1 JARQUE VS. DESIERTO (A.C. No.

4509, En Banc Resolution

December 5, 1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be
removed from office via impeachment before they may be held to answer
for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in
disbarment proceedings.

2. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (November

10,2003)

Facts:

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of

the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean " to
file", and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could
not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

Ruling: Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the

same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object
in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from
the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision
is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several
steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint,
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or
she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate
as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.

in fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

3.BINAY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC:
1. SEC. 4, ART. XIII, 1973 Constitution – now SEC. 4, ART. XI, 1987
Constitution:
“The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.”
2. BILL OF RIGHTS: Right to speedy disposition of cases

FACTS:

Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB)

against Mayor Binay of Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’(RPC A220)
and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act’ (RA 3019) on
September 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which were
committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years
constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His
arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to quash and further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ‘pendente
lite’ (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed
that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even
before he could file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed
the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated
its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply.

Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on

May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his
cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said
cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The
SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s motion. Hence this
present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB
over the criminal cases.

RULING:

RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB

shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the
offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local
officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited

to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice. However, the right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and
such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case.

SYNOPSIS
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay sought the annulment,
among others, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion
to refer Criminal Cases filed against him, one for illegal use of public funds
and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and declaring that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of
R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assailed the
October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of
June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in the criminal case filed
against them for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 in
deference to whatever ruling the Supreme Court will lay down in the Binay
cases. The Court resolved the consolidated G.R. No. 128136 with G.R. Nos.
120681-83.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index
of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is
not determinative. As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal
Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local
officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section
4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately,
petitioner mayors are officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
The phrase specifically including after officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the
enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not
apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example
only. Should there be any doubt as to whether petitioner mayors are under
the category of Grade 27, Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code
settles the matter.
Petitioner Binay cited previous bills in Congress dealing with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The resort to congressional records to
determine the proper application of the law in this case was unwarranted for
the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio
alterius was inappropriate. From the foregoing, it is clear that the cases
against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. The provision is transitory in nature and
expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to
criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. The term
proper court, as used in Section 7, is not restricted to regular courts but
includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court.
The Supreme Court dismissed the consolidated petitions.

4.ORAP VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan
Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon.
Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged
under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk
of Court. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to
quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same
had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not
acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally
moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.

ISSUE: Whether tanodbayan has power to conduct preliminary

investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against
judges and their appurtenant judicial staff?

RULING:

YES
As prosecutor, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without
exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607,
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—There is hereby created
in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor
composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special
Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same
qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and L who shall be appointed by
the President; ..

The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and
the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to
file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said
cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may upon
recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Special
Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional
compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses
as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules
and regulations.

SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the

Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official employee, or
other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary
action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office
of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or
the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. In case of
failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the appropriate
recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.

If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the
investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee
could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the
preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them.

ADDITION: In Administrative complaints , the courts, judges and their

appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Tanodbayan's investigatory
power. Under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court that exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which an administrative
complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged,
5. BUENASEDA V. FLAVIER

In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and
corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government
officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then
Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The
suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the
officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the
Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers
of Buenaseda et al.

Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the

suspension order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority.
NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation
against the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s

lawyers as he maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend
suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on
Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public

official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend

government officials

HELD:

Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court
clarifies that what the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive
suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is
not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the
Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are
punitive suspensions.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to

recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring
public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an
investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an
expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes,
among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the
possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons
facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the
Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the
formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner
therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively
suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed
perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely
preventive.

6.PDIC vs CASIMIRO

FACTS:

The Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI) closed. PDIC became the
receiver. In the course of the receivership, Gomez - a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its closure - went to the PDIC
and submitted an Affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities when BDBI was
still in operation. These are:

1. Apelo (BSP’s Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI's books and

records) provides Cu (BDBI owner) an "advance warning" of any
impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP;
2. Upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then make the
necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing
BDBI employees on how to cover the possible findings/exceptions of
the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing cash into
BDBI's vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books
reflect the actual cash in vault, and thereafter returning such cash to
the source;
3. In exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate
(Chairman/President of BDBI) gave Apelo as "professional fees" the
aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the
latter's bank account; and
 4. To cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate, instructed
Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash
disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's
books as "Other Cash Items," and thereafter, regularize and remove
from BDBI's books such disbursements by including them in the other
accounts of BDBI until they were completely covered. To support such
statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit slips showing that such
amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account. She likewise
asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI, she does not
know of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo
that would warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the
latter's favor.

