LBP v.

CA

FACTS:

In this case, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected a 71.4-

hectare land owned by heirs of Bolanos, private respondents pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Thereafter, petitioner Landbank valued
the said property in the amount of P1.6-million, but the respondents rejected the
petitioner’s valuation. In spite of this, the petitioner still deposited the amount in
their favor.

Later, the respondents filed before the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court
(SAC) an action for determination of just compensation. Subsequently, the SAC
ordered the petitioner to re-value the property to which the petitioner acceded
coming up with a new valuation in the amount of P1.8-million. The respondents
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 before the SAC which gave the
notice due course. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the respondents made a wrong mode of appeal. The CA dismissed the same on
the ground of liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeals from the decision of SAC must be a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

Yes, it is settled in the case of Landbank of the Philippines v. De Leon, that the
proper mode of appeal from decisions of RTC sitting as SAC is by petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule
41. Furthermore, it has been held that an appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due process but is merely a statutory privilege, thus failure of a party to conform to
the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. In this case,
the private respondents failed to specifically cite any justification as to how and why
a normal application of procedural rules would frustrate their quest for justice and
have not been forthright in explaining why they chose the wrong mode of appeal.
Therefore, Rule 41 is not the remedy in filing an appeal from a decision of RTC
sitting as SAC.

LBP v. Kho

FACTS:

In this case, respondent Kho, entered into a verbal agreement with Red
Orange, represented by Rudy Medel, to purchase lubricants, however the latter
insisted that it would only accept Landbank Manager’s check as payment.
Subsequently, Kho, accompanied by Medel, opened a savings account with LBP and
deposited the amount of P25,993,537.37 which consisted of three (3) manager’s
check. Also, the respondent purchased Landbank manager’s check No. 07410
leveraged by his newly opened savings account. On January 2, 2006, the postdated
check valued at P25-million payable to Red Orange was scheduled for delivery. Kho
requested a photocopy of the manager’s check to be given to Red Orange as proof
that the check has available funds, however the deal did not push through. On the
same date, the respondent picked up the said check from the bank, without
informing the bank that the deal did not materialize. Afterwards, Red Orange
presented a spurious copy of check No.7410 to BPI for payment, in spite of this, LBP
cleared the check. Kho lamented that he never negotiated the actual check since the
same was in his possession the whole time. Hence, Kho filed an action for specific
performance and damages against LBP. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the
case was elevated to CA. The CA remanded the case to the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner bank has breached its duty of diligence.

HELD:

Yes, the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that Land Bank’s officers cleared
the counterfeit check. The business of banking is imbued with public interest; it is an
industry where the general public’s trust and confidence in the system is of
paramount importance. Consequently, banks are expected to exert the highest
degree of, if not the utmost, diligence. They are obligated to treat their depositors’
accounts with meticulous care, always keeping in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship.

LIMKAICHONG V. LBP

FACTS:

In this case, the petitioner owned agricultural lands with a total are of 19.68
hectares situated in Negros Occidental. Later, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) sent several Notices of Land Valuation and Acquisition
to the petitioner pursuant to R.A. 6657. However, the petitioner rejected such
valuation, hence DARAB conducted summary proceedings for the determination of
just compensation. Later, it issued an order that the valuation was consistent with
the existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.

The petitioner thereafter filed an action for fixing just compensation before
the RTC and prayed that the valuation be declared null and void and the price of
lands be fixed according to their fair market value. Meanwhile, the respondents filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petitioners did not file an appeal within
the reglementary period. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s dismissal of the action became final and
executor pursuant to Sec. 51 of R.A. 6657.
HELD:

No,

VILLAMOR V. SSS

FACTS:

In this case, the petitioner was employed with Valle Verde Country Club, Inc.
(VVCCI) with SSS No. 03-4047063-3. Sometime in 2006, the petitioner underwent a
Cranial Computed Tomography (CT) scan, it revealed that he had an "acute non-
hemorrhage infarct on the right pons/basal ganglia." Later, the petitioner filed a
claim for sickness benefits before the respondent SSS, however the latter denied the
same for lack of casual relationship between petitioner's job as clerk and his illness it also
noted petitioner’s habits such as smoking and drinking which increased his risk of developing
his illness

GSIS V. PAUIG

FACTS:

In this case, respondent Pauig started government service in 1964, as a casual

employee. Sometime in 1977, he became a permanent employee and a GSIS
member. In 2004, he retired from the service upon reaching the mandatory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years old. The respondent then filed
his retirement papers with the GSIS, the latter processed his claim for the Length
of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. The respondent thereafter wrote a
letter-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his first fourteen (14) years in
the government service had been erroneously omitted. In defense, the petitioner
contended that respondent’s first fourteen (14) years in the government
were excluded in the computation of his retirement benefitsbecause
during those years, no premium payments were remitted to it.