Prior to the 19th century, poetry, rhetoric, historiography and moral philosophy were

considered particularly valuable to humane education, as they transmitted knowledge of

beauty, goodness and truth. These so-called "fine sciences" ("schöne Wissenschaften") were
discredited by Immanuel Kant, who no longer recognised values as objects of scientific
knowledge. Kant advanced an ideal of "rigorous science" entailing a novel concept of
"scientific education" ("wissenschaftliche Bildung"): through methodically exploring the
harmonious totality of human knowledge, the human mind would take on a correspondingly
harmonious form. In the course of the 19th century, the disciplinary differentiation and
specialisation that resulted from the new concept of rigorous science proved ever more
difficult to reconcile with the educational ideal that had once been its motivating force.

Introduction
Mathematics and the natural sciences have worked their way up to unsuspected heights,
and ... acquired a classicism that can almost compete with the aesthetic classicism of
ancient literature.1

Without a doubt, the most influential concept in German university history is that of the
"unity of teaching and research" ("Einheit von Lehre und Forschung"). From the late
19th century onwards, university foundations and reforms both in and outside of
fEurope have been inspired by the – originally German – idea that universities should
not only aim at transmitting knowledge by means of education, but also at increasing it
by way of scientific research. In our time, the integration of teaching and research
within institutions for higher education is still widely pursued and commonly regarded
as the central legacy of the German university.

▲1

The conceptual integration of teaching and research is well known to have been
ultimately accomplished by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) , who was the leading
executive of the Prussian university reform in 1809/1810.2 Humboldt aimed to give
research a permanent place at the university, not only because he considered it a
constitutive part of scientific practice, but also, and more importantly, because he
regarded research as being of vital importance to achieve the highest end of all
education: "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education").3 This Humboldtian
belief in the close connection between science (Wissenschaft) and education (Bildung)
was based on three different principles.4 Firstly, like the major philosophers of his time
– e.g. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) , Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling
(1775–1854) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) , Friedrich Schleiermacher
(1768–1834) and Henrich Steffens (1773–1845) – Humboldt postulated the "unity of
science" ("Einheit der Wissenschaft"). He conceived of ariscience as the internally
coherent totality of human knowledge, in which all subareas were assigned their proper
place.5 Secondly, Humboldt argued that since the totality of human knowledge was
anything but fully explored, science must be understood as a "noch nicht ganz
Gefundenes und nie ganz Aufzufindendes" ("something not yet completely discovered,
and never to be completely discovered"), thus underlining scientific research as an
integral part of academic practice ("Wissenschaft als Forschung").6 Thirdly, Humboldt
believed that the human mind, by being initiated through scientific research into the
harmonious coherence of human knowledge, was supposed to take on a proportionally
harmonious and equally coherent form, which he called "wahre ... Bildung" ("true
science"). In this sense, Humboldt regarded science as ultimately aiming at "the highest,
generally-human" ("das höchst allgemein Menschliche"), which he called the "focal
point" ("Brennpunkt") of academic education.7

▲2

This early 19th century concept of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education")

had a profound impact on the history of the German university. At an institutional level,
its most obvious consequence was the reorganisation of the philosophical faculty, which
can be seen throughout the German states in the 19th century. Setting themselves the
task to represent the "unity of science", the philosophical faculties developed ambitious
curricula of encyclopaedic breadth, encompassing both the humanities and the natural
sciences. No longer being mere appendages to the higher faculties, they were
reconceptualised as the pre-eminent loci of research and Bildung (education): it was
here that scholars and students were offered scope to educate their minds by exploring
the harmonious and coherent totality of human knowledge through disinterested
research. Nearly everywhere in Germany, the reorganised philosophical faculties
succeeded in maintaining their newly acquired dominance for a very long time. It was
only in the late 19th and early 20th century that new faculties gradually began to
dissociate themselves from their unifying grip.

▲3

Yet, for all their durability, it is far from clear whether education at the reorganised
philosophical faculties actually had the expected effect of "wissenschaftliche Bildung"
("scientific education") as understood by Humboldt.8 For all scholarly interest in the
external conditions that prevented the 19th-century ideal of "wissenschaftliche Bildung"
("scientific education") from being successfully implemented, the ideal itself has
attracted little critical attention. Humboldt and his fellow reformers are usually very
positively assessed for having granted Bildung (education) a central place on Prussia's
academic and social agenda.9 Yet, at least up to the 1860s, the new concept of
"wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") encountered serious competition
from the still dominant classical ideal of education that had been inherited, ultimately,
from Renaissance humanism. Throughout the 19th century, many educationalists stuck
to the traditional opinion that humane education should primarily focus, not on the
acquisition of new knowledge by means of scientific research, but on a canonical body
of exemplary texts that offered aesthetic and ethical models worthy of imitation. In their
view, the new model of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") was so
abstractly conceived that it was unlikely to sort much effect in educational practice. The
relevance of this criticism would emerge ever more clearly in the course of the late 19th
century, when increasing numbers of scholars remained faithful to the concept of
"science as research" while abandoning the educational ideal that had once been its
motivating force. By examining its tense interplay with the traditional ideal of classical
education, we may get a grip on the intrinsic causes why the new ideal of
"wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") proved so difficult to realise and
why it ultimately created the very conditions of its own decline.
▲4

