

nature that cannot be the subject of an appeal and cannot be even reviewed by a
special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: WON dismissal of case on the ground of improper venue is proper. – Yes.

HELD:

In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred
grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB
GOMEZ VS CA AND TROCINO
FACTS:
Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action for specific performance and/or rescission filed
by herein petitioners, spouses Fortunato and Aurora Gomez, against the heirs of Jesus
J. Trocino, Sr., which include herein respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino. [2]
Filed on December 16, 1991, the complaint alleges: Some time in 1975, the spouses
Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The
mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction on July
11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the
property to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from
Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the
properties to petitioners, hence, the complaint.
On January 10, 1992, the trial courts Process Server served summons on respondents
at their given address at Maria Cristina Extension (besides Sacred Heart School for
Girls), Cebu City.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants. Due to the
defendants failure to deliver the owners duplicate it issued an order on August 29,
1995 declaring said titles null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City to issue new titles in the name of herein petitioners. [6]
Respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the CA, a petition for the annulment
of the judgment rendered by the RTC-Cebu (Branch 10) in Civil Case No. CEB-11103.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS: alleged that the trial courts decision is null and void on the
ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly
served with a copy of the summons and the complaint. According to them, at the time
summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A., and has
been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has
been residing there since 1986. They also refuted the receipt of the summons by
Caridad A. Trocino, and the representation made by Atty. Bugarin in their
behalf. Respondents also contended that they have a meritorious
defense.[7] Petitioners filed their Comment/Answer to the petition.[8]
CA issued the assailed Decision granting the petition and annulling the decision of the
RTC-Cebu (Branch 10).
ISSUE: 1. What is the nature of action filed (specific performance). – in personam
2. WON summons was effectively served on respondents. – NO.
Held:
1. In the present case, petitioners cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is
anchored on the claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino reneged on their
obligation to convey ownership of the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus,
petitioners pray in their complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the
appropriate deed of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in the
alternative, that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to
return to petitioners their down payment in the amount of P500,000.00 plus
interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect the parties alone, not the
whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded.[21]
Contrary to petitioners belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or
rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
possession of the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, it does
not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem. In Hernandez vs. Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Court made the following distinction:
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real
action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or
for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,
while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not
necessarily an action in rem.[22]
The objective sought in petitioners complaint was to establish a claim against
respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the title to the two parcels of
land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of
the properties to petitioners. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action in
personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the
basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the
defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their
persons.[23]
2. To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature
of the action filed against them must first be determined. As the Court explained
in Asiavest Limited vs. Court of Appeals, it will be helpful to determine first whether the
action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of
the action.[13]
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, substituted
service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling
house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.[15] In substituted service, it is mandated
that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be explained in the proof of
service.[16]
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done
if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him.[17] An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein service
of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was
held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first
case.[18]
Meanwhile, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the
defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements. [19] Thus, where the
defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines, and (1) the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter
of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the
property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been
attached in the Philippines, summons may be served extraterritorially by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court;
or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. [20]
A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on
respondents Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records show, is
already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him.
On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly
acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or
through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such
impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be
explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to
the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers
Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds.[24]
In the present case, the process server served the summons and copies of the
complaint on respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice and
Racheal,[25] through their mother, Caridad Trocino.[26] The return did not contain any
particulars as to the impossibility of personal service on Mariano Trocino within a
reasonable time. Such improper service renders the same ineffective.
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and,
when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights
and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary
appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. [27]
Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the facts and circumstances
showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon respondents within a
reasonable time, petitioners should have sought the issuance of
