The Eastern

Mediterranean:
Between Power
Struggles and
Regionalist Aspirations

Zenonas Tziarras

REIMAGINING THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SERIES: PCC REPORT /2018

Zenonas Tziarras is a Research Consultant at PRIO Cyprus Centre focusing on Eastern
Mediterranean geopolitics. He holds a BA in Mediterranean Studies and International Relations
from the University of the Aegean (Greece), an MA in International Relations and Strategic
Studies from the University of Birmingham (UK), and a PhD in Politics and International Studies
from the University of Warwick (UK). He has worked as adjunct lecturer at the University of
Cyprus, UCLan Cyprus and the University of Warwick, completed a Post-Doctoral Fellowship
in the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Cyprus, and collaborated
with a number of think tanks in Cyprus and abroad on matters pertaining to foreign policy,
international security, Turkey, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover,
Zenonas has attended specialization courses in International Security at the University of Delhi,
India, training courses in Leadership and Conflict Resolution at Koç University, Turkey, and has
a certificate in Conflict Management & Mediation Skills. He is a member in the editorial board
of New Middle Eastern Studies and, among other publications, the co-author of Turkey in the
Eastern Mediterranean: Ideological Aspects of Foreign Policy [in Greek].
 THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN:
BETWEEN POWER STRUGGLES AND
REGIONALIST ASPIRATIONS

Zenonas Tziarras

Report 2/2018
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
Hausmanns gate 7
PO Box 9229 Oslo
NO-0134 OSLO, Norway
Tel. +47 22 54 77 00
Fax +47 22 54 77 01
Email: info@prio.no
Web: www.prio.no

PRIO encourages its researchers and research affiliates to publish their work in peer-reviewed journals
and book series, as well as in PRIO’s own Report, Paper and Policy Brief series. In editing these series, we
undertake a basic quality control, but PRIO does not as such have any view on political issues. We
encourage our researchers actively to take part in public debates and give them full freedom of opinion.
The responsibility and honour for the hypotheses, theories, findings and views expressed in our
publications thus rests with the authors themselves.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
20, Stasandrou, Apt. 401,
CY 1060 Nicosia
Tel. +357 22377336
Website: www.fescyprus.org

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the
organizations for which the authors work.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from
the copyright holder(s).

Within the framework of the PRIO Cyprus Centre Re-Imagining The Eastern Mediterranean Series, this
report was co-produced with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Cyprus

ISBN 978-82-7288-919-6 (online)

Production and Cover design: Crystal Graphics

CONTENTS
FOREWORD.......................................................................................................................................................3

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 4

ON REGIONALIZATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONS .......................................................... 6

ON REGIONALISM ....................................................................................................................................... 10

ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN .................................................................................................... 12

AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT OF REGIONALISM? ...................................................................................... 17

EPILOGUE: CONDITIONS FOR REGIONALISM ..................................................................................... 24

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................. 28
 3

FOREWORD

T
he Report Series aims to explore the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct geopolitical
space in the context of global and regional transitions. It conceptualizes the Eastern
Mediterranean’s new geopolitical identity both historically and theoretically and
looks at its security and politico-economic prospects. At the same time, it tracks the main
challenges that regional states face, and attempts to re-imagine the patterns of conflict and
cooperation by examining the potential of regionalism and inter-state cooperation in various
sectors. In doing so, the series makes recommendations about the way forward in addressing
important obstacles to further regional cooperation and with regard to the strategy that
could be followed towards designing a viable and sustainable regionalism project in the
Eastern Mediterranean. The series begins with the conceptualization of the Eastern
Mediterranean as a region and the specific sector of the environment as an entry point to
discussing a more expanded regional cooperation. It then moves to other policy sectors and
matters pertaining to the Eastern Mediterranean state policies and interests as well as to the
role of greater powers.

Dr. Harry Tzimitras

Director, PRIO Cyprus Centre
4

INTRODUCTION

T
he new millennium has been marked by great geopolitical shifts at both the global
and the regional level. American hegemony has been under reconfiguration while
other nation-states have risen to great power. The greater Middle East has been central
to these changes, i.e., the new global balances of power and the emerging spheres of
influence. Unlike during the 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States (US) is no longer
uncontested in the broader area of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean (MEEM):
Russia is now taking a stance, especially in the Syrian conflict, thus claiming an agenda-
setting role and a geopolitical foothold. At the same time, the discovery of hydrocarbons in
the Eastern Mediterranean, post-Arab Spring security concerns, and the formation of energy-
and security-oriented inter-state partnerships (i.e., Israel-Cyprus-Greece; Greece-Cyprus-
Egypt, etc.), have greatly affected the geopolitical landscape of the region.
Taking into account the power changes at the global level and their impact on the regional
level (particularly the Eastern Mediterranean), it is here argued, in line with a small but growing
body of literature,1 that the Eastern Mediterranean should be seen as a distinct geopolitical
space. I begin this examination by looking at the transition of the international system to
multipolarity. As explained below, one of the outcomes of this transition is the regionalization
of the international system and the growing importance of the regional level of analysis.
Moreover, regionalism is defined, in fact, as a response to the transitions in the international
system; I also explore how this might apply to the Eastern Mediterranean.

1 See e.g., Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, eds., The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and
Power (New York: Routledge, 2015); Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, eds.,The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory,
Politics and States in a Volatile Era (Cham: Springer, 2019); Constantinos Adamides and Odysseas Christou, “Energy Security
and the Transformation of Regional Securitization Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean,” in Societies in Transition: The
Social Implications of Economic, Political and Security Transformations, ed. Savvas Katsikides and Pavlos Koktsidis (New
York: Springer, 2015); Constantinos Adamides and Odysseas Christou , “Beyond Hegemony: Cyprus, Energy Securitization
and the Emergence of New Regional Security Complexes,” in The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics
and Power, ed. Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015); Filippos Proedrou, “Re-Conceptualising
the Energy and Security Complex in the Eastern Mediterranean,” The Cyprus Review 24, no. 2 (2012); Zenonas Tziarras,
“Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance,” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 3 (2016); Andreas Stergiou, Kivanç
Ulusoy, and Menahem Blondheim, eds., Conflict & Prosperity: Geopolitics and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean (New York:
Israel Academic Press, 2017); Evaghoras L. Evaghorou, “Turbulent Times in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Struggle for
Power,” Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2018).
Introduction 5

Ultimately, what I examine is whether the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct region (or
sub-region) has been experiencing processes of regionalism with regard to different areas of
cooperation. In the final section, I argue that the synergies currently under development in
the Eastern Mediterranean could be seen as the first step towards a regionalist project (or
“proto-regionalism”), highlighting, however, that the realization of such a project faces multiple
limitations and is highly conditional on a number of factors that need to be addressed first. A
more gradual, well-thought-out and comprehensive approach should be followed—one that
would also address important regional challenges— if the involved actors want to invest in a
stable and sustainable regionalist project.
6

