Kinds of jurisdiction party from defendant or

1. Subject matter jurisdiction – conferred by law raising issue may be

o General power of a court to decide of subject agreed upon
o Enumeration of all issues a court has power to matter - in criminal
decide upon jurisdiction cases: venue
2. Exercise of jurisdiction - as determined by SC - net effect: is
o The SC can say in which courts can certain court jurisdictional
cases be filed acquired
3. Jurisdiction over the case - acquired by the physical jurisdiction
filing of the complaint and payment of correct docket (even though
fees it doesn‘t
4. Jurisdiction over Person – upon correct service of have subject
summon matter
5. Jurisdiction over Property – upon correct service of jurisdiction)
writ of attachment
6. Jursidiction over the Issues – based on what the When is the latest time to raise subject matter
parties raised in the pleadings jurisdiction? Upon appeal (Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive
o Court can only decide on issues raised/brought Associaion) but not when the appellate court has already
before it even though not expressly stated by decided (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy)
the parties
o There is only an issue when the defendant
controverts. If the defendant admits everything Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 S 29 (1968)
then there is no issue Barely one month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of
7. Residual jurisdiction – residue of jurisdiction over the 1948, spouses Tijam filed an action to recover P1,908
case against the spouses Sibonghanoy at CFI Cebu. The CFI
o at some point, the lower court can no longer ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution
decide all of the issues except a few against the defendants. The writ having been returned
o Court loses residual jurisdiction upon unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
transmittal of the records of the case to the execution against the bond issued by Manila Surety and
appellate court Fidelity Co. The latter opposed the motion, but its oppositions
were denied by the CFI. Said denials were affirmed by the
When can a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of CA in December 1962. In January 1963, Manila Surety filed a
jurisdiction be made? motion to dismiss alleging that when the action was filed
GR: within the time for but before filing the answer to the before CFI Cebu, Sec.88 of Judiciary Act of 1948 already
complaint or pleading (Rule 16, Sec.1) placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
 Ratio: Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000 hence
(Rule 9, Sec.1) CFI had no jurisdiction. The CA transmitted the case to the
EX: However, when it appears from the pleadings or the SC observing that the SC ―frowned upon the ‗undesirable
evidence on record: practice‘ of appellants submitting their case for decision and
o that the court has no jurisdiction over the then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for
subject matter, lack of jurisdiction when adverse.‖
o that there is another action pending between HELD:
the same parties for the same cause, (litis - Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon
pendentia) the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
o or that the action is barred by a prior judgment affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
(res judicata) of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
o or by statute of limitations, (prescription) the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
the court shall dismiss the claim (Rule 9, Sec.1) circumstances of the present case —the Surety is now
 this is also known as the OMNIBUS MOTION RULE barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour
 the RTC may only dismiss motu proprio on the grounds for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore
enumerated in Rule 9, Sec.1 in the case with its active participation.
 the MTC may dismiss motu proprio on any ground  - Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
summary procedure unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a. Subject matter jurisdiction and estoppel a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
Subject Matter Estoppel Venue abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Jurisdiction - The doctrine of laches or of ―stale demands‖ is based
- Totality of - subject - where the upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
issues a matter case should peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
court has jurisdiction be filed and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
power to may no - waivable question of time but is principally a question of the
decide upon longer be - may be in inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
- Not waivable assailed the locality of enforced or asserted.
- prevents plaintiff or
- It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
- Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court
Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 169370, April 14, 2008
- Petitioners Manuel Melgazo, Eustacio Atwel and Lucia
Pilapil were the President, VP and Treas. of Concepcion
Progressive Association (CPA), respectively. The
association has a wet market (allegedly acquired as
early as 1968)
- while CPA was in the process of registering as a stock
corporation (in 1997), its other elected officers and
members formed their own group and registered
themselves in the SEC as officers and members of
respondent Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.
(CPAI). Petitioners were not listed either as officers or
members of CPAI. Later, CPAI objected to petitioners'
collection of rentals from the wet market vendors.
- CPAI filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction.
Because of RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code), the
case was transferred to the RTC (special commercial
courts)
- The special commercial court ruled that:
o the deed of sale covering the property was in
the name of CPA, not Emiliano Melgazo (father
of petitioner)
o but CPA and CPAI are the same. Rentals
should be paid to CPAI not to petitioners
- Hence, petitioners appealed to CA and contested the
jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the
case
o Not an intra-corporate dispute
- CA ruled that even though there was no intra-corporate
dispute, petitioners are barred from questioning the
court‘s jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel
- On appeal to the SC, petitioners argued that estoppel
cannot apply because a court's jurisdiction is conferred
exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the
parties' agreement or by estoppels
HELD: MTD granted
- The special commercial court considered the case an
intra-corporate dispute when it acquired jurisdiction over
the case
- But in this case, the petitioners were not officers or
members of CPAI
- Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the
regulation of CPAI (or even CPA). The determination as
to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled
to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and
should be threshed out in a regular court.
- Lozon v. NLRC: The operation of estoppel on the
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether
the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had
no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel
- Tijam provided an exceptional circumstance. To void the
trial court's decision in Tijam for lack of jurisdiction was
not only unfair but patently revolting considering that the
question on jurisdiction was raised only after 15 years of
tedious litigation.
Why was the Atwel case dismissed and not just
transferred or continued in the RTC which has
jurisdiction over cases that are not intra-corporate
disputes? Because they first filed it in the SEC which has no
jurisdiction in the first place. Transferring it to the special
comm‘l court does not mean the latter acquired jurisdiction
b. Exercise of jurisdiction
Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664, 10
November 2015
- petition for injunction to prevent respondent SJ Land
from selling shares which were already bought by
petitioners to other stockholders
- case was raffled to a regular court (Branch 276) which
issued the TRO and granted the application for WPI
- respondents filed MTD otg of lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter because it is an intra-corporate dispute
and should be heard by a special commercial court
(Branch 256)
- RTC granted the MTD
- Petitioners filed MR, saying that it was the Office of the
Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa that raffled to Branch 276
HELD:
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is
governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued
from time to time by the Court
- the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of
procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction.
- RA 8799 only provided for the transfer of the cases
under Sec. 5 of PD 902-A from the SEC to RTCs, being
courts of general jurisdiction (the transfer of jurisdiction
was made not to particular RTC branches but to RTCs
in general)
o when the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs
was first implemented, they were transmitted to
the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle
between or among its different branches,
unless a specific branch has been designated
as a Special Commercial Court
o eventually an AM was issued designating a
Special Commercial Court per locality to
streamline
- ITC, the intra-corporate dispute was filed with the Office
of the COC of RTC Muntinlupa which is the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court 
from the time of such filing, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
- The proper course of action was not for the commercial
case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have
first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then assign said case to the
only designated Special Commercial Court in the
station, i.e., Branch 256.
 c. Jurisdiction over the case
Manchester Development v. CA, 149 S 562 (1987)
- underpayment of docket fees (Magaspi case= action for
recovery of ownership and possession of parcel of land;
Present case = action for damages and specific
performance)
- during reassessment of filing fee complaint was
amended (damages deleted but original prayer
maintained)
HELD:
- a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court
- in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court
- there is no such original complaint that was duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null
and void.
- (1) all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
- (2) The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
- (3) An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 S 274 (1989)
- Sun Insurance filed complaint with RTC Makati for
consignation of premium refund on a fire insurance
policy against Manuel Uy Pu Tiong. Latter failed to
respond within reglementary period
- Private respondent filed complaint with RTC QC for
refund of premiums plus damages. The amount of
damages was not specified but it may be inferred that
damages sought amounted to P50M. He only paid P210
as docket fee
- Upon re-raffling and reassessment of the case, the
Clerk of Court told Judge Asuncion that it was difficult to
assess the docket fees because amount of damages
was not indicated
- Private resp filed re-amended complaint stating a claim
of P10M in actual compensatory damages but the body
alleged damages in the amount of P44,601,623.70
nd
- Judge Asuncion ordered admission of the 2 amended
complaint and reassessment of docket fees based on
the P10M amount of damages. So priv resp paid only
P39,786 as docket fee
- Sun Insurance filed pet for cert with CA questioning said
order (which was dismissed by CA)
- Priv resp filed supplemental complaint alleging
additional claim of P20M and paid add‘l 64k docket fee
while Sun Insurance was appealing to SC
- Sun Insurance argued before SC that CA erred in not
finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction on
the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper
docket fee
o the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49 more or less
o Not having paid the same, complaint should be
dismissed and all orders annulled
o Manchester should apply
- Priv resp: Manchester should not apply retroactively for
at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchester ruling yet. Magaspi should apply
HELD:
- The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
- Magaspi: the case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court (it just so happened that in Magaspi there was
confusion as to the nature of the case)
- The principle in Manchester could very well be applied
in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it is
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
o However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay
any additional docket fee until the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in
Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a
quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
and that the amended complaint could not
have been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was null and void.
o In the present case, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required.
- (new rules amending Manchester)
Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. 136048, 23 January 2001
- Heirs of Mercader filed for damages against JB Lines,
the operator of the bus where Dominador Mercader was
riding and which fell into the river due to the driver‘s
negligence
- The complaint simply asked for damages of an amount
to be proven in court
- JB Lines filed a bill of particulars and claimed that it was
wrongfully impleaded. Among the defenses is the
payment of incorrect amount of docket fees.
- RTC awarded 50k compensatory damages for the death
of Dominador Mercader plus more than P1M for loss of
earning capacity and other damages
- CA affirmed RTC decision with modification (reduced
loss of earning capacity to 798k)
HELD:
- Generally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the commencement of the action,
unless such statute provides for its retroactive
application. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it
continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial
court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character that
 would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance.
- The Manchester ruling, which became final in 1987, has
no retroactive application and cannot be invoked in the
subject Complaint filed in 1984. The Court explicitly
declared: To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record
Standard set in Baritua v. Mercader: damages that are
quantifiable at the time of the filing of the complaint must be
alleged therein and shall serve as basis for the docket fees
Metrobank v. Perez, G.R. 181842, 5 February 2010
- 1998: Petitioner Solidbank had a lease contract (15y)
with respondent Bernardita Perez when it was acquired
by Metrobank.
- 2002: Metrobank terminated the contract
- Perez filed a complaint for breach of contract and
damages and asked that she be paid the would be
unrealized income
- Malolos RTC ruled in favor of Perez and ordered
Metrobank to pay her the would be unrealized income
for the ensuing idle months in the amount of more than
P7M plus other damages
- On appeal Metrobank challenged the RTC‘s jurisdiction
otg of Perez‘s failure to pay docket fees
- Perez‘s response: at the time of filing and payment, the
period that the building would be idle could not yet be
determined
- CA affirmed TC: Perez could not have been certain at
time of filing that Metrobank would no longer return. It
would have been speculative…
HELD:
- Sun Insurance relaxed the rule in Manchester. As
echoed in Heirs of Hinog v. Melico: non-payment of
docket fee at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment.
o When insufficient filing fees were initially paid
by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule
does not apply
- Metrobank raised the issue of jurisdiction only before
the appellate court after it and its co-petitioner
participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
While lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a
party may be held in estoppel if, as in the present case,
it has actively taken part in the proceedings being
questioned
- Nonetheless, Perez should still pay the balance in
docket fees
When is the latest time to raise lack of jurisdiction based
on non-payment of docket fees? Before perfection of
appeal (Metrobank v. Perez)
d. Residual jurisdiction
section 9, Rule 41
Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing
of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as
to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the
appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with 2 of Rule 39,
and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a)
Two Kinds of Appeal
1. By notice
2. By record
When is jurisdiction over the case lost, during which
only residual jurisdiction is exercised? (Rule 41, Sec.9)
- In appeals by notice of appeal, upon:
o the perfection of the appeal filed (filing of the
notice of appeal) in due time and
o the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties
- in appeals by record on appeal, upon:
o the approval of the records on appeal filed in
due time and
o the expiration of the appeal of the other parties
Until when can residual jurisdiction be exercised? Prior to
the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal
What are the components of residual jurisdiction? (Rule
41, Sec.9) The court may:
- issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal
- approve compromises
- permit appeals of indigent litigants
- order execution pending appeal
- allow withdrawal of appeal
e. Jurisdiction over the person or property
section 20, Rule 14
Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
(23a)
section 2, Rule 47
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of,
or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief. (n)
section 48, Rule 39
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)
Philam Life v. Breva, G.R. 147937, 11 November 2004
- respondent Milagros Morales filed a complaint for
damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums.
Complaint stated that petitioner could be served with
summons and other court processes thru its Manager at
its branch office in Davao City
- Summons served upon Philam‘s Davao office and
received by Insurance Service Officer
- Philam filed MTD otg of lack of jurisdiction over its
person due to improper service of summons. The
employee who received was not among those
enumerated in Rule 14, RoC
- Morales filed amended complaint alleging that summons
may also be served at Philam‘s principal office in Manila
- RTC denied MTD and directed service of alias
summons in Manila (improper service of summons not
ground for dismissal because case is still in its initial
stage)
- CA held that the service of alias summons vested the
RTC with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
HELD:
- An alias summons may be served in case of wrongful
service of summons
- ITC, complaint was amended after the petitioner filed
the motion to dismiss.
- Where the defendant has already been served
summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of
another summons. But if no summons yet been validly
served on the defendant, new summons for the
amended complaint must be served on him
- ITC, since at the time the complaint was amended no
summons had been properly served on the petitioner
and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons
should have been issued on the amended complaint.
SO, the TC should have ordered the service of an
original summons, not an alias summons (which is just a
continuation of an original summons)
- Nonetheless, alias vs. original = mere nomenclature
A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant (Rule 16, par.1a)
presupposes that the court really has no jurisdiction
over the person regardless of the proper service of
summons. (example: when the defendant is outside the
Philippines)
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 173946, 19 June 2013
- Boston Equity filed a complaint for sum of money
against spouses Toledo. Lolita Toledo responded that
her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo is
already dead. She was then required to submit a list of
heirs. Boston Equity then filed a Motion for Substitution
- During trial (after Boston‘s evidence were admitted),
Lolita filed a MTD otg that:
o the complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in interest
o trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule
86
o court erred in ordering the substitution of the
deceased Manuel by his heirs
o court must also dismiss case against Lolita
Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86
- TC denied MTD otg that it was filed out of time citing
Section 1, Rule 16 which states that: "Within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made‖
o Lolita‘s attack on the jurisdiction of the court
was already barred by laches as respondent
failed to raise the said ground in her amended
answer and during the pre-trial, despite her
active participation in the proceedings.
- On appeal, CA granted Lolita‘s MTD
o courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant only when the latter voluntarily
appeared or submitted to the court or by
coercive process issued by the court to him.
When Boston filed the complaint, defendant
Manuel Toledo was already dead. CFI could
not have acquired jurisdiction over his person
o issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, even for the first time
on appeal
o when issue on jurisdiction was raised by
respondent, the court a quo had not yet
decided the case, hence, there is no basis for
the court a quo to invoke estoppel
HELD: CA reversed. MTD denied.
- MTD filed out of time
- No GAD by RTC. Correct in denying MTD because it
was filed 6y and 5m after Lolita filed her amended
answer
o clear contravention of the express mandate of
Section 1, Rule 16: motion to dismiss shall be
filed within the time for but before the filing of
an answer to the complaint or pleading
o MTD filed after submission of evidence! Only
delaying tactic
o Not the first MTD filed  earlier MTD =
unenforceability of petitioner‘s claim under the
Statute of Frauds, which motion was denied
o Tijam not applicable because only for subject
matter jurisd (Only SM jurisd cannot be
waived)
- Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which
are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such
defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion
 to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the
defense.
- Court‘s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one‘s person
is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it.
In case of death, this is impossible to invoke. Failure to
serve summons on one‘s person will not be a cause for
the dismissal of the complaint against the other
defendants
- "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in
the controversy or subject matter is separable from the
interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily
be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which
does complete justice between them. Also, a person is
not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him or her and those
already parties to the action, or if he or she has no
interest in the subject matter of the action."
o ITC, the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for
the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel
and his wife is solidary
- Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that
"neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground
for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately."
o A misjoined party must have the capacity to
sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or
against the misjoined party is pursued in a
separate case. In this case, therefore, the
inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be
considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action
would have proceeded against him had he
been alive at the time the collection case was
filed by petitioner. This being the case, the
remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does
not obtain here.
o The name of Manuel as party-defendant
cannot simply be dropped from the case.
Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in
Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te should be followed: the
failure to effect service of summons unto one
of the defendants, does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the other
defendant was validly served with summons
and the case with respect to the answering
defendants may still proceed independently
o Only the case against Manuel must be
dismissed: Section 1 of Rule 3 = only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action
 The TC erred when it ordered the
substitution of Manuel by his heirs.
Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the
pendency of the case
Generally, in both solidary and joint obligations, neither
party is an indispensable party
f. Jurisdiction over the issues
g. Hierarchy of courts  implicit condition:
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Sy v. Coslap, 365 S 49 (2001)
- respondent Fenina Mina wrote a letter-complaint to
COSLAP about SM Fairview occupying her property
- Henry Sy was subpoenaed by COSLAP.
- Sy sought dismissal of the case (by special appearance)
otg that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over Sy‘s person
- COSLAP denied Sy‘s MTD, citing COSLAP‘s purpose in
providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems in general
- Without filing MR, Sy filed petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before SC
HELD:
Two ways by which the SC exercises its power of judicial
review:
1. Original jurisdiction - The SC‘s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared with RTCs
and the CA. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. This hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs.
2. Appellate jurisdiction under Rule 45
 Does not include COSLAP! (ONLY COURTS)
 EO 561 which created COSLAP provided that
its orders and decisions are appealable to the
SC by certiorari within 30d
 BUT the Consti (Sec.30, Art.VI) provides that no
law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Fabian v.
Desierto)
 Appeals from COSLAP must first be brought to
the CA! (QUASI-JUDICIAL)  UNDER RULE
43 (APPEAL FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCIES)
Sir Lumba thinks that the SC is wrong in this case
because the COSLAP was not exercising its quasi-
judicial powers
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. CA, G.R. No. 130866, 16
September 1998
- Respondent Bienvenido Aricayos filed an illegal
dismissal case against St. Martin Funeral before the
NLRC.
- The LA ruled that there was no ER-EE rel‘n and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
- NLRC reversed and remanded case to LA; denied MR
- St. Martin Funeral filed petition before SC for GAD by
NLRC
HELD:
- NLRC decisions used to be appealable first to the
Secretary of Labor until this provision was repealed. No
appellate review has since then been provided for.
- BUT there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep
 the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is
that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications
- remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file an MR as
a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65
- in Sec. 9 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7902, the CA
has Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission… Except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines (the NLRC was not included in
the list of quasi-judicial agencies)
o this is illogical and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are
no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or of any other court for that matter.
- all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
TWO KINDS OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
RULE 45: A MODE OF APPEAL
RULE 65: AN ORIGINAL ACTION (RTC, CA, SC)
KNDS OF APPEAL FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
GR: appeal to CA under Rule 43
EX: Labor cases (no mode of appeal from the NLRC. Can
only be by petition for certiorari under Rule 65)
Ordinary appeal v. Extraordinary appeal
Ordinary Appeal – appellate court cannot dismiss it (Appeal)
Extraordinary Appeal – appellate court can dismiss it (Petition
for Review)
Modes of appeal from different courts of origin
MTC  RTC under Rule 40 (Ordinary)  CA under Rule 42
(Extraordinary)  SC under Rule 45 (Extraordinary)
RTC  CA under Rule 41 (Ordinary) UNLESS involves only
questions of law then CA under Rule 42 (Extraordinary) 
SC under Rule 45 (Extraordinary)
QJ  CA under Rule 43 (Extraordinary)  SC under Rule 45
(Extraordinary)
Jurisdiction of the different courts
A. Original (exclusive/concurrent)
1. Supreme Court
section 5(1), article VIII, Const.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. (NOTE: NO INJUNCTION)
paragraph A, section 7, article IX, Constitution (CSC,
COMELEC, COA)
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.
section 2, Rule 64
Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided
section 1-4, Rule 65
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings
of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section
3, Rule 46. (3a)
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates
to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days
section 1, Rule 43
Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
sec. 18, art. VII, Const.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing.
section 1, Rule 56
Original cases cognizable. — Only petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and
attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme
Court.
paragraph 4, section 4, Sandiganbayan law
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and
exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as
herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with
the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and
the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged,
he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the
offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the
Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized;
Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had
therefore been filed separately with a regular court but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the
Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same
notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the
regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further,
that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the
criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the
corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be,
shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent
jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law,
are criminal cases against officers and members of the
armed forces in the active service.
2. Court of Appeals
section 9(1)(2), BP 129
Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction; (NOTE: NO INJUNCTION)
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commission, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, Except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A.
No. 7902.)
Rule 47(1)
Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions
in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
3. Regional Trial Court
section 19, 21, BP 129
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where
the demand or claim exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or
claim exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where
the gross value of the estate exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Four hundred
thousand pesos (400,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as
now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(300,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items
exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000.00). (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;
and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public
ministers and consuls.
section 10, Rule 47
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of
Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a judgment or
final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It
shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3,
4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto.
sections 1(1)(2), RSP
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded,
the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where
the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.
sections 2, 4, RSC
SEC. 2. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the procedure in
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed Three hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.
SEC. 4. Applicability.—The Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all
actions which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or
relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or
reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of
criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the
criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal
action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules Of
Criminal Procedure. These claims or demands may be: (a)
For money owed under any of the following: 1. Contract of
Lease; 2. Contract of Loan; 3. Contract of Services; 4.
Contract of Sale; or 5. Contract of Mortgage; (b) For
damages arising from any of the following: 1. Fault or
negligence; 2. Quasi-contract; or 3. Contract; (c) The
enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this
Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
 SC CA RTC MTC
Martial Law Yes (Constitution)
Ambassadors Yes (Constitution) Yes (BP 129;
concurrent)
Certoirari, Prohibition, Yes (Rule 65) Yes (Rule 65) Yes (Rule 65)
Mandamus
Quo warranto Yes Yes Yes
Habeas Corpus Yes Yes Yes
Injunction Yes
Specific Performance Yes (incapable of
pecuniary estimation 
sec. 19, 21, BP 129)
Rescission (flipside of Yes
specific performance)
Damages Yes (above 300k if Yes
outside MM or above
400k if within MM)
Replevin Yes (above 300k if Yes
outside MM or above
400k if within MM)
REAL ACTIONS
Accion Yes (above 20k if Yes
reinvindicatoria outside MM or above
(recovery of 50k if within MM)
possession based on
ownership)
Accion publiciana Yes (above 20k if Yes
(recovery of outside MM or above
possession based on 50k if within MM)
real right of
possession)
Reconveyance Yes (above 20k if Yes
(Recovery of title outside MM or above
based on real right of 50k if within MM)
ownership)
FE/UD Yes
Partition  Real Yes (above 20k if Yes
Action? outside MM or above
50k if within MM)
REM Foreclosure  Yes (above 20k if Yes
Real Action? outside MM or above
50k if within MM)
Land titling Yes Yes
Quieting of Title  Yes
Real action?
- Bank of
Commerce: Real
Action
- Sabitsana: Rule
63
Declaratory relief Yes

a. Ambassadors, public ministers, consuls 
FOREIGN
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004); main
opinion; discussion on the Alien Tort Statute only
- Alvarez-Machain was a Mexican physician suspected of
participating in the torture and murder of a DEA agent
assigned in Mexico
- The DEA hired Mexican men including petitioner Sosa
to abduct Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the US for
trial
- The case against Alvarez-Machain was eventually
dismissed
- Alvarez-Machain then brought a civil action against the
US government, DEA agents and the Mexican men who
were responsible for his abduction. He sought damages
from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) alleging false arrest, and from Sosa under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for a violation of the law of
nations.
o FTCA: authorizes suit for personal injury
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office
o ATS: district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States
- On the ATS: the District Court awarded summary
judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez. Affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit
o The ATS not only provides federal courts with
subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a
cause of action for an alleged violation of the
law of nations
- Before the SC, Sosa argues that there is no relief under
the ATS because the statute does no more than vest
federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor
authorizing the courts to recognize any particular right of
action without further congressional action
HELD:
- federal courts could entertain claims once the
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in
violation of the law of nations would have been
recognized within the common law of the time.
- In history: There was a sphere in which rules binding
individuals for the benefit of other individuals overlapped
with the norms of state relationships. Blackstone
referred to it when he mentioned three specific offenses
against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law
of England: (1) violation of safe conducts, (2)
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and (3)
piracy.
o Basically: common law afforded criminal law
remedies for violations of the law of nations
o An assault against an ambassador, for
example, impinged upon the sovereignty of the
foreign nation and if not adequately redressed
could rise to an issue of war
- Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a
relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the
law of nations. Uppermost in the legislative mind
appears to have been offenses against ambassadors,
violations of safe conduct, and individual actions arising
out of prize captures and piracy
o These are of the hybrid variety because these
are principally incident to whole states or
nations (hence they are more definite and
actionable, acdg to Blackstone)
o Basically, some torts in violation of the law of
nations were understood to be within the
common law.
 NOTE: positive law was frequently
relied upon to reinforce and give
standard expression to the brooding
omnipresence of the common law
then thought discoverable by reason
- In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action, the reasonable
inference from the historical materials is that the statute
was intended to have practical effect the moment it
became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability at the time.
- BUT ITC, federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when ATS was enacted.
o This is because the treatment of common law
in the US legal system has changed
o Thus, Alvarez‘s detention claim must be
gauged against the current state of
international law
 Alvarez grounded his argument on the
UDHR and ICCPR but these two do
not impose obligations as a matter of
international law
 There is no norm of requisite force
prohibiting a forcible abduction across
a border
b. Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, injunction
Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 200670, 6 July 2015
- Subic and Clark were converted into special economic
zones.
- Under RA 7227, in lieu of national and local taxes, all
businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross
income tax rate of five percent (5%). Also, they shall be
exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties on the
importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into
the Subic Special Economic Zone
- The same tax and fiscal incentives were extended to
Clark under RA 9400
- The DOF issued RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT and
excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport
Zones
- petitioner, which represents the businesses and
enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone, filed the
instant petition alleging that respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-2012
- OSG: petition must be denied outright because the
special civil action for certiorari cannot be used to assail
RR 2-2012 which was issued by the respondents in the
 exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers
o certiorari can only be used against a public
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers
o violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts
o RR 2-2012 not inconsistent with RA 7227 and
RA 9400: Section 3 allows the businesses and
enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone to
claim for a tax refund upon submission of
competent proof that they used imported fuel
exclusively within the Subic Special Economic
Zone and Clark Freeport Zone
HELD: Petition denied for being improper remedy
- DOF did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
(Rule 65)
o For a special civil action for certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must concur:
1. it must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
2. the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction
3. there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
o Judicial function = power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties
o Quasi-judicial function = action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative bodies required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature
- DOF acted within the exercise of their quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers
o Under Sec.244 NIRC
- Moreover, the case seeks the declaration by the SC of
the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned
rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which the SC has only appellate,
not original, jurisdiction
o special civil action of declaratory relief falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts (even if only questions of law),
Rule 63
- although the SC, CA, and RTC have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum 
HIERARCHY
o The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (1) it
would be an imposition upon the precious time
of this Court; and (2) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which
in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts
Board of Trustees of GSIS v Velasco, G.R. No. 170463, 2
February 2011
- petitioners charged respondents administratively with
grave misconduct and placed them under preventive
suspension for 90 days
o alleged participation in the demonstration held
by some GSIS employees denouncing the
alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for
the ouster of its president and general
manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia
- respondent Mario I. Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice
President Concepcion L. Madarang for the
implementation of his step increment. Respondents also
asked that they be allowed to avail of the Christmas
raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees.
These were denied because of their pending
administrative case
- petitioner GSIS Board issued a Board Resolution (in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative power)
recommending that an employee with a pending
administrative case be disqualified from promotion, step
increment, performance-based bonus, and other
benefits and privileges
- respondents filed before the trial court a petition for
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction:
o sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from
implementing the Resolution
o denial of the employee benefits due them on
the ground of their pending administrative
cases violates their right to be presumed
innocent and that they are being punished
without hearing
- petitioners filed MTD
- TC denied MTD and granted WPI
o TC said it can take cognizance of the petition
because the territorial area referred to in
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does
not necessarily delimit to a particular locality
but rather to the judicial region
o respondents were entitled to all employee
benefits as provided under the law by reason
of their employment.
- On appeal to SC, petitioners argue that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), not the trial court, has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 03-108389 because it involves
claims of employee benefits. Petitioners point out that
the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
o Petitioners also claim that the petition for
prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial
jurisdiction because the acts sought to be
prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold
their principal office in Pasay City, while the
petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.
HELD:
- TC not CSC has jurisdiction: petition for prohibition!
- petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special
civil action which may be filed in SC, CA, SB or RTC.
o Personal action  may be tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff
 o respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial
court, is a resident of Manila
- ALSO: writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction may be
enforced in any part of the respective regions of the
RTCs
NOTE: This case should have been filed with RTC Pasay
where the principal office of GSIS is, even though the
plaintiff resides in Manila because:
- Rule 4 Section 4a provides that Rule 4 on venues does
not apply when a specific rule provides otherwise
- Rule 65 Section 4 provides that a petition should be filed
with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area
(the SC might have made a mistake in this case)
Benguet Management Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
153571, 18 September 2003
- Benguet Mgt Corp and Keppel Bank Phil entered into a
Loan Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture
(mortgaged lands in Zambales and Laguna)
o BMC failed to pay the loan; KBPI filed an
application for extra-judicial foreclosure before
the CoC of RTC Iba and RTC San Pablo. In
the application with RTC San Pablo, it was
indicated that the fees were already paid in
RTC Iba
- In RTC San Pablo:
o BMC claimed that the application should be
denied for being insufficient in form and
substance and because there is no need to
proceed with the foreclosure of its properties
situated in Laguna because it was willing to
execute a dacion en pago in place of the
mortgaged properties
o KBPI opposed otg of wrong remedy and forum
shopping (because BMC also filed suit in RTC
Iba)
o Application was found to be sufficient in form
and substance, and was granted
- In RTC Iba:
o BMC filed a complaint for damages and
nullification of foreclosure of its properties in
Zambales, with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO. Allegedly, KBPI imposed unauthorized
penalties, interest and charges. Also, KBPI did
not comply with the 60-day grace period. BMC
added that dacion en pago should be preferred
over the foreclosure of the collaterals
o RTC Iba issued TRO
- BMC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing
the validity of the foreclosure of its properties in Laguna.
It prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
and/or TRO to enjoin the scheduled sale of its
properties in Laguna. Since no injunction or restraining
order was issued, the auction sale proceeded with KBPI
as the highest bidder
o BMC filed a Supplemental Petition to restrain
the registration of the certificate of sale 
GRANTED. CA issued TRO on registration
o BMC filed with the appellate court an Amended
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance
of a WPI/TRO to enjoin the consolidation of
titles  DENIED
HELD:
- On forum shopping:
o Under the Procedure on Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, the applicant in an
extra-judicial foreclosure covering properties
located in different provinces is required to pay
only one filing fee. The venue, however, of the
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the
place where each of the mortgaged property is
located
o BMC is not guilty of forum shopping precisely
because the remedy available to them under
the law was the filing of separate injunction
suits. It is mandated to file only one case for a
single cause of action, e.g., breach of
mortgage contract, yet, it cannot enforce any
injunctive writ issued by the court to protect its
properties situated outside the jurisdiction of
said court.
Note: only the RTC has jurisdiction to issue injunction
Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, 27 August 2013
- Petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney‘s fees filed with RTC Sorsogon
o iron ore mining operations being conducted by
Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore without
the required permit to operate
o Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators
a small-scale mining permit, which they did not
have authority to issue
- Reliefs prayed for:
o issuance of a writ commanding the
respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations
o TEPO
o inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site
o damages
o return of iron ore
- case was referred to Branch 53, the designated
environmental court
- BUT the case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction
HELD:
- the RTC‘s motu proprio dismissal otg of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect
- In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC
relied on SC AO No. 7 defining the territorial areas of
the RTCs and Admin Circ No. 23-2008 designating the
environmental courts ―to try and decide violations of
environmental laws committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions‖
- Such reasoning is plainly erroneous
- BP 129 Sec. 21(1) provides that the RTCs shall
exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions
- A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 merely
provide for the venue where an action may be filed
- the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case
with RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue
 o Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
states that special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the territory where
the actionable neglect or omission
occurred
o ITC, alleged actionable neglect or omission
occurred in Matnog which is within the territory
of RTC Irosin
o But even then, it does not warrant the outright
dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue
may be waived
- what the RTC should have done under the
circumstances was to transfer the case (similar to an
election protest) to the proper branch
Where do you file the petitions pertaining to violations of
environmental rules such as petition for continuing
mandamus? According to the Rules on Environmental
Cases, such petitions should be filed in the RTC which has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the act was
committed. Hence, this case could have been dismissed if
the MTD cited the said rule.
Note: Rule 4 Section 4a provides that Rule 4 on venues does
not apply when a specific rule provides otherwise. The Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that special civil
action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable
neglect or omission occurred
Note: case cannot be dismissed motu proprio otg of improper
venue because venue may be waived
Devesa v. Arbes, G.R. No. 4891, 23 March 1909
- Crispin Arbes was the administrator of the estate of
Gregoria Arbes.
- Sofia Devesa prayed before the CFI for an injunction
restraining Crispin Arbes from continuing in possession
and enjoying the fruits of the land in question until and
unless he obtained a final judgment in a proper action
declaring these lands to be the property of the estate of
Gregoria Arbes
- Sofia Devesa alleged that Crispin Arbes had unlawfully
taken possession of some of her rice lands and coconut
groves
- property in question was assigned to Sofia‘s husband,
Vicente Sola pursuant to an extra judicial partition
contract executed in the year 1887 by the heirs of
Gregoria Arbes (first wife of Sofia‘s husband). Ever
since, Sofia and her husband continued in the quiet,
peaceable, and exclusive possession thereof.
- TC granted the WPI prayed for
- After trial, TC ruled in favor of Sofia Devesa, granting a
final injunction perpetually restraining Crispin Arbes
from continuing in possession of the land in question
HELD:
- the remedy by injunction sought by the plaintiff and
allowed the trial court was not the proper remedy for the
cause of action set out in the pleadings and established
by the evidence
o TC should have required an amendment of the
complaint by striking out the prayer for an
injunction and substituting therefor a prayer for
a judgment for possession of the land
described in the complaint
- An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code
from American practice, and originally borrowed from
English legal procedure, which was there issued by the
authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and
limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is
sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law" which "will not be granted
while the rights between the parties are undetermined,
except in extraordinary cases where material and
irreparable injury will done," which cannot be
compensated in damages, and where there will be no
adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be
granted, to take property out of the possession of one
party and put it into that of another whose title has not
been established by law.
- injunction, mandamus and prohibition = SPECIAL
REMEDIES!!  limited use where there is no other
adequate remedy (hold otherwise would be to render
practically of no effect the other ordinary actions)
- source of confusion: Spanish for injunction = interdicto
prohibitorio  Devesa mistook injunction for accion
interdictal
o BUT accion interdictal is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court of the (MTC) hence,
CFI (RTC) has no jurisdiction
o Also, since there is nothing in the allegations or
proof to show that defendant obtained
possession of the land in question by force,
intimidation, fraud, or strategy the action is not
in the nature of the summary remedy of forcible
entry and wrongful detainer
- TC decision REVERSED and preliminary and
permanent injunctions DISSOLVED
ITC, the plantiff should have filed accion reinvindicatoria.
Nevertheless, the CFI had subject matter jurisdiction because
it is not the caption of the pleadings that matters but the body
(in relation to Rule 10, Sec.5).
a. Totality Rule
section 2, SC Admin Circular 09-94 (March 14, 1994)
The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
In determining filing fees: the value of subject matter
involved or the amount of demand, inclusive of interest,
penalties, surcharges, damages of whatever kind, attorney‘s
fees, litigation expenses and costs (Rule 141, Sec.8)
In determining jurisdictional amount: if the interest on the
loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of
action, not merely incidental thereto, and already
determinable at the time of the filing of the Complaint, it must
be included in the determination of which court has the
jurisdiction over the case. (Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No.
174414, March 14, 2008)
Soliven v. Fastforms Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 139031, 18
October 2004
- May 1994: Antoinette Soliven filed with RTC Makati a
complaint for sum of money with damages against
Fastforms
o Fastforms thru its president, Dr. Escobar,
obtained a 170k loan from Soliven which the
former failed to pay
- Fastforms countered that it did not authorize Escobar to
obtain a loan from Soliven
- RTC ruled in favor of Soliven, ordering Fastforms to pay:
o P195,155.00 as actual damages;
o P200,000.00 as moral damages;
o P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
o P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs
of suit.
- In its MR, Fastforms questioned for the first time the
RTC‘s jurisdiction alleging that the principal amount
sought by petitioner was only 195,155 which is below
200k; hence, the complaint should have been filed with
the MTC pursuant to RA 7691
o Soliven countered that Fastforms can no longer
question the RTC‘s jurisdiction because it
already sought affirmative relief from the RTC
and actively participated during trial
- 1995: RTC denied MR and asserted its jurisdiction
because the totality of the claim exceeded 200k
o RTC also ruled that Fastforms was already
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction
- CA reversed RTC: jurisdiction is with MTC because the
claim was below 200k and it may question jurisdiction
anytime even for the first time on appeal
HELD: CA reversed. Jurisdiction should be with the MTC
BUT Fastforms is estopped from questioning jurisdiction
- RA 7691 (April 1994): where the amount of the demand
in civil cases instituted in Metro Manila exceeds
P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged with
the RTC
- BUT under section 2, SC Admin Circular 09-94
(March 14, 1994), the exclusion of the term "damages
of whatever kind" applies to cases where the damages
are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action
- ITC, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum
of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages
being claimed by petitioner are merely the
consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they
are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount.
Hence, jurisdiction is with the MTC
- BUT respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly,
respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court‘s
jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has
been rendered.
Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 164012, 8 June 2007
- 1997: Sonny Soriano died after being hit by an FX
driven by Lomer Macasasa and owned by Flordeliza
Mendoza. A case for RIRI homicide was filed against
Macasasa and Mendoza by the heirs of Soriano.
o They also asked for 200k moral damages,
500k lost income, 22,250 for funeral services,
45k for the burial lot, 15,150 for interment, 8k
for hospitalization, 28k for the food during the
wake, 50k exemplary damages, 60k indemnity,
(TOTAL 929k in damages) and 25k AF.
- Mendoza countered that she exercised the diligence of
a good father of the family over her employee,
Macasasa
- The complaint for damages against Macasasa was
dismissed. Eventually, the complaint against Mendoza
was also dismissed
o Neither Macasasa nor Mendoza was negligent
o Soriano crossed thru a small gap in the islands
instead of using the overpass
- 2004: CA reversed the TC and ordered Mendoza to pay
damages to the heirs of Soriano
o While Soriano was negligent, Macasasa was
also negligent for speeding
- Before the SC, Mendoza questioned the jurisdiction of
the RTC
o According to Mendoza, in determining the
jurisdictional amount, the moral damages, lost
income, exemplary damages and attorney‘s
fees should not be considered. If these were
excluded, the total amount would only be 179k
which is below the jurisdictional amount of the
RTC
HELD: CA affirmed. RTC had jurisdiction over the case
- Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of
a sum of money for the damages for tortuous acts
o ITC, total damages = 929k + 25k AF
- [Mendoza also failed to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family as employer]
b. Incapable of pecuniary estimation  principal
relief sought may not be estimated in terms of money; the
basic issue of the action is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or the money claim is merely
incidental to the principal relief
Russel v. Vestil, 304 S 738 (1999)
- petitioners and private respondents were co-heirs of an
undivided 57k sqm lot in Liloan, Cebu
- 1990: petitioners discovered a document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION‖ 1990  private
respondents divided the property among themselves to
the exclusion of petitioners
o Petitioners claimed that the document was
perjurious
- 1994: petitioners filed a complaint against private
respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF
NULLITY AND PARTITION‖ in the RTC Mandaue
- Private respondents filed MTD otg of lack of jurisd over
the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which falls under the
jurisdiction of MTC Liloan
- Petitioners opposed the MTD saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation
- Judge Vestil of RTC Mandaue granted the MTD
HELD: RTC has jurisdiction
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the RTC
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation:
- specific performance
- support
- foreclosure of mortgage
- annulment of judgment
- actions questioning the validity of mortgage
- annulment of a deed of sale or conveyance and to
recover the price paid
- rescission (counterpart of specific performance)
ITC, the subject matter = annulment of a document
denominated as ―DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." While
the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this
is just incidental to the main action
Note however that a person who is not a party to the
contract cannot seek its annulment. Hence, this case is
ultimately one for partition or recovery of possession
and should have been filed with the MTC.
Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, 10 March
2014
- 1983: Alfredo Bautista inherited a free-patent land
- 1991: Bautista eventually subdivided the lot and sold to
respondents.
- 1994: Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, anchoring his cause of
action on CA 141 (Public Land Act) which says that one
who acquired a free-patent land may repurchase the
same within 5years
- 2013: Respondents filed MTD alleging that the
complaint failed to state the value of the property sought
to be recovered
o The total selling price is only 16,500 which is
below the jurisdictional requirement of the RTC
- RTC granted the MTD
- Before the SC, petitioners argue that an action for
repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, it being founded on privity of
contract between the parties. According to petitioners,
what they seek is the enforcement of their right to
repurchase the subject property under CA 141
- Respondents argue that Bautista‘s action is one
involving title to or possession of real property or any
interests therein and is therefore covered by sec.33 of
BP 129
HELD:
- The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent
is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation
- Civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation:
o specific perf
o support (requiring det of civil status)
o annulment of decisions of lower courts
o rescission or reformation of contracts
o interpretation of a contractual stipulation
- ITC, the cause of action is for specific performance. The
re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista is but incidental to
and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter
to redeem said lots pursuant to CA 141
- ALSO, respondents are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC because they have actively
participated in the proceeding. The MTD was belatedly
filed (9 years after)
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-II Builders, Inc., G.R. No.
192649, 22 June 2011
- R-II Builders filed MR questioning the ruling that the
RTC of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case
o R-II Builders sought the nullification of the
Deed of Assignment and Conveyance
transferring the Asset Pool in favor of petitioner
Home Guaranty Corporation
o After R-II Builders filed the case with RTC
Manila, it was raffled to Branch 24 which was a
special commercial court. Branch 24 found that
the case did not involve an intra-corporate
dispute. Hence, the case was re-raffled to
Branch 22
o Branch 22 held that the case was a real action
and that R-II Builders evaded the payment of
the proper docket fees computed on the basis
of the assessed value of the realties in the
Asset Pool
- In this MR, R-II Builders argued that the subject matter
of the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation
HELD: MR denied
- The case is a real action because the complaint did not
just seek the nullification of the Deed but also prayed for
the transfer of possession of and/or control of the
properties in the Asset Pool.
- R-II Builders in its opposition to HGC‘s motion to dismiss
admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to
or possession of real property or an interest therein
- if the petition is solely for annulment or rescission of the
contract, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. If the
complaint also asks for the transfer of title or possession
of the subject property to the adverse party, then it is
already a real action
The SC here harmonized De Leon (prayed only for
annulment even though it may eventually lead to
recovery of possession) and Serrano (prayed for both
annulment and recovery of possession). Most SC cases
follow the doctrine in Home Guaranty, except the
Olivarez case.
c. Real actions
Sebe v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, 12 October 2009
- 1999: Spouses Sebe filed with the RTC of Dipolog a
complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and
Technology and Livelihood Resources Center for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery
of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed
value of 9,910 plus damages.
o Sebes claimed that they owned the subject lots
but, in 1991, Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign
documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim which
the latter signed (they were illiterate).
 o Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant
Sevilla applied for and obtained free patent
titles covering the two lots on September 23,
1991. He then mortgaged the lots to defendant
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center
for P869,555.00
o 1992: Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes
under his name. Then, using force and
intimidation, he seized possession of the lots
from their tenants and harvested coconut and
palay worth P20,000.00
- Sebes asked the RTC:
o to declare void the affidavits of quitclaim and
the deeds of confirmation of sale
o to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the
two lots
o restore possession to them
o to order defendant Sevilla to pay them 140k in
lost produce from 1991 to the date of the filing
of the complaint, 30k moral damages, 100k AF,
30k litigation expenses, and such amount of
exemplary damages as the RTC might fix
- 2006: RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter considering that the ultimate
relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of
title and possession over two lots that had a total
assessed value of less than 20k
- The Sebes filed an MR saying that the RTC mistakenly
classified their action as one involving title to or
possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case
for the annulment of documents and titles. Hence,
incapable of pecuniary estimation
- RTC denied the MR
HELD: DISMISS. RTC has no jurisdiction
- An action involving title to real property means that the
plaintiff‘s cause of action is based on claim that he owns
such property or that he has the legal rights to have
exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition
of the same.
- Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or
not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their
property by making them sign documents of conveyance
rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their
debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining
which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject
lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lots.
o the total assessed value of the two lots is
9,910. Hence, it is below the jurisdictional
requirement of the RTC
Spouses Decena v. Spouses Piquero, G.R. No. 155736,
31 March 2005
- 1997: Spouses Decena and spouses Piquero executed
a MOA in which the former sold property (house and lot
in Paranaque) to the latter for 940k payable in 6 monthly
installments via PDCs. The property was transferred to
the Piqueros. There was a condition in the MOA that if 2
of the PDCs would be dishonored by the drawee bank,
the Piqueros would be obliged to reconvey the property
to the Decenas
- The Decenas filed a complaint for annulment of the
sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages with
RTC Malolos (where they were residing). They declared
in the complaint that the property was worth P6.9M.
They asked that:
o The sale/MOA be declared null and void,
rescinded and with no force and effect
o Defendants be ordered to vacate the property
o Defendants be ordered to pay: 10k monthly
from the time the property was transferred to
defendants until it is reconveyed to petitioners,
as reasonable compensation for its continued
unlawful use and occupation by the defendants
o 200k moral damages
o 200k exemplary damages
o 250k AF
- Piqueros filed MTD otg that:
o the principal action of the petitioners for the
rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the
possession of the property is a real action and
not a personal one; hence, it should have been
brought in the RTC Paranaque, where the
property subject matter of the action was
located, and not in the RTC of Malolos
- Decenas insisted that their action for damages and
attorneys fees is a personal action and not a real action;
hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they
reside. They averred that while their second cause of
action for the recovery of the possession of the property
is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined
with the rest of their causes of action for damages,
conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court
- Piqueros replied that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court applies only when one or more of multiple causes
of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first
level courts, and the other or others are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies
therein
- RTC granted the MTD
HELD: Petition DENIED
- The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the
MOA on account of the respondent‘s breach thereof and
the latter‘s failure to return the premises subject of the
complaint to the petitioners, and the respondent‘s
eviction therefrom is a real action. As such, the action
should have been filed in the proper court where the
property is located, namely, in Paranaque
Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, 9 July
2014
- Benjamin Castillo owned a parcel of land that was also
being claimed by the Philippine Tourism Authority.
- 2000: Castillo and Olivarez entered into a contract of
conditional sale over the property where the latter will
purchase the property for P19M. Downpayment of P5M
was to be paid within 9 months while the balance was to
be paid in 30 equal monthly installments beginning in
the month that the parties would receive a decision
voiding the Philippine Tourism Authority‘s title to the
property.
o Olivarez Realty Corporation shall file the action
against the Philippine Tourism Authority ―with
the full assistance of Castillo.‖
o Should the action against the Philippine
Tourism Authority be denied, Castillo agreed to
reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez
Realty Corporation.
o As to the ―legitimate tenants‖ occupying the
property, Olivarez Realty Corporation
undertook to pay them ―disturbance
compensation,‖ while Castillo undertook to
 clear the land of the tenants within six months
from the signing of the deed of conditional sale.
Should Castillo fail to clear the land within six
months, Olivarez Realty Corporation may
suspend its monthly down payment until the
tenants vacate the property.
o Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately
occupy the property upon signing of the deed
of conditional sale. Should the contract be
cancelled, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed
to return the property‘s possession to Castillo
and forfeit all the improvements
- 2004: Castillo filed a complaint for rescission of the
contract and damages against Olivarez Realty with the
RTC Tanauan
o Substantial breach of contract: Olivarez paid
only 2.5M and did not fulfill its other obligations
under the contract
o The contract was prepared solely by Olivarez
and was not adequately explained to Castillo in
Tagalog
- Olivarez argued that Castillo availed himself of the
irreconcilable reliefs of reformation of instrument and
rescission of contract. Thus, the case should be
dismissed outright
- RTC issued a summary judgment and ruled that
Olivarez breached the contract of conditional sale. The
contract was rescinded and Olivarez was ordered to pay
damages
- CA affirmed in toto the RTC‘s decision
- Before the SC, Olivarez argued: that the trial court had
no jurisdiction to decide the case as Castillo failed to
pay the correct docket fees. Castillo should have paid
docket fees based on the property‘s fair market value
since Castillo‘s complaint is a real action
- Castillo‘s response: he prayed for rescission of contract
in his complaint. This action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and the Clerk of Court properly computed
the docket fees based on this prayer
HELD:
- The contract in this case is a contract to sell. Hence,
upon its cancellation, the parties shall stand as if the
obligation to sell never existed.
- TC acquired jurisdiction over the case because
Castillo paid the correct docket fees
o Although the action involves real property, ―it is
the nature of the action as one for rescission of
contract which is controlling.‖ Consequently,
the docket fees to be paid shall be for actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation, regardless if
the claimant may eventually recover the real
property.
o Although we discussed that there is no
rescission of contract to speak of in contracts
of conditional sale, we hold that an action to
cancel a contract to sell, similar to an action for
rescission of contract of sale, is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Like any
action incapable of pecuniary estimation, an
action to cancel a contract to sell ―demands an
inquiry into other factors‖ aside from the
amount of money to be awarded to the
claimant.
This case is in conflict with the Home Guaranty case.
While in the Home Guaranty case, the type of action
(personal or real) depends on the reliefs prayed for, in
the Olivarez case, the type of action depends on the right
asserted. More SC cases follow the doctrine of the Home
Guaranty case.
d. Declaratory relief  incapable of pecuniary
estimation! Therefore, RTC only
section 1, Rule 63
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to
real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule
Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, 17 September 2009
- Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for
Reinvindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages
o Alleged that they own a parcel of land situated
in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan which they
inherited from Anastacio Danao who died
intestate
o During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig and Joaquin Boncad
to build on and occupy the southern portion of
the subject property with the agreement that
the spouses would vacate the said land at any
time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it
o Respondents, who were also claiming
ownership of the property, refused to vacate
despite petitioners‘ demand.
o During conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property
and presented documents supporting their
claim of ownership
o Petitioners claimed that respondents‘
documents were falsified
- RTC issued an Order dismissing petitioners‘ Complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
o subject property had a value of less than
P20,000.00; hence, petitioners‘ action to
recover the same was outside the jurisdiction
of the RTC
o assessed value of subject property per Tax
Declaration was P410.00
- Petitioners filed MR, arguing that their main cause of
action was quieting of title
o Sec. 1, Rule 63 states that an action to quiet
title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC
- RTC denied MR: an action to quiet title is a real action
o differentiated between the first and the second
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63:
1. first paragraph refers to an action for
declaratory relief, which should be brought
before the RTC
2. second paragraph, however, refers to a
different set of remedies, which includes an
action to quiet title to real property  must be
read in relation to BP 129 (as amended by RA
7691) which vests the MTC with jurisdiction
over real actions, where the assessed value of
 the real property involved does not exceed
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in
all other places
HELD: RTC did not commit GAD; correctly dismissed
complaint
nd
- The three remedies in 2 paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 63
are considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect
nd
- emphasis on ―may‖ in the 2 paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule
63 (hence merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option); must be read
together with BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 which
uses the word ―shall‖ (hence mandatory for MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed
P20,000.00)
- Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder
o purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith,
and not to settle issues arising from an alleged
breach thereof
o Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action.
o ITC: Complaint for quieting of title was filed
after petitioners already demanded and
respondents refused to vacate the subject
property.
- Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had
already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case
for declaratory relief
- Petitioner‘s Complaint contained sufficient allegations
for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction should have
been with the MTC
Treating the pleading in this case as one for recovery of
possession instead of quieting of title as stated in its title
is in line with Rule 63, Sec.6
Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, G.R. No.
167848, 27 April 2007
- Melencio Santos obtained a P1M loan from Direct
Funders. As security, Santos mortgaged a property
owned by Spouses San Pablo (who knowingly signed as
co-mortgagors of Santos to help/accommodate him
since they were close friends/business associates)
o Spouses San Pablo executed a SPA in favor of
Santos authorizing him to mortgage
- Direct Funders informed the spouses that Santos failed
to pay. Upon confrontation, Santos promised to pay
- Upon learning that Santos‘ debt with Direct Funders had
been fully settled, the spouses demanded from Santos
to turn over to them the TCT of the subject property but
the latter failed to do so despite repeated demands
o Upon inquiry with the RoD, they discovered
that the property was again used by Santos as
collateral for another loan obligation he
secured from the Bank of Commerce
- Spouses filed a Complaint seeking for the Quieting of
Title and Nullification of the SPA and the deed of real
estate mortgage with the prayer for damages against
Santos and the Bank of Commerce before the MTC of
Mandaue City
- MTC dismissed complaint for lack of merit; declared that
while it was proven that the signatures of the spouses
San Pablo on the loan documents were forged, the
Bank of Commerce was nevertheless in good faith.
- spouses San Pablo appealed the adverse decision to
the RTC which, in turn, affirmed the unfavorable ruling
of the MTC
- CA reversed the decisions of the MTC and RTC
- Before the SC, the Bank of Commerce, for the first time
in more than 10 years of pendency of the instant case,
raises the issue of jurisdiction
o since the subject matter of the case is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
complaint for quieting of title and annulment of
the SPA, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage,
and foreclosure proceedings should have been
originally filed with the RTC and not with the
MTC
o The decision rendered by the MTC is therefore
void from the very beginning
HELD: Petition dismissed; CA affirmed
- case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC is
actually an action for quieting of title, a real action, the
jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed
value of the property
- The assessed value of the subject property located in
Mandaue City, as alleged in the complaint, is P4,900.00,
which aptly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC
- Even granting for the sake of argument that the MTC did
not have jurisdiction over the case, the Bank of
Commerce is nevertheless estopped from repudiating
the authority of the court to try and decide the case after
having actively participated in the proceedings before it
and invoking its jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative
relief therefrom.
Sabitsana v. Muertegui, G.R. No. 181359, 5 August 2013
- 1981: Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of
Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui over a 7,500 sqm
parcel of unregistered land in Biliran, Leyte del Norte.
Juanito‘s brother and father (Domingo Jr. and Sr.) took
actual possession of the lot
- 1991: Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer
petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr., through a
notarized DOAS
o sale was registered with the RoD
- When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for
registration and coverage of the lot under the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141
- Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter to the CENRO/PENRO office
in Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that
he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the
application for registration be held in abeyance until the
issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved
- Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed a
case for quieting of title and preliminary injunction. They
prayed, among others, that the Sabitsana DOAS be
declared null and void and of no effect; that petitioners
be ordered to respect and recognize Juanito‘s title over
 the lot; and that moral and exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to
him
- The evidence and testimonies of the respondent‘s
witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner Atty.
Sabitsana was the Muertegui family‘s lawyer at the time
Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and that as such, he was
consulted by the family before the sale was executed;
that after the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into
actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of
the lot
- RTC ruled in favor of Muertegui; declaring null
Sabitsana‘s DOAS and ruling that he was a buyer in bad
faith
- CA affirmed the trial court‘s Decision in toto
- Before the SC, Sabitsana argued that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the case because the assessed
value of the lot was only P1,230.00
- Muertegui countered that a suit for quieting of title is one
whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
HELD: Petition denied. The RTC had jurisdiction over the
case
- an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real
property in dispute (Rule 63)
ACTION PRESCRIPTION NATURE PRAYER BASIS OF RIGHT JURISDICTION
Accion Titled owner: In personam Possession Ownership RTC or MTC
reinvindicatoria imprescriptible depending on value
(recovery of EX: estoppel
possession based (misled you to
on ownership) believe that I don‘t
own it; or if I slept
on my rights)

