STATE

PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES
CASE: ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
TOPIC: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
FACTS:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which
expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869.
PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection
clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
RULING: NO.
Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
 A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to
“create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of
Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments.
CASE: SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI,
Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel
IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO
ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
TOPIC: Incorporation clause
FACTS:
Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was
tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed
against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid.
RULING: YES.
EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted
by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war
as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles
of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military
or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation
of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that
time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of
international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan).
 As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest
because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being
charged of.
Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special
law.
CASE: PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND
FABRIQUES OF TABAC REUNIES, S.A., petitioners vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
TOPIC: Incorporation clause
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and
setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty
conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent
Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local market.
Banking on the thesis that petitioners’ respective symbols “MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and
“MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated
transaction, They Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue
before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need
of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and without necessity of
actually doing business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against
Fortune Tobacco before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling
cigarettes bearing the trademark “Mark” which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip Morris
trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right of property to such trademark or
trade name.
RULING: NO.
There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which they seek to protect from any
adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for
commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in
the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not
engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be
suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence
of their “right” to be protected.
CASE: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a.
MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent.
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
TOPIC: Doctrine of Transformation
FACTS:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for
his provisional liberty.
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings.
RULING: NO.
The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered
from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
CASE: LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
TOPIC: Doctrine of Transformation
FACTS:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act,
among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
RULING: YES.
A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme
Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith.
If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented
an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.
CASE: GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
FACTS:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order
the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress celebration in the City of Manila.
The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio
Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested
Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said
stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof
remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
RULING: NO.
The respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative
postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious
purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new
postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous
to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of
the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country.
In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of
showing a Catholic chalice.
The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that
reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it
is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps
is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement
as to costs.
CASE: MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
TOPIC: Social Justice
FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street
from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: NO.
The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preserving.
SECOND ISSUE: NO.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
CASE: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf
of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS
IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it
to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
A. Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the
State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients
to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. Whether or not the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. Whether or not the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
RULING:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR)
would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For
the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9
of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that
the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution
of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to
the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress
cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support
of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according
to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the
RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies
of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance
its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These
provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary
to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other
providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling
them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections
23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected
right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR)
also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health
officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the
government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free
exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a
legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the
right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines)
and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of
a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend
the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic
social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the
case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures”
is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education.
Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution”
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the
RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple
may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law
only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is
imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA
3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of
Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated
as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are
not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as
an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.