PDIC filed a criminal complaint of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public

Officials, and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.

The ombudsman dismissed the complaint. No proof that Apelo

withdrew the deposited amount. The “advance warnings” are hearsay.

ISSUE: Is the Ombudsman correct in dismissing the case?

RULING: NO.

The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court
is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a
charge of grave abuse of discretion.

The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the

Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether
or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the
supposed crime that he committed.

Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering

whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it.

Assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her

affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit
the same, considering that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and
Treasurer of BDBI - a high-ranking officer that may be privy to delicate
transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal involving
private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in
determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a
finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case
against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause
implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.

In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict

private respondents of the crimes charged against them. Hence, the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint
against private respondents.

7.EFREN G. AMIT, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL

OFFICE NO. VI, OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), and THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, Respondents, G.R. No. 176172
November 20, 2012

Facts:

The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit on the Multi-

Purpose Drying Pavement (MPDP) projects, under the Grains Production
Enhancement Program of the Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit
No. (DA RFU) 6. COA discovered that 19 MPDP projects in the Province of
Iloilo do not exist, resulting to the loss of P1,130,000.00 on the part of the
government. The construction of 101 MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo
falls short of the standard measurement of 420 square meters as per
approved plan and specifications of DA RFU 6, Iloilo City, resulting in an
estimated loss of P879,301.00 on the part of the government. The checks
representing the reimbursement for the cost of materials for the construction
of the MPDP projects were released to persons other than the payee, without
authority from the recipient, MCPI, in violation of COA Circular 92-386 and
Article 1240 of the Revised Penal Code. The supplies and materials for the
construction of the MPDP projects were procured by DA RFU 6, in violation
of the Memorandum of Agreement. For these irregularities, eleven (11)
government employees , including Amit, were administratively charged
before the Ombudsman for being allegedly responsible for the ghost projects
and the misappropriation.

Amit was a Senior Agriculturist of DA RFU 6, designated to hold the

concurrent positions of Chief of the Regional Agricultural Engineering Group,
Iloilo City, and DA Provincial Coordinator of the Province of Antique for
Infrastructure Projects. He approved five issue slips of materials for the
construction of MPDP units and signed the disbursement voucher for the
MPDP project in one of the MPDP units.
 The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty for conspiring in the falsification of documents to
facilitate the disbursement and misappropriation of the funds intended for the
MPDP projects. It imposed on all of the officials the penalty of dismissal from
the public service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from holding
public office. Sixteen (16) of the subject MPDP projects were not
implemented, but the funds intended therefor were disbursed and released.
In other words, these projects turned out to be "ghosts". In some vouchers,
the signatures of the MCPI chairpersons and officers affixed in the
memoranda of agreement differ from those attributed to them in the
documents attached to the vouchers.

Amit argued that he cannot be held liable for falsification because the
issue slips, which were ordinarily used in the requisition and procurement of
supplies and materials by the DA RFU 6, were unnecessary in the
implementation of the MPDP projects. He also argued that the issue slips
were not intended to facilitate the release of funds

Issue: Is Amit liable for grave misconduct?

Ruling:
Yes.
First, Amit’s acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the
necessary prudence in complying with the proper procedure. The
performance of the complained acts was discretionary on his part. Amit’s
acts were done willfully and deliberately. They were done without regard to
the high positions that he occupied, which impose upon him greater
responsibility, and obliged him to be more circumspect in his actions or in
the discharge of his official duties. Amit inexplicably signed the issue slips
despite his alleged knowledge that these documents were unnecessary.
With Amit’s signing of the documents, however, the immediate release of the
funds was facilitated. This indicates shortsightedness on the part of Amit
which is so gross that it cannot be considered a result of indifference or
carelessness. Amit simply failed to conduct himself in the manner expected
of an occupant of a high office. In other words, he failed to act in accordance
with the demands of the responsibility that attaches to the office he was
occupying.