ON REGIONALIZATION
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONS

T
he 21st century is a time of important and fast-paced geopolitical changes, including
a reshuffling of the post-Cold War global order and thus of the structure of the
international system. New players are rising fast and they are challenging the primacy
of the US. As Randall Schweller writes, the more these emerging powers “gain influence
around the world,” the more the US “suffer[s] a corresponding loss of global influence.”2 Apart
from Asia, where China has become the main source of concern for the US, the developments
in the Middle East, with the Syrian war and the re-emergence of Russia, are perhaps the most
indicative of this change.3
As these shifts take place, middle powers and smaller states have been able to exploit the
growing power vacuums in different regions of the world and further their own agendas
independently from the interests of their great power partners or allies.4 In addition, given that
the post-Cold War order has been less about global-scale rivalries and influences, “region-
specific dynamics have been allowed to develop into the primary venues within which most
states securitize and de-securitize actors and issues.”5 In other words, the international order has
been going through two interconnected processes: a) decentralization and b) regionalization.
A decentralized international order (or “decentered globalism”) is that in which “no single-
power–or cluster of powers–is pre-eminent”; the international system is no longer centered in
the Western pole of hegemony and power diffuses across the world, most notably towards
Asia.6 On the other hand, regionalization, a largely contested concept, is here seen as a side-
effect of the power and economic transitions in the international system; and a response to

2 Randall L. Schweller, Maxwell’s Demon and the Golder Apple: Global Discord in the New Millenium (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2014), 79.
3 See, Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Penguin Books,
2011); Anna Borshchevskaya, Russia in the Middle East: Motives, Consequences, Prospects, vol. Policy Focus 142 (Washington:
The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 2016).
4 Schweller, 92-93; Barry Buzan, “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture. A World Order without Superpowers:
Decentred Globalism,” International Relations 25, no. 1 (2011): 16.
5 Derrick Frazier and Rober Stewart-Ingersoll, “Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within
Regional Security Complexes,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 734.
6 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order,” International Affairs 90, no. 1 (2014): 72, 75;
see also, Buzan.(2011).
On Regionalization and the Importance of Regions 7

globalization “both as a fallback against the possible failure of globalization, and as a strategy
to acquire more weight to operate in a globalized world.”7 In this sense, regionalization is linked
to the processes of globalization, while at the same time it “reflects the growing multipolarity
of the international system, accommodates new ideas and actors and alleviates the problem
of cooperation in wider multilateral fora…; it also builds on a regional store of knowledge and
resources and reduces burdens on the United Nations and major powers.”8
It should be emphasized that there is still much disagreement over whether the
international system has reached mutlipolarity, as it would be rather far-fetched to argue with
certainty that “there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines
between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low” – as one
definition of multipolarity posits.9 For instance, one could make the case that there are still
clear-cut alliances in the world, not least along the lines of ‘West vs East.’ And yet, the example
of MEEM and countries such as Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt, to name a few, shows that
the foreign policy behaviour and international orientation of states is becoming more fluid in
terms of their attachment to traditional alliances. In this light, it would be safer and more
accurate to argue that although we are today closer to multipolarity than ever before in the
post-Cold War era, the international system is still in a process of transition.
Within the framework of this transition, great powers (other than the dominant superpower,
the US)10 acquire more importance as they have more space to exert their power and influence,
at least within their own regions and, more often than not, beyond them (see e.g., Russia, China,
India, Brazil, Germany, etc.). We thus have a phenomenon sometimes called “regional
hegemons” or “regional superpowers.”11 In a nutshell, the global power diffusion in question
creates international systemic vacuums in which such powers thrive and regional dynamics
grow in significance and prominence within the structure of the international system, thus
rendering the regional level of analysis more salient and central. To be sure, there are still global-
level concerns such as nuclear proliferation,12 but as the “salience of military–political security

7 Buzan (2011), 17.

8 Louise Fawcett, “The Regionalization of Security: A Comparative Analysis,” in Effective Multilateralism, ed. Jochen Prantl
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 44; see also, Zenonas Tziarras, “The Changing World Order and the ‘Acceleration of
History’: The Middle East Example,” in Acceleration of History: War, Conflict, and Politics, ed. Alexios Alecou (London:
Lexington Book, 2016), 20-26.
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc., 2010), 168.
10 According to Buzan (2011), superpowers are those that can exert various types of powers globally, whereas great powers
are those that can only exert power beyond only one region. Nevertheless there are powers that are not superpowers
but that can exert power over more than one region, such as Russia that can arguably exert at least some power in
Europe, the Middle East, and the post-Soviet space.
11 Barry Buzan, “A Leader without Followers? The United States in World Politics after Bush,” International Politics 45 (2008):
565-68; Dale C. Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2007), 6-7; Buzan (2011), “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture. A World Order
without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism,” 4-5.
12 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in Regional Orders: Building Security in a
New World, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 7.
8 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

issues amongst the great powers”13 declines, various sectors of the contemporary security
agenda (e.g., economic, environmental, societal, energy) come to dominate regional security
as well.14

The Regional Level

In this context, it is important to first determine what makes a region, thus highlighting the
importance of the regional level of analysis. According to Joseph Nye, an international region
is made of “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree
of mutual interdependence.”15 From another point of view, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever coined
the concept of Regional Security Complex (RSC) and defined it as “a set of units whose major
processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security
problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”16 From this
perspective, geographic proximity or adjacency “is potent for security because many threats
travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.”17 Moreover, Buzan and Waver go
on to argue that, “Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern
of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense
between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those
outside it.”18 As such, security interactions within a RSC are, more often than not, little affected
by developments in other regions.

In his review of the literature on regions, Aristotle Tziampiris concludes that,

a region can be defined by the simultaneous existence of geographical territory that

might include sub-regions but must include a number of states in proximity, some of
which may constitute the region’s core; a security dimension that could include the
existence of a Regional Security Complex; a degree of cohesion; internal and external
recognition; a common historical background, possibly economic interdependence
and perhaps some unique characteristics. Depending to what degree a region fulfills the
above criteria, it could be judged to be a “strong” or “weak” region.19

13 Barry Buzan, “Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World,” in Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave
Reader, ed. Frederik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 140-141.
14 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 72.
15 Joseph Nye, International Regionalism: Readings (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), vi-vii.
16 Buzan, “Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World,” 44.
17 Ibid., 45.
18 Ibid., 46.
19 Aristotle Tziampiris, “The New Eastern Mediterranean as a Regional Subsystem,” in The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory,
Politics and States in a Volatile Era, ed. Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris (Cham: Springer, 2019), 6.
On Regionalization and the Importance of Regions 9

For the purposes of this report, it is accepted that, at the bare minimum, a geographical
region is defined by a set of states in close proximity to each other that are interrelated and
involved in some – cooperative or conflictual – interaction; namely, that their interests are
linked in one way or the other.
However, two policy dimensions call for particular attention to the regional level and intra-
regional relations: a) (in)security and b) cooperation (i.e., the degree of interdependence). As
Tziampiris’s definition shows, these dimensions can affect the character of a region, its
importance and future dynamics. The two dimensions are further discussed below in the
specific context of the Eastern Mediterranean, following a necessary discussion on regionalism
and its place in the emerging international order.
10

ON REGIONALISM

A
s seen thus far, the decentralization and regionalization of the international system
creates the need for more regional approaches to managing the geopolitical order,
peace, stability, and security.20 In this vein, Louise Fawcett argues that regionalism
can be seen as the “product and driver of regionalization,”21 with regionalism defined as a
formal, state-led process of building “regional or subregional clusters” that aim at improving
the capabilities of states within a region “to stand up to the unprecedented proliferation of
new global challenges”; as such it also “outlines cooperation in the economic, institutional,
defense, or security fields, occurring at a political decision-making level.”22 In addition, the
“policy and project” nature of regionalism in the contemporary world encompasses the
aspect of state-society relations and acknowledges the agency of non-state actors in the
success of regionalist projects, despite the predominant role of the state.23
Against this background, if regionalization is understood as a spontaneous and rather
informal process that may contribute to the emergence of regions and, in turn, of “regional
groups, actors and organizations,” it can be also said that it both precedes and flows from
regionalism (see Figure 1).24 And if regionalization is more of a side-effect of global transitions,
regionalism is a conscious,25 state-led effort to capitalize on regionalization and advance the
agency and interests of smaller states thus enhancing, by extension, a more decentralized
international order.

