FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ALBERTO M INA, HON.
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the
ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES
G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (Cruz) filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in
a criminal case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano
Cruz, is the complaining witness. Cruz describes himself as a
third year law student and justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. case —that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent
or friend of a party litigant. Cruz also avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for Cruz to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over Cantimbuhan case . Cruz filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of
Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of
the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. MeTC denied the Motion
for Reconsideration.
Cruz filed before the RTC a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC. The RTC denied the
issuance of an injunctive writ. Cruz cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated
June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-
lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
supervision of a member of the bar.
Cruz filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration with the
MeTC seeking the reversal of the Denial Order of the said court, on
the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In
Abeyance the Trial of the criminal case pending the outcome of the
certiorari proceedings before the RTC. RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. Likewise, the MeTC denied the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the
ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of
Cruz before the MeTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
RULING:
Yes. There is really no problem as to the application of
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34
of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact
that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before
the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in
1
Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
“Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice.—A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school’s clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance.—The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.”
However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of
a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.”7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase “In the court of a justice of the peace” in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to “In the court of a
municipality” as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:
“SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the
Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.” (Emphasis supplied)
2
 A.M . No. M TJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003. *
IM ELDA Y. M ADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO
H. M EDIODEA, 12th M unicipal Circuit Trial Court,
Cabatuan and M aasin, Iloilo, respondent.
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level
court may—without having to resign from their posts—
conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for
and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However,
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the
employee to administrative liability.
FACTS:
A Complaint dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y.
Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with “gross ignorance of the law
amounting to grave misconduct” for failing “to observe and apply
the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure” in Civil Case No. 252.
On September 7, 2001, complainant (maderada) filed before
the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo— presided
over by Judge Erlinda Tersol—an action for
forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and
damages covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Because complainant (maderada) was the clerk of
court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito
Gustilo designated respondent judge (mediodea) to
hear and decide the case.
In an Order dated September 13, 2001, respondent
(mediodea) required the defendants in the civi l case to
show cause why the preliminary injunction should not
be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing
on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation on September 17, 2001, praying that
they be given an additional period of ten days to file an
answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent
reset the hearing to September 28, 2001. Meanwhile,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
the defendants filed their Opposition to complainant’s
prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO.
The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after
the defendants’ lawyer questioned the authority of
complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for
her co-plaintiff. Respondent gave the defendants ten
days to file a motion to disqualify complainant from
appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to
file her opposition thereto.
In his Order dated October 19, 2001, respondent
denied the defendants’ Motion to disqualify
complainant from appearing on behalf of and as
counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions praying for
judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order
dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied
complainant’s Motions because of the pending hearing
for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants’ Motion
for extension of time to file an answer. Complainant did
not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her
Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment on the Complaint, respondent (mediodea)
contends that complainant filed a Petiti on for his inhibition
after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues
that the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is
not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the
exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily
disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later
inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then
reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San
Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot
be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law and
the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before
him. Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies
available to her to question the
3
validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to
render a decision on the case.
Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that
1. she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because
she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such
claim was allegedly without basis, since her
compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were
more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.
2. He further alleges that she did not secure authority
from this Court to appear as counsel, and
3. that she failed to file her leave of absence every time
she appeared in court.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court
Administrator
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary
must devote their full time to government service to ensure
the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although
they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation
or a profession, they should do so only with prior approval of
this Court.
The OCA added that “engaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to
moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in
office.”
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in
the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without
authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more
severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to
file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had
appeared in court to litigate her case.
ISSUE: Whether Maderada, a clerk of court, may appear as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff.
HELD: May appear for herself but not for co-plaintiff
Practice of Law; A party’s right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law; W hen they act as their
own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Individuals have long been permitted to manage,
prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do
so they are not considered to be in the practice of law
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private
vocation or profession when she appeared on her own behalf
in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party’s right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. —In the court of a justice of
the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.”
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may
personally do everything during its progress—from its
commencement to its termination. 41 When they, however, act
as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. 42
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. 43 “One does not
practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,
involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity
and as counsel by rendering legal advice to others.
Private Practice Defined; Complainant cannot be said to
be in the practice of law.
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: “x x x.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for
judges and other officials or employees of
4
the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public,
as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Clearly, in
appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually
holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she
demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to
be in the practice of law.
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate
their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of
the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful
exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we
need not go into a
discussion of the Court’s ruling 49 in Cayetano v. Monsod
regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had
appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for
which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on
behalf of someone else.
The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves
in court will not apply when a person is already appearing for
another party. Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-
plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will
not give complainant authority to appear in court. The
undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two
distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the
efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter
without permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we
consider that this was the first-time complainant appeared in court,
that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing
she did so for a fee. Again, we should be reminded that everyone
connected with an office that is charged with the
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of
responsibility. Given these circumstances, the penalty of
reprimand is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms
of public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from
its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in
order not to diminish the people’s faith in our justice system.
But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield
the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation
that trifles with judicial processes, 52 and that serves only to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.
CANON 9 RULE 9.01;
BAR MATTER 730 (June 13, 1997)
I. Canon 9 Rule 9.01
“A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing.”
1. Delegation of legal work to an unqualified person is
misbehavior
- Practice of law is limited only to individuals duly
qualified in moral character and education and
who passed the Bar examinations
- Practice of law is just a privilege and may be
withdrawn if the lawyer fails to maintain the
standards of moral and professional conduct
- Whether such person is knowledgeable in the law
is immaterial
Example:
 A lawyer under
suspension from practice
of law is NOT a member of
the Bar in good standing
5
 