Second, the Ombudsman’s finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial

role which Amit played in the commission of fraud with other officials. Amit’s
acts were one of the more, if not the most, indispensable, final, and operative
acts that ultimately led to the consummation of the fraud. No disbursement
or release of government funds could happen without Amit’s imprimatur. The
irregularities will not see their fruition if Amit and the other officials involved
in the fraud did not consent to its implementation by making it appear that
there were valid requisitions, deliveries, inspections, pre-auditing and
approval of the vouchers and checks paid to the contractors/suppliers.

Third, Amit’s defense – the alleged reliance on the acts of his

subordinates in good faith – is simply unacceptable. Public office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead
modest lives. This high constitutional standard of conduct is not
intended to be mere rhetoric; those in the public service are enjoined
to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing
administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service. As such, Amit has the duty to
supervise his subordinates – he must see to it that his subordinates have
performed their functions in accordance with the law. Hecannot be allowed
to simply interpose this defense, as he is precisely duty-bound to check
whether these acts are regular, lawful and valid, and his full reliance on the
acts of his subordinates is antithetical to the duties imposed by his position
on them. The excuse or defense is totally unacceptable, too, given that the
transaction relates to disbursement of public funds, over which great
responsibility attaches.

Fourth, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As
earlier mentioned, he performed functions using independent judgment. Amit
signed the issue slips despite the absence of some of the required
documents for the release of government funds for the MPDP projects..

Viewed in these lights, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible

error of law in affirming the Ombudsman’s decision. "Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As
differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest." "Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character
[reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others."

In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., it was held that by uniform legal

definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as
an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual.
In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the
character of the man from the character of the officer x x x It is settled that
misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of
an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.

Amit’s acts were well within the scope of his functions. There is no
doubt that his inability to live up to the standards so imposed on him in the
performance of his duties is misconduct. In this case, the misconduct cannot
be considered simple misconduct; it is grave misconduct, considering the
presence of the qualifying elements of corrupt motive and flagrant disregard
of the rules taken from a collective consideration of the circumstances of the
case.

8. SONIA V. SEVILLE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Regional

Office VI, Iloilo City, Respondent.

This case provides what it takes to make a government official or employee

liable for ghost projects.

FACTS

CoA filed a complaint against Seville and 11 others, alleged that, as a

result of a special audit of the Post Harvest Component of the Grains
Production Enhancement Program of the DA, particularly the construction
of Multi-Purpose Drying Pavements (MPDPs) projects in Iloilo from January
1, 1995 to June 30, 1999, it was discovered that she signed a ghost MPDP
project in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.

She signed the disbursement voucher, as required by Memorandum Order

104, Series of 1998, in view of the absence of the Regional Director and
the Assistant Regional Director for Administration. But she claimed that she
acted in good faith, merely relying on the completeness and genuineness
of the supporting documents that were shown to her. She had no prior
knowledge of the MPDPs, which catered to rice production, since she was
an Assistant Regional Director for Fisheries. She admitted, however, not
conducting an actual physical inspection of the project since she believed
that it was not her responsibility to do so

ISSUE : whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Ombudsmans

decision that found petitioner liable for grave misconduct and gross
dishonesty for signing the disbursement voucher for the particular ghost
MPDP in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.

RULING
No. Seville is not liable for grave misconduct.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the

law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident.
Misconduct, in the administrative sense, is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action. On the other hand, dishonesty is
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact or the disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. Both are considered grave offenses for
which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders.

Here, the COA charged petitioner Seville administratively because the

government released funds for that particular ghost project. Seville anchors
her innocence on good faith. Good faith implies honest intent, free from any
knowledge of circumstances that ought to have prompted an individual to
undertake an inquiry.

The Court finds, however, that Seville cannot be held liable for grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the
official or employees act of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position to
gain benefit for ones self.

Here, the Court is not convinced that under the circumstances then
present, she had depraved motives.