20 Lake and Morgan, 6-7.

21 Fawcett (2013), 43.
22 Matteo Legrenzi and Marina Calculli, “Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East: Options and Challenges,”
International Peace Institute Issue Brief (2013): 1.
23 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs 80, no. 3
(2004): 433.
24 Ibid.
25 It should be noted that the concepts of regionalization and regionalism are subjects of much debate in the literature and,
as is often the case with such academic discussions, there is not much consensus as far as their definition, types and
generations are concerned. See e.g., Charalambos Tsardanidis, “The Bsec: From New Regionalism to Inter-Regionalism?,”
Agora Without Frontiers 10, no. 4 (2005); Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism.”;
Fawcett, “The Regionalization of Security: A Comparative Analysis.”; Rick Fawn, “‘Regions’ and Their Study: Wherefrom,
What for and Whereto?,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009).
On Regionalism 11

Figure 1

Importantly, in contrast to regionalization, a regionalist project also entails some form of

institutionalization of interstate arrangements and agreements – mainly economic – at the
regional level. Examples of regionalism, be they successful or less so, abound and include the
League of Arab States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union
(AU), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) among others. Of course, the most successful
of all is the European Union (EU), which started as a primarily economic regionalist project and
gradually transformed into a politico-economic organization that over the past years has also
tried to develop a more coherent security policy. Undoubtedly, there are conflicting views
among EU member-states as to whether the Union should pursue more integration towards
federalism (supranationalism) or maintain a more inter-governmental character in conjunction
with further enlargement.26 However, despite the limitations, the EU’s success in developing
supranational institutions and pursuing economic and political integration is undisputed and
unprecedented; for this reason it is often seen as a model for other regionalist projects.27
To move, therefore, from regionalization to regionalism, political will for a state-led process
as well as institutional structures are necessary. The extent to which the Eastern Mediterranean
is equipped for such a future is examined below.

26 See e.g., Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter, “The New Intergovernmentalism: European
Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era,” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 4 (2015).
27 Fawn, 18-19.
12

ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

T
he Eastern Mediterranean is today an example of the broader dynamics of interna-
tional systemic regionalization, with a number of states becoming stronger or finding
more space to manoeuvre in the absence of tight great-power control, often at the
expense of the interests of their traditional allies – e.g., Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Greece. As
Spyridon Litsas argues,

The franticness of a multipolar system with almost every state contained in the systemic
roller coaster of antagonism gives a central position to various regions worldwide
manifesting a significant tendency to friction such as the Asia-Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa
and the Eastern Mediterranean.28

These developments warrant a rethinking of the Eastern Mediterranean space in particular as

a potentially distinct geopolitical region, while assessing the reconfiguration of great-power
influence over it and the repercussions for regional relations.
The Eastern Mediterranean as a region is not a new notion as such, for it has been repeatedly
used in the past. A case in point is the usage of the term by the British Empire, at least in the
19th and 20th centuries. British archives often cite the Eastern Mediterranean when referring
to the Empire’s operations in the region.29 Not only that, but it seems that the Eastern
Mediterranean as a space had a special place in the colonial-strategic calculations of the British.
For example, in the 1910s they established the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence
Bureau (EMSIB) for intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence purposes with operations
in Turkey, Syria and Cyprus,30 and also used it for information exchange and joint operations

28 Spyridon N. Litsas, “War, Peace and Stability in the Era of Multipolarity: What Lies at the End of the Systemic Rainbow,” in
The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, ed. Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris
(Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 15.
29 See e.g., “Governorship of Cyprus” press notice by Colonial Office Information Department, 26 September 1955,
FO371/117662, The National Archives of the UK. See also, William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 16, 19, 20, 25, 26; The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus Held by the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey [with Relevant Documents],
(London: H.M. Stationery Office, Great Britain Parliament, 1955).
30 Andrekos Varnava, “The Impact of the Cypriot Contribution During the Great War on Colonial Society and
Loyalties/Disloyalties to the British Empire,” First World War Studies 8, no. 1: 22.
On the Eastern Mediterranean 13

with the French.31 These activities took place in the context of a broader intelligence structure
in the area of the greater Middle East that aimed to “monitor the threat from the east” and
eventually “obtain current military intelligence on western Turkey prior to the Gallipoli
campaign in 1915.”32
And yet the term “Eastern Mediterranean” was often used interchangeably with that of
“Middle East,”33 while the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean was not really seen
independently from strategic imperatives in the Middle East, or the rest of the Empire to the
East for example. As Robert Holland and Diana Markides argue,

…Britain’s impulse towards a stake in continental paramountcy was partially displaced

into a quest to make the Mediterranean into an English lake. The force of gravitation
exerted by the significance of the route to its Indian Empire meant that for Great Britain
the eastern portions of that lake [i.e. the Eastern Mediterranean] came to possess a
special resonance.34

This is to say that, despite the name of the Eastern Mediterranean being used, the concept
was quite different to that of today. Similarly, towards the end of the Cold War the US believed
that dealing with terrorism and radicalism in the Middle East as well as with Soviet regional
influence and access to the Mediterranean (particularly through Syria and Libya) depended
“in significant part on American capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean.”35
From the perspective of imperial powers (particularly Great Britain) or superpowers such
as the US and the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean was seen as a strategic space, not
so much because of its own geopolitical or geo-economic importance as such but because of
its role in allowing the pursuit of greater strategic interests in the Middle East and beyond. In
other words, it was an area that needed to be secured or controlled in order for something
more important to be achieved. By extension, the Eastern Mediterranean has been a space for
clashing spheres of influence among great powers – be they imperial or otherwise – but never
before was it seen as a space with its own geopolitical identity that stemmed from the relations
and interaction among the countries that constitute it. And that is the particularity of today’s
Eastern Mediterranean: it is not only important to external powers as a means to an end; it has
its own importance and value.

31 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
University of California Press, 2008), 37.
32 Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 323.
33 Mallinson, ibid.
34 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-
1960 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 6.
35 Martin Indyk, “Introduction,” in Strategy and Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean: An American-Israeli Dialogue, ed. Robert
Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987), 1.
14 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

One could argue that it was the discovery of hydrocarbons and the increased relations
between regional states that led analysts to pay unprecedented attention to the political,
economic and security relations within this limited geographical area, despite the fact that the
Eastern Mediterranean has not been commonly perceived or analysed as a distinct region.36
Interestingly, the Middle East’s abundance in oil has been at least partly the reason for great
power interest in the Middle East since the early 20th century,37 and for the bridgehead role
that the Eastern Mediterranean acquired back then. Roughly a century later, at a very different
historical juncture and under very different international circumstances, natural gas becomes
Eastern Mediterranean’s “oil”, giving rise to a new security reality at the regional level.
As a result, the current view in Washington has evolved into recognizing the security and
economic threats that challenge the region’s own stability even as it focuses on the natural
gas discoveries off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus and Egypt that “could boost regional economic
prospects” but are, nonetheless, hindered by “a divided Cyprus, historical animosities, as well
as a lack of infrastructure connectivity.”38 And all that, while maintaining the superpower
perspective that the US “needs a holistic and integrated strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean
that will stabilize Europe and shift the regional balance in the Middle East toward the
United States.”39
In line with this shifting conception of the Eastern Mediterranean, for example, Filippos
Proedrou has characterized it an energy and security complex40 while Constantinos Adamides
and Odysseas Christou argue that the Turkey-Israel-Cyprus triangle could be seen as a security
sub-complex “at the edge of two RSCs [Europe and the Middle East] and an insulator state
[Turkey].”41 For his part, Tziampiris argues, and this report is in agreement, that the Eastern
Mediterranean is a Mediterranean sub-region, which according to his definition of regions (as
cited previously) can be seen as,

