JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT CASES

1. Casar v. Soluren

FACTS: Judge Soluren visited the Aurora Provincial Jail and talked with inmates, including inmates with pending cases in her sala.
Allegedly, the jail visitation of Soluren was to persuade the inmates to sign a letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona
pleading to the latter to dismiss the administrative complaint filed against Judge Soluren by Atty. Reyes.

The jail visition was in contravention of Circular No. 03-2010, dated January 12, 2010, which suspended the conduct of jail
visitation and inspection by Executive Judges and Presiding Judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Soluren guilty of simple misconduct.

HELD: YES.
This Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be damaging to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s role in the
administration of justice. To say the least, using detention prisoners who had cases before Judge Soluren cannot be countenanced.

2. Madriaga v. CBC

Topic: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies. When there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to
have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

FACTS: Spouses Trajano sold to Madriaga Sr. the subject lot. Upon completion of payment, Spouses Trajano executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favour of Madriaga Sr. but failed to deliver the lot titles prompting Madriaga Sr. to file for specific performance.
They later entered into a compromise agreement that the Spouses Trajano will return the money they received as payment from
Madriaga Sr. in their previous transaction. However, they again failed to comply with their obligation so Madriaga Sr. filed with RTC.
The RTC issued a writ of execution on the properties of Trajano, including the subject lots. Madriaga Sr. won the bid and a certificate
of sale was issued to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M) were cancelled and replaced by T-284713(M) and T-
284714 in his name.

Meanwhile, Spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China Bank secured by a mortgage over TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M). Upon default, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and was declared the highest bidder. TCT Nos. T-346239(M) and T-
346240(M) were issued to China Bank to replace, for the second time, TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M).

Madriaga Sr. filed an opposition to the writ but was denied because the RTC was merely performing a ministerial duty to
issue the writ of possession to China Bank. After Madriaga Sr’s death, Madriaga Jr succeeded to the properties and filed a petition
for certiorari to the CA contending grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA denied the petition on the ground that
the motion had already been rendered moot and academic since the writ was already satisfied on April 25, 2005 with the physical
removal of Madriaga Sr. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the case been rendered moot and academic

RULING: Yes. The case has been rendered moot and academic by the full implementation/ satisfaction of the writ of possession.
The writ of possession the RTC issued to China Bank had been satisfied on April 15, 2005 after the petitioner had been successfully
removed from the subject premises, prompting the court to declare that the petitioner’s Motion to Quash/Abate the Writ of
Possession has been rendered moot and academic. Indeed, with the writ of possession having been served and satisfied, the said
motions had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, and a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where there is no more live subject of
controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction on the ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
judicial review,which are not extant in this case.

In any event, as we have previously noted, the petitioner has already pursued Civil Case No. 406-M-2002 for "Specific
Performance, Nullification of Title, Reconveyance and Damages," a plenary action to recover possession or an accion
reivindicatoria." It is in said forum that the contending ownership claims of the parties, and resultantly the right of possession, can
be best ventilated and resolved with definiteness.

3. People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173

FACTS: The accused were charged with two crimes, i.e. arson with homicide and arson. They were arraigned before Judge Gutierrez.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 226 authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the two criminal
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274 of the Department of Justice. The prosecution moved to the respondent Judge for a transfer
of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative orders and calling attention to the
circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and personal safety. The accused opposed
such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative Order only provided for
transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal of the cases; and
in the cases involved, the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of
these cases.

In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the
SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to
compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the subject administrative order merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and
likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits
of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the administrative orders mentioned. However, in refusing to consider Department
Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the
prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their
lives would be endangered.

The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law
(Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every
quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government. One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts
is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

In the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of the said criminal cases of the
CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice. The informations filed
in the CFI of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses, some eighty-two (82) are still
unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the
province, being concededly the son of the Congressman and that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the
criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them.

4. In Re: Atty Marcial Edillon

FACTS: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was removed from the Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP
from the time of its constitution. However, he argued that the by-laws of the IBP constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
whereby he is being compelled, as a pre-condition of maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the fees. He questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the
said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."

HELD: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged
to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations.