A lawyer whose authority
to practice law has been
withdrawn due to a
change in citizenship or
allegiance to the country
is NOT a member of the
bar in good standing
2. A lawyer shall not allow a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer
3. A lawyer cannot delegate his authority without the
client’s consent
- It doesn’t follow that the retained lawyer is
always authorized to make such delegation to a
qualified person. Consent of client needed.
- Client-lawyer relationship is a personal one.
II. IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING
UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED
DURING TRIAL (Bar matter 730 June 13, 1997)

Issue raised by retired SC Justice Antonio P. Barredo, as
counsel for the defendant in Caliwara v. Catbagan: WON
a law student who appears before the court under the
Law Student Practice Rule (Rule138-A) should be
accompanied by a member of the bar during trial.

In the case of Caliwara v. Catbagan, the plaintiff was
represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona Jr, an intern of
the Office of the Legal Aid, UP College of Law (UP-OLA).

Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the evidence-in-chief without the
presence of the supervising lawyer.

Justice Barredo questioned Mr. Carmona’s appearance
during the hearing because the latter was not
accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer.
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS

Presiding Judge Pastoral issued an order requiring
Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer
on the next hearing.

UP-OLA and Secretary of Justice executed a MOA
directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the PAO
to supervise Carmona during the subsequent hearings.

Justice Barredo: a law student appearing before the
court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer. However UP-OLA submits: such
matter should be left to the sound discretion of the
court after having at least one supervised appearance.

Court En Banc: A law student appearing before the
RTC under Rule 138-A should AT ALL TIM ES BE
ACCOM PANIED BY A SUPERVISING LAW YER
pursuant to Sec 2 of Rule 138-A.

“Direct supervision and control” requires no less than
the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during
the hearing, in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule:
1. To ensure that there will be no
miscarriage of justice;
2. To provide a mechanism to protect law
school clinic from any potential
vicarious liability arising from culpable
action by their law students;
3. To ensure consistency with the
fundamental principle that no person is
allowed to practice a profession without
possessing the qualifications, particularly a
license, as required by law.