Untitled:  based
on Art. 1137
GF: 10y
BF: 30y
Accion publiciana 10y (regardless of In personam Possession Real right of RTC or MTC
(recovery of GF/BF)  based possession depending on value
possession based on Art.555(4), NCC
on real right of
possession)
Reconveyance 10y Quasi in rem Title Ownership RTC or MTC
(Recovery of title There is title but depending on value
based on real right not with the owner
of ownership) Art.1456: Trustee
only!  obli from
law
FE/UD 1 year In personam Possession Prior actual MTC
physical
possession for
forcible entry (even
without real right of
possession); notice
to vacate for
unlawful detainer
Partition  Real Imprescriptible Quasi in rem RTC or MTC
Action? (under Rules on depending on value
Co-Ownership)
REM Foreclosure 10y (prescription of Quasi in rem Possession Lien RTC or MTC
 Real Action? contracts) depending on value
Land titling Imprescriptible In rem RTC or MTC
depending on value
Quieting of Title  Imprescriptible if in Quasi-in rem Quieting of Title Ownership RTC or MTC
Real action? possession depending on value
- Bank of (Chacon v. CA!!!)
Commerce:
Real Action Otherwise, 10
- Sabitsana: years (based on
Rule 63 constructive trust)

Action in rem v. Action in personam v. Action quasi in rem (as to the binding effect and enforceability of the case)
Action in personam: binding on a specific person, enforceable against the person (judgment binds parties to the case only because
court has jurisdiction over the parties)
Action in rem: binding on a specific property, enforceable against the property (court has jurisdiction over the property)
Action quasi in rem: binding on a person, enforceable with respect to a specific property (judgment binds parties even if one is
abroad)
 Syntax
Case Relief Nature Remarks
Right Prayer
Russel v Vestil 1. Annulment Owner (real right) Possession SC: Personal / Should have been
(1999) 2. Repartition incapable of filed with the MTC!
Where first filed: pecuniary
RTC (dismissed) estimation (a person who is
SC: RTC has (Annulment) not a party to the
jurisdiction Sir: Real action contract cannot
(Partition) seek its annulment)

Heirs of Bautista v Repurchase Right to repurchase repurchase Personal (Specific

Lindo (2014) (personal right) Performance)
Where first filed:
RTC
SC: RTC has
jurisdiction
Home Guaranty 1. Annulment Right to annul Annul and deliver SC: Real action Wrong! The SC
Corp. v R-II 2. Possession (personal) possession (thus should pay here harmonized
Builders (2011) docket fees based De Leon (prayed
Issue: payment of on value of only for annulment
docket fees property)  even even though it may
Held: paid incorrect though it involves a eventually lead to
docket fees contract, once you recovery of
ask for possession, possession) and
it becomes a real Serrano (prayed for
action both annulment
and recovery of
possession)
Olivarez Realty 1. Rescission Right to annul Annul and deliver SC: Personal / CONFLICT WITH
Corp. v. Castillo 2. Possession (personal) possession incapable of HGC!!!! BUT THIS
(2014) pecuniary SHOULD BE THE
Issue: payment of estimation (citing CORRECT
docket fees De Leon) DOCTRINE
Held: paid correct (possession will be
docket fees transferred anyway
upon annulment)
 should be based
on the right
asserted
Spouses Decena v. 1. Rescission SC: Real action Wrong (similar to
Spouses Piquero 2. Possession HGC)
(2005)
- Plaintiff filed in
Malolos where
he resides on
the theory that
it‘s a personal
action
Issue: Venue
Held: Improper
venue
Sebe v Sevilla 1. Annulment SC: Real action Wrong  personal
(2009) 2. Conveyance / (Possession) action!!!!
Where first filed: Possession
RTC
SC: RTC has no
jurisdiction
4. Shari'a courts
Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court, G.R. No. 188832,
23 April 2014
- 1996: Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter
parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,
Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres
Cañete. A TCT covering the parcel of land was issued in
Roldan‘s name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B.
Villagracia occupied the parcel of land
- 2002: Vivencio secured an OCT from the LRA covering
the same parcel of land
- 2006: Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. He found
that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land
Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel
of land with respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court
- Respondent court took cognizance of the case and
caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his
answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent
Fifth Shari‘a District Court granted.
- Respondent Court ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess and ordered
Vivencio to vacate the property and pay damages
- 2008: respondent Fifth Shari‘a Distict Court issued the
notice of writ of execution to Vivencio
- 2009: Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
o argued that Shari‘a District Courts may only
hear civil actions and proceedings if both
parties are Muslims (Article 155, paragraph (2)
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines)
o Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari‘a District
Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Roldan‘s action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land.
- Respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court ruled that
Vivencio ―intentionally [waived] his right to defend
himself‖ and denied Vivencio‘s petition for relief from
judgment for lack of merit.
o duly served with summons and had notice
o Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law.
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers
to the jurisdiction of Shari‘a Circuit Courts, not
of Shari‘a District Courts
o Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim,
his rights were not prejudiced since respondent
Fifth Shari‘a District Court decided the case
applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
- Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order with the SC
o Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
Shari‘a District Courts may only take
cognizance of real actions where the parties
involved are Muslims
HELD: Petition GRANTED. Shari' a District Courts have no
jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
- When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court should have motu
proprio dismissed the case. Respondent Fifth Shari‘a
District Court had no authority under the law to decide
Roldan‘s action because not all of the parties involved in
the action are Muslims.
- Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of
Shari‘a District Courts over real actions not arising from
customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing
civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over
real actions ―is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims‖
5. Municipal Trial Court
section 32-35, 38(2), BP 129
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) exclusive of
interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases,
the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there
is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the value of
which does not exceed Three hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit
of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if
there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the
absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city,
any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal
cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial
Judges sit.
section 2, SC Admin Circular 09-94
The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
Why do we need lands to be titled? If lands were titled,
there would be more transactions involving land. The more
transactions there are, the better for the economy.
CADASTRAL PROCEEDING = government surveys land
and files a case to have the land titled
Fernandez v. International, 316 S 326 (1999)
- Fernandez purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a
financing scheme of International
o the cash purchase price was P492,000.00,
minus the downpayment of P147,500.00,
leaving the amount of P344,[5]00.00 to be
financed. The total amount to be paid for 48
monthly installments would amount to
P553,944.00
- International filed an unfounded complaint for a sum of
money with replevin before the MTC, Pasay
- Considering that the principal amount involved was
P553,944.00, petitioners filed an Answer mentioning in
the special and affirmative defenses a Motion to
Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied
o Aside from that, petitioners contested the
venue considering that the principal office of
the respondent bank was in Makati while their
residence is in QC
o When the respondent bank filed its complaint
with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Replevin the monthly installments were almost
fully paid
o They could not have been considered in default
at the time the complaint was filed, considering
that they attempted many times to pay the
bank their installments and up to the time of the
filing of the case, they ha[d] not received any
statement of delinquency
o They even consigned a check with the court
but were refused by the court for no valid
reason
- CA ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Pasay City had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the
amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000
exclusive of interest, damages and attorneys fees. The
basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90;
hence, the MTC had jurisdiction.
o further held that the objection to the impropriety
of the venue should have been raised in a
motion to dismiss before the filing of a
responsive pleading. The said issue, however,
was raised for the first time only in petitioners
Answer.
o Writ of Replevin could be validly executed
anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27,
Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the
establishment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila with eighty-two (82) branches.
Therefore, any branch in this case, Branch 44
which was stationed in Pasay -- could issue
writs and processes that could validly be
served and executed anywhere within Metro
Manila
HELD: Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED
- Writ of Replevin may be validly enforced anywhere in
the Philippines.
o Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court
to hear and decide a case on the one hand
with, on the other, its power to issue writs and
processes pursuant to and in the exercise of
said jurisdiction.
o Also, Objection to Venue Too Late
- The fundamental claim in the main action against
petitioners, as shown in respondent banks Complaint, is
the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount
that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Although the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the
Writ of Replevin may have exceeded P200,000, that fact
does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the
case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a
chattel mortgage that had been used to secure
petitioners loan. In any case, private respondents are
entitled only to the amount owed them.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, 20 October 2014
- In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V.
Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they were
able to acquire a property in Bacolod
- their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity
- Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused
- Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the MTCC
Bacolod
- Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the
subject property had already been sold to their children
o likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- Bacolod MTCC ordered the conjugal dwelling
adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the
spouse with whom majority of the common children
choose to remain (applying Art. 129, FC)
- RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered: (1)
the partition of the house; (2) reimbursement of the
children; and (3) delivery of the presumptive legitimes of
the children
- CA affirmed the RTC Decision
o since the property‘s assessed value was only
P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC‘s
jurisdiction
o RTC correctly ordered partition of the property
although the applicable law should have been
Art.147, FC, not Art.129
HELD: Petition dismissed for lack of merit
- Contrary to Barrido‘s contention, the MTCC has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property
- Here, the subject property‘s assessed value was merely
P8,080.00
Note: At present, under the rules on declaration of
nullity, the family court must automatically declare the
partition of the properties upon the declaration of nullity.
B. Appellate (exclusive/concurrent)
1. Supreme Court:
section 5(2), article VIII, Const.
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
section 1, 9, Rule 45
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Section 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. —
The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be
applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
section 2(c), Rule 41
Section 2. Modes of appeal - (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all
cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45.
section 30, Article VI
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
section 3, Rule 56
Section 3. Mode of appeal. — An appeal to the Supreme
Court may be taken only by a petition for review
on certiorari, except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
section 3(c), Rule 122
Section 3. How appeal taken. — (c) The appeal to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for
offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of
appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
Appellate Court
RTC CA SC
MTC 40 41 45
(Delegated (Delegated
jurisdiction jurisdiction
in cadastral in cadastral
and land and land
registration registration
Court of Origin cases, BP case, Rule
129 Sec.34) 41, Sec.2)
RTC 42 45
CA 45; 41 (122
Sec.3c)
QJ 43
Fabian v. Desierto, 295 S 470 (1998)
- Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation while private respondent Nestor Agustin
was the incumbent Assistant Regional Director, Region
IV-A, DPWH when he allegedly committed the offenses
for which he was administratively charged in the Office
in the office of the Ombudsman
- Promat participated in the bidding for government
construction project and Agustin, reportedly taking
advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into
an amorous relationship. Hence, Agustin gifted
PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for
it in problems concerning the same in his office.
- misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties and when petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
She eventually filed the administrative case against him
for oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral
conduct (sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, RA 6770 and of Section 36 of
PD 807)
- The graft investigator issued a resolution finding Agustin
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the
law. This was approved by the Director and the Asst.
Ombudsman
- Ombudsman Desierto found Agustin guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for one year.
 o Upon MR, Ombudsman Desierto inhibited
himself (counsel was his close friend) and
referred the case to Dep. Omb. Guerrero
- Dep. Omb. Guerrero set aside the earlier order and
exonerated Agustin from the administrative charges
- Fabian appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45,
arguing that Section 27 of RA 6770 provides: ―In all
administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.‖
o However, she points out that under Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),
when a respondent is absolved of the charges
in an administrative proceeding decision of the
ombudsman is final and unappealable  the
office of the ombudsman has no authority
under the law to restrict the right of appeal
allowed RA 6770 nor to limit the power of
review of the SC
o Fabian also asked that should the remedy
under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be
treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65
- The SC treated the case as a challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 27 of RA 6770 given that that
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no law shall be passed increasing the appellate
indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent‖
- In support of the constitutionality of said provision,
Fabian argued that the SC‘s appellate jurisdiction
includes "all cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the
Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the final
judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide," section 27 does not increase this Court's
appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode
of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule
45, then what may be raised therein are only questions
of law of which this Court already has of which this
Court already has jurisdiction
HELD: Sec. 27, RA 6770 unconstitutional. Appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
SC under Rule 43
- Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution specifies
that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC is to be
exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower
courts‖. does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies
- The RoC preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari
- Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies
2. Court of Appeals
section (2)(a)(b), Rule 41
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except
in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in
like manner.
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
section 9(3), 22, BP 129
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall
Exercise:
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commission, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, Except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials. Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A.
No. 7902.)
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision
of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals
which may give it due course only when the petition
shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification
of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
section 1, Rule 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural
Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
section 1, Rule 42
Petition for Review From the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said
court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing
the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of
the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
3. Regional Trial Court
section 1, Rule 40 (Appeal From Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts)
Where to appeal. — An appeal from a judgment or final order
of a Municipal Trial Court may be taken to the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the area to which the former
pertains. The title of the case shall remain as it was in the
court of origin, but the party appealing the case shall be
further referred to as the appellant and the adverse party as
the appellee. (a)
section 22, BP 129
Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such
cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required
by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional
Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for
review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course
only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court
has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to
be reviewed.
II. Venue
Sec. 18, B.P. 129
Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. –
The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority.
The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over
the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The
power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making the attendance of
litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
Rule 4
Venue of Actions
Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any
of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the
court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found. (2[c]a)
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not
apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing
before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof. (3a, 5a)
article 360, RPC
Article 360. Persons responsible. - Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is
a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, or of the city
or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office
in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one
of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed
in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice
versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And,
provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to
cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions
which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of
this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written
defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted
by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the
municipal court of the city or capital of the province where
such action may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint
expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended by R.A.
1289, approved June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved June
19, 1965).
section 1(c), Rule 16
Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (1a)
Section 4, A.M. No 03-03-03-SC
The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over
cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with
respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the
respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth
Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court
Sec. 4, Rule 65;
When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates
to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998;
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)
Note: There can be multiple residences for purposes of
remedial law

section 15, Rule 14 Can the venue be filed in…

Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not Plaintiff‘s Defendant‘s
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action residence residence
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the Defendant Yes Yes
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which resides in Ph,
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or found in Ph
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly Defendant Yes Yes
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest resides in Ph,
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached not found in Ph
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be Defendant does Yes Yes (where he may
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under not reside in Ph, be found, not in his
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general is found in Ph residence because
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may he is a non-
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the resident)
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known Defendant does Yes (if affecting No
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court not reside, is not personal status or
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall found in Ph property situated
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty in Philippines)
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant must Note: The key is the situation of the defendant
answer.

section 1(f), Rule 57 A. Real v. personal

Preliminary Attachment
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At Board of Trustees of GSIS v Velasco, supra
the commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
Boleyley v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 128734, 14 September
1999
- Angel L. Boleyley filed with RTC Baguio a complaint
against Albert Surla for recovery of sum of money
- Surla filed MTD otg that Boleyley did not comply with
the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as
a condition for the filing of a complaint in court referral of
the matter to the barangay lupon chairman or the
pangkat, for conciliation or settlement
- Boleyley opposed: Surla was not a resident of Baguio
so that the dispute involving the parties was not within
the authority of the lupon to bring together for
conciliation or settlement
- RTC dismissed the case
HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC committed GAD
- jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant
- from the allegations of the complaint, the parties do not
reside in the same city or municipality, and hence, the
dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to
the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or
settlement prior to filing with the court
- ITC, the address of defendant in the complaint was his
mailing address and not his residence
- the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency
- Nevertheless, the complaint clearly implies that the
parties do not reside in the same city or municipality.
- The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of
defendant‘s (respondent‘s) motion to dismiss stating
that he also resided in Baguio City. That is not decisive
to determine the proper venue.
- there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to the
barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in
the complaint itself that the parties reside in the same
city or municipality
Ang v. Sps. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, 22 August 2012
- spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a
loan (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang
(petitioners)  promissory note to pay the latter the said
amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated
demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
- petitioners, who were then residing in LA, executed SPA
in favor of Atty. Aceron for the purpose of filing an action
in court
- Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money with RTC QC
- Respondents filed MTD, alleging that they reside in
Bacolod City while petitioners reside in LA hence RTC
QC was improper venue for the complaint
- RTC denied MTD  Atty. Aceron had SPA and his
address is in QC.
- Before the CA, respondents argued that Atty. Aceron,
being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not
the real party in interest in the case below; accordingly,
his residence should not be considered in determining
the proper venue of the said complaint.
- CA reversed RTC; directed the dismissal of the
complaint; complaint below should have been filed in
Bacolod City
HELD: Petition denied; CA affirmed. Complaint should
have been filed in Bacolod City
- the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.
However, choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiff‘s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court
- The petitioners‘ complaint for collection of sum of money
against the respondents is a personal action as it
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The
Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to
file his complaint. However, if the plaintiff does not
reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case
may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides.
- Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case
below
o Section 2, Rule 3: real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
o Atty. Aceron does not stand to be benefited or
injured by any judgment therein. He was
merely appointed by the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing
and prosecuting the complaint against the
respondents. Such appointment, however,
does not mean that he is subrogated into the
rights of petitioners and ought to be considered
as a real party in interest.
Dacoycoy v IAC, 195 S 641 (1991)
- Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal,
filed before RTC Antipolo a complaint against private
respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of
riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen,
Pangasinan
- before summons could be served on defendant, the
RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel
for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the
matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue.
o petitioner‘s action is a real action as it sought
not only the annulment of the aforestated
deeds of sale but also the recovery of
ownership of the subject parcel of riceland
- IAC affirmed dismissal of the complaint
- Before the SC, Dacoycoy argues that the IAC erred in
finding that the venue was improperly laid when the
defendant, now private respondent, has not even
answered the complaint nor waived the venue
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner‘s complaint by
RTC is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
o the laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the
 court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant
and not between the court and the subject
matter.
o Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to
decide a case on the merits; while venue deals
on the locality, the place where the suit may be
had.
- the instant case, even granting for a moment that the
action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court
would still have jurisdiction over the case, it being a
regional trial court vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over ―all civil actions which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein xxx‖ in accordance with Section 19 (2) of BP 129
- Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper
venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at
this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in
inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance
(now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly.
o Where defendant fails to challenge timely the
venue in a motion to dismiss and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived
o Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to
the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly
laid
o Venue = for convenience of parties; wherever
is acceptable for them. Hence RTC cannot pre-
empt the defendant‘s prerogative to object to
the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case.
Note: The Dacoycoy case is an annulment case asking for
recovery of possession hence treated as a real action
Davao Light v CA, G.R. No. 111685, 20 August 2001
- Davao Light filed a complaint for damages (P11M)
against private respondent Francisco Tesorero before
RTC Cebu
- private respondent filed MTD claiming that: (a) the
complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the
plaintiff‘s claim has been extinguished or otherwise
rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder
of indispensable parties; and (d) venue was improperly
laid
- RTC dismissed complaint otg of improper venue
o In complaint, Davao Light claimed that its
principal place of business = Banilad, Cebu
City
o In defendant‘s motion, it is submitted that the
principal office of plaintiff = Davao City
HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED
- Tesorero argued that Davao Light is estopped from
claiming that its residence is in Cebu City. Tesorero
cited several contracts of Davao Light with NAPOCOR
as well as several civil cases where Davao Light
claimed that its address is in Davao City
o This was the same issue in Young Auto Supply
Co. v. Court of Appeals. In said case filed in
RTC Cebu, defendant Roxas sought dismissal
on ground of improper venue since the address
of petitioner YASCO in their contract of sale,
letters and several commercial documents sent
by YASCO to Roxas was in Pasay City. If it
was Roxas who sued YASCO in Pasay City
and the latter questioned the venue on the
ground that its principal place of business was
in Cebu City, Roxas could argue that YASCO
was in estoppel because it misled Roxas to
believe that Pasay City was its principal place
of business. But this is not the case before us.
o Also, in the present case, Tesorero was not a
party to the contracts or cases he cited.
- A corporation has no residence in the same sense in
which this term is applied to a natural person. But for
practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation.
o The Corporation Code precisely requires each
corporation to specify in its articles of
incorporation the ―place where the principal
office of the corporation is to be located which
must be within the Philippines‖ (Sec. 14[3]).
The purpose of this requirement is to fix the
residence of a corporation in a definite place,
instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
- petitioner‘s principal office is in Cebu City, per its
amended articles of incorporation
Hernandez v. DBP, 71 S 290 (1976)
- Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of DBP for
twenty-one (21) years until his retirement
- in recognition of his unqualified service, DBP awarded
to the petitioner a lot
- after Hernandez received from DBP‘s Housing Project
Committee a statement of account of the purchase price
of the said house and lot, he sent to the said Committee
a Cashier‘s Check to cover the cash and full payment of
the purchase price of the lot and house awarded to him.
- more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accountant and
Comptroller of DBP returned to Hernandez the check,
informing him that DBP had cancelled the award
- Hernandez filed a complaint in CFI Batangas seeking
the annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot
and house in his favor and the restoration of all his
rights thereto
o cancellation of said award was unwarranted
and illegal for he has already become the
owner of said house and lot by virtue of said
award and has acquired a vested right thereto,
which cannot be unilaterally cancelled without
his consent
- DBP filed MTD otg of improper venue, contending that
since the petitioner‘s action affects the title to a house
and lot situated in QC, the same should have been
commenced in CFI QC where the real property is
located and not in CFI Batangas where Hernandez
resides
- CFI granted MTD
HELD: CFI reversed. Case remanded
- Hernandez seeks the annulment of the cancellation of
the award (Hernandez was basically seeking specific
performance of the award  he had a personal right
that he wanted to be enforced) PERSONAL ACTION!!!
- his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation
of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve
 title and ownership over said properties but seeks to
compel respondent to recognize that the award is a
valid and subsisting one
Note: it was not stated WoN Hernandez was in possession of
the property  by not mentioning possession, Hernandez
was able to show that his cause of action was a personal
right, although the subject matter is land (Dilemma: what will
happen after rescission? Will he file a separate case for
recovery of possession so that the action will be a real one
and not a personal one?)
Another perspective: the next course could be the
continuation of payments
*Vis-à-vis other cases where specific performance involving
land is actually a real action
BASICALLY:
- for Sir Lumba, determination of WoN personal or real
action should be based on the right asserted
- for the SC, determination of WoN personal or real action
should be based on the prayer or relief prayed for end-
result being sought
Go v UCPB, G.R. No. 156187, 11 November 2004
- Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-
owners of Noah‘s Ark International (and other Noah‘s
Ark companies). They applied for an Omnibus Line
accommodation from UCPB amounting P900M and was
favorably acted upon by UCPB
- The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages
over parcels of land in Mandalyong City
- accommodation granted to petitioner was subsequently
cancelled by UCPB
- Go demanded from UCPB the return of the TCTs of the
2 parcels BUT UCPB refused to return the same and
proceeded to have the two Real Estate Mortgages
notarized and caused the registration thereof before the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
- UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage for nonpayment of
the obligation secured by said mortgage
- Go filed a complaint with RTC Pasig (where Go
resided) for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and
damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction
- UCPB filed MTD based on the following grounds
o court has no jurisdiction over the case due to
nonpayment of the proper filing and docket
fees
o complaint was filed in the wrong venue
o an indispensable party/real party in interest
was not impleaded and, therefore, the
complaint states no cause of action
o complaint was improperly verified
o petitioner is guilty of forum shopping
- MTD denied
- UCPB questioned order denying MTD before the CA via
a petition for certiorari alleging GAD
- CA granted petition, set aside RTC Order and ordered
dismissal otg of improper venue
HELD: improper venue
- Partition, condemnation, expropriation, foreclosure =
real action
- the controlling factor in determining venue is the primary
objective for which said cases are filed
o an action to redeem by the mortgage debtor
affects his title to the foreclosed property. If the
action is seasonably made, it seeks to erase
from the title of the judgment or mortgage
debtor the lien created by registration of the
mortgage and sale. If not made seasonably, it
may seek to recover ownership to the land
since the purchaser‘s inchoate title to the
property becomes consolidated after [the]
expiration of the redemption period. Either way,
redemption involves the title to the foreclosed
property.
o in extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the
result is a conveyance of the title of the
property sold to the highest bidder at the sale.
Hence, an action to annul the foreclosure sale
is necessarily an action affecting the title of the
property sold.
o ITC: action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage filed by herein petitioner was
primarily an action to compel private
respondent bank to return to him the properties
over which the bank had already initiated
foreclosure proceedings because of the
cancellation by UCPB of the credit line
Note: Although it involves a contract (mortgage), there is
a lien on property, making it a real action.
Infante v Aran, GR No. 156596, 24 August 2007
- Before the Muntinlupa RTC was an action for revival of
judgment filed by Aran Builders, Inc against Adelaida
Infante
- The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the
Makati RTC in an action for specific performance and
damages. It ordered Infante to execute the deed of sale
of a lot in Ayala Alabang Subdivision (Muntinlupa)
- Infante filed MTD otg that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that
venue was improperly laid
- Muntinlupa RTC denied MTD: although the Decision
was rendered by the Makati RTC, it must be
emphasized that at that time there was still no
Muntinlupa RTC which was then under the territorial
jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases from
Muntinlupa were tried and heard at Makati City.
o With the creation of Muntinlupa RTC, matters
involving properties located in this City, and
cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were
all ordered to be litigated before these Courts
o ITC: property = in Muntinlupa
- Infante asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a
personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the
judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that,
consequently, the venue of the action for revival of
judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where
private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at
the election of private respondent
- Aran maintains that the action for revival judgment is
―quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or
adjudged right on a real property‖ hence venue lies in
Muntinlupa City where the property is
- CA ruled in favor of Aran: since the judgment sought to
be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, the
 action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem
which should be filed with the RTC of the place where
the real property is
HELD: petition is unmeritorious
- Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry
of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may
be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in
which court the action for revival of judgment should be
filed.
- Aldeguer v. Gemelo: an action upon a judgment must
be brought either in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of
actions in general
- if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, then it is
a real action that must be filed with the court of the
place where the real property is located
- The sole reason for the present action to revive is the
enforcement of private respondent‘s adjudged rights
over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the
category of a real action, for it affects private
respondent‘s interest over real property.
Note: ITC, there was no prayer for possession but the
consequence is transfer of title (which is the natural
consequence of a specific performance which covering a
parcel of land)
B. Venue stipulations
Polytrade v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 31 October 1969
- Polytrade has its principal office and place of business
in Makati while Blanco is a resident of Meycauayan,
Bulacan
- Polytrade filed suit before CFI Bulacan on 4 causes of
action to recover the purchase price of rawhide
delivered by Polytrade to Blanco
- Blanco filed MTD otg of improper venue: by contract suit
may only be lodged in the courts of Manila
- CFI denied MTD and ruled in favor of Polytrade
HELD: Venue here was properly laid
- The alleged stipulation stated: "The parties agree to sue
and be sued in the Courts of Manila." This agreement is
valid
- BUT no such stipulation appears in the contracts
covering the first two causes of action. Hence, the GR
for personal actions governs and the venue was
properly laid
- The stipulation adverted to is only found in the
agreements covering the third and fourth causes of
action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation,
does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant
o The plain meaning is that the parties merely
consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or
restrictive words which would indicate that
Manila and Manila alone is the venue are
totally absent therefrom.
o that agreement did not change or transfer
venue. It simply is permissive. The parties
solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts
specifically mentioned in the RoC
Philippine Banking v. Tensuan, 228 S 385 (1993)
- Philippine Banking has its principal office at Makati,
Metro Manila.
- Circle Financial Co. obtained several loans aggregating
P1,000,000.00 from Phil. Banking.
- Circle delivered to Phil. Banking 4 promissory notes with
the stipulation: ―We hereby expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action
which may arise out of this promissory note.‖
Circle failed to pay its obligations
- Philippine Banking instituted a complaint for collection of
a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary
attachment, at the Makati RTC. The trial judge issued a
writ of preliminary attachment
- Circle filed MTD otg of improper venue since an
agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from
the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only
- respondent Judge Tensuan granted the MTD
HELD:
- the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in
Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or
ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or
permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there is not the
slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other
competent courts
- the stipulation on venue must show that the parties
intended contractually to designate a specific venue to
the exclusion of any other court also competent and
accessible to the parties under the ordinary rules on the
venue of actions.
- no one of the private respondents has claimed to have
been put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result
of the institution of the action in Makati. Venue relates to
the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the
parties rather than upon the substance or merits of the
case
Unimaster v. CA, 267 S 759 (1997)
- Kubota (holding office in QC) and Unimasters (holding
office in Leyte) entered into a ―Dealership Agreement for
Sales and Services‖ of the former‘s products in Samar
and Leyte Provinces. The contract contained a
stipulation reading: "** All suits arising out of this
Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of
Quezon City,‖
- Unimasters filed an action in RTC Tacloban against
Kubota for damages for breach of contract, and
injunction with prayer for TRO
- Kubota filed MTD otg of improper venue
- RTC denied the MTD
o UNIMASTERS is holding its principal place of
business in the City of Tacloban while Kubota
is holding its principal place of business in
Quezon City. The proper venue therefore
pursuant to Rules of Court would either be
Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of
the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila are
additional places other than the place stated in
the Rules of Court. The filing, therefore, of this
complaint in Tacloban RTC is proper
- CA granted Kubota‘s petition for certiorari
 o assuming that KUBOTA‘s standard printed
invoices provided that the venue of actions
thereunder should be laid at the Court of the
City of Manila, this was inconsequential since
such provision would govern ―suits or actions
between petitioner and its buyers‖ but not
actions under the Dealership Agreement
between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS
HELD: CA reversed, RTC affirmed
- Stipulations designating venues other than those
assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to
make it more convenient for the parties to institute
actions arising from or in relation to their agreements;
that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the
venues indicated in said Rule 4. On the other hand,
because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this
general policy, the language of the parties must be so
clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their
intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places
other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions.
- Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties‘ desire and intention
that actions between them should be ventilated only at
the place selected by them, Quezon City—or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire
and intention—the stipulation should be construed, not
as confining suits between the parties only to that one
place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in
Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the
plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
To be restrictive, add the phrase: “to the exclusion of
other courts”
III. Cause of Action
Rule 1
General Provisions
Section 1. Title of the Rules. — These Rule shall be known
and cited as the Rules of Court. (1)
Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall
apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the
Supreme Court. (n)
Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the
procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and
special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a
person for an act or omission punishable by law. (n)
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2)
Section 4. In what case not applicable. — These Rules shall
not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (R143a)
Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If
an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the
action is commenced with regard to him on the dated of the
filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the
motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
(6a)
Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. (2a)
sections 1-4, 6, Rule 2
Cause of Action
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary
civil action must be based on a cause of action. (n)
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is
the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. (n)
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. (3a)
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others. (4a)
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall
comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the
same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. — Misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately. (n)
section 5(b), Rule 6
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or
affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material
fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential
to his cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter
which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations
in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or
bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud,
statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy,
and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
(5a)
A. General
Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, 13 June 2008
- Cabansag bought a 50sqm property from spouses
Gomez. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot
registered in the name of the Gomez spouses.
- Cabansag eventually received a demand letter from
Nala asking for the payment of rentals until he leaves
the premises as said property is owned by Nala
- Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square
meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio
Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts.
The 400- sqm property was conveyed to spouses
Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement
that it will be merely held by them in trust for Duyan‘s
children.
- Nala filed a case against spouses Gomez for
reconveyance of real property and cancellation of TCT
with damages. This was dismissed
- Cabansag filed a case for damages against Nala
- QC RTC ruled in favor of Cabansag
- CA affirmed the RTC
- Before the SC, petitioners argue that their predecessor-
in-interest had no knowledge that the property was sold
by spouses Gomez to respondent when the demand
letters were sent. What she was aware of was the fact
that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals on the
property by virtue of the implied trust created between
them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed
to remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the
property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the
services of legal counsel to protect their right over the
property. Also, the RTC decision on the reconveyance
case filed by Nala against spouses Gomez was already
reversed by the CA
HELD: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED.
Case for damages DISMISSED.
- claim for damages is anchored on Art.19, NCC (abuse
of rights). In order to be liable for damages under the
abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another
- In the present case, there is nothing on record which will
prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted
in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to
respondent. In the first place, there was ground for
Nala‘s actions since she believed that the property was
owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that
respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had
no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a
portion of the property to respondent. It was only after
respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that
she learned of such sale.
- Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad
faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since
Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the
property.
- There can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
- Nala was acting well within her rights when she
instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters.
She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce
her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by
respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right
does no injury.
- Nala‘s acts in protecting her rights over the property find
further solid ground in the fact that the property has
already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs
Far East Marble v. CA 225 S 249 (1993)
- BPI filed a complaint v. Far East Marble alleging that on
it extended to Far East several loans and that despite
repeated requests and demands for payment thereof,
Far East had failed and refused to pay. Thus, BPI
sought foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing
such indebtedness.
- Far East admitted the genuineness and due execution
of the promissory notes involved in the case, but denied
BPI‘s allegation that repeated demands for payment
were made by BPI on it. Far East then raised the
affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of
action, arguing that since the promissory notes matured
in 1976 while BPI filed its action to foreclose the chattel
mortgage only in 1987 (or more than 10 years from the
time its cause of action accrued), and there being no
demand for payment which would interrupt the period of
prescription for instituting said action, BPI‘s claims have
prescribed
- TC ruled in favor of Far East and dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action and otg of
prescription
- CA set aside TC ruling and remanded the case for
further proceeding
HELD:
- Seemingly, the TC believed that the interruption of the
prescriptive period to institute an action is an ULTIMATE
FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably
pleaded by BPI in its complaint, and that failure to so
allege such circumstance is fatal to BPI‘s cause of
action
- a ―complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action.‖
o No need for evidentiary facts
- Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements:
1. the legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendant
3. act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right
- ITC:
1. For valuable consideration, BPI granted several
loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and
extended credit facilities in the form of trust
receipts to Far East
2. Said promissory notes and trust receipts had
matured
3. despite repeated requests and demands for
payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused
to pay.
- Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that ―despite
repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East
has failed to pay‖ is sufficient to establish BPI‘s cause of
action.
- Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it is a
defense which, having been raised, should, as correctly
ruled by the CA be supported by competent evidence.
But even as Far East raised the defense of prescription,
BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period
was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial
demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East
of the debt
- A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of
the cause of action even though the allegation may be
 vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the
defendant would be to file a motion for a bill of
particulars. It is indeed the better rule that, pleadings, as
well as remedial laws, should be liberally construed so
that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities
Advantage of Affirmative Defense vis-à-vis MTD: A party
may amend a pleading as a matter of right before the other
party files a responsive pleading or answer citing affirmative
defenses (thus, if the defendant filed an answer with
affirmative defense instead of MTD, the plaintiff can no longer
amend his pleading).
Laches/Estoppel Prescription
Based on reliance (one party Mere lapse of time
is misled by the other to
believe otherwise)
According to Sir Lumba, in Far East Marble v. CA, by
saying that a complaint is only a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff‘s cause of action, the
court, in effect is saying that it is not necessary to state the
legal basis. The legal basis can be the subject of a bill of
particulars.
Question of Fact Question of Law Questions of
Fact and Law
Can be answered Can be answered Need knowledge
only by knowing only by knowing of both facts and
the facts (no need the law (no need law to answer the
to know the law) to know the facts) question
B. Joinder
section 5, Rule 2
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
section 6, Rule 3
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in
whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which
he may have no interest. (6n)
sections 2, 6, RSC1  based on contract
SEC. 2. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the procedure in
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs
SEC. 6. Joinder of Claims.—Plaintiff may join in a single
statement of claim one or more separate small claims against
a defendant provided that the total amount claimed, exclusive
of interest and costs, does not exceed P200,000.00.
IA, B (last par.), RSP2  based on tort
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction
A. Civil Cases
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are
awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where
the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) in Metro Manila,
exclusive of interest and costs
B. Criminal Cases
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged is imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable
fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs‘
cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another
cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a
criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily
related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary
procedure.
Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. — Upon the filing of
a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order
declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this
Rule A patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground
for disciplinary action.
Rules on joinder of parties arranged in hierarchical order
(Section 5 Rule 2)
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply
with the rules on joinder of parties
o One may or may not join parties, depending on
the choice of the plaintiff
 o PREMISE:
 different parties (section 6, Rule 3
 Permissive joinder of parties)
 related causes of action (same
transaction or series of transactions;
question of law or fact common to all)
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules
o e.g. rules on small claims, rules on summary
procedure
o PREMISE:
 different parties (section 6, Rule 3
 Permissive joinder of parties)
 related causes of action
o EXCEPTION: IA, B (last par.), RSP2
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein
o PREMISE:
 Same parties
 Whether related or unrelated
causes of action (because the
purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction
o TOTALITY RULE
Can we join…?
Related Causes of Unrelated
Action causes of action
(same transaction or
series of
transactions;
question of law or
fact common to all)
Same parties YES YES
Different YES NO
parties - Pantranco - Flores
- PB Comm
- Spouses Perez
- Ada
1. Joinder and jurisdiction
Flores v. Mallare-Philipps, 144 S 277 (1986)  different
parties; unrelated causes of action
- the application of the totality rule is subject to the
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties
- the order appealed from states that:
o the first cause of action alleged in the
complaint was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of
P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner
o the second cause of action was against
respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires
- respondent Binongcal filed MTD otg of lack of jurisd
since the amount of the demand was below P
20,000.00.
o although another person, Fernando Calion,
was allegedly indebted to petitioner, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that
of the other respondent.
- Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Baguio RTC
dismissed complaint for lack of jurisdiction
HELD: order appealed from is affirmed
- Under the present law, the totality rule is applied to
cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more defendants should arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact
- in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, the total of all the claims
shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
- ITC: there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that
the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion
are separate and distinct. DISMISS because neither of
the claims falls within its jurisdiction.
Pantranco v. Standard, 453 S 482 (2005)
 Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned
by his mother Martina Gicale. Alexander Buncan, on the
other hand, was driving a bus owned by Pantranco North
Express Inc. Both drivers were travelling along the
National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy
afternoon. Buncan was driving the bus northbound while
Cripin was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were
negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger
bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, thhe passenger
bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
 Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the
insurer of their jeepney, Standard Insurance Co. The
total cost of the repair amounted to P21, 415. Standard
only paid P8,000 while Martina Gicale shouldered the
remaining P13,415. Thereafter, Standard and Martina
demanded reimbursements from Pantranco and Buncan,
but the bus company and the driver refused. Thus,
Standard and Martina were prompted to file a complaint
for sum of money with the RTC of Manila.
 Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations of the
complaint and asserted that it is the MeTC which has
jurisdiction over the case.
 RTC: ruled in favor of Standard and Martina, and
ordered Pantranco and Buncan to pay the former
reimbursements with interests due thereon plus
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
 CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
HELD: no misjoinder of parties in the case.
 Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
the following requirements for a permissive joinder of
parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a
question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction
and venue.
 ITC, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
Pantranco‘s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney.
There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
 petitioners are negligent. There being a single
transaction common to both respondents, consequently,
they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
 To determine identity of cause of action, it must be
ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would
have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first.
Here, had respondents filed separate suits against
petitioners, the same evidence would have been
presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus,
the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the
court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy
and orderly administration of justice.
 There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the money
sought to be claimed is in favor of the same plaintiff/s
and against the same defendant/s.
2. Joinder and venue
Spouses Decena v. Spouses Piquero, supra
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Lim, G.R. No.
158138, 12 April 2005
- PB Comm filed a collection case against Respondents
Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and Tri-Oro with the Manila
RTC
o Respondents obtained a loan from PBComm
and executed a continuing surety agreement
(SA) for all loans, credits, etc.
o Said loans were evidenced by promissory
notes (PN) which expressly stipulated that the
venue for any legal action that may arise out of
said promissory note shall be Makati City, ‗to
the exclusion of all other courts‘
o Respondents failed to pay said obligation upon
maturity
o PBComm foreclosed the real estate mortgage
executed by respondents leaving a deficiency
balance of P4,014,297.23
- Respondents filed MTD otg of improper venue, invoking
the stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the
promissory note
- RTC denied said motion asseverating that petitioner had
separate causes of action arising from the promissory
note and the continuing surety agreement
- CA reversed, ruling that respondents‘ alleged debt was
based on the Promissory Note, which had provided an
exclusionary stipulation on venue ―to the exclusion of all
other courts.‖
o The parties‘ Surety Agreement, though silent
as to venue, was an accessory contract that
should have been interpreted in consonance
with the Promissory Note
- Before the SC:
o petitioner claims that there was no restriction
on the venue, because none was stipulated in
the SA on which petitioner had allegedly based
its suit. Accordingly, the action on the SA may
be filed in Manila, petitioner‘s place of
residence.
o Petitioner adds that its Complaint filed in the
trial court had two causes of action:
1. the first was founded on a breach of the
PN
2. the second, on a violation of the SA
Consequently, it was allegedly correct to join
the causes of action and to file the case in
Manila, per Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court
HELD: Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
- In enforcing a surety contract, the ―complementary-
contracts-construed-together‖ doctrine finds application
o accessory contract must be read in its entirety
and together with the principal agreement
o Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can be
enforced only in conjunction with the PN. The
latter documents the debt that is sought to be
collected in the action against the sureties.
o ITC: the SA was entered into to facilitate
existing and future loan agreements. It makes
no sense to argue that the parties to the SA
were not bound by the stipulations in the PN.
 By inserting the provision that Makati
City would be the venue for any legal
action that may arise out of the PN,
PBComm also restricted the venue of
actions against the sureties. The legal
action against the sureties arose not
only from the SA, but also from the
PN.
 the PN was a contract of adhesion.
Ambiguities therein are to be
construed against the party that
prepared the contract
- PB Comm correctly argues that there are two causes of
action
1. As against Tri-Oro International Trading &
Manufacturing Corporation, petitioner‘s cause
of action is the alleged failure to pay the debt in
violation of the PN
2. as against Elena Lim and Ramon Calderon,
in violation of the SA.
- Because of the variance between the causes of action,
petitioner could have filed separate actions on condition
that it could not recover twice from the same cause.
o It could have proceeded against only one or all
of them, as full payment by any one of them
would have extinguished the obligation.
o Nevertheless, respondents could have been
joined as defendants in one suit, because
petitioner‘s alleged right of relief arose from the
same transaction
o To avoid a multiplicity of suits, joinder of parties
is encouraged by the law.
- The cause of action, however, does not affect the venue
of the action.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI) v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, 9
August 2007
- UHI (with principal office in Paranaque), granted Cruz a
franchise in Marikina
o Cruz was to pay UHI a franchise fee of P50k or
3% of gross monthly purchase whichever is
higher, payable within five days after the end of
each month without need of formal billing or
demand
o In case of any delay, Cruz would be liable to
pay an interest charge of 3%/mo.
o There was also a stipulation: The Franchisee
consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
 courts of Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving
any other venue
- Cruz purchased goods from UHI‘s affiliated companies
First Paragon Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales
Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
o FPC and USWCI executed Deeds of
Assignment assigning to UHI all their rights and
interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to
them.
- Cruz had outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC, and
USWCI in the total amount of P1,358,531.89
o UHI sent him a letter but Cruz‘s accounts
remained unsettled.
- UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
before Paranaque RTC stating 4 causes of action
1. Failure to pay monthly service fee under
the franchise agreement
2. Receivables from FPC, being its assignee
3. Receivables from USWCI being its
assignee
4. Atty‘s fees (forced to litigate because of
obstinate refusal to settle obligations)
- Cruz filed MTD otg of improper venue, invoking the
stipulation in the franchise agreement that all suits will
be filed in QC
- Parañaque RTC granted MTD
- Before the SC, UHI argued that the franchise agreement
did not include FPC and USWCI, hence they cannot be
bound to the stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the
same parties one of which does not arise out of the
contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon,
the complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought
before other venues provided that such other cause of
action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the
venue lies therein
nd rd
- UHI‘s 2 and 3 causes of action are based on the
deeds of assignment executed in its favor by FPC and
USWCI. The deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation
with respect to the causes of action thereunder. Hence,
the general rule on venue applies
- where the exclusivity clause does not make it
necessarily encompassing, such that even those not
related to the enforcement of the contract should be
subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation
designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined
to the specific undertaking or agreement
3. Severance
Spouses Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, 8 July 2005
- Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and
Milagros Perez filed before QC RTC a civil case for
Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc.,
and Antonio Hermano  Petitioners presented 3
causes of action in their complaint:
1. enforcement of contract to sell entered into
between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc
2. annulment or rescission of two contracts of
mortgage entered into between petitioners
and respondent Hermano  allegedly,
simultaneous with the execution of the contract
to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., petitioners were
made to sign Mortgage deeds over the same
properties in favor of Hermano whom they had
never met
3. damages against all defendants
- Hermano filed a civil case entitled ―Judicial Foreclosure
of Real Estate Mortgages against petitioners. This case
was raffled to another branch of the QC RTC
- Hermano filed ―Motion with Leave to Dismiss the
Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial‖
o TC granted this and denied petitioners‘ MR otg
that Hermano has nothing to do with the
transaction which the plaintiffs entered into with
defendant Zescon Land, Inc.
o TC also said that whatever claims plaintiffs
may have against defendant Hermano, they
can set it up by way of an answer to the judicial
foreclosure case
- petitioners filed an original action for certiorari before the
CA imputing GAD on the part of TC in granting
Hermano‘s MTD
- CA dismissed petition for certiorari for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period
o From the time petitioners received the assailed
Order on March 21, 2000 and filed their MR, 4
days had elapsed
o Petitioners received denial of their MR before
RTC on June 18, 2000
o They filed petition for certiorari before the CA
on August 17, 2000  total of 63 d (based on
the old RoC where period is interrupted by MR
but continues the same count)
- Before the SC:
o Petitioners claim that they filed petition on the
th
60 day (based on the amended RoC which
provides for a fresh period rule)
o Respondents claim that the petition was filed
st
on the 61 day
- Re: Hermano‘s MTD  Petitioners assert that Hermano
should not have been dismissed from the complaint
because:
1. He did not file a MTD under Rule 16 and his motion
was filed almost 2years after he filed his Answer to
the complaint
2. There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this
case
3. There was no misjoinder of parties
HELD: Petition GRANTED. CA reversed. RTC orders
annulled and set aside. RTC directed to reinstate
Hermano as defendant
- Re: timeliness of filing petition for certiorari  during the
pendency of the case before the CA, Rule 65 Sec. 4
was amended providing for a fresh period from receipt
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to
file a petition for certiorari
o Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure
defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for
want of conformity with certain legal
requirements, by their very essence, are
retroactive
o procedural laws are construed to be applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage
- Re: Hermano‘s MTD
o a joinder of causes of action means the uniting
of two or more demands or rights of action in
 one action. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of which could be made
the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff
may under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
o Joinders are allowed to avoid multiplicity of
suits and to promote the efficient administration
of justice wherever this may be done without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Rules on
joinders are liberally construed
o While joinder of causes of action is largely left
to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule
2 allows joinders in the presence of the
following requisites:
a. it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties
b. the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between
the parties, or are for demands for money
or are of the same nature and character
- Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action
effectively disallows unlimited joinder. BUT:
o Section 6, Rule 2: Misjoinder of causes of
action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action. A misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court, be severed and proceeded with
separately.
o There is misjoinder of causes of action when
the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule
2 are not met
o ITC: it is the first condition—on joinder of
parties—that the trial court deemed to be
lacking.
o The joinder of causes of action may involve the
same parties or different parties. If the joinder
involves different parties, as in this case, there
must be a question of fact or of law common to
both parties joined, arising out of the same
transaction or series of transaction
- ITC: there are questions of fact and law common to both
Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising
from a series of transaction over the same properties
- bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action
should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy
involving one, the TC committed GAD in severing from
the complaint petitioners‘ cause of action against
Hermano
Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, 13 August 2012
- This case involves the estate of spouses Baylon who
were survived by their children Victoria, Dolores, Rita,
Panfila, Ramon, and petitioner Lilia Ada
o respondent Florante Baylon is the son of
Ramon from his first marriage
nd
o petitioner Flora Baylon is the 2 wife of Ramon
o petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and
Ma. Ruby are the children of Ramon and Flora
o petitioner Luz B. Adanza is the daughter of
Victoria
- petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for partition,
accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and
Panfila
o they averred that the 43 parcels of land
originally owned by spouses Baylon were
possessed by Rita who appropriated for herself
all the income from said properties and bought
two other properties using said income
o Rita, Florante and Panfila denied this (only 22
parcels were co-owned and the others were
individually owned)
- During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed
of Donation conveyed 2 properties to Florante and
subsequently died
- petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading praying that
the said donation in favor of the respondent be
rescinded because it was executed without their
competent judicial authority (since it refers to the parcels
of land in litigation without the knowledge and approval
of the plaintiffs or of the Court)
o They further alleged that Rita was already sick
and very weak when the said Deed of Donation
was supposedly executed and, thus, could not
have validly given her consent thereto.
- Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said
donation,
- RTC declared co-ownership and partition of the subject
properties and rescinded the donation inter vivos
o Clearly, the donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante Baylon was executed to prejudice the
plaintiffs‘ right to succeed to the estate of Rita
Baylon in case of death considering that as
testified by Florante Baylon, Rita Baylon was
very weak
- CA reversed the RTC‘s rescission of the Deed of
Donation and remanded the same to the RTC
o before the petitioners may file an action for
rescission, they must first obtain a favorable
judicial ruling that said properties actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and
not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an
action for rescission is premature
o Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners‘ action
for rescission cannot be joined with their action
for partition, accounting and damages through
a mere supplemental pleading
HELD: RTC decision rescinding Deed of Donation is
reinstated.
- complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves
two separate, distinct and independent actions—
partition and rescission.
- while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in
the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action
as they may have against an opposing party, such
joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition,
inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil
actions governed by special rules there was a
misjoinder of causes of action.
- The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not
be joined with the action for the rescission of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an
action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed
by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in
the procedure in the special civil action of partition and
in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their
joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single
proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules
shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as
 the determination of the presence of requisite elements
of each particular cause of action
- Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a
ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua
sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of
action to be proceeded with separately
- However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder
or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance,
then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication
of all the erroneously joined causes of action
- It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only
applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over
all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has
no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then
such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from
the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any
adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the
same would be a nullity
- ITC: Florante posed no objection, and neither did the
RTC direct the severance of the petitioners‘ action for
rescission from their action for partition. While this may
be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this does
not constitute a ground to assail the validity and
correctness of its decision. The RTC validly adjudicated
the issues raised in the actions for partition and
rescission filed by the petitioners.
- A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of
action as long as it has some relation to the original
cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
- While a matter stated in a supplemental complaint
should have some relation to the cause of action set
forth in the original pleading, the fact that the
supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of
action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a
matter that may be considered by the court in the
exercise of its discretion. In such cases, we stressed
that a broad definition of ―cause of action‖ should be
applied.
- ITC: the donation inter vivos made by Rita in favor of
Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners‘
prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos
in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in
fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition
case.
o The petitioners‘ supplemental pleading merely
amplified the original cause of action
o the principal issue raised by the petitioners in
their original complaint remained the same.
- The resolution of the instant dispute (partition) is
fundamentally contingent upon a determination of
whether the donation inter vivos may be rescinded
o The petitioners can ask for the rescission of the
Deed of Donation because of Article 1381(4):
any disposition of the thing subject of litigation
or any act which tends to render inutile the
court‘s impending disposition in such case,
sans the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of the court, is unmistakably and
irrefutably indicative of bad faith
- contrary to the CA‘s disposition, the RTC aptly ordered
the rescission of the donation inter vivos of the lots to
Florante
- petitioners‘ right to institute the action for rescission
pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not
preconditioned upon the RTC‘s determination as to the
ownership of the said parcels of land.
IV. Parties
A. Real party in interest

Standing Behalf Name Example Basis Suit

RPI RPI RPI Includes agents Rule 3, Sec. 2 Individual suit
pursuant to an SPA
(because they are
merely acting for
the principal)
Representative RPI RPI administrator, Rule 3, Sec. 3 Representative
trustee, executor, suit
guardian, criminal
case, derivative suit Premium Marble
(stockholder suing v. CA
in behalf of the
corporation)
Representative RPI (people/public) Representative Public action Representative
(direct injury which (person filing the Suit
is not merely de case is merely the
minimis) representative 
e.g. taxpayer suit)
RPI (surety) RPI (surety) (debtor) Quasi-party Tijam v. Individual Suit
Sibonghanoy 
Manila Surety
filed MTD for its
own behalf;
Siguion-Reyna
case
x x Nominal parties Rule 65, Sec.5;
(judge whose ruling Tuzon v.
is assailed in Claribel-
certiorari) Purungganan)
RPI+Rep RPI+Rep RPI+Rep Class suit (person Rule 3, Sec. 12 Class suit
filing the case is
included in the class
 acting on one‘s
own behalf and on
behalf of the class)
RPI RPI x Transfer of Interest
 Standing (locus standi) = capacity to make an affirmative claim/ask for relief
o conferred by law, particularly the Rules of Court
o Even if not raised prior to an answer, should be a ground for MTD due to public policy consideration