an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may
be issued when the original summons is returned without being served on any or all of
the defendants.[28] Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear the
consequences of their lack of diligence.
The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents without any
exception does not transform the ineffective service of summons into a valid one. It
does not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction. There was not even the slightest proof showing that respondents
authorized Atty. Bugarins appearance for and in their behalf. As found by the Court of
Appeals:
While Caridad Trocino may have engaged the services of Atty. Bugarin, it did not
necessarily mean that Atty. Bugarin also had the authority to represent the defendant
heirs. The records show that in all the pleadings which required verification, only
Caridad Trocino signed the same. There was never a single instance where defendant
heirs signed the pleading. The fact that a pleading is signed by one defendant does not
necessarily mean that it is binding on a co-defendant. Furthermore, Caridad Trocino
represented herself as the principal defendant in her Motion to Withdraw Appeal. (Rollo,
p. 80)
Since the defendant heirs are co-defendants, the trial court should have verified the
extent of Atty. Bugarins authority when petitioners failed to appear as early as the pre-
trial stage, where the parties are required to appear. The absence of the defendant
heirs should have prompted the trial court to inquire from the lawyer whether he was
also representing the other petitioners. As co-defendant and co-heirs over the disputed
properties, the defendant heirs had every right to be present during the trial. Only
Caridad Trocino appeared and testified on her own behalf. All the defenses raised were
her own, not the defendant heirs.[29]
Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents were rendered
without jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of summons nor was there
any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. Hence, the same is
void, with regard to private respondents except Caridad Trocino.
It must be pointed out that while it was the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino who
sold the properties to petitioners, their right to proceed against Jesus Trocino when he
died was passed on to his heirs, which includes respondents and Caridad
Trocino. Such transmission of right occurred by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.[30] When the process server personally served the summons on Caridad
Trocino, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over her person alone. Hence, the
trial courts decision is valid and binding with regard to her, but only in proportion to
Caridad Trocinos share. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
This Courts decision is therefore applicable to all the defendant heirs with the exception
of defendant Caridad Trocino considering that it was the latter who entered into the
alleged sale without the consent of her husband. She is therefore estopped from
questioning her own authority to enter into the questioned sale. Moreover, Caridad
Trocino was validly served with summons and was accorded due process. [31]
GUILLERMO SALVADOR VS PATRICIA
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in
the complaint of the assessed value of the property involved. The silence of the
complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction because
the trial court is not given the basis for making the determination.
FACTS:
Action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied
by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
To prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective
improvements along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in
their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.
A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land
occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was
also filed alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.
A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.
Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as
genuine.
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and
respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three
geodetic engineers as commissioners.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc.,
permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from
their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from them. The RTC deemed
it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land
belonged to the City of Manila.
CA reversed the RTC's judgment,7 and dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that
the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to
maintain a suit for quieting of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber
stamp of the majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC should have
conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the
adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title.
Petitioners maintain that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, arguing that the
parties had openly raised and litigated the boundary issue in the RTC, and had thereby
amended the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court; that they had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of
title because they had built their improvements on the property; and that the RTC
correctly relied on the reports of the majority of the commissioners.
Patricia, Inc. counters that the boundary dispute, which the allegations of the complaint
eventually boiled down to, was not proper in the action for quieting of title under Rule
63, Rules of Court; and that Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court did not apply to
vest the authority to resolve the boundary dispute in the RTC.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s complaint.
Held:
1.Jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value of the property
involved as alleged in the complaint.
The RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for injunction because it was one in
which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation. But the same
was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the
nature of a real action — that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or
possession of real property, or any interest in real property31 — in view of the expansion
of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended
Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of Rule 63 specifies the forum to be "the
appropriate Regional Trial Court,"33 the specification does not override the statutory
provision on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa,34 to wit:
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions
for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may
x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may"
in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving
title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the MTC, not the RTC.35
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of
the property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court
could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC
could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although
neither the parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the
proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu
proprioconsider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law,