Bildung in the late 18th century: schöne

Wissenschaften
Up to the early 19th century, only a limited number of sciences was assigned with a
potential of humane education (Bildung). In late 18th century Germany, these sciences
were usually named "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences"), an interesting term that
originated in the 17th century and reached the peak of its popularity between 1750 and
1780.10 Negatively, the "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") distinguished
themselves from the "faculty sciences" ("Fakultätswissenschaften") – theology, law and
medicine – as well as from other "higher sciences" ("höhere Wissenschaften"), such as
mathematics and physics.11 Positively, the "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences")
could be described as aesthetic disciplines, that is, disciplines in which beauty of form
plays an essential role: poetry, architecture, painting, music, dance, etc.12

▲5

Within educational contexts, the "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") usually

referred only to literary genres: poetry, oratory, historiography and, to a lesser extent,
philosophy.13 As the classical Greeks and Romans were widely considered to have
brought these literary genres to matchless heights the "fine sciences" were often equated
with classical literature, which took pride of place in classical Gymnasium education as
well as at the philosophical faculties of the universities.14 Apart from classical literature
itself, however, the "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") also comprised
disciplines that were needed for a full understanding and appreciation of classical texts,
such as history, mythology, antiquities and geography.15 Although in these ancillary
disciplines, beauty itself did not play a central role, they could be grouped amongst the
"fine sciences" because they ultimately contributed to the understanding and
appreciation of beautiful, classical literature. As far as education was concerned, then,
the term "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") took on a meaning very similar to
that of classical studies. It comprised both the literary texts that formed the main subject
of classical education and the ancillary disciplines needed to explain them.16

▲6

From the concept of "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") we can learn that
classical literature was considered of essential importance to education because it
excelled in beauty, or, more precisely, in perfect form.17 As Johann Gottfried Herder
(1744–1803) explained in an essay on the relation between the "schöne" and the
"höhere Wissenschaften" ("fine" and "higher sciences"), beauty was of fundamental
importance to humane education as the "sensory faculties" of the human mind must be
cultivated before the more abstract, intellectual faculties.18 Children could best study
beauty, he argued, because beauty was a concrete phenomenon that could be taught by
means of "easy rules and good examples". Thus, an intensive training in perfect form
was dictated by the "nature and order of the human soul".19

▲7
Yet, although beauty was classical education's central point of focus, it was by no
means its only objective. Like most classical school teachers of his time Herder
believed that beauty was intimately connected to virtue and truth. Once having acquired
"accuracy" and "precision" by the intensive study of perfect form, he argued, children
could reasonably be expected to translate these virtues into moral behaviour.20
Moreover, as "beauty is just the outer shape of truth", the intensive study of beauty
would have an immediate effect on children's sense of veracity. Herder adhered to the
widespread view that "everything beautiful can only lead to the true and the good".21 In
his view, the ultimate purpose of classical education was to imprint upon the youthful
soul "the eternal, inviolable rule of the true, the good and the beautiful".22

▲8

Herder's appeal to this "Platonic triad" is of crucial importance to understand the

relation between "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") and Bildung (education). In
Herder's view, the "fine sciences" were indispensable to cultivating the three properties
that above all make a human being a human being: the sense of beauty, the sense of
virtue and the sense of truth. As these properties are pre-eminently human, Herder
described the "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") as "sciences and exercises that
cultivate [our] sense of humanity (Humanität)".23 To him, the "fine sciences" belonged
to the age-old tradition of humane learning that had been passed down from classical
antiquity and the Renaissance. "The ancients", he wrote, "called the schöne
Wissenschaften artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, ad humanitatem informant, that
is, sciences, which make us human, which educate (bilden) us to human beings. For that
reason it is ... best to call them 'educational sciences' (bildende Wissenschaften)".24

▲9

For our present investigation it is of central importance that underlying the late 18th-
century ideal of Bildung (education) with its focus on the beautiful, the good and the
true, was a concept of science that did not exclude values. On the contrary, the very
term "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") testifies to the fact that values were
seen, not just as involved in a substantial number of sciences, but as their central point
of focus. The element "Wissenschaft" ("science") in "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine
sciences") denoted a certain disposition: both the knowledge of the rules that must be
observed to produce something beautiful and the capacity to put this knowledge into
practice.25 Poetry, for example, was seen both as the science (knowledge) of the rules
that must be applied to compose a beautiful poem and as the capacity to write such a
poem.26 In the late 18th century, beauty, far from being dispelled to the realm of
subjective judgment, was seen as a worthy object of scientific knowledge. Although it
was generally agreed that knowledge of the beautiful could not lay claim to the same
degree of certainty as the higher sciences,27 it was nevertheless recognised as a science
in its own right.28

