Volume 3, Issue 11, November – 2018 International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology

ISSN No:-2456-2165

Fuzzy Model for Solving Stag Hunt Game with Two

Decision – Maker
S. A. Sahathana Thasneem B.Kalaiselvi
Research Scholar in Mathematics Associate Professor in Mathematics
Sri G.V.G Visalakshi College for Women Sri G.V.G Visalakshi College for Women
Udumalpet Udumalpet
Abstract:- In game theory the players deals with a membership function are used to represent the player’s degree
decision – making situation with conflicting objectives. In of satisfaction.
the case of disagreement and doubtfulness the fuzzy II. STAG HUNT
approach is more effective and conducive. The generally
known stag hunt game which portrays the combat between Jean – Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which
safety and social cooperation is solved using a fuzzy two persons go out for hunting. Each can independently
approach. choose to hunt a stag or hunt a rabbit. Each player must take
an action without knowing the preference of the other. If a
Keywords:- fuzzy set, decision making , membership function person hunts a stag, they must have the association with the
, stag hunt. other in order to succeed. An individual put up a rabbit
himself, but a rabbit is valueless than a stag. This is useful
I. INTRODUCTION correspondence for social cooperation, such as international
A game is defined by a common situation in which two agreements and climate change. Another names for it or its
or more contestants are involved in decision making variants include “assurance game”, “coordination game” and
movement in expectation of certain result over a duration of “trust dilemma”. Every player must choose an action without
time which is considered in The theory of Games and conscious about the choice of the other. The stag hunt vary
Economic Behavior[9] by von Neumann and Mongenstern and from the prisoner’s dilemma in that there are two pure strategy
its concepts discussed in Fun and Games, A text on game nash equilibria : while both players cooperate and both of the
theory[2] done by K.Binmore. A set of moves a player will players defect. In the stag hunt, in spite of the fact that both
follow in a given game are described as strategies which must players cooperating is pareto efficient, the only pure Nash
be complete, defining an action in every possibility and each equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. The general
player has an non trivial set of strategies and he chooses form of stag hunt game is
among them. While facing the conflicting objectives the
P2’s strategies
players are likely to maximize his own outcome and maximize
/ minimize his opponents payoff. He may either cooperate or
non cooperate with the opponent. In some situations the game Stag Rabbit
may have uncertain values to the objective functions. The
vagueness is due to the unknown decisions of the P1’s Stag (Q,Q) (R,S)
opponents[4]. Also the real life situations may contain Strategies
imprecision that cannot be expressed efficiently in crisp Rabbit (S,R) (T,T)
numbers[7][8]. Using the concept of fuzzy game is the way to
deal with these situations related to the payoff functions. In Table 1
contrariety to conventional logic prof L.A. Zadeh initiated a with the condition 𝑄 > 𝑆 ≥ 𝑇 > 𝑅 where Q, R, S and T are
fuzzy logic[10] and the Applications of fuzzy sets[11] by H.J. the payoffs for player 1 and player 2. Given in the example
Zimmermann. Instead of using the classical Boolean {0,1}
values, the degree of an element in certain group is mapped
P2’s strategies
by fuzzy sets between [0,1]. In a conflicting situation the
intellectual and social characteristics of the opponent are taken
Stag Rabbit
into consideration. Since such things are complicated in
classical game theory methods such as minmax, maxmin and
P1’s Stag (2,2) (0,1)
dominance. A 2 × 2 strategic games was solved by using a
Strategies
fuzzy procedure[6] by Song and Kandel and the prisoner’s
dilemma game was solved with this approach[3] by Mubarak. Rabbit (1,0) (1,1)
S. a triangular membership function and a conditional
Table 2