As to the payment of annual dues, the collection is to further the State’s legitimate interest to elevate the quality of
professional legal services. The fees are imposed to defray the cost of regulating the profession he belongs.

As to the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, the
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

5. Maturan v. Gutierrez Torres

FACTS: Atty. Maturan was handling a criminal case which was already submitted for decision on since June 2002 however the case
had remained pending and unresolved. On August 2004, Atty. Maturan filed a complaint against the presiding judge, Judge
Gutierrez-Torres for unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Gutierrez-Torres shall be sanctioned.

HELD: YES. She is guilty of gross inefficiency.
YES. Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within: a) SUPREME COURT- 24 months from date of submission unless reduced by the SC; b) LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS-12
months; c) ALL LOWER COURTS-3 months. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in
the disposition of the cases or matters pending in their courts.
All judges should be mindful of the duty to decide promptly, knowing that the public's faith and confidence in the Judiciary
are at stake if they should ignore such duty. They must always be aware that upon each time a delay occurs in the disposition of
cases, their stature as judicial officers and the respect for their position diminish. Because of her act, the reputation of the entire
Judiciary, of which she is among the pillars, is also undeservedly tarnished.
If the Judge anticipate that she would need a period longer than what the Constitution and the issuances of the Court
prescribe within which to render her decision, she should request a proper extension of the period from the Court, through the OCA,
and lay out in the request the justification for her inability. In this case, Judge Gutierrez-Torres did not at all do so.

6. Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman

Topic: It is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel and has
exclusive power to take administrative action against them in case of violations.

FACTS: On May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Judge Alumbres asked Judge Caoibes to return the
executive table he borrowed from him. Judge Caoibes did not answer so Judge Alumbres reiterated his request but before he could
finish, Judge Caoibes blurted “Tarantido it ah”, and boxed Judge Alumbres at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw, therefore
destroying his eyeglasses.

Judge Alumbres filed before the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of his eyeglasses and assault upon a person in authority. Later on, he lodged an administrative case with the Supreme
Court for the dismissal of Judge Caoibes from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial
officer.

Judge Caoibes filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the
Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case because it is the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, which has the authority to
make a preliminary determination regarding the respective culpability of members of the bench.

ISSUE: Whether it is the Ombudsman or the SC who has jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving members of the judiciary

RULING: It is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

7. Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria with interference on Behalf of a
Suspected Drug Queen AM NO. 00-7-09 CA, March 27, 2001

FACTS: This administrative charge was triggered by newspaper accounts. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze
Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.

Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he
indeed visited the DOJ, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was
purely accidental. Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about
the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could
well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."

Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III,
such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and
Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about
the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.

In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for
the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk
Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know.
Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.

ISSUE: Whether Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD: Yes. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced.
Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or
any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed
with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. His must be free
of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the
courtroom and as a private individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions,
Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The
mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her
prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained,
without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no
place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

8. Marbury v. Madison

NOTE: Wala pong full case sa net. Dinigest ko lang digest.

FACTS: On his last day in office, President John Adams named 42 justices of the peace and 16 new circuit court justices for the
District of Columbia under the Organic Act. Newly elected President Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming
that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William Marbury (P) was an intended
recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.

ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and Executive and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?

HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and
legislative acts. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the
operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
In addition, Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution.

9. Hebron v. Garcia II

FACTS: Judge Matias M. Garcia II was charged of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and abuse of authority and abuse of
discretion by Ernestro Hebron. He filed a case for falsification of public document against Aladin Simundac to which Simundac filed
for a TRO – first denied by the MTC and was later on raffled to the RTC, landing to Judge Matias’ court. Hebron filed a motion for
Judge Garcia’s inhibition, citing his perceived bias and partiality of Judge Garcia, who had earlier dismissed an earlier civil case filed
by Hebron against Simundac.

The administrative complaint was later withdrawn but the issue remains: the motion was submitted for resolution on
November 25, 2009 but Judge Matias claimed that they were unable to resolve the case until July 2011. He failed to resolve the
motion within the 90-day reglementary period provided by the Constitution.