Seville signed on the rare happenstance that both the Regional Director
and the Assistant Regional Director for Administration were absent. That
both signatories were absent when the Sto. Rosario project was presented
to her for signature was a coincidence that cannot be imputed to her for
she could not have orchestrated that for her gain, absent evidence to the
contrary. She did not volunteer for the position nor is there proof that she
lobbied for the OIC designation, it being provided by a DA internal
regulation. She is but liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct
since she should have exercised the necessary prudence to ensure that
the proper procedure was complied with in the release of government
funds.

The penalty for simple misconduct is suspension for one month and one
day to six months for the first offense.

9.MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
FACTS:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via

petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7,
2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public
respondent).

July 22, 2010 – Four days before the 15th Congress opened its first session
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez,
upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and
Walden Bello.

July 27, 2010 - HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker
Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business

August 3, 2010 - Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group)
filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
The House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. The Secretary General
transmitted the Reyes group's complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by
Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.

August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m - during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to the
Committee.

After hearing, the Committee, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found

both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have
been referred to it at exactly the same time.

After hearing, the Committee, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the

two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance.

September 13, 2010 - Gutierrez filed with this Court the present petition with
application for injunctive reliefs.
RULING:

1. Does the SC have the power to determine whether public respondent

committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its
discretion relating to impeachment proceedings? --- YES, under the
doctrine of expanded judicial review.

The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of

impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided
for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system
of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, in the present case, the Court is not asserting its
ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding
the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign
will.

2. Whether the petition filed by Gutierrez is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication. – NO.

In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter

alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and
on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent
two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke
judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation
that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.

3. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?

The term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment

complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
 Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.

4. Whether the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible

standards in determining the sufficiency in form and substance of the
complaint. – YES.

The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional

requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the committee.
It is also notable that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where
a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of
form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to
effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence,
such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

5. Whether the petitioner was denied of due process because of the delay
in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. – NO.

Days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on

August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on
September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially
identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general
circulation.

Citing Tanada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was

deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published
only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention
on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.
There is a statutory difference between promulgation and
publication. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these
 rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication. In the case of
administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on
different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-
legislation. As detailed in one case, the publication of implementing
rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
generally understood that is, to make known. It is within the discretion
of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment
Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to
tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
In Neri v. Senate, inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution
where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure.
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it
does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would
already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day
period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment
Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for
its inaction on the impeachment complaints.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature,
they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment
of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for
the punishment of the offender. Even in Neri v. Senate, concedes that
the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null
and void in its entirety.

6. When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?

 Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of
the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four
days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the
impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the
Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period
ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on
the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence,
in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar
provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second
impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light
the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that
once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.

7. Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one

impeachable offense? – NO.

The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment

offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment,
assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment. It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.

8. Whether consolidation of the complaints is proper

In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the
Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within
one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate
need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
consolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate.
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion,
did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a
determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of
 public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

11.ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was

filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion
skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 3019). The Information alleged:

That on or about June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan,

Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON
and PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public officers, duly appointed and
qualified as such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and
Property Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being
members of Bids and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase
of office supplies for the Provincial Government of Samar and while in
the performance of their respective positions, confederating and
mutually helping one another and through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter into a
purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private
citizen, for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one
hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five
Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said
item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue
injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).

Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a

plea of "not guilty."

On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia

moved for petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
which provides in part:

Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public

officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
 under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office.

Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing inter alia that:

2. Upon a bare invocation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution
would have this Honorable Court issue an Order suspending the
accused, as if suspension of a public officer is a mindless and
meaningless exercise, and is imposed without regard to the spirit and
intent of the law upon which it is based.
3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed that laws are enacted and
followed without a particular purpose to be served, especially when a
mechanical application shall injure not only the public official
concerned, but the entire electorate as well.1

The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the

suspension of petitioner from office for a period of 90 days. It held that
preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of Rep. Act No. 3019,
pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to make a finding that
the accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the above-
described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for
suspension.”

ISSUE:

Whether Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in

ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner

RULING:

NO.

It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it

mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against
whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the
Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is
required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate
witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to
determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction
of the court.