36 For example, Buzan and Waever (2003) do not consider it to be a distinct regional security complex (RSC) as they
categorize some of its countries under the RSC of Europe and other under the RSC of the Middle East.
37 See e.g., Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Owl Books, 2002), 29-35;
Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 2003), 35-53.
38 John B. Alternaman et al., Restoring the Eastern Mediterranean as U.S. Strategic Anchor (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London:
CSIS, Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), vii.
39 Ibid. A similar approach could be found in the Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs of the US State
Department Wess Mitchell’s testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See, Wess Mitchell, “Hearing: U.S.
Policy in Europe,” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe
and Regional Security Cooperation (26 June 2018),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062618_Mitchell_Testimony.pdf.
40 Proedrou.
41 Adamides and Christou, “Beyond Hegemony: Cyprus, Energy Securitization and the Emergence of New Regional Security
Complexes,” 182. See also, Alper and Kaliber, “Re-Imagining Cyprus: The Rise of Regionalism in Turkey’s Security Lexicon,”
in Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads, ed. Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci (2013).
 " " " " " " " " "
" " " " " " " " " " "
On the Eastern Mediterranean 15
" " " " " " " " " " " " "
" " " " " " " "
a regional subsystem with moderate cohesion and economic interdependence that
shares a common historical background, high internal and probably lesser external"
" " " " " " " " " " "
"
recognition, "
operates as a kind of border between East and West and has substantial
security significance for contemporary international politics. Compared to the
" " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
Mediterranean as a whole, the Eastern Mediterranean is a “stronger” region.42
" " " " " " " " " " " " "
As the same author points out, this definition is far from claiming that the Eastern Mediterranean
" " " " " " " " " " " " " "
(see Map I) – comprised of Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Libya and
" "
"
certain non-" or semi-state
" "
actors " "RSC (or a" sub-RSC).
– is an " " 43 Indeed," more research" and " "
theoretical analysis is needed on the Eastern Mediterranean’s place in Regional Security
" " " " " " " " " " " " " "
Complex Theory – something that falls outside the scope of this report.

$ $ $ $ $
Map I: The Eastern Mediterranean

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

" Source: https://www.google.com/maps/

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
Z
" " " "
" " "
42 Tziampiris, 24, 26.
43 Ibid., 23-24.
"
"
16 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

This brings us to another particularity of today’s Eastern Mediterranean: because of its

heterogeneity in terms of the states that comprise it,44 it provides the opportunity for
geopolitical and diplomatic bridges to be built within it. For instance, with Cyprus and Greece
being member-states of the EU and, politically speaking, parts of the “West,” other coastal states
of the Eastern Mediterranean such as Israel, Lebanon and Egypt can more easily “access” the EU
and the West more broadly, and vice versa. The same happens with political or economic
activities in the Eastern Mediterranean undertaken by Russia, China, and the Gulf States. Syria
is a good example of how regional and international interests, outside of the Eastern
Mediterranean, manifest within it and impact its stability and security. Therefore, certain good
relations and geopolitical dynamics that have developed within the Eastern Mediterranean
render it politically valuable for both local and external actors, while the region functions as a
meeting and often socializing space for various international interests and policies.

44 It encompasses, at least, Turkish, Greek, Arab and Jewish national identities as well as Christian, Jewish and Muslim
religious identities.
 17

AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT OF REGIONALISM?

B
eyond the need to re-conceptualize and address the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct
geopolitical space, there is also a pressing need to envision and work towards a regional
order that is for the benefit of all actors who share it. In other words, there is need for
an approach that would surpass the unintentional and de facto processes (regionalization)
that have been influencing the regional order in the Eastern Mediterranean, by looking at the
various intentional efforts for cooperation and security management as well (regionalism).45
Conflict and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean have long been debated, often as
two alternative and mutually exclusive paths that the region might follow in the future, even
though they more often than not co-exist in international relations, especially in the 21st
century.46 Against a historical background marked primarily by conflict and geopolitical
competition, cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has in recent years been promoted as
a much more feasible prospect.47 The significant energy discoveries and the revitalized peace
process in Cyprus have been two of the driving factors.

The Trilateral Partnerships & Areas of Regional Cooperation

The so-called “diplomacy of trilateral partnerships” (or “quasi-alliances”),48 that is followed in
the area—with Greece and Cyprus as the main initiators—has been perhaps the most
important evidence of the growing networks of regional cooperation. Not only in the domain
of economy broadly speaking, but that of security and beyond. States like Greece, Cyprus,
Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Italy have been to one degree or the other part of this
project of multileveled cooperation.

43 See e.g., Charles Ellinas, “The Eastern Mediterranean: An Energy Region in the Making,” in The Political and Economic
Challenges of Energy in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. David Ramin Jalilvand and Kirsten Westphal (London:
Routledge, 2017).
46 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit Accross the Taiwan Strait,” in Neoclassical
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104.
47 See e.g., Ayla Gürel, Harry Tzimitras, and Hubert Faustmann, eds., East Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Geopolitical
Perspectives, Markets, and Regional Cooperation, vol. PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 3 (Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2014);
Ioannis Grigoriadis, “Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict or Cooperation?,” Middle East Policy XXI,
no. 3 (2014); Gareth M. Winrow, “The Anatomy of a Possible Pipeline: The Case of Turkey and Leviathan and Gas Politics
in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 5 (2016).
48 See e.g., Tziarras, “Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance.”
18 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

From an ambitious perspective, these intentional efforts towards a deeper and more
integrated regional cooperation could function as the prelude to something more institution-
alized and official – a form of regionalism; this is a project that will have a strong security
dimension as well. In fact, one could argue that, collectively, the existing trilateral partnerships
constitute a kind of a security community as well; that is, a community in which the actors
“cannot imagine a war among each other” as their relations and interactions are completely
desecuritized.49 The members of a security community often share at least some common
threat perceptions,50 as is the case with Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt vis-à-vis Turkey.51
Moreover, the notion of a security community is compatible with the concept of regionalism,
given that “well-developed security communities will normally [but not necessarily] become
increasingly institutionalised and integrated.”52
By default, these patterns of enmity (and amity) have greatly impacted the security
environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. And yet, at the same time, one should look at other
types of security concerns, such as energy security, terrorism, refugee and migration waves,
environmental problems, economic development, etc.53 Because many of these problems are
common to the states of the region, a number of efforts for cooperation have been made, thus
bringing many of the countries in question closer together.
The most advanced cooperation triangles thus far are those of Cyprus-Greece-Israel,
Cyprus-Greece-Egypt, and Cyprus-Greece-Jordan. At a more nascent stage are the triangles of
Cyprus-Greece-Lebanon and Cyprus-Greece-Malta (mostly in the domain of shipping and
maritime affairs). Only the first two are taken under consideration here since they are the most
advanced, while Malta and Jordan fall outside the definition of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt stand to benefit both from collectively addressing security
challenges54 and from economically profiting out of cooperation. The Joint Declarations of

