WorldDev&pment, Vol. 23, No. 7, pp.

1073-1084, 1995
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Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects

(ICDPs) Sustainable?
On the Conservation of Large Mammals in
Sub-Saharan Africa

CHRISTOPHER B. BARREIT
Utah State University, Logan, U.S.A.
and
PETER ARCESE”
University of Wisconsin, Madison, U.S.A.

Summary. - Initiatives to link rural development and species conservation, known as integrated conser-
vation-development projects (ICDPs), have been launched with considerable fanfare and funding around
the world. Although ICDPs hold appeal as broader ecological efforts than the conservation and develop-
ment strategies that preceded them, they also suffer conceptual flaws that may limit their appropriateness
and potential sustainability, at least when applied to the protection of large African mammals.

1. INTRODUCTION We are concerned about the ICDP approach for

Traditional techniques of protected area manage-
ment, sometimes referred to as the “fences and fines”
approach, are increasingly viewed as having failed in
their goals of preserving biological diversity in the
tropics (e.g., Bell, 1986a; 1986b; Leader-Williams
and Albon, 1988). In their place, integrated conserva-
tion and development projects (ICDPs) are being pro-
moted and portrayed as “the vanguard of what will
undoubtedly be a broad array of initiatives attempting
to link conservation and development.“1 In sub-
Saharan Africa, ICDPs are frequently designed to
encourage conservation by linking the controlled
exploitation of wildlife resources in protected areas to
the curtailment of human encroachment into these
areas (Kiss, 1990). Despite their nearly universal
acceptance, however, ICDPs have recently drawn
attention because of what are viewed as ill-conceived
and untested assumptions about their sustainability
and appropriateness to local conditions. In a review of
23 such projects in Africa, Asia, and South America,
for example, Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992)
noted that “measurable progress has been rare”, and
they concluded that all projects had failed to meet their
stated objectives because”the critical linkage between
development and conservation is either missing or
obscure.“’
several reasons, and in this paper we comment on
these from the perspectives of an economist working
on African agricultural development and rural poverty
alleviation, and a wildlife ecologist concerned with
the conservation of African wildlife. We first offer
some background to the problem. Second, we list two
particular concerns for the sustainability and feasibil-
ity of ICDPs from a biological perspective, and a
slightly greater number of concerns based on social
and economic arguments. Finally, we list potential
alternatives to the ICDP approach of encouraging the
increased reliance of rural peoples on the exploitation
of wildlife resources.
Much early development theory applied in colonial
and postcolonial Africa advocated rapid resource
extraction. Conservation strategies of these periods, as
typified by the fences and fines approach, were as bio-
centric as the contemporaneous development strate-
gies were anthropocentric. In contrast, ICDPs assume
that human and nonhuman systems are interdependent
and, therefore, that the challenges of conservation and
development are inextricable. The core philosophy of
the ICDP approach is revealed in the language used to
*We thank John Peck for helpful discussions. Final revision
accepted: February IO, 1995.

1073
1074 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
describe them as “community-based” programs,
employing “participatory” methods to simultaneously
“empower” rural residents and conserve threatened
species, and this language may also account for much
of the enthusiasm with which international develop-
ment agencies and conservation groups support them.3
The distinctive feature of ICDPs as conservation
strategies is that rural residents are induced to surren-
der access to, or to curtail illegal offtake of, native
species and their habitats in exchange for alternative
sources of income and sustenance, or for the provision
of direct compensation, infrastructure, or social ser-
vices associated with an improved standard of living.
Such exchanges are sometimes contractual, but
whether formalized or not, the basic notion of an
exchange of access for material consideration is cen-
tral to ICDPs.
In the case of plans to promote the sustained use and
conservation of large African mammals, the CAMP-
FIRE program of Zimbabwe’ offers a general model
of a project design that is being emulated across
Africa. Kiss (1990) and Child and Peterson (1991)
provide details of this program, which we summarize
briefly here. In several semi-arid districts of
Zimbabwe, tsetse flies are often abundant to the point
of preventing the successful production of domestic
stock. Moreover, rainfall is erratic and the soils are
typically shallow and infertile. As a result, local peo-
ple have subsisted, particularly in times of scarcity, on
wildlife taken illegally from parks, game-controlled
areas, or other undeveloped lands in the region. Prior
to the mid- 1980s this situation pitted local people try-
ing to better their lives against government officials
with a mandate for the protection of wildlife, with nei-
ther group realizing substantial progress in part
because of interference by the other. The sentiments of
local people were summarized by Chief Malama for
one region near Nyaminyami: “Tourists come here to
enjoy lodges and to view wildlife. Safari companies
come here to kill animals and make money. We are
forgotten. Employment here is too low. Luamfwa
Lodge employs only about four people and safari
hunting employs no one. How can you ask us to coop-
erate with conservation when this is SO?“~
In an effort to ameliorate conditions of human
poverty, dwindling wildlife, and a lack of cooperation
between local people and government workers,
CAMPFIRE has attempted to promote the sustainable,
legal use of certain wildlife species (particularly ele-
phants, Cape buffalo, and several antelope species) by
small. homogeneous communities in order to provide
both employment and cash.” Harvests are determined
by ecologists of a nongovernmental trust, who work in
consultation with villagers and receive a portion of the
proceeds from the sale of wildlife products (mainly
meat) for their continued involvement. Local people
are said to react positively to these initiatives because
they typically receive employment, tangible benefits
in cash or in kind, and also because they develop a
sense of “ownership” over wildlife after having
become involved in decisions having to do with its use
(Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya, 1990; Peck, 1993).