THREE KINDS OF SUITS

INDIVIDUAL SUIT – one files on behalf of oneself
REPRESENTATIVE SUIT – one files on behalf of another (e.g. derivative suit  suing on behalf of corporation)
CLASS SUIT – combination of individual suit and representative suit  sues not only on his behalf but also on behalf of others

Note:
The transferor of interest is either a nominal or representative party based on Rule 3, Sec. 19. But according to jurisprudence, the
transferor may be a real party in interest.
section 2-4, 11, 13-15, 18-19, 21-22, Rule 3
Section 2.Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.
Section 3.Representatives as parties. — Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a
trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging
to the principal.
Section 4.Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue
or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Section 11.Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately.
Section 12.Class suit. — When the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect
the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest.
Section 13.Alternative defendants. — Where the plaintiff is
uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to
relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the
alternative, although a right to relief against one may be
inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.
Section 15.Entity without juridical personality as defendant.
— When two or more persons not organized as an entity with
juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be
sued under the name by which they are generally or
commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of
the persons composing said entity must all be revealed.
Section 18.Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party
becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon
motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or
against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by
his legal guardian or guardian ad litem.
Section 19.Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of
interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in
the action or joined with the original party.
Section 21.Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to
litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the
party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of
docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished
him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which
the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the
court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue
or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose.
Section 22.Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any action
involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive
order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in
its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor
General who may be heard in person or a representative duly
designated by him.
section 5(b), Rule 6
Kinds of Pleadings
Section 5.Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or
affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material
fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant
essential to his cause or causes of action.
An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which,
while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud,
statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy,
and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
section 5, Rule 65
Section 5.Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When
the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private
respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining
the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such
private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their
own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or
respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs
awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall
be against the private respondents only, and not against the
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in
or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either
party, the public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in
the proceedings therein
section 20-21, Corporation Code
Section 20. De facto corporations. - The due incorporation
of any corporation claiming in good faith to be a corporation
under this Code, and its right to exercise corporate powers,
shall not be inquired into collaterally in any private suit to
which such corporation may be a party. Such inquiry may be
made by the Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding
Section 21. Corporation by estoppel. - All persons who
assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without
authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all
debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result
thereof: Provided, however, That when any such ostensible
corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a
corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not
be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate
personality.
On who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation
as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground
that there was in fact no corporation.
section 111, Family Code
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate
or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without
the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to
litigate with regard to the same.
articles 102-103, RPC
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In default
of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable
for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them
or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
section 46, Rule 39
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
Section 46.When principal bound by judgment against
surety. — When a judgment is rendered against a party who
stands as surety for another, the latter is also bound from the
time that he has notice of the action or proceeding, and an
opportunity at the surety's request to join in the defense.
section 17, Rule 57
Preliminary Attachment
Section 17.Recovery upon the counter-bond. — When the
judgment has become executory, the surety or sureties on
any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this
Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become
charged on such counter-bond and bound to pay the
judgment obligee upon demand the amount due under the
judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety
or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same
action.
Tuzon v. Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662, 26
November 2001
- Administrative complaint against Judge Loreto Cloribel-
Purugganan of Tuguegarao RTC for illegal practice of
law, gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct,
evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, and willful violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
- Tuzon filed with the CA petition for certiorari assailing
the order of respondent judge denying Tuzon‘s motion
to allow cross-examination of his witness and directed
that the case be submitted for resolution.
o CA directed private respondent Raymundo E.
Catral to file comment thereon
o respondent judge filed the comment for
Raymundo Catral and herself, and affixed her
name and signature on the comment
o petition dismissed by CA for lack of merit
- Tuzon filed the administrative complaint before the SC
deploring the act of filing a comment in the civil case as
illegal private practice of law
o Tuzon also averred that respondent judge
antedated her decision in the Civil Case
HELD: Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan guilty of illegal practice of
law  SUSPENDED 3 MONTHS
- a judge must maintain a detached attitude from the case
and shall not waste his time by taking an active part in a
proceeding that relates to official actuations in a case
o He is merely a nominal party and has no
personal interest or personality therein
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragrante, G.R. No.
L-770, 27 April 1948
- Pedro Flagrante‘s application for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant
was approved by the Public Service Commission
through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez
o certificate of public convenience was issued to
the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant and to sell the ice produced from said
plant
- Limjoco contends that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the
latter as party applicant in the case then pending before
the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
 estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
HELD: PSC decision affirmed. Petition dismissed
- The commission declared in its decision, in view of the
evidence before it, that Flagrante‘s estate was
financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant
o The right of Fragante to prosecute said
application to its final conclusion was one
which by its nature did not lapse through his
death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets
of his estate, for such a right was property
despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied the application
- Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or
administrator may bring or defend actions, among other
cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the
deceased which survive, and it says that such actions
may be brought or defended "in the right of the
deceased"
- Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the
duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which shall come to his
possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any
other person for him
- unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action
affecting the property or rights of a deceased person
which may be brought by or against him if he were alive,
may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against
the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very
nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes
the right
- Manresa considered as immovable and movable things
rights which are not material
- the estate of a decedent is in law regarded as a person
o the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality
independent of the heirs.
- Under the regime of the Old Civil Code the heirs of a
deceased person were considered in contemplation of
law as the continuation of his personality
o the heirs succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of
his death
- BUT in the New Civil Code and the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is the estate or the mass of property, rights
and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs
directly, that becomes vested and charged with his
rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
o among the artificial persons recognized by law
figures "a collection of property to which the
law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties"
o the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. It is the creation of law for
the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made
- under the Bill of Rights, the term ―person‖ includes
artificial and juridical persons  they also have the
constitutional guarantee against being deprived of
property without due process of law, or the immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures
- Flagrante‘s citizenship also extends to his estate (by
legal fiction)
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 S 29 (1968), supra
RE: Party in interest
- although the action, originally, was exclusively against
the Sibonghanoy spouses, the Surety became a quasi-
party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-
bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued
by the court of origin. Since then, it acquired certain
rights and assumed specific obligations in connection
with the pending case
Premium Marble v. CA, 264 S 11 (1996)
- Premium Marble filed an action for damages against
International Corporate Bank (represented by Atty.
Dumadag)
o Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation issued three checks payable to
Premium Marble
o Former officers of Premium Marble without
authority deposited the checks to the current
account of Intervest Merchant Finance (conduit
of one of the former officers) with International
Corporate Bank
o Although the checks were clearly payable to
Premium Marble only, defendant bank
accepted the checks to be deposited to the
current account of Intervest and thereafter
presented the same for collection from the
drawee bank which subsequently cleared the
same thus allowing Intervest to make use of
the funds to the prejudice of Premium Marble
- International Corporate Bank alleged, inter alia, that
Premium has no capacity/personality/authority to sue in
this instance and the complaint should, therefore, be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
- Printline Corporation, a sister company of Premium also
filed an action for damages against International
Corporate Bank
- Premium Marble (this time represented by Siguion
Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office) filed MTD
otg that the filing of the case was without authority from
its duly constituted board of directors as shown by the
excerpt of the minutes of the Premium‘s board of
directors‘ meeting
- Premium thru Atty. Dumadag contended that the
persons who signed the board resolution are not
directors of the corporation (already dismissed for
various irregularities and fraudulent acts)
o Siguion Reyna Law Office is the lawyer of the
persons who signed the board resolution
(Belen and Nograles) and not of Premium
Marble
o Articles of Incorporation of Premium shows that
Belen, Nograles and Reyes are not majority
stockholders.
- Siguion Reyna Law Firm as counsel of Premium in a
rejoinder, asserted that it is the general information
sheet filed with the SEC that is the best evidence that
would show who are the stockholders of a corporation
and not the Articles of Incorporation since the latter does
not keep track of the many changes that take place after
new stockholders subscribe to corporate shares of
stocks.
- International Corporate Bank adopted in toto Premium
Marble‘s (represented by Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and
Ongsiako Law Office) MTD
- LC ruled that the officers represented by Atty. Dumadag
do not have the legal capacity to sue for and in behalf of
Premium Marble because of a pending intra-corporate
dispute before the SEC (RE: who are the current
officers, those in the GI sheet or those newly elected?)
- CA affirmed LC‘s dismissal of the cases
HELD: Petition DENIED
- in the absence of any board resolution from its board of
directors giving the authority to act for and in behalf of
the corporation, the present action must necessarily fail.
The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any
court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises
its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of authority and
the invalidity of plaintiff-appellant‘s subscription which is
still pending, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the
SEC
Premium Marble v. CA implies that lack of standing =
failure to state cause of action. Sir Lumba thinks that this is
wrong because standing is different from cause of action. The
correct doctrine should be: Lack of standing = lack of legal
capacity to sue (which is still a ground for dismissal).
Pacaña-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No.
168979, 2 December 2013
- Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña filed
this case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages
- Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie
Pacaña (authorized by Lourdes, their mother, through a
sworn declaration and special power of attorney)
claimed that their family operated the ―Rovila Water
Supply‖ from their family residence and were engaged in
the distribution of water to customers in Cebu City.
- Lilia was a former trusted employee until she claimed
ownership over the family business through a
corporation named ―Rovila Water Supply, Inc.‖ (Rovila
Inc.) which was registered with the SEC with the
respondents as the majority stockholders.
- respondents filed MTD otg that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute
- RTC denied the motion
- Lourdes died during pendency of the case
- During pre-trial, respondents manifested to the RTC that
a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the
deaths of Lourdes and Luciano.
o in the pre-trial order, one of the submitted
issues was whether the case must be
dismissed
- Respondents filed another MTD otg that petitioners are
not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case.
- RTC denied MTD anew
o Filed out of time as it was filed only after the
conclusion of the pre-trial conference
o rule on substitution of parties only applies when
the parties to the case die, which is not what
happened in the present case
- CA ruled that RTC committed GAD
o petitioners filed the complaint and the amended
complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents.
As such, they are not the real parties in interest
and cannot bring an action in their own names;
thus, the complaint should be dismissed
o petitioners should first be declared as heirs
before they can be considered as the real
parties in interest. This cannot be done in the
present ordinary civil case but in a special
proceeding for that purpose
o ground of lack of cause of action may be raised
in a MTD any time
- Before the SC, petitioners argued:
o Filed out of time
o even if there is non-joinder and misjoinder of
parties or that the suit is not brought in the
name of the real party in interest, the remedy is
not outright dismissal of the complaint, but its
amendment to include the real parties in
interest
o petitioners sued in their own right because they
have actual and substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action as heirs or co-
owners,  declaration as heirs in a special
proceeding is not necessary
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- As the rule now stands, the failure to invoke lack of
cause of action in MTD or in the answer would result in
its waiver because failure to state a cause of action may
be cured under Section 5, Rule 10 (Amendment to
conform to or authorize presentation of evidence)
- ITC: MTD was filed out of time and the failure to state
cause of action was thus waived
o They should have at least raised this in their
answer. Petitioners claimed that the CA found
that this was indeed raised in their answer BUT
the SC‘s examination of the records shows that
the CA had no basis in its finding that the
respondents alleged the grounds as affirmative
defenses in their answer.
o it was only during the pre-trial stage that they
verbally manifested and invited the attention of
the lower court on their grounds for dismissal
- To justify the belated filing of the motion to dismiss, the
CA reasoned out that the ground for dismissal of ―lack of
cause of action‖ may be raised at any time during the
proceedings, pursuant to Dabuco v. CA. This is an
erroneous interpretation and application of Dabuco
o in Dabuco, the grounds for dismissal were
raised as affirmative defenses in the answer
which is in stark contrast to the present case.
o in Dabuco, the Court distinguished between the
dismissal of the complaint for ―failure to state a
cause of action‖ and ―lack of cause of action.‖
Failure to state a cause of Lack of cause of action
action
refers to the insufficiency of refers to a situation where the
the pleading evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the
pleading (questions of fact are
REMEDY: MTD under Rule involved, therefore, courts
16 hesitate to declare a plaintiff
as lacking in cause of action.
Such declaration is postponed
until the insufficiency of cause
is apparent from a
preponderance of evidence)
REMEDY:
1. require the pleading to
state a cause of action,
by timely objection to its
deficiency; or
2. at the trial, to file a
demurrer to evidence, if
 such motion is warranted - ITC: proper remedy = implead the indispensable parties.
To do so would serve proper administration of justice
- ITC, the Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the and prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits
present case based on the grounds invoked by the - the deceased Pacañas can no longer be included in the
respondents which they have waived for failure to complaint. Upon their death, however, their ownership
invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules. and rights over their properties were transmitted to their
The Court cannot also dismiss the case based on ―lack heirs, including petitioners.
of cause of action‖ as this would require at least a - HENCE court ordered all heirs of the spouses to be
preponderance of evidence which is yet to be impleaded
appreciated by the trial court. Therefore, the RTC did
not commit GAD in issuing the assailed orders denying Summary of the arguments of Rebecca Pacaña-
the respondents‘ MTD and MR. Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña acdg. to Sir Lumba
- RE: Real party in interest Standing Behalf Name Ground
Real party in Indispensable party Necessary party for MTD?
interest RPI RPI representative NO
party who stands party in interest one who is not RPI representative representative YES
to be benefited or without whom no indispensable but
injured by the final determination who ought to be
judgment of the can be had of an joined as a party Magallanes v. Palmer Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 205179, 18 July
suit, or the party action if complete relief 2014
entitled to the is to be accorded - Magallanes was a sales agent of Andrews International
avails of the suit. also considered as to those (selling fire extinguishers). He negotiated with 3
real party in interest already parties, prospective buyers who all issued checks payable to
If a suit is not because party or for a complete Andrews. These checks, however, bounced
brought in the stands to be determination or - the President of Andrews returned the bum checks to
name of or benefited or injured settlement of the Magallanes. Desirous of obtaining his accrued
against the real by the judgment of claim subject of commissions, Magallanes signed Sales Invoices
party in interest, a the suit the action covering the fire extinguishers that were intended to be
MTD may be filed sold to the prospective buyers, and he also issued 5
otg that the ISSUE to be also considered checks covering the purchase price of the items
complaints states RESOLVED: WoN real party in o Magallanes‘ checks were dishonored upon
no cause of persons interested interest because presentment to the bank.
action. in such outcome party stands to - Andrews and another corporation, Palmer Asia entered
are actually be benefited or into an agreement whereby all the business of Andrews
ISSUE to be pleaded injured by the was going to be handled by Palmer
RESOLVED: judgment of the - Magallanes was charged with BP 22 by Andrews in a
WoN the parties suit complaint filed before MeTC Branch 62.
presently pleaded - Another criminal case was filed in Branch 67, by
are interested in ISSUE to be EMSAVILL as the counsel of Palmer (also the counsel
the outcome of RESOLVED: of Andrews). This case was entitled Palmer Asia, Inc. v.
the litigation (NOT WoN persons Gerve Magallanes. (The 2 cases have different docket
WoN persons interested in such numbers)
interested in such outcome are - Magallanes filed an Omnibus Motion to Disqualify
outcome are actually pleaded Private Prosecutor and to Strike Out Testimony of Angel
actually pleaded) Palmiery (president of Andrews)
o According to Magallanes since the assets and
- ITC: spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties- credits of Andrews were transferred to Palmer,
plaintiffs. They are indispensable parties to the case as the real party in interest in this case is Palmer
the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply. Without their and not Andrews. Therefore, the criminal case
inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination should have been instituted by Palmer
of the present case. They possess such an interest in - Palmer filed its Opposition to Magallanes‘ motion
the controversy that a final decree would necessarily - MeTC denied the motion filed by Magallanes for lack of
affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed merit. It also acquitted Magallanes, but held him civilly
without their presence. Their interest in the subject liable
matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably - Magallanes filed a Partial Appeal before the RTC
intertwined with that of the other parties. - When the parties were required by the RTC to submit
- Jurisprudence on the procedural consequence of the their respective memoranda, the memorandum for the
inclusion or noninclusion of an indispensable party is complainant was filed by Palmer, and not Andrews.
divided in our jurisdiction. BUT the Court clarified in - RTC held that Magallanes was not civilly liable for the
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that value of the checks because the complaining juridical
the failure to implead indispensable parties is a curable entity has not fully established the existence of a debt by
error Mr. Magallanes in its favor
- non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul - Palmer (not Andrews) filed Petition for Review before
the judgment. The rules allow the amendment of the the CA
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through o Magallanes then filed his Comments to Petition
motion or on order of the court on its own initiative for Review with MTD Due to Finality of
Judgment wherein he alleged that Palmer Asia
 has never been a party plaintiff litigant in the
civil aspect of the Criminal Case
- CA ruled against Magallanes
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- RTC Decision absolving Magallanes from civil liability
has attained finality, since no appeal was interposed by
the private complainant, Andrews. While Palmer filed a
petition for review before the CA, it is not the real party
in interest; it was never a party to the proceedings at the
trial court.
- The CA erred in stating that Palmer and Andrews are
the same entity. These are two separate and distinct
entities claiming civil liability against Magallanes.
Andrews was the payee of the bum checks, and the
former employer of Magallanes. It filed the complaint for
B.P. 22 before MeTC Branch 62. Thus when the MeTC
Branch 62 ordered Magallanes to pay the private
complainant the corresponding face value of the checks,
it was referring to Andrews, not Palmer.
- Palmer, on the other hand, was first mentioned in an
Entry of Appearance filed by its counsel EMSAVILL
before MeTC Branch 67 in connection with Palmer Asia,
Inc. v. Gerve Magallanes. Palmer also filed the
Memorandum required by the RTC.
- Although Andrews relinquished control of its business to
Palmer, it was never dissolved and thus remained
existing
- the real party in interest here is Andrews
Magallanes doctrine acdg. to Sir Lumba:
If you have no standing, if you appeal, it is as if there is no
appeal.
If you have no standing, if you file a case, it is as if there is no
case filed.
Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices v.
Chionlo-Sia, G.R. No. 181186, February 3, 2016
- Siguion Reyna acted as counsel for Remedios N.
Rodriguez when she commenced an action for the
intestate settlement of the estate of her deceased
husband before the Lucena RTC
- During the pendency of the intestate proceedings,
Remedios asked for the payment of widow's allowance
(denied by RTC, but granted by CA)
- while the case was pending before the CA, Remedios
executed a Deed of Sale of Inheritance wherein she
agreed to sell all her rights, interests and participation in
the estate of Susano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio
M. Gerardo
- As a condition subsequent to the sale, executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Gerardo to receive
from any person or from any court, any property and to
receive said property in his own name and for his own
account and to deposit the same at his sole discretion
for his own account and dispose of the same without
any limitation
- Gerardo later on executed a document titled as
"Substitution of Attorney-in-Fact" where he designated
Siguion Reyna as substitute attorney pursuant to the
power of substitution granted to him in the earlier SPA.
Gerardo subsequently executed his own SP A
authorizing Siguion Reyna
- Siguion Reyna filed a motion with the RTC for the
payment of the allowance  the Estate of Deceased
Rodriguez remitted to Siguion Reyna 3 checks for this
purpose
- A Partial Project of Partition of the Estate was approved
by RTC
- Remedios filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion and Notice
of Termination of the Services of Petitioner's Counsel of
Record."
- Remedios questioned the RTC's Order approving the
partition and denied the execution of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Gerardo. Also demanded that Siguion Reyna
return the amount it received from the partition motion
eventually withdrawn
- Nevertheless, RTC directed Siguion Reyna to reimburse
the Estate
o the sale of inheritance was never made known
to the RTC
o the sale cannot comprehend a widow's
allowance because such allowance is
"personal in nature‖
- Siguion Reyna appealed to the CA
o argued that it merely acted as representative of
Gerardo, Remedios' successor-in-interest,
when it received the allowance
- CA denied Siguion Reyna‘s petition otg that the latter
was not a party in the case before the lower court and
therefore had no standing to question the assailed order
- Before the SC, Siguion Reyna argued:
o while it was not a party in the intestate
proceedings, it is nevertheless an "aggrieved
party" which can file a petition for certiorari.
o the RTC's order of reimbursement violated due
process
o Siguion Reyna received said allowance only in
favorlof Gerardo as buyer of Remedios'
interests pursuant to the Deed of Sale
HELD:
- GENERAL RULE: the "aggrieved party" referred to in
Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original
proceedings that gave rise to the original action for
certiorari
o a stranger to the litigation would not have the
legal standing to interfere in the orders or
decisions of the said court
- The peculiar facts of this case, however, call for a less
stringent application of the rule.
- Siguion Reyna became involved in its own capacity only
when the RTC ordered it to return the money that it
received on behalf of its client
o The order of reimbursement was directed to
Siguion Reyna in its personal capacity - not in
its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or
Gerardo
o order for reimbursement would typically have
been addressed to the parties of the case; the
counsel's role and duty would be to ensure that
his client complies with the court's order.
o Siguion Reyna never claimed the amount for its
own account. It only facilitated the transfer of
the amount to Gerardo
- Under the law of agency, an agent is not personally
liable for the obligations of the principal unless he
performs acts outside the scope of his authority or he
expressly binds himself to be personally liable.
Otherwise, the principal is solely liable.
o ITC Siguion Reyna acted within bounds of its
authority
 B. Necessary and indispensible parties
sections 7-10, Rule 3 Arcelona v. CA, 280 S 20 (1997)
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — - 6 siblings = co-owners of a fishpond. 3 of them are in
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be the US. Those in the PH entered into a lease contract
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or with a certain Tandoc who then entrusted the lease to
defendants. (7) Farnacio. At the end of the lease contract, Farnacio filed
Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who a case for peaceful possession before the RTC asking
is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if that his tenancy in the fishpond be maintained. RTC and
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, IAC ruled in favor of Farnacio. Before the CA,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim petitioners, the siblings who were in the US, filed an
subject of the action. (8a) action for declaration of nullity of judgment because they
Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. — were not impleaded as indispensable parties and they
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a were not served summons extraterritorially. The SC held
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the
name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the petitioners who are indispensable parties.
court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No. 157767, 9 September 2004
jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. - Hular filed accion reinvindicatoria and accion publiciana
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without alleging that Baloloy erroneously had his land registered
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim under the latter‘s name. The lower courts granted his
against such party. petitions and declared him the sole owner of said land.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the The SC declared that the lower court made an error in
court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment declaring Hular the sole owner because he inherited
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of said land along with his siblings from their parents;
such necessary party. (8a, 9a) hence they are co-owners and his siblings are
Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any indispensable parties in the action. Likewise, the
party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, Republic of the Philippines was also an indispensable
he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall party because Hular sought the nullification of the Free
be stated in the complaint. (10) Patent and OCT. Hular‘s failure to include indispensable
parties is fatal. (Art. 487: co-owner may only file on
art. 487, 1208-1209, NCC behalf of other co-owners if it is for the benefit of all. If
Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in the co-owner filed the action claiming that he is the sole
ejectment. (n) owner to the prejudice of other co-owners, the action
must fail.)
Article 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of Note: 487 is for ejectment. But the SC in this case
the obligations to which the preceding article refers the applied 487 to other real actions.
contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be
presumed to be divided into as many shares as there are
creditors or debtors, the credits or debts being considered Sir Lumba‘s analysis of the 2 above cases involving co-
distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court owners:
governing the multiplicity of suits. (1138a) Arcelona v. CA Baloloy v. Hular
Facts The 3 co-owners who The plaintiff (Hular)
Article 1209. If the division is impossible, the right of the were in the US and failed to include 2
creditors may be prejudiced only by their collective acts, and were supposed to be co—onwers who
the debt can be enforced only by proceeding against all the indispensable parties were necessary
debtors. If one of the latter should be insolvent, the others were not included as parties
shall not be liable for his share. (1139) defendants
Nature of The co-owners are The co-owners are
Summary of parties relationship joint debtors solidary creditors
Indispensable Necessary Permissive Judgment in May be annulled for Judgment in favor
Party Party Party favor of failure to implead of one co-owner is
Absence Not a ground Not a ground Not a ground plaintiff indispensable valid
for dismissal for dismissal for dismissal parties. Otherwise, it
Remedy - Include party Include party would be a violation
(Rule 3, (Rule 3, Sec. of due process
Sec. 7) OR 9) because the other
- If the co-
judgment owner/indispensable
has become parties did not have
final and their day in court
executory, Judgment in The plaintiff may no The co-owners who
have favor of longer file another were not impleaded
judgment defendant action against the may still be allowed
annulled other indispensable to file another
under Rule parties who were not action. Otherwise, it
47 (Arcelona impleaded. The would be a violation
v. CA) principle of res of due process
 judicata should apply because the other
co-owner/
necessary parties
did not have their
day in court
Note: The SC did not apply this analysis in the Baloloy
case. In said case, Hular‘s co-owners were treated by the SC
as indispensable parties. For Sir Lumba, they should only be
treated as necessary parties.
According to Sir Lumba, in the Baloloy case, Hular‘s co-
owners are examples of the first type of necessary parties
because they ought to be joined as parties for complete
relief to be accorded as to the Baloloy‘s. Otherwise, Hular‘s
co-owners might still file another action against the
Baloloy‘s, which will also be unfair.
Two types of necessary parties:
1. One who is ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties
2. One who is ought to be joined as a party for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action
Adlawan v. Adlawan, 479 S 275 (2006)
- Petitioner = illegitimate son of Dominador, owner of
subject parcel of land. He filed an ejectment suit against
the siblings of Dominador occupying the subject
property. The MTC dismissed the action but the RTC
reversed. The CA reinstated the MTC ruling and held
that the heirs of Dominador‘s wife Graciana
(intervenors), are petitioner‘s co-owners. Hence,
petitioner cannot eject occupants of the property via an
unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as sole
owner of the property. SC affirmed CA (Art. 487: co-
owner may only file on behalf of other co-owners if it is
for the benefit of all. If the co-owner filed the action
claiming that he is the sole owner to the prejudice of
other co-owners, the action must fail.)
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, 29
November 2006
- Spouses Carandang and spouses De Guzman are the
stockholders of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. When
they increased the capital stock of the corporation, De
Guzman claimed that he was the only one who paid for
such increase. Hence Quirino De Guzman filed an
action to recover from Spouses Carandang. One of the
arguments raised by spouses Carandang before the SC
is Quirino De Guzman‘s failure to include in the
complaint his wife Milagros de Guzman, who is an
indispensable party since some of the checks issued
were bearing her name. The SC ruled that the failure to
include Milagros does not warrant the dismissal of the
case because Milagros and Quirino, being spouses
whose property were under the CPG regime, should be
considered co-owners. Art.487 would apply
Pacaña-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., supra
Land Bank of the Phils. v. Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667,
22 April 2015
- Municipality of Agoo allegedly entered into irregular
loans with LBP through its officials for the
redevelopment of the Plaza. Cacayuran filed a taxpayer
suit assailing the loan agreements, impleading LBP and
the officials. The RTC, CA and SC ruled in favor of
Cacayuran. The Municipality filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene with Pleading-in-Intervention praying that it be
included as a party-litigant to the instant case. It
contends that as a contracting party to the Subject
Loans, it is an indispensable party to the action filed by
Cacayuran. Hence, there cannot be any real disposition
of the instant suit by reason of its exclusion from the
same. Cacayuran insists that the Municipality is not a
real party-in-interest to the instant case as his complaint
is against the municipal officers in their personal
capacity for their ultra vires acts which are not binding
on the Municipality. The SC held that the municipality is
indeed a RPI but this is not a ground for the dismissal of
the case; rather, the remedy is to implead the
indispensable parties. Hence, the SC remanded the
case to the RTC
Note: The Land Bank case involves a personal action
rd
(action for annulment of contract of loan). If a 3 party sues
a party to the contract, the other party is an indispensable
party because the judgment will necessarily affect him and
his right to due process will be violated.
C. Class suits
section 12, Rule 3
Section 12.Class suit. — When the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect
the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest.
Elements:
1. common or general interest to many persons 
all members of the class are indispensable parties
2. so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties (relate with indispensable party-defendants
who are joint indivisible debtors)
3. sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all
OPT-IN JURISDICTION OPT-OUT JURISDICTION
Member of the class has the Member of the class can be
right to intervene but does excluded from said class so
not have the right to be as not to be affected by the
excluded from the class judgment
The Philippines is an opt-in jurisdiction
Three kinds of class suits
1. True –members of the class are indispensable
parties
o only type available in the Philippines; provided
for in the Rules on Environmental Cases
2. Hybrid – members of the class are necessary
parties
3. Spurious – members of the class are permissive
parties
o Type available in the US
Effect of filing a class suit which is not actually a class
suit: DISMISSIBLE
- According to the SC, the party had no capacity to sue;
hence, he has no cause of action
- Sir Lumba thinks this is wrong because the proper
remedy should be a joinder since the individual still
stated a cause of action as to himself
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-
23136, 26 August 1974
- plaintiffs-appellants alleged that they were stockholders
in the Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI)
- at a regular meeting, the stockholders passed a
Resolution providing that the Consolidated Bank & Trust
Co. be organized with an authorized capital of
P20,000,000.00 and all stockholders of the CMI, who
were legally qualified to become stockholders, would be
entitled to subscribe to the capital stock of the proposed
Bank ―at par value to the same extent and in the same
amount as said stockholders‘ respective shareholdings
in the CMI,"
o the Board of Directors of the CMI, who are the
defendants-appellees in this case, constituted
themselves as the Interim Board of Organizers
who then sent out to the CMI stockholders
circular letters ―Pre-Incorporation Agreement to
Subscribe‖ forms regarding the payment of
subscription
o the CMI stockholders paid the subscriptions
and accomplished the ―Pre-Incorporation
Agreement to Subscribe‖
o However, when the Board of Organizers
caused the execution of the Articles of
Incorporation of the proposed Bank, it only
indicated an original subscription of 50,000
shares woth P5,000,000 subscribed and paid
only by six of the individuals-defendants-
appellees and excluding the plaintiffs-
appellants and the other CMI subscribing
stockholders who had already subscribed
o plaintiffs-appellants and other CMI subscribing
stockholders had been denied the right to
subscribe at par value, in proportion to their
equities established under their respective
―Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe‖ to
the capital stock
- Plaintiffs filed this case saying that the AoI was in
violation of law and in breach of trust and the contractual
agreement as a means to gain control of the Bank
o Prayed that the subscriptions and
shareholdings acquired by the individuals-
defendants-appellees and the persons chosen
by them, to the extent that plaintiffs-appellants
and the other CMI stockholders had been
deprived of their right to subscribe, be annulled
and transferred to plaintiffs-appellants and
other CMI subscribing stockholders.
- Defendants filed MTD otg that plaintiffs-appellants had
no legal standing or capacity to institute the alleged
class suit and complaint did not state a sufficient and
valid cause of action
- TC granted the MTD holding that the class suit could not
be maintained because of the absence of a showing in
the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were
sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action
- Before the SC, plaintiffs-appellants argued that the
propriety of a class suit should be determined by the
common interest in the subject matter of the
controversy; that ITC there is such common interest
HELD:
- The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class
suit are accordingly:
(1) that the subject matter of the controversy be one of
common or general interest to many persons, and
(2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all to the court.
- An action does not become a class suit merely because
it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the
suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending
facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the
class action should allege the existence of the
necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter
of common interest, and the existence of a class and the
number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the
court might be enabled to determine whether the
members of the class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, to
contrast the number appearing on the record with the
number in the class and to determine whether claimants
on record adequately represent the class and the
subject matter of general interest
- ITC: the complaint explicitly did not state the number of
said CMI subscribing stockholders so that the trial court
could not infer, much less make sure as explicitly
required by the statutory provision, that the parties
actually before it were sufficiently numerous and
representative in order that all interests concerned might
be fully protected, and that it was impracticable to bring
such a large number of parties before the court.
- There was also no common or general interest ITC:
The interest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors,
and the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of
this suit—the portion of stocks offering of the Bank left
unsubscribed by CMI stockholders who failed to
exercise their right to subscribe on or before January 15,
1963—was several, not common or general in the sense
required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and
the CMI stockholders had determinable interest; each
one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion of
the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any
interest in, the stock to which another was entitled.
- Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
appellants and the CMI stockholders suffered wrongs
that had been committed by similar means and even
pursuant to a single plan of the Interim Board of
Organizers of the Bank, the wrong suffered by each of
them would constitute a wrong separate from those
suffered by the other stockholders, and those wrongs
alone would not create that common or general interest
in the subject matter of the controversy as would entitle
any one of them to bring a class suit on behalf of the
others.
- It may be granted that the claims of all the appellants
involved the same question of law. But this alone, as
said above, did not constitute the common interest over
the subject matter indispensable in a class suit. The
right to purchase or subscribe to the shares of the
proposed Bank, claimed by appellants herein, is
analogous to the right of preemption that stockholders
have when their corporation increases its capital. The
right of preemption, it has been said, is personal to each
stockholder
- Re: Cause of action
o facts did not even show that appellants
were entitled to subscribe to the capital
stock of the proposed Bank, for said right
depended on a condition precedent, which
was, that they were qualified under the law
to become stockholders of the Bank, and
there was no direct averment in the
complaint of the facts that qualified them to
become stockholders of the Bank
Newsweek v. IAC, 142 S 171 (1986)
- private respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to
have 8,500 members and several individual sugar
planters, filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a
class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the
province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and
two of petitioners‘ non-resident
correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came
o they allegedly committed libel by publishing
―An Island of Fear‖ portraying Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not
only exploited the impoverished and
underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but
also brutalized and killed them with
impunity.
o prayed that defendants be ordered to pay
them P1M as actual and compensatory
damages, and such amounts for moral,
exemplary and corrective damages as the
court may determine, plus expenses of
litigation, attorney‘s fees and costs of suit.
- Petitioner filed MTD for failure to state a cause of action
which was dismissed by TC
- Before the SC, petitioner argued that in cases where
libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is
actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to
reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a
specific, individual group member‘s reputation.
HELD:
- where the defamation is alleged to have been directed
at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed
to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if
need be.
- ITC: each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy
Liana’s Supermarket v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 111014, 257 SCRA 186 (1996)
- Private respondents are members of the National Labor
Union and are sales ladies, cooks, packers, cashiers,
electricians, warehousemen, etc., of Liana‘s
Supermarket. They were allegedly underpaid and
required to work more than 8 hours a day without
overtime pay and were deprived of holiday pay and
allowances
- Petitioner‘s consultant met with the employees
individually and told them to quit their membership with
the union under pain of being suspended, dismissed or
criminally prosecuted. When they refused, many were
dismissed without any charges and others were given
memorandum on concocted offenses and violations.
- The Union on behalf of its members filed a complaint
before the Labor Arbiter for underpayment of wages,
nonpayment of overtime pay, monthly emergency
allowance, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay
and 13th month pay
o The complaint was amended since
respondent Union manifested through its
authorized representative that it was
intended as a class suit.
o 3 other cases were filed by other
employees as individual complainants
 One case = 2 complainants
 Another = 5 complainants
 Another = Elorde Padilla, Jr., et
al., as complainants
- The 4 cases were then consolidated.
o The Union submitted 2 lists of 136 workers
with 85 original complainants
o 16 complainants later filed motions to
withdraw with prejudice and 5 were found
to be non-employees
o 3 other complainants settled with petitioner
and moved to dismiss
o 27 more employees submitted their sworn
statements
o TOTAL: 88 complainants (85 – (16+5+3) +
27)
- petitioner filed what was purportedly a compromise
agreement between itself and the local chapter of
respondent Union. It appeared to have been signed by
representatives of petitioner and the President, Vice
President and another officer of the local chapter of
respondent Union
- LA ruled that complainants were illegally dismissed;
ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages.
NLRC affirmed
- petitioner now asks how many individual complainants
are there in these cases: 7 or 85?
o Only 7 names appear in the captions of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
 Sec. 3, Rule 6 clearly provides
that the names and residences of
the parties plaintiff and defendant
must be stated in the complaint;
 Sec. 1, Rule III, of the New Rules
of Procedure of respondent NLRC
states that the full names of all the
real parties in interest shall be
stated in the caption of the
complaint or petition as well as in
the decision, award or judgment
o not class suit because the parties are not
so numerous that it would be impracticable
to bring them all before the court.
HELD: NLRC affirmed
- This is a ―representative suit‖ as distinguished from
―class suit‖
 o Class suit: only one right or cause of action
pertaining or belonging in common to many
persons, not separately or severally to
distinct individuals
- ITC: there are multiple rights or causes of action
pertaining separately to several, distinct employees
- Art. 242 of the Labor Code authorizes a union to file a
―representative suit‖ for the benefit of its members in the
interest of avoiding an otherwise cumbersome
procedure of joining all union members in the complaint,
even if they number by the hundreds
- the detail that the number and names of the striking
members of petitioner union were not specified in the
decision nor in the complaint is of no consequence.
o it was the function precisely of a labor
union to carry the representation of its
members and to file an action for their
benefit and behalf without joining them and
avoid the cumbersome procedure joining
each and every member as a separate
party.
- A ―representative suit‖ is akin to a ―class suit‖ in the
limited sense that the phrases found in Sec. 12 of Rule
3, ―one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all,‖
and ―the parties actually before it are sufficiently
numerous and representative,‖ are similar to the phrase
―may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended‖ found in
Sec. 3 of the same Rule. In other words, both suits are
always filed in behalf of another or others.
- Before money claims can be the object of settlement
through a union, the individual consent of the employees
concerned should first be procured. This is because
waiver of money claims is considered a personal right
which must be protected by the courts on consideration
of public policy.
o There is no evidence on record that the
compromise agreement was approved by
the complainants individually.
Ching v. Subic Bay Golf and Country Club, Inc., G.R. No.
174353, 10 September 2014
- petitioners Nestor Ching and Andrew Wellington filed a
Complaint with RTC Olongapo on behalf of the
members of Subic Bay Golf and Country Club, Inc.
(SBGCCI) against the said country club and its Board of
Directors and officers
- The complaint alleged that the defendant corporation
sold shares to plaintiffs at US$22,000.00 per share but
the Articles of Incorporation made known to them was
amended to make the shares nonproprietary, as it takes
away the right of the shareholders to participate in the
pro rata distribution of the assets of the corporation after
its dissolution
o The By-Laws was also amended
suspending the voting rights of the
shareholders
o Aside from these amendments the BoD
and officers committed several instances of
fraudulent mismanagement of the
corporation
- The complaint prayed that upon the filing of the case a
TRO be issued enjoining the defendants from acting as
Officers and BoD and a Receiver be appointed until a
duly constituted BoD and officers be elected and
qualified.
o Also asked for damages
- Respondents claimed by way of defense that petitioners
failed (a) to show that it was authorized by SBGSI to file
the Complaint on the said corporation‘s behalf; (b) to
comply with the requisites for filing a derivative suit and
an action for receivership; and (c) to justify their prayer
for injunctive relief since the Complaint may be
considered a nuisance or harassment suit under Section
1(b), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
Corporate Controversies. Thus, they prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint.
- RTC dismissed the complaint otg that it is a derivative
suit
o this case is intended not only for the benefit
of the two petitioners. This is apparent from
the caption of the case which reads Nestor
Ching, Andrew Wellington and the Subic
Bay Golfers and Shareholders, Inc., for and
in behalf of all its members as petitioners.
This is also shown in the allegations of the
petition.
o Being a derivative suit, the stockholders
and members may bring an action in the
name of the corporation or association
provided that he (the minority stockholder)
exerted all reasonable efforts and allege[d]
the same with particularity in the complaint
to exhaust of (sic) all remedies available
under the articles of incorporation, bylaws
or rules governing the corporation or
partnership to obtain the reliefs he desires.
o ITC: petitioners did not apply for redress to
the BoD of the corp. there being no
demand, oral or written on the respondents
to address their complaints. Neither did the
petitioners apply for redress to the
stockholders of the corp. and make an
effort to obtain action by the stockholders
as a whole.  should have asked for a
meeting first!
o The shareholdings of petitioners out of 409
outstanding shares or 0.24% is an
indication that the action is a nuisance or
harassment suit which may be dismissed
either motu proprio or upon motion
- CA affirmed RTC
- Before the CA, petitioners argued that the Complaint
they filed with the RTC was not a derivative suit. They
claim that they filed the suit in their own right as
stockholders against the officers and BoD under Section
5(a) of PD902A (which transferred jurisdiction over
such cases from SEC to the RTC) which allows any
stockholder to file a complaint against the BoD for
employing devices or schemes amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which is detrimental to the interest of
the public and/or the stockholders.
o They also argued that even if this were
treated as a derivative suit, the RTC erred
in dismissing it otg of failure to exhaust
remedies within the corporation because in
Republic Bank v. Cuaderno, the Court
allowed the derivative suit as it was futile to
exhaust internal remedies since the BoD
were all members of the same family.
HELD: Petition DENIED
- the Complaint in question appears to have been filed
only by the two petitioners, namely Nestor Ching and
Andrew Wellington, who each own one stock in the
respondent corporation SBGCCI. While the caption of
the Complaint also names the ―Subic Bay Golfers and
Shareholders, Inc. for and in behalf of all its members,‖
petitioners did not attach any authorization from said
alleged corporation or its members. Thus, the Complaint
is deemed filed only by petitioners and not by SBGSI.
- On WoN it is a derivative suit, the nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. Also, the body rather than the
title of the complaint determines the nature of an action
Direct Action Derivative
Individual Suit Class suit Suit/Derivative
Action
(Representative
Suit)
wrong is done to Where the wrong where the acts
him personally is done to a group complained of
and not to the of stockholders, constitute a wrong
other as where to the corporation
stockholders or preferred itself, cause of
the corporation. stockholders‘ action belongs to
rights are the corporation and
violated; not to the individual
stockholder or
member  theory
of separate entity,
avoidance of
multiplicity of suits,
and priority rights of
creditors
DERIVATIVE SUIT  in cases of mismanagement where the
wrongful acts are committed by the directors or trustees
themselves; an individual stockholder is permitted to institute
a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds
stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights,
whenever officials of the corporation refuse to sue or are the
ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as the nominal
party, with the corporation as the party-in-interest
o seeks to recover for the benefit of the
corporation and its whole body of
shareholders when injury is caused to the
corporation that may not otherwise be
redressed because of failure of the
corporation to act.
o ―derivative‖ = in the corporate right 
gravamen of the complaint is injury to the
corporation, or to the whole body of its
stock and property without any severance
or distribution among individual holders, or
it seeks to recover assets for the
corporation or to prevent the dissipation of
its assets.
o E.g. when the damages shown at trial were
the loss of corporate profits  since
shareholders own neither the property nor
the earnings of the corporation
- ITC: reliefs sought (enjoining defendants from acting as
officers and BoD, appointment of a receiver, prayer for
damages in the amount of the decrease in the value of
the shares of stock) = to curb the alleged
mismanagement of SBGCCI. The causes of action
pleaded by petitioners do not accrue to a single
shareholder or a class of shareholders but to the
corporation itself.
- as minority stockholders, petitioners do not have any
statutory right to override the business judgments of
SBGCCI‘s officers and BoD
o PD902A does not grant minority
stockholders a cause of action against
waste and diversion by the BoD but merely
identifies the jurisdiction of the SEC over
actions already authorized by law or
jurisprudence. It is settled
o a stockholder‘s right to institute a derivative
suit is not based on any express provision
of the Corporation Code, or even the
Securities Regulation Code, but is impliedly
recognized when the said laws make
corporate directors or officers liable for
damages suffered by the corporation and
its stockholders for violation of their
fiduciary duties
- Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies imposes the
following requirements for derivative suits:
o stockholder or member at the time the acts
subject of the action occurred and at the
time of filing of action
o exerted all reasonable efforts, and alleges
the same available under the articles of
incorporation, bylaws, laws or rules
o No appraisal rights are available for the act
or acts complained of
o suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit
- RTC dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with
nd th
the 2 and 4 requisites
- SC thinks that 4
th
requisite was present here. But 2
nd
requisite was not
Villamor, Jr. v. Umale, G.R. No. 172843, 24 September
2014
- Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) obtained an option to
lease portions of the property of Mid-Pasig Development
Corporation.
- PPC‘s BoD issued a resolution waiving all its rights,
interests and participation in the option to lease contract
in favor of the law firm of Atty. Villamor (petitioner). PPC
received no consideration from Villamor‘s law firm
- PPC, represented by Villamor entered into a MOA with
MC Home Depot to occupy a portion of the property as
a sub-lessee. MC Home Depot issued checks
representing rental payments
- Hernando Balmores, respondent, and a stockholder and
director of PPC, wrote a letter to PPC‘s BoD that
Villamor should be made to deliver to PPC and account
for MC Home Depot‘s checks or their equivalent value
- Due to the alleged inaction of the BoD, Balmores filed
with the RTC an intracorporate controversy complaint
against petitioners for their alleged devices or schemes
amounting to fraud or misrepresentation ―detrimental to
the interest of the corporation and its stockholders.‖ He
 prayed for appointment of a receiver or the creation of a Interim Rules which refers to acts of the board,
management committee associates, and officers, amounting to fraud or
- RTC denied because the resolution issued by PPC‘s misrepresentation, which may be detrimental to the
BoD waiving its rights to the option to lease contract in interest of the stockholders  these may also be class
favor of Villamor‘s law firm, must be accorded prima or individual suits
facie validity - Hence, Balmores‘ action was an individual suit. He did
o Also, there was a pending case filed by one not bring the action for the benefit of the corporation.
Leonardo Umale against Villamor, involving Instead, he was alleging that the acts of PPC‘s directors,
the same checks. Umale was also claiming specifically the waiver of rights in favor of Villamor‘s law
ownership of the checks. Hence, firm and their failure to take back the MC Home Depot
weakening Balmores‘ claim that the checks checks from Villamor, were detrimental to his individual
are property of PPC interest as a stockholder.
o Also, failure to implead PPC was fatal. PPC - Balmores has no cause of action that would entitle him
should have been impleaded as an to the reliefs sought. He did not allege any cause of
indispensable party action that is personal to him. His allegations are limited
- CA reversed the trial court‘s decision, and issued a new to wrongs that pertain to PPC. Therefore, the cause of
order placing PPC under receivership and creating an action belongs to PPC — not to respondent Balmores or
interim management committee any stockholders as individuals.
o danger of dissipation, wastage, and loss of - Hence, Balmores is not entitled to the reliefs sought in
PPC‘s assets if the review of the trial the complaint. Only the corporation, or arguably the
court‘s judgment would be delayed stockholders as a group, is entitled to these reliefs,
o the case filed was a derivative suit because which should have been sought in a proper derivative
there were allegations of fraud or ultra vires suit filed on behalf of the corporation.
acts by PPC‘s BoD
o board‘s waiver of PPC‘s rights in favor of D. Deceased parties
Villamor‘s law firm without any
consideration and its inaction on Villamor‘s Contract/Quasi- Recovery of
failure to turn over the proceeds of rental contract property/Tort
payments to PPC warrant the creation of a P dies before Administrator, Administrator,
management committee filing exectutor (87.2) executor (87.2)
HELD:
P dies during Substitute heirs or Substitute heirs or
- th
5 requisite for filing derivative suits: to bring the action case legal legal
in the name of the corporation or the association representatives representatives
o Not only is the corporation an indispensible (3.16) (3.16)
party, but it is also the present rule that it P dies before executor or executor or
must be served with process. The reason execution administrator, or administrator, or
given is that the judgment must be made successor in interest successor in
binding upon the corporation in order that (39.7) interest (39.7)
the corporation may get the benefit of the D dies before File claim in Administrator,
suit and may not bring a subsequent suit service settlement executor (87.1)
against the same defendants for the same proceedings of
cause of action. In other words, the estate of defendant
corporation must be joined as party (86.5)
because it is its cause of action that is
being litigated and because judgment must D during case Substitute heirs or Substitute heirs or
be a res judicata against it legal legal
- ITC, Balmores‘ action failed to meet 2 requisites for filing representatives representatives
a derivative suit: (3.16, 3.20), file (3.16), no
o Balmores failed to exhaust all available contingent claim contingent claim
remedies to obtain the reliefs he prayed for. with settlement
Though hetried to communicate with PPC‘s proceedings of
directors about the checks in Villamor‘s estate (86.5)
possession before he filed an action with D before executor or executor or
the RTC, he was not able to show that this execution administrator, or administrator, or
comprised all the remedies available under successor in interest successor in
the articles of incorporation, bylaws, laws, (39.7) interest (39.7)
or rules governing PPC.
 Balmores failed to allege that sections 16-17, 20, Rule 3
appraisal rights were not available Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a
for the acts complained of here party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
o Neither did respondent Balmores implead extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
PPC as party in the case nor did he allege court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
that he was filing on behalf of the thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
corporation. representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
- Also, Balmores did not refer to his action as a derivative comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
suit but as an action under Rule 1, Section 1(a)(1) of the The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and
the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
(16a, 17a)
Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public
officer. — When a public officer is a party in an action in his
official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued
and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty
(30) days after the successor takes office or such time as
may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the
court by any party that there is a substantial need for
continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or
continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution
is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly
assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the
application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
(18a)
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When
the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of
final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at
the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(21a)
section 5, Rule 86 (covers contracts and quasi-contracts)
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the
decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent,
instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
section 1, Rule 87
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him.
section 7, Rule 39
Section 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of
the death of a party, execution may issue or be enforced in
the following manner:
(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee,
upon the application of his executor or administrator,
or successor in interest;
(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor,
against his executor or administrator or successor in
interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of real or
personal property, or the enforcement of a lien
thereon;
(c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property,
the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the
judgment obligation, and the officer making the sale
shall account to the corresponding executor or
administrator for any surplus in his hands. (7a)
section 4, Rule 111
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of
the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising
from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is
instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall
be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Sarsaba v. Vda. De Te, G.R. No. 17591030, July 2009
- a Decision was rendered in NLRC in favor of Patricio
Sereno who was illegally dismissed by Teodoro Gasing,
ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims
- After the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied,
Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ of
Execution directing Sheriff Lavarez of the NLRC to
satisfy the judgment award
- Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel,
petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck
in the possession of Gasing. The truck was sold at
public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest
bidder
- respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-
in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC Digos a
complaint for the recovery of motor vehicle, damages
with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite
against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC
Davao City (NOTE: Sereno died before he was served
summons)
o wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered
owner of the truck
o Gasing merely rented the truck from her
o Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing
owned the truck
o since neither she nor her husband were
parties to the labor case between Sereno
and Gasing, she should not be made to
answer for the judgment award
- Petitioner filed MTD otg:
o respondent has no legal personality to sue,
having no real interests over the property
subject of the case
o allegations in the complaint do not
sufficiently state that the respondent has
cause of action
o not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit
and Bond that would entitle the respondent
to the delivery of the tuck pendente lite.
- RTC denied Petitioner‘s MTD
- Petitioner fliled his Answer:
o no showing that the heirs have filed an
intestate estate proceedings of the estate
of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly
authorized by her co-heirs to file the case
o the truck was already sold to Gasing by
one Jesus Matias, who bought the same
from the Spouses Te. Corollarily, Gasing
was already the lawful owner of the truck
when it was levied on execution
- Petitioner filed Omnibus MTD the case otg of lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants (Sereno
who was not served with summons because he was
already dead) and to discharge respondent‘s attorney-
in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.
- Fe Vda. de Te died during pendency
- Vda. De Te‘s lawyer contended that failure to serve
summons upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing
the complaint (other defendants already filed MTD!);
also, respondent‘s death did not render functus officio
her right to sue since her attorney-in fact, Faustino
Castañeda, had long testified on the complaint for and
on her behalf
- Sarsaba filed another Motion to Inhibit and MR of the
RTC‘s denial of his MTD‘s
- petitioner directly sought recourse from the SC
HELD:
- petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the
effect of non-service of summons following the death of
the person to whom it should be served (Sereno), and
the effect of the death of the complainant during the
pendency of the case (Vda. De Te)
- re: Sereno
o petitioner argues that since Sereno died
before summons was served on him, the
RTC should have dismissed the complaint
against all the defendants and that the
same should be filed against his estate
o SC ruled that Sarsaba raised this out of
time (only in his Omnibus MTD, after his
first MTD and answer). Also, The court‘s
failure to acquire jurisdiction over one‘s
person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it
 Failure to serve summons on
Sereno‘s person will not be a
cause for the dismissal of the
complaint against the other
defendants, considering that they
have been served with copies of
the summons and complaints and
have long submitted their
respective responsive pleadings.
- Re: Vda. De Te
o petitioner moves that respondent‘s
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, be
discharged as he has no more legal
personality to sue on behalf of Fe Vda. de
Te
o SC rules that respondent‘s counsel did not
make any manifestation before the RTC as
to her death. In fact, he had actively
participated in the proceedings. Neither
had he shown any proof that he had been
retained by respondent‘s legal
representative or any one who succeeded
respondent‘s legal representative or any
one who succeeded her.
 BUT failure of the counsel to
comply with his duty to inform the
court of the death of his client,
such that no substitution is
effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action
survives the death of such party.
The trial court‘s jurisdiction over
the case subsists despite the
death of the party
 RATIO: protection of the right to
due process of every party to the
litigation who may be affected by
the intervening death. The
deceased litigants are themselves
protected as they continue to be
properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal
representative of their estate
o Petitioner argues that the SPA executed by
respondent in favor of Faustino has
become functus officio and that the agency
constituted between them has been
extinguished upon the death of respondent
(principal)
SC agrees that the agency has been extinguished BUT it
should not lead to dismissal of the case because an action
for the recovery of a personal property is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court. As such, it is not extinguished by the death of a party.
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra
Metrobank v. Absolute Management Corp., G.R. No.
170498, 9 January 2013
- Sherwood Holdings Corporation Inc. (SHCI) made
advance payments to Absolute Management
Corporation (AMC) for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of
plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Checks. These
checks we all crossed, and were all made payable to
AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC‘s General
Manager
- Chua died and a special proceeding for the settlement
of his estate was commenced before the Pasay RTC
- SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua‘s death, for
allegedly undelivered items
- According to AMC, these transactions could not be
found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC
discovered the transactions made by Chua
- SHCI filed a complaint for sum of money against AMC
before the QC RTC
- In its answer with counterclaims and third-party
complaint, AMC averred that it had no knowledge of
Chua‘s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any
money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold
Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is
adjudged liable to SHCI.
- Metrobank filed a motion for bill of particulars which bill
was not submitted by AMC. Hence, Metrobank filed a
motion to strike out the third-party complaint
- Metrobank also filed MTD against AMC otg of forum
shopping because AMC‘s claim against it is the same
claim that it raised against Chua‘s estate in Special
Proceedings before the Pasay RTC  motion denied
- Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in
question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The
deposit was allegedly done with the knowledge and
consent of AMC.
o Chua gave the assurance that the arrangement
for the handling of the checks carried AMC‘s
consent. Chua also submitted documents
showing his position and interest in AMC. It
was also admitted by AMC that it allowed Chua
to manage AMC with a relative free hand.
Hence it was AMC‘s own gross negligence that
was the proximate cause of the loss that AMC
must now bear.
o Chua‘s records show that the proceeds of the
checks were remitted to AMC which cannot
therefore now claim that it did not receive these
proceeds.
o Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel.
According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge
of its arrangements with Chua for several
years. AMC did not object to nor did it call the
attention of Metrobank about Chua‘s alleged
lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala
Lumber and Hardware‘s account.
- Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party
complaint against Chua‘s estate. It alleged that Chua‘s
estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be
held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by
AMC.
- RTC denied the motion to admit fourty-party complaint
o It is a ―cobro de lo indebido‖ – a kind of quasi-
contract that mandates recovery of what has
been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall
within the concept of implied contracts that
must be included in the claims required to be
filed with the judicial settlement of the
deceased‘s estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should
have been filed in Special Proceedings, not in
the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.
- CA affirmed RTC
o Based on the statutory construction principle of
lex specialis derogat generali, the CA held that
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is a
special provision that should prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6. The
latter applies to money claims in ordinary
actions while a money claim against a person
already deceased falls under the settlement of
his estate. Rules for ordinary actions only apply
suppletorily to special proceedings.
HELD: Petition DENIED. CA Affirmed
- Metrobank‘s claim against the Estate of Jose Chua
(fourth-party complaint) is based on a quasi-contract
o Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of
the Civil Code, has two indispensable
requisites: first, that something has been
unduly delivered through mistake; and second,
that something was received when there was
no right to demand it
o Metrobank‘s claim fulfills the requisites of
solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a
manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the
AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware‘s
account; because of Chua‘s control over
AMC‘s operations, Metrobank assumed that
the checks payable to AMC could be deposited
to Ayala Lumber and Hardware‘s account.
Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no
right to demand and receive the checks that
were deposited to its account; despite Chua‘s
control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and
checks exclusively and expressly payable to
one cannot be deposited in the account of the
other
- Metrobank‘s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent
claim, falls within the claims that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86
o It is contingent because the claim depends on
the possibility that Metrobank would be
adjudged liable to AMC
Cabugao v. People, G.R. No. 163879, G.R. No. 165805, 30
July 2014
- Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (family med) and Dr. Clenio
Ynzon (surgeon) were convicted of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
o attending physicians of one RODOLFO
PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old
o through negligence, carelessness and
imprudence to perform immediate operation
upon their patient of acute appendicitis
- While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner
Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died
HELD:
- the effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of
petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and
pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People
v. Bayotas
 o Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict.
o Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.
- If the same act or omission complained of arises from
quasi-delict, as in this case, a separate civil action must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court: actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him
- Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of
arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action
must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
- the policy against double recovery requires that only
one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the executor or
administrator, or the estate.
o The heirs of JR must choose which of the
available causes of action for damages they
will bring.
Ferreria v. Vda. De Gonzales, G.R. No. L-11567, 17 July
1958
- Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales presumably owned a
parcel of land in Umingan, Pangasinan, cultivated by
tenants
- After the sharing of the crop for the agricultural year
1946-47, a number of the tenants, dissatisfied with their
share on the basis of 60-40, claiming that they were
entitled to 70% of said crop, filed complaints with the
Tenancy Division of the Department of Justice.
o only tenant Ferreria continued the complaint
(the others withdrew)
- Ferreria's complaint was filed not only against Manuela
Ibarra, but also against the overseer, Luis Tecson
- During the pendency of the case, Manuela died.
o Counsel for Ferreria filed a petition for
substitution which was granted by the DOJ
- In the DOJ order, the address of Manolita Gonzales was
specified.
o The return of service of said order shows that a
copy was left with Aurora Gonzales, niece of
Manolita Gonzales, apparently living in said
address
o Manolita Gonzales claims that she did not own
the land in question; that her only right and
interest in it was as an heir, being one of the
five surviving children of Manuel.
- The scheduled hearing was held in the absence of
Manolita Gonzales. Decision was rendered ordering the
landlord to deliver to tenant Ferreria 20 cavans of rice
and the CIR issued a writ of execution of the judgment
- Luis Tecson and Manolita Gonzales each filed a petition
to set aside said writ
o Luis claimed that it was true that he was an
overseer of Manuela Ibarra, but that upon her
death on the possession that he held of the
land as overseer passed on to the
administrator of the estate; he no longer had
anything to do with said property
o Manolita claimed that she was never made a
party to the case and had never been served
any process or notice of hearing therein, and
that an examination of the record of the case
would show that from the inception of the case
up to the rendering of the decision, her name
was never mentioned by any of the parties;
that although she was one of the five heirs of
Manuel Ibarra, she, Manolita, was not the
actual owner of the estate which was then
under probate proceedings; if Ferreria had any
claim against the estate, he should file the
same to be passed upon by the probate court.
HELD:
- Manolita had not been duly served with the order of
substitution. She was not living with her niece when a
copy was given to the latter.
- there had been no court order for the legal
representative of Manuela Ibarra to appear, nor had any
such legal representative ever appeared in court to be
substituted for the deceased; neither had complainant
Ferreria ever procured the appointment of such legal
representative of the deceased, nor had the heirs of the
deceased, including Manolita ever asked to be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased Manuela.
o Manolita argued: Atty. Emilio Fernandez
represented Manuela and Luis Tecson but
upon the death of Manuela, his relationship as
counsel ceased, and he was never authorized
to appear for Manolita Gonzales
- HOWEVER, the fact that the landlord dies does not
mean that the relation of landlord and tenant ends,
because the estate continues to be the landlord
o The obligation to Ferreria remained a charge
on Manuela‘s estate after she died and there
was no necessity for the tenant to file a claim
with the probate court in charge of the estate
- BUT the SC set aside not only the writ of execution, the
resolution of the Agrarian Court and its order denying
the motion for reconsideration of the same, now sought
to be reviewed, but also the original decision of the
Tenancy Division for lack of jurisdiction.
o Case remanded to Court of Agrarian Relations
for further proceedings, in which proceedings,
the Agrarian Court may bear in mind and
consider the rulings and holdings contained in
this decision, specially with regards to
substitution of parties
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, 29
November 2006
- Spouses Carandang and spouses De Guzman are the
stockholders of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. When
they increased the capital stock of the corporation, De
Guzman claimed that he was the only one who paid for
such increase. Hence Quirino De Guzman filed an
action to recover from Spouses Carandang. One of the
arguments raised by spouses Carandang before the SC
is Quirino De Guzman‘s failure to include in the
complaint his wife Milagros de Guzman, who is an
 indispensable party since some of the checks issued
were bearing her name. The SC ruled that the failure to
include Milagros does not warrant the dismissal of the
case because Milagros and Quirino, being spouses
whose property were under the CPG regime, should be
considered co-owners. Art.487 would apply
E. Indigent parties
sec. 11, Art III, 1987 Const.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
sec. 21, Rule 3
Section 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to
litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the
party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of
docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished
him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which
the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the
court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue
or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)
sec. 19, Rule 141
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal
fees. - Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of
their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not
own real property with A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED
IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION of more than
THREE hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in
the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court
otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant
shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do
not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any
real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by
an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the litigant‘s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall
be attached to the litigant‘s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person
shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or
to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (16a)
OCA Circular Nos. 34-15 & 125-14
exempt from sheriff‘s fees not from sheriff‘s expenses (Rule
141, Sec. 10)
Spouses Algura v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, 20 Oct
2006
- spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura
filed a Complaint for damages against the Naga City
Government, for the alleged illegal demolition of their
residence and boarding house and for payment of lost
income derived from fees paid by their boarders
amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly
o Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants
 Appended Antonio Algura‘s Pay Slip
(showing a gross monthly income of
PhP 10,474.00 and a net pay of PhP
3,616.99)
 Also attached was a Certification
issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Naga City, which stated
that petitioners had no property
declared in their name for taxation
purposes
 Because of the loss of rental income,
Lorencita Algura‘s sarisari store
income and Antonio Algura‘s small
take home pay became insufficient for
the expenses of the Algura spouses
and their 6 children for their basic
needs including food, bills, clothes,
and schooling, among others
- Executive Judge of Naga City RTC granted petitioners‘
plea for exemption from filing fees.
- The City Government countered that the defenses of the
petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the
spouses‘ boarding house blocked the road right of way,
and said structure was a nuisance per se.
o filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for
Non-Payment of Filing Fees
 in addition to the more than PhP
3,000.00 net income of petitioner
Antonio Algura, who is a member of
the Philippine National Police, spouse
Lorencita Algura also had a ministore
and a computer shop on the ground
floor of their residence
- RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as
indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to
substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of
legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule
141, Section 18
o Spouses submitted MR with their affidavits and
affidavits of their neighbors
- RTC still denied their MR because Antonio Algura‘s
salary in his pay slip was over and above the amount
mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18
for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila
o rule provides that the gross income of the
litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a
month and shall not own real estate with an
assessed value of PhP 50,000.00
HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Order set aside. Naga
City RTC is ordered to set the ―Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as
Indigent Litigants‖ for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21
- AT PRESENT: Amendments to Rule 141 (including the
amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to
implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases
in filing fees
o the ceiling for the gross income of litigants
applying for exemption and that of their
 immediate family was increased from PhP
4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP
3,000.00 a month outside Metro Manila, to
double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee; and the maximum value of the
property owned by the applicant was increased
from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a
maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to
be able to accommodate more indigent litigants
and promote easier access to justice by the
poor and the marginalized in the wake of these
new increases in filing fees
- BUT ITC: Complaint was filed on September 1, 1999.
However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and
July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141,
Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at
that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party
which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section
16 on Pauper Litigants which became effective on July
19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
o In the old rules, there are two requirements:
a) income requirement—the applicants should
not have a gross monthly income of more than
PhP 1,500.00, and
b) property requirement——they should not
own property with an assessed value of not
more than PhP 18,000.00
- the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court
was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras
as indigent litigants
- It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been
impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004
amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is
bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned upon unless
the intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal
- the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible
with each other
o When applicant complies with the income and
property standards prescribed in the present
Section 19 of Rule 141, then the authority to
litigate as indigent litigant is automatically
granted and the grant is a matter of right
o However, if the trial court finds that one or both
requirements have not been met, then it would
set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove
that the applicant has ―no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.‖
 In that hearing, the adverse party may
adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by
the applicant; after which the trial
court will rule on the application
depending on the evidence adduced.
 adverse party may later still contest
the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the
trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at
the time the application was heard
- ITC: when the Alguras did not pass the standards in
Rule 141, the trial court should have called a hearing as
required by Rule 3, Section 21
Re Query of Roger Prioreschi, A.M. 09-6-9-SC (2009)
- Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from
payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if
the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
- only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant
- extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged
people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition
of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule
on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too
time-consuming and wasteful for the courts
V. Motions
MOTION V. PLEADING
MOTION = application for relief other than a pleading (not
based on cause of action)
PLEADING = claims and defenses (based on causes of
action)
Rule 15
Section 1. Motion defined. — A motion is an application for
relief other than by a pleading. (1a)
Section 2. Motions must be in writings. — All motions shall
be in writing except those made in open court or in the course
of a hearing or trial. (2a)
Section 3. Contents. — A motion shall state the relief sought
to be obtained and the grounds upon which it is based, and if
required by these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged
therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and
other papers. (3a)
Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party), every written motion shall be set for hearing
by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of
the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice. (4a)
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall
be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)
Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion
set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of service thereof. (6a)
Section 7. Motion day. — Except for motions requiring
immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing
on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the
afternoon of the next working day. (7a)
Section 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of
section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived. (8a)
Section 9. Motion for leave. — A motion for leave to file a
pleading or motion shall be accompanied by the pleading or
motion sought to be admitted. (n)
Section 10. Form. — The Rules applicable to pleadings shall
apply to written motions so far as concerns caption,
designation, signature, and other matters of form. (9a)
section 3, Rule 35 (Summary Judgments/MSJ) 
exemption from 3-day and 10-day rule (because it‘s hard
to produce affidavits, depositions, or admissions in less
than 10 days)  MSJ = essentially a MTD because the
trial has to be quick
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time
specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three
(3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (3a, R34)
GR: All hearings shall be set for hearing by the applicant
EX: Motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party (e.g. Motion for Extension)
What is the 3-day/10-day rule?
 3-day rule: the notice of hearing and a copy of the motion
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt
by the other party at least 3 days before the date of
hearing
 10-day rule: the hearing shall not be later than 10 days
after the filing of the motion
Exception to the 3-day/10-day rule: Motion for Summary
Judgment (MSJ) because it‘s hard to produce affidavits,
depositions or admissions in less than 10 days
 An MSJ is essentially a MTD because the trial has to be
quick
VI. Pleadings
A. Complaint
1. General:
Sections 1, 3, Rule 6
Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written
statements of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (1a)
Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading
alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names
and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated
in the complaint. (3a)
Section 5, Rule 1
Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If
an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the
action is commenced with regard to him on the dated of the
filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the
motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
(6a)
2. Format, certification, verification
GR: Not all pleadings need to be verified
EX: Pleadings should only be verified if specifically required
by law or rule
 Normally, only pleadings that carry opposing sides are
verified (e.g. petition)
Rule 7 (Parts of a Pleading)
Section 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of the
court, the title of the action, and the docket number if
assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They
shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the
first party on each side be stated with an appropriate
indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
(1a, 2a)
Section 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets forth
its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or
defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
(n)
(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a
pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so
numbered to be readily identified, each of which
shall contain a statement of a single set of
circumstances so far as that can be done with
convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its
number in all succeeding pleadings. (3a)
(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action
are joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced
by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second by
"second cause of action", and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are
addressed to one of several causes of action in the
complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words
"answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to
the second cause of action" and so on; and when
one or more paragraphs of the answer are
addressed to several causes of action, they shall be
prefaced by words to that effect. (4)
(c) Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief
sought, but it may add a general prayer for such
further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable. (3a, R6)
(d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated. (n)
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change
of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action. (5a)
Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief", or upon
"knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. (n)
SC AM 00-2-10 SC
RULE 7
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on ―information and belief,‖ or upon
―knowledge, information and belief,‖ or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.(4a)
RULE 41
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of the
original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court,
the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the
appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment
of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period. (13a)
The foregoing amendments shall take effect on May 1, 2000,
following the publication of this Resolution in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation not later than March 15,
2000.
Bar Matter No. 1132
RE:REQUEST TO REQUIRE LAWYERS TO INDICATE IN
THE PLEADING THEIR NUMBER IN THE ROLL OF ATTYS.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated 12 NOV 2002.
Bar Matter No. 1132(Re:Request to Require Lawyers
to Indicate in the Pleading their Number in the Roll of
Attorneys.)
The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require
all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all
papers or pleadings submitted to the various judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies in addition to the requirement of indicating the
current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official
Receipt or Life Member Number.
Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined
effective immediately.
a. Forum shopping
Ayala Land v. Valisno, 324 S 522 (2000)
- Ayala Land discovered that several persons had
adverse claims of ownership over its property
o Among these claimants is respondent Marietta
Valisno
- On the premise that portions of respondent‘s claimed
land overlap petitioner‘s properties covered in fourteen
of petitioner‘s torrens titles, petitioner instituted actions
to quiet its titles
o Since petitioner‘s entire property in Las Piñas
is allegedly covered by twenty-one separate
torrens titles, petitioner contends that it could
have brought twenty-one distinct actions to
quiet title
o Upon advice of counsel, however, petitioner
filed only eight cases on a ―per lot/per TCT (or
sets thereof)‖ basis. Among those eight cases,
respondent was named respondent in five of
them (some in Makati, some in Las Pinas)
- Respondent, on the other hand, filed with the Las Pinas
RTC an action against petitioner and several others
wherein she claimed ownership of the 1,082,959 square
meter tract of land and prayed that petitioner‘s TCTs be
declared null and void.
- Both parties accused each other of forum-shopping.
o Petitioner: respondent‘s action = counterclaim!
Should have pleaded in the cases s initiated by
petitioner against her
o Respondent: why file five distinct cases all on
the ground that her lands overlapped those of
petitioner?
- Las Pinas RTC Judge in Branch 253 found petitioner
guilty of forum-shopping, ordered the dismissal of its
complaint and maintained the civil case filed by
respondent against petitioner
- Las Pinas RTC Judge in Branch 275 denied
respondent‘s motion to cite petitioner guilty of forum-
shopping and found respondent guilty of forum-shopping
- Makati RTC Judge found neither party guilty of forum-
shopping
- CA found petitioner guilty of forum-shopping and
ordered the dismissal of the five cases filed by petitioner
HELD: CA Decision REVERSED. all five cases filed by
petitioner against respondent Marietta Valisno, which were
ordered dismissed by the CA, are revived, and ordered
consolidated to be jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City, where the real property is situated
- Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another
- Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars
in the two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res
adjudicata in the other case
- ITC: while there may be identity of parties and of some
reliefs prayed for, any judgment rendered in one of the
actions filed by petitioner will not amount to res judicata
in the other actions
o The following are the elements of res judicata:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. The court which rendered judgment must
have jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter;
3. It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action
- the five actions filed by petitioner were for quieting of
title based on separate certificates of title. Hence, the
subject matters and causes of action involved are
different in each case. Corollarily, a judgment in any one
case will not affect the issue in the other cases
inasmuch as those pertain to different lands covered by
different certificates of title. Consequently, petitioner
could not have been guilty of forum-shopping
 SPLITTING v. LITIS PENDENTIA/RES JUDICATA v. FORUM SHOPPING
(Based on Cause of Action)
SPLITTING LITIS PENDENTIA/RES FORUM SHOPPING
JUDICATA
(Preclusion of claims v.
Preclusion of issues)
Public Policy To avoid multiplicity of suits To avoid multiplicity of suits To avoid different tribunals having
To have finality of decisions contradictory ruling
Basis Rule 2 Sec. 4 Rule 39 Sec. 47 Rule 7 Sec. 5
Definition If two or more suits are instituted In other cases, the judgment or commenced any action or filed
on the basis of the same cause of final order is, with respect to the any claim involving the same
action, the filing of one or a matter directly adjudged or as to issues in any court, tribunal or
judgment upon the merits in any any other matter that could quasi-judicial agency
one is available as a ground for have been raised in relation
the dismissal of the others. thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in
interest, by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for
the same thing and under the
same title and in the same
capacity;
EXAMPLES
Theft, victim Yes Yes Yes
asserting violation
of us posidendi and
jus vindicandi  1
cause of action
with (several
matters that could
have been raised
in relation thereto)
10 punches  10 Yes Yes Yes
causes of action, 1
transaction
(several matters
that could have
been raised in
relation thereto)
10 punches  No No No
breach of contract
in one, tort in
another, criminal
action in another
2 independent No No (no preclusion of claims) No
contracts between
a minor and
another person. In
1 case, minority
was not raised as a
defense. In another
it was raised  2
transactions
2 independent No Yes (preclusion of issues) No
contracts between
a minor and
another person. In
1 case, minority
was raised as a
defense. In another
it was not raised 
2 transactions
 There can only be forum shopping if there is res judicata that is preclusion of claims, not just preclusion of issues.
 There could be litis pendentia without forum shopping but there can be no forum shopping without litis pendentia.
Summary of rule on Forum Shopping (Rule 7, Sec. 5)
1. No certification
a. No forum shopping – dismissal upon
motion without prejudice
b. With forum shopping
i. Not deliberate – dismissal upon
motion without prejudice
ii. Deliberate – summary dismissal
(motu proprio) with prejudice ;
direct contempt; admin. sanction
2. With Certification
a. No forum shopping
b. With forum shopping
i. No falsification
1. Not deliberate
dismissal upon motion
without prejuice
2. Deliberate – summary
dismissal (motu proprio)
with prejudice; direct
contempt; admin.
sanction
ii. With falsification
1. Not deliberate
dismissal upon motion
without prejudice; indirect
contempt; admin. and
crim. sanction
2. Deliberate – summary
dismissal (motu proprio)
with prejudice; direct
contempt; admin.
Sanction and crim.
sanction
Sevilleja v. Laggui, 362 S 715 (2001)
- In the May 11, 1998 elections, herein complainant
Marco Francisco Sevilleja was proclaimed the winner in
the local election for Mayor in the Municipality of Sta.
Teresita, Cagayan
o took his oath of office and assumed the
position
- his rival Romeo Garcia filed with the Aparri RTC an
election protest
o Sevilleja filed a motion to inhibit respondent
Judge on the ground that the wife of the
protestant, Mrs. Lolita Garcia, is the legal
researcher of respondent Judge Laggui.
o Motion granted
- Judge Agcaoili rendered a decision declaring Romeo
Garcia as the duly elected mayor.
o Sevilleja filed a notice of appeal
o Garcia filed a motion for execution pending
appeal
- Judge Agcaoili ordered that the entire records be
elevated to the Commission on Elections.
- Due to the absence of Judge Agcaoili, Judge Laggui, in
his capacity as Executive Judge, issued an order
holding in abeyance the transmittal of the records to
Comelec pending resolution of the motion for execution
pending appeal
o He eventually granted the motion for execution
pending appeal
- Sevilleja filed the present administrative complaint on
the ground of gross misconduct
HELD: Judge Laggui be fined in the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely
- with respect to the argument of respondent Judge that
herein complainant is guilty of forum-shopping for
having filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the
Ombudsman involving the same facts and the same
issues, suffice it to state that the Court, in the case of
PNB Republic Bank vs. Court of Appeals, has already
ruled that a case pending before the Ombudsman
cannot be considered for purposes of determining if
there was forum-shopping, as the power of the
Ombudsman is only investigative in character and its
resolution cannot constitute a valid and final judgment
because its duty is to file the appropriate case before
– the Sandiganbayan
Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, 10 December 2008
- Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career
positions in the city government to the CSC. The city
government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to
publicly announce the existence of the vacant positions.
- Petitioners and other applicants submitted their
– applications for the different positions where they felt
qualified.
- Toward the end of his term Mayor Quijano issued
appointments to petitioners.
- the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued Resolution
addressed to the CSC Iligan City Field Office requesting
a suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the
city government until the enactment of a new budget.
o Also issued a resolution in view of its stated
policy against ―midnight appointments,‖
directed the officers of the City Human
Resource Management Office to hold in
abeyance the transmission of all appointments
signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor
in order to ascertain whether these had been
hurriedly prepared or carefully considered and
whether the matters of promotion and/or
qualifications had been properly addressed.
- Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a
certification as to availability of funds for the payment of
salaries and wages of petitioners
o the other respondents did not sign petitioners‘
position description forms
- CSC Field Office disapproved the appointments issued
to petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of
availability of funds.
- On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office
dismissed the appeal, it explaining that its function in
approving appointments is only ministerial
- Petitioners thus filed with the Iligan RTC a petition for
mandamus against respondent Empleo or his successor
in office for him to issue a certification of availability of
funds for the payment of the salaries and wages of
petitioners, and for his corespondents or their
successors in office to sign the position description
forms
- Iligan RTC denied petitioners‘ petition for mandamus:
the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a
certification as to availability of funds for the payment of
salaries and wages of petitioners as this ministerial
function pertains to the city treasurer
- Petitioners brought the case before the SC
- Respondents assail as defective the verification and ground of ―substantial compliance‖ or presence of
certification against forum shopping attached to the ―special circumstances or compelling reasons.‖
petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59 5. The certification against forum shopping must be
petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
presented by the signing petitioners. They thus move for otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped
the dismissal of the petition as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
o Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
have a justifiable cause for their inability to plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
obtain the signatures of the other petitioners as invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
they could no longer be contacted or are no signature of only one of them in the certification
longer interested in pursuing the case against forum shopping substantially complies with
HELD: Moot and academic the Rule
- re: forum shopping 6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping
o it is a far better and more prudent course of must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
action to excuse a technical lapse and afford counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
the parties a review of the case to attain the reasons, the party pleader is unable to sign, he
ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case must execute a Special Power of Attorney
on technicality and cause grave injustice to the designating his counsel of record to sign on his
parties, giving a false impression of speedy behalf.
disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice Verification Certification
o ITC: signing of the verification by only 11 out of (stricter)
the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures Non-compliance Not fatally Not curable/
the Court that the allegations in the pleading defective/ Curable Dismissible
are true and correct and not the product of the Submission of
imagination or a matter of speculation; that the Defective
pleading is filed in good faith; and that the - Incomplete No effect Non-signing
signatories are unquestionably real parties-in- parties (because Court parties will be
interest who undoubtedly have sufficient already assured dropped
knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of by one party of
the allegations in the petition. personal
o the failure of the other petitioners to sign as knowledge) 
they could no longer be contacted or are no substantial
longer interested in pursuing the case need not compliance
merit the outright dismissal of the petition - It is the No effect Dismissible
without defeating the administration of justice. counsel that (because Court
The non-signing petitioners are, however, verified already assured
dropped as parties to the case by counsel that it
- Summary of jurisprudential pronouncements already is true)
reflected above respecting noncompliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification
and certification against forum shopping: Vda. De Formoso v. PNB, G.R. No. 154704, 1 June 2011
1. A distinction must be made between non- - Nellie Panelo Vda. de Formoso and her children
compliance with the requirement on or submission executed a SPA in favor of Primitivo Malcaba
of defective verification, and non-compliance with authorizing him, among others, to secure all papers and
the requirement on or submission of defective documents including the owner‘s copies of the titles of
certification against forum shopping real properties pertaining to the loan with REM originally
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a secured by Nellie and her late husband from PNB
defect therein does not necessarily render the - The Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its properties to Malcaba through a Deed of Absolute Sale
submission or correction or act on the pleading if - Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the
the attending circumstances are such that strict loan obligation including interests
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in - PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcaba‘s
order that the ends of justice may be served tender of payment and to release the mortgage or
thereby surrender the titles of the subject mortgaged real
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with properties
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to - the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or Performance against PNB before the Vigan RTC
petition signs the verification, and when matters praying that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith P2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan obligation of
or are true and correct the Formosos
4. As to certification against forum shopping, - RTC ruled in favor of petitioners
noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike - When petitioners received their copy of the decision,
in verification, is generally not curable by its they filed their Petition for Relief from Judgment
subsequent submission or correction thereof, questioning the RTC decision that there was no
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the testimonial evidence presented to warrant the award for
moral and exemplary damages
 o They reasoned out that they could not then file
a motion for reconsideration because they
could not get hold of a copy of the transcripts of
stenographic notes
o denied by RTC for lack of merit
- CA dismissed the petition stating that the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
only one (Macalba) of the many petitioners
- Before the SC, petitioners argued substantial
compliance
HELD: Petition DENIED
- Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned,
only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was
no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-
petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power
of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba
as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on
certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a
reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
- The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to
comply with the Rules when they filed their motion for
reconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the
opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they
still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to
deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution
- At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the
petitioners‘ request to re-examine the testimony of
Malcaba in the transcript of stenographic notes of the
April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged
testimonial proof of damages
b. Corporations
BA Savings v. Sia, 336 S 484 (2000)
- CA issued a Resolution denying due course to a Petition
for Certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank, on the ground
that ―the Certification on anti-forum shopping
incorporated in the petition was signed not by the duly
authorized representative of the petitioner, as required
under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 but by its
counsel, in contravention of said circular‖
- BA Savings filed MR showing that petitioner‘s Board of
Directors approved a Resolution authorizing the
petitioner‘s lawyers to represent it in any action or
proceeding before any court, tribunal or agency; and to
sign, execute and deliver the Certificate of Nonforum
Shopping, among others.
- MR denied
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- A corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers
except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors
and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical
acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed
only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose
by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors.
- ITC, the Resolution by the BoD was sufficient to vest
such persons with the authority to bind the corporation
and was specific enough as to the acts they were
empowered to do
- the Circular does not require corporate officers to sign
the certificate. More important, there is no prohibition
against authorizing agents to do so
- In fact, not only was BA Savings Bank authorized to
name an agent to sign the certificate; it also exercised
its appointing authority reasonably well. For who else
knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate
but its own retained counsel. Its regular officers, like its
board chairman and president, may not even know the
details required therein.
Cagayan Valley Drug v. CIR, G.R. No. 151413, 13 Feb
2008
- Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and
other pharmaceutical products
- it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified senior
citizens on purchases of medicine
o In compliance with Revenue Regulation No.
(RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the 20% sales
discounts granted to qualified senior citizens as
deductions from the gross sales in order to
arrive at the net sales, instead of treating them
as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA
7432
o however, petitioner filed with the BIR a claim
for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the
20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens
o The BIR‘s inaction on petitioner‘s claim for
refund/tax credit compelled petitioner to file a
petition for review before the CTA
- CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
review for lack of merit
o CTA rejected the refund as it is clear that RA
7432 only grants the 20% sales discounts
extended to qualified senior citizens as tax
credit and not as tax refund
o while petitioner may be qualified for a tax
credit, it cannot be so extended to petitioner on
account of its net loss
 if no tax has been paid or if no amount
is due and collectible from the
taxpayer, then a tax credit is
unavailing
- CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition on procedural grounds
o the person who signed the verification and
certification of absence of forum shopping, a
certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of
petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was
duly authorized by the board of directors to do
so
HELD: CA reversed
- an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise
any corporate power pertaining to the corporation
without authority from the board of directors.
o In a slew of cases, however, we have
recognized the authority of some corporate
officers to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping: (1) the Chairperson of
the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
- the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was
done on a case to case basis.
- ITC: petitioner substantially complied with Secs. 4 and
5, Rule 7
o requisite board resolution has been submitted
albeit belatedly by petitioner
o we apply our ruling in Lepanto with the
rationale that the President of petitioner is in a
position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition
o President of petitioner has signed the
complaint before the CTA at the inception of
this judicial claim for refund or tax credit
- Re: tax credit
o the CTA erred in denying the tax credit to
petitioner on the ground that petitioner had
suffered net loss
o petitioner is entitled to a tax credit for the full
20% sales discounts it extended to qualified
senior citizens
MC Engineering v. NLRC, 360 S 183 (2001)
- Petitioner Hanil Development Co., Ltd. is the overseas
employer of all contract workers deployed by petitioner
MC Engineering, Inc.
- private respondent Aristotle Baldameca entered into an
Employment Agreement with MCEI for deployment as a
plumber in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.
o commenced working for petitioner Hanil in
Saudi Arabia on September 21, 1992
o contract was for a term of twelve (12) months.
- private respondent was not able to finish the full term of
his contract and he was repatriated back to Manila
- private respondent filed a complaint with the POEA
against petitioners for illegal dismissal
o prayed for the payment of his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment
agreement and the reimbursement of his
airfare
- LA ruled in favor of private respondent
- NLRC dismissed appeal
- CA dismissed Petition for Certiorari for being fatally
defective for two (2) reasons: (1) there is no certification
against forum shopping by co-petitioner Hamil
Development Co., Ltd.; and (2) there is no written
explanation why the service of the pleading was not
done personally
o The certification against forum shopping was
signed only by the corporate secretary of
petitioner MCEI. No representative of petitioner
Hanil signed the said certification
HELD: dismissal affirmed because of improper filing of
pleading
- in all cases filed in the Court of Appeals, as with all
initiatory pleadings before any tribunal, a certification of
non-forum shopping signed by the petitioner must be
filed together with the petition. The failure of a petitioner
to comply with this requirement constitutes sufficient
ground for the dismissal of his petition.
o Thus, the Court has previously held that a
certification not attached to the complaint or
petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by
counsel and not the party himself constitutes a
violation of the requirement which can result in
the dismissal of the complaint or petition
- However, with respect to the contents of the
certification, the rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded
- ITC: CA should have taken into consideration the fact
that petitioner Hanil is being sued by private respondent
in its capacity as the foreign principal of petitioner MCEI.
It was petitioner MCEI, as the local private employment
agency, who entered into contracts with potential
overseas workers on behalf of petitioner Hanil.
o the local private employment agency may sue
on behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of
its contractual undertakings submitted to the
POEA  there is no reason why the said
agency cannot likewise sign or execute a
certification of non-forum shopping for its own
purposes and/or on behalf of its foreign
principal.
- the rationale behind the requirement that the petitioners
or parties to the action themselves must execute the
certification of non-forum shopping is that the said
petitioners or parties are in the best position to know of
the matters required by the Rules of Court in the said
certification
o ITC: It is the local private employment agency,
in this case petitioner MCEI, who is in the best
position to know of the matters required in a
certification of non-forum shopping.
- Re: filing of pleading
o service and filing of pleadings and other papers
must, whenever practicable, be done
personally. Section 11 of Rule 13 gives the
court the discretion to consider a pleading or
paper as not filed if the other modes of service
or filing were resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal
service was not done in the first place
o ITC: there was no substantial compliance
made by petitioners of the requirement in
Section 11, Rule 13. The fact that an affidavit
of service accompanied their petition does not
amount to a substantial compliance with the
requirement of an explanation why other
modes of service other than personal service
were resorted to,
 An affidavit of service is required
merely as proof that service has been
made to the other parties in a case.
Thus, it is a requirement totally
different from the requirement that an
explanation be made if personal
service of pleadings was not resorted
to
LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, 25
January 2006
- Erlinda Dyolde Monter, a cashier at the Red Tag
Convenience Store, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and related causes of action against petitioner LDP
Marketing, Inc. owner-operator of the store, and LDP‘s
Vice-President-co-petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña
- LA ruled in favor of respondent; affirmed by NLRC
- Petition for certiorari was filed before the CA wherein the
Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping was
 accomplished by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña-
VicePresident of its co-petitioner corporation
- CA dismisses petition for ―failing to attach to the petition
a copy of the company board resolution authorizing said
Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña to sign the said Verification/
Certification
o Petitioner filed MR attaching Secretary‘s
Certificate quoting a Resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors of petitioner corporation
during a special meeting authorizing Dela Pena
o MR denied
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- In Digital Microwave Corporation case relied upon by
the CA in dismissing petitioners‘ Petition for Certiorari,
the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
the therein petitioner corporation‘s counsel
- In the more recent case of Shipside Incorporated v.
Court of Appeals the SC held that in certain exceptional
circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the
belated filing of the certification in the same way that it
allowed non-filing of the certification when there are
special circumstances or compelling reasons that
justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification
and certification on non-forum shopping
South Cotabato Communications Corp. v. Sto. Tomas,
G.R. No. 173326, 15 December 2010
- an inspection was conducted at the premises of
appellant DXCP Radio Station where it was found to
violate labor standards law by underpayment of min.
th
wage, underpayment of 13 month pay, non-payment of
SIL pay, Non-remittance of SSS premiums, Non-
payment of rest day premium pay of some employee,
Non-payment of holiday premium pay, and Some
employees are paid on commission basis aside from
their allowances
- he Regional Director issued the assailed Order,
directing appellants to pay appellees the aggregate
amount of Php759,752.00
- DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas dismissed appeal
- CA dismissed petition for certiorari because it was not
properly verified and the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping was not executed by the plaintiff or principal
party
- CA denied MR because while 2 petitioners and
petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the verification and
the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition, the
records show that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan did not
initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his
personal interest in the case but was, in fact, only acting
for and in the corporation‘s behalf as its president
o Having acted in the corporation‘s behalf,
petitioner Benzonan should have been clothed
with the corporation‘s board resolution
authorizing him to institute the petition
o attachment of a ―Secretary‘s Certificate‖ was
insufficient since their submission merely
authorized petitioner Benzonan ―to represent
the corporation and cause the preparation and
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals.‖
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC
Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled
that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the
Company can sign the verification and certificate against
non-forum shopping even without the submission of the
board‘s authorization.
o In sum, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a
board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation, (Cagayan
case)
(3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager,
(4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case
- It must be stressed, however, that the Cagayan ruling
qualified that the better procedure is still to append a
board resolution to the complaint or petition to obviate
questions regarding the authority of the signatory of the
verification and certification
- the requirement of the certification of non-forum
shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly
judicial procedure. However, the Court has relaxed,
under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that,
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being
jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of
substantial compliance
- ITC: there has been substantial compliance  the
President of petitioner-corporation is in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations
in the petition
o Petitioner Benzonan clearly satisfies the
aforementioned jurisprudential requirement
because he is the President of petitioner South
Cotabato Communications Corporation.
Moreover, he is also named as co-respondent
of petitioner-corporation in the labor case
Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. Treasurer of the City
of Manila, G.R. No. 181277, 3 July 2013
- Petitioner paid taxes to respondent based on the Manila
Revenue Code. Part of the amount was pursuant to
Section 21 of said code. Assenting that it was not liable
to pay taxes under Section 21, petitioner filed a Petition
for Refund of Taxes with Manila RTC.
- RTC dismisses petition for the failure of petitioner to
plead the latter‘s capacity to sue and to state the
authority of Tiarra T. Batilaran-Beleno who had
executed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping
- CTA denied petition for review for the same reason
- Before the SC, petitioner argues that there can be no
dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting within her authority
when she instituted the Petition for Refund before the
RTC, notwithstanding that the Petition was not
accompanied by a Secretary‘s Certificate. Her authority
was ratified by the Board in its Resolution
o even if she was not authorized to execute the
Verification and Certification at the time of the
filing of the Petition, the ratification by the
board of directors retroactively applied to the
date of her signing.
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- a verification signed without an authority from the board
of directors is defective. However, the requirement of
 verification is simply a condition affecting the form of the
pleading and noncompliance does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective.
o The court may in fact order the correction of
the pleading if verification is lacking or, it may
act on the pleading although it may not have
been verified, where it is made evident that
strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with so that the ends of justice may
be served
- ITC: Petition filed with the RTC was accompanied by a
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
signed by Ms. Beleno, although without proof of
authority from the board. However, this Court finds that
the belated submission of the Secretary‘s Certificate
constitutes substantial compliance
o the Secretary‘s Certificate signed by
petitioner‘s Corporate Secretary Rafael Khan
and submitted to the RTC shows that not only
did the corporation authorize Ms. Beleno to
execute the required Verifications and/or
Certifications of Non-Forum Shopping, but it
likewise ratified her act of filing the Petition with
the RTC
o It should be noted that the nature of the
position of Ms. Beleno as the corporation‘s
finance director/manager is relevant to the
determination of her capability and sufficiency
to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the Petition  for this particular
case, Ms. Beleno, as finance director, may be
said to have been in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations
in the claim for a refund of the corporation‘s
business taxes
c. Individuals
Santos v. CA, 360 S 521 (2001)
- petitioners Ismael V. Santos and Alfredo G. Arce were
employed by PEPSI as Complimentary Distribution
Specialists while Hilario M. Pastrana was employed as
Route Manage
- PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor
performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations it
would restructure and streamline certain physical and
sales distribution systems  employees with affected
positions were terminated
- petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their
separation pays and executed the corresponding
releases and quitclaims. However, before the end of the
year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new
positions called Account Development Managers with
substantially the same duties and responsibilities
- petitioners filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement
- LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit; affirmed by
NLRC
- CA dismissed the petition outright because the
verification and certification against forum shopping
were executed merely by petitioners‘ counsel and not by
petitioners
HELD: CA affirmed
- It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we
have held that there is substantial compliance if the
same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that
facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and
belief. However, the same does not apply as regards the
requirement of a certification against forum shopping.
- certification must be made by petitioner himself and not
by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best
position to know whether he has previously commenced
any similar action involving the same issues in any other
tribunal or agency
- BA Savings Bank must be distinguished from the case
at bar because in the former, the complainant was a
corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore,
that case made an exception to the general rule that the
certification must be made by the petitioner himself