▲10

At an institutional level, the concept of "schöne" or "bildende Wissenschaften" ("fine"

and "higher sciences") was reflected in the traditional preponderance of classical
literature both at the Latin schools and at the philosophical faculties, i.e., in institutions
for general (non-vocational) education. Bildung (education), far from being associated
with the "totality" of human knowledge, was believed to be attainable only by studying
those scientific disciplines in which humane values played a central role. Only after the
acquisition of Bildung (education) one would continue to the "higher" or "faculty
sciences", to which no specific educational value was assigned. This firm distinction
between the "schöne" and the "höhere Wissenschaften" ("fine" and "higher sciences")
would only be shaken when under the influence of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804) values were gradually discredited as a suitable object of scientific
knowledge.

▲11

The Kantian turn

With his Critique of Judgment (1790), Immanuel Kant launched a trenchant and
seminally influential critique on the concept of "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine
sciences"), which he considered an "absurdity" ("Unding"). He was convinced that there
was "neither a science of the beautiful, but only a critique [of the beautiful], nor schöne
Wissenschaft, but only schöne Kunst".29 Kant's critique sprang from an attempt to
narrow down and solidify the concept of science, which up to then had been used in a
variety of meanings. Although Kant did not yet develop a consistent concept of science
himself, he insisted that true science deal exclusively with knowledge that was
obtainable by the application of strict methods and therefore determinable with
complete certainty. "True science", he wrote, is "only that [science], whose certainty is
apodictic".30 Thus, if the concept of "schöne Wissenschaft" ("fine sciences") would be
viable,

▲12
it should be possible to establish in a scientific way (wissenschaftlich), that is, by means
of arguments (Beweisgründe), whether something should be considered beautiful or not;
therefore, the judgment on the beautiful, if it were to be attributed to science, would not
be a judgment of taste31

which, to Kant, was "not to be determined by arguments at all".32 To Kant, however, it

was a judgment of taste, as there seemed to be no objective concepts on the basis of
which it could be decided why certain things are considered beautiful whereas others
are not.33

▲13

This "subjectification" of aesthetics by Kant was of profound influence on the

philosophical way of reflecting on science.34 After Kant, the concept of "fine sciences"
declined rapidly. As early as 1801, August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845) called the
expression "almost obsolete".35 A few years later, Hegel wrote that the term "schöne
Wissenschaft" ("fine sciences") was no longer in use.36 Meanwhile, the ideal of rigorous
science experienced a spectacular upsurge. A.W. Schlegel wrote that "all science is
rigorous by nature; the appearance of play and freedom, which plays an essential role
with everything beautiful, is entirely excluded [from science]".37 In his
Geschmackslehre oder Ästhetik (1818), the philosopher Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–
1842) wrote: "Art we call 'fine' inasmuch as it is concerned with production or
presentation of the aesthetically-pleasing; science is never concerned with that, but only
with the production, or rather the discovery of truth."38 By this dissociation between
science and art, realised in the wake of the Kantian turn, a wedge was driven between
the elements of knowledge and values, which for long had been successfully combined
in the concept of "fine sciences".

▲14

This paradigm shift in the philosophical way of reflecting on science deeply influenced
ideas on humane education (Bildung). The widespread study of classical literature , with
its major focus on aesthetic and ethical values, was increasingly at risk of not being
acknowledged as a true science and therefore of being discarded as frivolous.39
Therefore, defenders of classical education endeavoured to transform classical studies in
such a way as to make it meet the new demands of science . Aiming to reduce the
traditional focus on aesthetic and other humane values, they highlighted that aspect of
classical studies which was the most strictly methodical and therefore best fitted the
Kantian view: philology.

▲15

Classical philology as "pure science": Friedrich

August Wolf
From the 1790s onwards, a group of leading academic philologists undertook to apply
the changing demands of science to classical philology. The central aim of these
scholars was to conceive of classical philology as a clearly ordered system of
knowledge in which interdependent subdisciplines were all assigned their proper place
and task.40 The most famous and influential of these attempts was made by Friedrich
August Wolf (1759–1824) in his Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft (1807).41
With this work, Wolf aimed to "elevate everything that belonged to the full knowledge
of ... antiquity to the value of a well-ordered philosophical-historical science".42 His aim
was to produce an

▲16
encyclopaedia of philology in which, after the entire circle of ... subjects covered by
ancient literature would have been passed through, the scope, the content, the [mutual]
linkages, the utility, the tools [and] finally the correct and fruitful treatment of each one
of the individual disciplines [were] explained.43

Wolf's aim to transform the study of antiquity into a systematically ordered whole
showed the influence of Immanuel Kant, who wrote that "each doctrine (Lehre) is called
science (Wissenschaft) when it is a whole of knowledge that is ordered according to
principles".44