The aims of conservation are also said to be served,
ostensibly because local people come to realize the
long-term benefits of healthy wildlife populations via
their ability to generate revenues from tourism, safari
hunting, and meat sales, as well as their traditional
value as food. What is less clear from a biological per-
spective, however, is (a) the degree to which present
day harvests are sustainable over the long term, (b) the
assumption that, even though present day benefits may
be viewed favorably, they will suffice in the future to
promote sustainable harvest policies and curtail sup-
plementary, illegal exploitation, and (c) that it is a bio-
logically sound policy to base human needs, which
must be assumed to grow, on the harvest of wildlife
populations that will not grow and which may be
inherently unstable in size. We now consider these
concerns in more detail before considering some of
the social and economic ramifications of ICDPs.
2. THE BIOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY
OF ICDPs
It is clear that most populations of large African
mammals can sustain some harvest without declining
to extinction (Dasmann, ,1964; Parker, 1984, 1987;
Child and Child, 1987; Child, 1990; Muir-Leresche,
1987; Macnab, 1991; Burton, 1994). The economics
of commercial or cooperative cropping ventures,
however, are uncertain for most species of large
African mammals, mainly because of the difficulties
of obtaining, processing and transporting animals and
their products. Where careful analyses have been
done, the evidence suggests that cropping will be
marginally profitable for only a handful of species that
can be easily slaughtered, without relying on refriger-
ation or vehicle transportation; and further, that under
most environmental conditions domestic stock will
have higher productivity than wild species in the same
area (Macnab, 1991). Nevertheless, if cropping
schemes are initiated and monitored as ecological
experiments (Macnab, 1983) there is reason to
believe that something more could be learned about
the conditions under which they might be operated
successfully within protected areas; i.e. at a profit,
without causing undue depletion of a particular
species or irreversible change to the structure and
functioning of the protected ecosystem. At present,
however, cropping schemes as components of ICDPs
are being promoted uncritically (Macnab, 1991:
Sinclair and Arcese, 1995) and with little or no eco-
logical monitoring (Kremen, Merenlender and
Murphy, 1994). Below, we list some areas where the
assumptions that underlie these schemes remain
 ARE ICDPs SUSTAINABLE?
untested and are likely to be false. If we are correct and
these problems are ignored, the collapse of these pro-
grams may be inevitable.
(a) Estimating sustainable harvests over the
long term
Given reliable information on the number, social
system, and survival and reproductive rates of a
species, it is a relatively straightforward task to esti-
mate how many animals may be killed each year with-
out causing the population to decline to extinction,
given that the environment remains constant
(Caughley, 1977). Several additional pieces of infor-
mation are required, however, if one wishes to main-
tain a stable harvest in the face of a varying environ-
ment, as is found in many protected areas in Africa
(Sinclair, 1977, 1979a, 1979b; McNaughton, 1983,
1985). This information can be summarized as that
which answers the question: what maintains the cur-
rent population size at present? Experience shows that
for many large African mammals, the answer to this
question rests mainly on the amount and temporal
availability of food resources (Sinclair, 1977, 1979a;
Hilbom and Sinclair, 1979; Caughley and Sinclair,
1994). Resource abundance depends in turn on the
quality of the habitat utilized, the amount of habitat
available, and the overall rate of resource production,
which is typically linked to rainfall in savanna systems
(Sinclair, 1977; McNaughton, 1983, 1985; Caughley
and Sinclair, 1994).
Many critical assumptions underlie wildlife crop-
ping schemes initiated in these conditions. We now
highlight two particular assumptions that are probably
false for ICDPs as they are presently conceived. First,
managers are assumed to be able to respond to changes
in rainfall by increasing harvests following “good
years” and decreasing them following “bad years”,
because the degree to which these adjustments can be
achieved will determine the success of the culling
operation, in terms of maintaining populations at their
optimal or maximal size for harvest. Increases might
be arranged successfully within the ability to harvest,
process and transport additional animals. Decreases,
however, are likely to be politically unpalatable in the
ICDP context, since the benefits of off-take are
assumed to be linked to the willingness of local resi-
dents to comply with regulation (Lewis, Kaweche and
Mwenya, 1990). If political pressure limits a man-
ager’s ability to reduce harvests, a downward spiral in
the size of the harvested population will result,
because short-term overexploitation will lead to lower
future sustainable harvests, less local cooperation, and
so on. Clearly, for the assumption of sustainable har-
vest to be upheld, managers must be flexible to the
point of closing harvests during years when rainfall is
low and when demand by local people is at its peak.
1075
The problem of flexibility in management policy
will be worsened by the fact that many large African
mammal populations slated for harvest are unstable in
size. For example, Young (1994) lists 47 die-offs
involving 20 species of large African mammals, all of
which occurred by natural causes in the last five
decades. Die-offs resulted most often from droughts,
but also from natural disease outbreaks and increases
in predator populations. Young (1994) did not include
die-offs resulting from human causes, such as overex-
ploitation or the introduction of exotic diseases (e.g.,
rinderpest). Even so, natural die-offs resulted in an
average 63% reduction in population size. Young
(1994) concluded that severe natural reductions in the
size of large African mammal populations are a wide-
spread and not uncommon phenomenon.