and could not be vested by any act or omission of any party.36
Issue 2:
The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title
Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of
title, the petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence,
the dismissal of this cause of action was warranted.
An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action
governed by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded
on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to put things in their proper place, to make
the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also
for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.37
CA's adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was
concerned was correct. The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there
is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is
alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their
admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the
existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and
thus the action must necessarily fail.
Issue 3:
The petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction.
The petitioners did not also make out a case for injunction in their favor.
The nature of the remedy of injunction and the requirements for the issuance of the
injunctive writ have been expounded in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v.
Carantes,44 as follows:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to
do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from
doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action,
injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued
by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, provides,
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the
court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined
from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be
protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction
will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper
action for the purpose. [Emphasis Supplied]
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The
records show, however, that they did not have any right to be protected because they
had established only the existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and
the City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise
to the right of action in favor of the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the
petitioners at all.
Issue 4:
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court did not save the day for the petitioners
The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising
of the boundary dispute was unwarranted. First of all, a boundary dispute should not
be litigated in an action for the quieting of title due to the limited scope of the action.
The action for the quieting of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud
upon, doubt, or unce1iainty affecting title to real property; 45 it should not be used for
any other purpose. And, secondly, the boundary dispute would essentially seek to alter
or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any
alteration or modification either way should be initiated only by direct proceedings, not
as an issue incidentally raised by the parties herein. To allow the boundary dispute to
be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section 4846 of the Property
Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against collateral attacks on Torrens
titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in another action to obtain a different relief,
the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action.47 This is exactly what the
petitioners sought to do herein, seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s
title.
HERNANDEZ VS DBP AND CFI
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez (Assistant Attorney) was an employee of DBP for 21
years until his retirement due to illness. In due recognition of his unqualified service,
private respondent awarded to the petitioner a lot, identified as Lot No. 15, Block No.
W-21, in the private respondent's Housing Project at No. 1 West Avenue, Quezon City.
On August 31, 1968, after the petitioner received from the private respondent's Housing
Project Committee a statement of account of the purchase price of the said lot and
house in the total amount of P21,034.56, payable on a monthly amortization of P153.32
for a term of 15 years, he sent to the said Committee a Cashier's Check to cover the
cash and full payment of the purchase price of the lot and house awarded to him.
However, DBP cancelled the award of the lot and house previously awarded to him.
Petitioner protested against the cancellation of the award of the house and lot in his
favor and demanded from private respondent the restoration of all his rights to said
award. However, private respondent refused.
PETITIONER filed a complaint in the CFI of Batangas against the private respondent
seeking the annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor
and the restoration of all his rights thereto. He contends that the cancellation of said
award was unwarranted and illegal for he has already become the owner of said house
and lot by virtue of said award on August 12, 1964 and has acquired a vested right
thereto, which cannot be unilaterally cancelled without his consent.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue, contending that since the petitioner's action affects the title to a house
and lot situated in Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the CFI of
Quezon City where the real property is located and not in the CFI of Batangas where
petitioner resides.
RESPONDENT COURT sustained the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent on
the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE: 1. What is the nature of the action (annulment of the cancellation of the award)
– personal action.
2. Whether the action of the petitioner was properly filed in the Court of First Instance
of Batangas. - YES
HELD: It is a well settled rule that venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county
where the action is triable 1 depends to a great extent on the nature of the action to be
filed, whether it is real or personal. 2
A real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or
hereditaments. 3
A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery
of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. 4
Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting title to, or for recovery
of possession, or for partition, or condemnation of , or foreclosure of mortgage in real
property, shall be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff".
A close scrutiny of the essence of the petitioner's complaint in the court a quo would
readily show that he seeks the annulment of the cancellation of the award of the
Quezon City lot and house in his favor originally given him by respondent DBP in
recognition of his twenty-one years of service in its Legal Department, in pursuance of
his contention that he had acquired a vested right to the award which cannot be
unilaterally cancelled by respondent without his consent.
The Court agrees that petitioner's action is not a real but a personal action. As
correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation
of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said
properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and
subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to
accept the proffered payment in full which it had rejected and returned to petitioner.
2. Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in