since a corporation can only act through natural persons
- ITC: petitioners are all natural persons and there is no
showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure
to personally sign the certification
o it was petitioners themselves who executed the
verification and certification requirements in all
their previous pleadings
o Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter
of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is
executed to promptly and effectively meet any
contingency relative to the handling of a case
 in the case of natural persons, this
policy serves no legal purpose.
Convenience cannot be made the
basis for a circumvention of the Rules
Fiel v. Kris Security Systems Inc., G.R. No. 155875, 3
April 2003
- Petitioners were employed by private respondent Kris
Security Systems, Inc., as security guards. On different
dates, private respondent terminated the services of
petitioners
- Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
- LA held that they were constructively dismissed
- NLRC reversed LA
- Petitioners filed petition for certiorari with CA which
dismissed the petition because only three of the four
petitioners signed the mandatory verification and
certification of non-forum shopping
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- The greater interest of justice would be served if the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court
of Appeals is adjudicated on its merits with respect to
the three petitioners who have signed the verification
and certification on non-forum shopping The greater
interest of justice would be served if the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals
is adjudicated on its merits with respect to the three
petitioners who have signed the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping
- The three petitioners who have faithfully observed the
rules by signing the requisite verification and certification
on non-forum shopping, should not be unduly prejudiced
by the fault of their co-petitioner who apparently has lost
interest in pursuing his case.
- technical rules of procedure should be used to promote,
not frustrate, the cause of justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable aim, the just
resolution of cases on their merits, however, cannot be
sacrificed merely in order to achieve that objective
- Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but
to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and
rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons,
 have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need
to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course
Hamilton v. Levy, 344 S 821 (2000)
- Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages, with prayer for preliminary attachment against
respondents and one Pablo de Borja with the Angeles
RTC
- RTC issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.
o the court sheriff levied on a Cherokee 180
Piper aircraft, allegedly owned by respondent
David Levy
o the Return manifested that the sheriff
personally served summons and a copy of the
writ of preliminary attachment to respondents,
through Mercita S. Reyes and Ramon Araneta,
secretaries of W.E.L. Phils., Inc., at Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, Olongapo City, the address of
respondents stated in the complaint
- Ramon Araneta filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim
asserting ownership of the levied aircraft by virtue of a
sale from W.E.L. Phils., Inc., represented by respondent
Levy
- petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in
Default for failure to file any responsive pleading within
the reglementary period. This was granted by the trial
court
- petitioner proceeded with the presentation of evidence
ex parte
- Prior to the presentation of evidence, however,
respondents‘ counsel filed a Special Appearance to
Question the Jurisdiction of the trial court. When no
action was made on the Special Appearance,
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
o While the petition for certiorari was pending
before the Court of Appeals, proceedings
before the trial court continued
- CA issued the assailed Decision granting the Petition
and ordering the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
on its finding that summons was not validly served upon
respondents, hence, the trial court never assumed
jurisdiction over their persons
- Before the SC, petitioner alleges (inter alia) that the
certification on nonforum shopping attached to
respondents‘ Petition was prepared not by respondents
but by one Teresita Torres, who was not a party to the
suit either before the trial court or the certiorari
proceedings in the Court of Appeals
- respondents explained that they were both abroad when
the petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals
HELD: CA affirmed
- that the respondents were abroad is reasonable cause
to exempt them from compliance with the requirement
that they personally execute the certification. Moreover,
to dismiss their petition for certiorari on this sole ground
would deny them the opportunity to question the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over their persons
- (Re: improper service of summons:
o The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer‘s
Return; otherwise, any substituted service
made in lieu of personal service cannot be
upheld. This is necessary because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in
character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized
by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
comply with the requirements of substituted
service renders said service ineffective)
Cavile v. Cavile, 400 S 255 (2003)
- Bernardo Cavili contracted three marriages. The first
marriage was with Ines Dumat-ol with whom he had one
child, Simplicia. The second was with Orfia Colalho with
whom he had two children: Fortunato and Vevencia.
And the third was with Tranquilina Galon with whom he
had three children: Castor, Susana and Benedicta.
Throughout his lifetime, Bernardo Cavili acquired six
parcels of land which became the subject of the instant
case
- Upon the death of Bernardo, his son by his third
marriage, Castor Cavili, took possession of the
properties as administrator for and in behalf of his
coowners. However, when Castor died, his children took
possession of the parcels of land but no longer as
administrators. They claimed the properties as well as
their fruits as their own and repeatedly refused
respondents‘ demand for partition
- the descendants of Bernardo‘s first and second
marriage (herein respondents) filed a complaint for
partition against the descendants of his third marriage
(herein petitioners)
- As petitioners failed to file an Answer within the
reglementary period, they were declared in default and
respondents were allowed to present evidence, ex parte
- TC ordered the partition of the six parcels of land.
o However, upon motion of Primitivo Cavili and
Quirino Cavili who were not properly served
with summons, TC held a new trial and allowed
said parties to present evidence. Among the
evidence they proferred was a Deed of
Partition which appeared to have been
executed by the heirs of Bernardo Cavili
o Giving weight to the documentary evidence
presented by Primitivo Cavili and Quirino
Cavili, TC rendered another decision and
DISMISSED the complaint for partition
- CA reversed, TC erred in admitting the Deed of Partition
as evidence without proof of its authenticity and due
execution. CA ordered partition
- Before the SC:
o Petitioners essentially argue that the Deed of
Partition is a public document duly
acknowledged before a Notary Public. Hence,
its genuineness and due execution need not be
proved.
o Respondents, on the other hand, pray for the
denial of the petition because it violates the
rule on the certification against forum shopping
required to be attached to petitions for review
filed with this Court
 only one of the twenty-two (22)
petitioners, Thomas George Cavili,
Sr., executed and signed the
certification against forum shopping
when the Rules require that said
certification must be signed by all the
petitioners
HELD: Petition GRANTED. TC decision reinstated
- the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of
all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum
shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the
Rules.
o All the petitioners, being relatives and co-
owners of the properties in dispute, share a
common interest thereon. They also share a
common defense in the complaint for partition
filed by the respondents.
o when they filed the instant petition, they filed it
as a collective, raising only one argument to
defend their rights over the properties in
question. There is sufficient basis, therefore,
for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and
in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not
filed any action or claim involving the same
issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there
other pending action or claim in another court
or tribunal involving the same issues
o Moreover, it has been held that the merits of
the substantive aspects of the case may be
deemed as ―special circumstance‖ for the Court
to take cognizance of a petition for review
although the certification against forum
shopping was executed and signed by only one
of the petitioners
- TC was correct in dismissing the complaint for partition,
it appearing that the lawful heirs of Bernardo Cavili have
already divided the properties among themselves, as
evidenced by the Deed of Partition
3. Alleging causes of action
sections 1-2, 5, 6, 9, Rule 8
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
Section 1. In general. — Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary facts. (1)
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent
provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be
clearly and concisely stated. (n)
Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of
action or defense or in separate causes of action or
defenses. When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. (2)
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all
averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person
may be averred generally.(5a)
Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision
of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the
judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing
jurisdiction to render it. (6)
Section 9. Official document or act. — In pleading an official
document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(9)
section 16(g), Rule 16
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action;
Tantuico v. Republic, 204 S 428 (1991)
- Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG
filed with the Sandiganbayan a case against Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos. for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages
o Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as
defendant on the theory that he conspired with
them as COA chair
- after his motion for production and inspection of
documents was denied by respondent court, petitioner
filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars alleging inter alia
that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as
(a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both
capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms
and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to
understand and know with certainty the particular acts
allegedly committed by him and which he is now
charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff
furnish him the particulars sought therein so that he can
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and
prepare for trial.
o dates of the resolutions or acts issued or
performed by Tantuico which allowed the
facilitation of, and made possible the,
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable
use of government funds
o ministries or Departments, offices or agencies
of the government involved in these
questionable use of government funds
o names of the auditors who had the original
audit jurisdiction over the said withdrawals,
disbursements and questionable use of
government funds
o amount of government funds involved in these
questionable-disbursements, individually and in
total
o ETC.
- SB denied BoP on the ground that the particulars sought
by petitioner are evidentiary in nature
HELD: Petition GRANTED. SB committed GAD.
Respondents ordered to file BoP
- Complaint: Its office, purpose or function is to inform the
defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made
against him so that he may be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the
defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff
relies to support his demand; it should state the theory
of a cause of action which forms the bases of the
plaintiffs claim of liability
o Ultimate facts  essential facts constituting the
plaintiff ‗s cause of action. A fact is essential if
it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action insufficient.
Ultimate facts are important and substantial
facts which either directly form the basis of the
 primary right and duty, or which directly make
up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. The term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are
to be established. It refers to principal,
determinate, constitutive facts, upon the
existence of which, the entire cause of action
rests
o Evidentiary facts  facts which are necessary
for determination of the ultimate facts; they are
the premises upon which conclusions of
ultimate facts are based
- Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute
the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right,
the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the
complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
o However, where the allegations of the
complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form
of conclusions, the proper recourse would be,
not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill
of particulars
- ITC:
o the allegations that defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with the other defendants
―embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth‖ and that said
defendants acted ―in flagrant breach of public
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of
right and in brazen violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines‖, are conclusions of
law unsupported by factual premises.
o the allegation that petitioner ―took undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit,‖ that he ―failed to
perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman,‖ and acting in concert with
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
―facilitated and made possible the withdrawals,
disbursements, and questionable use of
government funds as stated in the foregoing
paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable
damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire
Filipino people‖, are mere conclusions of law
o On top of that, the complaint does not even
contain any factual allegation which would
show that whatever withdrawals,
disbursements, or conversions were made,
were indeed subject to audit by the COA.
o the allegation that petitioner acted as dummy,
nominee, or agent by allowing himself ―to be
used as instrument in accumulating illgotten
wealth through government concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff‖ or
―to be (an) incorporator, director, or member of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled‖
by the Marcoses and Romualdezes, is a
conclusion of law without factual basis.
o there is no averment in the complaint how
petitioner allowed himself to be used as
instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or
policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are
prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with
the granting, issuance, and or formulation of
such concessions, orders, and/or policies
- The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to,
pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that
they merely articulate conclusions of law and
presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence,
without the particulars prayed for in petitioner‘s motion
for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner
cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and
for trial
- the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons,
names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a
specification of property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts
as would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature
o those particulars are material facts that should
be clearly and definitely averred in the
complaint in order that the defendant may, in
fairness, be informed of the claims made
against him to the end that he may be prepared
to meet the issues at the trial.
- the purpose or object of a bill of particulars is to amplify
or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and
particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in
general terms, give information, not contained in the
pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the
precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the
cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and
apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to
meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited
to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at,
and needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided,
and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial
Convets, Inc. v. National Dev’t Corp., G.R. No. L-10232,
28 February 1958
- Confederation of Filipino Veterans (CONVETS) filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
the National Development Company (NDC), Land
Settlement and Development Corporation
(LASEDECO), and the Board of Liquidators before CFI
Manila for the recovery of the sum of P36,000 as agent's
commission on the sale of certain commodities
- a committee of the NDC in a memorandum submitted to
the latter's general manager recommended that plaintiff
be allowed a 10% straight commission on sales of items
from the Caledonia Pile (a mass of surplus goods which
the NDC had in the compound in Manila) where plaintiff
had a direct hand in the sale
- plaintiff informed the NDC Board that it had found a
buyer, the firm of Joseph Behr & Sons, Inc.
- through the direct intervention of plaintiff in its capacity
as sole agent of the defendant NDC, a contract of sale
was approved by the NDC'S Board of Directors
- in confirmation of previous commitments, promises and
past business dealing between plaintiff and the NDC, a
written agency agreement was entered into between
them with retroactive effect
- upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 355 the
management and disposition of the Caledonia Pile were
transferred from the NDC to the LASEDECO and that
 upon the latter being dissolved by Republic Act No.
1160 its assets were turned over to the Board of
Liquidators
- plaintiff being, for that reason, uncertain from which one
of the defendants it is entitled to get relief; and that
notwithstanding repeated demands, the defendants
have failed and refused to pay plaintiff its commission
on the sale mentioned.
- Defendants filed MTD otg that the complaint did not
state a cause of action and that plaintiff's action, if it had
any, had already prescribed
- LC granted MTD
HELD: Petition GRANTED
- The LC inferred from the documents submitted that the
sale in question was neither initiated nor consummated
by plaintiff but was a direct transaction between the
management of the NDC and Joseph Behr & Sons, Inc
- it is elementary that lack of cause of action as ground for
dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint and
that to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other,
should be considered
- ITC: the allegations in the complaint, the truth of which
is hypothetically admitted by defendants' motion to
dismiss, do constitute a cause of action for the recovery
of the stipulated commission; and while the annexes to
the complaint do also mention certain terms under which
the sales of merchandise from the Caledonia Pile should
be made, there is really nothing in said annexes that
contradicts or nullifies the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint or proves by itself alone that the terms
prescribed were not complied with to the satisfaction of
the principal
o Any such non-compliance is a matter of
defense, which should be alleged in the answer
and proved at the trial.
4. Alleging capacity to sue or be sued
section 4, Rule 8
Section 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a party
to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued
in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of person that is made a party, must be
averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or
be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific
denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge. (4)
section 16(d), Rule 16
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
French Oil v. CA, 295 S 462 (1998)
- Ludo and Luym Oleochemical, Co. filed a complaint for
breach of contract with damages against French Oil Mill
Machinery (a corporation with principal office at Piqua,
Ohio, USA) and its alleged Philippine agent Trans-World
Trading Company
- Summons was served on Trans-World which moved to
dismiss the complaint arguing that it is not petitioner‘s
agent.
- French Oil itself filed a special appearance with MTD
contending that the court had no jurisdiction over its
person due to improper service of summons. It argued
that:
o it is not doing business in the Philippines
o Trans-World is not its agent
- RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
petitioner
- Upon MR, RTC reversed the order of dismissal and
ruled that summons was properly served on petitioner
whom it found doing business in the Philippines thru
Trans-World as its agent
- CA affirmed RTC: summons properly served
- Before the SC, French Oil contends that it is not doing
business in the Philippines and that Trans-World is not
its agent, and thus, the summons served on the latter
has no effect on the former
HELD: CA affirmed
- It is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a
defendant foreign corporation is doing business. For
purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing
business must first be ―established by appropriate
allegations in the complaint‖ and the court in
determining such fact need not go beyond the
allegations therein
- ITC: the ff. allegations are sufficient that petitioner is
doing business for purposes of Section 14, Rule 14
o allegations that petitioner entered into a
contract with private respondent to supply and
install various machineries and equipments for
the use of the latter‘s oil mill factory
o that the first shipment of machineries from
petitioner was received by private respondent
- The determination that a foreign corporation is doing
business is merely tentative and only to enable the local
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
foreign corporation through service of summons. It does
not foreclose a subsequent finding to the contrary
depending on the evidence
- Under the Rules of Court, if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, summons
may be served on
(a) its resident agent designated in accordance with law;
(b) if there is no resident agent, the government official
designated by law to that effect; or
(c) any of its officer or agent within the Philippines.
- For purposes of the rules on summons, the
determination of principal-agent relationship from the
allegations in the complaint is only preliminary and is not
even conclusive as to liability. Nothing bars the court
from later making a different finding after the parties had
substantiated their respective allegations with respect to
agency should the same be disputed.
- As found by both courts below, petitioner treated Trans-
World as its Philippine agent in the assailed transaction.
Such factual assessment is binding on this Court and
will not be disturbed as no exceptional circumstances
nor cogent reasons were shown to justify its reversal
Scenario 1: What will happen if a juridical person fails to
state in the complaint the facts regarding its legal capacity?
Effect: The complaint may be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state of cause of action because the juridical person
does not have any right which may be violated (which is an
element of a cause of action) since it does not exist. In this
case, the juridical person may have legal capacity to sue but
its personality may be questioned.
Scenario 2: What will happen if a natural person fails to state
in the complaint the facts regarding his/her legal capacity?
Effect: The complaint may be dismissed on the ground of
lack of legal capacity to sue. Contrary to Scenario 1, the
plaintiff in this case exists and has legal personality, although
his/her legal capacity may be questioned.
Scenario 3: What will happen if the plaintiff did not allege
that defendant corporation was doing business in the
Philippines (although it was indeed doing business in the
Philippines)?
Effect: There is no ground for dismissal. A complaint may not
be dismissed for lack of legal capacity to be sued (Rule 16,
Sec.16d only contemplates a plaintiff who has no legal
capacity to sue). Note that the French Oil case is not
applicable because the issue in French Oil is
factual/evidentiary.
Scenario 4: What will happen if the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant corporation was doing business in the Philippines
when in fact, it was not doing business in the Philippines?
Effect: The complaint may be dismissed for the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Note that our
summons and other judicial processes do not operate
extraterritorially (vis-à-vis in the US which recognizes long-
arm jurisdiction). Also, in the corporation code, ―doing
business‖ does not refer to an isolated transaction but applies
only to continuous business in the Philippines.
5. Alleging compliance with conditions precedent
section 3, Rule 8
Section 3. Conditions precedent. — In any pleading a general
averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions
precedent shall be sufficient. (3)
section 1(j), Rule 16
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with. (1a)
art. 151, Family Code
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
sections 408-409, Local Government Code
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Thereto. - The lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of Justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any
time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.
Section 409. Venue.
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays
within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the
barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, at the election of the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending
parties are employed or at the institution where such parties
are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation
proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the
same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling
thereon shall be binding.
art. 2035, NCC
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
Conditions precedent
1. Compromise under the Family Code
o Effort for compromise must be alleged in
verified complaint
o Includes illegitimate siblings (Heirs of Favis v.
Gonzales)
Ground Effect
No allegation Curable
Unverified allegation Curable
No compromise Dismissible
2. Barangay Conciliation Proceedings
o Applies only:
 when both parties reside in the same
city or municipality or
 when the parties reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities but
such barangays adjoin each other and
the parties there to agree to submit
their differences to amicable
settlement
o when real property is involved, the dispute shall
be brought to the barangay where the real
property or a larger portion thereof is situated
o disputes arising in the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for
study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located
3. Arbitration – usually, a case is not dismissed for
failure to resort to arbitration as stipulate or provided
by law; instead of dismissing the case, the judge
would refer the case for arbitration and suspend the
proceedings pending arbitration
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, 15
January 2014
- Dr. Favis died intestate in 1995 (due to several illnesses
since 1992) leaving behind several properties
- Allegedly, Dr. Favis executed a Deed of Donation in
1994 transferring some of the properties in favor of his
grandchildren with his second wife
- Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr.
Favis‘ children with his first wife, petitioners herein, filed
an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation
- RTC: nullified the Deed of Donation
o Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with
illnesses, could not have had full control of his
mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of
Donation.
- CA: motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
petitioners‘ nullification case on the ground that
petitioners failed to make an averment that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, as
mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
- Respondents filed MR contending that the case is not
subject to compromise as it involves future legitime
- CA denied MR: the prohibited compromise is that which
is entered between the decedent while alive and
compulsory heirs.
o ITC: it does not involve a testator and a
compulsory heir. Also, the subject properties
cannot be considered as ―future legitime‖ but
are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint
was filed after the death of the decedent
HELD: CA Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. RTC
AFFIRMED
- Rule 16 provides the grounds that can be raised in a
MTD. Said grounds cannot be the basis of motu
proprio dismissal. Only the grounds in Sec. 1, Rule 9
can be the grounds for motu proprio dismissal (Omnibus
Motion Rule). The grounds in Rule 16 must be raised
before the filing of an answer, or else they are deemed
waived
- ITC: respondents did not file MTD. The CA motu proprio
dismissed the case on the basis of a condition
precedent that was not complied with only upon appeal.
This is not allowed under the rules
- Even assuming that the CA may motu proprio dismiss
the case on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent for filing a claim, the facts of the
case show that compromise was never an option insofar
as the respondents were concerned
- The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was
shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss
but on the respondents‘ insistence on the validity of the
donation in their favor of the subject properties
Note:
 the RTC may only dismiss motu proprio on the grounds
enumerated in Rule 9, Sec.1 (Omnibus Motion Rule)
 the MTC may dismiss motu proprio on any ground,
following the rules on summary procedure
Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. 28394, 26 Nov 1970
- Petitioner Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against
respondent spouses Silvestre and Genoveva Gayon
asking for a judicial decree for consolidation of title
o The spouses Gayon failed to repurchase the
land within the 5-year redemption period
- Respondent Genoveva filed MTD otg that petitioner did
not exert efforts for compromise before filing the present
suit, considering that petitioner Pedro Gayon and
respondent Silvestre Gayon are brothers
- CFI dismissed
HELD: Petition granted. The CFI should not have
dismissed
- Pedro Gayon did not need to exert efforts for
compromise before filing the case
- ―Members of the same family‖ in Art. 222 (now Art. 151)
of the Civil Code was defined in Art. 217 (now Art.150)
as:
o Between husband and wife
o Between parents and children
o Among other ascendants and descendants
o Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full
or half-blood
- ITC: Genoveva was petitioner‘s sister-in-law while her
children are petitioner‘s nieces and nephews. None of
them are included in the enumeration in the Civil Code
Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC, G.R. No. 125465, 29 Jun 1999
- spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint
for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson before the RTC alleging that:
o they were deprived of income from the parcel
of land that they owned because the
 respondents filed a land registration case
involving said land
o respondents withheld possession of the land in
bad faith
- respondents answered,
o denying that they had deprived petitioners of
possession of and income from the land
o alleging that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action since it did not allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made (Augusto and Gregorio are
brothers)
- petitioners filed an Amended Complaint alleging that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
but were unsuccessful
- respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint
with Counterclaim in which they denied that earnest
efforts had been made to reach a compromise
- TC: dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint
was not verified as required by Art. 151 FC and,
therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been
made to arrive at a compromise
HELD: petition granted, TC should not have dismissed
- The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If
the court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regarding efforts made to settle the case among
members of the same family, it could simply have
ordered petitioners to verify them
- The court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may be served. Otherwise, mere suspicion or
doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the
allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a
compromise but the parties efforts proved unsuccessful
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is
later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted
would the court be justified in dismissing the action
- Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case
since the suit is not exclusively among family
members. Whenever a stranger is a party in a case
involving family members, the requisite showing of
earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
Since Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros
family, the case is not covered by the requirements of
Art. 151 of the Family Code
- Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently,
Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse
of G. Hontiveros, and Maria Hontiveros, who is
admittedly the spouse of A. Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art.
151
6. Striking out
section 12, Rule 8
Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained
therein. — Upon motion made by a party before responding
to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by
these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20)
days after the service of the pleading upon him, or upon the
court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any
pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false,
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be
stricken out therefrom. (5, R9)
B. Answer
1. General
section 4, Rule 6
Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a
defending party sets forth his defenses. (4a)
section 1, 2, 11, Rule 11
Section 1. Answer to the complaint. — The defendant shall
file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after
service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the
court. (la)
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical
entity. — Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical
entity and service of summons is made on the government
official designated by law to receive the same, the answer
shall be filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of summons
by such entity. (2a)
Section 11. Extension of time to plead. — Upon motion and
on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time
to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other
pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (7)
Rule 22 - Computation of Time
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period
of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or
event from which the designated period of time begins to run
is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday
a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day. (a)
Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done
which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the
allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on
the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be
excluded in the computation of the period. (n)
section 11, RSC
Section 11. Response - The defendant shall file with the court
and serve on the plaintiff a duly accomplished and verified
Response within a non - extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of summons. The Response shall be
accompanied by certified photocopies of documents, as well
as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support
thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing
which was not attached to or submitted together with the
Response, unless good cause is shown for the admission of
additional evidence.
section 5, RSP
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in
the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded.
2. Alleging defenses
section 5, Rule 6
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or
affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material
fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential
to his cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter
which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations
in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or
bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud,
statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy,
and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
(5a)
section 2, 7-8, 10-11, Rule 8
Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of
action or defense or in separate causes of action or
defenses. When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. (2)
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. —
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original
or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or
said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (7)
Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an
action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless
the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement
of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not
appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused. (8a)
Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of
the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where
a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he
shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder
Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this
shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed
admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed
admitted if not denied under oath. (1a, R9)
section 1, Rule 9
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(2a)
section 6, Rule 16
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no
motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the
court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed. (5a)
Specific denial
1. Where a defendant does not admit the truth of a
material allegation of fact:
Par. 1 is denied, the truth being that.. (state the truth)
2. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment:
Par. 1 is denied insofar as it alleges that… the truth being
that… the rest is denied for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof
3. Where a defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of a material averment made in the complaint:
Par. 1 is denied for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
4. Where a defendant does not admit the truth of a
material allegation of fact but does not have an
alternative version of the fact:
Par. 1 is denied for being a conclusion of law
Philippine American General Insurance v Sweet Lines,
G.R. No. 87434, 5 August 1992
- Sweetlines was supposed to ship bags of Polyethylene
to Tagum Plastics from LA to Manila and then to Davao
- May 15, 1977: the shipments were discharged into the
custody of the consignee
- July 8, 1977: a survey was conducted showing that
there were shortages, damages and losses
- April 28, 1978: Tagum Plastics filed claim with
Sweetlines (almost a year after the delivery)
- May 12, 1978: Tagum Plastics and Philamgen
Insurance (subrogated to the right of Tagum Plastics)
filed action to recover the cost of lost or damaged
shipment (almost a year after the delivery)
- Sweetlines invoked the following stipulation in the bill of
lading:
 o ―Claims for shortage, damage, must be made
at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if
container shows exterior signs of damage or
shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery,
loss or damage must be filed within 30 days
from accrual. Suits arising from shortage,
damage or loss, non-delivery or misdelivery
shall be instituted within 60 days from date of
accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims
or institute judicial proceedings as herein
provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of
action.‖
- Philamgen answered, not denying the presence of the
stipulation but claiming that it is contrary to public policy
(NEGATIVE PREGNANT)
- TC ruled in favor of Philamgen, ordering Sweetlines to
pay
- CA reversed, dismissing the complaint on the ground of
prescription
- Philamgen and Tagum Plastics filed MR, contending
that CA erred in reversing the RTC decision and
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription
because Sweetlines failed to present the bills of lading
as evidence, hence the said prescriptive periods were
not proven
- CA denied MR, resolving that although the bills of lading
were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously
revolves on such bills of lading which are practically the
documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are
inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be
disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of
the parties thereto
- Before the SC, petitioners argue that the CA should not
have considered the issue on prescription
HELD: dismissal proper because the action has
prescribed
- prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably
raised by Sweetlines in its answer, except that the bills
of lading embodying the same were not formally offered
in evidence
- non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the
formal offer of evidence is not a fatal procedural lapse in
this case
o petitioners are suing upon the contract of
carriage as contained in the bills of lading
o bills of lading can be categorized as actionable
documents which under the Rules must be
properly pleaded either as causes of action or
defenses, and the genuineness and due
execution of which are deemed admitted
unless specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party. The rules on actionable
documents cover and apply to both a cause of
action or defense based on said documents
- Petitioners‘ failure to specifically deny the existence,
much less the genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments in question amounts to an admission
Note: Philamgen‘s answer was a negative pregnant.
NEGATIVE PREGNANT = denial pregnant with admission
Spouses Abrajano v. Heirs of Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895,
February 16, 2006
- Augusto Salas, a registered owner of a large parcel of
land, entered into an owner-contractor agreement with
petitioner Laperal Realty Development
- Laperal eventually subdivided the properties, and sold
portions thereof to petitioner spouses Abrajano, et.al.
- The heirs of Augusto Salas filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale, conveyance, cancellation of
contract, accounting and damages against petitioners
- Laperal filed MTD on the ground of failure to comply
with arbitration requirement first before filing the suit
- Other petitioner-buyers filed separate answers, some of
them also raising the argument regarding arbitration
- Respondent heirs opposed the MTD on the ground that
the arbitration clause is not applicable because there
are petitioners who are not privy to the Owner-
Contractor Agreement
- RTC granted MTD, dismissed
- SC set aside the order of dismissal and directed the trial
court to proceed with the hearing; hence, remanded
- Petitioners Vacuna and Capellan filed Motion for Leave
to Conduct Preliminary Hearing on the Defendants‘
Affirmative Defenses pursuant to Rule 16, Sec. 6
- RTC granted the motion, hence preliminary hearings
were conducted
- Respondents filed a motion to inhibit the RTC judge but
this was denied; hence filed petition for certiorari with
the CA
- CA ordered inhibition and ruled that preliminary hearing
on the affirmative defense SHOULDN‘T have been
conducted because Rule 16, Sec. 6 only applies in
cases where no motion to dismiss has been filed
o ITC: Laperal already filed MTD
HELD: preliminary hearings on the affirmative defenses
were properly ordered
- Rule 16, Sec. 6 only allows the hearing for affirmative
defenses if a motion to dismiss has already been filed.
HOWEVER, the section doesn‘t contemplate a situation
where there are several defendants but only one filed a
motion to dismiss
- The MTD filed by petitioner Laperal doesn‘t affect the
right of the other petitioners to plead their own
affirmative defenses and be preliminarily hear thereon
- ONLY CAVEAT: Ground for non-compliance with the
condition precedent of resorting to arbitration may no
longer be included in the preliminary hearing because it
has already been heard and finally resolved in Laperal‘s
MTD
Associated Bank v. Spouses Montano, Sr., G.R. No.
166383, October 16, 2009
- Spouses Justiniano and Ligaya Montano owned 3
parcels of land
- When Marcos declared martial law, Justiniano went on
self-exile to the US to avoid harassments and threats
- While in the US, the Montanos transferred the said
properties to Tres Cruces Agro-Industrial Corporation
(TCAIC) in exchange for shares of stock, allowing the
Montanos to control 98% of the stockholdings
- TCAIC sold the properties to International Country Club,
Inc. (ICCI)
- ICCI mortgaged the parcels of land to Associated Bank.
The loan matured but remained unpaid, prompting
Associated Bank to foreclose the mortgage. The
properties were put on public auction and were sold for
P5.7M to Associated Bank
- After the ouster of Marcos, the Montanos returned to the
country. After discovering the transfer of the properties,
the Montanos immediately took physical possession of
the same and began cultivating the land.They filed an
 action for reconveyance of title praying that the transfer
of the properties be declared null and void
- Associated Bank filed an Answer setting forth affirmative
defenses. Basically argued that the complaint did not
state a cause of action because the allegation of threat
and intimidation was not averred with particularity; and
even if the complaint stated a cause of action, the same
had already prescribed
- 8 years after Associated Bank filed its answer and while
the case was still on its pretrial stage, the bank filed a
Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative
Defenses and/or MTD
- RTC dismissed complaint
- CA reversed, reinstated the case for further proceedings
- Before the SC, Associated Bank argued that the failure
of the Montanos to file a comment on or an
objection to the motion to dismiss despite
opportunity to do so should be construed as a
waiver in contesting the allegations and affirmative
defenses raised by Associated Bank
HELD: Petition denied for lack of merit
- It is inconsequential that Associated Bank had already
filed an answer to the complaint prior to its filing of a
MTD. The option of whether to set the case for
preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which
raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss
raising any of the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule 16
of the Rules are procedural options which are not
mutually exclusive of each other
- Moreover, as petitioner correctly pointed out,
respondents failed to oppose the motion to dismiss
despite having been given the opportunity to do so by
the RTC. Therefore, any right to contest the same was
already waived by them.
On whether the complaint for reconveyance should be
dismissed:
- the complaint clearly states a cause of action and
raises issues of fact that can be properly settled only
after a full-blown trial. On this ground, petitioner‘s motion
to dismiss must, perforce, be denied
- the Court does not agree that the action has already
prescribed.
- An action for annulment shall be brought within four
years. This period shall begin: In case of intimidation,
violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of
the consent ceases.
● In the circumstances prevailing in this case, the
threat or intimidation upon respondents is
deemed to have ceased only upon the ouster of
Marcos. The four-year prescriptive period must,
therefore, be reckoned from the said date. Thus,
when respondents filed their complaint for
reconveyance on September 15, 1989, the period
provided for by law had not yet prescribed.
Sun Bros. v. Caluntad, G.R. No. L-21440, 30 April 1966
- Conditional sale of a GE television between Caluntad
and Sun Bros under the condition that the price would
be P3,440.00, the down payment P884.00, and it would
be paid in monthly installments of P142.00 each for 18
months
- Caluntad only paid the amount of P1,442.00, leaving a
balance of P1,988.00
- Sun Bros filed an action praying that if said balance is
not paid, the property be returned to plaintiff
- Caluntad argued: Sun Bros just made Caluntad sign a
deed of sale for P3,440.00 → he was made to enter a
usurious transaction under the guise of a contract of
sale
- The allegation of usury made by Caluntad in his answer
was not denied under oath by Sun Bros and so the court
a quo considered said allegation as admitted under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
- the court a quo considered the transaction null and void
and on that basis dismissed the complaint
HELD: Decision appealed from reversed. the failure of
plaintiff to specifically deny under oath the allegation of
usury in his answer does not constitute an implied
admission of usury
- The mere failure to deny under oath the allegation that
the transaction was actually a usurious loan does not
amount to an admission. Such transaction must still be
proven before usury can be invoked
- If it is alleged in the complaint that the defendant,
whether an individual or a corporation, has entered into
a contract of loan with the plaintiff, there is no need for a
sworn answer. But if it be added that on this loan the
defendant has collected usurious interest, then there is
need of an oath. In that case, if no oath is taken to the
answer, the only thing admitted is the allegation that the
interest charged is usurious, not that the contract
entered into is a loan, which is something that must be
proved independently of the admission
Toribio v. Bidin, G.R. No. L-57821, 17 January 1985
- upon the death of Engracio Francisco and Juliana
Esteban, their land was subdivided among their 10 heirs
- the share of Dionisio Toribio as sold to Juan Camacho
- the other heirs (herein petitioners) filed a complaint
against Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos for recovery of
hereditary rights, alleging that their shares had never
been sold nor in any wise transferred or disposed to
others
- respondents answered that petitioners actually sold their
shares to Dionisio who, in turn, sold the shares to
respondents, as evidenced by Deeds of Sale and TCTs
- While testifying during trial, Eusebia (one of petitioners)
was asked whether she executed any sale of her share
in the parcel of land in litigation
o Counsel for respondents objected, raising the
proper mode of contesting genuineness of an
actionable document pursuant to Sec. 7 and 8,
Rule 8 (should be specific denial under oath)
o Basically respondents are emphasizing that the
Deed of Sale being assailed by Eusebia in her
testimony is an actionable document
o TC sustained the objection
- Petitioners filed MR arguing that the deeds of sale and
TCTs are merely evidentiary in nature and NOT a cause
of action or defense of which due execution and
genuineness had to be proven (hence, not actionable
documents)
o Hence, simple specific denial without oath
should have been sufficient
- CFI declared that deeds of sale and TCTs are
actionable documents and not merely evidentiary in
nature
HELD: the deeds of sale and TCTs are actionable
documents BUT there was no need to specifically deny
their genuineness and due execution because plaintiffs
already stated in the complaint that these were not
executed
- Jurisprudence has centered mainly on a discussion of
actionable documents as basis of a plaintiff‘s cause of
action but little has been said of them being a foundation
for defense. However, Rule covers both an action or a
defense based on documents
o Usual situation: Defendant would present a
document, to which both are parties and which
states that the plaintiff relinquishes his rights to
the defendant, as his defense
o ITC: respondent presented a document to
which petitioner was a party and respondent
was not (the deed of sale between Dionisio and
Eusebia)
- Test as to essentiality of any allegation: Can it be
made the subject of a material issue? In other words, if it
be denied, will the failure to prove it decide the case in
whole or in part? IF NOT: Fact is NOT essential
o Fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of
action or defense insufficient
- ITC, although the documents are actionable documents,
the court grants the petition out of equitable
considerations
- Reason for rule on contesting actionable documents →
to relieve a party of the trouble and expense of proving
in the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or
nonexistence of which is necessarily within the
knowledge of the adverse party, and of the necessity (to
his opponent‘s case) of establishing which such adverse
party is notified by his opponent‘s pleading
o to enable the adverse party to know
beforehand whether he will have to meet the
issue of genuineness or due execution of the
document during trial
o While mandatory, the rule is a discovery
procedure and must be reasonably construed
to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to
effect a denial of substantial justice
o The interpretation should be one which assist
the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive,
and most important, a just determination of the
disputed issues
- ITC: the private respondents will still have to introduce
evidence to establish that the deeds of sale are genuine
and that they were truly executed by the parties with
authority to dispose of the disputed property
3. Bill of particulars
Rule 12
Section 1. When applied for; purpose. — Before responding
to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for
a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averted with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly
to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply,
the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service
thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained
of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the
details desired. (1a)
Section 2. Action by the court. — Upon the filing of the
motion, the clerk of court must immediately bring it to the
attention of the court which may either deny or grant it
outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard. (n)
Section 3. Compliance with order. — If the motion is granted,
either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be
effected within ten (10) days from notice of the order, unless
a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars
or a more definite statement ordered by the court may be
filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving
a copy thereof on the adverse party. (n)
Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. — If the order is not
obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the
court may order the striking out of the pleading or the portions
thereof to which the order was directed or make such other
order as it deems just. (1[c]a)
Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. — After
service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading,
or after notice of denial of his motion, the moving party may
file his responsive pleading within the period to which he was
entitled at the time of filing his motion, which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event. (1[b]a)
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. — A bill of particulars
becomes part of the pleading for which it is intended. (1[a]a)
Tantuico v. Republic, supra
4. Default
section 3, Rule 9
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party
fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court
shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take
part in the trial. (2a, R18)
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default
may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file
a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18)
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a
claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail
to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the
answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. (4a, R18).
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages. (5a, R18).
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in an
action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18)
section 3, Rule 67 (Expropriation)
Section 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no
objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a
manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or
 to answer and there was a judgment by default and writ
identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, of execution)
within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be
entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same. If a Filinvest v. CA, 182 S 664 (1990)
defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations - Filinvest Land Incorporated filed with the RTC Makati, a
in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of complaint against Philippine Underwriters Finance
his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated Corporation, for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of
in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or land
identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, o Summons, together with a copy of the
state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and complaint, was served upon the defendant.
adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his - A motion was filed by defendant, through Atty. Emerita
property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party T. Salva, requesting for an extension of 20 days on the
complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any ground that counsel had to confer with the officers of the
subsequent pleading. A defendant waives all defenses and corporation (GRANTED)
objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of - A second motion for extension of 15 days to file an
justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made answer was filed by the defendant, through Atty. Pastor
not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, M. Reyes, Jr., on the ground that the transactions
at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether or not a involved voluminous records and in order to prepare an
defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may intelligent answer, undersigned counsel had to read all
present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be the records in his possession in addition to the heavy
paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of pressure of work in other equally important cases.
the award. (n) (ALSO GRANTED)
- A third motion for extension to file an answer for 10 days
Party in default  precluded from presenting evidence was filed by defendant, through Atty. Angel D. Bautista,
ONLY (defendant may still oppose motions) Jr., on the ground that the lawyer assigned to handle
this case was quite busy preparing for his wedding, as
A party cannot be held in default in the ff. cases: well as daily court appearances (ALSO GRANTED)
1. Annulment of marriage - An urgent request for another extension of 20 days was
2. Declaration of nullity of marriage also filed through Atty. Magno F. Salva, on the ground
3. Legal separation that the issues to be brought up for judicial scrutiny in
4. Expropriation  just compensation the answer and in the third party complaint of defendant
5. RSC are very controversial, complicated and difficult requiring
6. RSP careful analysis, study and research (ALSO GRANTED)
- For the fifth time, defendant filed another urgent motion
Rules on default = benefit of defendant  when the for extension of time to file its answer, asking for another
defendant reads the complaint, he would rather accept the 20 days, on the following grounds: the heavy pressure
prayer instead of presenting evidence as long as he would of work in pending cases before the SEC; the
only be adjudged to pay what was prayed for preparation of other pleadings, motions, memoranda
and papers in other cases; the preparation and
Order of default Judgment by default attendance in the trial of cases before the RTCs, all of
- Definition: Order for the - Remedy: which would prevent counsel for defendant from being
party to be declared in 1. Motion for New Trial able to file their answer (GRANTED BUT ONLY FOR
default  present new FIVE DAYS UPON RECEIPT OF ORDER)
- Remedy: Motion to Set evidence (by - Finally, another verified urgent motion, asking for a final
Aside Order of Default defendant) and last extension of 10 days was filed by defendant's
 before judgment 2. Appeal  same counsel on the ground that Atty. Emerito Salva, who
- Grounds to set aside: evidence was the one personally studying and preparing the
1. Fraud (presented by answer, was stricken ill and collapsed in his house due
2. Accident plaintiff), but the to lobar pneumonia, and was bedridden for 10 days.
3. Excusable conclusions of law Besides, even while still recuperating, he had to file a
negligence by the court are not lengthy motion for reconsideration in another case
4. Meritorious defense correct (FINALLY DENIED)
3. Petition for Relief - The day after, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion to
from Judgment declare defendant in default and be allowed to adduce
under Rule 38 (After evidence ex-parte. On the same date, the lower court
judgment has issued an order declaring the defendant in default, and
become final and allowing the plaintiff to adduce evidence ex-parte. A
executory) if hearing ex-parte was conducted and terminated that
granted, 1 or 2 same day.
(Usually if not able - The very next day, a two-page decision was rendered
to file MR, MNT or by the lower court in favor of plaintiff.
appeal within - A verified Answer with Counterclaim consisting of 15
reglementary pages, excluding its annexes, was filed by the
period) defendant on January 12, 1984, at 8:00 o'clock in the
 Certiorari only proper if not in default but held in default morning, which denied plaintiff‘s claims
(e.g. if not properly served with summons and not able - the lower court denied defendant's motion/ petition
HELD:
- Respondent's counsel, through 4 of its lawyers filed no
less than 6 motions for extension of time asking for a
total of 98 days to answer the complaint.
- The lower court granted the 5 motions and denied the
sixth motion before it declared Philfinance in default. All
in all, the lower court gave the private respondent 88
days to answer the complaint, so it can not be stated
that the trial court has in any way unduly favored the
petitioner neither can it be considered that private
respondent has been denied due process.
Cavili v. Florendo, G.R. No. 73039, 9 October 1987
- private respondents filed for Partition, Accounting, and
Damages with CFI Negros Oriental against the
petitioners (Perfecta, Quirino and Primitivo Cavili)
- summons was issued to the three petitioners
- server went back to the court stating in the return that
Quirino and Primitivo Cavili cannot be contacted
- The defendants failed to file their answer within the
requested period and upon motion of the plaintiffs, the
defendants were declared in default
- a judgment by default was promulgated
- Atty. Almarillo filed a motion for new trial in behalf of the
defendants on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of Primitivo and Quirino Cavili who had not
been legally served with summons
o Also alleged a meritorious defense that the
properties sought to be partitioned have
already been the subject of a written partition
agreement
- CFI granted motion for new trial
- In the new trial, defendants, (now petitioners), presented
Perfecta Cavili dela Cruz as their first witness
- respondents, through counsel, moved for disqualification
of Perfecta as a witness on the ground that having been
declared in default, Perfecta has lost her standing in
court and she cannot be allowed to participate in all
proceedings therein, even as a witness
- CFI sustained the respondents' contention and
disqualified her from testifying
HELD: Perfecta may testify as a witness despite being
declared in default
- There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties
declared in default from taking the witness stand for
nondisqualified parties
- Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an order
of default
o a party declared in default is considered out of
court and cannot appear therein, adduce
evidence, and be heard and for that reason he
is not entitled to notice
o "loss of standing" must be understood to mean
only the forfeiture of one's rights as a party
litigant, contestant or legal adversary
o A party in default loses his right to present his
defense, control the proceedings, and examine
or cross-examine witnesses
o no right to expect that his pleadings would be
acted upon by the court nor may he object to or
refute evidence or motions filed against him
- There is nothing in the rule, however, which
contemplates a disqualification to be a witness or a
deponent in a case
- A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by his
codefendants who have the standing and the right to
present evidence which the former may provide
Garcia v. CA, 209 S 732 (1992)
- Petitioner Garcia filed an action for damages against
respondent spouses Uy after the latter padlocked
commercial stalls being rented by Garcia at Virra Mall
Shopping Center, Greenhills
- Uys failed to file answer within reglementary period
- Garcia moved to declare Uys in default and for reception
of his evidence ex parte  granted by RTC (a copy of
the order was received by Uys)
- Uy filed an appearance with motion for extension of time
to file answer  denied by RTC for having been filed out
of time
- RTC issued judgment by default, in favor of Garcia
- Garcia filed ex parte motion for execution pending
appeal  granted by RTC, which issues the writ
- Uy filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,
challenging validity of writ of execution which was
granted without proper notice to them and without
hearing
- CA granted Uy‘s petition because after the judgment by
default was rendered, Uy automatically regained their
standing and were entitled to notice of proceedings
subsequent to the final judgment of default
HELD: a defendant declared in default entitled to notice of
final judgment or order rendered against him
- a defaulted defendant is entitled to notice of final orders
or judgments. Being in default doesn‘t imply a waiver of
rights.
o What is waived: Right to be heard and present
evidence during trial while the default prevails
- Requirement on notice to the adverse party is
MANDATORY
Talsan v Baliwag, G.R. No. 126258, 8 July 1999
- a passenger bus owned by respondent Baliwag Transit,
Inc. and driven by respondent Angeles Ramos, hit and
bumped a Kia Ceres Van owned by petitioner Francisco
P. San Diego and driven by Alfredo Santiago. As a
result of the mishap, petitioners instituted a civil
complaint for damages against herein private
respondents before RTC Makati
- Summons and copy of the complaint were served upon
private respondent‘s cashier, Miss Baby Cansino at
respondent‘s bus station, who received the court
process but refused to sign the original summons
- TC upon motion of petitioners, declared private
respondents in default. Pursuant to the order of default,
petitioners presented their evidence ex-parte
- Respondents received a copy of the default order and
filed MR alleging that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person by reason of improper service
of summons. Respondents argued that the person who
received the summons is only a cash receiving clerk
- Without ruling on the respondents motion, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering defendants to jointly and
severally pay petitioners
- respondents appealed the decision to the CA, arguing
that they could not be held in default because the
receipt of summons by Ms. Baby Cansino, a mere cash
receiving clerk in one of the respondents station does
not bind the petitioner
- CA: annulled and set aside the order of default and the
judgment by default and remanded the case to the trial
court for appropriate proceedings
HELD: petition denied, CA affirmed; remand to TC
- The service of summons upon Angeles Ramos, the bus
driver, was improper
o the sheriff hastily effected the service of
summons upon respondent Ramos by
substituted service without first attempting to
personally serve the same upon him. This is in
violation of the rule which provides that service
of summons upon the defendant shall be by
personal service first and only when the
defendant cannot be promptly served in person
will substituted service be availed of
o the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Ramos and for that reason it has
no right or power to render judgment against
him. The judgment against him is nugatory and
without effect
- With regard to the service of summons upon Baliwag
Transit through its cashier, Ms. Baby Cansino, the Court
finds such service of summons proper
o Under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court, if the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines,
such as private respondent Baliwag, service of
summons may be made on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of
its directors (NOTE: NO LONGER GOOD
LAW)
- On the second issue, the appeal taken by the private
respondents was proper. It is well-settled that, a defendant
who has been declared in default has the following
remedies:
(a) he may, at any time after discovery of the default
but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set
aside the order of default on the ground that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious
defense;
b) if judgment has already been rendered when he
discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for
new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If he discovered the default after the judgment
has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him.
- It must be recalled that after private respondents received a
copy of the resolution declaring them in default, they
seasonably filed MR. However, pending resolution, the court
rendered its decision. Given this factual milieu, private
respondents can appeal the judgment pursuant to Section
2(3), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. A default judgment is an
adjudication on the merits and is thus appealable
Ortero v. Tan, GR. No. 200134, 15 August 2012
- Roger Tan filed complaint for sum of money and
damages with the Cagayan de Oro MTC alleging that on
several occasions, Otero purchased on credit petroleum
products from him. Despite several verbal demands,
Otero failed to settle his obligation.
- Despite receipt of the summons (by his wife), Otero
failed to file his answer with the MTC
- Tan filed motion to declare Otero in default for his failure
to file his answer
- MTCC issued an order declaring him in default. Tan was
then allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
- MTC ruled in favor of Tan, ordering Otero to pay his
obligation
- RTC affirmed MTC decision
- CA denied Otero‘s petition for review, holding that any
defense which Otero may have against Tan‘s claim is
already deemed waived due to Otero‘s failure to file his
answer
HELD: Petition Denied. Otero, having been declared in
default by the MTCC, may, in the appellate proceedings,
still raise the failure of Tan to authenticate the
statements of account which he adduced in evidence.
But Tan was able to prove the material allegations of his
complaint.
- the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in court
for having been declared in default does not mean that
he is left sans any recourse whatsoever
- a defending party declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default. However, the
grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are
restricted to any of the following:
o first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of the complaint;
o second, the decision is contrary to law;
o third, the amount of judgment is excessive or
different in kind from that prayed for
- the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of
evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the
ex parte presentation of his evidence
o A defendant who has been declared in default
is precluded from raising any other ground in
his appeal from the judgment by default since,
otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce
evidence in his defense, which right he had lost
after he was declared in default
5. Counter-claims
section 2, 6-7, 9, Rule 6
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are
asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross- claim, third
(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the
pleading asserting a claim against him. An answer may be
responded to by a reply. (n)
Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim
which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
(6a)
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and
the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount. (n)
Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims.
— A counter-claim may be asserted against an original
counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-
claimant. (n)
section 2, Rule 9
Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set
up barred. — A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim,
not set up shall be barred. (4a)
sections 4, 8- 10, Rule 11
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. — A
counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within ten (10)
days from service. (4)
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. — A
compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending
party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained
therein. (8a, R6)
Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer.
— A counterclaim or a cross-claim which either matured or
was acquired by a party after serving his pleading may, with
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim
or a cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgment.
(9, R6)
Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. — When a
pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross- claim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or
when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the
counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgment.
(3, R9)
Section 6, Rule 16
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no
motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the
court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed. (5a)
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be
without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate
action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. (n)
Section 2, Rule 17
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the motion he manifests his preference to have his
counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall
be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court. (2a)
Art. 1283, NCC
Article 1283. If one of the parties to a suit over an obligation
has a claim for damages against the other, the former may
set it off by proving his right to said damages and the amount
thereof. (n)
section 13, RSC
SEC. 13. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule.—If
at the time the action is commenced, the defendant
possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the
coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b)
arises out of the same transaction or event that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff‘s claim; (c) does not require for its
adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the
subject of another
pending action, the claim shall be filed as a counterclaim in
the Response; otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from
suit on the counterclaim. The defendant may also elect to file
a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence, provided that the amount
and nature thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and
the prescribed docket and other legal fees are paid.
section 3(A), 5, RSP
Sec. 3. Pleadings. —
A. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to be
filed are the complaints, compulsory counterclaims and
cross-claims' pleaded in the answer, and the answers
thereto.
B. Verifications. — All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in
the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded.
OCA Circular 096-09
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC suspending payment of filing fees for
compulsory counterclaims remains in effect.
Requisites of a compulsory counterclaim:
1. cognizable by the regular courts of justice
2. arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim
3. does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
o when the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over an
indispensable party-defendant (e.g. A, B, and C are
parties to a contract. A filed an action for damages
on the ground of breach of contract against B. C is
abroad. B filed counterclaim: rescission. This is not
a compulsory counterclaim because C must be a
party for an action for rescission to prosper.
4. must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof
o except that in an original action before the Regional
Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount
Gojo v. Goyala, G.R. No. L-26768 30 October 1970
- Spouses Segundo and Antonina Goyala sold to Gojo
through a pacto de retro sale an agricultural land with a
redemption period of 1 year
- 10 years after, Goyala still failed to repurchase. Gojo
filed petition for consolidation of ownership of the land
- Goyala opposed and by way of counterclaim, raised that
the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage
- Counsel of Segundo Goyala filed Manifestation
informing the TC that Antonina was already dead
- CFI: Ordered Segundo Goyala to submit an amended
complaint substituting the successors-in-interest of
Antonina
- Gojo filed MTD for Goyala‘s failure to submit amended
complaint
- CFI: Dismissed the case, wihtout prejudice
- Gojo then filed a Motion to Declare Petitioner in default
in respect of the Respondent‘s counterclaim contained
in his answer to the dismissed complaint
- CFI: Granted, declared Goyala in default
- CFI then issued a favorable judgment in Gojo‘s
counterclaim
- Before the SC, Goyala argued that the counterclaim in
this case falls within the category of ―compulsory
counterclaim‖ wc doesn‘t call for an independent answer
as the complaint already denies its material allegations.
Also, the dismissal of the complaint in this case without
prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the counterclaim
HELD: Goyala should not have been declared in default with
respect to Gojo‘s counterclaim; CFI shouldn‘t have dismissed
the complaint
- Rule: Plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a
compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default,
principally because the issues raised in the
counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by
the allegations of the complaint.
- ITC: counterclaim was a compulsory one inasmuch as it
arises out of or is necessarily connected with transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint
o the counterclaim was clearly inconsistent with
and directly controverted the whole theory and
basic allegations of the complaint
- Hence, the original complaint stood as the answer to the
counterclaim
- Not proper to dismiss a complaint when a compulsory
counterclaim has been pleaded by defendant
o the right of the plaintiff to move for the
dismissal of an action after the defendant has
filed his answer is qualified by the clause
providing that: ―If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant‘s objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court.‖
o Purpose: avoid multiplicity of suits over the
same suits and possibility of conflict and
inconsistency and resolution
Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park Association, G.R.
No. 133119, 17August 2000
- USSR owns a lot in Forbes Park; engaged the services
of Financial Building for the construction of a multi-level
office and staff apartment building
- Forbes Park reminded the USSR of existing regulations
authorizing only the construction of a single-family
residential building in each lot within the village. It
enjoined further construction work
- Financial Building filed in RTC Makati a Complaint for
Injunction and Damages with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against Forbes Park.
- Forbes Park filed MTD on the ground that Financial
Building had no cause of action because it was not a
real party-in-interest
- RTC: issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
Forbes Park
- CA: nullified writ and dismissed the complaint
- SC: affirmed dismissal
- After the Financial Building case (1988) was terminated
with finality, Forbes Park filed with RTC Makati a
Complaint for Damages against Financial Building
arising from the violation of its rules and regulations
- RTC: rendered decision in favor of Forbes Park (ordered
demolition of building within 3 months when judgment
becomes final and executory, ordered payment of
damages)
- CA: affirmed RTC decision
HELD: CA reversed
- instant case is barred due to Forbes Park‘s failure to
set it up as a counterclaim in the previous civil case
(the prior injunction suit initiated by Financial Bldg.
against Forbes Park)
- a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a
separate action but it should instead be asserted in the
same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence,
which gave rise to it. To determine whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the
following tests:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim
and the counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant‘s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiff‘s claim as well as the defendant‘s
counterclaim? and
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim?
Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the
existence of a compulsory counter-claim
- A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding
in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support
therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of
a claim against the party filing the counterclaim. Hence,
where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the
counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed, more so
where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the
counterclaimant
- if the dismissal of the main action results in the
dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to
reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the
complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory
counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately
results in the dismissal of the counterclaim
- the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a
compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. In
the event that a defending party has a ground for
dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same
time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to
file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory
counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory
counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal
as an affirmative defense in his answer. The latter
option is obviously more favorable to the defendant
although such fact was lost on Forbes Park
- ITC: the ground for dismissal invoked by Forbes Park in
the prior civil case was lack of cause of action. There
was no need to plead such ground in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer since the same was not
deemed waived if it was not pleaded. Nonetheless,
Forbes Park still filed a motion to dismiss and thus
exercised bad judgment in its choice of
remedies. Thus, it has no one to blame but itself for the
 consequent loss of its counterclaim as a result of such
choice
Notes:
- Filing MTD bars setting up the same grounds as a
counterclaim (Rule 9, Sec. 2)
- Better to be declared in default than answering because
a judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for nor award unliquidated damages (Rule 9,
Sec. 3d)
o E.g. of unliquidated damages: ―medical
expenses as may be proved‖
Calo v. Ajax, G.R. No. L-22485, 13 March 1968
- Consuelo Calo ordered 1,200 ft wire rope from Ajax
International but when it was delivered it was short by
300 ft. Calo then wrote letters asking either for
completion of delivery or account adjustment
- A certain Adolofo Benavides filed a complaint with the
MTC Manila, claiming that he acquired the outstanding
credit account of Calo from Ajax. The transaction
involving the wire rope was among the assigned credits
o A judgment by default was entered, and a writ
of execution issued against Calo
o Calo filed petition for certiorari with SC which
set aside the judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings
- Calo filed before CFI a complaint against Ajax asking:
o Ajax to effect complete delivery OR that she
relieved from paying the balance of P855 AND
o Ajax to indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney‘s
fees, damages and expenses of litigation
- Ajax filed MTD otg that the subject matter was intimately
related with the case in the MTC
o CFI sustained the motion and dismissed the
case
HELD: Dismissal by CFI was not proper
- Calo‘s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim because
the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the MTC
Note: According to Sir Lumba, the case should have been
dismissed by the SC because of litis pendentia.
Agustin v. Bacalan, G.R. No. L-46000, 18 March 1985
- Bacalan was a lessee of a one-door ground floor space
in a building administered by petitioner Agustin but she
failed to pay rentals despite repeated demands
- Agustin filed Complaint for ejectment with damages in
the city court
- Bacalan filed an answer including counterclaim alleging:
o That the present action was ―clearly unfounded
and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice
and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff for the
obvious reason that plaintiff pretty well knows
that defendant does not have any rentals in
arrears‖
o That by virtue of the unwarranted and
malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff
against the defendant:
 the latter suffered, and will continue to
suffer, actual and moral damages in
the amount of no less than
P50,000.00;
 P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary
damages.
 In addition, defendant has been
compelled to retain the services of
undersigned counsel to resist
plaintiffs‘ reckless, malicious and
frivolous claim and to protect and
enforce his rights for which he
obligated himself to pay the further
sum of P3,500.00 as attorney‘s fees
- City court dismissed the counterclaim; ordered
respondent to vacate the premises and pay petitioner
- CFI set aside judgment, reversed and ordered petitioner
to pay:
o P10,000 - moral damages
o P5,000 - exemplary damages
o P1,000 - atty‘s fees
- Decision became final and executory → Writ of
execution issued
- Petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of nullity of
decision alleging that CFI‘s exercise of appellate
jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning
because Total relief granted was P16,000 which is
clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu
(city court limited to P10,000 damages)
HELD: CFI decision is NULL AND VOID insofar as it awards
damages on the RESP‘s counterclaim in excess of P6,000.00
beyond its appellate jurisdiction
- Rule: court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a
set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction
- A counterclaim beyond the court‘s jurisdiction may
only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of
which, however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff‘s
claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief
- Legal effect: Party is considered as having voluntarily
waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction Therefore, by presenting his claim voluntarily
before the City Court of Cebu, Bacalan submitted the
same to the jurisdiction of the court → became bound to
P10,000 as the jurisdictional amount
o deemed to have waived the excess of his claim
beyond P10,000.00
- Rule: counterclaim not presented in the inferior court
cannot be entertained in the CFIon appeal
Meliton v CA, 216 S 485 (1992)
- Nelia Ziga filed a complaint before RTC Naga against
Lydia Meliton for rescission of a contract of lease over a
parcel of land for Meliton‘s failure as lessee to deposit
the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals
due; her construction of a concrete wall and roof on the
site of a demolished house on the leased premises
without the lessor‘s written consent; and her
unauthorized sublease of the property to a third party
- Lydia Meliton filed an answer to the complaint denying
the material averments and setting up three
counterclaims
o recovery of the value of her kitchenette
constructed on the leased parcel of land and
which was demolished by private respondent,
in the amount of P34,000
o value of the improvements introduced in the
kitchenette to beautify it, in the amount of
P10,000
o value of the furniture and fixtures purchased for
use in the kitchenette in the amount of P23,000
o moral damages in the amount of P20,000
 o attorney‘s fees of P5,000 and P250 per court
appearance, with litigation expenses in the
amount of P1,000
- RTC: dismissed the complaint on motion of plaintiff Ziga
(cause of action already became moot and academic by
the expiration of the lease); counterclaims were also
dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees
- Meliton filed a complaint against private respondent for
recovery of the same amounts involved and alleged in
her counterclaims in the prior case
- Ziga filed MTD on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by prior judgment
- RTC dismissed motion to dismiss (prior dismissal was
not an adjudication on the merits bec the court did not
acquire jurisdiction bec of failure to pay the docket fees)
- CA: reversed RTC, granted petition
nd
HELD: Meliton is not barred from filing the 2 case
- Contrary to the claim of private respondent, it cannot be
said that herein petitioners failed to duly interpose their
causes of action as counterclaims in the previous action.
Petitioners‘ claims were duly set up as counterclaims in
the prior case but the same were dismissed by reason
of nonpayment of docket fees
- Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject
of a separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter
action pendant or litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the
ground of res judicata, depending on the stage or status
of the other suit
- The present action cannot be dismissed either on the
ground of litis pendentia since there is no other pending
action between the same parties and for the same
cause, nor on the ground of res judicata.
- The first case was dismissed upon motion of private
respondent, plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17.
Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when
otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated
to be with prejudice in the order of the court.
- The order of dismissal of the first case was unqualified,
hence without prejudice and, therefore, does not have
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of
rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim
duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed
but not on the merits thereof.
- In the same order of dismissal of the complaint, the
counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by
reason of the fact that the RTC had not acquired
jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the docket
fees. On that score, the said dismissal was also without
prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata, there having
been no consideration and adjudication of the case on
the merits.
Note: The Meliton case is the precursor of Rule 17, Sec. 2 of
the present Rules of Court.
Rule 17 Sec. 1 v. Rule 17 Sec. 2
Rule 17 Sec. 1: upon dismissal of complaint, counterclaim
will not survive because notice of dismissal was filed before
service of answer (counterclaim is set up in the answer)
Rule 17 Sec. 2: upon dismissal of complaint, counterclaim
may survive
Visayan Packing v. Reparations Commission, G.R. No. L-
29673, 12 November 1987
- Reparations Commission (REPACOM) contracted the
sale of a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and
three (3) filing boats to Visayan Packing (VISPAC) to be
paid in 10 equal yearly installments
- REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder of the first
installment
- Instead of paying, VISPAC filed with CFI a special civil
action for declaratory relief, alleging that its contract with
REPACOM was ambiguous as to the precise time when
the obligation to pay the first installment would arise
- On the other hand, REPACOM filed a complaint for
collection of the first installment
- VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection suit on the
ground of the pendency of the declaratory relief action,
arguing that until and unless the latter were resolved, no
cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of
REPACOM for collection of said first installment
- On the declaratory relief action:
o CFI dismissed, holding that the issues raised
would be necessarily threshed out in the
collection suit
o SC affirmed dismissal of the declaratory relief
suits, holding that the clarity of the terms of the
contract eliminated all occasion for
interpretation thereof
- On the collection suit:
o CFI denied MTD, ordering VISPAC to pay
REPACOM the sum claimed
o CA affirmed CFI
o VISPAC appealed to SC (subject of the present
case)
- Before the SC, VISPAC argued that REPACOM‘s
money claim should have been set up as a compulsory
counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since
REPACOM had not done this, but had instead set it up
in a separate suit, the claim had thereby become barred
HELD: Petition dismissed for lack of merit
- a compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject
of a separate action but should be asserted in the same
suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving
rise to it. The omission is not however irremediable or
irreversibly fatal
o when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
negligence, or when justice requires, he may,
by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or
crossclaim by amendment before judgment
- Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a
separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter
action pendant or litis pendentia, and/or dismissed on
the ground of res adjudicata
o Res adjudicata may be pleaded as a ground for
dismissal on the theory that what is barred by
prior judgment are not only the matters
squarely raised and litigated, but all such other
matters as could have been raised but were
not
- there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a
counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or
contract subject of the complaint
- Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for
collection should have been dismissed and set up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits,
by way of an amended answer. This was not done.
- The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits
instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, and, in the
 light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been
initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and delay the
payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment
of which was decreed in the collection suit
- Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not
inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has
been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial
justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for
breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims
Francisco Motors v. CA, 309 S 72 (1999)
- Francisco Motors filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money
o P3,412.06, representing the balance of the
jeep body purchased by the Manuels
o P20,454.80 for the unpaid balance of the cost
of repair of the vehicle
o P6,000 for cost of suit and attys fees
- Manuels filed an answer with counterclaim for:
o P50,000 for unpaid legal services of Gregorio
Manuel who used to be the Assistant Legal
Officer of PET and he represented members of
the Francisco family (who are incorporators,
directors and members of Francisco motors)
- Francisco Motors failed to answer the counterclaim;
hence, the RTC declared Francisco Motors in default
- RTC ordered Manuel to pay Francisco Motors‘ claim for
money but also allowed Manuel‘s counterclaim
- On appeal to the CA, Francisco Motors argued that:
o RTC didn‘t acquire jurisdiction over it because
no summons was validly served together with
the copy of the answer containing the
permissive counterclaim
o Not a RPI in the permissive counterclaim, but it
is the individual members of the Francisco
family
- CA affirmed RTC
HELD: Petitioner was properly held in default but the
permissive counterclaim should not be granted (without
prejudice to filing the proper suit against the concerned
members of the Francisco family in their personal capacity)
- Nothing in the ROC says that summons should first be
served on the defendant before an answer to
counterclaim must be made
- Purpose of summons: enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
o In the case of counterclaims → the defendant
in the counterclaim, being the plaintiff in the
original complaint, has already submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court
- But the piercing of the corporate veil in this case was not
proper
o Francisco Motors‘ corporate assets could not
be used to answer for the liabilities of its
individual directors, officers, and incorporators
Singapore v. Dakila Trading, 530 S 170 (2007)
- Dakila entered into a Distribution Agreement with
Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd (PEIA). PEIA
appointed Dakila as the sole distributor of its products in
the Philippines
- PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement,
prompting Dakila to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 212, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ
of Attachment
- RTC denied prayer for issuance of writ (MR also denied)
- Dakila then filed Ex Parte Motions for Issuance of
Summons
- An Alias Summons, was issued by the RTC to PEIA. But
the said Alias Summons was served and received by
Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole
proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a
separate and distinct entity from PEIA.
- PEIP filed MTD on the ground that it states no cause of
action. Perkinelmer Asia, on the other hand, through its
counsel, sent letters, to Dakila and to the RTC,
respectively, to inform them of the wrongful service of
summons upon Perkinelmer Asia
- Dakila filed an Ex Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint, together with the Amended Complaint
claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship
owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its
name to Perkinelmer Asia. Being a sole proprietorship of
the petitioner, a change in PEIA‘s name and juridical
status did not detract from the fact that all its due and
outstanding obligations to third parties were assumed by
the petitioner
- Amended complaint was accepted by RTC. It also
deputized Dakila‘s General Manager to serve summons
on petitioner in Singapore. RTC thus issued summons
to petitioner.
- Meanwhile, RTC denied PEIP‘s MTD, compelling the
latter to file its Answer to the Amended Complaint
- PEIP filed with RTC a Special Appearance (Answer ad
cautelam with compulsory counterclaim) and MTD
respondent‘s Amended Complaint based on the
following grounds:
(1) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
ofthe petitioner;
(2) the respondent failed to state a cause of action
against the petitioner because it is not the real party-in-
interest;
(3) even assuming arguendo that the respondent
correctly filed the case against the petitioner, the
Distribution Agreement which was the basis of its claim
grants PEIA the right to terminate the contract at any
time; and
(4) the venue was improperly laid
- RTC denied MTD; affirmed by CA
HELD: counterclaim should not be dismissed
- The action for collection of sum of money and damages
from breach of Distribution Agreement is an action in
personam; the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction by
extraterritorial service of summons
o Petitioner seeks to recover damages and
attorney‘s fees as a consequence of the
unfounded suit filed by Dakila against it. Thus,
petitioner‘s compulsory counterclaim is only
consistent with its position that the respondent
wrongfully filed a case against it and the RTC
erroneously exercised jurisdiction over its
person.
- Distinction must be made in the case as to the
jurisdiction of the RTC over respondent‘s complaint and
over petitioner‘s counterclaim—while it may have no
jurisdiction over the former, it may exercise jurisdiction
over the latter. The compulsory counterclaim attached to
petitioner‘s Answer ad cautelam can be treated as a
separate action, wherein petitioner is the plaintiff while
respondent is the defendant
- Petitioner could have instituted a separate action for the
very same claims but, for the sake of expediency and to
 avoid multiplicity of suits, it chose to demand the same.
Jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter and the
parties in the counterclaim must thus be determined
separately and independently from the jurisdiction of the
same court in the same case over the subject matter
and the parties in respondent‘s complaint
- Since etitioner‘s counterclaim, which is purely for
damages and attorney‘s fees by reason of the
unfounded suit filed by the respondent against it falls
under the classification of compulsory counterclaim, it
must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it is
barred
- The Court orders the dismissal of the Complaint filed by
the respondent against the petitioner because the court
a quo failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
latter.
- Ordinarily, if the court does not have jurisdiction to
entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the
same, then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary
to the principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed
since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief
under the counterclaim
- HOWEVER, if dismissal of a complaint is due to fault
of the plaintiff, it will be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute any pending
counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or
separate action
- While respondent‘s Complaint against petitioner is
already dismissed, petitioner may have very well
already incurred damages and litigation expenses
such as attorney‘s fees since it was forced to
engage legal representation in the Philippines to
protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of the
courts over its person by virtue of the improper service
of summons upon it. Hence, the cause of action of
petitioner‘s counterclaim is not eliminated by the
mere dismissal of respondent‘s complaint
Action in personam v. Action quasi in rem
Action in personam: judgment may be executed on all the
properties of the person
Action quasi in rem: judgment may only be executed on the
property subject of the action
GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, 4 October
2010
- Fernando Caballero obtained a loan from GSIS secured
by a mortgage over his lot with a 2-storey
residential/commercial building
- Defaulted in payment, mortgage foreclosed, Fernando
failed to repurchase within period of redemption
- GSIS scheduled the subject property for public bidding
- Fernando‘s daughter Jocelyn submitted a bid but
Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC)
submitted a higher bid and was awarded the subject
property
- Fernando and Jocelyn filed with the RTC a complaint
against CMTC and GSIS asking for nullification of the
GSIS Resolution awarding the property to CMTC, the
DOAS between GSIS and CMTC, and the registration of
the TCT in the name of CMTC.
o Alleged irregularities in the bidding such as the
misrepresentation by CMTC that it was wholly
Filipino-owned and the lack of authority of
Carmelita Ang Hao as representative of CMTC
- GSIS filed answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim
o Fernando lost right of redemption when he
failed to repurchase the property
o Fernando owed GSIS the rentals that he
unlawfully collected from Carmelita which
should have been paid to GSIS
- RTC ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed the
complaint; also granted GSIS‘ counterclaim and ordered
Fernando to pay the rentals given by Carmelita
- CA affirmed RTC, but deleted the portion ordering
Fernando to pay rentals given by Carmelita
- GSIS appealed to the SC regarding the deletion of the
portion ordering Fernando to pay rentals
o GSIS argues that its counterclaim is in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the
original action filed by Fernando
o Fernando counters that this counterclaim is
merely permissive and failure to pay the
prescribed docket fees results into dismissal of
the claim
HELD: petition denied. CA affirmed
- GSIS‘ counterclaim is permissive because the evidence
needed by Fernando to cause annulment of the award,
DOAS, and TCT, is entirely different from the issue in
the counterclaim which is the entitlement of GSIS to
receive CMTC‘s rentals
- The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees
- ITC: Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC,
insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the
rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered
null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction
is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal
Note: The Court could have applied the Manchester doctrine
in this case. The Manchester doctrine, as amended by the
Sun Insurance doctrine, states that if there is no intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Compulsory counterclaim Permissive counterclaim
Answer not required (Gojo v. Answer required; otherwise,
Goyala) might be held in default
 (Francisco Motors v. CA)
Exempted from filing fees Filing fees required to
acquire jurisdiction
7. Third-party complaint
sections 11, Rule 6
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third
(fourth, etc.) — party complaint is a claim that a defending
party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) — party
defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. (12a)
section 14, RSC
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following
pleadings, motions, and petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the compliant except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement,
or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or
any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
section 19, RSP
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following
pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint
or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment,
or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or
any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
Republic v Central Surety, 25 S 641 (1968)
The Surety executed in favor of the Deportation Board a bond
for the release of Po Kee Nam, a Chinese citizen in a
deportation proceeding. Because the Chinese national failed
to appear in one hearing, the Commissioner of Immigration
informed the Surety of the forfeiture of the bond. Surety filed
a third-party complaint against Po Kee Nam and Tony Go.
HELD: The third-party complaint is an ancillary suit which
depends on the jurisdiction of the court over the main action.
Since the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint, it necessarily follows that it likewise had
jurisdiction over the third-party complaint which is but an
incident thereof. This must be so because jurisdiction over
the main case embraces all incidental matters arising
therefrom and connected therewith. A contrary rule would
result in "split jurisdiction" which is not favored, and in
multiplicity of suits, a situation obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
The third-party complaint is but a continuation of the main
action
- 'where a court has jurisdiction of a claim and the parties
in the principal action, it generally has jurisdiction also of
a suit or proceeding which is a continuation of or
incidental and ancillary to the principal action, even
though it might not have jurisdiction of the ancillary
proceeding if it were an independent and original action
or proceeding. The jurisdiction of the ancillary suit or
proceeding is referrable to or dependent upon the
jurisdiction of the court over the principal suit or
proceeding.
- A third-party complaint cannot be likened to a
counterclaim which must be within the jurisdiction of the
court trying the main case, because unlike a third-party
complaint, a counterclaim 'need not diminish or defeat
the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may
claim itself exceeding in amount or different in kind from
that sought in the opposing party's claim.' (Rule 6, Sec.
6)
- A third-party complaint may likewise be likened to a
cross claim under Rule 9, section 5. The principle is at
once apparent, namely, that where an action is ancillary
to a main action over which a court has jurisdiction, no
independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to
take cognizance of the ancillary action.
Samala v. Victor, G.R. No. L-53969, 21 February 1989
- Three-way vehicular accident: passenger jeepney,
delivery van, and passenger bus, due to the negligence
of the bus driver.
- Main complaint: Passenger sued jeepney owner and
driver.
- Third-party complaint: Jeepney owner and driver sued
bus owner and driver.
- TC held bus owner and driver liable.
- Before the SC, bus owner and driver argued:
o since plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages
against the defendants on a breach of contract
of carriage, they cannot recover from the third-
party defendants on a cause of action based
on quasi-delict
o third party defendants are never parties liable
with respect to plaintiff s claim although they
are with respect to the defendants for
indemnification, subrogation, contribution or
other reliefs. Consequently, they are not
directly liable to the plaintiffs. Their liability
commences only when the defendants are
adjudged liable and not when they are
absolved from liability as in the case at bar
HELD: bus owner and driver liable
 a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by
the defendant either:
(a) on an allegation of liability to the latter;
 (b) on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-, or,
(c) both (a) and (b)
 The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for
contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c)
are subsumed under the catch all "or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim."
 ITC: the third party defendants are brought into the
action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the
allegation that "the primary and immediate cause as
shown by the police investigation of said vehicular
collision was the recklessness and negligence of the
third-party defendant Esguerra, driver of the bus.
 it is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant
be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party
defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff
o it is the third party defendant, and not the
defendant, who is directly liable to plaintiff
 the argument of Samala and Esguerra would properly
pertain to situation (a) above wherein the third party
defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or
subrogation
 on Samala and Esguerra‘s claim that plaintiff who sued
on contractual breach cannot recover on the basis of
quasi-delict:
o as the primary purpose of this rule is to avoid
circuity of action and to dispose of in one
litigation, the entire subject matter arising from
a particular set of fact it is immaterial that the
third-party plaintiff asserts a cause of action
against the third party defendant on a theory
different from that asserted by the plaintiff
against the defendant
o a defendant in a contract action may join as
third-party defendants those liable to him in tort
for the plaintiff s claim against him or directly to
the plaintiff
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No.
161909, 25 April 2012
- Inland Trailways bus was bumped by a Philtranco bus
- Main complaint: Inland bus passenger sued Inland
- Third-party complaint: Inland sued Philtranco
- RTC and CA held Philtranco liable
HELD: In an action for breach of contract of carriage
commenced by a passenger against his common carrier, the
plaintiff can recover damages from a third-party defendant
brought into the suit by the common carrier upon a claim
based on tort or quasi-delict. The liability of the third-party
defendant is independent from the liability of the common
carrier to the passenger
REQUISITES of a THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
(1) The party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to
the action
(2) The claim against the third-party defendant must
belong to the original defendant
(3) The claim of the original defendant against the third-
party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff‘s claim
against the original defendant
(4) The defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-
party defendant the liability asserted against him by
the original plaintiff [PHILTRANCO SERVICES
ENTERPRISES INC V PARAS]
th
There could also be a 4 /etc-party complaint with the same
purpose and function
Pascual v Bautista, 33 S 301 (1970)
● In the Civil Case entitled "Wenceslao Pascual vs.
Pilar Bautista, Primitivo Lovina, Nelly Montilla de
Lovina and Leon Yambao", Bautista filed a third-
party complaint against Mariano R. Flores. Having
failed to answer the third-party complaint, Flores
was declared in default
● after due trial of the whole case, the court rendered
judgment in favor of Pascual and against Bautista. It
ordered Bautista to pay Pascual.
● Judgment was also rendered in favor of Bautista as
third-party plaintiff against Flores, as third-party
defendant
● all parties except third-party defendant Flores,
appealed to CA
● CA affirmed TC; SC affirmed CA
● Bautista secured the corresponding writ to execute
the decision rendered in her favor as third-party
plaintiff, but the writ returned unsatisfied.
● Bautista filed a petition for the examination under
oath of Flores alleging that the latter had
fraudulently disposed of his properties, and, the
court ordered said judgment debtor to appear before
it for examination.
● Upon petition of Flores, however, the court set aside
its order for his examination as well as the writ of
execution on the ground that "more than ten years
had already elapsed since the judgment was
entered, so that no writ of execution of said
judgment can now be issued (Sec. 6, Rule 39 ROC)
● Bautista filed a petition for relief but the same was
denied by the court.
● Bautista filed an action in CFI Manila for the revival
of final judgment.
● Flores answered that judgment already prescribed.
● The SC REVIVED judgment.
ISSUE: Which judgment, that of CFI Manila or that of the SC
affirming the CA decision could be revived as against
appellant
Flores?
Context:
● If CFI, action to revive it is too late --
rendered March 7, 1951
● If SC, action for revival is timely filed. --
rendered April 18, 1956
● Action to revive was filed on November 21,
1961
HELD: None actually applies
● In CFI decision, all parties except third-party
defendant Flores, appealed to CA.
● Flores, therefore, was not affected at all neither by
the decision rendered by the CA nor by the one
subsequently rendered by SC.
● The decision of the CFI Manila was, as far as Flores
was concerned, a judgment by default which, under
the law then in force, was not appealable and was
deemed to be immediately executory. Therefore,
even if Flores had attempted to appeal therefrom,
his appeal would have been out of order.
● It has been argued that, as the judgment by default
against Flores was in favor of Bautista upon her
third-party complaint, the same may not be
considered final or enforceable until the final
determination of the main case— which took place
only upon the finality the SC decision—and that, this
 being so, the action for revival in question was filed
on time.
● This argument might apply if the cause of action
alleged in Bautista's third 'party complaint against
Flores was dependent upon the success or failure of
the claim subject matter of the main action instituted
by Pascual against Bautista. Such, however, is not
the case.
● Bautista's cause of action as third party plaintiff
against third party defendant Flores was based on a
stipulation in their agreement that Bautista will be
entitled to recover from Flores damages in the event
that for any reason whatever, Lovina should refuse
to execute a deed of sale of the fishpond
● The cause of action or claim of Bautista, as third
party plaintiff, against Flores, as third party
defendant, did not depend upon the outcome of the
principal action
● Moreover, it is clear from the provisions of the ROC
that for a claim to be properly raised in a pending
action by way of third party complaint, it is not
necessary that it be one arising from or entirely
dependent upon the main action; it is enough that it
be "in respect" of the claim of third party plaintiff‘s
opponent (Rule 6, Section 12, ROC), or that it be
"connected with plaintiff‘s claim."
● WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting
aside the appealed decision, without costs.
Commissioner of Customs v Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21036,
30 June 1977
- World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (Warvets) was
granted an allocation to purchase reparation goods
- First case (Civil Case No. 34998) → pending in Manila
CFI
o minority suit filed by certain stockholders of
Warvets alleging irregularities in the
management and disposition of the reparation
goods being purchased by the corporation
o They asked for the appointment of receivers
o Two receivers were appointed: Ramon E.
Saura and Macario M. Ofilada
o In the same case, Ofilada was ordered to
deliver to Jose Cochingyan and Susana
Cochingyan the second shipment of goods
under Warvets' allocation, pursuant to the
Cochingyans‘ contract with Warvets regarding
said goods
 An MR of this order was filed and was
still unresolved when the CFI Judge
Francisco Arca ordered that all
resolutions be held in abeyance until
such time that the Court knows the
result of the pending settlement being
negotiated among the parties
- Second case (Civil Case No. 52318) → being tried by
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel
o Ofilada filed a special civil action for
declaratory relief seeking a judicial declaration
as to whether, under the allocation granted to
said Warvets to purchase reparations goods,
the conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of
said goods should be at the rate of two pesos
to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at
the time for payment, which would be much
higher
o The Cochingyans filed an ex-parte motion
asking permission to file a third party complaint
which was forthwith granted.
o On the same day, another motion was filed
asking for immediate admission of the third
party complaint, which likewise, was forthwith
granted.
o The third-party complaint included in the
prayer, among other reliefs, the following:
 Issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ex-parte, without
notice to the other parties, ordering
the third-party defendants
Commissioner of Customs and
Collector of Customs and Reparations
Commission to release the shipment
of goods that were supposed to be
delivered to the third-party plaintiffs
pursuant to their contract with
Warvets
o On the same day, (without hearing the third-
party defendants), an order was issued
granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
o A motion to lift the writ was filed
o Respondent court denied the motion to lift
- Commissioner of Customs filed this Petition for certiorari
and prohibition to annul and set aside orders of
respondent court
HELD: respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
allowing the filing of and in admitting the third-party
complaint of the Cochingyans
- Civil Case No. 52318 was a special civil action for
declaratory relief
o No positive or affirmative, much less any
material relief was sought therein
o it is in the very nature of a 'declaratory relief
special civil action that "the Relief is confined to
a case of actual controversy within the Court's
jurisdiction, without the need of injunction,
execution or other relief beyond the
adjudication of the legal rights which are the
subject of controversy between the parties."
- a third-party complaint is inconceivable when the main
case is one for nothing more than a declaratory relief
o In a third-party complaint, the defendant or
third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief from the third-party defendant is
respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him
- The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in
a third-party complaint in respect to plaintiff's claim is
proper, are:
(a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which
plaintiff's claim is based; or
(b) whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of
another or different contract or transaction, is connected with
plaintiff's claim;
(c) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the
plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff‘s claim
against the original defendant, although the third- party
defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or
(d) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense
which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have, against
plaintiff's claim.
- The present case fails these tests Summons on third (fourth, etc)-party defendants must be
- respondent court also paid no heed to the requirement served for the court to obtain jurisdiction over his person,
that: "Before the service of his answer a defendant may since he is not an original party
move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on
notice to the plaintiff, for leave as third- party plaintiff to ANCILIARY JURISDICTION
file a complaint against a third-party defendant." If court has jurisdiction over main case, it has jurisdiction over
o ITC: the motions of the Cochingyans for leave the third party complaint
to file their third-party complaint and for the  Jurisdiction not cause of action
admission thereof were granted ex parte
notwithstanding that the trial of the case had CLAIM INDEPENDENT ANCILLIARY
already been terminated COUNTERCLAIM ✔
(COMPULSORY)
RD
COUNTERCLAIM ✔
CROSS-CLAIM COUNTERCLAIM 3 PARTY (PERMISSIVE)
COMPLAINT CROSSCLAIM ✔
Against a co-party Against an Against a person (DEFENSIVE OR
opposing party not a party to the OFFENSIVE)
action RD
3 PARTY ✔
Must arise out of May arise out of or Must be in COMPLAINT
the transaction be necessarily respect of the
that is the subject connected with the opponent‘s
matter of the transaction or the (plaintiff‘s) claim
original action or subject matter of D. Intervention
of a counterclaim the opposing
therein party‘s claim Rule 19
(compulsory Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal
counterclaim), or interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
it may not the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
(permissive be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
counterclaim) property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
No need for leave No need for leave Leave of court is may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
of court of court needed The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights
3
RD
PARTY COMPLAINT COMPLAINT IN may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (2[a], [b]a,
INTERVENTION R12)
Brings into the action a 3
rd
Brings into the action a 3
rd Section 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may
person who was not person who was not be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
originally a party originally a party court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached
Initiative is with a non-party to the motion and served on the original parties. (n)
Initiative is with the person
Section 3. Pleadings-in-intervention. — The intervenor shall
already a party to the action who seeks to join the action
file a complaint-in-intervention if he asserts a claim against
either or all of the original parties, or an answer-in-
RD intervention if he unites with the defending party in resisting a
3 PARTY COMPLAINT COUNTERCLAIM
claim against the latter. (2[c]a, R12)
Need not be within the Must be within the Section 4. Answer to complaint-in-intervention. — The
jurisdiction of the court trying jurisdiction of the court trying answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed within
the main case the main case fifteen (15) days from notice of the order admitting the same,
Diminishes/defeats the Need not diminish/defeat the unless a different period is fixed by the court. (2[d]a, R12)
recovery sought by the recovery sought by the
opposing party opposing party section 6, Rule 3
Cannot exceed the amount COMPULSORY: may Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in
stated in the original exceed in amount or be whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
complaint different in kind from that arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
sought in the original alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
complaint alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
PERMISSIVE: The Rules are complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
not as categorical as in the such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
case of compulsory action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to
counterclaims prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which
ADDITIONAL RULES he may have no interest. (6n)
rd
Leave of court to file a 3 -party complaint may be obtained
by motion filed under Rule 15
● Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in a proceeding, becomes a litigant
 therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or
interest which may be affected by such proceeding.
Pleadings-in-Intervention [Sec. 3, Rule 19]
(1) Complaint-in-intervention – If intervenor asserts a claim
against either or all of the original parties.
(2) Answer-in-intervention – If intervenor unites with the
defending party in resisting a claim against the latter.
● Intervention is never an independent action, but is
ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation, and
in subordination to the main proceeding. [Saw v. CA,
G.R. No. 90580 (1991)]
● Its purpose is "to settle in one action and by a single
judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons
involved." [First Philippine Holdings v. Sandiganbayan
(1996), G.R. No. 88345; Rule 19]
When Allowed
Intervention shall be allowed when a person has:
(1) A legal interest in the matter in litigation  sets up a
cause of action
example: when a solidary creditor files a complaint-in-
intervention
(2) A legal interest in the success of any of the parties
 does not require setting up a new cause of action
(the case of Virra Mall Tenants v. Virra Mall should have
applied this theory)
example: when a guarantor files an answer-in-
intervention
(3) An interest against the parties
(4) When he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof.  for
this to apply property must be in the custody of the court
such as when the property has been attached [Sec. 1,
Rule 19; Fernandez v. CA, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-
CA-J (2013)]
● The Court has full discretion in permitting or disallowing
intervention, which must be exercised judiciously and
only after consideration of all the circumstances
obtaining in the case. [Mago v. CA, G.R. No. 115624
(1999)]
● It is not an absolute right as it can be secured only in
accordance with the terms of applicable statute or rule.
[Office of Ombudsman v. Samaniego (2010)]
Legal Interest
● Interest must be of a direct and immediate character so
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be
actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not
be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote,
conjectural, consequential or collateral. [Virra Mall
Tenants v. Virra Mall, G.R. No. 182902 (2011)]
Requisites for a Valid Intervention
(1) There must be a motion for intervention filed before
judgment is rendered by the trial court.
(2) Movant must show in his motion:
(a) That he has a legal interest:
(i) in the matter of litigation,
(ii) in the success of either party in the
action, or
(iii) against both parties.
(b) That the movant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof
(c) That the intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties; and
(d) That the intervenor‘s rights may not be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
How to Intervene
(1) With leave of court, the court shall consider the 2 factors
(2) Motion to intervene may be filed at anytime before
judgment is rendered by trial court
(3) Copy of the pleadings-in-intervention shall be attached to
the motion and served on the original parties
Time to Intervene [Sec. 2, Rule 19]
GENERAL RULE: The motion to intervene must be filed at
any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) With respect to indispensable parties, intervention may be
allowed even on appeal [Falcasantos v. Falcasantos (1952)]
(2) When the intervenor is the Republic [Lim v. Pacquing
(1995)]
(3) Intervention may be allowed after judgment where
necessary to protect some interest which cannot otherwise
be protected, and for the purpose of preserving the
intervenor‘s right to appeal [Pinlac v. CA (2003)]
Remedies for Denial of Motion for Intervention
(1)The movant may file a motion for reconsideration since the
denial of a motion for intervention is an interlocutory order.
(2) Alleging grave abuse of discretion, movant can also file a
certiorari case.
Virra Mall Tenants v. Virra Mall, 2011
● Ortigas & Company is the owner of the Greenhills
Shopping Center (GSC).
● Ortigas and Virra Realty Development Corporation
entered into a Contract of Lease over a portion of the
GSC. Pursuant thereto, Virra Realty constructed a
commercial building, the Virra Mall Shopping Center
● Thereafter, Virra Realty organized Virra Mall Greenhills
Association (VMGA), an association of all the tenants
and leasehold right holders, who managed and
operated Virra Mall.
○ VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the
rights, obligations and liabilities of Virra Realty.
○ VMGA secured two insurance policies to protect
Virra Mall against damage by fire and other causes.
● Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair
and restoration. VMGA thus filed an insurance claim
through the insurance broker, RESP Winternitz
Associates Insurance Company, Inc.
● The President of VMGA, Uy, assigned and transferred
to Virra Mall Tenants Association (VMTA) all his rights
and interests over the property.
● Ortigas filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages and Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment on the grounds of fraud,
misappropriation and conversion of substantial portions
of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use
unrelated to the repair and restoration of Virra Mall
● VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that Note:
upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the services - The court can always make a formal amendment motu
of various contractors who undertook the restoration of proprio
the damaged area of Virra Mall. Hence it sought the - Parties can only make formal amendment as a matter of
reimbursement of the expenses right before responsive pleading (thereafter, upon
● RTC admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention motion)
● Virra Mall filed a MTD the Complaint-in-Intervention on - Court can never make substantial amendment motu
the ground that it stated no cause of action proprio. Only upon motion!
● RTC denied MTD because by filing the same, Virra Mall - Parties can only make substantial amendment as a
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in matter of right before responsive pleading (thereafter,
the Complaint-in-Intervention upon motion)
● CA reversed, granted MTD, dismissed the Complaint-in-
Intervention
Rule 10
○ VMTA failed to state a cause of action
Section 1. Amendments in general. — Pleadings may be
○ VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation
○ Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name
trial of the action, make the issues more of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party
complicated, prejudice the adjudication of the rights or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any
of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy
breadth of the remedies and relief. may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities,
HELD: Complaint-in-Intervention should be admitted and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. (1)
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may
 VMTA has a legal interest in the case, which is rooted in
amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
the alleged failure of VMGA to turn over the insurance
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
proceeds for the restoration and rehabilitation of Virra
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (2a)
Mall, in breach of the latter‘s contractual obligation to
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as
Ortigas
provided in the next preceding section, substantial
VMTA has a cause of action ( not necessarily cause of
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But
action but legal interest  not necessarily legal damage but
such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the
injury if Ortigas wins)
motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court
● VMTA as real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds,
upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon
on the grounds that it had:
motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party,
○ (a) facilitated the repair and restoration of
and an opportunity to be heard. (3a)
the insured infrastructure upon the orders
Section 4. Formal amendments. — A defect in the
of Ortigas, and
designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or
○ (b) advanced the costs thereof
typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court
● Virra Mall has a duty to reimburse it for its expenses
at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion,
since the insurance proceeds had already been
provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
issued in favor of RESP VMGA, even if the latter
(4a)
was not rightfully entitled thereto.
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
VMTA has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the
● VMTA had already advanced substantial amounts
pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. That
parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
VMTA seeks reimbursement from Ortigas is
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
precisely the reason why intervention is proper.
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
● The main issue in the civil case is whether Ortigas
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
has a contractual right to the insurance proceeds
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
received by VMGA.
failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these
○ Thus, the recoupment by VMTA of the
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
expenses it incurred in the repair of Virra
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
Mall depends on the success of either
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
party in the main case.
with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action
VMTA therefore has an undeniable stake in the case that
and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
would warrant its intervention therein.
The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment
to be made. (5a)
VII. Amendments and Supplements
Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such
Amendment - adding or striking out an allegation or the
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental
name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of
pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events
a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought
in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the
to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto
controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to
within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive
supplemental pleading. (6a)
manner
Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. — When any
Supplement - setting forth transactions, occurrences or
pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading,
events which have happened since the date of the pleading
incorporating the amendments, which shall be indicated by
sought to be supplemented.
appropriate marks, shall be filed. (7a)

Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended
pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in
evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged
therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived. (n)
section 7, Rule 18
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-
trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court
shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters
taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall,
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents
of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a,
R20)
How to Amend Pleadings [Sec. 1, Rule 10]
(1) Adding an allegation of a party;
(2) Adding the name of a party;
(3) Striking out an allegation of a party;
(4) Striking out the name of a party;
(5) Correcting a mistake in the name of a party; and
(6) Correcting a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect
● A new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the
amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate
marks, shall be filed. [Sec. 7, Rule 10]
● Purpose: That the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities,
and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
[Sec. 1, Rule 10]
● As a general policy, liberality in allowing amendments is
greatest in the early stages of a law suit, decreases as it
progresses and changes at times to a strictness
amounting to a prohibition. This is further restricted by
the condition that the amendment should not prejudice
the adverse party or place him at a disadvantage.
[Barfel Development v. CA, G.R. No. 98177 (1993)]
AMENDMENTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right, at
any time before a responsive pleading is served, thus:
(1) Amendment of complaint is before an answer is served.
(2) Amendment of answer is before a reply is filed, or before
the period for filing a reply expires, and
(3) Amendment of reply any time within 10 days after it is
served
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading and does
not preclude the exercise of the plaintiff‘s right to amend his
complaint. [Remington Industrial Sales v. CA, G.R. No.
133657 (2002)]
AMENDMENTS BY LEAVE OF COURT
Leave of court is necessary in the following instances:
(1) Further amendments after the party has already amended
his pleading as a matter of right; and
(2) When a responsive pleading has already been served.
Requisites
(1) A motion for leave of court to amend pleading is filed
● Amended pleading should be attached to the motion
[Sec. 9, Rule 15]
(2) Notice is given to the adverse party
(3) Parties are given opportunity to be heard
When amendment may not be allowed
(1) If the cause of action, defense or theory of the case is
changed
(2) If amendment is intended to confer jurisdiction to the
court.
● If the court has no jurisdiction in the subject matter
of the case, the amendment of the complaint cannot
be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction on the court
over the property. [PNB v. Florendo, G.R. No. L-
62082 (1992)]
(3) If amendment is for curing a premature or inexistent
cause of action.
● The cause of action must exist at the time the action
was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an
amendment to introduce a cause of action which
had no existence when the action was commenced.
[Surigao Mine Exploration v. Harris et al, G.R. No. L-
45543 (1939)]
(4) If amendment is for purposes of delay.
FORMAL AMENDMENTS
Instances:
(1)Mere defect in the designation of the parties;
(2) Other clearly clerical or typographical errors
● The formal amendment must not cause prejudice to the
adverse party.
How formal amendments are effected
(1) May be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of
the action
(2) A party may, by motion, call for the formal amendment
AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO OR AUTHORIZE
PRSENTATION OF EVIDENCE [Sec. 5, Rule 10]
This is an instance wherein the court acquires jurisdiction
over the issues even if the same are not alleged in the
original pleadings, where the trial of said issues is with the
express or implied consent of the parties.
What Sec. 5 contemplates
(1) Allows a complaint which failed to state a cause of
action to be cured either by:
(a) Evidence presented without objection or
(b) In the event of an objection sustained by the
court, by an amendment of the complaint with
leave of court
(2) Also allows admission of evidence on a defense not
raised in a motion or answer:
(a) if no objection is made thereto; or
(b) in the event of such objection, upon amendment
of the answer with leave of court
● However, where the plaintiff has no cause of action at
the time of the filing of the complaint, this defect cannot
be cured or remedied in this manner by the acquisition
or accrual of one while the action is pending.
Two Scenarios
(1) No objection to the evidence is raised – amendment of
pleading to conform with the evidence presented
 ● Issues not raised in pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties; they are treated in
all respects as if they had been raised.
● Such amendments as may be necessary to cause
the pleadings to conform to the evidence may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment  for purposes of appeal
● Failure to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of those issues
(2) Objection to the evidence is raised – amendment of
pleading to authorize presentation of evidence
● Objection on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings
● Court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved  even after
pre-trial
● As safeguard, the court may grant a continuance to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
● A pleading which sets forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
[Sec. 6, Rule 10]
● Purpose: To bring into the records new facts which
will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled [Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435
(2012)]
● How Made: Upon motion of a party, with reasonable
notice and upon terms as are just.
● The admission or non-admission of a supplemental
pleading is not a matter of right but is discretionary
on the court.
Amended versus Supplemental Pleadings
Amendments Supplemental pleadings
Reason for amendment is Grounds for supplemental
available at time of the first pleading arose after the filing
pleading of the first pleading
Either as a matter of right or Always by leave of court
by leave of court
Supersedes the original Merely supplements, and
exists side-by- side with the
original
A new copy of the entire Does not require a new copy
pleading must be filed of the entire pleading
Supplemental pleadings are not allowed on separate and
distinct causes of action but a supplemental pleading may
raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to
the original cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
[Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435 (2012)]
EFFECT OF AMENDED PLEADING
(1) An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends
(2)Admissions in the superseded pleading can still be
received in evidence against the pleader (as extrajudicial
admissions)
(3) Claims or defenses alleged therein but not incorporated or
reiterated in the amended pleading are deemed waived [Sec.
8, Rule 10]
Surigao Mine v. Harris, G.R. No. 45543, 17 May 1939
- Surigao Mine Exploration Co. Inc. filed a complaint
asking CFI Surigao to declare them the owner and
possessor of the 14 placer mining claims and to annul
the forty-three lode mining claims of the defendants, C.
Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate. Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., and Otto Weber
- Defendants C. Harris, Surigao Mainit Mining Syndicate,
Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., and Otto Weber
demurred to the complaint on the grounds
(1) that there was a misjoinder of parties in that Otto
Weber had been included as defendant;
(2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, because it merely alleged
that the plaintiff was the owner by purchase of the placer
claims named therein; and
(3) that the complaint was ambiguous and unintelligible.
- CFI Surigao entered an order finding merit in the third
ground of the demurrer and requiring the plaintiff to
amend its complaint so as to contain a detailed
description of its placer claims
- An amended complaint was filed to which another
demurrer was interposed. The CFI overruled the
demurrer and required the defendants to file their
answer within the reglementary period.
- Before the plaintiff could close its evidence, the
defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that, when the action was commenced,
plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued, since,
under its own evidence, the plaintiff did not become the
owner of the claims in dispute until after the original
complaint was filed in the CFI of Surigao
- CFI dismissed the complaint
HELD: dismissal by CFI affirmed
- an action commenced before the cause of action has
accrued is prematurely brought and should be
dismissed, provided an objection on this ground is
properly and seasonably interposed.
- The cause of action must exist at the time the action
was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an
amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no
existence when the action was commenced
- Amendments "must be such, and only such, as are
necessary to promote the completion of the action
begun—all parties necessary for that purpose may
come or be brought into it, and so also, any and all such
amendments may be made as to the cause of action, as
may be necessary to its completeness in all respects.
But neither general principles of practice, nor the statute
providing for amendments, authorize amendments that
reach beyond these purposes
- the court has no authority to allow such amendments as
to parties, or as to the cause of action, as make a new,
or substantially a new action, unless by the consent of
the parties. Indeed, this would not be to amend, in any
proper sense, but to substitute a new action by order, for
and in place of a pending one, which the court cannot
do
- Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of
action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or
accrual of one while the action is pending, and a
supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up
such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible
Gumabay v Baralin, G.R. L-30683, 31 May 1977
- Gumabay sued Baralin in CFI Cagayan to recover
possession of the subject parcel of land; alleging that
the defendants forcibly entered the land
- Defendants filed MTD: inasmuch as it alleged a cause of
action for forcible entry, the CFI had no jurisdiction
- Gumabay filed an amended complaint wherein she
alleged that the defendants claimed to be the owners of
the land. She transformed her forcible entry action into
an action to quiet title
- CFI admitted the amended complaint, ordered the
defendants to answer it, and denied the MTD
- Defendants were eventually declared in default
- CFI declared Gumabay the owner of the land and
ordered the defendants to vacate it, restore its
possession to her, and to pay her damages
- Before SC, defendants argued: the lower court erred in
not dismissing the original complaint, in admitting the
amended complaint, in assuming that it acquired
jurisdiction over their persons on the basis of the
amended complaint even without service of new
summons, in declaring them in default, and in not
granting them relief from the judgment by default
HELD: Petition DENIED
- The original complaint for forcible entry contained the
basic prayer ―that the plaintiff be declared the absolute
owner of the land in question‖. That relief was retained
in the amended complaint. The only difference between
the original and amended complaints is that the latter
contained the additional allegation that the ―defendants
are now asserting and claiming title and absolute
ownership over the land in question which is adverse
and against the interest of the plaintiff‖.
- The plaintiff explained that she had to amend her
complaint in order that the ―real matter in dispute‖, which
is ―the question of ownership‖, may be ―determined in a
single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits‖
- CFI‘s order admitting the amended complaint is in
consonance with the object of the Rules of Court to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
- To dismiss the original complaint and to require the
plaintiff to file another action to quiet title would have
resulted in a circuitous, dilatory and expensive
proceeding which, in the case of a pauper litigant like
Celestina Gumabay, should have been avoided, as it
was prudently avoided by the trial court.
Note: Notwithstanding the ruling in Gumabay v. Baralin, the
rule now is that amendment cannot cure the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (Sante v. Claravell, 2010)
Remington v. CA, G.R. No. 133657, 29 May 2002
- Remington Industrial Sales Corporation filed a complaint
for sum of money and damages arising from breach of
contract before Manila RTC. Principal defendant was
Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH
(Ferro) and British Steel as alternative defendants.
- ISL and British Steel separately filed MTD otg of failure
to state cause of action
- RTC denied MTD
- ISL then filed its answer to the complaint
- On the other hand, British Steel filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA. It claimed that
the complaint did not contain a single averment that
British Steel committed any act or is guilty of any
omission in violation of petitioners legal rights
- Remington sought to amend its complaint by
incorporating therein additional factual allegations
constitutive of its cause of action against British Steel
- RTC noted the amended complaint and further
proceedings are held in abeyance until final resolution
by the CA
- CA granted the writ of certiorari and ordered RTC to
dismiss without prejudice the Complaint
HELD:
- Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a
matter of right before a responsive pleading is served
- This right granted to the plaintiff to amend the complaint
before an answer has been served is not precluded by
the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency
- The fact that the other defendants below has filed their
answers to the complaint does not bar petitioners
right to amend the complaint as against British Steel
- Where some BUT NOT ALL the defendants have
answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as
to claims asserted against the other defendants.
Leobrera v. CA, G.R. No. 80001, 27 Feb 1989
- Leobrera obtained a credit facility from BPI secured by
two real estate mortgages
- Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate three-year
term loan also secured with a real estate mortgage
- Leobrera failed to settle his loans under the credit facility
thus BPI prepared to foreclose the real estate
mortgages securing the same. Before BPI could institute
foreclosure proceedings however, Leobrera filed
complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI
from foreclosing the mortgages
- Meanwhile, bank wrote Leobrera claiming that he failed
to pay the amortization due on the three-year term loan,
as a result of which, BPI opted to accelarate the maturity
of the loan and called the entire loan due and
demandable. Leobrera likewise failed to remit the
amount due and BPI thus threatened to foreclose the
real estate mortgage securing the loan
- Before BPI can foreclose, petitioner filed with the trial
court a ―Motion to File Supplemental Complaint,‖
attaching thereto the supplemental complaint which
prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI
from foreclosing the third mortgage
- Motion granted by RTC
- BPI filed pet. for certiorari before CA
- CA granted BPI‘s petition
HELD: CA affirmed. RTC committed GAD in admitting the
supplemental complaint
- As to the supplemental complaint, the matters involved
therein are entirely different from the causes of action
mentioned in the original complaint. A supplemental
complaint should, as the name implies, supply only
deficiencies in aid of an original complaint. It should
contain only causes of action relevant and material to
the plaintiff‘s right and which help or aid the plaintiff‘s
right or defense
- The supplemental complaint must be based on matters
arising subsequent to the original complaint related to
 the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on
the same cause of action. It cannot be used to try a new
matter or a new cause of action
- ITC: the main action in the original complaint concerned
BPI‘s threat to foreclose 2 real estate mortgages
securing the first credit facility obtained by Leobrera
- The supplemental complaint on the other hand alleged
acts of harassment committed by BPI in unreasonably
opting to declare petitioner in default and in demanding
full liquidation of the three-year term loan. This three-
year term loan, as previously mentioned, was entirely
distinct and separate
- The two causes of action being entirely different, the
latter one could not be successfully pleaded by
supplemental complaint
Note:
Sir Lumba thinks that the SC might have made a mistake in
this case because a supplemental complaint is essentially a
joinder which allows unrelated causes of action if the parties
are the same.
Supplemental Complaint v. Joinder
Joinder: none of them are after-acquired
Supplemental Complaint: may include after-acquired
causes of action
Supplemental Complaint v. Amendment
Amendment: only omitted causes of action may be set up
Supplement: must be after-acquired
Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings &
Development Corp., G.R. No. 153777, 15 April 2005
- LZK obtained loan from Planters; secured by real estate
mortgage over AGZ Building
- For non-payment of loan, non-compliance with the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Assignment, and failure to
comply with the conditions of the promissory notes,
Planters caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage; property sold to Planters as highest
bidder
- LZK filed with Makati RTC a complaint against the
Planters for ―Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure,
Mortgage Contract, Promissory Notes and for Damages‖
- just before the scheduled pre-trial, the LZK filed a
―Motion for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint‖ to
cover occurrences subsequent to the original complaint
○ alleged that after the filing of the original
complaint, it agreed in principle to enter
into a contract of lease with a prospective
lessee, AMA Computer College, over three
floors of AGZ Building but the lessee
required LKZ to first secure Planters‘
consent. However, the latter gave
unreasonable conditions in its reply,
prompting AMA Computer College to back-
out from the contract of lease
○ Planters wrote other tenants demanding
that they directly remit their respective
rentals to it
o Planters, which was leasing a space in the
same building for its branch, had ceased
paying its rentals
- Planters opposed the supplemental complaint: matters
involved therein would bring into the case new causes of
action, distinct from those mentioned in the original
complaint
- RTC admitted supplemental complaint
- CA affirmed RTC
HELD: CA affirmed; admit supplemental complaint
- the issue as to whether the petitioner stopped the
payment of rentals and the application thereof on the
perceived loan deficiency of the respondent, is a new
matter that occurred after the filing of the original
complaint. However, the relief for damages, the
collection of the rentals and the application thereof by
the petitioner to the perceived loan deficiency of the
respondent are germane to, and are in fact, intertwined
with the cause of action of nullification of the real estate
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof, as
well as the sale at public auction
- By its supplemental complaint, the respondent merely
enlarged its original causes of action on account of
events that transpired after the filing of the original
complaint and prayed for additional reliefs. The principal
and core issues raised by the parties in their original
pleadings remain the same. There is no showing on
record that the petitioner would be prejudiced by the
admission of the supplemental complaint.
Lambino v. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. 169551, 14 Jan
2007
- Lambino entered a Mortgage Loan Agreement with BPI
- Lambino failed to pay amortizations
- BPI filed petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
- Lambino filed complaint for annulment of the MLA and
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
- Parties tried to settle amicably
- BPI furnished Lambino with statements of their account
- Lambino objected to the damages included by BPI in the
statement of account
- Lambino filed Motion to Admit their Supplemental
Complaint alleging that he was forced to litigate due to
the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage
filed by BPI and unlawful imposition of escalating and
arbitrary rate of interest without the consent of the
plaintiffs which Lambino only found about during pretrial
- RTC and CA denied motion
HELD: deny motion to admit supplemental complaint
- Before they filed their original complaint, PET were
already aware of the deductions made on the proceeds
of the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire
insurance premium. They received notices on the
following dates
o because PET had alleged all these charges in
the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it
behooved PET to have incorporated in their
original complaint as a cause of action the
alleged illegal/unauthorized and
unconscionable charges for MRI, escalating
interest charges, liquidated damages, attorneys
fees, and foreclosure expenses.
- They should have sought to nullify such charges in
the original complaint, but they did not. They are
thus proscribed from incorporating the same via a
supplemental complaint.
Note: Sir Lumba thinks that what Lambino was actually
asking for was an amendment of the complaint
Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, 13 August 2012
- petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for partition,
accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and
Panfila
o they averred that the 43 parcels of land
originally owned by spouses Baylon were
possessed by Rita who appropriated for herself
all the income from said properties and bought
two other properties using said income
o Rita, Florante and Panfila denied this (only 22
parcels were co-owned and the others were
individually owned)
- During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed
of Donation conveyed 2 properties to Florante and
subsequently died
- petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading praying that
the said donation in favor of the respondent be
rescinded because it was executed without their
competent judicial authority (since it refers to the parcels
of land in litigation without the knowledge and approval
of the plaintiffs or of the Court)
- RTC declared co-ownership and partition of the subject
properties and rescinded the donation inter vivos
- CA reversed the RTC‘s rescission of the Deed of
Donation and remanded the same to the RTC
o before the petitioners may file an action for
rescission, they must first obtain a favorable
judicial ruling that said properties actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon
HELD: RTC decision rescinding Deed of Donation is
reinstated
- While a matter stated in a supplemental complaint
should have some relation to the cause of action set
forth in the original pleading, the fact that the
supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of
action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a
matter that may be considered by the court in the
exercise of its discretion. In such cases, we stressed
that a broad definition of ―cause of action‖ should be
applied.
- ITC: the donation inter vivos made by Rita in favor of
Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners‘
prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos
in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in
fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition
case.
o The petitioners‘ supplemental pleading merely
amplified the original cause of action
o the principal issue raised by the petitioners in
their original complaint remained the same.
Pre-existing After-acquired
Related AMENDMENT SUPPLEMENT
Unrelated AMENDMENT NA
Son v. Son, 251 S 556 (1995)
● Private respondents are the children and heirs of the
late spouses Pedro Son, who died sometime in
November 1957 and Marcelina Tudtud who died on 2
January 1972.
● Petitioners are the heirs of Anastacio Son, brother of
Pedro Son.
● During his lifetime, Pedro Son inherited from his parents
Juan Son and Susana Perilla a parcel of land located at
Caputatan Norte, Medellin, Cebu containing an area of
two (2) hectares and seven (7) centares.
● Sometime in 1972, upon discovery that a portion of said
land, 6,324 square meters to be exact, was being
occupied by petitioners, private respondents demanded
that the latter return the land to their possession.
● Petitioners refused and claimed that they owned the
said portion as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed by Pedro Son on 5 November 1957
● Private respondents filed a complaint with the CFI Cebu
for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 5
November 1957 on grounds of forgery and for recovery
of real property.
● During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
limit the issue to the validity or invalidity of the deed of
absolute sale
● TC: rendered DOAS null and void; ordered petitioners to
return land to respondents
● Petitioners filed MR insisting that by virtue of an earlier
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, wherein Pedro
Son allegedly sold to petitioners one-half (1/2) of the
land he inherited but with a right to repurchase within
one (1) year, petitioners acquired ownership thereof for
failure of Pedro Son to redeem the same within the
period stipulated.
● TC: reversed earlier decision (resps‘ MR DENIED)
● CA: upheld ruling that DOAS is null and void
HELD: The parties are not bound by the delimitation of
issues in the Pre-trial order
● A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue
of each and every issue that is to be or may be taken up
during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included
therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary
implication are as much integral parts of the pretrial
order as those that are expressly stipulated.
● The case at bar falls under this particular exception.
Contrary to private respondents‘ contention, petitioners
did not raise the issue of the 1951 Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase only in their motion for
reconsideration before the trial court.
● They also categorically stated it In their answer to
private respondents‘ original complaint.
● Private respondents‘ failure to raise any objection (a)
when petitioners presented in evidence the 1951 Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase; (b) when petitioners‘
counsel vigorously cross-examined respondent Teofista
Son Arcipe on the aforementioned deed; and (c) when
Anastacio Son testified on said document, constitutes
an implied assent on the part of respondents to
depart from the issue contained in the pre-trial
order.
● Private respondents‘ implied consent to try the issue
was further demonstrated by their own counsel‘s
extensive cross-examination of petitioners‘ witness
Anastacio Son regarding both the 1951 Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase and the 1957 Deed of
Absolute Sale.
● Private respondents cannot claim that they were not
adequately prepared to meet petitioners‘ defense. They
were simply not ―caught in surprise.‖ On the other hand,
they had every opportunity to present rebuttal or
counterevidence on the issue.
Note: Son v. Son is an example of amendment of pleading to
conform with the evidence
 4. Any other
VIII. Filing & Service of Pleadings 5. Voluntary Appearance