▲17

In Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft, Wolf gave substance to this objective by

subdividing classical studies into 24 subdisciplines, ranging from "fundamental"
disciplines (grammar, hermeneutics and criticism), to specialist ones such as mythology,
numismatics and epigraphy.45 Because he emphatically wanted these interdependent
disciplines to form a systematic whole, he chose to denote the study of antiquity by a
name that was expressive of the intended order: "Alterthumswissenschaft" (antiquity
studies).46 His quest for conceptual clarity was accompanied by a quest for solid, certain
knowledge. Wolf expected the knowledge yielded by a properly operated science of
antiquity to possess a degree of certainty that would "often not be less" than that yielded
by "the mathematical calculus".47 He clearly modelled his concept of
"Alterthumswissenschaft" (science of antiquity) on the example provided by what he
called the "exact" or "more precise" ("genauere") sciences.48 Also in this respect, Wolf's
concept of science closely resembled that of Immanuel Kant, a resemblance that earned
him the reputation of being the "Kant of philology".49

▲18

As order and coherence were amongst Wolf's main concerns, he was highly critical of
the conceptual obscurity that characterised classical studies up to his day. He strongly
disapproved of the fact that the various subdisciplines of the study of antiquity were
plagued by "fluctuating boundaries and an indeterminate scope".50 Therefore, right at
the beginning of his treatise, he expressed his discomfort with the conceptual and
terminological confusion surrounding classical learning. Above all, the term "schöne
Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") aroused his disapproval, which he described as
"wholly unsuitable" to capture the nature of classical studies. Antiquity, Wolf argued,
had various "sides that plainly attract by everything else than by beauté".51 To Wolf, the
ultimate objective of the true scholar of antiquity (Alterthumsgelehrte) was not to value
the quality of perfect form, but "to raise one's view to the purely-scientific" ("dem rein
Wissenschaftlichen").52

▲19

Nothing illustrates with more clarity the shift in thinking about classical studies than
Wolf's attempt to replace the concept of "fine sciences" by a new concept of "pure
science". "It would be to adversely narrow down the scope of classical studies," he
wrote,

▲20
if, as happens ... by most people studying the ancient works of art, one would highlight
with false disgust only the classical and the beautiful, leaving everything else to the so-
called antiquity-mongers.53

Wolf complemented the traditional, exemplary perspective on the ancient world with a
historical perspective, which he even considered superior to the traditional view:

▲21
The point of view focusing on the classicality (Classizität) of individual writers and
works of their kind should prevail less in the true expert on antiquity than the purely
historical [perspective].54

In Wolf's view, the primary aim of classical studies was no longer to appreciate classical
texts for their exemplary qualities, but to gain "historical and philosophical knowledge,
by which we can get to know the nations of the ancient world ... in all possible respects
through their remaining works".55
▲22

Bildung transformed: classical philology as an

educational science
The transformation of classical philology initiated by Friedrich August Wolf posed a
major challenge to the late 18th-century ideal of humane education (Bildung). As the
concept of "schöne Wissenschaften" ("fine sciences") was discredited by the Kantian
turn, educationalists faced increasing difficulties in justifying the traditional focus on
classical literature as a storehouse of humane values. Yet, Wolf, like most contemporary
academic philologists, did not himself consider scientific philology and humane values
to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, Wolf explicitly motivated his transformation
of classical studies in normative terms. It was because he considered classical antiquity
a world of rare significance and beauty that he recommended it as an excellent object of
scientific study. In the introduction to Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft, Wolf
celebrated antiquity as "the inner sanctum of the ... arts of the Muses", harbouring the
"eternal sources of beauty".56 Yet, Wolf departed from tradition by giving up on the idea
that beauty can only be found in concretely demonstrable and imitable aesthetic
exempla. Wolf was amongst the first philologists to conceive of the classical world at
large as a beautifully structured work of art. Seeing antiquity as an "organic unity"
("organisches Ganze") and an "animated whole" ("belebtes Ganze"), Wolf held that the
"mediocrity" of many remains of the ancient world "still had a nobler stamp than
modern mediocrity", as all remnants of the ancient world were infused by a sacred
"spirit that unite[d] everything individual to a harmonious whole".57 This concept of
classical antiquity as an organically structured unity in which all individual components
have a proper and meaningful place was widely shared amongst contemporary academic
philologists.58

▲23

This early 19th-century concept of classical antiquity as a beautifully structured unity is

of essential importance to understand why the concept of rigorous science was
integrated into the ideal of classical education. In Friedrich August Wolf's view, getting
sight of the "organic unity" underlying the ancient Greek and Roman world would only
be possible by subjecting this world to conscientious methodical research. Only a
Wissenschaft (science) that would explore all aspects of antiquity in detail and
conjunction would be able to fully expose its beautiful "inner coherence". By
transforming classical studies, Wolf aimed to create a science of antiquity that was as
harmoniously organised as antiquity itself. Yet, Wolf left not the slightest doubt that the
ultimate purpose of unravelling antiquity's inner coherence was to see its beauty and
value. Scientific philology would ultimately generate an inspirational "Epoptie"
("epopty") of "ancient humankind itself", an uplifting "vision of the sacred".59 And it
was precisely this nearly mystical vision that granted scientific philology its humane
educational value. It was because it confronted people with an edifying "image of a
more divine humanity"60 that "Altertumswissenschaft" ("science of antiquity")
contributed more "perfectly" than any other science to "the harmonious development of
the [human] mind".61