49 Buzan and Waever, 57.

50 Ibid.
51 More specifically, the evolution of Turkish foreign policy towards a more revisionist behavior challenges the interests of
various regional states and plays into their threat perceptions. For example, Greece has had problems with Turkey over
issues such as the legal and geopolitical status of the Aegean Sea; the Republic of Cyprus has for almost 45 years been
trying to deal with the Turkish occupation and everything that comes with it, while in 2018 Ankara practically disputed
Cyprus’s sovereign rights regarding energy developments in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone; Israel has had ups and
downs in its relationship with Turkey which does not seem to have very good prospects of full normalization; and Egypt
has not had official relations with Turkey since 2013. “Turkey Warns Israel and Egypt over Cyprus,” TRT World (30 July 2018),
https://www.trtworld.com/europe/turkey-warns-israel-and-egypt-over-cyprus-19259.
52 Buzan and Waever, 58.
53 See, Ayla Gürel Moran, Harry Tzimitras, and Hubert Faustmann, eds., Global Energy and the Eastern Mediterranean, vol. PCC
Report 1/2016 (Oslo, Nicosia, and New York: PRIO Cyprus Center, 2016); Emine Eminel Sülün and Zenonas Tziarras, “Federal
Cyprus in the Context of Regional Security,” Berghof Foundation & SeeD Security Dialogue Project - Background Paper (2017).
54 For security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean see e.g., Thanos Dokos, “The Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf
Region in 2020: Alternative Scenarios for the Regional Security Environment,” in Mediterranean 2020: The Future of
Mediterranean Security and Politics, ed. Eduard Soler i Lecha and Thanos Dokos (Washington: The German Marshall Fund
of the United States, 2011); Andrea Prontera and Mariusz Ruszel, “Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Middle
East Policy 24, no. 3 (2017); Stergiou, Ulusoy, and Blondheim; Sülün and Tziarras; Tziarras, “Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A
‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance.”
An Ambitious Project of Regionalism? 19

the two trilateral partnerships clearly state the sectors of existing or aspiring cooperation. By
analysing one Joint Declaration of each of the two trilateral partnerships, respectively, five
main and overarching sectors or areas of cooperation stand out: a) military-hard security, b)
economic, c) energy, d) environmental, and e) cultural-social-political.55
These sectors roughly correspond to Buzan’s categorization of security sectors and threats:
“the security of human collectives is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political,
economic, societal and environmental” and their respective threats.56 As such, to a great extent,
the allocation made here of challenges-threats and mutual interests under each sector follows
Buzan’s approach. Table I summarizes the areas of existing or prospective cooperation among
the participating states of each trilateral partnership.
Although energy is usually seen as part of the economic sector, more recent research has
suggested that it actually has its own distinct importance and cuts across most of the five
sectors suggested by Buzan.57 Taking that into account in conjunction with its significance in
the overall value of the Eastern Mediterranean as an emerging region, energy is here addressed
as a separate sector. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that many of the issues listed in
Table I can fall under the concept of “human security” as well; a concept that goes beyond
military-related threats, violence and crime, dealing with “the security of people’s livelihoods
(economic, food, environment or health security)” and “can also be used to look into personal,
community and political security.”58 This aspect is important as it centres not only on the state
(or national security narrowly defined), but on the various security needs of individuals (or
social groups and Non-Governmental Organizations) and their role in addressing security
concerns and contributing to regional cooperation. It was in this context that the 4th trilateral
Summit between Israel, Cyprus and Greece convened under the thematic heading “Building
People-to-People Bridges.”59

55 “Cyprus-Greece-Israel 4th Trilateral Summit Declaration,” Press and Information Office - Republic of Cyprus (May 2018),
https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/press-releases-article.html?id=1656#flat; “Joint Declaration Following the 5th Cyprus-Egypt-
Greece Trilateral Summit,” United Nations General Assembly (November 2017),
https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/newsroom/2018/03/UN%20A-72-760%20Cyprus-Egypt-Greece.pdf.
56 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War, 2nd ed. (Colchester:
ECPR Press, 1991, 2007), 38. See also, Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 132-134.
57 Adamides and Christou, “Beyond Hegemony: Cyprus, Energy Securitization and the Emergence of New Regional Security
Complexes,” 181.
58 Oscar A. Gómez and Des Gasper, “Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human
Development Report Teams,” United Nations Development Programme - Human Development Report Office (2013),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human_security_guidance_note_r-nhdrs.pdf; see also, Mahbub Haq, Reflections
on Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 116.
59 “Cyprus-Greece-Israel 4th Trilateral Summit Declaration”.
20 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

Table I: Cooperation within the Trilateral Partnerships

Sectors of Israel-Cyprus-Greece Greece-Cyprus-Egypt

Cooperation (Common Interests & Challenges) (Common Interests & Challenges)
Military-Hard n Support the exercise of sovereign n Counter-terrorism and extremist
Security rights ideologies
n Tackling asymmetric threats n Irregular migration
n Counter-terrorism n Promote regional stability and
n Information exchange security
n Cyber defence n Increase information sharing
n Common exercises on search and n Effective management of large
rescue movements of refugees and migrants
n Against weapons proliferation n Support respect of the sovereignty,
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of
each state
n Call on Turkey to cease illegal
activities within the maritime zones
of Cyprus and refrain from similar
actions in the future
n Against Smuggling and trafficking

Economic n Trade n Tourism, cruise tourism, increase of

n Tourism tourist flow
n Agriculture n Sustainable development
n Industry n Economic prosperity
n Energy n Information Communication
n Economic Growth Technologies
n Investments n Innovation
n Innovation
n Entrepreneurship
n Research
n Information Communication
Technologies
n Sustainable Development

Energy n EastMed Pipeline Project n Diversification of energy resources

n EuroAsia Interconnector and routes
n Security of energy supply
n Need to modernize and develop
new energy infrastructures
n Promote trilateral energy
cooperation
n Energy infrastructure projects (with
the private sector)
n EuroAsia Interconnector
n Exploitation and transfer of
natural gas
An Ambitious Project of Regionalism? 21

Sectors of Israel-Cyprus-Greece Greece-Cyprus-Egypt

Cooperation (Common Interests & Challenges)
Environmental n Concept of joint ecosystems
n Protection of the marine
environment in the Mediterranean
n Satellite monitoring of the coastal
and marine environment
n Climate Change
n Water and wastewater management
n Treatment of wastewater from olive
oil mills
n Common sets of indicators for
climate change adaptation
n Joint marine oil pollution drill (2017)
n Sustainable Development
(Common Interests & Challenges)
n Impact of transboundary projects
n Preparedness and response to major
marine pollution incidents
n Combating coastal erosion
n Coastal zone management
n Biological diversity and nature
protection
n Waste management
n Climate change adaptation

Cultural- n Against Religious intolerance, n Against looting and illicit trafficking

Social- xenophobia, anti-Semitism,
Political incitement, harassment or violence
against persons or communities
based on ethnic origin or religious
belief
n Safeguard cultural heritage,
underwater heritage
in cultural property
n Protection of cultural heritage, and
underwater cultural heritage
n Diaspora
n Migration
n Against extremist ideologies

An Eastern Mediterranean Cooperation Council (EMCC)?