Filing Service Service of Service of

of Judgment Summons A. Modes of filing
Pleading
section 2-4, 11-12, Rule 13
Personal X X X X
Section 2. Filing and service, defined. — Filing is the act of
Registered X X X
presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Mail
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
Ordinary X pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by
Mail counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or
Substitution X X one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered
Publication X X by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties,
Any X he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served
upon him by the opposite side. (2a)
Notes: Section 3. Manner of filing. — The filing of pleadings,
Ways to file appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all
1. Personal – to clerk of court other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies
2. Registered Mail (same as registered mail in service thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of
of pleading) court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case,
the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and
Ways to serve pleading hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
1. Personal motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or
a. Hand (1) deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope
i. Party or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their
ii. Counsel filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be
b. Office (1) - leaving it in his office with his attached to the record of the case. (1a)
clerk or with a person having charge Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. — Every
thereof. judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the
c. Residence (2) - If no person is found in his complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer
office, or his office is not known, or he has of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and
no office, then by leaving the copy, served upon the parties affected. (2a)
between the hours of eight in the morning Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. —
and six in the evening, at the party's or Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and
counsel's residence, if known, with a other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to
person of sufficient age and discretion then papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes
residing therein  must understand must be accompanied by a written explanation why the
English and the import of the document service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this
given Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. (n)
 GR: if there is counsel, always serve to counsel Section 12. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or paper
 EX: if the rules provide otherwise or if ordered by court shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it
(e.g. Rule 25 Sec. 1 – Interrogatories to Parties) is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed
2. Registered Mail (1) - made by depositing the copy in personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or
the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on
addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry
known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing,
postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to
(10) days if undelivered the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to
3. Ordinary Mail (2) - If no registry service is available the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10)
in the locality of either the senders or the addressee days if not delivered. (n)
4. Substituted service (last resort)

Ways to serve a judgment FILING VERSUS SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

1. Personal (1) – same manner in serving pleading ● Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other
2. Registered mail (1) - same manner in serving paper to the clerk of court. [Sec. 2, Rule 13]
pleading ● Service is the act of providing a party or his counsel
3. Publication (2) – only if party summoned by with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned.
publication failed to appear in the action, judgments, [Sec. 2, Rule 13]
final orders or resolutions
Papers required to be filed and served: [Sec. 4, Rule 13]
Ways to serve summons 1. Pleading subsequent to the complaint;
1. Personal (1) 2. Appearance;
2. Substituted 3. Written Motion;
a. Office (1) 4. Notice;
b. Residence (1) 5. Order;
3. Publication 6. Judgment;
 7. Demand; Filing by Registered Mail [Sec. 3, Rule 13]
8. Offer of Judgment; ● Filing by mail should be through the registry service
9. Resolution; (i.e. by depositing the pleading in the post office).
10. Similar papers. ● Deemed filed on the date it was deposited with the
post office, as shown by the post office stamp on the
PERIODS OF FILING OF PLEADINGS envelope or the registry receipt.
Period Reckoning point ● NOTE: Filing a pleading by facsimile is not
sanctioned. But fax was allowed in an extradition
Answer to the complaint
case [Justice Cuevas v. Juan Antonio Muoz (2000)]
General rule: Within 15 days Service of summons, unless
a different period is fixed by Filing by Private Carrier
the court [Sec. 1, Rule 11] If a party avails of a private carrier, the date of the court‘s
Foreign private juridical entity Receipt of summons [Sec. 2, actual receipt of the pleading (not the date of delivery to the
defendant, summons through Rule 11] private carrier) is deemed to be the date of the filing of that
government official: Within pleading. [Benguet Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, G.R. No.
30 days 89070 (1992)]
Non-resident defendant, with Service of extrajudicial
extraterritorial service of summons [Sec. 15, Rule 14]
summon: reasonable time B. Modes of service
not less than 60 days set by
section 5-10, 13, Rule 13
court
Section 5. Modes of service. — Service of pleadings
motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall
Answer to the amended complaint be made either personally or by mail. (3a)
Section 6. Personal service. — Service of the papers may be
Amendment was matter of Service of a copy of the
made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his
right: Within 15 days amended complaint
counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a
Amendment not matter of Notice of the order admitting
person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his
right: Within 10 days the same [Sec 3, Rule 11]
office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by
Answer to Counterclaim or Cross-Claim leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning
Within 10 days From service [Sec. 4, Rule and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if
11] known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then
residing therein. (4a)
Answer to third (fourth, etc)-party complaint Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail
Within 15 days Same rule as answer to the shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office in a
complaint [Sec. 5, Rule 11] sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if
Reply known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
Within 10 days From service of the pleading postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days
responded to [Sec. 6, Rule if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality
11] of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done
by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
Answer to supplemental complaint Section 8. Substituted service. — If service of pleadings,
Within 10 days From notice of the order motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot
admitting the same, unless a be made under the two preceding sections, the office and
different period is fixed by place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown,
the court service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of
court, with proof of failure of both personal service and
Extension of Time to Plead service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such
Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court delivery. (6a)
may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules. The Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions.
court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other — Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served
pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. [Sec. either personally or by registered mail. When a party
11, Rule 11] summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action,
judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be
served upon him also by publication at the expense of the
MANNER OF FILING prevailing party. (7a)
Personal Filing Section 10. Completeness of service. — Personal service is
● By personally presenting the original copy of the complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is
pleading, notice, appearance, motion, order, or complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing,
judgment to the clerk of court. [Sec. 3, Rule 13] unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered
● Deemed filed upon the receipt of the same by the mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
clerk of court who shall endorse on it the date and after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of
hour of filing. the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (8a)
Section 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service
shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and Filing by registered mail
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof On the date the pleading was (1) Registry receipt, and
thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of deposited with the post office (2) Affidavit of the person
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If who did the mailing
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing In the case of filing by registered mail, when the paper does
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon not appear in the record, the affidavit of the person who did
its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed the mailing must contain:
letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. (10a) (1) A full statement of the date and place of depositing the
mail in the post office
section 1, Rule 25 (2) The fact that the paper was in a sealed envelope
Section 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. — Under addressed to the court
the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any (3) The fact that postage was fully paid
party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any (4) The fact that there were instructions to the postmaster to
adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written return the mail to the sender after 10 days if undelivered
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership
or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in Completeness of service Proof of service [Sec. 13,
its behalf. (1a) [Sec. 10, Rule 13] Rule 13]
section 1, Rule 26
Section 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues Personal service
have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other Upon actual delivery (1) Written admission of the
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the party served; or
genuineness of any material and relevant document (2) Official return of the
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of server; or
any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the (3) Affidavit of the party
request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the serving, with a full statement
request unless copy have already been furnished. (1a) of the date/place/manner of
service.
Service of Judgments, Final Orders, or Resolutions Service by ordinary mail