▲24
Wolf's transformation of the ideal of classical education testifies to the implementation
of the novel, Humboldtian concept of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific
education") in classical philology.62 Just as Humboldt expected research into the
harmonious totality of human knowledge to bestow "wahre Bildung" ("true science")
upon the human mind, Wolf believed the philologist's mind to be harmoniously
educated, not by studying concrete exempla of the beautiful, the true and the good, but
by exploring the organic unity underlying the classical world at large. It was this
abstraction of the ideal of humane education from its traditional connection to
concretely demonstrable and imitable values that created a new standard of reflection on
the relation between Wissenschaft and Bildung (science and education). After Wolf's
implementation of the concept of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") in
classical philology, educational value was no longer the prerogative of the humane
sciences, but could be claimed by each scientific discipline that aimed to unveil a part of
the harmonious totality of human knowledge. Thus the path was cleared for many more
sciences than ever before to gradually enter the canon of the educational sciences .

▲25

The educational value of the natural sciences

From the 1820s onwards, the educational value of the natural sciences began to be
defended in a fashion that would have been unthinkable without the Wolfian model.
Karl von Raumer (1783–1865) , a well-known geologist, deduced the educational value
of his discipline from the geologist's task to uncover the mathematical structure
underlying geological formations by means of rigorous science.63 Geology had recently
acquired the status of a true "science" when it was discovered that geological structures
obey a "comprehensive, strict, mathematical law", so that "what previously was based
only on empirical measurements, ... acquired rigorous, scientific certainty".64 It was
precisely this mathematical, scientifically researchable order that granted geology a
claim to humane education. For this order, being of an unmistakable, magnificent
beauty, pointed to a higher, non-material reality. The "admirable, beautiful ...
mathematical ratio" that was "revealed" in geological formations, Raumer wrote, would
make students wonder at the "unfathomable depths of God's wisdom".65 By
scientifically exposing the systematic order underlying geological formations, students
would develop a sense for the beauty and magnificence of the creative order.66

▲26

Moritz Drobisch (1802–1896) , professor of mathematics and philosophy at the

University of Leipzig, welcomed the recent exposure of the "mathematical fundament"
of many sciences, as it put students in the position to "awe at the teleological coherence"
and "recognise a superhuman, ordering wisdom whose purposes ... [they] will gradually
understand".67 Astronomy could justly lay claim to humane educational value because

▲27
the harmonious order, in which the celestial bodies describe their orbits, the eternally
consistent regularity, touches a deep sounding string within us and elevates us – far
from just letting the dead mechanism of chance unwind before us – to the notion of the
supreme wise being.68
By directing the student's attention towards a spiritual reality behind the world of
nature, astronomy could impossibly be denied "a powerful moral and religious
influence".69

▲28

Also mathematics was increasingly praised for its humane educational potential.
According to the philosopher and theologian Moritz Erdmann Engel (1767–1836) , the
"indisputable certainty" of mathematical knowledge would have a moralising influence
on human beings.70 Mathematical structures are "instructive and delightful creations"
("belehrende und entzückende Schöpfungen") that point to "an invisible realm of
spiritual and emotional refinement".71 Therefore, mathematics "like no other science"
fulfilled humane education's task to bring people closer to "the realm of morality".72

▲29

In the early 19th century, scholars from widely different disciplines subscribed to the
idea that the systematic structure underlying the various fields of human knowledge
pointed to a higher, spiritual reality. Much like Wolf, who expected the positive results
of scientific philology to yield a mystical vision of "ancient humankind itself", natural
scientists believed that the exposure of nature's mathematical foundations would
generate insight into the splendour and greatness of creation.73 This widespread belief
that by means of rigorous science one could get insight into the spiritual world
underlying the various fields of human knowledge was of essential importance to early
19th-century ideas on the educational value of science. Precisely the combination of
"the marvellous and the scientifically exact" lay at the heart of the early 19th-century
concept of scientific education.74

▲30

The institutional impact of the German concept of

scientific education
The institutional impact of the above described ideal of scientific education can be
measured by a number of reorganisations affecting the philosophical faculties of most
19th-century German universities. Firstly, as the ideal of "wissenschaftliche Bildung"
("scientific education") was based on the concept of the totality and unity of human
knowledge, the philosophical faculties began to develop curricula of encyclopaedic
breadth that included both the humanities and the natural sciences. In order to achieve
this, they integrated numerous disciplines that had previously been accommodated
elsewhere, for example botany, zoology, mineralogy and chemistry, which traditionally
had the status of ancillary disciplines at the medical faculty.75 The first university to
adopt this integration was that of Berlin, followed by other ones such as Munich (re-
founded in 1826), Giessen, Kiel, Göttingen and Heidelberg.76 The unity of the
philosophical faculty and of science in general was also expressed by the
standardisation of the doctorate of philosophy as the highest degree in both arts and
sciences, a circumstance that persists to the present day (see "dr." sc. "doctor
philosophiae," = "PhD" or "DPhil").77
▲31