Within the framework of the two trilateral partnerships and their various sectors of cooperation,
a number of agreements have been signed. As Table I demonstrates, cooperation in the
economic and environmental sectors, for example, is particularly strong. On the other hand,
although cooperation in the energy sector has not yet materialized, its prospect could greatly
deepen meaningful cooperation and interdependence among participating states. Cypriot
Foreign Minister, Nikos Christodoulides, took things a step further when he stated that,

Cyprus has adopted the view that hydrocarbons can become the new coal and steel, in
a new regional context. A tool of cooperation and synergies that would create an
economy of scale, an inviting environment for companies and investors; a tool that
would meet the energy security needs of the region and that of the EU and gradually
contribute to greater stability in relations among countries of the region and promote
security and peace. And ultimately, why not, a catalyst for greater, more institutionalized
political co-operation in the region.60

60 “The Foreign Minister, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, on Cyprus’s Geopolitical Role in the Eastern Mediterranean at the Ajc
Transatlantic Institute, Brussels,” Press and Information Office - Republic of Cyprus (17 July 2018),
https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/press-releases-article.html?id=2938#flat.
22 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

In this regard, it is not too early for one to contemplate – at least on a theoretical level – the
future prospect of more regional integration in the Eastern Mediterranean. And even though
energy may not soon become the catalysing factor for something like this, other sectors such
as the environment or the economy might. If this is indeed a vision that all four states
participating in the trilateral partnerships in question share, their cooperation could be seen
– perhaps with some degree of ambition – as “proto-regionalism”—a project that could one
day result in an Eastern Mediterranean Cooperation Council (EMCC) – akin to the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) – or something similar.
The GCC61 is a good comparative example, as it would share similar characteristics with a
prospective EMCC:

n both refer to sub-regional cooperation in the economic, political and security fields,
among others
n as in the case of the GCC, EMCC countries have the potential of becoming hydrocarbons-
abundant with energy being central to their economic development and growth
n their participating states share common security concerns
n the likelihood of war among participating states is very low

There are of course a number of differences as well that stem from the fact that the GCC is
a much more advanced and integrated regionalist project. For example, GCC members have
a unified stance on international issues within the United Nations (UN); they have developed
strong coordination on defence issues; they facilitate labour mobility for their citizens with the
use of national IDs; and they have an established and functional institutional structure partially
inspired by the EU.62
Eastern Mediterranean states could learn from the GCC experience should they choose to
move towards regionalism and the institutionalization of their cooperation. In a sense, they
are in an even more advantageous position in terms of institutional design given the
experience of Greece and Cyprus as member-states of the EU. Borrowing from the GCC
example,63 Diagram I shows a basic organizational structure that an EMCC could have,
comprised of a Supreme Council, a Ministerial Council, and a General Secretariat with its sub-
divisions. Other bodies could also exist in this structure, such as a Consultative Commission to
the Supreme Council, a Dispute Settlement Commission, etc.

61 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE).
62 Legrenzi and Calculli, 3.
63 “GCC Organizational Structure,” Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (2018), http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-
us/Pages/default.aspx.
An Ambitious Project of Regionalism? 23

Diagram I: A Basic Organizational Structure for EMCC

The Supreme Council

The Ministerial
Council

General
Secretariat

Head of Delegation Secretary Head of Delegation

to the EU General to the UN

Ass. Sec. Gen. Ass. Sec. Gen. Ass. Sec. Gen. Ass. Sec. Gen. Ass. Sec. Gen. Ass. Sec. Gen.
(Political) (Economic) (Military) (Environmental) (Energy) (Cultural)

As the GCC has been characterized as “the most successful example of subregional integration
in the Middle East,”64 despite its problems and limitations, an EMCC could hope to achieve
great success in terms of deeper inter-state cooperation, regional development, stability and
security. However, this already ambitious idea is further complicated by geopolitical realities
on the ground. In other words, regionalism in the Eastern Mediterranean is conditional on a
number of factors.

64 Legrenzi and Calculli, 3.

24

EPILOGUE: CONDITIONS FOR REGIONALISM

Regionalism is admittedly a very good vision to have, especially if one takes into account all its
positive qualities. Fawcett points out that,

Aside from promoting economic, political and security cooperation and community, it
[regionalism] can consolidate state-building and democratization, check heavy-handed
behaviour by strong states, create and lock in norms and values, increase transparency,
make states and international institutions more accountable, and help to manage the
negative effects of globalization.65

But in the Eastern Mediterranean things are more complex. And if the participating states of
the trilateral partnerships want to work for an effective and sustainable regionalist project,
they will need to address and overcome a number of obstacles. Below is a non-exhaustive list
of the main problems that a regionalist project in the Eastern Mediterranean will face.

A. Turkey. The first issue with the developing inter-state network in the Eastern Mediterranean
is the absence of Turkey. To be sure, this is not without justification given the troubled
relations Turkey has with the rest of the states of the region as explained above. In fact,
Turkish foreign policy has contributed to the development of closer relations between
Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Egypt. In this respect, the growing regional cooperation also
works as a counter-balance to Turkey. And yet, the sustainability of the existing regional
cooperation is challenged by Turkey and depends to a great extent on Ankara maintaining
poor relations with Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. However, this is not a certainty in the
medium or long term; a change in Turkish foreign policy, among other things, could easily
reshuffle the patterns of cooperation in the region. That means that Turkey cannot remain
permanently excluded from a regionalist vision that aspires to take the Eastern Mediterranean
from conflict to cooperation; its future prospects will partly depend on its ability to include
and socialize Turkey.

B. Cyprus Problem. Related to the above is the hitherto unresolved Cyprus conflict that
prevents the normalization of Turkey-Cyprus relations and by extension complicates other
international relations of Turkey as well (e.g., with Greece). It is de facto impossible for the

65 Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” 429.

Epilogue: Conditions for Regionalism 25

Republic of Cyprus and Turkey to develop bilateral relations as Turkey does not recognize
the Republic of Cyprus. For its part, the latter does not accept Turkey’s control over the
island’s north nor recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (recognized only by
Turkey). It is thus necessary for all actors involved to support a sustainable resolution of
the Cyprus conflict, thereby contributing to the depolarization and normalization of Eastern
Mediterranean’s geopolitics.

C. Israel-Lebanon. The traditionally troubled relationship between Israel and Lebanon is not
necessarily something that could prevent the progress of regional cooperation.
Nonetheless, it could turn into a more serious problem in the future, especially in terms of
natural gas exploration, exploitation and exportation, given the existing EEZ boundary
dispute between the two countries.66 Moreover, the activities and operations of Lebanon’s
Hezbollah in Syria at the side of Bashar al Assad’s government67 have increased tensions
with Israel and could even lead to military confrontation in the future. Therefore, prompt
de-escalation and conflict resolution is of the essence; moreover, other Eastern
Mediterranean states – e.g., Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt – could play a positive role for the
sake of maintaining regional stability and peace.

D. Syria. The Syrian war in itself is perhaps the greatest security problem in the Eastern
Mediterranean, with repercussions ranging from internally displaced people, migrants and
refugees, to Kurdish secessionist aspirations, international spheres of influence, Islamic
terrorism, environmental disasters, destruction of cultural heritage, and human security
more generally. The war has affected many other states and peoples of the region while its
negative consequences will likely be felt for years to come. In the context of regional
cooperation, Eastern Mediterranean states could provide all sorts of help such as
humanitarian aid, financial and practical support for post-conflict reconstruction,
diplomatic support for negotiations among the warring parties, etc. It is better to engage
with this problem rather than ignore it, because of the various repercussions it has for the
whole region.