Instability further complicates the estimation of
sustainable harvests in large mammal populations,
and it is also likely to affect the dynamics of human
resource interactions. This is because reductions in the
size of harvested populations that result from natural
catastrophes are difficult or impossible to predict. But
when they occur, the conservation goals of ICDPs dic-
tate that managers must curtail harvest to allow popu-
lations to recover. As noted above, however, because
the needs of local people are likely also to vary with
environmental conditions, managers can expect to
face the difficult decision of choosing between human
needs and conservation goals. In this case, one of two
outcomes is inevitable. First, if managers curtail the
legal harvest, the credibility of the ICDP scheme is
imperiled and resumption of illegal harvest is likely.
Second, if managers yield to public pressure to main-
tain or increase harvests, the depletion of the harvested
population is ensured. Neither of these alternatives is
consistent with the goals of ICDPs.
A second assumption of wildlife harvesting
schemes promoted in ICDPs is that the quality and
amount of habitat available to the harvested popula-
tions will remain constant or increase. This is required
because a stable resource base for animal production
is essential to maintaining stable harvests over the
long term. Many populations slated for harvest, how-
ever (e.g., the migratory wildebeest and zebra of the
Serengeti and Tarangire regions of Tanzania, and
migratory wildebeest of the Central Kalahari,
Botswana), utilize large amounts of habitat in areas
that are only marginally protected or completely
unprotected at present (Sinclair, 1995; Hilborn et al.,
1995). Thus, in areas such as the Loliondo and
Ikorongo Game Controlled Areas, which straddle the
east and west boundaries of Serengeti, habitat is
rapidly being usurped by commercial grain and veg-
etable farms, peasant settlements, and domestic stock
grazing (Sinclair and Arcese, 1995). Loss and degra-
dation of habitats, particularly those which may only
be used by wild ungulates in times of severe stress due
to drought, will reduce the sustainable size of harvests
1076 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
in the absence of land protection and restoration pro-
grams. For example, in a year of record low rainfall in
1992-93, the Serengeti wildebeest herd moved into
minimally and unprotected areas west of the park
where rainfall is typically greatest. Coincident with
doing so, the population experienced a loss of approx-
imately 30% in size (from circa 1.25 million animals
to 0.90 million animals) because of the joint effects of
limited food supply and intense poaching as the herd
moved through areas inhabitated by humans. Thus,
unless aggressive habitat restoration and protection
programs are made part of the ICDP approach, there is
little reason to believe that sustainable harvests will be
maintained without there being mechanisms in place
to reduce the dependence of local peoples on wildlife.
In summary, we predict that normal variation in
environmental conditions will often force ICDP man-
agers into situations that pit human needs against con-
servation goals. We also suggest that many large
mammal populations offered as examples for harvest
are “artificially” large, because the habitats utilized at
present extend well beyond those that are suitably pro-
tected, and because no allowance for habitat degrada-
tion is factored into long-term projections of sustain-
able harvests. We must expect that as unprotected and
less-protected habitats degrade, or are usurped for
other purposes, carrying capacities for harvested
mammals will decline accordingly. In the face of sta-
tic harvests, we therefore predict that a point of unsus-
tainability will be reached in the absence of harvest
adjustment. Furthermore, we also predict that such
downward adjustments will be difficult for managers
to enact because they will be politically unpalatable,
and because they run counter to the main thrust of
ICDPs.
(b) Willpresent-day benejts promote sustainable
harvests in future?
A second area of concern for the sustainability of
large mammal harvests involves assumptions about
the growth rates of human and harvested populations.
If the main cause of noncooperation between pro-
tected area managers and local people is that the latter
realize few or no benefits from protected areas, it is
reasonable to assume that by initiating ICDPs, man-
agers will experience increased cooperation as the
level of satisfaction with protected areas increases. In
addition, if increased satisfaction is reflected in lower
rates of illegal activity, ICDPs may thus enhance the
conservation of biological resources. By the same
argument, however, we must also accept that as
human populations grow, the level of satisfaction will
decline if gross benefits remain static, because this
will result in declining benefits per capita. The critical
question with respect to the conservation of large
mammals, therefore is whether their harvest, as part of
ICDPs, can provide benefits that will be sufficient to
prevent declines in human satisfaction, cooperation
and lawful behavior over the long term.
In answering this question it should be clear that
whenever the main benefits provided to local people
are derived directly or indirectly from the harvest of
large mammals, these benefits will be limited by the
size of the sustainable harvest. Because of this, we
envisage only two scenarios in which the initiation of
harvests in protected areas can offer anything better
than a short-term solution to the problems of dissatis-
faction, noncooperation and illegal exploitation.
First, several protected areas in Africa are sur-
rounded by human populations that are at relatively
low densities. In these areas, the initial harvest
required to meet the needs of local people may be less
than the sustainable harvest. At least initially, there-
fore, harvest programs in such areas may help to
increase cooperation and curtail illegal exploitation.