Allowing a law student to appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer CANNOT be left
to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule must be
strictly construed because public policy demands that
legal work should be entrusted only to those who
6
 possess tested legal qualifications, are sworn to
observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
subject to judicial control.
 The rule is different when the law student appears
before an inferior court where the issues are relatively
simple. In this case a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without a supervising lawyer
pursuant to Section 34 Rule 138.
Romulo Cantimbuhan, M alana, Lucila vs.
Judge Cruz & Fiscal Quilatan
Facts:
Petitioner Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against two police officers for less serious physical
injuries in the municipal court of Paranaque.
Petitioners Malana and Lucila, were the senior law
students of the UP, assisting the needy clients in the office of
legal aid. They filed their separate appearances as friends of
complainant petitioner Cantimbuhan which was opposed by
Fiscal Quilatan and sustained by Judge Cruz and disallowed
the appearances if petitioner Malana and Lucila, as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners was also denied.
It was contended by the respondents that pursuant to
Sec. 4 and 15 of Rule 110 of ROC, the fiscal is empowered to
determine who shall be the private prosecutor and the
exercise of the offended party to intervene is subject to the
direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
The basis of the petitioner on the other hand is section 34 of
Rule 138 of the ROC which provides that in the court of the justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar.
Issue:
W/N Malana and Lucila are allowed to appear as
friends of party litigant Cantimbuhan.
Held:
Yes, there is merit in the petition.
The court held that pursuant to Sec. 34 Rule 138 ROC
in a municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in
person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for that
purpose.
In the case of Laput vs. Bernade, a law student was
allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
Manila Municipal Court, who was charged for damages to
properly through reckless imprudence.
Further, the court held that the permission of the
fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as
private prosecutors because the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do if he wants to handle the
case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor’s
participate, whether he be a lawyer or not. On the other hand,
if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private
prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of
the case under his supervision and control. Furthermore, the
court held that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense council
or as friend of the accused in a case before the MTC, with
more reason that he allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of their fiscal.
Wherefore, the orders issued by the respondent Judge
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila
were set aside and Judge Cruz was ordered to allow the
7
appearance and intervention of Malana and Lucila as friends
of Cantimbuhan.
SECTION 4 and 15 OF RULE 110 RULES OF COURT
Section 4.
Information defined. — An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
Section 15.
Place where action is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip,
the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place
of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to
the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the
court where the criminal action is first filed.
In relation to:
Revised Penal Code
Article 2.
Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and
laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be
enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of
the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction
into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned
in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit
an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISM AEL G. KHAN JR. vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIM BILLO
FACTS:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements
were published in the issues of the Manila Bulletin and issue of The
Phili ppine Star.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation
of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines finding respondent guilty
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
8
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Simbillo committed an act in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining
of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is
a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. What adds to the gravity of
respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of M arriage Specialist," he wittingly or
unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but
also the sanctity of an institution still conside red sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the
time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Therefore, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
9
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
LINSANGAN VS ATTY. TOLENTINO
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of
the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged
that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented
the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P 50,000. Complainant also attached
respondents calling card. Respondent, in his defense, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card. The complaint was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is guilty of solicitation of clients
and encroachment of professional services.
Held:
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Yes. Atty. Tolentino is suspended from practicing law for one
year for violating Rule 1.03, 2.03, 8.02, 16.04 and Canon 3 of
Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3 of the CPR, it provides that:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR
PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03
of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY
CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
10
 ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals suits. Although respondent initially denied knowing
Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing. Through Labianos actions, respondents
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result. With regard
to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in
his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his
office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep
into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under
Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
Court of Appeals, Second District, Division 3, California.
Ralph J. GEFFEN, Plaintiff Cross-Defendant and
Appellant, v. Russell J. M OSS, Defendant Cross-
Complainant and Respondent.
Civ. 46079.
Decided: November 24, 1975
FACTS: Ralph J. Geffen appeals from a judgment entered in
favor of Russell J. Moss in an action for damages for breach of