HELD: Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the SC, and, unless reduced by
the SC, twelve months for all collegiate courts, and three months for all other courts." Judge Garcia failed to meet this three-
month deadline.

Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice deprives
litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed
is justice denied.

10. OCA v. Balut

Topic: A judge should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.

FACTS: The OCA conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya
wherein Judge Balut was the acting and presiding judge in both courts. Results showed that Judge Balut failed to decide 33 cases and
101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. Further, both MTCs of Bayombong and Solano incurred substantial cash
shortages due to the continuous borrowing of Judge Balut for the past years, as alleged by the Clerks of Court. The Court ordered
Judge Balut to pay a fine for his failure the decide the numbers of cases and motions but referred to the CA the issue of cash
shortages. The CA dismissed the charges against him for the failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the participation of
Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. Despite his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA
held that he could no longer be penalized because he was already fined by the Court.

RULING: The SC disagrees with the recommendation of the CA. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard
of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of
MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds
and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money from the various
funds of the court collections.

The Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of his
position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards
of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode the
public faith in the Judiciary.

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately
made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed to become a role
model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his official and
personal conduct.

Therefore, Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

11. Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Judge Baluma 704 SCRA 415

FACTS: Judge Baluma availed himself of optional retirement on July 22, 2011. Reportedly, there were 23 cases submitted for
decision/resolution, which were left undecided by Judge Baluma. All 23 cases were already beyond the reglementary period for
deciding them by the time Judge Baluma retired. Thus, the processing of Judge Baluma’s Application for Clearance has been put on
hold pending clearance from the OCA. Judge Baluma’s son, averred that his father was suffering from depression and requested for
the early release of Judge Baluma’s retirement pay and other benefits. Atty. Baluma appealed that if any amount needs to be
withheld from Judge Baluma’s retirement benefits due to the undecided cases, Judge Baluma’s health condition be taken into
consideration.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Baluma is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision

HELD: Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to decide
cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down guidelines
in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that "judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by
Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus,
all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while
all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so."

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period
is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.

At the same time, however, the Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts. The Court has allowed
reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge
cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.

Here, Judge Baluma failed to decide 23 cases already submitted for decision/resolution within the mandatory reglementary
period for doing so; he left said cases still undecided upon his retirement on July 22, 2011; he did not give any reason/explanation
for his failure to comply with the reglementary period for deciding cases; and there were no previous requests by him for extension
of time to decide said cases. Judge Baluma’s gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the
reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions.

In the present case, the Court takes into account the survey of cases; together with the number of cases Judge Baluma
failed to decide within the reglementary period (23 cases upon his retirement) and the lack of effort on his part to proffer an
explanation or express remorse for his offense; but considering as well that he is suffering from depression and that he has no prior
infraction, the Court finds that a fine of ₱20,000.00 is adequate. He is FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits withheld by the Fiscal Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator. The balance of his retirement
benefits shall be released without unnecessary delay.

12. People v. Wahiman

Jorie Wahiman was charged of the crime of murder for the death of Jose. He was found guilty and the court directed him to pay the
heirs the sum of

P75,000.00 as moral damages,

P75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity and

actual damages as follows:

P59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;

[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for P220,000[;]

P1,500.00 Appearance fee; and

P50,000.00 Attorney's fee.

He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao Penal [C]olony.

HELD: Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that there must be documentary proof to support indemnity for loss
of earning capacity. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule: By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.

Jose is neither self-employed earning less than the minimum wage nor is he employed as a daily wage worker. However, we
are inclined to award lost earnings considering that the deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils,
in Malaybalay City and was receiving a monthly salary of P95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This
testimony was not objected to by appellant or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal. Clearly, the existence of factual
basis of the award has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the award for lost earnings must be modified
following the formula [2/3 x 80 - age] x [gross annual income - necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income].
Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)] [(P95,000 x 12) - 50% (P95,000 x 12)] = P9,878,100.00. The award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof,
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.

13. Disini v. Sec of Justice

FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
Related to judiciary:

Section 8 – Penalties

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a
measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the
act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime.Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the
legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Section 14 – Disclusre of Computer Data

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands
of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute
an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial intervention.