But, if human populations grow past the point where a
sustainable harvest can provide satisfactory benefits
on a per capita basis, ICDPs should be expected to fail
for the same reasons that local cooperation may have
been lacking prior to their initiation. Therefore, in the
low human-density scenario, whether harvest pro-
grams can provide substantial long-ferm benefits will
depend on the size and growth rate of the human pop-
ulation, relative to the size of the sustainable harvest of
large mammals in the area.
Our second scenario concerns more populated
areas, where initial harvests will have to be set at or
near sustainable levels at the outset of the ICDP in
order to provide per capita benefits that will yield gen-
eral satisfaction, cooperation and lawful behavior.
This is the typical case in most areas where ICDPs are
being promoted (Kiss, 1990). In such cases, however,
only two policies can prevent the erosion of local sup-
port for ICDPs as human populations grow.
First, managers could increase harvests above sus-
tainable levels in order to prevent declines in benefits
per capita to local people. This has been the tack taken
by managers of several marine fisheries (Clark, 1990;
Hilborn, 1992; Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters, 1993).
Under this strategy, however, the depletion of har-
vested populations is inevitable. An alternative is for
managers to attempt to increase the size of harvested
populations in order to increase the size of the sustain-
able harvest. This might be achieved, for example, by
removing predators, competitors and diseases, or by
improving the productivity of harvested species by
selective breeding, increasing food resources via fer-
tilization and/or irrigation, or increasing the size of the
available habitat (Macnab, 1991). In this ca5e, the har-
vested populations may be mamtained, but the charac-
ter and diversity of the biotic community. which
ICDPs are meant to conserve. will have been lost.
In addition, by enhancing the living stanckmla 01
humans adjacent to protcctcd ;irc;is. ICDP’r miturall~
 AREICDPsSUSTAINABLE?
stimulate greater per capita demand for meat and other
wildlife products; the income elasticity of demand is
surely positive and likely greater than one. Moreover,
improving local standards of living will probably con-
tribute to higher rates of local population growth than
would be observed in the absence of an ICDP that is
successful in enhancing the well-being of local popu-
lations. This may occur especially rapidly in regions
where living standards are depressed, and thus immi-
gration into areas with enhancements is made more
attractive.
In summary, we suggest that it is biologically
unsound to base human needs, which must be assumed
to grow, on the harvest of wildlife populations that
will not grow. Although the present-day benefits of
large mammal harvest may be viewed favorably, these
benefits are unlikely to be large enough to promote
sustainable harvests and curtail illegal exploitation in
the future. This is because as human populations and
incomes grow, per capita benefits will decline while
per capita demand increases. Eventually, these bene-
fits will approach the levels realized by local people
living adjacent to protected areas without ICDPs.
Finally, because ICDPs may enhance local population
growth, they may also accelerate the rate at which
local satisfaction declines. In the end, therefore, we
predict that many ICDPs will leave local communities
with access to fewer animals, and with higher popula-
tion densities, than if development dollars were spent
in other ways. In particular, we suggest that the above
concerns point towards a critical, biological need for
development projects to decouple human needs from
the harvest of large mammals.
3. A SOClOECONOMlC CRITIQUE
ICDPs generally employ several different instru-
ments to induce behavioral change in humans living
adjacent to protected areas. We first address some con-
ceptual and design flaws in specific tactics before turn-
ing to more fundamental critiques of the current ICDP
approach.
(a) Who is responsible for nddlife rleplerion?
A crucial first question to ask is: who poaches large
mammals and degrades their habitats? It is often
assumed that poor rural inhabitants are the principal
culprits, but this assumption is based primarily on
anecdotes because few systematic studies of illegal
harvest exist. Leader-Williams, Albon and Berry
( 1990) found that offenders involved in relatively
mmor offences within the Luangwa Valley, Zambia,
oripinated locally. but that the well-organized, armed
%mgs that decimated Luangwa’s rhinoceros and ele-
.?
phant populations originated from outside areas.
1077
Hofer, East and Campbell (1993) cite limited evidence
for the primary role of local people in the illegal har-
vest of ungulates in Serengeti National Park,
Tanzania. This study did not address, however,
whether individuals arrested in the park were orga-
nized by people living in urban centers farther away,
as is often suggested in this and other wildlife areas
(Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya, 1990; Thomson, 1992;
our unpublished results). Marks (1991) noted that in
the case of Luangwa, westerners have had an exces-
sive tendency to blame the locals for wildlife deple-
tion. In the absence of systematic studies, the extent of
responsibility for illegal exploitation and subsequent
wildlife depletion will remain a subject of debate.
Clearly, several other groups of potential culprits
do exist. Damage in some cases has been done by pri-
vate hunting concessions that operate with unlimited
quotas and no specific protection for endangered
species (Turner, 1987; Newby, 1990; Cloudsley-
Thompson, 1992; Sinclair and Arcese, 1995).
Widespread and serious damage has also been done by
regional warfare. Insurgents and armies in Angola,
Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South
Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe are all alleged to have
turned to poaching, especially of elephant and rhinoc-
eros, as a source of meat and finance.’ Perhaps most
disappointingly, it is also often the case that parks staff
themselves are a threat to wildlife. Bonner (1993, p.