his residence, as held in the case of Adamus vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 5 where this
Court speaking through former Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal distinguished the
case from an earlier line of J.M. Tuaxon & Co., Inc. cases involving lot purchasers from
the Deudors 6, as follows:
... All the allegations as well as the prayer in the complaint show that this is not a real
but a personal action — to compel the defendants to execute the corresponding
purchase contracts in favor of the plaintiffs and to pay damages. The plaintiffs do not
claim ownership of the lots in question: they recognize the title of the defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. They do not ask that possession be delivered to them, for they
allege to be in possession. The case cited by the defendants (Abao, et al. vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-16796, Jan. 30, 1962) is therefore not in point. In that
case, as stated by this Court in its decision, the 'plaintiffs' action is predicated on the
theory that they are 'occupants, landholders,' and 'most' of them owners by purchase'
of the residential lots in question; that, in consequence of the compromise agreement
adverted to above, between the Deudors; and defendant corporations, the latter had
acknowledged the right and title of the Deudors in and to said lots; and hence, the right
and title of the plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest of the Deudors; that, by entering into
said agreement, defendant corporations had, also, waived their right to invoke the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title in favor of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.; and that
defendants have no right, therefore, to oust plaintiffs from the lots respectively occupied
by them and which they claim to be entitled to hold. Obviously, this action affects,
therefore, not only the possession of real property, but, also, the title thereto.
Accordingly, it should have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Rizal in which said property is situated (Section 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court).
JOSE VS OMEGA
FACTS:
On November 14, 1994, the RTC of Cebu City rendered a decision in Civil Case
declaring the March 3, 1981 marriage between plaintiff Danilo Omega and Criselda F.
Jose, null and void ab initio.
The ground for declaring the marriage null and void is psychological incapacity on the
part of defendant Criselda. During the trial, the counsel on record of defendant Criselda
was Atty. Margarito D. Yap of the Cebu City District Office of the PAO. However,
defendant Criselda filed a Notice of Appeal, dated December 7, 1994, on her own,
without the assistance of Atty. Yap.2
CA sent a notice to pay docket fee, dated August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was
received by him.3 The appellate court promulgated a Resolution which reads as
follows:"For failure of the defendant-appellant to pay the docketing fee in this case
within the reglementary period which expired on August 25, 1995, despite receipt by
his counsel on August 10, 1995 of this Court’s notice dated August 3, 1995, this appeal
is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Resolution had become final and executory as of December 1, 1995. ”
On May 13, 1996, the appellate court received a letter from defendant-appellant
Criselda addressed to CA inquiring about the status of her appeal and claiming that
she has not received any notice from the appellate court.
The appellate court noted that Atty. Yap was sent the notice to pay docket fee because
Criselda had sent a copy of her Notice of Appeal to Atty. Yap and that per the records
of the case, Atty. Yap was earlier sent a copy of the formal offer of exhibits and duly
received in his behalf, he filed the comments and objections to the exhibits for the
plaintiff; he appeared at the hearings conducted by the trial court. 8
On October 28, 1996, Criselda through counsel filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal but was denied by the CA.
Hence, the present petition on the following ground: "The public respondent CA
committed grave error in denying the petitioner’s Motion for Leave of Court to file
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to
Reinstate Appeal which if not corrected, would deprive petitioner of her constitutional
right to due process and injustice would be done to her."
ISSUE: WON CA erred in denying the motion of petitioner. – NO.
HELD:
Based on the records, it appears that the PAO, through Atty. Victor C. Laborte and Atty.
Yap, represented petitioner during the trial of the case. Although petitioner herself
personally filed the Notice of Appeal, the fact remains that Atty. Yap or the PAO has
not filed any formal notice of withdrawal of appearance in the trial court. Therefore,
insofar as the appellate court is concerned, Atty. Yap is the counsel of record. As such,
the appellate court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for leave of court to file omnibus motions or motion to reinstate appeal.
Section 22, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides: Attorney who appears in lower
court presumed to represent client on appeal. – An attorney who appears de parte in a
case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court."
Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on
appeal renders the judgment final and executory.13
Indeed, the Court, in some instances, had allowed liberal construction of the Rules of
Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals on
equitable consideration.14 In Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has enunciated
the following:
"The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit: First, the failure
to pay appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the appeal; Second, such power
should be used in the exercise of the Courts’ sound discretion ‘in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair "play and with great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances.
"Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve
the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. This is
based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial
justice. It may be recalled that the general rule is that the Rules of Court are rules of
procedure and whenever called for they should be so construed as to give effect rather
than defeat their essence.
"Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
‘SEC. 6. Construction – These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.’
"Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception
is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules
on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception
to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an
appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have
denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice, and
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
"The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of
appeal, if done in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, amounts to an undue denial of
the petitioner’s right to appeal. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of
appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appealswhere this Court ruled that
an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed
that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities." 15
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to be liberal in the present case for the
following reasons:

Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO was properly sent by the appellate
court a notice to pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did not file any formal
withdrawal of appearance and therefore, for all intents and purposes, the appellate
court correctly sent the notice to Atty. Yap. It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.16

Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed
to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. Under Section
22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court
shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

Petitioner failed to pursue her appeal for almost two years. She herself filed the notice
of appeal on December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from the Court of Appeals about
her appeal only on May 13, 1996 (or after the lapse of one year and five months) as to
the status of her appeal.

Petitioner failed to show that her appeal is extremely meritorious that to deprive her of
an appeal would unduly affect her substantial rights.

In other words, petitioner failed to show any compelling reason to warrant the issuance
of the writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to
Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution dated October 24, 1995 dismissing petitioner’s appeal
had become final and executory as of December 1, 1995.
LA TONDENA DISTILLERS VS HON JUDGE BERNARDO T. PONFERADDA
FACTS:
Several persons (defendants) reneged on their contract to sell to private respondents
a parcel of land 2 located in Bago City;
This breach prompted private respondents to file on August 25, 1987 before the RTC
of Bacolod City an action for "specific performance with damages" against defendants.
A notice of lis pendens was annotated on the latter's title although the same was
cancelled on November 9, 1988 upon defendants filing a bond.
Pending the trial before the lower court on November, 1991, petitioner bought the
above lot from defendants.
PETITIONER filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on two grounds: no
cause of action and improper venue. In support of the first ground, petitioner asserts
that it is a buyer in good faith since the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled
when it bought the lot. As for the second ground, petitioner argued that venue should
be in Bago City where the lot is located and not in Bacolod City.
LOWER COURT denied their motion as there was need for the parties to present
evidence on the question of good faith. More than 3 months later, or on April 21, 1993,
petitioner went directly to this Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing
the denial of their motions.
16 10 sanctions deferment of hearing on the motion "until the trial if the ground alleged
does not appear to be indubitable." Clearly respondent judge had doubts on the
allegation of petitioner's good faith. This is a question of fact which necessitates
presentation of evidence and is certainly far from indubitable. 11 It is within the
discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged does not appear to be
indubitable 12 and that deferment is only deemed a provisional denial of the motion to
dismiss.13
Finally, We are not also persuaded by petitioner's argument that venue should be
lodged in Bago City where the lot is situated. 14 The complaint is one for "specific
performance with damages." Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot but
in fact recognized title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. In one
case, 15 a similar complaint for "specific performance with damages" involving real
property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where
the party resides. Not being an action involving title to or ownership of real property,
venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.
Counsel for the petitioner should have meticulously observed the procedural guidelines
established by the Rules of Court as well as by jurisprudence. We reiterate that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not intended to be a tool to delay litigation and must
be resorted to only in cases of manifest grave abuse of discretion. The case at bench
does not call for such extraordinary remedy.