Secondly, as the concept of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") was

intrinsically bound up with an ideal of scientific research, the philosophical faculties
considered it their specific task, not only to provide general education, but also to
expand the existing body of human knowledge.78 The integration of teaching (Lehre)
and research (Forschung) was most obvious at the seminars (Seminare), institutes
(Institute) and laboratoria that were founded in great number at the philosophical
faculties of most German universities. Here students were given the opportunity to
acquire scientific education by actively partaking in advanced, inquiry-based learning
under the guidance of a scientific specialist.79 Despite the ongoing process of
specialisation and disciplinary differentiation that these institutions put in motion, the
unity of science was given central importance for a very long time.80 Firstly, many
seminars were initially led by a collective directorate, which gave expression to the
unity of the disciplines that were taught.81 Secondly, until the last third of the 19th
century, the natural sciences received little autonomous funding, which indicates that
they were conceptualised as part of a broader curriculum of general education, rather
than being judged on their own merits. Thirdly, well into the late 19th century, it was
common for German scholars to justify scientific research by stressing its educational
potential. Specialisation within a small subdiscipline was widely considered suitable to
harmoniously educate the mind because the systematic structure underlying the various
subfields of human knowledge reflected the overall structure of the whole.82

▲32

Thirdly, the influence of the new ideal of scientific education is testified by the fact that
at most universities, the philosophical faculty lost its traditional status of subordination
to the other faculties. Studying at the philosophical faculty was no longer seen as a way
of gathering preparatory knowledge required for entering the higher, professional
faculties, but, on the contrary, as the pre-eminent formative stage of the development of
a true scientist (Wissenschaftler).83 Nearly everywhere in Germany, the philosophical
faculties were conceptualised as embodying the "fullness" of science for a very long
time. Only when mathematical and natural-scientific faculties began to emancipate
themselves in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the philosophical faculties
gradually gave up their claim of being the pre-eminent faculties to provide students with
scientific education.84

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Scientific education abroad

The 19th-century German ideal of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education")
was also a major influence outside of Germany. Although a German "model" was not
known as such, many European countries copied various aspects of the German
university system that closely related to the German concept of scientific education.85 In
1837, five years after Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire, the University
of Athens was founded along the lines of the model provided by the University of
Berlin. The first official regulation of studies, put into effect on April 26th 1837, was
prepared by Christian August Brandis (1790–1867) , a German professor of philosophy
who worked as a consultant for the young Bavarian King Otto I (1815–1867) , who
ascended the Greek throne in 1832. In accordance with the Prussian model, Brandis
accommodated the natural sciences at the philosophical faculty, against earlier
proposals to equip them with a faculty of their own. Apart from thus making the
philosophical faculty represent the "unity of science", he also successfully introduced
the typically German institution of "outside lecturers" (Privatdozenten): privately paid
university teachers who distinguished themselves by scientific research and thus
contributed to spreading an integrative concept of Forschung and Lehre (research and
teaching).86

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Russian 19th-century university foundations and reforms also took place along the lines
of German models, most notably that of Göttingen and Berlin. The foundation and
refoundation of six universities under Alexander I (1777–1825) in 1802 to 1804 –
Dorpat, Kazan, Moscow, Vilnius, Kharkov and St. Petersburg – led to the establishment
of a three-year curriculum of general scientific education that preceded higher,
professional training. At nearly all of them, numerous eminent German scholars were
employed, whose academic status helped spread the German ideal of science and
research. These German-inspired achievements were remarkably preserved during
subsequent university reforms (in 1835 and 1863), despite the significant political
changes brought by time.87

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In the Low Countries, German influence was most noticeable in the last quarter of the
19th century. In 1876, the Dutch parliament justified a decision to preserve theology's
position at the state's universities – against proposals to remove it from them in view of
the radical separation of church and state prescribed by the Constitution of 1848 – by
appealing to the celebrated German principle of the unity of science, which was even
called "sacred" in one of the parliamentary debates. Moreover, the first article of the
1876 Law on Higher Education mentioned scientific research as one the university's
central tasks, whereas before, universities were primarily seen as teaching institutions.
Comparable developments took place in Belgium from the 1890s onwards, with
German universities serving as examples.88

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In Romanic countries, the influence of German ideas on scientific education was

considerably smaller. Since the French Revolution , the French system of higher
education was in many ways diametrically opposed to that of Germany.89 The idea of
the "unity of science" could hardly take root in a country that had abolished the
universities (i.e. as overarching corps de facultés) in 1793 to make way for
independently operating, specialised faculties for vocational training. Secondly, in the
French faculties of letters, as in that of most other Romanic countries, a traditional,
humanistic approach remained dominant throughout the 19th century. This approach
centred not on the ideal of rigorous science, but on elegant, empathetic text explanation
intended for a wide audience.90 Thirdly, research in France for long remained the
specialty of specific institutions, such as the Collège de France, the Musée d'Histoire
Naturelle, and above all the famous École Pratique des Hautes Études, founded in 1863
by minister of education Victor Duruy (1811–1894) . The sharp separation between
faculty education on the one hand and scientific research on the other proves that the
typically German integration of teaching and research did hardly materialise in France.