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Volume 3, Issue 11, November – 2018 International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology
ISSN No:-2456-2165
III. PRELIMINARIE For player 1 with two targets
′ (𝑃 ) ′
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = 𝑊1 . 𝜇11 1 + 𝑊2 . 𝜇12 (𝑃1 ) (6)
The fuzzy set theory is used to frame a model that will The optimal strategy for player1 is 𝑃1∗ is defined as
overcome the short comings of classical game model.Let 𝑛
𝑝𝑖 𝑛𝑖
′ (𝑃 )
𝑆𝑖 = { ≥ 0 ∑ 𝑝1𝑗 = 1} (1) 𝜇(𝑃1∗ ) = max (∑ 𝑊𝑗 . 𝜇1𝑗 1 )
𝑃1
𝑝𝑖𝑗 𝑘=1 𝑗=1
be the strategy set of player i. Tij is the function represents the here for player 1’s two goals
jth target for the player I which measures the fulfillment of the 2
jth goal for the player. Each target function is a function of (P1, ′
𝜇(𝑃1∗ ) = max (∑ 𝑊𝑗 . 𝜇1𝑗 (𝑃1 )) (7)
P2,……. Pj,….PL) where L is the players set, Each other 𝑃1
𝑗=1
player’s reaction affects the player’s outcome. Player1
construct a conditional fuzzy set 𝐴1𝑗 in S1, corresponds to the IV. FUZZY MODEL TO STAG HUNT’S GENERAL
goal T1j. On the state that the strategies of other players are FORM
𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑗 , 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐼. The membership function of 𝐴1𝑗 is
denoted as Let the payoff table of the game be
𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )
𝜇𝐴1𝑗 = 𝜇1𝑗 ( ) (2)
𝑃2
P2’s Strategies
which is used to maximize player1’s j goal.
th

player1’s first target is to maximize his payoff, C N

The Membership function is (r,s)
𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 P1’s C (q,q)
𝜇1𝑗 (𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) ⁄𝑃2 ) = (3) Strategies
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
max,min are maximum and minimum estimate of the objective N (s,r) (t,t)
function.The objective function has a finite range. If the goal
is to minimize a value, the membership function is, Table 3
𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜇1𝑗 (𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) ⁄𝑃2 ) = (4) The four parameters q ,r ,s ,t should satisfy 𝑞 > 𝑠 ≥ 𝑡 > 𝑟> .
𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 The strategy combination for player 1 is (P1, 1-P1) and for
If 𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥, then 𝜇1𝑗 (𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ) = 0,
player 2 is (P2 ,1-P2 ).
If 𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛, then 𝜇1𝑗 (𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ) = 1 Assuming the triangular membership function for player 1 as
2𝑃2 , 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1
The fuzzy set 𝐴1 has the possible strategies 𝑆2 × 𝑆3 × 𝜇1 (𝑃2 ) = {
−2𝑃2 + 2, 𝑖𝑓 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1
… … … … . 𝑆𝐼 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃2 . If there are two players in the game the
membership function of 𝐴1 is In the first case the player 1 will maximize his own payoff and
2𝑃 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 minimize player2’s payoff, from
𝜇1 (𝑃2 ) = { 2
−2𝑃2 + 2 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃2 (𝑞. 𝑃1 − 𝑟. 𝑃1 + 𝑠 − 𝑠𝑃1 − 𝑡 + 𝑡𝑃1 )
+𝑃1 . 𝑟 + 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑃1
To find the optimum strategy for player 1, constructing an
unconditional fuzzy set 𝐴′1𝑗 the membership function of 𝐴′1𝑗 The conditional membership function is,
is 𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑟
′ (𝑃 ) 𝜇11 (𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 )) =
𝜇1𝑗 1 = max(𝜇1𝑗 (𝑇1𝑗 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 )) (5) 𝑞−𝑟
𝑃2
𝜇1𝑗 . 𝜇1 is the chance of two events at the same time. The If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 , then
weight vector is used to aggregate the two objective 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 )
membership functions for the player. = 𝜇11 (𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 2𝑃2
𝑊 = (𝑊1 , 𝑊2 , … … … … , 𝑊𝑛 ) and 2
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (𝑃 2 (𝑞𝑃1 − 𝑟𝑃1 + 𝑠 − 𝑠𝑃1 − 𝑡 + 𝑡𝑃1 )
𝑛 𝑞−𝑟 2
∑ 𝑊𝑗 = 1 𝑃 𝑟+𝑡
+ 𝑃2 ( 1 ))
𝑗=1 −𝑡𝑃1 − 𝑟
𝑊1 is assigned for his first goal and 𝑊2 is assigned for his 𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 2 2𝑃 𝑃 (𝑞 − 𝑟) + 2𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃1 )
second goal. = ( 1 2 )
The objective function is , 𝜕𝑃2 𝑞 − 𝑟 (𝑠 − 𝑡) + (1 − 𝑃1 )(𝑡 − 𝑟)
′ (𝑃 ) ′
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = 𝑊1 . 𝜇11 1 + 𝑊2 . 𝜇12 (𝑃1 ) + ∙∙∙∙
′
+𝑊𝑛 . 𝜇1𝑛 (𝑃1 )