134) attributed more than one-third of Kenyan rhino
losses to employees of the services mandated to pro-
tect them. Even so, no careful decomposition of the
incidence of encroachment and exploitation by rural
peoples versus other groups yet exists. It is essential to
the success of ICDPs that these analyses are under-
taken because programs designed around false
assumptions are unlikely to succeed.
(b) Nonpecuniary benejits of illegal harvest
If we nonetheless assume that rural Africans bear
primary responsibility for the threats posed to large
mammals, it follows that it is crucial to understand
why they do so. For example, implicit in the
exchanges designed into ICDPs is the notion that
wildlife are poached, or their habitats exploited, so as
to generate income or provide food for a household or
community. While these reasons are likely to be
important in some cases, they may be insufficient to
explain many relationships between rural human and
large mammal populations in sub-Saharan Africa.
This is because many cultures vest hunting, foraging
and shifting cultivation with great nonpecuniary
importance. Ceremonial feasts that require freshly
killed game, rites of passage to adulthood or marriage,
as well as a sometimes mdomitable sense of tradition,
all add intrinsic value to wildlife depredation that gen-
erally goes unrecognized in the design of ICDPs. Such
1078 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
values underlie the opinion of several senior enforce-
ment personnel in the Serengeti, for example, that no
amount of provisioning of meat or cash will dissuade
some traditional groups from hunting lions, ostriches
or Cape buffalo, even if this requires entering the park
and risking arrest to do so. Although there is a sub-
stantial literature on human relations with wildlife in
Africa, conservation planners apparently do not
appreciate the nonpecuniary dimensions of these rela-
tions sufficiently to incorporate them into their plans.
(c) Demand for wildlife products andfood
Even if we accept that wildlife uses are based on
pecuniary or subsistence motives, there are economic
reasons to doubt the sustainability of ICDPs, in addi-
tion to the biological concerns mentioned above.
Consider, for example, the structural effects on food
demand patterns of the establishment of previously
nonexistent programs of wildlife meat distribution.
We would expect relative price changes to induce
changes in demand patterns, but they may also induce
changes in food preparation, diet, or even subsistence
cultivation patterns, especially of the oilseeds and
vegetables that complement the principal sources of
calories and protein.8 Such structural changes have
persistent effects on demand patterns. Thus, if ICDPs
increase a rural population’s dependence on game
meat, these projects may fuel local demand for game
and, in the event legal harvest distributions are cur-
tailed for biological reasons (see above), they may
ultimately foster the activities they are designed to
counter.
As an alternative to distributing game meat for
local consumption, project managers may opt to mar-
ket game meat in urban areas or overseas where prices
are higher, and then distribute the proceeds to local
communities. Many ICDPs have a revenue-sharing
component, whereby some portion of the profits from
sales of meat, hides and other wildlife products, or
receipts derived from park fees or tourist receipts, are
distributed to local residents as cash transfers. Even
revenue-sharing arrangements, however, face poten-
tial shortcomings.
First, a fallacy of composition might apply with
respect to the sale of hides, meat and other wildlife
byproducts. High domestic and international prices
for exotica probably result in large part from their
scarcity. If many parks in Africa or elsewhere enter
into the business of marketing wildlife products,
prices might well respond as did cocoa prices to the
glut induced by widespread export promotion in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Unfortunately, too little is
known about demand for wildlife products to deter-
mine how to produce and market them so as to maxi-
mize net revenues, particularly if one wishes to jointly
optimize herd size.
(d) The efJicacy of ecotourism and rural food
marketing
Second, although tourism is widely touted as hav-
ing great potential to generate distributable surpluses,
it has yet to deliver substantial sums in excess of costs.
This is due in part to extreme variability in tourist rev-
enues in response to political turmoil, exchange rate
fluctuations and international economic conditions. It
is also due, however, to a substantial proportion of
gross tourism revenues being consumed by the cost of
imported goods and services, and the repatriation of
profits by foreign investors. Thus, there is often little
net receipt to share locally; almost surely not enough
to significantly alter incentives to encroach on pro-
tected areas and species (International Resources
Group, 1992).y Even in Masai Mara National Reserve,
which is Kenya’s premier wildlife attraction and gen-
erates some $20 million in foreign exchange revenues
annually, locals received only an estimated 1.6% of
revenues in 1989. At Amboseli National Park, another
of Kenya’s major tourist spots, the corresponding fig-
ures were 1% distributed locally out of $15 million in
wildlife tourism revenues.10 Thus, even among the
most accessible, attractive, well-equipped and publi-
cized sites in Africa, only modest surpluses are gener-
ated with which ICDPs can compensate locals for sur-
rendering access to wildlife and habitats. Finally, only
a minority of protected areas in Africa attract suffi-
cient visitors to cover costs (Wells, Brandon and
Hannah, 1992). Given that few protected areas are
capable of generating a surplus, tourism is probably
overemphasized as a primary source of funds with
which conservationists can entice rural residents to
leave species and habitats alone.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, for cash
inducements to work rural inhabitants must be able to
convert cash income into food. Opportunities to do
this, however, are often severely constrained by the
organization of the rural food marketing network.