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Despite its limited institutional influence, however, German science and the German
university played a central role in French debates on higher education in the second half
of the 19th century. Firstly, leading educational reformers such as Victor Duruy, Gaston
Paris (1839–1903) and Michel Bréal (1832–1915) were profoundly influenced by
German ideas about university education. Duruy for example encouraged young
academics to study in Germany or to examine German educational institutions. Most of
these academics agreed that German science was superior to French science and that
German universities widely surpassed the French faculties.91 Secondly, the German
concept of rigorous science exerted a strong influence, not only on the French natural
sciences but also on the humanities, which were gradually professionalised by the
foundation of scientific journals.92 In the century's last decades, ever more French
educationalists became convinced that the task of the university was not only education
but also scientific research.93 Even though the German university model was not
concretely incorporated into the French system of higher education, then, German ideas
about science and scientific education nevertheless succeeded in informing the French
debates on higher education to a remarkable extent.

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Of all European countries, England was probably most immune to German influences.
Throughout the 19th century, the universities of Oxford and Cambridge were mostly
attended by students from the upper middle class, gentry and nobility, who saw a
classical education as part of their gentlemanly upbringing and who harboured little
interest in the novel German ideal of rigorous science. Moreover, in England, the
concept of "science" never took on the comprehensive and pretentious meaning that the
term "Wissenschaft" obtained in Germany. Furthermore, state-directed, centralised
reforms such as took place in Germany could hardly be implemented in a country like
England where universities and colleges were still autonomous corporations that were
largely independent from ministerial bureaucracy. Nonetheless, German specialised
research and education enjoyed a positive reputation in England in the late 19th century.
The foundation of technical colleges and the promotion of subsidised research was often
legitimised with reference to German examples. The influence of a specific "model" of
science or of scientific education, however, can hardly be observed.94

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The conflict between science and education

Despite the profound influence that the new ideal of "wissenschaftliche Bildung"
("scientific education") exercised both in and outside of Germany, it would not
withstand the test of time. The major disciplinary differentiation and specialisation that
began at most German universities from the Vormärz period onwards, put severe
pressure on the original ideal of the "unity of science" as well as on the closely related
idea of the moral and educational value of scientific research. This pressure would be
only increased by the final institutional subdivision of the philosophical faculty into
independent smaller faculties from the late 19th century onwards. In the 20th century, of
the three constitutive characteristics of the German ideal of scientific education – which
have been discussed in the introduction – only the research ideal remained. This was a
highly ironical fact, as the concept of the unity and the educational value of science had
initially played a key role in legitimising the accommodation of research at the
university. The founders of the "Wissenschaftsideologie" ("ideology of science")
believed in the educational potential of scientific research because they considered it
ideally suited to educate the human mind in conformity with the unity of knowledge. In
the course of the 19th century, however, the proliferation of scientific research created a
degree of differentiation and specialisation that proved ever harder to reconcile with the
educational ideal endorsed by the research ideal's early advocates. At the turn of the
20th century it had become clear that the German ideal of scientific education had
created the very conditions of its own decline.95

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This paradoxical development is best explained by comparing the ideal of

"wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") with the traditional, classical ideal
of humane education. Prior to the 19th century, the humane value of education was
usually searched for at a very concrete level. The classical texts that formed the primary
focus of the schöne or bildende Wissenschaften ("fine sciences") were full of aesthetic
and moral exempla that students were encouraged to study and imitate. As the ideal of
humane education was abstracted from this traditional connection to demonstrable
exempla, this concreteness could no longer be maintained. The beautiful "organic unity"
that Friedrich August Wolf aimed to get sight of by the scientific study of antiquity
could not be concretely exposed, explained or imitated, but only be sensed. Although
Wolf considered this unified view the ultimate outcome of scientific philology, it could
not itself be analysed in scientific terms.96 It is not coincidental that Wolf described
scientific philology in terms of an initiation into a mystery that would finally yield a
sacred "vision" of ancient humankind. He was sharply aware of the tense relation
between his concept of rigorous science and the spiritual insight that it was supposed to
evoke.97

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This same tension was felt in the natural sciences. For although it could well be
assumed that the scientific study of geology, astronomy or mathematics would imbue
students with reverence for the majestic beauty of the creative order, this beauty was
fundamentally beyond grasp of the scientific apparatus that should effectuate its
appreciation. Beauty or divine wisdom might well be believed to underlie the eternal
laws of nature, but they could not possibly be explained or analysed in scientific terms.