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Volume 3, Issue 11, November – 2018 International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology
ISSN No:-2456-2165
Here 1 − 𝑃1 ≥ 0 and 𝑞 > 𝑠 ≥ 𝑡 > 𝑟. So the above term is ≥ 𝜕𝜇(𝑃1 ) 𝑊1 𝑊2
= (𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑠 − 𝑡) +
0. i.e) 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing in the interval 𝜕𝑃1 2(𝑞 − 𝑟) 2(𝑞 − 𝑟)
[0,0.5]. (𝑟 + 𝑡 − 𝑞 − 𝑠) ≤ 0
If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 then,
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 ) Hence (0,1) is the optimal strategy combination .
2 If player1 cooperates with player 2 his second target is to
= . 𝐴. (1 − 2𝑃2 ) − 𝐵 , where maximize the value of player2
𝑞−𝑟
𝐴 = (𝑞 − 𝑟)𝑃1 + (1 − 𝑃1 )(𝑠 − 𝑡) ≥ 0 and 𝑇12 (P1 , P2 ) = P1 P2 (q − s − r + t) + P1 (s − t) + P2 (r − t) + t
𝐵 = (𝑟 − 𝑡)(𝑃1 − 1) ≥ 0 . The conditional membership function is given by
1
𝜇12 (𝑇12 (P1 , P2 )⁄P2 ) = (𝐴P2 + 𝐵)
Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) reaches it’s maximum value at 𝑃2 = 0.5 . 𝑞−𝑟
′ (𝑃 )
1 where
𝜇11 1 = (𝑃 (𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑠 − 𝑡)
2(𝑠 − 𝑟) 1 𝐴 = (𝑞 − 𝑠)P1 + (1 − P1 )(r − t ≤ 0
+ (𝑠 + 𝑡 − 2𝑟) 𝐵 = 𝑠P1 − tP1 + t ≥ 0
If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 then,
The second target of the prisoner is to minimize the rate of 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (P1 , P2 ). 𝜇1 (P2 )
player 2 = 𝜇12 (P1 , P2 ). 2𝑃2
𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃1 𝑃2 (𝑞 − 𝑠 − 𝑟 + 𝑡) + 𝑃1 (𝑠 − 𝑡) + 𝑃2 (𝑟 − 𝑡) 1
+𝑡 = (𝐴𝑃2 + 𝐵). 2𝑃2
𝑞−𝑟
1
The conditional membership function is 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (𝐴𝑃2 2 + 𝐵𝑃2 )
𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑞 𝑞−𝑟
𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ) = 𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 2
𝑟−𝑞 = (2𝐴𝑃2 + 𝐵)
1 𝜕𝑃2 𝑞−𝑟
= (𝑃 𝑃 (𝑞 − 𝑠 − 𝑟 + 𝑡) + 𝑃1 (𝑠 − 𝑡)
𝑟−𝑞 1 2 If 𝐴 ≤ 0 and 𝐵 ≥ 0 then it’s unable to decide 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is
+ 𝑃2 (𝑟 − 𝑡) + 𝑡 − 𝑞) monotonically increasing or decreasing on the interval [0,0.5] .