The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period

prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is
decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety
days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive
suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal
prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last
for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period;
otherwise, it will continue for ninety days. The duration of preventive
suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time
it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of any discretion
lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the accused may
use his office to hamper his prosecution.

Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the
people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least
temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a
mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise
been elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even the Constitution
authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of
Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus rejecting the view
expressed in one case that members of the legislature could not be
suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal,
the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.

12. MILAGROS L. DIAZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to have made
cash payments in the total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-
one pesos and twenty three centavos (P6,171.23). The audit team also
found petitioner to have sold postage stamps which she had failed to
record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered the cash
items as having been validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had
incurred a total cash shortage of P14,191.63. He then referred the matter to
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts. The Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner of the crime of malversation. The failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal
uses.

ISSUE: WON Diaz is liable for malversation of public funds.

RULING:

NO. The elements of malversation of public funds are that (a) the offender
is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds
or propertyfor which he is accountable, and, most importantly, (d) he has
appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence funds is not due to
the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely
destroyed; in fact, the presumption is deemed never to have existed at all.

The evidence submitted, just to the contrary, would point out that not a
centavo of the so-called missing funds was spent for personal use, a matter
that was later acknowledged by the Special Prosecutor who thereupon
recommended the withdrawal of the information earlier filed against
petitioner. The records would show that petitioners use of the cash in her
possession for operational expenses was founded on valid authority. COA
Circular No. 76-37 allowed postmasters to make payments for gasoline,
spare parts and minor repairs of vehicles subject to reimbursement by the
Regional Office. She advanced payments of salaries of employees on the
basis of the Circular No. 82-21 issued by the Postmaster General. The
Regional Office, through the chief of the finance section, certified that all
the payments made by petitioner were legitimate operational expenses.

Since the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of

thoroughness and completeness as there were accounts which were not
considered, the same cannot be made the basis for holding petitioner liable
for malversation. Hopefully, the Court is not being pertinent if it were to
urge COA, in the exercise of its awesome powers, to act with extreme care
and judicious consideration of all attendant circumstances in order to
ensure that innocent public officials may not have to undergo the trial and
the pains that always go with an indictment for an offense. Generally, the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court but
there are established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion,
when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or
founded on a mistake; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact
are premised on a want of evidence are contradicted by evidence on
record. In these instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in order
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The case at bar, as may be gleaned from
the foregoing disquisition, is one such instance.

13 LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First
Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with
the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two
(2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases
of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the

Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
a formal complaint (criminal for 9 counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents; administrative
for 9 counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public
Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty) against herein petitioner.
In a Joint resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes resolved
the administrative case by suspending Atty. Ledesma for one year which the
Ombudsman approved. The Ombudsman also approved a Resolution
dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of
evidence. The CA affirmed petitioner’s suspension but reduced the period to
6 months and 1 day without pay

Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned
applications for the extension of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or
deceived the BOC into approving these applications and argues that the
BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct when it
approved the subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith
and the government did not suffer any damage as a result of his alleged
administrative lapse.

Issues and Ruling:

WON the CA was correct

Yes.
 In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in
the BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his
own admission, it appears that the BSI not only transmits the applications for
TRV extension and its supporting documents, but more importantly, it
interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before making a
recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it
finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC
certifying to the regularity and propriety of the applications.
Equally untenable is the contention that the BOC’s approval of the
defective applications for TRV extension cured any infirmities therein and
effectively absolved petitioner’s administrative lapse. The instant
administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI in processing nine (9) defective applications, independent
of and without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does not impugn the
validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach upon the authority of the BID
on immigration matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine whether
petitioner committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or
malfeasance in the performance of his duties.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not commit any error
in finding the petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service and reducing petitioner’s period of suspension to 6 months and 1 day
without pay, taking into account the education and length of service of
petitioner.

WON the OMBUDSMAN’S resolution finding petitioner administratively liable

constitutes an indirect encroachment into the power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters
No.
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the
1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the
people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to
investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989, provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not
only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil
and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case
where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government
to the people.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order
that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its
investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is
provided:
 Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning; that
is, that the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one
having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service,
more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.

Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial
evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that
made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to
varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it
cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from
judicial examination.

The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents’ theory. Section

15 is substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution
which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We
draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this
Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause
to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
 employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer;

We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee – akin
to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just
cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This
should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority
of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore
that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper
officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to

provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it
can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept
and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was
given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the
exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority
pending an investigation when the case so warrants.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical

Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the
people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The
Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power
to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role
in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The
legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his
own actions.

14. BAGONG KAPISANAN VS. DOLOT GR No 179054, Sept. 5, 2012

Mendoza, J
FACTS:

Brgy. 901 and Brgy 902, represented by their respective Chairmen (Azer
Dolot and Silverio Tanada) and Inpart Engineering, represented by Antonio
Benzon, signed a MOA formulated to address the repair and rehabilitation
of the water system of Punta Tenement and to manage the water
distribution in the tenement as well as to handle the payment of the back
accounts of its tenants to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) Punta Tenement, an association formed by the residents in Punta
Sta. Ana, Manila, filed a complaint for Dishonesty and Corruption before
the Office of the Ombudsman against their brgy chairmen and other brgy
kagawads. It alleged that the respondent defraud the tenants by not
remitting to MWSS the agreed brgy share of P0.125 or 50% of P0. 25/liter
container from the cost of water collection paid by the tenement residents
which was intended to pay the back account to MWSS as instructed by the
MOA. Ombudsman found them all guilty of Dishonesty and imposed upon
them the penalty of dismissal from service. MR was filed but the same was
denied. The respondents appealed to the CA but the petition was granted.
Punta Tenement filed an MR alleging that the COA clearly demonstrated
the respondents' acts of corruption when they submitted improvised, not
official, receipt of collections of the Patubig project. Likewise, the
Ombudsman filed its MR asking for the re-evaluation of the CA's decision.
CA partly granted Punta's MR and held that the respondents were indeed
remiss in their duties but the penalty of dismissal would be too harsh since
that the collections were spent for noble Barangay projects. It thus imposed
a penalty of suspension.

ISSUES:
1. Are they guilty of Dishonesty?
2. Is the penalty correct?

HELD:

1. Yes. Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. Here, the supposed dishonesty was convincingly
established. Based on the contract, both barangays were to receive P.
25/20 liter as their share in the water distribution arrangement of which
50% was allocated for the payment of back account with MWSS, while 50%
was earmarked to their other barangay related projects. The two
respondents cannot feign ignorance of the fact that their chosen people
acted as collectors for the water distribution set-up and had the first access
to the money collected before the money was supposed to be turned over
to Inpart less their commission /share or that they could have easily
effected the proper recording of payments and allocation of shares and
securee the money for the MWSS repayment. Further, the MOA provides
that they have a say on who should be appointed as arguardors or
collectors of the water distribution set-up. These nonfeasance seriously
tainted their integrity as public servants.

The findings of fact of the office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and
weight specially when they are affirmed by the CA. In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is required to support findings. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. All circumstances here point to the in
excusable misfeasance of Dolot and Tanada. Dishonesty is a malevolent
act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to perform his duties with the
integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.

The underlying reason is because when a public officer or government

employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such
officer or employee but the improvement of public service and the
preservation of public's faith and confidence in the government. As public
officials, Dolot and Tanada are expectes to exhibit the highest degree of
dedication in deference to their foremost duty of accountability to the
people. The Constitution sanctifies the principle that public office is a public
trust, and enjoins all officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of integrity, responsibility, loyalty and efficiency.

2. No. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service classifies dishonesty as a grave offense
punishable with dismissal from service even for the first offense. It carries
with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service,
unless provided in the decision. Absent any mitigating circumstance
(physical illness, good faith, education, length of service in government,
and other analogous circumstances), as in this case, the Court has no
disposition except to impose the penalty of dismissal.

3. The court upheld the dismissal of the complaint against the other
respondents for lack of evidence even in the slightest degree that they had
a direct hand in the mishandling of the tenement's patubig project. They
merely signed the resolution approving the MOA in their capacities as Brgy.
Kagawads, a laudable remedy to alleviate the plight of the Punta Tenement
members.