E. Israel-Egypt. The good but sensitive Israel-Egypt relations may render it difficult for the
respective governments to acquire the necessary public legitimacy for closer and more
direct cooperation, especially in the context of a regional organization. Steps need to be
taken at both the governmental and social levels in order for such a closer relationship to
be more feasible and domestically legitimized.

66 For more on the dispute see e.g., “Israel, Lebanon Argue over Offshore Energy Block,” Cyprus Mail (31 January 2018),
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/31/israeli-minister-says-lebanese-claim-gas-field-provocative/.
67 E.g., Mona Alami, Hezbollah’s Military Involvement in Syria and Its Wider Regional Role (Riyadh: King Faisal Center for
Research and Islamic Studies, 2017).
26 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

F. Palestinian Issue. The Palestinian issue is, of course, another problem that will have to be
addressed as it affects Israel’s relations with the Arab World and is often the cause of conflict
outbreaks. It would be safe to argue that further normalization in Arab-Israeli relations will
not be possible without positive developments on this issue. Lack of progress will, in turn,
keep complicating Israel’s relations with Cyprus and Greece – i.e., countries with traditionally
good relations with the Arab World – let alone Egypt.

G. Energy. Though energy can prove to be the cornerstone of a future regionalist project in the
Eastern Mediterranean, it can just as easily become a major problem in the case that natural
gas exports, pipeline or LNG projects become a point of contention and antagonism. To
avoid such a scenario, the concerned countries will need to remain in close and continuous
dialogue and, to the extent possible, design their next steps collectively.

There are evidently many issues to be addressed, and Eastern Mediterranean regionalism will
likely not be an easy task. Yet, with hard work there are positive prospects—provided that the
involved actors possess the necessary political will to go the extra mile for the sake of a better
regional future.

The Way Forward – A “Low-Politics” Entry Point to Regionalism

The difficulty in moving forward in such a volatile area and in the midst of sensitive geopolitical
and inter-state balances must be acknowledged. After all, the trilateral partnerships were first
developed in domains that were not very politically charged, such as the economy. And indeed,
Joint Declarations issued after the trilateral summits make sure to highlight that the
partnerships do not turn against other states, with references such as: “As has been underlined
on previous occasions, this partnership is not exclusive in design or nature, and our three
countries remain committed to welcoming other like-minded parties in our efforts to create
and advance synergies and collaboration.”68 This testifies to the fact that inter-state synergies
in the region are not necessarily perceived positively by other states of the Eastern Mediterranean,
especially when cooperation starts extending to the military and defence sectors.
If we wish to categorise the areas in which the four states in question cooperate according
to their degree of geopolitical sensitivity, we note the following three:

1. Military – Hard Security (as it contains the dimension of hard power antagonism and the
potential of military confrontation)
2. Energy (as it might exclude certain countries from the regional energy security architecture
and export routes)
3. Economy (as it could work in a competitive manner)

68 “Cyprus-Greece-Israel 4th Trilateral Summit Declaration”.

Epilogue: Conditions for Regionalism 27

Cooperation in the areas of the environment and social-political-cultural affairs is considered

little to not-at-all threatening, since such cooperation has a minor impact – if any – on national
security considerations of other countries.
An Eastern Mediterranean regionalist project will eventually have to expand and
encompass more regional – state and non-state – actors to the end of promoting the develop-
ment of common interests and political culture through cooperation. Failure to do so will lead
to an exclusivist project that will defeat its own purpose – i.e., a more stable, secure, integrated
and prosperous region. Yet given the existing problems, as discussed above, such cooperation
should be initially pursued in politically non-sensitive areas or through what is often called
“low politics.” Low politics issues such as the environment and human security can function as
areas of dialogue and cooperation when more sensitive areas, such as national security,
constitute points of contention.69
A non-sensitive area, such as the environment, can be used as an entry point to a more
long-term strategy towards expanded regional cooperation and, ultimately, regionalism. Even
the institutionalization of a broader regional cooperation could begin as mono-sectoral and
focus, for example, on environment-related issues. This approach will provide time and space
to the actors involved so that they can develop the necessary political and technical capacities.
Lastly, it will contribute to trust-building and help the relevant actors develop a more
cooperative mind-set that will later be necessary, when cooperation will have to move to more
politically sensitive issues.

69 Shia-wha Lee, “The United Nations and Low Politics: Environmental & Human Security in East Asia,” Global Economic
Review 30, no. 2 (2001).
28

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adamides, Constantinos, and Odysseas Christou. “Beyond Hegemony: Cyprus, Energy
Securitization and the Emergence of New Regional Security Complexes.” In The
Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, edited by
Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, 179-90. Surrey: Ashgate, 2015.
———. “Energy Security and the Transformation of Regional Securitization Relations in the
Eastern Mediterranean.” In Societies in Transition: The Social Implications of Economic,
Political and Security Transformations, edited by Savvas Katsikides and Pavlos
Koktsidis, 189-206. New York: Springer, 2015.
Alami, Mona. Hezbollah’s Military Involvement in Syria and Its Wider Regional Role. Riyadh:
King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2017.
Alper, and Kaliber. “Re-Imagining Cyprus: The Rise of Regionalism in Turkey’s Security
Lexicon.” In Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads, edited by Thomas Diez and Nathalie
Tocci, 105-23, 2013.
Alternaman, John B., Heather A. Conley, Haim Malka, and Donatienne Ruy. Restoring the
Eastern Mediterranean as U.S. Strategic Anchor. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London:
CSIS, Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.
Bickerton, Christopher J., Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter. “The New
Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era.” Journal of
Common Market Studies 53, no. 4 (2015): 703-722.
Borshchevskaya, Anna. Russia in the Middle East: Motives, Consequences, Prospects. Vol. Policy
Focus 142, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 2016.
Buzan, Barry. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture. A World Order without
Superpowers: Decentred Globalism.” International Relations 25, no. 1 (2011): 3-25.
———. “A Leader without Followers? The United States in World Politics after Busch.”
International Politics 45 (2008): 554-570.
———. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, 1991, 2007.
Bibliography 29

———. “Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World.” In Theories of New
Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader, edited by Frederik Söderbaum and Timothy M.
Shaw, 140-59. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order.” International
Affairs 90, no. 1 (2014): 71-91.
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
“Cyprus-Greece-Israel 4th Trilateral Summit Declaration.” Press and Information Office - Republic
of Cyprus (May 2018). https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/press-releases-
article.html?id=1656#flat.
Dokos, Thanos. “The Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf Region in 2020: Alternative
Scenarios for the Regional Security Environment.” In Mediterranean 2020: The Future
of Mediterranean Security and Politics, edited by Eduard Soler i Lecha and Thanos
Dokos, 34-59. Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011.
Ellinas, Charles. “The Eastern Mediterranean: An Energy Region in the Making.” In The Political
and Economic Challenges of Energy in the Middle East and North Africa, edited by
David Ramin Jalilvand and Kirsten Westphal. London: Routledge, 2017.
Evaghorou, Evaghoras L. “Turbulent Times in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Struggle for
Power.” Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2018): 1-18.
Fawcett, Louise. “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism.”
International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 429-46.
———. “The Regionalization of Security: A Comparative Analysis.” In Effective Multilateralism,
edited by Jochen Prantl, 43-69. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Fawn, Rick. “‘Regions’ and Their Study: Wherefrom, What for and Whereto?”. Review of
International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 5-34.
“The Foreign Minister, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, on Cyprus’ Geopolitical Role in the Eastern
Mediterranean at the Ajc Transatlantic Institute, Brussels.” Press and Information
Office - Republic of Cyprus (17 July 2018). https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/press-releases-
article.html?id=2938#flat.
Frazier, Derrick, and Rober Stewart-Ingersoll. “Regional Powers and Security: A Framework
for Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes.” European Journal of
International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 731-753.
“Gcc Organizational Structure.” Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (2018).
http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx.
30 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