If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 , then
2𝐴 𝐵 2 𝐵2
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ). 2𝑃2 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = ((𝑃2 + ) − 2 ) where
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 2 2𝑃1 𝑃2 (𝑞 − 𝑠 − 𝑟 + 𝑡) + 𝑃1 (𝑠 (𝑞 − 𝑟) 2𝐴 4𝐴
= ( ) 𝐵 𝑠𝑃1 − 𝑡𝑃2 + 𝑡 − 𝑟
𝜕𝑃2 𝑟 − 𝑞 −𝑡) + 2𝑃2 (𝑟 − 𝑡) + (𝑡 − 𝑞) = ≥0
≥0 −2𝐴 2(𝑠𝑃2 + 𝑟𝑃2 − 𝑞𝑃2 − 𝑡𝑃2 + 𝑡 − 𝑟)
If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 , then
𝜇1 (𝑃2 ) = 2 − 2𝑃2 and Hence the maximum value attained at 𝑃2 = 0.5 .
If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 and 𝜇1 (𝑃2 ) = 2 − 2𝑃2
1 𝑃 𝑃 (𝑞 − 𝑠 − 𝑟 + 𝑡) + 𝑃1 (𝑠 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (P1 , P2 ). 𝜇1 (P2 )
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = ( 1 2 ) 1
𝑟 − 𝑞 −𝑡) + 𝑃2 (𝑟 − 𝑡) + 𝑡 − 𝑞 = (𝐴P2 + 𝐵). (2 − 2P2 )
. (2 − 2𝑃2 ) 𝑞−𝑟
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 2 2
= ((1 − 2𝑃2 )𝐴 − 𝐵) 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (𝐴P2 + 𝐵 − 𝐴P2 2 − 𝐵P2 )
𝜕𝑃2 𝑟−𝑞 𝑠−𝑟
where 𝜕𝑓(P1 , P2 ) 2
= (𝐴 − 2𝐴P2 − 𝐵)
𝐴 = (𝑞 − 𝑠)𝑃1 + (𝑟 − 𝑡)(1 − 𝑃1 ) ≤ 0 𝐵= 𝜕P2 𝑠−𝑟
𝑠𝑃1 − 𝑡𝑃1 + 𝑡 − 𝑞 ≤ 0
Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing in the interval If 𝐴 ≤ 0 and 𝐵 ≥ 0, then it’s unable to decide 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is
[0.5,1] . monotonically increasing or decreasing on the interval [0.5,1]
′ (𝑃 ) −2𝐴 𝐴−𝐵 2 𝐵 𝐴−𝐵 2
𝜇12 1 = max(𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 )) 𝑓(P1 , P2 ) = ((𝑃2 − ) − −( ) )
𝑃2
1 𝑞−𝑟 2𝐴 𝐴 2𝐴
= (𝑃 (𝑟 + 𝑡 − 𝑞 − 𝑠) + 2𝑞 − 𝑟
4(𝑞 − 𝑟) 1 Hence the maximum value happen at P2 = 0.5 .
− 𝑡) ′ (P )
𝜇12 1 = max(𝜇12 (P1 , P2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 )
If the weight vector is 𝑊 = (𝑊1 , 𝑊2 )𝑇 then P2
𝑊1 𝑃 (𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑠 − 𝑡) 2
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = ( 1 )
′ (P )
𝜇12 1 = (𝐴𝑃2 2 + 𝐵𝑃2 )
2(𝑞 − 𝑟) +(𝑠 + 𝑡 − 2𝑟) 𝑞−𝑟
𝑊2 𝑃 (𝑟 + 𝑡 − 𝑞 − 𝑠) 1
+ ( 1 ) = ((𝑞 + 𝑠 − 𝑟 − 𝑡)P1 + t − r)
2(𝑞 − 𝑟) +2𝑞 − 𝑟 − 𝑡 2(𝑞 − 𝑟)
If the weight vector is 𝑊 = (𝑊1 , 𝑊2 )𝑇 ,