(Petitioner filed a "manifestation" alleging for the first time that it sold the lot sometime
in September, 1992 to Distileria Bago, Inc. a separate entity with which the former has
substantial stockholdings. Based on such admission, private respondents moved to
dismiss the instant petition, arguing that petitioner is no longer a real party in interest,
having sold the lot.)

ISSUE: WON petition should be dismissed. – Yes

HELD:

Petition should be dismissed outright for being filed beyond the reasonable period, 4 the
same having been filed only after more than three months from the time petitioner
received a copy of the assailed RTC resolutions.

Even assuming that the petition was promptly filed, dismissal is still warranted on
account of the following reasons:

First, an order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither

appealable until final judgment, 5 nor could it generally be assailed on certiorari. 6 The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 16, and
interpose as defenses, the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial,
and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the whole case by appeal in due time. 7

Second, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if the denial of the
motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 8 In the case at bar, the lower court did
not abuse its discretion in deferring 9 action on the motion. Section 3 of Rule
MANALO VS CA
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar
S. Manalo, and his 11 children. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine
Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45
General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto,
Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent RTC of Manila 7 of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for
hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for 3
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further
directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the
petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial
court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando
who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,
culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to set
aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the
motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
Trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on
July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue
of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for
hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the CA. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving
spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification
of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11promulgated on
September 30, 1996. Motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise
dismissed.12
PETITIONERS claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. Petitioners, the same should
be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition
precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners
therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to
the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of
the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to
aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family
have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
HELD:
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint,
or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of
an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required
in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-
63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative
list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this
Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner
ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased
TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that
this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal
heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance
with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of
P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of
this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which
may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took
advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and
denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort
to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may
be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of
an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case
either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So
it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to
be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same
by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article
222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement
of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring
supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This
is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law
or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same
family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger. 25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded
therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such,
it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent
with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt
SPOUSES YU VS PACLEB
FACTS:
Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the registered
owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Langcaan Property became the subject of 3 documents purporting to transfer its
ownership. On February 27, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale5 was entered into between
Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario. On May 7,
1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale6 was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and
Ruperto L. Javier (Javier). On November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell7 was entered into
between Javier and petitioner spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In their
contract, petitioner spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of
₱900,000.₱600,000 was acknowledged as received by Javier and ₱300,000 remained
as balance. Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to
sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of the contract.All the
aforementioned sales were not registered.
On April 23, 1993, petitioner spouses Yu filed with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, a
Complaint8 for specific performance and damages against Javier to compel the latter
to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan Property.
In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan
Property was not tenanted. However, after they already paid ₱200,000 as initial
payment and entered into an Agreement dated September 11, 1992 for the sale of the
Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by Ramon C. Pacleb
(Ramon).9 Petitioner spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the
return of their initial payment. Thereafter, petitioner spouses and Javier verified from
Ramon if he was willing to vacate the property and the latter was agreeable. Javier then
promised to make arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay the
latter his disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to
Sell canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his
obligations.
Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default. On September
8, 1994, the trial court a rendered a judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant
based on the sale of subject parcel of land to the former who is entitled thereby to the
ownership and possession. The defendant is further directed to deliver the certificate
of title of the land to the plaintiff who is entitled to it as transferee and new owner thereof
upon payment by the plaintiff of his balance of the purchase price in the sum of
₱300,000.00 with legal interest from date.
On March 10, 1995, petitioner spouses and Ramon and the latter’s wife, Corazon
Bodino, executed a "Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag
ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan."14 Under the said agreement, petitioner spouses paid
Ramon the amount of ₱500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over
the Langcaan Property.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint15 for annulment of deed of sale and
other documents arising from it. He alleged that the deed of sale purportedly executed
between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario was spurious as their
signatures thereon were forgeries. Respondent moved to have summons served upon
Rebecca Del Rosario by publication since the latter’s address could not be found. The
trial court, however, denied his motion.16 Respondent then moved to dismiss the case,
and the trial court granted the motion in its Order17 dated April 11, 1996, dismissing the
case without prejudice.
Meanwhile, on November 23, 1995, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry
against respondent with the MTC. They alleged that they had prior physical possession
of the Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted by
respondent in September 1995. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner spouses, which
decision was affirmed by the RTC.18 However, the CA set aside the decisions of the
lower courts and found that it was respondent who had prior physical possession of the
property as shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon. 19
On May 29, 1996, respondent filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title with
damages to cancel Entry No. 2676-75 and Entry No. 2677-75, the annotated Decision
in Civil Case No. 741-93 and its Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan
Property.20 Respondent alleged that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife
and Rebecca Del Rosario, who is not known to them, could not have been possibly
executed on February 27, 1992, the date appearing thereon. He alleged that on said
date, he was residing in the United States 21 and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, died
twenty (20) years ago.221avvphi1
On May 28, 1997, during the pendency of the instant case before the trial court,
respondent died and was substituted by his surviving spouse, Antonieta S. Pacleb, and
Lorna Pacleb-Guerrero, Florencio C. Pacleb and Myrla C. Pacleb representing the
children with the first wife.23
On December 27, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondent’s case and held that
petitioner spouses are purchasers in good faith. 24 The trial court ratiocinated that the
dismissal of respondent’s complaint for annulment of the successive sales at his
instance "sealed the regularity of the purchase"25 by petitioner spouses and that he "in
effect admits that the said sale…was valid and in order."
Accordingly, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-118375 in the name
of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner spouses. The
trial court also ordered the heirs of respondent and all persons claiming under them to
surrender possession of the Langcaan Property to petitioner spouses.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. CA ruled that petitioner
spouses are not purchasers in good faith and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-
93 did not transfer ownership of the Langcaan Property to them.
PETITIONER spouses argue that the decision of the RTC is conclusive and binding
upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it involved the question
of possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in
personam but an action quasi in rem.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the action (specific performance) in this case. –in
personam
HELD:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether
a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined
by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding
to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on
the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of
ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam
is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to
specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action
in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person,
as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It
has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking
to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an
action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests
of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who
joined in the action.

Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by
petitioner spouses against Javier to compel performance of the latter’s undertakings
under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, its object is to
compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed
of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their favor. The obligations of Javier
under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan
Property.36

We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is
an action in personam.37 In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development
Corporation,38 we ruled that an action for specific performance praying for the execution
of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract
to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.

Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard.39 Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither
can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late
first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.

All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between respondent
and petitioner spouses, respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property as
the true owner thereof.
TAGABI VS TANQUE
FACTS:
Plaintiff Margarito Tanque is the son of Anastasio Tanque who, during his lifetime,
owned and possessed a parcel of land situated at Barangay Jolason, Tubungan, Iloilo.
Upon the death of his father on December 16, 1966, plaintiff took over the ownership
and possession of the said land and declared the same in his name for taxation
purposes.
The same parcel of land was the subject of a civil case for recovery of ownership filed
sometime in 1968 by plaintiff against Genaro Tablatin before the CFI of Iloilo, which
was decided on February 8, 1974in favor of herein plaintiff and which decision, on
appeal by the losing party, was affirmed by the CA on February 2, 1979 . The decision
of the CA attained finality on March 4, 1979.
When the lands in Tubungan, Iloilo were cadastrally surveyed by the Bureau of Lands
in 1982, plaintiff’s parcel of land was surveyed and identified as Cadastral Lot 2104
with an area of 4.7433 hectares. On February 24, 1986, Original Certificate of Title No.
F-31883 was issued to plaintiff based on Free Patent No. 17553 obtained from the
Bureau of Lands.
Sometime in 1988, defendant Pedro Tagabi asserted ownership over a portion of
Cadastral Lot 2104 with an area of 654 square meters, claiming that the same forms
part of Cadastral Lot 2097 which is owned by him. Without the knowledge and consent
of plaintiff, defendant Tagabi had the said portion entered into by his co-defendant,
Demetrio Tabaniag, who planted the same with palay and corn.
Plaintiff then went to the Bureau of Lands and asked that Cadastral Lot 2104 be
relocated to determine whether a portion was encroached upon by the defendant.
Accordingly, relocation survey was made by Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Ciriaco in the
presence of both plaintiff and defendants and, thereafter, a sketch, was prepared and
issued by the said Geodetic Engineer. It was found out that, indeed, a portion with an
area of 654 square meters within lot 2104 was encroached upon by the defendants.
The matter was then referred by plaintiff to the barangay officials concerned for
conciliation. But no settlement was reached. Hence, plaintiff filed the present action in
court to recover possession of the disputed portion, plus damages. 3
RTC: rendered declaring plaintiff the lawful owner of the property in question and
ordering the defendants to vacate and deliver possession of the same to plaintiff
Defendants Pedro Tagabi and Demetrio Tabaniag (petitioners) filed an appeal with the
CA.
Plaintiff-appellee Margarito Tanque (respondent) filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds
that the appellants’ brief was filed beyond the period allowed by the CA and that the
said brief was not accompanied by a written explanation why it was not filed personally
in violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. 5
Petitioners filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss contending that the delay of
one day in the filing of their appellants’ brief does not automatically cause the dismissal
of the appeal. Petitioners further contend that since there was no allegation of any
prejudice on the part of the appellee which may have been caused by the delay and
since the issues raised are substantial enough to merit consideration by the appellate
court, the liberal interpretation of the rules is justified. On the matter of lack of
explanation why the appellants’ brief was not filed personally with the CA, petitioners
aver that the practicability of the filing is self-explanatory considering that the law office
of their counsel is in Iloilo City while the CA is in Manila; and that the court may take
judicial notice of the distance between these two places and, hence, the impracticability
of personal filing.6
CA issued the presently assailed Resolution whereby, in the exercise of its judicial
discretion, it admitted herein petitioners’ brief for appellants despite having been filed
one day late but granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply with
Section 11, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and ordered that petitioners’ brief be
expunged from the records of the case.9 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution issued on June 16, 2000. 10
The petitioners submit that when the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners on the ground that there was no explanation why the said brief was filed by
registered mail and not by personal service in strictest compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals acted not in accord
with the said provisions and with the cited decision of the Supreme Court. Petitioners
further argue that the dismissal by the CA of herein petitioners’ appeal on the ground
of failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court is not in accord with the policy of liberal construction of the said Rules as provided
in Section 6, Rule 1 thereof. Petitioners submit that a strict interpretation of the above-
cited provisions of the Rules of Court will obstruct rather than serve the broader
interests of justice. Moreover, petitioners assert that the CA can take judicial notice of
the distance between the CA office in Manila and the law office of counsel for petitioners
in Iloilo City; and that said distance renders personal filing impracticable. Petitioners
also contend that a mere perusal of their brief already filed with the CA shows merit in
their appeal and that its dismissal would prejudice the substantial rights of herein
petitioners.
Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing the case. – NO.
HELD:
On technical grounds, Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that personal
service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while a resort to other modes
of service and filing is the exception.12 Where recourse is made to the exception, a
written explanation why the service and the filing were not done personally is
indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is acceptable and
manifest.13 Where no explanation is offered to justify the resort to other modes,
the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes
mandatory.14 Thus, the CA did not err when it granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
and ordered that petitioners’ brief be expunged from the records in view of the latter’s
failure to present a written explanation why they did not personally file their appeal brief
with the CA.
Citing Kowloon House/Willy Ng v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court reiterated the
following pronouncements in United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v. United Pulp and Paper
Chapter-Federation of Free Workers:16
[R]ules of procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of
liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a
party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants
or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors
may be heard in the correct form and manner, at the prescribed time in a peaceful
though adversarial confrontation before a judge whose authority litigants acknowledge.
Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
of the rules of procedure, particularly by government officials and agencies.17
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.18 Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. 19
Even on substantive grounds, the Court still finds the present petition without merit.
According to Geodetic Engineer Filomeno Dano, both plaintiff and defendant Tagabi,
were present during the relocation survey and both were fully aware of and, in fact,
agreed to the use by the Commissioner of the cadastral records and the available data
pertinent to the cadastral survey of the two lots. In any case, it is quite clear from the
text of the Order dated February 5, 1993 appointing the Commissioner that the parties
agreed to abide by the results of the relocation survey which results, according to the
same Order, "shall be made the basis of resolving the dispute between them". It is now
too late in the day, so to speak, for the defendants to back out from such commitment
that they had made. Having agreed to abide by the results of the relocation survey,
defendants are now estopped from questioning the same.

In the present case, the CA already extended to petitioners the benefit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court by not dismissing their appeal on the ground that
their appellants’ brief was belatedly filed by one day. What cannot be ignored, however,
are petitioners’ successive violations of the Rule requiring explanation why they did not
personally file their brief with the CA. The first violation was committed when they filed
their appellants’ brief and the second violation was incurred when they filed their
Comment on respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners cannot feign ignorance of
such Rule because they are represented by counsel. Moreover, they were already
informed of such lapse through the Motion to Dismiss filed by herein respondent.