contract. It appears without conflict that, because of an
appointment as a United States magistrate precluding him
from continuing the private practice of law, attorney Geffen
entered into a written agreement with attorney Moss whereby
Geffen agreed to sell and Moss to buy ‘the physical assets,
files and work in process' of Geffen's law practice. The total
purchase price was $27,500. Fifteen thousand dollars was
paid in accordance with the terms of the contract. The action
seeks to recover an unpaid balance of $12,500 plus attorney's
fees and costs.
The pertinent provisions of the contract are as follows:
The purchase shall include:
A. Entire law library, excepting not to exceed ten (10) books to
be agreed upon between the parties, and Martindale -Hubbell
(1969);
B. Any and all furniture, fixtures, furnishings and equipment,
excepting not to exceed six (6) items of decor (not major items)
selected by Geffen; and
C. Subject to approval thereof by the respective clients, all
cases and legal matters now pending in the above law practice
11
except personal injury or wrongful death cases and the
following legal matters:
Geffen will sublet to Moss, at the same rental (Three Hundre d
Dollars ($300.00) per month (and upon the same terms and
conditions as are provided in the Master Lease held by him,
Suite 7 (six (6) rooms) now occupied by Geffen at 11850 East
Firestone Boulevard, Norwalk, California, for a term of three
(3) years. Upon full payment of the purchase price, Geffen will
assign to Moss said Master Lease and will assist in procuring
a further lease in Moss' name alone as lessee thereafter upon
request of Moss.
Geffen expresses an intention to exert his influence for
the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage
present and former clients to utilize the legal services of
the office in the future.
Of the total purchase price, Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00) is attributable to the fair value of physical assets
sold.'
The trial court found, among others, that the plaintiff's
attempt to sell the expectation of future patronage of his
former and current clients and to encourage them to patronize
the defendant, and the defendant's attempt to purchase the
future patronage of the plaintiff's former and current clients
and the recommendation of himself by the plaintiff to those
former and current clients constitutes an attempt to buy and
sell the good will of a law practice, and such sale or attempted
sale of the good will of the law practice is contrary to public
policy and against the spirit and intent of Rules 2 and 3 of
Section 6076 of the Business and Professions Code, ‘The State
Bar Act’ and of the ABA Canons of Ethics No. 4, EC 4—6,
prohibiting the sale of a law practice as a going business.
MIJARES, QUIMSON, BUGTAS, BADAYOS, TABION, POLANGCOS, MAGSINO, QUINTOS
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the contract which
states that Geffen expresses an intention to exert his influence
for the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage
present and former clients to utilize the legal services of the
office in the future is contrary to public policy and
unenforceable.
HELD: YES. Noting that the fair value of the physical assets,
defined as library, furniture, fixtures, furnishings and
equipment is established in the contract to be $15,000 and
that all fees earned for work done by Moss or collected for
work in progress belong to Moss, we immediately wonder what
the additional consideration, payable in monthly installments
totaling $12,500 covers. It does not appear to be for
assignment of the lease since that act is contingent upon and
to be made after full payment of the total purchase price of
$27,500. What else was being sold for the $12,500 now being
sought by Geffen in this action?
No attack is made upon the sufficiency of the e vidence to
support the finding that the parties ‘considered the
expectation of future business from present and former clients
as a principal motivating factor in this sale transaction’ and
that without that expectation the value of the law office would
not exceed $15,000.
Noting, as found by the trial court, that two able experienced
attorneys drew the agreement to sell only insofar as this could be
accomplished ‘within the limits and confines of the canons of ethics,’
they themselves acknowledge some applicable limitation on the scope
of the sale. We agree that, insofar as the parties purport to sell the
physical assets and to assign the leasehold and dispose of pending
office matters, the agreement does not violate public policy as
expressed in the canons of legal ethics. However, it appears obvious
to us that both parties, recognizing a limitation against the sale of
good will,
12
nevertheless attempted to avoid a proscription against such by Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 682, 289 P. 818.) Thus, our research has
deliberately failing to mention good will as such in the brought to light no case in this jurisdiction in whi ch an
agreement. We cannot say that the trial court's resolution of allowance was made to a partner for goodwill upon the
the matter was unreasonable. The attempted sale of the dissolution of a partnership created for the practice of law.’
expectation of future patronage by former and current clients The judgment is modified by striking therefrom that portion
of a law office coupled with an agreement to encourage said awarding defendant attorney's fees. In all other respects the
clients to continue to patronize the purchaser of the physical judgment is affirmed.
assets of the office, under the facts of this case, may well be
said to constitute an attempt to buy and sell the good will of a
law practice as a going business, contrary to public policy,
and that the portion of the agreement purporting to so do is
invalid and unenforceable.

The following language found in Linnick v. State Bar, 62

Cal.2d 17, 21, 41 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 396 P.2d 33, 35, although
involving the activities of a lay person and an attorney,
indicates the existence of applicable e thical considerations:

‘Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, however, prohibits an

attorney from remunerating another for either ‘soliciting’ or
‘obtaining’ employment for him. Whether or not a lay intermediary
solicits the business referred, he may not keep the best interests of
the clients paramount when he profits from his referrals. He is likely
to refer claimants, not to the most competent attorney, but to the
one who is compensating him. (See Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36
Cal.2d 504, 521, 523, 225 P.2d 508 (concurring opinion by Traynor,
J.);

‘The nature of a professional partnership for the practice of law, the

reputation of which depends on the skill, training and experience of
each individual member, and the personal and confidential
relationship existing between each such member and the client,
places such a partnership in a class apart from other business and
professional partnerships. The legal profession stands in a peculiar
relation to the public and the relationship existing between the
members of the profession and those who seek its services cannot be
likened to the relationship of a merchant to his customer. (Barton v.
State