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′ (𝑃 ) ′
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = 𝑊1 . 𝜇11 1 + 𝑊2 . 𝜇12 (𝑃1 ) which is monotonically increasing and reaches maximum
𝑊1 value at 𝑃2 = 0.5
= (𝑃 (𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑠 − 𝑡) + 𝑠 + 𝑡 − 2𝑟)
2(𝑞 − 𝑟) 1 If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 , then
𝑊2 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇11 (𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). (2 − 2𝑃2 )
+ (𝑃 (𝑞 + 𝑠 − 𝑟 − 𝑡) + 𝑡 − 𝑟) 1
2(𝑞 − 𝑟) 1 = (−3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3). (2 − 2𝑃2 )
𝜕𝜇(𝑃1 ) 1 4
= (𝑊 (𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑠 − 𝑡) 1
𝜕𝑃1 2(𝑞 − 𝑟) 1 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (−6𝑃1 + 14𝑃1 𝑃2 + 6 − 8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 − 6𝑃2 )
+ 𝑊2 (𝑞 + 𝑠 − 𝑟 − 𝑡)) . 4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
= (14𝑃1 − 6 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 )
V. APPLICATION TO STAG HUNT 𝜕𝑃2 4

The payoff table has both ordinal payoff and relative which is monotonically decreasing and attains maximum at
preference for the outcome. 𝑃2 = 0.5 .
′ (𝑃 )
1
𝜇11 1 = (−𝑃1 + 3)
4
P2’s strategies
The second goal is to minimize the payoff of 𝑃2
𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃1 . 4. 𝑃2 + 𝑃1 . 3. (1 − 𝑃2 ) + (1 − 𝑃1 ). 0𝑃2
Stag Rabbit
+ (1 − 𝑃1 ).
3. (1 − 𝑃2 )
Stag [4,4]1 [0,3]
= 4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3 .
P1’s (3,3)2 (1,2)
conditional membership function is
Strategies 4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3
Rabbit [3,0] [3,3] 𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 )) =
0−4
(2,1) (2,2) 1
Table 4 = (3𝑃2 − 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 1)
4
If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 , then
In this payoff table 1 denotes the Cardinal payoffs and
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 2𝑃2
2 denotes the Relative preferences. Player 1’s first goal is to 1
maximize his own payoff and minimizing Player2’s payoff. = (3𝑃2 − 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 1). 2𝑃2
The strategy set is 4
1
𝑆1 = {(𝑃1 , 1 − 𝑃1 )⁄ 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 } = (6𝑃2 2 − 8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 + 2𝑃2 )
4
𝑆2 = {(𝑃2 , 1 − 𝑃2 )⁄0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1} 𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
The expected payoff value is given by = (12𝑃2 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 + 2)
𝜕𝑃2 4
𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃1 . 4. 𝑃2 + 𝑃1 . 0. (1 − 𝑃2 ) +
Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing if 𝑃2 increases on
(1 − 𝑃1 ). 3. 𝑃2 + ( 1 − 𝑃1 ). 3. (1 − 𝑃2 )
the interval [0,0.5] and reach maximum when 𝑃2 =0.5
= −3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 .
If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 , then
The conditional membership function is, 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑇12 (𝜇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). (2 − 2𝑃2 )
−3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 − 0 1
𝜇11 (𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 )) = = (4𝑃2 − 8𝑃1 𝑃2 + 2 − 6𝑃2 2 + 8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 )
4−0 4
1 𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
= (−3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3) . = (4 − 8𝑃1 − 12𝑃2 + 16𝑃1 𝑃2 )
4 𝜕𝑃2 4
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ). 𝜇1 (𝑃2 )
If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5, then Here 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing in the interval
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇11 (𝑇11 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 2𝑃2 [0.5,1].
1 ′
1 5
= (−3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3). 2𝑃2 𝜇12 (𝑃1 ) = ( − 4𝑃1 )
4 4 2
1
= (−6𝑃1 𝑃2 + 8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 The aggregate membership function of 𝑃1 is
4
+ 6𝑃2 ) 1 1 5
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = 𝑊1 ( (3 − 𝑃1 )) + 𝑊2 ( ( − 4𝑃1 ))
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1 4 4 2
= (−6𝑃1 + 8𝑃1 𝑃2 + 6) 𝑊1 𝑊2 5
𝜕𝑃2 4
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = (3 − 𝑃1 ) + ( − 4𝑃1 )
4 4 2