Service is done either: 10 days after mailing, unless Affidavit of person mailing of
(1) Personally otherwise provided by the facts showing compliance
(2) By registered mail court with Sec. 7 of Rule 13.
(3) By publication, if: Service by registered mail
(a)A party is summoned by publication; and
(b)Such party failed to appear in the action Whichever is earlier of: (1) Affidavit of person mailing
(1) Actual receipt by the showing compliance as
NOTE: There is NO substituted service of judgments and addressee; or above; and
final orders. (2) 5 days after addressee (2) Registry receipt issued by
received postmaster's notice the post office
PRIORITIES IN MODES OF SERVICE AND FILING Substituted Service
GENERAL RULE: Personal filing and service is preferred.
[Sec. 11, Rule 13] At the time of delivery of the copy to the clerk of court
together with proof of failure of both personal service and
Resort to other modes of filing and service must be service by mail
accompanied by an explanation why the service/filing was not
done personally. If there is no written explanation, the paper Duties of sender when service is effected by registered
is considered not filed. mail:
(1)The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
Exception: Papers emanating from the court. receipt by the sender; or
(2) The unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn
COMPLETENESS AND PROOF OF FILING copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee
GENERAL RULE: The filing of a pleading or paper is proved shall likewise be filed immediately. [Sec. 13, Rule 13]
by its existence in the record of the case [Sec. 12, Rule 13]
EXCEPTION: When the pleading or paper is not in the Service to the lawyer binds the party. But service to the
record, its filing may be proved as shown below party does not bind the lawyer, unless ordered by the
court in the following circumstances:
Completeness of Filing Proof of filing [Sec. 12, (1) When it is doubtful who the attorney for such party is; or
[Sec. 3, Rule 13] Rule 13] (2) When the lawyer cannot be located; or
(3) When the party is directed to do something personally, as
Personal filing when he is ordered to show cause. [Retoni, Jr. v. CA,
Upon receipt by the clerk of Written or stamped G.R. No. 96776 (1993)]
court acknowledgment by the clerk
of court
Notice to the lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice
to his client, as it would then be easy for the lawyer to
prejudice the interests of his client by just alleging that he just
forgot every process of the court affecting his clients,
because he was so busy. [Bayog v. Natino, G.R. No. 118691
(1996)]
1. Personal
(1) Delivering personally a copy to the party, who is not
represented by a counsel, or to his counsel; or
(2) Leaving a copy in counsel‘s office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof; or
(3) Leaving the copy between 8am and 6pm at the party‘s or
counsel‘s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age
and discretion then residing thereon – if not person is found
in his office, or if his office is unknown, or if he has no office
2. Mail
(1)Ordinary Mail - it does not constitute filing until the papers
are actually delivered into the custody of clerk or judge
(a) Service may be done by ordinary mail if no
registry service is available in the locality of either
sender or addressee
(2) Registered Mail - The date of mailing is the date of filing
(a)Date of filing is determinable from 2 sources:
(i) From the post office stamp on the
envelope
(ii) From the registry receipt
(b)It is done by depositing in the post office:
(c) In a sealed envelope
(d) Plainly addressed to the party or his counsel
(i) At his office if known
(ii) Otherwise, at his residence if known
(e) Postage fully pre-paid
(f) With instructions to the postmaster to return the
mail to the sender after 10 days if undelivered
3. Substituted
Done by delivery of the copy to the clerk of court with proof of
failure of both personal and service by mail
Proper only when:
(1) Service cannot be made personally or by mail
(2) Office and place of residence of the party or his counsel
being unknown
Service is complete at the time of such delivery.
4. Publication
Solar v Ricafort, G.R. No. 132007, 5 August 1998
● Solar Entertainment [PET] filed before Paranaque RTC
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with prayer for a writ of replevin vs. Felix Co, Jeffrey Cal
and King Cuisia [RESP]
● RESP filed their ―Answer (with Counterclaims)‖. A copy
thereof was furnished counsel for PET by registered
mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written
explanation as to why service was not made personally,
as required by Section 11 of Rule 13
● PET filed a motion to expunge the ―Answer (with
Counterclaims)‖ and to declare RESP in default. There
was no valid reason for not serving personally (distance
of counsels‘ offices only 20m away, post office was
even farther)
● public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an
order stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13 ―it is
within the discretion of the [trial court] whether to
consider the pleading as filed or not,‖ and denying, for
lack of merit, petitioner‘s motion to expunge the ―Answer
(with Counterclaims)‖ and to declare private
respondents in default
HELD: Judge Ricafort did not commit GAD
● Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion
to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other
modes of service or filing were resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal
service was not done in the first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the
clause ―whenever practicable.‖
● personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort
to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with
● In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.
● proximity would seem to make personal service most
practicable, but exceptions may nonetheless apply. For
instance, where the adverse party or opposing counsel
to be served with a pleading seldom reports to office
and no employee is regularly present to receive
pleadings, or where service is done on the last day of
the reglementary period and the office of the adverse
party or opposing counsel to be served is closed, for
whatever reason.
● ITC: the proximity between the offices of opposing
counsel was established; moreover, the office of private
respondents‘ counsel was ―ten times farther‖ from the
post office than the distance separating the offices of
opposing counsel. Private respondents‘ counsel violated
Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was
prima facie meritorious
● BUT: the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only
on 1 July 1997, while the questioned ―Answer (with
Counterclaims)‖ was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on
the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules.
Hence, private respondents‘ counsel may not have
been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications
of Section 11, Rule 13.
● instant petition is DISMISSED considering that while the
justification for the denial of the motion to expunge the
―Answer (with Counterclaims)‖ may not necessarily be
correct, yet, for the reasons above stated, the violation
of Section 11 of Rule 13 may be condoned
IX. Service of Summons
section 1(c), Rule 16
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
section 4, Rule 46
Section 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how
acquired. — The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (n)
section 7, Rule 24
Section 7. Depositions pending appeal. — If an appeal has
been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of
Appeals in proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if
the time therefor has not expired, the court in which the
judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions
of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for in the event of
further proceedings in the said court. In such case the party
who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion
in the said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the
same notice and service thereof as if the action was pending
therein. The motion shall state (a) the names and addresses
of the persons to be examined and the substance of the
testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and (b) the
reason for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that
the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure
or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the
deposition to be taken, and thereupon the depositions may
be taken and used in the same manner and under the same
conditions as are prescribed in these Rules for depositions
taken in pending actions. (7a, R134)
A. Modes of service
1. Personal
section 6, Rule 14
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him. (7a)
2. Substituted
section 7, Rule 14
Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March
2004
● RESP Sps Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856
to Dr. Clarence Yujuico.
● Mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the
properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988
● Before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses
Trocino sold the property to PET Sps Fortunato and
Aurora Gomez on December 12, 1989, who in turn,
redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico.
● The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey
ownership of the properties to PET, hence, the
complaint for specific performance and/or rescission
● RTC‘s Process Server served summons on RESP
through RESP Caridad Trocino (mother of RESPs)
● RESP filed their Answer verified by RESP Caridad
● RTC ruled in favor of PET, ordered RESPs to execute a
Deed of Sale in favor of the PET and to deliver the
owner‘s duplicate copies of TCTs
● RESP Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed petition for the
annulment of the judgment rendered by RTC, alleging
that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as
they were not validly served with a copy of the
summons and the complaint. At the time summons was
served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio,
U.S.A., and has been residing there for 25 years, while
Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been
residing there since 1986. They refuted the receipt of
the summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and the
representation made by Atty. Bugarin in their behalf.
● CA granted petition for annulment of judgment, annulled
decision of RTC Cebu
HELD: When the process server personally served the
summons on Caridad Trocino, the trial court validly acquired
jurisdiction over her person alone. Hence, the trial court‘s
decision is valid and binding with regard to her, but only in
proportion to Caridad Trocino‘s share
ACTIONS IN PERSONAM ACTIONS IN REM/QUASI IN
REM
summons on the defendant jurisdiction over the person
must be served by handing a of the defendant is NOT a
copy thereof to the defendant prerequisite to confer
in person, or, if he refuses to jurisdiction on the court
receive it, by tendering it to provided that the court
him. (R14.7) acquires jurisdiction over the
If efforts to find the defendant res, although summons must
personally makes prompt be served upon the
service impossible, defendant in order to satisfy
substituted service may be the due process
effected requirements
ITC: since the case is an action in personam because it is an
action against persons on the basis of their personal liability,
personal service of summons upon the RESPs is
essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction
over their persons
Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed
against respondents were rendered without jurisdiction
as there was neither a proper service of summons nor
was there any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial
court‘s jurisdiction. Hence, the same is void, with regard to
private respondents except Caridad Trocino
Notes:
Technique when some co-owners are abroad: have their
properties attached to convert the in personam action into
quasi in rem
Philam Life v. Breva, G.R. 147937, 11 November 2004
- respondent Milagros Morales filed a complaint for
damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums.
Complaint stated that petitioner could be served with
 summons and other court processes thru its Manager at
its branch office in Davao City
- Summons served upon Philam‘s Davao office and
received by Insurance Service Officer
- Philam filed MTD otg of lack of jurisdiction over its
person due to improper service of summons. The
employee who received was not among those
enumerated in Rule 14, RoC
- Morales filed amended complaint alleging that summons
may also be served at Philam‘s principal office in Manila
- RTC denied MTD and directed service of alias
summons in Manila (improper service of summons not
ground for dismissal because case is still in its initial
stage)
- CA held that the service of alias summons vested the
RTC with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
HELD:
- An alias summons may be served in case of wrongful
service of summons
- ITC, complaint was amended after the petitioner filed
the motion to dismiss.
- Where the defendant has already been served
summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of
another summons. But if no summons yet been validly
served on the defendant, new summons for the
amended complaint must be served on him
- ITC, since at the time the complaint was amended no
summons had been properly served on the petitioner
and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons
should have been issued on the amended complaint.
SO, the TC should have ordered the service of an
original summons, not an alias summons (which is just a
continuation of an original summons)
- Nonetheless, alias vs. original = mere nomenclature
Note:
- The ruling in Philamlife is the exact opposite of the
ruling in Manotoc. But Sir Lumba thinks that the
Philamlife ruling should be followed.
- MTD for lack of jurisdiction over the person is only
applicable among others if foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines
Manotoc v. CA, G.R. No. 130974, 16 August 2006
- PET Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc is the defendant in a civil
case entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of
the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda ‗Imee‘ R.
Marcos-Manotoc for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment
- RESP Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign
court‘s judgment in US District Court of Honolulu,
Hawaii, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos for wrongful death
of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under
the command of Manotoc
- trial court issued a Summons addressed to PET at
Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the
Complaint were allegedly served upon Macky de la
Cruz, an alleged caretaker of PET at the condominium
unit. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial
court declared her in default.
- PET, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted
service of summons
HELD: There was no valid substituted service of
summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
- There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why
efforts to serve summons on Manotoc proved
inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal
service has become impossible or unattainable
- Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff
must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate
the defendant through more direct means
- The narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant and the fact of failure written in broad
and imprecise words will not suffice
- The facts and circumstances should be stated with
more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of
the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for
failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily
show the efforts undertaken
- ADDED TO THIS, the Court ruled that the requirements
of (1) being a person of suitable age and discretion; and
(2) that the recipient must reside in the house or
residence of the defendant; were NOT MET in serving
the summons to the caretaker
3. Publication
section 14, Rule 14
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,
be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such time as
the court may order. (16a)
section 1(f), Rule 57
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At
the commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (1a)
4. Extraterritorial
sections 12, 15-16, Rule 14
Section 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities. —
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines. (14a)
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to,
or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer. (17a)
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. —
When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section. (18a)
section 1(f), Rule 57
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At
the commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (1a)
sections 123, 128, 133, Corporation Code
Section 123. Definition and rights of foreign corporations. -
For the purposes of this Code, a foreign corporation is one
formed, organized or existing under any laws other than
those of the Philippines and whose laws allow Filipino
citizens and corporations to do business in its own country or
state. It shall have the right to transact business in the
Philippines after it shall have obtained a license to transact
business in this country in accordance with this Code and a
certificate of authority from the appropriate government
agency. (n)
Section 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The
Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact
business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that
such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a written power of attorney designating some
person who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom
any summons and other legal processes may be served in all
actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation,
and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall
be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly
authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home
office. Any such foreign corporation shall likewise execute
and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an
agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities
of said corporation, in form and substance as follows: "The
(name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and
agree, in consideration of its being granted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in
the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall
cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be
without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in
any action or proceeding arising out of any business or
transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal process may be made upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service
shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly
authorized officers of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall
be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by
mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy by the Commission shall be necessary part of and
shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the
Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the
party at whose instance the service is made. In case of a
change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its
duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the new address. (72a; and n)
Section 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. (69a)
A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. —
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the
Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:
a) B y personal service coursed through the appropriate court
in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department
of Foreign Affairs;
b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country where the defendant may be found and by
serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-
registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could
generate proof of service; or
d) B y such other means as the court may in its discretion
direct."
This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
March 15, 2011
WoN the court can acquire jurisdiction:
PENNOYER (TERRITORIAL): substituted service of process
for in personam actions and acquisition of jurisdiction may not
be permitted if the defendant does not reside (for
corporations, was not incorporated) and is not found (for
corporations, is not doing business) in the territory  applies
to the Philippines
Found Not found
Related (to a Yes In personam – No
transaction in the In rem/quasi in
territory) rem - Yes permitted only for in rem actions. There could be no judgment
Unelated Yes In personam – No regarding the personal rights of the parties without personal
In rem/quasi in jurisdiction, so the sale was void. However, the sale would
rem - Yes have been valid if the plaintiff had attached the real property
in the state when the action was brought, which would have
SHAFFER/INTERNATIONAL SHOE/DAIMLER (LONG conferred in rem jurisdiction
ARM): substituted service of process for in personam actions
and acquisition of jurisdiction may be permitted even if the Note:
defendant does not reside (for corporations, was not - Attaching the property converts the action to a quasi in
incorporated) and is not found (for corporations, is not doing rem action
business) in the territory so long as there are MINIMUM - But according to Sir Lumba, MORTGAGE ALWAYS IN
POINTS OF CONTACT IN THE TERRITORY QUASI IN REM

Found (General Not found

Jurisdiction – (Specific Authority El Blanco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390,
continuous and – isolated 26 March 1918
systematic) transaction) - Palanca executed mortgage in favor of PET. After
Related Yes Yes if there are executing the instrument, Palanca returned to China (his
minimum points of native country)
contact - PET El Banco Espanol-Filipino filed action to foreclose a
Unrelated Yes No because there mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated
are no minimum in the city of Manila
points of contact - publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the
city of Manila
LUZON IRON CASE (2016)  changed the rule in Ph for - CFI made a judgment by default; property was sold
foreign corporations; applied long arm jurisdiction in ph but - Palanca died in China without returning to Manila
only for foreign corporations, not to foreign natural persons - 7 years after the confirmation of the sale, the
Found (General Not found administrator of the estate filed motion to set aside the
Jurisdiction – (Specific Authority order of default and the judgment alleging that the court
continuous and – isolated had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or
systematic) transaction) over the subject of the action
HELD: the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter
Related Yes Yes
but jurisdiction over the person was not acquired
Unrelated Yes In personam – No
- in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a
In rem/quasi in
nonresident who is not served personally within the
rem - Yes
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be
confined to the res
For Foreign Corporations:
Singapore v. Dakila Luzon Iron Development v. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
Trading Bridestone Mining
- Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, is the owner of one
Doing business matters Doing business does not share of stock in the Greyhound Corp., a business
matter (treats foreigners and incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its
foreign corporations principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona
differently) - Filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of
Applies Pennoyer Akin to long arm jurisdiction Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. Heitner
alleged that the individual defendants had violated their
Note: Sir Lumba prefers that we apply Pennoyer, even to duties to Greyhound by causing it and its subsidiary to
foreign corporations (like the Singapore case) engage in actions that resulted in the corporation's
being held liable for substantial damages in a private
antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal contempt
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) action. The activities which led to these penalties took
Mitchell sued Neff for legal fees that Neff allegedly owed to place in Oregon
him. The action was brought in Oregon, where Neff owned - Heitner filed a motion for an order of sequestration of
real property but was not a resident. After Neff was served by the Delaware property of the individual defendants. This
publication notice, he failed to respond, and Mitchell motion was accompanied by a supporting affidavit of
ultimately received a default judgment. Neff's land was sold counsel which stated that the individual defendants
at a sheriff's sale to satisfy the judgment, and Pennoyer were nonresidents of Delaware
bought it. Neff later sued in Oregon court to recover the - the sequestrator "seized" approximately 82,000 shares
property, once he found out about the sale, and he argued of Greyhound common stock belonging to 19 of the
that the sale was improper because the court that issued the defendants, and options belonging to another 2
judgment against him did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants
him. This would have prevented it from adjudicating the HELD: The Delaware courts based their assertion of
personal rights between the two parties. jurisdiction in this case solely on the statutory presence of
HELD: People or property outside the boundaries of a state appellants' property in Delaware. Yet that property is not the
may not be subject to its direct jurisdiction, and substituted subject matter of this litigation, nor is the underlying cause of
service of process in actions against non-residents may be action related to the property. Appellants' holdings in
Greyhound do not, therefore, provide contacts with Delaware
sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that State's courts over
appellants. If it exists, that jurisdiction must have some other
foundation
International Shoe v. Washington
International Shoe Co. was a business incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri. It
employed about a dozen salesmen in the state of
Washington, who were residents of that state paid by
commissions on their sales. International Shoe did not own
any property or have a permanent location in Washington,
since the salesmen used hotels and rented spaces to interact
with potential clients. This system was designed to restrict the
company's location to Missouri, although the business earned
about $30,000 annually from customers in Washington.
The state enacted a tax on companies doing business there
that functioned as a mandatory contribution to its
Unemployment Compensation Fund. When International
Shoe failed to comply with the tax, the state of Washington
served a notice of assessment on one of the resident
salesmen and sent a letter by registered mail to the
company's Missouri headquarters. International Shoe tried to
forestall the case at the outset by moving that it be dismissed
for a lack of personal jurisdiction
HELD: Personal jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible
when a defendant has minimum contacts with the state
where a lawsuit is brought such that notions of fair play and
substantial justice would not be offended
- due process requires only that, in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam,if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
- Since the corporate personality is a fiction, it is clear
that, unlike an individual, its "presence" without, as well
as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only
by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are
authorized to act for it
- Whether due process is satisfied must depend, rather,
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure
Daimler A.G. v. Baumann
Argentinian residents filed in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California a complaint against
DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), a German
public stock company, headquartered in Stuttgart, that
manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany. They
alleged that during Argentina‘s 1976–1983 ―Dirty War,‖
(military dictatorship) Daimler‘s Argentinian subsidiary,
Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MB Argentina) collaborated with
state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain
MB Argentina workers. Damages for the alleged human-
rights violations were sought from Daimler under the
laws of the United States, California, and Argentina
Jurisdiction over the lawsuit was predicated on the
California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
(MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in New
Jersey. MBUSA distributes Daimler-manufactured
vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the
United States, including California
HELD: No jurisdiction
Two categories of personal jurisdiction were
subsequently developed (International Shoe Co v
Washington):
1. Specific authority - in which the in-state activities of the
corporate defendant ―ha[d] not only been continuous and
systematic, but also g[a]ve rise to the liabilities sued on.‖
- commission of some single or occasional acts of the
corporate agent in a state may sometimes be enough to
subject the corporation to jurisdiction in that State‘s tribunals
with respect to suits relating to that in-state activity
2. General jurisdiction - situations where a foreign
corporation‘s ―continuous corporate operations within a state
[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.‖
- affiliations with the State are so ‗continuous and
systematic‘ as to render them essentially at home in the
forum State.‖
ITC: neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in
California, nor does either entity have its principal place of
business there. Hence, there is no general jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into the
specific jurisdiction category
Asiavest v. CA, 296 S 539 (1998)
- Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant
Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to
pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong
Kong Court Judgment
- MR. LOUSICH: presented as an expert on the laws of
Hong Kong, and as a representative of the law office of
the defendant‘s counsel who made a verification of the
record of the case filed by the plaintiff in Hong Kong
against the defendant, as well as the procedure in
serving Court processes in Hong Kong
- Under Hong Kong laws: The writ of summons or claim
can be served by the solicitor (lawyer) of the claimant or
plaintiff. In Hong Kong there are no Court personnel
who serve writs of summons and/or most other
processes
- there was an application for service of summons upon
the defendant outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong;
there was an order of the Court authorizing service upon
Heras outside of Hong Kong, particularly in Manila or
any other place in the Philippines; there was an affidavit
stating that service was effected in a particular man
here in Manila; such affidavit was filed by one Jose R.
Fernandez of the firm Sycip Salazar
- TC: concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment
should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction
for failure of Heras to overcome the legal presumption in
favor of the foreign judgment
- CA: reversed the TC decision and dismissed
ASIAVEST‘s complaint without prejudice; underscored
the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself have
any extraterritorial application. For it to be given effect,
the foreign tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter. If such tribunal
has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void
HELD: There was no valid service of summons
- In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on
this particular issue, the presumption of identity or
similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall
come into play. It will thus be presumed that the Hong
Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law
- In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against
HERAS was in personam, since it was based on his
personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal
debtor
- The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was
therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong
court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the
Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and
effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered
without jurisdiction
- Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of
Hong Kong, he was no longer so when the
extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be
made on him
Singapore v. Dakila Trading, supra
Sir Lumba‘s summary of the Singapore case‘s doctrine re:
voluntary appearance
Affirmative Defense  No voluntary appearance
Affirmative Relief  voluntary appearance EXCEPT
compulsory counterclaim (because if not set up, deemed
waived); hence, permissive counterclaim is voluntary
appearance
NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Ltd. v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. 175799, 28 November
2011
- Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed Complaint
against PET NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited
praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging
contracts between the parties void
- RTC authorized respondents‘ counsel to personally
bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter
office to effect service of summons on petitioner
- PET filed Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss:
(a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons;
(b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and
respondent does not have any against petitioner;
(c) the action is barred by estoppel; and
(d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands
- PET filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take the
deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk
Management of petitioner) before the Philippine Consul
General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve
Interrogatories on respondent.
- RTC: Denied MTD because there was a proper service
of summons through the DFA on account of the fact that
the defendant has neither applied for a license to do
business in the Philippines, nor filed with the SEC a
Written Power of Attorney designating some person on
whom summons and other legal processes maybe
served
HELD: Court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner of PET
- Irrelevant to discuss whether or not petitioner is doing
business in the Philippines because since the Complaint
was filed on August 30, 2005, the provisions of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure govern the service of summons
(Section 12, Rule 14)
- Service of summons to petitioner through the DFA by
the conveyance of the summons to the Philippine
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia was clearly
made not through Section 12, but pursuant to Section
15
- Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision
dealing precisely with the service of summons on a
defendant which does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines. Only four instances wherein a defendant
who is a non-resident and is not found in the country
may be served with summons by extraterritorial service:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiffs;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims
a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been
attached within the Philippines
(Note: all these four instances are ACTIONS IN REM)
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b)
publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner
the court may deem sufficient
- extraterritorial service of summons applies only
where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if
an action is in personam
- ITC: Action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts
between the parties void with a prayer for damages →
Action in personam
- BUT RESP voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court
o distinction between the raising of affirmative
defenses in an Answer (which would not
amount to acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
court) and the prayer for affirmative reliefs
(which would be considered acquiescence to
the jurisdiction of the court)
Note:
Under Section 12, Rule 14, it doesn‘t matter if action is in rem
or in personam because the rule does not distinguish.
Under Section 15 however the action must be in rem,
particularly, it must be one of the instances enumerated
therein.
Luzon Iron Development Group Corp. v. Bridestone Mining
and Development Corp., G.R. No. 220546, 7 December 2016
- Bridestone Mining and Development Corporation
(Bridestone) and Anaconda Mining and Development
Corporation (Anaconda) filed separate complaints
before the RTC for rescission of contract and damages
against petitioners Luzon Iron Development Group
Corporation (Luzon Iron) and Consolidated Iron Sands,
Ltd. (Consolidated Iron).
- Both complaints sought the rescission of the Tenement
Partnership and Acquisition Agreement (TPAA) entered
into by Luzon Iron and Consolidated Iron, on one hand,
and Bridestone and Anaconda, on the other, for the
assignment of the Exploration Permit Application of the
former in favor of the latter. The complaints also sought
the return of the Exploration Permits to Bridestone and
Anaconda
- Luzon Iron and Consolidated Iron filed their Special
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss separately
against Bridestone‘s complaint and Anaconda‘s
complaint. They contended that the RTC could not
acquire jurisdiction over Consolidated Iron because it
 was a foreign corporation that had never transacted
business in the Philippines
- RTC: denied the MTDs, finding that Consolidated Iron
was doing business in the Philippines, with Luzon Iron
as its resident agent
HELD: Summons were not validly served in this case
- The Rule on Summons, as it now reads, thus, makes
the question whether Consolidated Iron was “doing
business in the Philippines” irrelevant as Section
12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was broad enough
to cover corporations which have “transacted
business in the Philippines.”
- In the case at bench, it is crystal clear that Consolidated
Iron transacted business in the Philippines as it was a
signatory in the TPAA that was executed in Makati.
Hence, as the respondents argued, it may be served
with the summons in accordance with the modes
provided under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court
- Consolidated Iron was not properly served with
summons through any of the permissible modes
under the Rules of Court. Indeed, Consolidated Iron
was served with summons through Luzon Iron.
Such service of summons, however, was defective
because Luzon Iron was never registered before the
SEC as Consolidated Iron‘s resident agent
Note: Case was dismissed for wrong service of summons but
in Philamlife v. Breva the wrong service of summons is not
the ground for dismissal if the court can still acquire
jurisdiction
Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa, 89
SCRA 131 1979
● Leonardo dela Osa [RESP] filed a petition before the
CIR for reinstatement with full backwages, plus OT
pay, and swing shift and graveyard shift differentials
○ Worked as painter, houseboy, cashier for
Facilities Management Corp
● Facilities Management Corporation (FMC) and J. S.
Dreyer [PET] interposed special defenses:
○ that they were domiciled in Wake Island
which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippine Government;
○ that petitioner J. V. Catuira, though an
employee of PET corporation presently
stationed in Manila, is without power and
authority of legal representation; and
○ that the employment contract between
petitioner and respondent corporation
carries the approval of the Department of
Labor.
● PET then filed MTD otg of lack of jurisdiction
● CIR denied MTD
○ while it is true the site of work is identified
as Wake Island, it is equally true the place
of hire is established in Manila
○ what is important is the fact that the
contract of employment between the
parties litigant was shown to have been
originally executed and subsequently
renewed in Manila
○ Hence, any dispute arising therefrom
should Hence, any dispute arising
therefrom should
● CIR ultimately ruled in favor of RESP, ordered PET
to pay full backwages, plus OT pay, and swing shift
and graveyard shift differentials
● considering that PET paid the claims of RESP, the
case had become moot and academic. Besides, the
fact of such payment amounts to an
acknowledgment on the part of PET of the
jurisdiction of the court over it (but the SC still
discussed the main issue since other cases tackle
the same question)
HELD: PET has been ‗doing business in the Philippines‘
so that the service of summons upon its agent in the
Philippines vested the Court with jurisdiction
- if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the
Philippines, is not barred from seeking redress from
courts in the Philippines, a fortiori that same corporation
cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine
courts for acts done against a person or persons in the
Philippines
Avon Insurance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97642, 29
August 1997
● Yupangco Cotton Mills engaged to secure with
Worldwide Security and Insurance Co., Inc. several
of its properties.Both contracts were covered by
reinsurance treaties (made through an international
insurance broken) between Worldwide Surety and
Insurance and several foreign reinsurance
companies, including the petitioners.
● The properties insured by Yupangco were razed by
fire and thus, partial payments were made by
Worldwide Surety and Insurance and some of the
insurance companies to indemnify the former.
○ Worldwide acknowledged, in a Deed of
Assignment, a remaining balance of P19M
due to Yupangco, and assigned to the
latter all reinsurance proceeds still
collectible form all the foreign reinsurance
corporations.
● In its interest as assignee and original insured,
Yupangco instituted a collection suit against the
petitioners. Service of summons upon the latter was
made by notification to the Insurance Commissioner,
pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the RoC.
● Petitioner‘s argument: (1) Court has no jurisdiction
over them, being all foreign corporations not doing
business in the PH, with no office, place of business
or agents in the PH and (2) extra-territorial service of
summons on petitioners in null and void since the
complaint for collection is not one affecting plaintiff‘s
status and not relation to property within the PH.
● CA: (1) petitioners were properly served with
summons and whatever defects were cured by their
voluntary appearance in court via an MTD, (2) Being
reinsurers of Worldwide, petitioners cannot now
validly argue that they do not do business in the
country.
HELD: Court does not have jurisdiction over petitioners.
● Yupangco did not make an allegation or
demonstration of the existence of petitioner‘s
domestic agent, but avers simply that they are doing
business not only abroad, but in the PH as well. A
general allegation standing alone, that a party is
doing business in the PH does not make it so.
● The reinsurance treaties b/w the petitioners and
Worldwide were made through an international
 insurance broker, and not through any entity or
means remotely connected with the Philippines.
○ Furthermore, a contract of reinsurance is
generally a separate and distinct
arrangement from the original contract of
insurance whose contracted risk is insured
in the reinsurance agreement. Hence, the
original insured has generally no
interest in the contract of reinsurance.
● A foreign corporation, is one which owes its
existence to the laws of another state, and generally
has no legal existence within the state in which it is
foreign.
■ Before a FC can transact
business in the country, it must
first obtain a license to transact
business here and secure the
proper authorizations under
existing law; purpose: to subject
the FC doing business in the PH
to the jurisdiction of the courts.
● The same danger does not exist among FC that are
indubitably NOT doing business in the PH. If a FC
does not do business here, there would be no
reasons for it to be subject to the State‘s
regulation. As far as the State is concerned, such
FC has no legal existence thus, to subject the FC to
the courts‘ jurisdiction would violate the essence of
sovereignty
X. Early Dismissal
A. Dismissal by the plaintiff
section 1-2, 4, Rule 17
Section 1.Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint
may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed,
the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. (1a)
Section 2.Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the motion he manifests his preference to have his
counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall
be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court. (2a)
Section 4.Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party complaint. — The provisions of this Rule shall apply to
the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
complaint. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant by notice as
in section 1 of this Rule, shall be made before a responsive
pleading or a motion for summary judgment is served or, if
there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial
or hearing. (4a)
section 6, Rule 16
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no
motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the
court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed. (5a) The dismissal of the
complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the
prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim
pleaded in the answer. (n)
BA Finance v. Rufino, 224 S 163 (1993)  bad law
● BA Finance [PET] filed petition to recover a sum of
money arising from a credit accommodation in the form
of a discounting line which it granted to defendant Rufino
Co [RESP]
● After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with
Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the case was
set for Pre-Trial Conference. For various reasons,
however, the conference was repeatedly reset
● PET failed to attend the Pre-Trial Conference.
● RESP moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice.
The motion was granted
● RESP moved to set the reception of their evidence in
support of their counterclaim → PET opposed
● TC denied the motion of RESP
● CA reversed, directed TC to set the reception of RESP‘s
evidence on their counterclaim
● Before SC, PET contends that the dismissal of the
complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand,
claim that their compulsory counterclaim should not have
been included in the dismissal.
HELD: Petition GRANTED. CA decision reversed. TC
decision reinstated.
● The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely
permissive but compulsory in nature
● The counterclaim of private respondents is denominated
"compulsory" and consists of claims for alleged
overpayments and damages. They assert that they are
no longer indebted to petitioner and are in fact entitled to
reimbursement for overpayments. They ask for damages
for expenses incurred and inconveniences suffered by
them as a result of the filing of the present action
● Clearly, the same evidence needed to sustain the
counterclaim of private respondents would also refute
the cause of action in petitioner's complaint. For, if
private respondents could successfully show that they
actually made overpayments on the credit
accommodations extended by petitioner, then the
complaint must fail. The counterclaim is therefore
compulsory.
● a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court." This is because
a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding
in the original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional
support therefrom.
● if the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to
entertain the main action of the case, as when it
dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim
being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise
be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for
the grant of any relief under the counterclaim
 ○ ―The petitioner does not object to the dismissal
of the civil case but nonetheless wants her
counterclaim therein to subsist. Impossible. A
person cannot eat his cake and have it at the
same time. If the civil case is dismissed, so also
is the counterclaim filed therein‖
● The Rules of Court provides a remedy to recover on
defendant's counterclaim if plaintiff moves to dismiss the
case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise
objection to the dismissal of the complaint; in such case,
the trial court may not dismiss the main action.
 ITC: RESP themselves moved for the dismissal of the
complaint. They could have simply asked the trial court
to declare petitioners to be "non-suited" on their
complaint, and "as in default" on their compulsory
counterclaim, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial
despite due notice. But private respondents did not.
Neither did they reserve their right to maintain their
counterclaim. Consequently, the dismissal of the
complaint carried with it the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim
 RULE: if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3,
Rule 17, RoC arises, the proper recourse for a
defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for
the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he should only
move to have plaintiff declared non-suited on the
complaint so that the latter can no longer present his
evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be
declared as in default on the compulsory counterclaim,
and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on
his counterclaim.
BPI v. CA, 303 S 19 (1999)
● RESP Citiwide Motors Inc (CMI) filed a Complaint for
Nullification of Foreclosure and Auction Sale with
Injunction PET Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
After almost five (5) years of resolving the issue of
preliminary injunction, the trial court set the case for pre-
trial. The entire records of the case were burned in a
fire. CMI filed petition for reconstitution of the burned
records attaching thereto pertinent documents which its
counsel was able to gather
● Trial court directed parties to attend a conference (for
reconstituting records of the case). Scheduled
conference was reset 2 times when the TC finally
DISMISSED complaint "upon failure of (private
respondent's counsel) to appear in Court x x x
evidencing lack of interest to pursue this case."
● CMI filed MR, wherein the counsel alleged alleging that
she failed to attend the conference on 10 September
1992 because she was physically indisposed due to her
monthly period
● TC denied MR; CMI appealed to CA
● CA: Reversed TC, remanded case for further
proceedings
○ unless a party's conduct is so negligent,
irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to
provide substantial grounds for dismissal for
non-appearance, the courts should consider
lesser sanctions which would still achieve the
desired end
○ In the absence of clear lack of merit or intent to
delay, justice is better served by a brief
continuance, trial on the merits, and final
disposition of the cases before the court
HELD: complaint should not have been dismissed
Rule 17 Section 3 contemplates certain instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault:
(1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on
the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief;
(2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time;
(3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the
court; or,
(4) where the plaintiff fails to appear when so required at the
pre-trial.
● None of these is applicable to the instant case.
● ITC: complaint was dismissed by the trial court after lengthy
proceedings, "upon failure of the latter (counsel for private
respondent) to appear in Court today, evidencing lack of
interest to pursue this case."
○ conference which counsel for private respondent
failed to attend was not a regular trial or trial where
she would be presenting her evidence. Neither was
it a pre-trial conference under Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
○ What counsel failed to attend was simply a
conference set by the trial court "to discover ways
and means of expediting disposition, including
submission of (the) case for mediation."
○ Hence, in the absence of any pattern to delay, the
trial court committed a reversible error in dismissing
the complaint solely on the ground of counsel's
failure to attend a conference called by the court.
● CMI also cannot be accused of failing to prosecute the
action for an unreasonable length of time
● BPI itself contributed largely to the delay of the proceedings
could not immediately comply with the order of the trial court,
after the records of the case were burned, to examine the
pages of the reconstituted records because its lawyer
handling the case, Atty. Alberto F. Serrano, supposedly
resigned from the law firm and went abroad, and the
defendant in the trial court had yet to locate the records for
comparison with the court's records to complete the process
of reconstitution
Roxas v. CA, 363 S 207 (2001)
Petitioner Ma. Carmina C. Roxas filed with the RTC of
Paranaque City an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
(with an application for support pendente lite for their four
minor children) on the ground of psychological incapacity of
her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas, private respondent. The
case was raffled to Branch 257 of the Paranaque RTC
presided by Judge Rolando C. How, but the petitioner filed a
Notice of Dismissal to dismiss the complaint, without
prejudice pursuant to the provision of Sec. 1, Rule 17,
considering that summons has not yet been served and no
responsive pleading has yet been filed. The same complaint
was re-filed on Nov. 25, 1997 and it was raffled to Branch
260 of the RTC of Paranaque presided by Judge Helen
Bautista-Ricafort, who granted the application for support
pendente lite. Judge Ricafort declared private respondent
guilty of Contempt of Court for failing to comply fully with the
Order by updating payment of his share in support of the
minor children pendente lite. Private respondent filed petition
for certiorari with CA. The CA held that while a complaint may
be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service of the answer (Sec. 1, Rule 17), there
is however a need to state the fact of prior filing and dismissal
thereof in the certification on non-forum shopping, in the
event the complaint is refiled such as in the case at bar. This
must be so in order to prevent the plaintiff or principal party
from invoking Sec. 1, Rule 17 in the hope that, if and when
refiled, the complaint will be raffled to a more sympathetic
judge. CA is of the opinion that the private respondent availed
of the rule not for any other reason/purpose than to take the
case of out of the Judge and to have it assigned to another.
This belief finds support from the fact that private
respondent‘s lawyer and respondent Judge were classmates
in UP Law.
HELD: No need to disclose in certificate of non-forum
shopping that a case involving the same issues and parties
was filed and dismissed without prejudice
● there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in
the first case filed and raffled to the Sala of Judge How.
The dismissal was without prejudice of the complaint at
the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 17 considering that it was done before service of
answer or any responsive pleading.
● The dismissal does not amount to litis pendentia nor to
res judicata. No litis pendentia since the first case before
Judge How was dismissed or withdraw by the plaintiff
(herein petitioner) without prejudice upon filing her notice
of dismissal (Sec. 1, Rule 17) Judge How‘s order is one
merely ―confirming the dismissal‖ of the complaint.
● No res judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal
was not a decision on the merits, but a dismissal ―without
prejudice.‖ PR‘s apprehension that the case was
dismissed in order to be transferred to the sala of a judge
who is more sympathetic is baseless and is not a valid
reason to declare the petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
Petitioner is not assured that the case would be raffled to
a more sympathetic judge since there are five RTC
branches in Paranaque. In any case, at the slightest
doubt of the impartiality, PR could have filed before the
same judge a motion for her inhibition on that ground,
but he did not.
● Considering that the original complaint was dismissed
without prejudice by virtue of the plaintiff‘s (herein
petitioner‘s) Notice of Dismissal filed pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 17, there is no need to state in the cert of non-FS in
the original complaint about the prior filing and dismissal
of the same.
○ An omission in the cert of non-FS about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and
litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal
as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the
entire proceedings considering the evils sought
to be prevented by the said certificate are not
present.
Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014
● ANTONIO CHING owned several businesses and
properties (including PO WING PROPERTIES). While he
was unmarried, he had children from 2 women.
○ RAMON CHING alleged he was the only child
of ANTONIO with common-law wife, LUCINA
SANTOS. Lucina disputed this and claimed that
even if in RAMON‘s birth cert it indicates that he
as ANTONIO‘s illegitimate child, he was merely
adopted and treated as their own
○ JOSEPH & JAIME CHENG claim to be
ANTONIO‘s illegitimate children with his
housemaid, MERCEDES IGNE. RAMON
disputed this. MERCEDES and LUCINA did not.
● ANTONIO was murdered. RAMON induced CHENGs to
sign an agreement and waived to ANTONIO‘s estate in
consideration of P22.5M. RAMON never paid them.
● RAMON executed an affidavit of settlement of estate,
naming himself as sole heir and adjudicating upon
himself the entirety of ANTONIO‘s estate
● After a year of investigating ANTONIO‘s death, the police
found RAMON to be its primary suspect. Information was
filed against him and a warrant of arrest was issued.
● CHENGs filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
titles against RAMON before RTC. Impleaded additional
defendants including PO WING PROPERTIES (PWP), of
which RAMON was a primary stockholders.
● PWP: filed motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. RTC granted the
motion to dismiss.
● CHENGs and LUCINA filed a complaint for ―Annulment
of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of
Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction‖ against Ramon
Ching and PWP with RTC
○ When Branch 20 was made aware of the first
case, it issued an order transferring the case to
Branch 6, considering that the case before it
involved substantially the same parties and
causes of action
○ CHENGs and LUCINA filed a motion to
dismiss their complaint in the second case,
praying that it be dismissed without
prejudice
○ RAMON and PWP filed MR - arguing the
dismissal should have been with prejudice
under the two-dismissal rule of Rule 17 Sec 1 in
view of the previous dismissal of the first case
● During pendency of MR, CHENGs and LUCINA field
complaint for ―Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction‖ against RAMON and PWP
○ R & PWP: filed motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata, litis pendencia, forum shopping,
and failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action
● RTC Br 6 OMNIBUS ORDER: Resolving both MR in 2nd
case and MTD in 3rd case - denied MR and MTD holding
that the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice and hence would not bar the filing of the third
case
● While MR in 3rd case was pending, R & PWP filed a
petition for certiorari with CA assailing order and portion
of omnibus order which upheld dismissal of second case
● RTC: MR in 3rd case denied. R & PWP filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction or the issuance of TRO
● CA: (on 1st petition) dismissed the petition - R & PWP‘s
reliance on the 2-dismissal rule was misplaced since the
rule involves 2 MTDs filed by plaintiff only. In this case,
dismissal of the first case was upon motion of the
defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was
at the instance of the plaintiffs
HELD: RTC‘ s dismissal of the 2nd case did not operate
as a bar to the filing of a third case, as per the ―two
dismissal rule‖
● Dismissal of actions - Rule 17 ROC
Sec 1 - contemplates a situation where a plaintiff
requests the dismissal of the case before any responsive
pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done
through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the
 court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court.
Sec 2 - contemplates a situation where a counterclaim
has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on
him or her of the plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss. It requires
leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court
Sec 3 - contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the
plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is
dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the
court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of
the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the
instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
which covers motions to dismiss
GENERAL RULE: Dismissals under Sec 1 Rule 17 are
without prejudice EXCEPT when it is the second time that the
plaintiff caused its dismissal.
For a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits,
i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the
following requisites must be present:
1. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a
competent court;
2. Both cases were based on or include the same
claim;
3. Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff;
and
4. When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was
consented to by the defendant on the ground that
the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the
former
PURPOSE OF 2-DISMISSAL RULE: To avoid vexatious
litigation. When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the
plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
ITC: DISMISSAL OF THE 2ND CASE WAS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE IN VIEW OF THE 2-DISMISSAL RULE
● 1ST CASE: Ordinary civil action; later amended to
include not only new defendants but new causes of
action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by
the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC
granted MTD stating that additional causes of action
were incorporated which should be threshed out in a
special proceedings case and a clear departure from
main cause of action in original complaint
● RTC dismissed the 1st case by granting MTD filed by
defendants. When it allowed counsel a period of 15
days to file an appropriate pleading, it was merely
acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiff‘s counsel
that had no bearing on the dismissal of the case.
● Rule 17 Sec 3 - a defendant may move to dismiss the
case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a
situation where the dismissal was due to lack of
jurisdiction. Since there was already a dismissal prior to
plaintiff‘s default, the trial court‘s instruction to file the
appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the
plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial court
does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing
the case still stands.
● ITC, the dismissal of the first case was done at the
instance of the defendant udner Rule 16 1(b) ROC.
Under SEc 5 Rule 16, a party may re-file the same action
or claim subject to certain exceptions.
● 2ND CASE: When they filed for 2nd case, they were
merely re-filing the same that had been previously
dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they
they moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to
dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the
plaintiff‘s instance. RTC ordered dismissing of the case
without prejudice
● While the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice, respondents‘ act of filing the third case
while petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration was
still pending constituted forum shopping.
● When respondents filed the third case, petitioners‘
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second
case was still pending. Order of dismissal was not yet
final since it could still be overturned upon
reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.
● Petitioners were not prohibited from filing the MR. A
defendant has the right to file MR of RTC‘s order denying
MTD since no rule prohibits the filing of such MR. [2ND
CASE WAS THUS STILL PENDING WHEN 3RD CASE
WAS FILED]
● REMEDY: Respondents should have waited until the
final disposition of the second case before filing the third
case.The dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim. In their haste
to file the third case,, they transgressed certain
procedural safeguards, among which are the rules on
litis pendentia and res judicata.
● LITIS PENDENTIA: There was an identity of parties,
rights, and reliefs in the second and third cases. While
RTC may have already dismissed the second case when
the third case was filed, MR was filed in 2nd case thus it
was still pending. When respondents filed third case,
they engaged in forum shopping. Any judgment by this
court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case
will inevitably affect the disposition of the third case.
○ HOWEVER, the denial of MR in 3rd case could
still be the subject of a separate certiorari. That
petition would be based now on the third case,
and not on the second case.
Chuan v. Uy, G.R. No. 155701, 11 March 2015
● Antonio Lim Tanhu (Antonio) sold the subject lot to
Spouses Cabansag (Francisco and Estrella) as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale
○ However, he failed to transfer the property to
their names because of his frequent travels
abroad.
● Spouses Cabansag then sold the lot to Serafin Uy
(Serafin) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
● Due to the sale, the Spouses first attempted to transfer
the property to their names so that they could eventually
transfer it to Serafin‘s.
○ However, Francisco lost the owner‘s copy of the
TCT and other documents  failed to transfer
○ Serafin also failed to secure the lost documents
himself.
● Serafin thus filed a petition for the issuance of a new
owner‘s duplicate TCT (cancelling the TCT in the name
of Antonio) → raffled to RTC Lapu-Lapu Branch 27
(Cadastral Court)
○ Cadastral Court issued order: directed Register
of Deeds to issue new owner‘s duplicate copy
● Said order however was recalled and nullified due to Lim
Teck Chuan‘s Opposition and/or Motion for
Reconsideration with Manifestation for Special
Appearance
○ He alleged that he is one of the six legitimate
descendants of Antonio; and that the original
 owner‘s copy of TCT was not lost and has
always been in his custody.
● In the meantime, Lim Sing Chan (alias Henry) executed
an Affidavit of Sole Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate
of Antonio Lim Tanhu with Deed of Sale claiming that he
is the only surviving heir of Antonio.
○ Henry sold the pertinent Lot to Leopolda.
● Serafin thus filed a Complaint for quieting of title,
surrender of owner‘s copy of certificate of title,
declaration of nullity of affidavit of adjudication and sale,
annulment of tax declaration, and other reliefs with a
prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC →
impleaded Leopolda, Henry and, Lim Teck
● Leopolda and Lim Teck then filed their respective
answers with counterclaim and cross claim
○ In his answer with counterclaim and crossclaim,
Lim Teck claims that the lot was never
transferred nor encumbered to any person
during Antonio‘s lifetime. The deed of sale in
favor of Spouses Cabansag was simulated and
spurious, and was intended to defraud the
estate of Antonio.
● Pretrial held where parties agreed on stipulation of facts
and issues à initial trial was held
● The initial trial was postponed upon motion and
manifestation of an on-going negotiation for an amicable
settlement.
● Sept 20, 2001 - Serafin (the plaintiff) and Leopolda
then submitted a Joint Motion to Dismiss averring
that they have amicably settled their differences
○ Serafin stated that the complaint has become
moot and academic as his title has been
allegedly quieted and the reliefs prayed for has
been obtained
○ October 04, 2001 Lim Teck filed his
Opposition/Comment praying for the denial of
the Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
bad faith → manifested his preference that
counterclaims and crossclaims be resolved
● RTC dismissed the case in its entirety
● Hence the present petition
○ Lim Teck invokes Section 2, Rule 17, stating
that his timely expression of such preference
should be enough for the trial court not to
dismiss the case in its entirety, and to limit its
action to the dismissal of the complaint.
HELD: RTC ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE IN ITS
ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DEFENDANT‘S COUNTERCLAIM
● when the present rules state that the dismissal shall be
limited only to the complaint.
○ A dismissal of an action is different from a
mere dismissal of the complaint.
○ For this reason, since only the complaint and
not the action is dismissed, the defendant in
spite of said dismissal may still prosecute
his counterclaim in the same action
● the dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily result
to the dismissal of the counterclaim
● Under the rules, where the plaintiff moves for the
dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has
been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint.
○ Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the
same resolved in the same action.
● ITC: Lim Teck‘s preference to have his counterclaim and
crossclaim be prosecuted in the same action was timely
manifested through his Opposition/Comment.
Singapore v. Dakila Trading, supra  good law
B. Demurrer to evidence
Rule 33
Section 1.Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence.
If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. (1a, R35)
Section 23, Rule 119
Section 23.Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution
rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving
the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of
court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court,
the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (15a)
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution
rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within
a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the
demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the
demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
Leave Without
leave
Granted X Dismissed
Denied X Present
Civil evidence
Reversed X Waived
grant
Granted Acquitted Acquitted
Denied Present Waived
Criminal evidence
Reversed X X
grant
Why is the presentation of evidence in Criminal cases
waived after a demurrer to evidence filed without leave
was denied? Because if in a criminal case, the accused was
still allowed to present evidence after his demurrer was filed
without leave and denied, then there is incentive to file
demurrer anytime and cause delay in the proceedings (Note:
in Civil cases one can appeal; in Criminal you cannot)