In explaining the importance of faithful compliance with procedural rules, this Court held
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad20 that:

[P]rocedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the
Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, there is no intention to forge a
weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation
and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt,
procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit
of justice.21

The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the Rules.22 Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost, more so, as in this case, where petitioners violated the same Rule not only once
but twice. The utter disregard of the rules made by petitioners cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction and substantial
compliance.23 Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality not only to explain and justify his
failure to abide by the rules but also to avoid committing the same mistake in the future.
Hence, petitioners’ repeated failure to comply with the provisions of Section 11, Rule
13 is enough basis to dismiss the present petition.
TALUSAN VS HERNANDEZ
DOCTRINE: For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property
is deemed the taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency
and the resultant proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly
acquired the property through an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such
notice, because they are not the registered owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers
must register their purchases as soon as possible and, equally important, they must
pay their taxes on time.
FACTS:
They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651,
from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Juan D. Hernandez, sued in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter
to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property
would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, to satisfy the delinquent real
estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of
P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial never
authorized a certain Dante Origan to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his
behalf;
[Respondent] Hernandez sold the property to [Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00
without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without
compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;
A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo
Tayag. The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market
value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these; The
bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience, thus, the
sale for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null
and void ab initio;
[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought
the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous,
adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never
been in possession of the said property. [Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to
pay to the [respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they]
might have incurred but said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
[Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer: (T)he ownership of the
Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio
City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the RTC of Baguio,
Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and
executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith in a
regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate. The
lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the [petitioners] pray for
the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was affirmed
by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September
16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by
the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;The public auction sale complied
with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464 hence, the same is lawful and
valid:
Petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.
RTC dismissed the complaint. RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16, 1987
judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier
Branch 6 Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of
Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of
Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent
Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had
already upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the
same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court,
contrary to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the
subject condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that sale, because the city
treasurer complied with the requirements of notice, publication and posting. It added
that [i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then they have
only themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them and the
former owner x x x.
Rejecting petitioners contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled
that such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale.
Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with
the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
ISSUE: (1) whether the RTC Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to this
proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the subject condominium unit should
be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of the notice of delinquency for the
payment of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale or public auction of the
subject property and (c) equitable considerations.
HELD:
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases
involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in
personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does
not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam.[20] As such, mere
publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the
procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city
treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect
the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the
permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer
of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest
in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered
mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of
the condominium unit.

For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed
the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency
and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the
property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they
were not entitled to it.

ISSUE 2:

Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the
public auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is
reproduced hereunder:

x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by

messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent
taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the municipality
or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said treasurer or
barrio captain. x x x. (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their Memorandum)

According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the
address appearing in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address
is Unit No. 5, Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known
address or residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. They contend that notice may be sent to the residence of the taxpayer,
only when the tax roll does not show any address of the property.

The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayers
address to which the notice may be sent is the treasurers discretionary prerogative. In
this case, the city treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the
residence of the taxpayer. The former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the
address of the latter was known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable
to the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his permanent
residence in Manila, because he was using the subject condominium unit merely as a
vacation house and not as a residence.
VALMMONTE VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte
and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte before the RTC
Manila. The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in Paco, Manila.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned,
but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the ground
that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a
special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion.
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondent's motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied on September 23, 1992. Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition
and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate court's decision
was received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January 15, 1993 at his Manila office
and on January 21, 1993 in Seattle, Washington. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1)
in refusing to apply the provisions of Rule 14, §17 of the Revised Rules of Court and
applying instead Rule 14, §8 when the fact is that petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14, §8 is the applicable provision,
there was no valid substituted service as there was no strict compliance with the
requirement by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts that petitioners are
invoking a technicality and that strict adherence to the rules would only result in a
useless ceremony.
ISSUE: 1. What is the nature of action in the case (partition and accounting) – quasi in
rem
2. WON petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons. -NO.
HELD:
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed
against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private
respondent, whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because
the rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an
action is one or the other of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and
he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-82 is
essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. 3 If defendant
cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is
a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by
publication.4 Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who
cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of
substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§
17 and 18 of the same Rule.5
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines,
otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his
person is essential to make a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found
in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17,
which provides:
§17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property
of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer..
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is
that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is
domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility
that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect
his interest if he is so minded.6
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which
is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi
in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest state where defendant was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered
in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As explained in the insufficient because no copy of the summons was sent to the last known correct
leading case of Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca :7 address in the Philippines..

[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly speaking an action in
rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such. . . . The action quasi in rem differs
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named
as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object
the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to
be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2)
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in
any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
In the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent's attorney that "all
communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her
lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for
her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the
filing of this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the
negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the
partition of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the
exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the
authority given to petitioner's husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be
construed as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte in this case.

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte
was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the
service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third
mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient."

We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides.8 Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons
on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14,
§17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused
to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon
prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As provided in §19, such
leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or
some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.

Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be
noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs
from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not
found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of
summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.

Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due
process. That is why in one case,9although the Court considered publication in the
Philippines of the summons (against the contention that it should be made in the foreign