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Volume 3, Issue 11, November – 2018 International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology
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𝜕𝜇(𝑃1 ) −1 6 Now 𝑃2 ′𝑠 first goal is to maximize his own payoff and
= 𝑊1 − 𝑊2 ≤ 0 second is to minimize 𝑃1 ′𝑠 payoff, that is to maximize the
𝜕𝑃1 4 10
expected payoff 𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) ,
Thus 𝜇1 (𝑃1 ) has the maximum value when 𝑃1 = 0 . The 𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃1 . 4. 𝑃2 + 𝑃1 . 3. (1 − 𝑃2 ) + (1 − 𝑃1 ). 0. 𝑃2
optimal strategy combination is (0,1). If 𝑃1 trusts 𝑃2 , then his +(1 − 𝑃1 ). 3. (1 − 𝑃2 )
second target is maximizing 𝑃2 ′𝑠 payoff, = 4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3 .
𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 )) = The conditional membership function is ,
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3 𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝜇21 (𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃1 )) =
4 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
If 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 0.5 , then 1
= (4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3)
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 2𝑃2 4
1 .If 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 0.5 , then
= (8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 − 6𝑃2 2 + 6𝑃2 ) 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇21 (𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). 2𝑃1
4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1 1
= (16𝑃1 𝑃2 − 12𝑃2 + 6) ≥ 0 = (8𝑃1 2 𝑃2 − 6𝑃1 𝑃2 + 6𝑃1 )
𝜕𝑃2 4 4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
= (16𝑃1 𝑃2 − 6𝑃2 + 6)
Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing if 𝑃2 𝜕𝑃1 4
increases on the interval [0,0.5] and reach maximum when
𝑃2 =0.5 Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing on the
If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 , then interval [0,0.5] and the maximum value reaches at 𝑃1 = 0.5 .
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇12 (𝑇12 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). (2 − 2𝑃2 ) If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 , then
1 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇21 (𝑇21 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃2 ). (2 − 2𝑃1 )
= (4𝑃1 𝑃2 − 3𝑃2 + 3). (2 − 2𝑃2 ) 1
4 = (14𝑃1 𝑃2 − 6𝑃2 + 6 − 8𝑃1 2 𝑃2 − 6𝑃1 )
1 4
= (8𝑃1 𝑃2 − 12𝑃2 + 6 − 8𝑃1 𝑃2 2 + 6𝑃2 2 ) 𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
4 = (14𝑃2 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 − 6)
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1 𝜕𝑃1 4
= (8𝑃1 − 12 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 + 12𝑃2 ) ≤ 0
𝜕𝑃2 4
Here 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing in the interval Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing on the interval
[0.5,1] . This implies [0.5,1] and it will reach it’s maximum value at 𝑃1 = 0.5
1 3 ′ (𝑃 )
1
𝜇21 2 = (−𝑃2 + 3)
′
𝜇12 (𝑃1 ) = = (2𝑃1 + ) 4
4 2
The aggregate membership function The second target of 𝑃2 is minimize 𝑃1 ′𝑠 payoff,
1 1 3 𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑃1 . 4. 𝑃2 + 𝑃1 . 0. (1 − 𝑃2 ) + (1 − 𝑃1 ). 3. 𝑃2 +
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = 𝑊1 ( (3 − 𝑃1 )) + 𝑊2 ( (2𝑃1 + )) (1 − 𝑃1 ). 3. (1 − 𝑃2 )
4 4 2
𝑊1 𝑊2 3 = −3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3
𝜇(𝑃1 ) = (3 − 𝑃1 ) + (2𝑃1 + ) 𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
4 4 2 𝜇22 (𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃1 )) =
𝜕𝜇(𝑃1 ) 1 2 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 𝑊1 + 𝑊2 ≥ 0 3𝑃1 − 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 1
𝜕𝑃1 4 4 = .
4
If 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 0.5 , then
The optimal strategy depends on the weight vectors
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇22 (𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃1 ). 2𝑃1
𝑊1 and𝑊2 .If 𝑊1 ≤ 2𝑊2 ,then 𝜇(𝑃1 ) is monotonically 1
increasing function and the optimal strategy is (1,0). If 𝑊1 > = (3𝑃1 − 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 1). 2𝑃1
2𝑊2 ,then the optimal strategy is (0,1) . 4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
In the view of player 2, = (12𝑃1 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 + 2) ≥ 0
𝜕𝑃1 4
His first goal is to maximize his own payoff and
minimize Player1’s payoff .The strategy set is , Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing on the interval
𝑆1 = {(𝑃1 , 1 − 𝑃1 )⁄ 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 } [0,0.5] and the maximum value reaches at 𝑃1 = 0.5 .
𝑆2 = {(𝑃2 , 1 − 𝑃2 )⁄ 0 ≤ 𝑃2 ≤ 1 } If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 , then
The membership function is 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝜇22 (𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃1 ). (2 − 2𝑃1 )
2𝑃 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 0.5 1
𝜇2 (𝑃1 ) = { 1 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (3𝑃1 − 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 1). (2 − 2𝑃1 )
2 − 2𝑃1 0.5 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 4
1
= (4𝑃1 − 8𝑃1 𝑃2 − 6𝑃1 2 + 8𝑃1 2 𝑃2 )
4