Gómez, Oscar A., and Des Gasper. “Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional
and National Human Deelopment Report Teams.” United Nations Development
Programme - Human Development Report Office (2013).
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human_security_guidance_note_r-nhdrs.pdf.
Grigoriadis, Ioannis. “Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict or
Cooperation?”. Middle East Policy XXI, no. 3 (2014): 124-133.
Gürel, Ayla, Harry Tzimitras, and Hubert Faustmann, eds. East Mediterranean Hydrocarbons:
Geopolitical Perspectives, Markets, and Regional Cooperation Vol. PRIO Cyprus Centre
Report 3. Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2014.
Haq, Mahbub. Reflections on Human Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. The International Politics of the Middle East. Manchester and New
York: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Holland, Robert, and Diana Markides. The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in
the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008.
Indyk, Martin. “Introduction.” In Strategy and Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean: An
American-Israeli Dialogue, edited by Robert Satloff, 1-12. Washington, D.C.: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987.
“Israel, Lebanon Argue over Offshore Energy Block.” Cyprus Mail (31 January 2018).
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/31/israeli-minister-says-lebanese-claim-gas-field-
provocative/.
“Joint Declaration Following the 5th Cyprus-Egypt-Greece Trilateral Summit.” United Nations
General Assembly (November 2017).
https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/newsroom/2018/03/UN%20A-72-
760%20Cyprus-Egypt-Greece.pdf.
Klare, Michael T. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Owl Books, 2002.
Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan. “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs.” In Regional
Orders: Building Security in a New World, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M.
Morgan. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
Lee, Shia-wha. “The United Nations and Low Politics: Environmental & Human Security in
East Asia.” Global Economic Review 30, no. 2 (2001): 52-73.
Legrenzi, Matteo, and Marina Calculli. “Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East:
Options and Challenges.” International Peace Institute Issue Brief (2013).
Bibliography 31

Litsas, Spyridon N. “War, Peace and Stability in the Era of Multipolarity: What Lies at the End
of the Systemic Rainbow.” In The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity,
Politics and Power, edited by Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, 1-19. Surrey
and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015.
Litsas, Spyridon N., and Aristotle Tziampiris, eds. The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition:
Multipolarity, Politics and Power. New York: Routledge, 2015.
———, eds. The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory, Politics and States in a Volatile Era. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2019.
Mallinson, William. Cyprus: A Modern History. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
Mitchell, Wess. “Hearing: U.S. Policy in Europe.” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security
Cooperation (26 June 2018).
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062618_Mitchell_Testimony.pdf.
Moran, Ayla Gürel, Harry Tzimitras, and Hubert Faustmann, eds. Global Energy and the Eastern
Mediterranean Vol. PCC Report 1/2016. Oslo, Nicosia, and New York: PRIO Cyprus
Center, 2016.
Nye, Joseph. International Regionalism: Readings. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.
Proedrou, Filippos. “Re-Conceptualising the Energy and Security Complex in the Eastern
Mediterranean.” The Cyprus Review 24, no. 2 (2012): 15-28.
Prontera, Andrea, and Mariusz Ruszel. “Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Middle
East Policy 24, no. 3 (2017): 145-162.
Schweller, Randall L. Maxwell’s Demon and the Golder Apple: Global Discord in the New
Millenium. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
Sheffy, Yigal. British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918. London and
New York: Routledge, 1998.
Stergiou, Andreas, Kivanç Ulusoy, and Menahem Blondheim, eds. Conflict & Prosperity: Geopolitics
and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. New York: Israel Academic Press, 2017.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit Accross the
Taiwan Strait.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven
E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 99-138. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Sülün, Emine Eminel, and Zenonas Tziarras. “Federal Cyprus in the Context of Regional Security.”
Berghof Foundation & SeeD Security Dialogue Project - Background Paper (2017).
32 The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles and Regionalist

Thomas, Martin. Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914.
Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2008.
The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus Held by the Governments of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey [with
Relevant Documents]. London: H.M. Stationery Office, Great Britain Parliament, 1955.
Tsardanidis, Charalambos. “The Bsec: From New Regionalism to Inter-Regionalism?”. Agora
Without Frontiers 10, no. 4 (2005): 362-91.
“Turkey Warns Israel and Egypt over Cyprus.” TRT World (30 July 2018).
https://www.trtworld.com/europe/turkey-warns-israel-and-egypt-over-cyprus-19259.
Tziampiris, Aristotle. “The New Eastern Mediterranean as a Regional Subsystem.” In The New
Eastern Mediterranean: Theory, Politics and States in a Volatile Era, edited by Spyridon
N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, 1-30. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019.
Tziarras, Zenonas. “The Changing World Order and the ‘Acceleration of History’: The Middle
East Example.” In Acceleration of History: War, Conflict, and Politics, edited by Alexios
Alecou, 17-35. London: Lexington Book, 2016.
———. “Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance.” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 3
(2016): 407-427.
Ullman, Richard. “Redefining Security.” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-153.
Varnava, Andrekos. “The Impact of the Cypriot Contribution During the Great War on
Colonial Society and Loyalties/Disloyalties to the British Empire.” First World War
Studies 8, no. 1: 17-36.
Walton, Dale C. Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century: Multipolarity and the
Revolution in Strategic Perspective. London: Routledge, 2007.
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc., 2010.
Winrow, Gareth M. “The Anatomy of a Possible Pipeline: The Case of Turkey and Leviathan
and Gas Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies 18, no. 5 (2016): 431-447.
Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest. 2nd. ed. London and New
York: Penguin Books, 2011.
 The report can be ordered from:
PRIO Cyprus Centre
P.O.Box 25157, 1307 Nicosia, Cyprus
Tel: +357 22 456555/4
cypruscentre@prio.org
Taking into account the power changes at the global level and their impact on the
regional level (particularly the Eastern Mediterranean), it is here argued, in line with
a small but growing body of literature, that the Eastern Mediterranean should be
seen as a distinct geopolitical space. The report begins with an analysis of the
transition of the international system to multipolarity, one of the outcomes of which
is the regionalization of the international system and the growing importance of
the regional level of analysis. It ultimately examines whether the Eastern
Mediterranean as a distinct region (or sub-region) has been experiencing processes
of regionalism with regard to different areas of cooperation. It further argues that
the synergies currently under development in the Eastern Mediterranean could be
seen as the first step towards a regionalist project (or “proto-regionalism”),
highlighting, however, that the realization of such a project faces multiple
limitations and is highly conditional on a number of factors that need to be
addressed first. A more gradual, well-thought-out and comprehensive approach
should be followed-one that would also address important regional challenges-if
the involved actors want to invest in a stable and sustainable regionalist project.

978-82-7288-919-6 (online)

The report can be ordered from:

PRIO Cyprus Centre
P.O.Box 25157, 1307 Nicosia, Cyprus
Tel: +357 22 456555/4
cypruscentre@prio.org