15.CORONA V. SENATE 678 SCRA 458, 2012

Facts:

In 2011, an impeachment complaint was filed against then Chief

Justice Renato Corona, charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption. A caucus was
held by the House and the impeachment was submitted to the Committee on
Justice. On the members of the House voted with 188 signing and endorsing
it. The next day, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate. This complaint
alleged the following:

a. His failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets,

liabilities and net worth as required under the Constitution
b. His failure to meet and observe the stringent standards under
the Constitution that provides that a member of the Judiciary must be
a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence
in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a
counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final
and executory cases
c. In creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo
through her appointment of his wife to office, and in discussing with
litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court; when he
blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing
a status quo ante order against the House of Representatives in
the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman
Merceditas Gutierrez
d. Through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently
disregarding the principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16
newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a
province
e. By arrogating unto himself and to a committee he created, the
authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the
Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and
jurisdiction is properly reposed by the Constitution in the House of
Representatives via impeachment
f. Through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order
(TRO) in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and her
husband in order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution
and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court
decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply
with the conditions of the Supreme Court’s own TRO
g. When he failed and refused to account for the Judiciary
Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ)
collections
 Corona filed his answer contending that the “blitzkrieg” fashion with
which the impeachment complaint was signed by the members of the House
of Representatives and it was immediately transferred to the Senate was all
part of a move by then President Aquino and his partymates to oust him from
his position as Chief Justice and that the charges against him were baseless.

In 2012, the Senate commenced proceedings against Corona. Both

parties submitted evidence and memoranda regarding the SALNs of Corona.
The impeachment court then issued a resolution allowing the prosecution to
submit evidence regarding the allegations of failure to disclose SALNs and
failure to include properties in his SALN. It also disallowed the introduction
of evidence on ill-gotten wealth, citing that the Court would be guided by the
legal presumptions on the nature of the property or asset that may be proven
to belong to Corona. The Impeachment court subsequently issued a
resolution granting the prosecution’s request to subpoena the responsible
officer of Philippine Savings Bank or PSBAnk and Bank of the Philippine
Islands or BPI for them to testify and submit records on Corona’s bank
accounts. PSBank filed a petition for certiorari against this subpoena.

Corona then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the proceedings of the impeachment court, the officers of the banks
from presenting documents and testifying on his and his family’s bank
accounts, and to void the proceedings of the Impeachment court. He alleged
that the impeachment court committed grave abuse of discretion when:

a. It proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by

Representatives whose complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause;
b. It did not strike out the charges of failure to disclose assets which,
aside from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute
allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion
or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of the allegation some
properties were not disclosed is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court
to retain it effectively allows the introduction of evidence as vehicle to prove
the allegation of accumulating ill-gotten wealth and therefore its earlier
resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection
to petitioner;
c. It allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged
corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due
process because first, Art. II of the Impeachment complaint (Failure to
Disclose SALN) does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully
acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under
Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and
distinct ground from "culpable violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of
public trust"; and;
 d. It issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank
accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result
of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those
documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality
of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits
Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for
the following reliefs:

Corona also sought to inhibit Justices Carpio and Sereno for partiality.
This motion was denied by the Court. Corona also later filed a Supplemental
Petition claiming that his right to due process was violated because certain
Senator Judges have lost their cold neutrality. The Solicitor General, for the
respondents, filed a comment that Corona’s petition before the Supreme
Court raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or
resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the
comment is being filed by the respondents "without submitting themselves to
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the
constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of
impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment."
Citing the case of Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow
a public official being impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues
relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an
unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms
of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is
clearly not what the Constitution intended.

ISSUE:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail
matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain
injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person
being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.

HELD:

Yes, the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked Corona. However the

petition was dismissed for being moot as Corona was convicted and he has
vacated his office without any protest

Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the

arsenal of democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and
enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that
"the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties,
than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their
concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the
effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political
departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave
abuse or arbitrariness.

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public

official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A
mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots
in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence
of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution and adopted
by our own Constitution.

