(1) GO VS.

CHAVES
GR No. 182341
April 23, 2010
FACTS:
Vicente Chaves filed a complaint against spouses Trinidad and Gonzalo Go for the removal of the
clouds on his certificate of title. Chaves prayed that the SPA and mortgage to the spouses Go be
invalidated. Subsequently, two parties intervened in the case namely Alice, wife of Vicente
Chaves, and Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms Inc. which claimed that it purchased from
Vicente a portion of the property in dispute. The Regional Trial Court decided in favor of Vicente
Chaves. Thereafter, spouses Go appealed to the Court of Appeals. A Motion to Dismiss was filed
by Mega and Alice, alleging that spouses Go failed to furnish them a copy of the brief. The Court
of Appeals granted the motion of Mega and Alice and dismissed the appeal of the spouses Go.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal due to the failure to append a
copy of the assailed judgment and late furnishing of copies of the brief to Mega and Alice.
RULING:
Yes. Despite deficiencies in the petitioner’s appellant brief, it is found to be sufficient in form and
substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as
the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same. The failure of the counsel
of spouses Go to serve a copy of the appellant’s brief to two of the adverse parties was a mere
oversight constituting excusable neglect. A deviation from the rigid application of the procedural
rules may thus be allowed, as the petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of their case, rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. Every litigant must
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Hence, the dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon.

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 (2) MARQUEZ VS. ESPEJO
G.R. No. 168387
August 25, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Espejos were the original owners of 2 parcels of land - Lantap Property and Murong
Property. The respondents mortgaged both properties to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc (RBBI).
Upon failure to pay the loans, the said properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. Transfer
certificate titles were issued in the name of the said bank.
After a month, Respondent Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The lot that they
want to repurchase is the Lantap Property tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez. However, the
Deed of Sale mentioned TCT No. 62096 as the subject property which refers to the Murong
Property tenanted by the petitioners.
Meanwhile, pursuant to RA 6657, RBBI executed separate Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT) in favor of petitioners Marquez and dela Cruz. Both the VLTs mentioned an agricultural
land located in Brgy. Murong as the subject property but the TCT No. or the title mentioned therein
refers to the Lantap Property. Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) were issued.
After more than 10 years, respondents filed a complaint before the Regional Agrarian reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) for the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs. Petitioners answered, insisting,
that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries and that the property that was
repurchased by the respondents was actually the Lantap property as evidenced by the continued
occupation of respondent Nemi Fernandez therein. RBBI, also, answered that it was, indeed, the
Lantap Property which was subject of the buy-back transaction with the respondents.
The OIC- RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers which appeared on the Deed of Sale,
VLTs and CLOAs. Since TCT no. T- 62096 appeared on respondents’ deed of sale, which refers
to Murong Property, the subject of sale is, indeed, the Murong Property. On the other hand, since
TCT No. T-62836 appeared on petitioners’ VLTs and CLOAs, which refers to Lantap Property,
the subject of sale is, indeed, the Lantap property.
Upon appeal, DARAB reversed the decision of the OIC- RARAD. It ruled that the presumption of
regular performance of duty prevails. Therefore, since petitioners are the actual tillers of the
Murong Property, which was admitted by the respondents, hence, the petitioners are the qualified
beneficiaries thereof.
However, the CA did not agree with the RARAD’s decision. It ruled that, using the Best Evidence
Rule - Rule 130, Sec. 3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the
description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its
subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that
the respondents repurchased. As for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No.
T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in
the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere
typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more

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accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the properties
metes and bounds. Hence, the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the Best Evidence Rule in the case.
RULING:
Principles: (Note: You may choose from any of the following principles; Emphasis though is given
on Best Evidence Rule)
 Appeals; The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is
within the Court’s authority to review; A petition for review should raise only questions of
law.
 Same; When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the “clean hands”
doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there
should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and
the appeal is dismissed outright; The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily
mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellant’s
inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
 Same; A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because
another party had already appealed ahead of him, or just because the other party’s separate
appeal had already been dismissed.
 Judgments; Res Judicata; Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is
conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action.
 Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Words and Phrases; The Best Evidence Rule states that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original
document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence)
is admissible as a general rule—The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering with the document; There is no room for the application of the Best
Evidence Rule when there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents.
 Same; Same; Same; Parol Evidence Rule; The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or
extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the
terms of a valid agreement or instrument.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in
question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument.
RULING BASED ON THE CASE
Yes. The CA erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and
no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The
original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

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 In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no
dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of
Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to
TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-
62836).