Sen’s (1981) entitlements approach to understanding
poverty and famine suggests that trading access to
species for monetary compensation will expose rural
residents to new risks associated with exchange enti-
tlements. In that setting, price variability and quantity-
rationing in rural food markets conspire to threaten
household food security. Households faced with such
situations actively work to diversify income and food
procurement sources so as to mitigate consumption
risk. This leads, however, to using protected areas and
the species conserved within them as prime diversifi-
cation strategies. Thus, the capacity of cash transfers
to induce rural peoples to withdraw from subsistence
cultivation, grazing or hunting in protected areas,
thereby exposing themselves to further market risks.
will depend in part on the state of the rural food mar-
keting network. Food marketing in rural Africa
remains poorly understood. It is known. however. that
 ARE ICDPs SUSTAINABLE?
prices are highly variable and markets do not always
clear through price adjustment when markets are spa-
tially segmented and often subject to imperfect com-
petition.”
(e) Impacts oflCDPs on local employment, prices
and well-being
In addition to pecuniary gains from transfers,
ICDPs can generate employment. Some programs,
notably the ADMADE scheme in Zambia and
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program, have generated
significant additional permanent employment as
nature scouts, park guards and the like. Nonetheless, it
is unclear if these positions, especially in Zambia, can
be funded once international donors pull out.
Moreover, jobs are exclusive, in that the benefits
accrue to a narrow subset of the local population, and
it is not clear whether those employed are primarily
from the best educated and motivated of their commu-
nities or are from the subsistence-stressed subpopula-
[ions that are generally believed to be the most likely
to engage in illegal activity in protected areas.
Proponents claim that even if ecotourism does not
generate substantial transferable cash surpluses, it can
stimulate local employment and incomes by increas-
ing tourist expenditures on local artisanal products,
food, lodging, and services. This assumption is as yet
untested however, as there is no evidence of signifi-
cant positive impacts on rural employment or income.
Moreover, substantial subpopulations of African
farming communities are in many cases net buyers of
the staple foods they produce. Thus, if tourism stimu-
lates local demand for food and thereby drives up
prices, tourism could hurt rather than help the poor
farmers who are its intended beneficiaries.12
Finally, ICDPs often provide infrastructure or
social services to local communities. Indeed, commu-
nity-level investments are the most common compo-
nents of ICDPs. The basic premise is that as economic
well-being improves, the opportunity cost of exploit-
ing natural resources rises. It is not difficult to build a
school here, a health clinic there, or to improve the odd
road. The lessons learned from decades of rural devel-
opment interventions, however, indicate that generat-
rng palpable improvements in rural well-being from
hmall-scale infrastructure investments and social ser-
vices provision is a tedious task with a high rate of fail-
urc (World Bank, 1988). Wells, Brandon and Hannah
( 1992. p. 29) report that “most of the ICDPs showed
no cvldence of having absorbed” the basic lessons of past
rural development projects. Perhaps most importantly,
these interventions require commitment of continuing
operations expenses, for road rehabilitation, supplies
ot’ pharmaceuticals and school materials, teachers and
health clinicians’ salaries, etc. Aid projects do not last
torc\cr, and the cruel kxon ot’massive project invest-
1079
ments in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s is that
governments rarely budget sufficiently for continuing
expenses once the requirement to match donor funds
expires. Lacking such outlays, infrastructure may
quickly fall into disrepair and services may be discon-
tinued. Theexperience of the Masai populations around
Amboseli National Park in Kenya are instructive.
In exchange for relinquishing access to the proposed
national park, Masai pastoralists were promised compen-
sation, some concession rights, and water points for their
livestock in an arid area outside the park. After the park
was established and a water piping system constructed,
cutbacks in government funding ended the compensation
payments and maintenance of the piping system. This
system has now been inoperative for more than a decade.
The pastoralists have continued to bring their cattle into
the park, particularly during the dry season, thus compet-
ing with the large wild herbivores (Wells, Brandon and
Hannah, 1992, p. 31).
A broader government commitment to rural develop-
ment and conservation, a point to which we will
return, is thus a crucial determinant of the sustainabil-
ity of any improvements in rural living standards
brought by community development efforts.
(0 Five otherfundamental concerns about ICDPs
In addition to the specific critiques of common
components of ICDPs listed above, we now offer five
more fundamental socioeconomic concerns. First,
encroachment and poaching require a commitment of
people’s time. Basic economics suggests that if people
are trying to maximize income, the crucial parameter
is the opportunity cost of time.13 In weak economies
plagued by rates of unemployment and underemploy-
ment commonly reaching 30% or more, and with low
labor productivity rates in land-scarce areas (notably
in east and southern Africa), the opportunity costs of
many rural Africans’ time is very low. Seasonally, if
not permanently, any income-maximizing rural resi-
dent would be wise to set off for the nearest protected
area, even in the face of risks of imprisonment or
injury. By virtue of their purely local jurisdiction,
ICDPs do not exert substantial influence over the
returns of alternative uses of rural inhabitants’ time.
For example, providing irrigation networks may keep
a rural farmer from further extensification of culti-
vated areas, and it may encourage application of more
time to canal maintenance, weeding and harvesting.
But except for advanced, panseasonal irrigation sys-
tems with dependable riverine sourcing, the effects are
likely to be negligible for at least several months each
year. Similarly, a project that hires even 100 new park
guards from neighboring communities is unlikely to
affect the wage rate that guides the behavior of those
left unemployed.