Here, Corona was impeached through the mode provided under Art.
XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue
haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the
said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-
Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings. On
the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the
Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in
the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege
any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on
the Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue
that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations,
this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the
actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the
functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-
Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial and as such, is a political question

The Court cited the case of Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng

mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. where it ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v.
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved
the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two
impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was
allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar
provision.

Here, petitioner asked the Court to determine whether respondents

committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court.

16.MONTALLANA V. OMBUDSMAN, 678 SCRA 458, 2012

Facts:

In 2001, a fire destroyed the Manor hotel in Kamias, Quezon City,

killing 74 people and injuring several others. The office of the ombudsman’s
Fact-Finding and Intelligence bureau found that the fire was caused by the
hotel’s faulty electric wiring and the gross negligence of the public officials of
the local government of Quezon City by failing to conduct an annual
inspection of the hotels electric systems, by failing to have a copy of its
electrical plans, and that the electrical inspectors, including Monatallana,
only indicated 89 air-conditioning units showing a great disparity as to the
hotels true electric load, and for failing to report that 4 electrical meters of the
hotel were disconnected by MERALCO due to jumper connections.

Montallana and his companions were preventively suspended. In his

defense, Montallana argued that as Chief of the Electrical division, all
inspections were regularly made, that he signed the inspections in good faith,
and that, as a superior officer, he cannot be liable for the acts of his
subordinates. The Ombudsman eventually found him guilty and dismissed
him from service and that being already retired, his benefits be returned.

Montallana’s motion for reconsideration and appeal to the CA were

both denied, with CA reasoning out that, as the final approving authority of
the electrical division, Montallana should have seen to it that his subordinates
are performing their duties effectively and verified their reports.

Issue:
Is Montallana guilty of gross negligence?

Held:

Yes.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. In
cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable.

The Court also ruled that while it is true that in several cases, the
absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the petitioner,
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command
responsibility. However, in the case at bar, the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA, clearly establish the negligence of
petitioner in the performance of his duties as head of the Electrical Division.

Here, among the duties and responsibilities attached to the Electrical

Division of Quezon City is to conduct annual inspection of existing electrical
installations within the jurisdiction of Quezon City. Thus, it was incumbent on
petitioner as head of the Electrical Division to see to it that proper annual
inspections are conducted on the existing electrical installations in Quezon
City. Records would disclose that the charges against petitioner were
supported by the evidence on record: There was no electrical inspection
conducted for 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001, the hotel did not apply and secure a
business permit for year 1996, 1997, 1998 and it has no business permit at
the time of the incident. Having no application for a business permit, there
was likewise no referral for an electrical inspection to the Electrical Division,
which is a Standard Operating Procedure in processing applications for
business permits. Thus, for these years, there can be no electrical inspection
conducted.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the

public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust. From the foregoing, petitioner's negligence in the performance
of his duties as a public servant was well established. In administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The Court reiterated that a public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. As a public servant, petitioner is tasked
to provide efficient, competent, and proper service to the public. Public
officials and employees are under obligation to perform the duties of their
offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. In the case at bar,
petitioner miserably failed to perform his duties as a public servant.

17.GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (G.R. No. 196231,

January 28, 2014)
Facts:

A formal charge for Grave misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery

extortion and physical injuries) as filed before PNP-NCR against Manila
Police district Senior Inspector (P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and four
others. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and
evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for appropriate administrative adjudication.

On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio

Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the
case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation
and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order on
April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director
Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to
petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days
after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order,
together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final
review and action when Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on
that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the

blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months
without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to
resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service.
Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

Administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.

Ruling:

YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a

Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably,
the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external
authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and
plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from
administrative liabilities.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a

Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled
an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself
is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a

Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is
already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
afore said officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and
effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog
looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for
the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional
mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for
the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This
means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably
insulated from the whims of politicians."

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the

questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-
IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing
any reason there for cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his
undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of
concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people."The factual circumstances that the case was
turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant
verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained
pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of
petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of
any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the
parties to the case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any
bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty
of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of
duty or misconduct in office do not amount
to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested
with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of

backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.