Caedo, Emilio Sebastian M.

Secretary of Justice
Gozali, Philip Armand G. Respondent
Letran, John Ellyson L.
I. The ICC has no jurisdiction over the six soldiers
a. There was no genocide.
i. Per the addendum concerning the Elements of Crimes punished
under the Rome Statute1, the Crime of genocide is committed
through five distinct methods. In these methods, two common
elements are present: (1) the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole
or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such and
(2) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could
itself effect such destruction.
ii. The first common element is not present. The policy of the
Westphalian State was not one which was intended to destroy,
in whole or in part2, the Rohanjees. Rather, it was a policy that
sought the displacement of the Rohanjees.
1. In Paragraph 2, Sentence 3 of the facts, it was stated that
“the Westphalian government adopted and began
implementing a state policy of removing Rohanjees from
Westphalian territory even if they had lived there since
birth or even if they had legal documents that support
their claim of Westphalian citizenship.”
2. In Paragraph 2, Sentence 4 of the facts, it was stated that
the Westphalian military has undertaken a campaign to
“force [Rohanjees] to leave Westphalia.”
3. The instances wherein statements regarding the “ridding”
or the “extermination” of Rohanjees all originated either
from the media or from the six soldiers who mistakenly
believed that the state policy was that of exterminating
the Rohanjees.
a. In paragraph 3 of the facts, it was only the
commanding officer that declared that they will
“completely rid the world of the Rohanjee
parasites!”
b. In paragraph 6 of the facts, it was the media that
reported the brutal campaign of Westphalia was to
“exterminate” the Rohanjees.
4. The crime of genocide requires dolus specialis.3 Here, the
policy was merely to deport an ethnic group recognized
by the majority of the population as being foreigners.

1 See also: Art. 9 of the ROME STATUTE.

2 Prosecutor vs. Semanza, Case. No. ICTR-97-20 (Trial Chamber), May 15, 2003, para. 315: “The drafters of the
Genocide Convention… unequivocally chose to restrict the meaning of ‘destroy’ to encompass only acts that
amount to physical or biological genocide.”
3 Prosecutor vs. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Trial Chamber), Sept. 2, 1998, para. 498, 517-522.

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Caedo, Emilio Sebastian M. Secretary of Justice
Gozali, Philip Armand G. Respondent
Letran, John Ellyson L.
5. There was no intention to destroy the Rohanjee people.
The claims of statements made to indicate such a stance
by the government were derived exclusively from the
media and the statement of a lone mistaken soldier. They
find no basis in the conduct undertaken by the
Westphalian government or the Westphalian military.
iii. The second common element is not present. The killing of the
ten leaders did not take place in the context of a manifest pattern
of similar conduct.
1. As previously stated, there has been no indication of any
killing being performed or sanctioned by the government
of Westphalia nor by the Westphalian military. For
conviction of the crime of genocide, the particular
conduct must have taken place within the context of a
manifest pattern of similar conduct.4
2. The given facts are bereft of any other circumstance of
destroying the Rohanjee people.
iv. The crime, therefore, of the six Westphalian soldiers, is not
genocide (by any means), but merely that of Murder plain and
simple, a separate and distinct concept from that of genocide.
1. The simple act of Murder5 does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.6
v. Therefore, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction.
b. Assuming arguendo that there was genocide, the matter of prosecution
is a political question, and there can be no surrender.
i. The case of Crespo vs. Mogul7 makes the distinction between
judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion. Prosecution is
exclusively within the sphere of the executive. To pray for
prosecution8 would violate the separation of powers, as it is a
political question.
ii. The facts are bereft of any indicia that Westphalia is a state party
to the Rome Statute.
1. Assuming arguendo that Westphalia is a state party to the
Rome Statute, under the VIFEDCA9, it is Westphalia

4 Prosecutor vs. Al-Bashir.

5 Where Murder is mentioned in the text of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, it is in relation to Crimes
Against Humanity, which may be committed by Murder, as well as the War Crime of Murder. Those two crimes are
legally distinct and separate from the crime of Genocide as alleged in the warrant of arrest and the findings of the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.
6 Art. 5 of the ROME STATUTE.
7 Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987.
8 i.e. Filing of the information and bringing the case
9 Art. V(6): The custody of any WESTPHALIAN personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction

shall immediately reside with WESTPHALIAN military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial proceedings…
2
Caedo, Emilio Sebastian M. Secretary of Justice
Gozali, Philip Armand G. Respondent
Letran, John Ellyson L.
who will immediately have custody over its personnel in
light of the fact found in paragraph 7 sentence 510. The
informing of such a fact may be deemed to be a
construction request considering that such a request may
be made at any time from the commission of the offense
until completion of all judicial proceedings.
II. The ICC has no jurisdiction over the Eastphalian Diplomat
a. There was no genocide
i. For the same reasons stated in I.a. of this memorandum, we
submit that there was no genocide.
ii. The crime committed by the Eastphalian diplomat is not the
crime of genocide
1. He took no part in the act of killing itself.
2. If any, the Eastphalian diplomat is guilty merely as
Accomplice to Murder.
iii. Granting that he is an Accomplice to Murder, the Court may
not take custody of his person.
1. The simple act of Murder does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.11
2. (Please see discussion in I.a.iv. of this memorandum)
b. Assuming arguendo that there was genocide, there can be no arrest and
prosecution or surrender.
i. Assuming arguendo that the act committed was genocide
nevertheless the Court cannot effect any arrest or surrender to
the ICC.
1. The Philippines is a state party and is therefore subject to
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(VCDR).
2. It is bound under Article 29 thereof, which states that:
“the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable.
He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention.”
ii. Assuming arguendo that the exception under Article 27(2) of the
Rome Statute12 applies, said Diplomat is currently residing in the
Eastphalian embassy.
1. Per Article 22 of the VCDR: “The premises of the
mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving
State may not enter them, except with the consent of the
head of the mission.”
10 Westphalia informed the Philippines that Westphalia would request custody of the Westphalian soldiers in the
event that the Philippines would exercise jurisdiction over the soldiers.
11 Art. 5 of the ROME STATUTE.
12 Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under

national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
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Caedo, Emilio Sebastian M. Secretary of Justice
Gozali, Philip Armand G. Respondent
Letran, John Ellyson L.
2. The exception in Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute13 only
refers to the official capacity of a person. The premises
of the mission (i.e. the Embassy) is not an official
capacity, thus it is not covered by the exception.
3. As applied to this case, the Embassy building refers to the
premises of the Diplomatic Mission of the Kingdom of
Eastphalia to the Philippines.
4. So long as the Diplomat remains in the Embassy, without
consent of the Head of the Mission, for which there is no
evidence, no agent of the Philippines may effect an arrest,
and thus a surrender, or the Diplomat.
III. The Direct Contracting Method was in accordance with the GPRA
a. The Loan Agreement stipulating Direct Contracting Method was an
Executive Agreement, and the Construction Agreement is an accessory
contract of the Loan Agreement.
i. Here, the Executive14, through the DOF, entered into a Loan
Agreement with the WEXIM Bank, a bank owned and
controlled by Westphalia, in the amount of $1 billion for the
construction of a joint military base between the two countries.
This was done pursuant to the VIFEDCA. The Executive, being
the chief architect of the nation’s foreign policy15, was well
within its prerogative to enter into the Loan Agreement.
1. The Loan Agreement being an executive agreement, the
Construction Agreement with ZTZ, done as an accessory
to and in pursuance16 of the Loan Agreement,17 attains
indivisibility with the same. Thus, the Construction
Contract was entered into in accordance with Sec. 4 of
the GRPA.
2. The case is thus on all fours with the case of Land Bank18:
An accessory contract following an executive agreement
cannot be read independently of the latter. It attains
indivisibility with the Executive Agreement, such that the
character of one has likewise become the character of the
other. Thus, if the Executive Agreement provides for a
13 Id.
14 “The Executive may enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval,
including those covering commercial relations. These executive agreements usually involve arrangements of a more
or less temporary nature.” (Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, Oct. 31, 1961.)
15 Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 1, 2011.
16 In paragraph 5 of the facts, it was stated that the Construction Agreement was entered into “[p]ursuant to the

Loan Agreement…”
17 “An international agreement is binding to a State who is a signatory thereto, whether in the form of a treaty or

executive agreement, the latter being similar to the former, except that they do not require legislative concurrence
and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.” (Bayan Muna vs. Romulo,
G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 1, 2011.)
18 Land Bank of the Philippins v. Atlanta Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014.

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Caedo, Emilio Sebastian M. Secretary of Justice
Gozali, Philip Armand G. Respondent
Letran, John Ellyson L.
procurement process different from that of the GPRA
and its IRR, the same is valid under Sec. 4 of the GPRA.19
b. Assuming arguendo, that the Loan Agreement was not an executive
agreement, both the Loan Agreement and the Construction Agreement
are accessory contracts of the VIFEDCA.
i. Applying the Land Bank20 case, it an accessory contract to
VIFEDCA, a treaty. In Article VIII-A of the VIFEDCA, the
Philippines and Westphalia agreed that “Westphalia agrees to
provide adequate financing and resources for the construction
and operation of joint Westphalian-Philippine military bases.”21
It was also agreed to use the most efficient procurement
methods for the construction of military bases.22
ii. Here, it was agreed upon by the parties that the Direct
Contracting Method would be best.
1. The Construction Agreement, obtained in the exercise of
the discretion expressly reserved by the treaty, was thus
an accessory contract to the same. It is indivisible from
the treaty and, pursuant to Land Bank, cannot be read
independently from the treaty.
2. Following the rule of pacta sunt servanda, part of the law of
the land under the Incorporation Clause, the Philippines
is obliged to keep their agreements with Westphalia, and
necessarily ZTZ Corporation, in good faith.
3. Thus, the Loan Agreement and the Construction
Contract was still entered into in accordance with Sec. 4
of the GRPA.

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 It is submitted that pursuant to this provision, the loan agreement is in furtherance and pursuant to the

VIFEDCA.
22 It is submitted that pursuant to this provision, the construction agreement is in furtherance and pursuant to the

VIFEDCA
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