1080 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Second, ICDP managers are in a difficult position
with respect to establishing the credibility of their pro-
jects with local populations. Rapport is often poor, due
in large measure to a history of confrontation under
the “fences and fines” approach, and thus depends
inordinately on rural residents’ perceptions of park
officials’ commitment to human development. Because
development is merely a means to conservation in
ICDPs, however, one might expect that rural residents
anticipate that when scarce funds dry up, as often hap-
pens in rural Africa, they will be abandoned in favor of
other mammals, and that they plan accordingly.
In particular, covariate shocks (e.g., drought,
rinderpest outbreaks) are a special threat to the credi-
bility of a project’s promise to deliver meat or cash to
local communities. In such circumstances, as residents
most need the transfer and can least afford to purchase
food on their own, lCDPs also will be least able to
ensure compensation as sustainable harvests, and per-
haps tourist revenues, drop. Poaching is likely to be an
important alternate means for consumption smoothing
in these cases, as suggested by events associated with
the drought of 1992 in southern Africa. In arid zones
such as the Gonarezhou area of southern Zimbabwe,
for example, rural communities became disillusioned
as conservationists worked to build water points and
provide nourishment for protected wildlife while
neighboring human populations, their fields and live-
stock perished from thirst, hunger and disease.
Third, the remarkable rate of African urbanization
has important ramifications for protected areas and
their species. Urbanization appears to correlate with
increasing demand for meat and status goods made of
hides or ivory. Thus, even where rural inhabitants
have been the agents of wildlife depletion, they are in
many cases responding to market signals induced by
distant urban or international demand for wildlife
products. Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992) point
out that the benefits of ICDPs are “directed toward
actual or potential agerlrs of park depletion, and not to
the ultimate sources of demand for the resources.“”
Urban demand for firewood or meat, for instance, may
heavily influence the incentives for rural residents to
exploit protected areas.
Fourth, one must question the administrative and
financial capacity of conservation agencies, especially
local ones, to add rural development interventions to a
potentially overwhelming portfolio of current responsi-
bilities. This general problem may be most formidable
with respect to preservation of migratory large mammal
populations, where the spatial breadth of protected
areas would necessitate interventions in many scattered
communities and jurisdictions. While comprehensive
interventions are probably infeasible, selective inter-
ventions can introduce moral hazard problems,15 in
which communities will quickly perceive that abuse of
habitats or wildlife will bring rewards.16 Rather than
rectifying the behavior of encroaching communities,
selective compensation and development schemes may
therefore induce delinquency on the part of communi-
ties which have historically been better stewards.
Finally, one needs to step to a more aggregated level
of analysis and operation than local projects to achieve
feasibility and uniformity of treatment across commu-
nities. In this sense we echo Cheru (1992, p. 497) in
cautioning that a fruitful coexistence between large
mammal and human populations requires “a funda-
mental reorientation of government policies and
resources towards solving rural problems.” Poverty
and ecological degradation have both micro and macro
origins. National policies have up to now contributed
to the overexploitation of the natural resource base and
immiseration of rural populations.17 As others have
suggested, it is possible that the adverse impacts of
indirect, economywide interventions on wildlife con-
servation have and will continue to swamp any direct
effects of sectoral interventions, whether they are pos-
itive or negative.18 Until African regimes devote seri-
ous attention and resources to combating the twin
blights of biodiversity depletion and rural poverty and
stagnation, it is unlikely that any amount of tinkering in
the hinterland will have its desired effect.
4. SUMMARY AND SOME SUGGESTIONS
ICDPs excite the interest and imaginations of con-
servation groups and international development agen-
cies. Nonetheless, ICDPs are not yet analytically or
empirically sound approaches. They proceed from
untested biological and economic assumptions, many
of which are likely false. If these problems continue to
be ignored, the collapse of ICDPs may be inevitable.
We close by summarizing the broad themes of this
critique and offering several suggestions toward rem-
edying important weaknesses of ICDPs. First. it is
unsound-and arguably unethical -to base sstisfac-
tion of inevitably increasing human demands on
inherently unstable wildlife populations that will not
grow in the absence of serious disruption of the biotic
communities that ICDPs are meant to preserve. While
ICDPs’ explicit recognition of the interdependence of
human and nonhuman species is a laudable advance
over earlier conservation and development strategies
that were excessively biocentric and anthropocentric,
respectively, too many ICDPs go beyond recognition
to promote the reinforcement of interdependence.
Schemes that depend on the granting of material ben-
efits (e.g., cash, employment or meat) generated by
managed wildlife cropping or ecotourism run counter
to the objective of decoupling rural livelihoods from
resource exploitation, and they are unlikely to be
sustainable in any significant volume per capita.
Furthermore, the covariate environmental risks to
both human and wildlife populations will inevitably
force managers to make politically perilous choices.
 ARE ICDPs SUSTAINABLE?
Second, the selective provision of benefits from
ICDPs is problematic. At present, only select commu-
nities on the periphery of protected areas enjoy direct
transfers (in cash, kind or public works projects) from
ICDPs. It is not clear that these transfers reach those
whose behaviors threaten protected species or their
habitats. Marginal employment creation and public
works projects (e.g., irrigation) aimed at sedentarizing
local populations are necessarily incomplete in cover-
age across the local population and seasons, respec-
tively, and the subpopulations and periods of greatest
concern from a conservation perspective are those
most likely excluded. Moreover, ICDPs clearly do not
address demand-side impulses of urban or intema-
tional origin. In addition, selective, discretionary dis-
tribution may lead to moral hazard problems, or may
induce endogenous effects in human migration pat-
terns that could increase population densities around
protected areas above what they would otherwise be.