As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap
property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong
was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong
reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects
an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately
express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside
of the instruments.

The CA rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence
Rule instead.

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary,
add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA
actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the
Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The CA gave primacy to the literal terms of the two
contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the
written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question,
and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.

But, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as
covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being
located in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent
was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to
express the true intent of the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties
respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that
in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a

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contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise
would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.

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 (3) TABINO VS. TABINO
GR No. 196219
July 30, 2014
FACTS:
Proclamation No. 518 (Proc. 518) excluded from the operation of Proc. 423 – which established
the military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Pateros and Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City – certain portions in said
reservation known and identified as BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the sameopen for disposition in
accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 274, and RA 730 in relation to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any
bona fideoccupants/residents of said BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied such areas on or before January
7, 1986.
On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s wife,
Leoniladela Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC).
The ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the 353-
square meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing the 300-square meter
limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the purchase of a portion of the lot after
subdividing the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s stay in the premises is merely by
tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent structures on the land; and that
petitioners refused to vacate the premises upon respondent’s formal demand. Respondent thus
prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to pay the former rentals, attorney’s
fees, and costs of suit.
Petitioners countered n their Answer1 that respondent had no right to eject them; that the parties’
trueagreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent’s Lot 3, and for this,
respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800.00; that respondent failed to honor the
agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there was a pending Protest filed with the Regional Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital
Region.
It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and
3. DENR granted the petitioners and denied the respondent.
MeTC: ruled in favour of the petitioners
RTC: affirmed MeTC’s decision in toto.
CA: Assailed RTC’s decision

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of facts by the DENR in resolving conflicting claims as to who has a
better right of possession between petitioners and respondent over subject parcels of lot be nullified
by the court under an Ejectment Case.
RULING:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Respondent is correct
in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
forum shopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) trying the ejectment case.—
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and forum shopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Besides, these issues are being
raised for the first time at this stage of the proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant Petition
pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC Decision; as such, they cannot be allowed to
simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings or actions taken by the lower courts.

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 (4) GO VS. SUNBANUN
GR No. 168240
February 9, 2011
FACTS:
Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and Yiu-Go
Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the respondents
made involving the property rented by petitioner.
The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. The court in its April
27, 2004 Order denied said motion
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial with a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that Aurora
has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running for the position of town
mayor in Calubian, Leyte and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of
appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an
extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal. The RTC denied the notice of appeal
thereafter filed.
For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioner. The CA dismissed the petition for being
procedurally flawed, viz: the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only
one petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing her to
represent the two (2) other petitioners; the Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were
personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation why service of the petition with this
Court was not done personally; counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers;
certified true copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a
mere photocopy of a certified true copy; the copies of pleadings and other relevant documents
referred to in the petition which would support the allegations therein are not attached.
ISSUE:
May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be relaxed in the interest of justice?
RULING:
The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures may be dispensed with as
these parties are not involved in the petition.

Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the
Complaint and Answer is not fatal. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be
attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a
determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.

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Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are not fatal. The failure of petitioner’s
former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP numbers
for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight.

However, whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the
preferred modes of service. Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her
to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the
court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Therefore, there was no grave abuse on
the part of the CA in exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.

Nevertheless, in spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals will be applied to her benefit.

Principles:

 Remedial Law; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-

forum Shopping; In filing a certiorari petition, one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order
or resolution must verify his/her petition and must also attach a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.
 Same; Same; Same; The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission
of a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition as well
as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents relevant to the petition; Court
emphasizes that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached, but
only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a
determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.
 Same; Same; Same; Service of Pleadings; Whenever practicable, personal service and
personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service; Should one deviate
from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why the
pleading was not personally filed/served.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Court emphasized that provisions with respect to the
rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only
relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations.
 Same; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; “Fresh Period Rule” as held in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals; A litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt
of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).
 Same; Same; Same; Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.