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Volume 3, Issue 11, November – 2018 International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology
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𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1 𝜕𝜇(𝑃2 ) 𝑊1 2𝑊2
= (4 − 8𝑃2 − 12𝑃1 + 16𝑃1 𝑃2 ) =− +
𝜕𝑃1 4 𝜕𝑃2 4 4

Here 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing on the interval The optimal strategy depends on the weight vector ,
[0.5,1] and it will reach it’s maximum value at 𝑃1 = 0.5 . which represents the attitude of the player about the structure
′ (𝑃 )
1 5 of his goals. If 𝑊1 ≤ 2𝑊2 , then 𝜇(𝑃2 ) is monotonically
𝜇22 2 = ( − 2𝑃2 ) increasing function with respect to 𝑃2 and takes maximum
4 2
value when 𝑃1 = 1. The optimal strategy combination is (1,0).
If the weight vector is 𝑊 = (𝑊1 , 𝑊2 )𝑇 , then the aggregate If 𝑊1 > 2𝑊2 , then the optimal strategy is (0,1). The
membership function for 𝑃2 complete solution is given in the payoff table 5
1 1 5
𝜇(𝑃2 ) = 𝑊1 ( (−𝑃2 + 3)) + 𝑊2 ( ( − 2𝑃2 ))
4 4 2
Player 2
𝑊1 𝑊2 5
= (−𝑃2 + 3) + ( − 2𝑃2 )
4 4 2
𝜕𝜇(𝑃2 ) −1 2
= 𝑊1 − 𝑊2 Cooperative
𝜕𝑃2 4 4
1 2
= − 𝑊1 − 𝑊2 𝑊1 ≤ 2𝑊2 𝑊1
4 4 > 2𝑊2

cooperative
Which is positive and takes maximum value at 𝑃2 = 0

Non -
.The optimal strategy is (0,1) .If the second target of 𝑃2 is to
maximize the payoff of 𝑃1 , then
𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = −3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3
−3𝑃1 + 4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 − 0
𝜇22 (𝑇22 (𝑃1 , 𝑃2 )⁄𝑃1 ) = Non cooperative (2,2) (2,1) (2,2)
4−0
4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 − 3𝑃1
=
4
If 0 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 0.5 , then
1
𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 − 3𝑃1 ). 2𝑃1
4
1
= (8𝑃1 2 𝑃2 − 6𝑃1 2 + 6𝑃1 ) 𝑊1 ≤ 2𝑊2 (1,2) (3,3) (1,2)
4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
= (16𝑃1 𝑃2 − 12𝑃1 + 6) ≥ 0
𝜕𝑃1 4

Thus 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically increasing on the interval (2,2) (2,1) (2,2)

Player 1

[0,0.5] and the maximum value reaches at 𝑃1 = 0.5 . 𝑊1 > 2𝑊2

If 0.5 ≤ 𝑃1 ≤ 1 , then
1
Cooperative

𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = (4𝑃1 𝑃2 + 3 − 3𝑃1 ). (2 − 2𝑃1 )

4
1
= (8𝑃1 𝑃2 − 12𝑃1 + 6 − 8𝑃1 2 𝑃2 + 6𝑃1 2 )
4
𝜕𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) 1
= (8𝑃2 − 16𝑃1 𝑃2 + 12𝑃1 ) ≤ 0
𝜕𝑃1 4 Table 5:- Solution to the Stag Hunt Game

Here 𝑓(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) is monotonically decreasing on the interval

[0.5,1] and it will reach it’s maximum value at 𝑃1 = 0.5 VI. CONCLUSION
′ (𝑃 )
1 3
𝜇22 2 = (2𝑃2 + ) In this paper we prescribe a fuzzy model to speak to the
4 2 contention circumstance in games with strategies .The
The aggregate membership function for 𝑃2
1 1 3 philosophical intentions or good qualities of players in the
𝜇(𝑃2 ) = 𝑊1 ( (−𝑃2 + 3)) + 𝑊2 ( (2𝑃2 + )) diversion are illustrated by fuzzy set model, which are
4 4 2 typically dubious and indeterminate by and by. The weight
𝑊1 𝑊2 3 vector data that speaks to the player's emotional qualities, the
= (−𝑃2 + 3) + (2𝑃2 + )
4 4 2 ideal technique can be effortlessly decided.

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