While selective distribution is clearly problematic,
conservation agencies clearly lack the capacity to
extend ICDPs’ coverage substantially.
So what productive steps might be taken? First,
ICDPs must be regarded as no more than short-term
palliatives in a longer term struggle to refocus atten-
tion and resources on parallel processes of rural devel-
opment, poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation.
There is no substitute for broader commitment by gov-
ernments, external donors and nongovernmental orga-
nizations to solving these rural problems and to coor-
dinating, if not necessarily integrating, such efforts.
Second, ecological and social monitoring and
applied research activities must be made organic to
ICDPs. Kremen, Merenlender and Murphy (1994,
p. 389) make a compelling case that “comprehensive
ecological monitoring is critical in shaping ICDP
management plans and in furthering the integration of
conservation and development.” Similarly, more must
be done on the social science side to understand the
etiology of the human threat to large mammal popula-
tions in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of identifying the
agents and economic or social impulses responsible
for encroachment, poaching and habitat degradation,
as well as in terms of agents’ motivations. Researchers
must identify not just the social correlates of wildlife
overexploitation, but also its root causes, and they
must monitor ICDP-induced changes in human activ-
ity and consumption patterns. For example, if the prin-
cipal threat IS locals poaching to supplement their food
supply, then improved marketing infrastructure to
facilitate lower-cost and more reliable access to com-
mercial food supplies may reduce illegal off-take. If,
1081
however, poaching is mainly by nonlocals or if urban
demand for meat and other wildlife by-products is
substantially responsible, improving transport and
communications infrastructure in the area may well
exacerbate the problem. Unfortunately, allied social
science research to answer such fundamental ques-
tions has been strikingly absent from ICDPs to date.
Third, ICDPs focused on large mammals in Africa
are partly a reaction to the perceived failures of both
the “fences and fines” approach to conservation and
state-directed rural development projects. Yet, ICDPs
run a serious risk of ignoring lessons of earlier disap-
pointments. Evidence from east and southern Africa
suggests that the efficacy of law enforcement remains
a crucial determinant of the conservation status of
large mammals (Milner-Gulland and Leader-
Williams, 1992; Caughley, 1993; Arcese, Hando and
Campbell, 1995). Proper equipment, training and
compensation of parks staff still promise high payoffs
in conservation of protected species, but have been
provided in exceptionally few African circumstances.
Likewise, active habitat maintenance and restoration
is central to maintaining the carrying capacity of pro-
tected areas and the sustainability of managed har-
vests (Sinclair and Arcese, 1995). but it is rarely prac-
ticed consistently.
On the development side, more serious national
efforts are needed to stimulate agricultural produc-
tivity and rural development through smallholder-
oriented national development strategies (Mellor,
Delgado and Blackie, 1987). Improved domestic stock
and veterinary services not only benefit pastoralists,
but can encourage the sedentarization of agriculture
and have positive, epidemiological spillover effects
on wildlife conservation. A priority must likewise be
placed on the development and dissemination of
stress-resistant seed varieties and water management
practices. These could permit panseasonal cultivation
and thus dampen the inclination of human populations
to exploit wildlife illegally at their most vulnerable
times, such as in periods of drought. Investments in
extending and deepening rural financial systems can
be expected not only to facilitate adoption of more
advanced technologies, but also in promoting rural
industry and services that may reduce human depen-
dence on wildlife exploitation. In conclusion, the only
sustainable way to advance both the conservation sta-
tus of large mammals and the well-being of rural
human populations in Africa is to decouple human
needs from wildlife harvest. Insofar as many contem-
porary ICDPs fail to do this, we fear these efforts are
unsustainable.
1082 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
NOTES
1. Brandon and Wells ( 1992). p. 577.
2. Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992). p. 60.
3. This enthusiasm has been backed up financially. Based
on figures reported in Kiss (1990). Brinkerhoff Gage and
Yeager (1992). and Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992) we
estimate that at least $160 million had been committed to
large mammal-oriented ICDPs in sub-Saharan Africa as of
early 1991. The World Bank alone presently has almost $50
million further approved or pending for similar ICDPs in
Africa (World Bank, 1994).
4. The acronym stands for the Communal Areas
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources.
5. Cited in Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya (1990).
6. Kiss (1990). See also Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya
(1990) for an example from Zambia.
7. See Cater (1989). Duming (1990). SouthScan (1992a.
1992b). and Galster (1993).
8. These effects are evident in the evolution of grains con-
sumption patterns in West Africa in response to food aid and
currency overvaluation (Delgado, 1991).
9. West and Brechin (199 I), and the papers therein, make
the point that the degree to which tourism benefits local pop-
ulations depends in large measure on the political economy
of the tourism sector. Large-scale, highly capitalized tourism
is generally controlled by outside interests, has a high
imported cost component, and returns little or nothing posi-
tive to locals. On the other hand, a small-scale, locally con-
trolled tourist trade is more likely to benefit locals.
IO. These figures originate with Norton-Grifliths (1995)
who marshals considerable evidence against the proposition
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