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In the course of the 19th century, the idea of "organic unity" that was assumed to
underlie human knowledge was abstracted to such an extent that its relationship with the
practice of education in the end became almost completely obscure.98 Already in the
early 19th century, the fundamental gap between the modern concept of science and the
humane values to which it laid claim was widely recognised, not only by people who
contested the novel ideal of rigorous science but also, tellingly, by scholars who
advocated it.99 Friedrich August Wolf was acutely aware that to average students,
"much of the material from the encyclopaedia of knowledge designed here" (i.e., in his
Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft) was "not more useful to the cultivation of
humane Bildung than our admirable exact sciences".100 Realising that the mystical
vision of "ancient humankind itself" would only be accessible to a handful of initiates,
he maintained that "propaedeutic education ... for literary careers" should be confined to
the traditional humanistic curriculum, which aimed at the acquisition of "knowledge of
... beautiful and classical works".101 Advocates of natural science education also often
showed themselves aware of the frequent inability of the natural sciences to realise their
humanistic claims. August Spilleke (1778–1841) , one of Germany's foremost advocates
of education in the natural sciences, acknowledged the danger that by this type of
education pupils would entirely lose sight of the spiritual world.102 Karl Scheibert
(1803–1898) , a particularly inspired defender of science education, acknowledged that
civil servants (Staatsbeamte), who had gone through the humanistic curriculum at the
classical Gymnasium had "a position much more ideal, more pure and more secured
against egoism than the höhere Bürgerstand" which had enjoyed science education at
the höhere Bürgerschule (secondary school).103 August Beger (1802–1859) , director of
a secondary school in Dresden-Neustadt, even considered it the task of science
education to counterbalance its natural "practical tendency" by the "power of ideas and
ideals".104 Even its staunchest defenders, then, acknowledged that the rigorous sciences,
by the absence of a direct correspondence between their subject matter and the humane
values to which they laid claim, were inherently at risk of failing on their humanistic
objectives.

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As a result of this inherent problem, in the course of the 19th century the gap between
the positive results of rigorous science and its humanistic motivation gradually
deepened. Eventually, it would become so wide as to compel many scholars to give up
on the humanistic ideal of education and to replace it by a novel ideal of "objective"
science. Within classical philology, this step would be taken by Ulrich von
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848–1931) , who expressly aimed to altogether abandon
the traditional, exemplary perspective on the ancient world and replace it by a concept
of pure, self-contained Wissenschaft (science).105 Outside of classical philology, one of
the first scientists to adopt a patently hostile attitude towards the classical ideal of
humane education was the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838–
1916) . Not seeing the point of "sacrificing a decennium" of one's life to "studying the
ancient models", Mach promoted an ideal of "objective" science: in his view, future
scholars should not aim to cultivate their taste and other values, but to learn "to simply
present the facts and the truth unconcealed".106

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For our argument it is crucial to understand that the final abandonment of the classical
ideal of humane education in the late 19th century and early 20th century – an
abandonment that is observable throughout Europe – was the ultimate result of its early
19th-century transformation. As we have seen, the novel concept of "wissenschaftliche
Bildung" ("scientific education") did initially not curtail, but broaden the ideal of
humane education. As humane studies were separated from their traditional relation to
concretely demonstrable exempla, more sciences than ever before could lay claim to
humane values. Eventually, however, this separation turned out to thwart the very
humanistic purpose that it was supposed to serve. The gap between the positive results
of rigorous science and its humanistic objectives finally grew so wide as to compel
many scientists to stop believing in their connection. Contrary to its initial tendency,
then, the concept of "wissenschaftliche Bildung" ("scientific education") turned out not
to invigorate, but to challenge the ideal of humane education.

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Conclusion
In our time, the tension between the concept of rigorous science on the one hand and the
ideal of humane education on the other is still widely felt. In more than one way, the
crisis in the modern humanities is heir to the conflict between science and education that
originated in the 19th century. The legitimacy of the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften)
is nowadays widely questioned because it is often insufficiently clear whether and how
the humane values to which they lay claim materialise in practice. One of the
difficulties scholars face in explaining this is that their concept of science does not
allow them to recognise humane values as anything more than a desirable side effect of
scientific practice. As most modern scholars adhere to the post-Kantian view that there
can be no true "science" of values, they are a priori unable to acknowledge the study
and transmission of values as one of the humanities' core tasks. Yet as we have seen, the
Kantian view of the mutual exclusivity of values and science has anything but intrinsic
validity. For many centuries before Kant, scholars did not only look upon values as a
worthy object of scientific knowledge, but considered their cultivation and transmission
the primary duty of the humane sciences. One way to positively inform the debate on
the modern humanities might therefore be to reconnect the concept of "Bildung"
(education) to its pre-19th-century roots. By re-establishing more direct relations
between their humanistic objectives and the actual content of their work scholars might
become more successful in parrying the critique that the modern humanities have lost
sight of their true objectives.

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