Why is leave of court required in Criminal cases?
Because if only without leave is allowed, there is no incentive
to file demurrer to evidence
Radiowealth v. Spouses Del Rosario, 335 S 288 (2000)
Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario, jointly and
severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of
Radiowealth Finance Company, a Promissory Note. They
defaulted on the monthly installments despite repeated
demands. Hence, Radiowealth filed a Complaint for the
collection of a sum of money before the RTC.
● During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and
collection officer of PET, presented in evidence the
RESPS‘ check payments, the demand letter, the
customers ledger card for the RESPS, another demand
letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico
admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of
documentary evidence, which had merely been
endorsed to him.
● RTC: issued an Order terminating the presentation of
evidence for the petitioner
● PET formally offered its evidence
● REPS: filed Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of
cause of action.
● RTC: dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented
being merely hearsay.
● CA: reversed the trial court and remanded the case for
further proceedings
HELD: CA erred in ordering the remand of this case to the
trial court instead of rendering judgment on the basis of
petitioner‘s evidence
● The rule imposes the condition that if his demurrer is
granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present
evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to
have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff‘s
case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court
which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to
render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff‘s
evidence.
● In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to
the plaintiff‘s evidence retain the right to present their
own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the
trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate
court disagrees with both of them and reverses the
dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present
their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.
● In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay
evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the
due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in
fact been admitted by defendants.
● the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of
the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the
appellate court correctly ruled that the documentary
evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been
allowed and appreciated, and that the petitioner
presented quite a number of documentary exhibits
enumerated in the appealed order, the CA had sufficient
evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A
remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also
logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.
Bernardo v. CA, 278 S 782 (1997)
Rule: only when the accused files a demurrer or motion to
dismiss on insufficiency of evidence without express leave of
court that the accused may be deemed to have waived his
right to present evidence and the case considered submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
If the accused has obtained prior leave of court, in case of
denial of his motion to dismiss, he retains his right to present
evidence in his behalf. The court may also motu proprio
dismiss the case on insufficiency of evidence, but before
doing so, it should give the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard and to oppose the motion
FACTS (note: these happened orally in court)
● Bernardo was originally charged with 4 counts of BP22
before RTC
● After the prosecution had formally offered its evidence,
Bernardo‘s counsel asked for a resetting, for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence
● RTC denied demurrer
● Bernardo‘s counsel asked for reconsideration
● RTC considered granting the motion to file (considering
that the oral demurrer was already denied) is tantamount
to postponing the case which the RTC considers dilatory
● Bernardo‘s counsel reiterated that it is within the option
of the parties to take remedies and Bernardo chose that
instead of presenting the accused or presenting our
witnesses, he preferred to move for a demurrer to
evidence
● RTC: ―You may include that in your motion for
reconsideration. Alright, the prosecution having rested,
and the defense having been considered to have waived
his right to present his evidence, this case is deemed
submitted for decision‖
● Bernardo then filed with CA petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus for the GAD committed by
RTC
● CA modified RTC, directing RTC to set for trial for
reception of evidence for Bernardo
● Bernardo filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground
that when it refused to allow petitioner to demur to the
evidence the appellate court decided the matter not in
accordance with law and applicable decisions of this
Court
HELD: Petition to allow petitioner to file a demurrer to
evidence is DENIED. The ruling of CA is SET ASIDE. The
RTC is directed to decide on the basis of the evidence
already presented by the prosecution
● under the new rule on demurrer to evidence (1988) the
accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after
the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused
obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied.
However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or
after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power
to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The
purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his
demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings
● ITC: motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence was
denied → petitioner‘s only recourse is to adduce
evidence in her defense. However, even without express
leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave
was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer
instead of presenting evidence in her defense.
● Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to
evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow
the accused to present evidence after he was denied
prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once
prior leave is denied and the accused still files his
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no
longer has discretion to allow the accused to present
evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide
the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not
present in the instant case, the trial court‘s denial of prior
leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss
may not be disturbed
C. Judgment on the pleadings
Rule 34
Section 1.Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may; on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved. (1a, R19)
Pacific Rehouse Corp. v. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No.
184036, 13 October 2010
 plaintiffs bought 60,790,000 Kuok Properties, Inc. (KPP)
shares of stock through the Philippine Stock Exchange
(PSE); acquired by plaintiffs through their broker,
defendant EIB
 also, plaintiffs bought/acquired 32,180,000 DMCI shares
of stock through the PSE. Of these shares, 16,180,000
were likewise acquired by the plaintiffs through their
broker, defendant EIB, while the remaining 16,000,000
DMCI shares were transferred from Westlink Global
Equities, Inc
 plaintiffs and defendant EIB later agreed to sell the
60,790,000 KPP shares of plaintiffs to any party with an
option on the part of the plaintiffs to buy back or
reacquire the said KPP shares within a period of thirty
(30) days from the transaction date
 When the last day of the 30-day buy back period for the
KPP shares came, plaintiff were undecided on whether
or not to exercise their option to reacquire said shares.
Thus, plaintiffs and defendant EIB agreed that plaintiffs
would have an extended period. plaintiffs decided not to
exercise their option to buy back the KPP shares and
did not give any buy-back instruction/s to their broker,
defendant EIB
 without plaintiffs prior knowledge and consent,
defendant EIB sold plaintiffs 32,180,000 DMCI shares
despite full knowledge by defendant EIB that the sale
would result in a substantial loss to the plaintiffs. EIB
used the proceeds thereof to buy back 61,000,000 KPP
shares because defendant EIB made an unauthorized
promise and commitment to the buyer/s of plantiffs‘ KPP
shares that plaintiffs would buy back the KPP shares.
 Plaintiffs learned of the unauthorized sale of their
32,180,000 DMCI shares and the unauthorized buy
back of 61,000,000 KPP shares only much later
 Hence this Complaint against RESP EIB Securities Inc
 RESP EIB filed Answer which contained Admissions
and Denials
 Plaintiff filed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
asserting that EIB materially admitted the allegations of
their complaint by not tendering any genuine issue in its
answer
 RTC: Rendered judgment on the pleading because the
assailed transactions were all documented; the
transactions were admitted by the parties and the main
issues can be resolved based on the parties
documentary evidence appended to the pleadings
 CA: Revoked the RTC‘s judgment on the pleadings;
Remanded case back to RTC; while some material
allegations in petitioners complaint were admitted by
EIB, the latters answer nonetheless raised other
genuine issues which it viewed can only be threshed out
in a full-blown trial
HELD: motion for judgment on the pleadings should have
been granted
When what is left are not genuinely issues requiring trial but
questions concerning the proper interpretation of the
provisions of some written contract attached to the
pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper
● Based on the admissions in the pleadings and
documents attached, the Court finds that the issues
presented by the complaint and the answer can be
resolved within the four corners of said pleadings
without need to conduct further hearings.
● Philippine National Bank v. Utility Assurance & Surety
Co., Inc: when what remains to be done is the proper
interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to
the pleadings, then judgment on the pleadings is proper.
● ITC: the issue of whether the sale of DMCI shares to
effectuate the buy back of the KKP shares is valid can be
decided by the trial court based on the SDAA, Notices of
Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the
parties, and other appendages to the pleadings in
conjunction with the allegations or admissions contained
in the pleadings without need of trial.
● CA nullified RTC decision on the ground that there are
other issues that must be resolved during a full-blown
trial (the average price of the KPP shares of stock, the
scope of the collaterals stated in the Notices of Sale and
the monetary claims of the Appellant against the
Appellees)
● SC: not genuinely triable issues but actually minor
issues or mere incidental questions that can be resolved
by construing the statements embodied in the
appendages to the pleadings
○ The facts that gave rise to the side issues are
undisputed and were already presented to the
trial court rendering trial unnecessary.
Note: Sir Lumba thinks that Judgment on the Pleadings
should not have been rendered because the plaintiff asked
for damages. The amount of damages should have been
determined in a trial. Hence, the plaintiff should have filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the amount of damages.
D. Summary judgment
Rule 35
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(1a, R34)
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for
a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(2a, R34)
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time
specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three
(3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (3a, R34)
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. — If on
motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what are actually and in
good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts
so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly. (4a,
R34)
Section 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers. —
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Certified true copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
(5a, R34)
Section 6. Affidavits in bad faith. — Should it appear to its
satisfaction at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith, or solely for
the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the
offending party or counsel to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur including attorney's fees, it
may, after hearing further adjudge the offending party or
counsel guilty of contempt. (6a, R34)
section 1, Rule 17
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint
may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed,
the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. (1a)
section 17, A.M. No. 02-11-10
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment
shall be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of
all persons, including members of the press, who do not have
a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if
the court determines on the record that requiring a party to
testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of
truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability
to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or
timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would
be offensive to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of
the records of the case or parts thereof be made by any
person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by
order of the court.
Notes:
 For Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
o No summary judgment
o No judgment of the pleadings
o no confession of judgment
 Test of genuiness = obviousness that it is not sham
or fictitious
Diman v. Alumbres, 299 S 459 (1998)
- Veronica Lacalle allegedly acquired the subject land by
virtue of a deed of sale. She retained as caretakers the
persons occupying the lot – the spouses Nario
- Spouses Nario received a notice to vacate and a writ of
demolition by virtue of an ejectment case filed by the
Dimans
- Heirs of Lacalle filed this complaint for Quieting of Title
and Damages vs. the Dimans
- In their counterclaim, Dimans alleged that they were the
true owners of the land, with no knowledge of Lacalle‘s
alleged claim. They presented TCTs registered in their
names.
- Dimans then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
the ground of the heirs‘ failure to file pre-trial brief,
appear at scheduled hearings, and that no genuine
issue existed
- RTC denied MSJ explaining that summary judgment is
not proper when the defendant presented defenses
tendering factual issues which call for presentation of
evidence
- RTC also denied the Heirs‘ Motion for Judgment on
Demurrer to Evidence. Hence, Rule 65 with CA then
Rule 45 with SC
HELD: Summary judgment before the RTC is warranted
- Summary judgment is proper when although the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact –
i.e. there are denials of, or conflict in, factual allegations
– if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits:
o That those issues are sham, fictitious or not
genuine OR that except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact
o And that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall
render a summary judgment for the plaintiff or
the defendant
- The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character on the other, are what distinguish a proper
case for a summary judgment from one for a judgment
on the pleadings
o In a summary judgment, there is no ostensible
issue at all, but the absence of any, because of
the failure of the defending party‘s answer to
raise an issue.
- In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently
exist – i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses
are in truth set out in the answer – but the issues arising
from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as
shown by admissions, depositions or admissions
Summary judgment Judgment on the pleadings
Judgment on the facts as Judgment on the facts as
summarily proven by pleaded
affidavits, depositions or
admissions
May be applied for by either Remedy may only be sought
a claimant or a defending by a claimant
party
- ITC: the grounds relied on by Judge Alumbres in
denying Dimans‘ MSJ are proper for the denial of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings
- the heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a
judgment in their favor. They had not presented any
copy of the title they wished to be quieted. The issues
raised in the pleadings of the heirs are sham/fictitious
Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, supra
● Benjamin Castillo owned a parcel of land that was also
being claimed by the Philippine Tourism Authority.
● 2000: Castillo and Olivarez entered into a contract of
conditional sale over the property where the latter will
purchase the property for P19M. Downpayment of P5M
was to be paid within 9 months while the balance was to
be paid in 30 equal monthly installments beginning in the
month that the parties would receive a decision voiding
the Philippine Tourism Authority‘s title to the property.
○ Olivarez Realty Corporation shall file the action
against the Philippine Tourism Authority ―with
the full assistance of Castillo.‖
○ Should the action against the Philippine
Tourism Authority be denied, Castillo agreed to
reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez
Realty Corporation.
○ As to the ―legitimate tenants‖ occupying the
property, Olivarez Realty Corporation undertook
to pay them ―disturbance compensation,‖ while
Castillo undertook to clear the land of the
tenants within six months from the signing of
the deed of conditional sale. Should Castillo fail
to clear the land within six months, Olivarez
Realty Corporation may suspend its monthly
down payment until the tenants vacate the
property.
○ Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately
occupy the property upon signing of the deed of
conditional sale. Should the contract be
cancelled, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed
to return the property‘s possession to Castillo
and forfeit all the improvements
● 2004: Castillo filed a complaint for rescission of the
contract and damages against Olivarez Realty with the
RTC Tanauan
○ Substantial breach of contract: Olivarez paid
only 2.5M and did not fulfill its other obligations
under the contract
● RTC issued a summary judgment and ruled that Olivarez
breached the contract of conditional sale. The contract
was rescinded and Olivarez was ordered to pay
damages
● CA affirmed in toto the RTC‘s decision
HELD: RTC correctly rendered summary judgment
● there were no genuine issues of material fact in this case
Trial ―is the judicial examination and determination
of the issues between the parties to the action.‖
○ During trial, parties ―present their respective
evidence of their claims and defenses.‖ Parties
to an action have the right ―to a plenary trial of
the case‖ to ensure that they were given a right
to fully present evidence on their respective
claims.
○ WHEN TRIAL MAY BE DISPENSED WITH
[Rule 35 ROC] – a trial court may dispense with
trial and proceed to decide a case if from the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact. In such a case, the judgment
issued is called a summary judgment.
○ A motion for summary judgment is filed either
by the claimant or the defending party. The trial
court then hears the motion for summary
judgment. If there are no genuine issues of
material fact, the trial court shall issue
summary judgment [Sec 3 Rule 35]
■ An issue of material fact exists if
the answer or responsive pleading
filed specifically denies the material
allegations of fact set forth in the
complaint or pleading
■ If the issue of fact ―requires the
presentation of evidence, it is a
genuine issue of fact.‖
■ If the issue ―could be resolved
judiciously by plain resort‖ to the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other papers on file, the issue of fact
raised is sham, and the trial court
may resolve the action through
summary judgment.
● ITC: OLIVARE REALTY CORP admitted that it did not
fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed
of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments, it set
up the following affirmative defenses:
1. CASTILLO did not file a case to void PTA‘s title to
the property
2. CASTILLO did not clear the land of the tenants
 3. CASTILLO sold the property to a third person, and
the subsequent sale is currently being litigated
before a QC court
● Considering that PETITIONERS‘ answer tendered an
issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion
for summary judgment.
● HOWEVER, the issues raised by PETITIONERS‘ answer
are not genuine issues of material fact – can be resolved
judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits,
dispositions, and other papers on file; otherwise these
issues are sham, fictitious or patently unsubstantial
E. Motion to Dismiss
section 9, 14, RSC
Section 9. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court
determines that the case falls under this Rule, it may, from an
examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim and
such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the case
outright of any of the grounds apparent from the Claim for the
dismissal of a civil action.
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following
pleadings, motions, and petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the compliant except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement,
or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or
any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the
case falls under summary procedure, it may, from an
examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as
may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of
the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil
action. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith
issue summons which shall state that the summary
procedure under this Rule shall apply. d-c ch
section 4, 19, RSP
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following
pleadings, motions, and petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint
or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement,
or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or
any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
section 7, A.M. No. 02-11-10
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the
petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant
a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative
defense in an answer.
3. Res judicata, litis pendentia
Two concepts of res judicata [Topacio v. Banco Savings
and Mortgage Bank (2010)]
(1) Bar by prior judgment [Sec. 47(b), Rule 39]
Judgment on the merits in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the subsequent action not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat
the claim or demand, but also to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and to all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
(2) Conclusiveness of judgment [Sec.47(c), Rule 39]
The second action is upon a different claim or demand, the
judgment in the first case operates as an estoppel only with
regard to those issues directly controverted, upon the
determination of which the judgment was rendered.
Requisites for ―Bar by Prior Judgment‖
(1) Former judgment or order must be final;
(2) The judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) The decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(4) There must be, between the two actions, identity:
(a) of parties;
(b) of subject matter; and
(c) of causes of action [Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank (2010)]
The test of identity of cause of action lies not in the form of
the action but on whether or not the same evidence would
support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. [DBP v. Pundogar (1993)]
Rationale: The sum and substance of the whole doctrine is
that a matter once judicially decided is finally decided
because of:
(1) Public policy and necessity makes it the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation;
(2) The hardship on the individual that he should be vexed
twice for the same cause. [Nabus v. CA (1991)]
section 1, Rule 9
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(2a)

section 1(f), Rule 16
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or
by the statute of limitations;
section 8, Rule 15
Section 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of
section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived. (8a)
Section 47, Rule 39
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect
of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or
final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration
or the condition, status or relationship of the person,
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
of the testator or intestate; (b) In other cases, the judgment or
final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been missed in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest, by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (49a)
article 15-16, 2037, 2041, NCC
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect
and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution
except in compliance with a judicial compromise. (1816)
Article 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by
the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand. (n)
section 50, Rule 39, 1964 Rules of Court
SECTION 50. Effect of Foreign Judgments. — The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
section 311, Act. No. 190
Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana Realty, G.R. No. 134284, 1
December 2000
- Ayala sold its lot (SPS SY) Manuel Sy & Vilma Po and
(SPS KIENG) with special conditions:
a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building
plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latters
approval
b) the construction of the building shall start on or before
March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such
completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor
the title released even if the purchase price shall have been
fully paid
c) there shall be no resale of the property
- Both Sps Sy and Sps Kieng failed to construct the
building in violation of the Special Conditions of
Sale.
- Notwithstanding the violation, Sy and Ka Kieng, in April
1989, were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development Corporation with Ayala‘s
approval
- Rosa-Diana executed an Undertaking promising to
abide by said special conditions of sale executed
between Ayala and the original vendees. Upon the
submission of the Undertaking, together with the
building plans for a condominium project, known as The
Peak, Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling
Rosa-Diana to register the deed of sale in its favor and
obtain Certificate of Title. The title carried as
encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the
deed restrictions. Rosa-Dianas building plans as
approved by Ayala were subject to strict compliance of
cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and
to the restrictions encumbering the Lot regarding the
use and occupancy of the same. Rosa-Diana submitted
to the building official of Makati another set of building
plans for The Peak which were substantially
different from those that it earlier submitted to Ayala for
approval.
- Ayala filed an action with RTC Makati for specific
performance, with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-
Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply with
the contractual obligations under the building plans it
submitted. In the alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission
of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa- Diana Realty
- RTC: DENIED
- Rosa-Diana able to complete the construction of the
building.
- Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on Rosa-Diana‘s title.
- Register of Deeds of Makati: refused registration of
the notice of lis pendens
o on the ground that the case pending before the
trial court, being an action for specific
performance and/or rescission, is an action in
 personam which does not involve the title, use
or possession of the property.
o Land Registration Authority (LRA): reversed
the ruling of the Register of Deeds
o action for specific performance or rescission
may be classified as a proceeding of any kind
in court directly affecting title to the land or the
use or occupation thereof for which a notice of
lis pendens may be held proper.
st
- CA: Overturned the LRA decision (1 CA case)
- SC affirmed CA: the notice of lis pendens is not proper
in this instance. The case before the trial court is a
personal action since the cause of action thereof arises
primarily from the alleged violation of the Deed of
Restrictions.
- In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of
evidence before the trial court.
- Rosa-Diana → filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring
that Ayala failed to establish its right to the relief sought
- RTC: sustained Rosa-Diana‘s Demurrer to Evidence
- CA: Affirmed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
appeal is sealed by the doctrine of the law of the case in
st
the 1 CA case where it was held that Ayala is barred
from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions in question
pursuant to the doctrine of waiver and estoppel
- Upon MR, the CA clarified that the citation of the
st
decision in 1 CA case was made not because said
decision is res judicata to the case at bar but rather
because it is precedential under the doctrine of
stare decisis
- Ayala filed the present appeal, contending that the
st
pronouncement in the 1 CA case that it is estopped
from enforcing the deed restrictions is merely obiter
dicta inasmuch as the only issue raised in the aforesaid
case was the propriety of a lis pendens annotation on
Rosa-Dianas certificate of title. Ayala avers that Rosa-
Diana presented no evidence whatsoever on Ayala‘s
supposed waiver or estoppel in said case.
HELD: Petition GRANTED, CA REVERSED
law of the case stare decisis Res judicata
- operates only - proceeds from the ruling adhered
in the particular the first principle of to in the particular
case and only as justice that, absent case needs to be
a rule of policy powerful followed as
and not as one of countervailing precedent
law considerations, like subsequent
- adhered to in cases ought to be litigation between
the single case decided alike the same parties
where it arises, - once a point of
but is not carried law has been
into other cases established by the
as a precedent court, that point of
law will, generally,
be followed by the
same court and by
all courts of lower
rank in subsequent
cases where the
same legal issue is
raised
- only issue that was raised before the CA was whether or
not the annotation of lis pendens is proper. It is clear
that the CA was aware that the issue as to W/N
petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of
restrictions has yet to be resolved by the trial court.
Though it did make a pronouncement that the petitioner
is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions, it
also mentioned at the same time that this particular
issue has yet to be resolved by the trial court. When
appealed to the SC, the latter affirmed the ruling of the
CA only as regards the particular issue of the propriety
of the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
- Hence, there is no reason why the law of the case or
stare decisis can be held to be applicable in the case at
bench.
- the pronouncement made by the CA that petitioner
Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of
restrictions can only be considered as obiter dicta.
- A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of the court, and
made without argument, or full consideration of the
point, not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge
himself
o Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine
of stare decisis
Notes:
 Stare Decisis - When the SC has laid down a principle
of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply to it all future cases where
the facts are substantially the same
 Law of the Case - Whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the case continues to be
the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.
 Obiter Dicta is not part of the law of the case
Zarate v. Director, G.R. No. 13334, 18 March 1919
 Court of Land Registration declared that Zarate has a
right to register title to all of the lands described in the
application, with exception of the portion claimed as
homestead by Gamido.
 On the return of the record to the CFI Nueva Ecija, an
order was issued by the judge, finding that a homestead
patent had been issued to Gamido and consequently
directing the exclusion of the portion of the land
a described in the main decision
in  Zarate appeals from this order, although his intention is
not well grounded, resulting principally through an
erroneous conception of the original decision of this
court as written in English.
HELD: The Court explained that ―we must respect the title so
secured, provided it be a fact that the patent has been
secured in any of said homestead proceedings.‖
 A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate
court has once declared the law in a case, such
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on
subsequent appeal.
 The ―law of the case‖ as applied to a former decision of
an appellate court merely expresses the practice of
courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided.
o Such rule is necessary to enable an
appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be
impossible if a question, once considered
and decided by it were to be litigated anwe
in the same case upon any and every
subsequent appeal.‖
o The goal is to end litigation.
 The Supreme Court of Missouri described the phrase
―Law of the Case‖ in Mangold v. Bacon: ―The general
rule, nakedly and badly put, is that legal conclusions
announced on a first appeal, whether on the general law
or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial court
to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they
become and remain the law of the case in all after steps
below or above on subsequent appeal.
o The rule is grounded on convenience,
experience, and reason. Without the rule
there would be no end to criticism,
reagitation, reexamination, and
reformulation. In short, there would be
endless litigation.
o It would be intolerable if parties litigant
were allowed to speculate on changes in
the personnel of a court, or on chance of
our rewriting propositions once gravely
ruled on solemn argument and handed
down as the law of a given case.
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942)
- MRS. SATHER MR. COOK and DR. ZEILER to make
drafts against her commercial account in Los Angeles.
MR. COOK opened a commercial account at Bank of
San Dimas in the name of CLARA SATHER BY
CHARLES COOK. Amounts were drawn from Los
Angeles account to San Dimas account to meet various
expenses of MRS. SATHER
- MRS. SATHER signed by mark an authorization
directing the Los Angeles bank to transfer the balance
of her savings account to San Dimas Bank. Cook
withdrew the entire balance from that account and
opened a new account in the same bank in the name of
himself and his wife
- MRS. SATHER died. COOK qualified as executor of
estate and proceeded with its administration. After the
lapse of several years, he filed an account and made no
mention of the money transferred by MRS. SATHER to
the San Dimas Bank. The beneficiaries under MRS.
SATHER‘s will filed objections to the account for this
reason. After a hearing on the objections the court
settled the account and ruled that the MRS. SATHER
during her lifetime made a gift to COOK of the amount
deposited
- BERNHARD was appointed adminstratrix. She
instituted the action against Bank of America
(successor of San Dimas Bank) seeking to recover
the deposit on the ground that the bank was
indebted to the estate for this amount because MRS.
SATHER never authorized its withdrawal
- TC ruled in favor of the bank: COOK‘s ownership of the
money was conclusively established by the finding of
the probate court
HELD: the doctrine of res judicata applies because of the
ruling of the probate court on settlement of COOK‘s account
● Doctrine of res judicata: precludes parties or their
privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been
finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Any issue necessarily decided in such litigation is
conclusively determined as to the parties or their privies
if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different
cause of action.
○ Rule is based upon sound public of policy of
limiting litigation by preventing a party who has
had one fair trial on an issue from again
drawing it into controversy
○ Protects persons from being twice vexed for the
same cause
○ Must conform to the mandate of due process of
law that no person be deprived of personal or
property rights by a judgment without notice and
an opportunity to be heard
WHO MAY ASSERT RES JUDICATA
● Facile formula: the plea of res judicata is available only
when there is privity and mutuality of estoppel
● Under the requirement of privity, only parties to the
former judgment or their privies may take advantage of
or be bound by it.
○ A party in this connection is one who is directly
interested in the subject matter, and had a right
to make defense or to control the proceeding,
and to appeal from the judgment
○ A privy is one who, after rendition of the
judgment, has acquired an interest in the
subject matter affected by the judgment through
or under one of the parties, as by inheritance,
succession or purchase
● The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the
earlier adjudication would have been bound by it, had it
gone against him
AGAINST WHOM A PLEA OF RES JUDICATA MAY BE
ASSERTED
● The requirements of due process of law forbid the
assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless
he was bound by the earlier litigation in which the matter
was decided
● He is bound by that litigation only if he has been a
party thereto or in privity with a party thereto. There
is no compelling reason for requiring that the party
asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a
party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation
● Courts have abandoned the requirement of mutuality and
confined the requirement of privity to the party against
whom the plea of res judicata is asserted
● Exception to the requirement of mutuality and
privity: that they are not necessary where the liability of
the defendant asserting the plea of res judicata is
dependent upon or derived from the liability of one who
was exonerated in an earlier suit brought by the same
plaintiff (example of derivative liability: master and
servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and
indemnitee)
● In determining validity of res judicata, 3 questions are
pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
● ITC: Bank is not precluded by lack of privity or of
mutuality of estoppel from asserting the plea of res
judicata against the plaintiff. Since the issue as to the
ownership of the money is identical with the issue raised
in the probate proceeding, and since the order of the
probate court settling the executor's account was a final
adjudication of this issue on the merits, it remains only to
determine WON the plaintiff was a party or in privity with
a party to the earlier proceeding. The plaintiff has
brought the present action in the capacity of
administratrix of the estate. In this capacity she
represents the very same persons and interests that
 were represented in the earlier hearing on the executor's
account.
● The plea of res judicata is therefore available against
plaintiff as a party to the former proceeding, despite her
formal change of capacity
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
- University of Illinois Foundation (Foundation) is the
owner by assignment of U.S. Patent No. 3,210,767,
issued to Dwight E. Isbell.
- The patent is for "Frequency Independent Unidirectional
Antennas, designed for transmission and reception of
electromagnetic radio frequency signals used in many
types of communications, including the broadcasting of
radio and television signals
- the patent has been much litigated since it was first
granted in Oct 1965. In University of Illinois Foundation
v. Winegard Co: The Foundation filed in the Southern
District of Iowa an infringement suit against the
Winegard Co., an antenna manufacturer - the Court
held for the alleged infringer and against the patentee. It
held that the patent was invalid
- in the present case, The Foundation filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois charging its customer,
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. (hereafter B-T), with
infringing two patents it owned by assignment, including
the Isbell Patent and Mayes patent.
- The trial judge held that the Foundation‘s patents were
valid and infringed
HELD: THE DETERMINATION OF PATENT INVALIDITY IS
RES JUDICATA AS AGAINST THE PATENTEE IN A
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
- Triplett v. Lowell exemplified the judge-made doctrine of
mutuality of estoppel: unless both parties (or their
privies) in a second action are bound by a judgment in a
previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in the second
action may use the prior judgment as determinative.
- However, even when the ruling was Triplett v Lowell
was promulgated, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
has been in scrutiny. Courts had discarded the
requirement of mutuality and held that only the party
against whom the plea of estoppel was asserted had to
have been in privity with a party in the prior action.
- Judicial economy and an interest in the best use of
plaintiff‘s and defendant‘s resources mandate the bar to
bring the same claim against a different party
● Assuming that a perfectly sound judgment of
invalidity has been rendered in an earlier suit
involving the patentee, a second infringement action
raising the same issue and involving much of the
same proof has a high cost to the individual parties.
● Following the Triplett ruling, there would be a
tendency to multiply the opportunities for holders of
invalid patents to exact licensing agreements or
other settlements from alleged infringers. (In its
discussion, the Court heavily discussed the fact that
patents are imbued with public interest)
- Thus, we conclude that Triplett should be overruled to
the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing
a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been
declared invalid
Perkins v Benguet Consolidated, G.R. No. L-1981, 30
October 1953
- Mrs. Perkins filed a suit for partition of community
property against her husband, Mr. Perkins before CFI
Manila [FIRST CASE]
o Mr. Perkins filed counterclaim, arguingthat
some of the assets in the community property
were joint property and that Mrs. Perkins
illegally deprived him of the possession and
admin of said assets; requested that she
render account of said assets
o Mrs. Perkins later on withdrew the lawsuit and
reuested that judgment be rendered pursuant
to Mr. Perkins‘ counterclaim
o CFI rendered decision granting Mr. Perkins‘
counterclaim
- Mr. Perkins filed a lawsuit before the SC of NY against
Mrs. Perkins asking for delivery of the shares of stock in
Benguet Consolidated Mining issued to Mrs. Perkins as
their marital property and under the custody of the
Guaranty Trust Co. of NY [SECOND CASE]
o Mrs. Perkins opposed, claiming that the
decision of the CFI Manila was obtained by
fraud and therefore void. She asked that she
be declared the owner of said shares
o The SC of NY ruled in favor of Mr. Perkins.
o On appeal, the State CA of NY ruled in favor of
Mrs. Perkins
- Mr. Perkins filed a case before the CFI against Mrs.
Perkins and Benguet Consolidated Mining, asking for
recognition as the person in control of the shares of
stocks and for delivery of the dividends [THIRD CASE]
HELD: the deision of the State CA of NY constitutes res
judicata
- When Mr. Perkins went to the NY court to litigate again
over the ownership of the shares of stock, he
abandoned the decision of the CFI Manla, waiving the
rights awarded to him. He should not be allowed today
to challenge the judgment against him in a case that he
promoted.
- In the case before the NY court and in the present case
there is identity of things: shares and dividends; there is
identity of causes, the claim of ownership and
possession; and identity of persons
- The contention that Benguet was not a party to the case
in NY is of no moment, because Benguet does not claim
any adverse rights over the shares
Feliciano v. CA, 287 S 61 (1998)
- Eleuterio Cosme obtained a loan from the Insular Bank
of Asia and America → secured by a mortgage over a
parcel of land registered in his name ―married to
Asuncion Obando.‖
- Loan not paid upon maturity; mortgage was foreclosed
extrajudicially and sold at public auction with the bank
as the highest bidder. After the lapse of the redemption
period, ownership over the land was consolidated in the
bank
- Eleuterio Cosme and his wife Asuncion Obando died.
Their daughters, Elisa C. Feliciano and Arsenia C.
Buendia, took possession of the property and exercised
their rights of ownership thereof as compulsory heirs of
their deceased parents
- Elisa instituted before the RTC an action against the
bank for the Annulment of Mortgage, Certificate of Sale,
Deed of Absolute Sale
- Ernesto Baron bought the subject property from the
bank and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in his favor
- Baron demanded from Elisa and Arsenia to pay rents
and vacate the premises
- Elisa refused insisting that she was owner of the
property and that it was currently the subject of a
pending litigation in the RTC
- Baron filed a complaint for ejectment before the MeTC
- MeTC dismissed the case on the ground of litis
pendentia
- RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC holding that litis
pendentia existed
- CA reversed: litis pendentia was not present in this case
as there was no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for
- Before the SC: Petitioner Elisa C. Feliciano now insists
that there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for in both the pending RTC case for annulment and
reconveyance with damages, and the MeTC case for
ejectment, i.e., ownership and possession of the subject
property and that, additionally, a judgment in the
pending RTC case, regardless of which party is
successful, will amount to res judicata in the ejectment
case
HELD: No litis pendentia
- Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means ―a
pending suit.‖
- It is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant
- Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action and that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious.
- Therefore, for litis pendentia to be invoked the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and,
(c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other
- litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of
the absence of the second and third requisites.
- the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the
same. In the annulment and reconveyance suit, the
issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent
foreclosure sale, whereas the issue in the ejectment
case is whether, assuming the mortgage and
foreclosure sale to be valid, private respondent has the
right to take possession of
o In the former case, the relief prayed for is
recovery of ownership of the subject land,
while the latter, it is the restoration of
possession thereof to private respondent
- MeTC can validly try the ejectment case even while the
annulment suit is being litigated in the RTC
- different causes of action in the RTC and MeTC cases,
a decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as
to the other. Concededly, a decision in one case may, to
a certain extent, affect the other case since they involve
the same parcel of land. But the test to determine
identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the
same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first
- The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no case bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment
shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon the different cause of action
involving possession
o If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases
could easily be frustrated by the defendant
through the simple expedient of filing an action
in the RTC contesting the plaintiff‘s ownership
over the property from which the defendant is
sought to be evicted. This would render
nugatory the underlying philosophy of the
summary remedy of ejectment which is to
prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the
peace and to discourage those who, believing
themselves entitled to the possession of the
property, resort to force rather than to some
appropriate action in court to assert their
claims
- the test is whether admitting the facts alleged, the court
can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff
Camara v. CA, 310 S 608 (1999)
- Jose Zulueta (Zulueta) executed in favor of Spouses
Camara a Contract of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot
in Makati City.
- After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Spouses
Camara noticed two separate mortgages annotated on
the TCT of the lot – a first mortgage in favor of China
Banking Corp. and a second mortgage in favor of
Ramon Lacson (Lacson).
- Upon knowing such encumbrances, Spouses Camara
brought an action for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
against Zulueta, to remove from the title the annotated
mortgages.
o During its pendency, the loan covered by the
first mortgage was settled, leaving only the
Lacson mortgage.
o Lacson executed a Deed of Assignment of his
mortgage in favor of Celina Hernaez
(Hernaez).
- A decision was rendered in the action for specific
performance, ordering Zulueta to cancel or release the
said mortgages
- Zulueta executed in favor of Hernaez a ―Supplemental
and Amendment to the Mortgage‖ over his (Zulueta‘s)
other properties, which instrument reproduced,
confirmed and supplemented the assigned Lacson
mortgage.

- Hernaez brought an action for JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE of the ―Supplemental and Amendment
to Contract of Mortgage‖ against the heirs of Zulueta
(who died at this time).
- A decision in the action for judicial foreclosure was
rendered in favor of Hernaez
- Spouses Camara instituted a case for QUIETING OF
TITLE against Hernaez before RTC Makati, but it was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata and lack of
cause of action.
HELD: Spouses Camara‘s case for quieting of title was
properly dismissed on the grounds of res judicata
- Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by
prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and
the second is conclusiveness of judgment under
Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
- ITC: , res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness
of judgment applies. The judgment in the ACTION
FOR JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE brought by Hernaez
is conclusive on Spouses Camara‘s ACTION FOR
QUIETING OF TITLE.
o There is ―conclusiveness of judgment,‖
when, between the first case where
judgment was rendered and the second
case where such judgment is invoked, there
is identity of parties, NOT of causes of
action. The judgment is conclusive in the
second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined, and
not as to matters merely involved therein.
- As to the cause of action, the action for judicial
foreclosure is different from the action of quieting of
title, the former being anchored on the Supplemental
and Amendment to Contract of Mortgage, and the latter
on the old cause of action arising from Zulueta‘s
violation of his express warranty that the subject Makati
lot was free from any lien or encumbrance when it was
sold to the Spouses.
- As to identity of parties, although the parties
involved are not exactly the same, there is
substantially an identity of parties, for purposes of
res judicata. Even if the first action for judicial
foreclosure was brought against the heirs of Zulueta and
the present action is against Hernaez, the former and
the latter can be considered as substantially the same
parties since Hernaez is a successor in interest of the
late Zulueta.
- There is identity of parties not only where the
parties are the same but also those in privity with
them, as between their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity, or where there is substantial
identity of parties
- As to subject matter, the prior action for judicial
foreclosure and the present action for quieting of
title involve the same Makati lot. Although it does not
have the same effect as res judicata which bars
subsequent actions, still, conclusiveness of judgment
operates as estoppel with respect to matters in issue or
points controverted, on the determination of which the
finding or judgment was anchored
Tan v. CA, G.R. No. 142401, 20 August 2001
 Andrew Tan and Wu Sen Woei met in Taiwan where the
former proposed to the latter to invest money in the
former‘s hatchery business.
 Wu Sen Woei parted with $80,000.00 (P1.6M) as a
result, but only repaid $10,000.
 Wu Sen Woei filed a complaint before the NBI to recover
the unpaid balance.
 Before the NBI, Tan and his sister assigned a Joint
Affidavit of Undertaking in which Tan acknowledged his
indebtedness to Wu Sen Woei and that they bind
themselves to pay him the remaining balance.
o Tan assailed the validity of the Undertaking
before RTC Dagupan claiming that he was
coerced into signing it.
 RTC: declared the undertaking null and void due to
vitiation of Tan‘s consent.
 CA: reversed RTC, dismissed Tan‘s complaint (1st
decision); ordered Tan to pay P45,000, doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment applicable (2nd decision)
o Based on the undertaking, Wu Sen Woei was
further able to collect $25,000. He filed another
complaint to collect the remaining P45,000 plus
interest and attorney‘s fees, on the ground that
Tan had defrauded him by not actually investing
the money into the said business.
HELD: the CA decision concerning the validity of Tan‘s
Affidavit of Undertaking has become conclusive on the
parties pursuant to the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment
 CA‘s earlier decision concerning the validity of the
undertaking has become conclusive to the parties,
pursuant to Sec. 47(c) Rule 39. The parties are bound by
the matters adjudged and those that are actually and
necessarily included therein.
 Doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment or ―preclusion of
issues‖ or ―collateral estoppel‖: issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action.
 In the case at bar, Tan again seeks refuge in the alleged
nullity of the same undertaking which was already ruled
upon with finality. The question on the validity of the
undertaking has been settled. The same question cannot
be raised again even in a different proceeding involving
the same parties.
 Although the action instituted in this case (collection of a
sum of money) is a technically different action from the
case in RTC Dagupan (for annulment of document), the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment still applies
because under this principle, the identity of causes of
action is not required, but merely identity of issues.
o Conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular acts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim/cause of action.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
- CORPUZ was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He married
STO. TOMAS, a Filipina
- STO TOMAS was having an affair with another man
- CORPUZ returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice granted the
petition for divorce and the divorce decree took effect a
month later
- 2 years after the divorce,CORPUZ has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiancee in PH, he went to Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and STO TOMAS‘ marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the NSO informed him that the
marriage between him and STO TOMAS still subsists
under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court
- CORPUZ filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with RTC. Although summoned, STO TOMAS
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted a
notarized letter/manifestation to RTC offering no
opposition to CORPUZ‘ petition and alleging her desire
to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circulstances
- RTC: Denied the petition. CORPUZ was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. Only the Filipino spouse can avail of this remedy
- CORPUZ filed present petition asserting that his petition
before RTC is essentially a declaratory relief similar to
that filed in ORBECIDO and asked for a determination
of his rights under Art 26 par 2 Family Code since the
provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse
HELD: 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code does
not extend to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce BUT
REMAND OF CASE IS PROPER. The foreign divorce
decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition
in this jurisdiction
- The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien‘s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves
as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of CORPUZ,
pursuant to Sec 48 Rule 39 which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments
- Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment
- RULE: No sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country. The foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien‘s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense
- ITC: Since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Sec 24 Rule 132 applies. This
requires proof either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office
- CORPUZ attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce. This can already justify dismissal of
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence unless
court deems it more appropriate to remand case to RTC
to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with Canadian divorce law. [SC: REMAND CASE -
more appropriate given the Art 26 interests that will be
served and STO TOMAS‘ obvious conformity with the
petition]
- Remand will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner‘s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact
- Every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Sec 48, Rule 39
o More than the principle of comity that is served
by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms
- This same effect will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that Art 26 par 2
Family Code provides
Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No.
167246, 20 July 2011
- Umale agreed to lease a lot owned by Canoga (who
acquired said lot from Ortigas Co. Ltd through a Deed of
Absolute Sale, subject to certain conditions)
- Before the lease contract expired, Canoga filed an
unlawful detainer case against Umale
o Umale violated some of the stipulations in the
lease contract regarding the use of the property.
The lease contract states that Umale shall use
the leased lot as a parking space for light
vehicles and as a site for a small drivers
canteen and may not utilize the subject
premises for other purposes without the
respondents prior written consent. Umale,
however, constructed restaurant buildings and
other commercial establishments on the lot and
subleased the property, without first securing
the required written consent.
- MTC ruled in favor of Canoga → RTC reversed and
dismissed the complaint → Canoga filed a petition for
review with the CA
- During the pendency of the case with the CA, Canoga
filed another unlawful detainer case concerning the same
property against Umale before the MTC because the
lease contract of the parties had expired
- MTC ruled in favor of Canoga → RTC reversed on the
ground of litis pendentia; however, Umale was still
ordered to pay rent → CA nullified and set aside RTC
decision ruling that there was no litis pendentia as the
two unlawful detainer cases have different causes of
action
HELD: No litis pendentia
- The two cases involve different causes of action
o The filing of the first ejectment case was
grounded on the violation of stipulations in the
lease contract, while the filing of the second
case was based on the expiration of the lease
contract.
o At the time the first eject complaint was filed,
the lease contract was still in effect. It was only
at the expiration of the lease contract that the
cause of action in the second ejectment
 complaint accrued and made available to
Canoga.
- The restatement in the second case of the cause of
action in the first case does not result in substantial
identity between the two cases
o Even if the respondent alleged violations of the
lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the
second complaint, the main basis for ejecting
the petitioner in the second case was the
expiration of the lease contract. Had it not been
for this development, Canoga could no longer
file the second complaint.
- There can also be no conflict between the decisions of
the two cases.
- Issue in second case: W/N contract had expired. The
MTC did not rule on the alleged violations of the lease
contract.
Lim v. Kou Co Ping, G.R. No. 175256, 179160, 23 August
2012
- An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion was filed against Co
- RTC acquitted Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency
of evidence
- RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim
- Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case
- Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before RTC against Co, et.al. The complaint
asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and
abuse of rights
- Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case and Lim‘s
appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case. He
maintained that the two actions raise the same issue,
which is Co‘s liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw
the bags of cement and should be dismissed on the
ground of lis pendens and forum shopping
- CA: dismissed Lim‘s appeal from the civil aspect of the
estafa case
- RTC denied Co‘s Motion to Dismiss. The Manila RTC
held that there was no forum shopping because the
causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It
observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an
obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas
the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal
case arose from a felony.
- CA: agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis
pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two
proceedings because they do not share the same cause
of action
HELD: the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil
obligations such that they can proceed independently of each
other
- The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is
based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined
with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability
ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.
- If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted
prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action,
its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action
declares that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist."
- On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are
separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the
Civil Code
- Because of the distinct and independent nature of
the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.
- The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having
been instituted together with the criminal action.
- On the other hand, the second action, judging by the
allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action
arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights).
- the civil case involves only the obligations arising
from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in
the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of
Co arising from the offense charged. They present
different causes of action, which under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent"
from each other. Both cases can proceed to their
final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on
double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
XVII. Post-judgment Remedies
A. Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration
CONTENTS OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
[Sec. 2, Rule 37]
1) If based on FAME, it shall be supported by an affidavit of
merits, which:
a) recites the nature and character of FAME on which
the motion is based
b) states the movant‘s good and substantial cause of
action or defense; and
c) states the evidence he intends to present if granted.
2) If based on newly found evidence, it shall be supported
by:
a) Affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is
expected or given; or
b) Duly authenticated documents which are proposed
to be introduced in evidence
Rule 37
New Trial or Reconsiderations
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial
or reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal,
the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more
of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move
for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages
awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to
justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final
order is contrary to law. (1a)

Section 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration
and notice thereof. — The motion shall be made in writing
stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of
which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided
for proof of motion. A motion for the cause mentioned in
paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall be supported by
affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by affidavits. A
motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph (b) shall be
supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such
evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated
documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.
A motion for reconsideration shall point out a specifically the
findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order which
are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to
law making express reference to the testimonial or
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to
be contrary to such findings or conclusions.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not
toll the reglementary period of appeal. (2a)
Section 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.
— The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or
may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final
order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly. (3a)
Section 4. Resolution of motion. — A motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from
the time it is submitted for resolution. (n)
Section 5. Second motion for new trial. — A motion for new
trial shall include all grounds then available and those not so
included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for new
trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the
first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein
provided excluding the time during which the first motion had
been pending.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order (4a, 4, IRG)
Section 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. — If a
new trial is granted in accordance with the provisions of this
Rules the original judgment or final order shall be vacated,
and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded
evidence taken upon the former trial, insofar as the same is
material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used
at the new trial without retaking the same. (5a)
Section 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration. — If the
grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to
affect the issues as to only a part, or less than an of the
matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the
parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without
interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (6a)
Section 8. Effect of order for partial new trial. — When less
than all of the issues are ordered retried, the court may either
enter a judgment or final order as to the rest, or stay the
enforcement of such judgment or final order until after the
new trial. (7a)
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. — An order denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is not appealed, the remedy being an
appeal from the judgment or final order. (n)
section 3, Rule 41
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (n)
section 4, Rule 51
Section 4. Disposition of a case. — The Court of Appeals, in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may affirm, reverse,
or modify the judgment or final order appealed from, and may
direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had. (3a)
FRESH PERIOD RULE:
Neypes v. CA, 469 S 633 (2005)
● Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and
titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before RTC against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
● On February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed the
complaint due to prescription
○ The petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998. They filed
a MR on March 18, 1998.
○ July 01, 1998 - MR dismissed; order dismissing
received on July 22, 1998
○ July 27, 1998 - filed notice of appeal; paid the
appeal fees on Aug 03, 1998
● CA dismissed the petition claiming that the notice of
appeal was filed eight days late. The 15 day appeal
period should have been reckoned on March 03, 1998,
the day they received the Feb 12, 1998 order.
● Hence this petition.
○ Petitioners claim that the period should be
reckoned from the receipt of the denial of their
MR.
HELD: petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
● Based on Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, an appeal should be taken within 15 days
from the notice or final order appeal from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it.
It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it
may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
○ Quelnan v VHF PH - the Court ruled that the
appeal should have been filed within 15 days
after the denial of the MR of an order of
dismissal, as this constitutes the final order,
which ended the issues raised.
○ Apuyan v Hadelman -order denying the MR was
held to be the final order which finally disposed
of the issues involved.
● Thus, it is the July 01, 1998 order, denying the MR which
is considered the final order as contemplated in the
rules.
● In Quelnan and Apuyan the Court ruled that with both
petitioners filing a MR, they only had the remaining time
of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal.
This means that the filing of the MR only interrupted the
running of the 15-day appeal period.
● The Court noted however that an appeal is an essential
part of the judicial system and the rules of procedure
should not be applied rigidly. It also noted that the
Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts.
● Thus, it ruled that to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This fresh period shall also apply to
Rule 40 (appeals from MTC to RTC), RUle 42 (petition
for review from RTC to CA), Rule 43 (appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to CA), and Rule 45.
● The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
or resolution.
○ Thus, this rule does not run counter to the spirit
of Sec 39 of BP 129, which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days from 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only
when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
MR.
Note: Fresh period does not apply to Rules 65 and 64
Pates v. COMELEC, G.R. 184915, 30 Jun 2009
● February 1, 2008 → The COMELEC First Division issued
its Resolution (assailed in the petition);
● February 4, 2008 → The counsel for petitioner Nilo T.
Pates (petitioner) received a copy of the February 1,
2008 Resolution;
● February 8, 2008 → The petitioner filed his MR of the
February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of
the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
● September 18, 2008 → The COMELEC en banc issued
a Resolution denying the MR (also assailed in the
petition).
● September 22, 2008 → The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
● Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a
petition for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final
COMELEC Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18,
2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining period
of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in
preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration.
● Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20, 2008
the following Monday or the first working day after
October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition to
the SC on October 22, 2008 or two days late.
● Petitioner now argues that the petition was seasonably
filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court in a number of cases decided beginning
the year 2005.
● Petitioner argues that this Court has consistently held
that the order or resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration or new trial is considered as the final
order finally disposing of the case, and the date of its
receipt by a party is the correct reckoning point for
counting the period for appellate review.
● The fresh period refers to the original period provided
under the Rules of Court counted from notice of the
ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the tribunal
below, without deducting the period for the preparation
and filing of the motion for reconsideration.
● He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the
prevailing rule in filing petitions for certiorari.
HELD: DENIED
● unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof
● the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELECs
rules of procedure should expedite the disposition of
election cases.
● we do not find convenience and uniformity to be reasons
sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for
the filing of petitions for certiorari under Rule 64
● The reason is constitutionally-based and is no less than
the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt
determination of election results
Velasco v. Ortiz, 184 S 303 (1990)
● petitioner in her personal capacity and in her capacity as
administratix of the intestate of Lorenzo filed with the CFI
of Rizal a complaint for recovery of property and
annulment of certain documents alleging that Tan Sim
Te had misappropriated and converted to her own use
the bank deposits of the deceased Lorenzo.
● In her answer, Tan Sim Te countered that the
withdrawals had been made by her upon instructions of
Lorenzo to whom the monies were allegedly given and
who allegedly used the same to pay his creditors and to
defray his medical expenses.
● CFI: Tan Sim Te to deliver to Velasco the amounts the
former wirthdrew representing double the share of the
estate of Lorenzo in the said deposits, and deliver the
plaintiff‘s corresponding conjugal share in the bank
deposits as well as interest, and attorney‘s fees.
● A copy of the CFI decision was received by PR‘s former
counsel, Atty. Acejas on April 6, 1979.
● May 10, 1979 or four days after the 30-day reglementary
period to appeal had lapsed, PR through her new
counsel Atty. Ordonez filed a Motion for New Trial
otg of newly discovered evidence (medical certificate
relating to the physical and medical examination
undergone by Lorenzo during his confinement at the
hospital and thereafter as of Jan. 24, 1975)
○ PR‘s new counsel sought to excuse the
tardiness of the filing of New Trial by pleading
―excusable negligence.‖
○ He was engaged only on April 18, 1979 and
believed in good faith that he had 30d from April
18 within which to file the appropriate
pleadings… it was only on May 9, 1979 that the
counsel was informed by the former counsel of
PR, Atty. Acejas, that he has not filed any
petition/motion insofar as the decision is
concerned
● TC: granted Motion for New Trial
HELD: grant of the respondent judge of the Motion for New
Trial was NOT proper
 at the time the Motion for New Trial was filed, the
reglementary period to appeal had already lapsed and
the CFI decision had already become final and executor
 the certification may not be regarded as ―newly
discovered evidence‖ under Rule 37. It is clearly in the
nature of impeaching evidence, for it seeks merely to
weaken or controvert findings of the earlier witness.
Being merely impeaching evidence, the certification by
itself would not have resulted in a different decision
● RATIONALE: Unless the movant sets the time and
place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection
● OBJECTIVE: To avoid a capricious change of mind in
order to provide due process to both parties ensure
impartiality in the trial
B. Petition for Relief from Judgment
When is a judgment “entered”? Judgment is entered when
it is deemed final and executor

PRO FORMA MOTION: What is the effect of granting a petition for relief? It has
Fajardo v. CA, 354 S 736 (2001) the effect of reopening the proceedings or an appeal. A
BUGARING field a complaint before RTC against FAJARDO petition for relief is not used to reverse a decision.
for collection of attorney‘s fees. BUGARING was allowed to
present evidence ex parte after RTC declared FAJARDO in
Rule 38
default for failure to appear during the pre-trial. The RTC
Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings
ruled in favor of Bugaring, ordering Fajardo to pay P3.5M for
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
attorney‘s fees covering Civil Cases No. B3472 and B3896.
proceedings. — When a judgment or final order is entered, or
● BUGARING filed a motion for correction of judgment
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
before RTC
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
● FEB 3 1998 - FAJARDO, alleging that she received a
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
copy of the RTC‘s decision on JAN 19 1998, filed a
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
notice of appeal
set aside. (2a)
● RTC: Denied notice of appeal for being premature
considering that there was a pending motion for
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a
correction of the decision; granted BUGARING‘s motion
judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case,
for correction [FEB 13]
and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
○ REVISED DISPOSITIVE: P3.5M for attorney‘s
negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he
fees for unpaid attorney‘s fees covering the
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
legal cases which he handled in favor of
that the appeal be given due course. (1a)
FAJARDO, as actual and compensatory
damages plus costs
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. —
● BUGARING: Filed motion for issuance of writ of
A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of
execution [GRANTED - SEP 28]
this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
● FAJARDO: Filed before CA a petition for certiorari. She
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
argued that motion for correction was a mere scrap of
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
paper because she was not furnished a copy and it
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
contained no notice of hearing. The filing of the notice of
proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with
appeal perfected the appeal and RTC no longer had
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
jurisdiction over the case when it issued the FEB 13
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
order and SEP 28 resolution.
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense,
● CA: petition dismissed, RTC affirmed
as the case may be. (3)
HELD: CA erred in ruling that the decision of RTC became
final and executory when FAJARDO failed to appeal within
Section 4. Order to file an answer. — If the petition is
the reglementary period
sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in
● FAJARDO filed a notice of appeal of OCT 15 decision
which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse
on FEB 3 (pendency of her appeal tolled the finality of
parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the
the decision) The resolution of RTC ordering the
receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as
execution of the judgment was without basis
the court may direct, together with copies of the petition and
● RTC orders were issued in consideration of the motion
the accompanying affidavits. (4a)
for correction of judgment filed by BUGARING with
RTC. HOWEVER, said motion was defective as it did
Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. —
not have a proper notice of hearing. It did not specify the
The court in which the petition is filed may grant such
date and time of the hearing on the motion
preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the
ROC requires that every written motion be set for hearing by
preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the
the movant, except those motions which the court may act
petitioner of a bond in favor of the adverse party, conditioned
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The
that if the petition is dismissed or the petitioner fails on the
notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must
trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party
specify the time and date of the hearing [Sec 4 & 5 Rule 15]
all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason
● A motion without hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of
of the issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings
paper. It presents no question which the court could
following the petition, but such injunction shall not operate to
decide. The
discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may
court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no
have acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner. (5a)
right to receive it.

Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. — After the filing
of the answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the
court shall hear the petition and if after such hearing, it finds
that the allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall be
dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set
aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding
complained of upon such terms as may be just. Thereafter
the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other
proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken. The
court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if
a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been
granted by it. (6a)
Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set
aside. — Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the
lower court shall be required to give due course to the appeal
and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely
and proper appeal had been made. (7a)
Francisco v. Puno, G.R. No. L-55694, 23 October 1981
● Josefina Lagar [PRIV RESP] filed with Judge Puno a
complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and
damages
● PET filed Answer, alleging that PRIV RESP lacks
personality to sue. Also alleged prescription and that
they are buyers in good faith
● case was set for pre-trial, but PET failed to appear
thereat
● January 8, 1980: PRIV RESP moved that they be
declared in default → granted. PRIV RESP presented
evidence. Judge Puno rendered judgment finding the
evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action
alleged and therefore dismissing the complaint
● January 15, 1980: PRIV RESP served with copy of the
decision
● February 16, 1980 (after 32 days): PRIV RESP filed, thru
a new counsel, a motion for new trial (MNT) and/or (MR)
reconsideration alleging that the insufficiency of her
evidence was due to the fault of her counsel who
presented the same without her being fully prepared 
judge denied MNT/MR for having been filed out of time
● May 7, 1980: PRIV RESP filed, thru another new
counsel, a petition for relief, purportedly under Rule 38
● PET answered: petition for relief was filed out of time in
the light of Section 3 of Rule 38, which provides that
such a petition should be " filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or order was entered or
such proceeding was taken."
● respondent judge ruled that: it is the date when plaintiff
actually learned (ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE) of the
decision from which she seeks relief that should be
considered in computing the period of 60 days
prescribed under Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
for purposes of determining the timeliness of the said
petition for relief
HELD: Certiorari granted. Decision granting petition for
relief set aside. January 8 decision reinstated
● where, as in this case, another remedy is available, as,
in fact, private respondent had filed a motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration alleging practically the same main
ground of the petition for relief under discussion, which
was denied, what respondent should have done was to
take to a higher court such denial. A party who has filed
a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for relief
after his motion has been denied. These two remedies
are exclusive of each other. It is only in appropriate
cases where a party aggrieved by a judgment has not
been able to file a motion for new trial that a petition for
relief can be filed.
● the petition for relief of private respondent was filed out
of time
○ We cannot sanction respondent court's view
that the period should be computed only from
March 17, 1980 when she claims self-servingly
that she first knew of the judgment because, as
stated above, she signed and even swore to the
truth of the allegations in her motion for new
trial filed by Atty. Mapaye on February 16, 1980
or a month earlier.
● notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for
purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that
notice to the party, when he is represented by a counsel
of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for
the very same reason that it is the lawyer who is
supposed to know the next procedural steps or what
ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection of
the rights of the client, and not the latter.
● respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of private respondent's petition for relief and,
therefore, all his actuations in connection therewith are
null and void, with the result that his decision of January
8, 1980 should be allowed to stand, the same having
become final and executory.
Purcon, Jr. v. MRM Philippines, Inc., 26 September 2008
● Petitioner filed a complaint for reimbursement of medical
expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability
benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees before the
NLRC.
● LA → March 31,2005: dismissed the complaint; NLRC:
September 30,2005 → dismissed appeal and affirmed
the LA → Dec 20, 2005 dismissed MR → this decision
became final and executory and was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgment on January 27, 2006.
● March 02, 206: Petitioner filed petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with CA → denied; MR denied → became final
and executory September 29, 2006
● May 09, 2007 - Pet for Review under Rule 45 with SC
● In a resolution dated July 16, 2007, the SC dismissed the
petition for being filed beyond the reglementary period of
15 days
● May 06, 2008 - Petitioner filed petition for relief from
judgment
HELD: PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS NOT
AN AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR PETITIONER
● A petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in SC.
● Although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a
judgment or final order is entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in
any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this
rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is
not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally
cognizable by this Court.
● While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and RTCs.
● Procedure in CA and SC governed by separate
provisions of the ROC
● There is no provision in the ROC making the petition for
relief applicable in the CA/SC. The procedure in the CA
from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which
pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies
available before said Court Nowhere is a petition for
relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
● If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the
remedies available in the CA, with more reason that
this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court.
This Court entertains only questions of law.
● A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are
beyond the concerns of this Court.
● Even assuming that petition for relief is applicable, the
present petition must still be dismissed.
● The Court noted the late filing of petition for review → not
excusable negligence.
● The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to
his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for
that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost, either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
● It is only in exceptional cases when the mistake of
counsel is so palpable that in amounts to gross
negligence that the Court affords a party a second
opportunity to vindicate his right. This opportunity is
unavailing in this case → squandered various
opportunities available to him
Tuason v. CA, 256 S 158 (1996)
● 1989: RESP Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the
RTC Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of
nullity of her marriage to PET Emilio R. Tuason
● June 29, 1990: RTC declared the nullity of private
respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding custody
of the children to private respondent.
● September 24, 1990: private respondent filed a Motion
for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties
● Petitioner opposed the motion and filed with the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment of the June
29, 1990 decision
○ decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process.
○ contends he was denied due process when,
after failing to appear on two scheduled
hearings, the trial court deemed him to have
waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
for private respondent
○ Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings
on the ground that he was then confined for
medical and/or rehabilitation reasons
○ admitted for treatment of drug dependency at
the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong
Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig
● RTC: Denied petition
● CA: Affirmed RTC
HELD: petition for relief from judgment is NOT warranted
● decision annulling petitioners‘ marriage to private
respondent had already become final and executory
when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary
period.
● the records show that the former counsel of petitioner did
not inform the trial court of this confinement. When the
court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of
the country for which reason the decision became final
and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom
● The failure of petitioner‘s counsel to notify him on time of
the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom
is negligence which is not excusable.
○ Notice sent to counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.
● Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former
counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner‘s
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his
non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
○ Petitioner has not given any reason why his
former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally,
did not inform the court of this fact.
● Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived
of due process. He may have lost his right to present
evidence but he was not denied his day in court.
● A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate
remedy.
○ When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail himself of this petition.
Goldline v. Ramos, 363 S 262 (2001)
Luisa Ramos‘ daughter, Leoniza, was riding a passenger
jeepney which collided head-on with a bus of GOLDLINE.
Ramos filed a Complaint for Damages against Goldline and
Eduardo Lumontad (driver of the bus) to seek indemnification
for the death of her daughter. TC ruled in favor of Ramos.
● Defendant's counsel was furnished with copy of the
decision on 20 November 1998.
● Decision of TC became final and executory for failure of
defendant to appeal therefrom. The trial court directed
the issuance of writ of execution.
● Atty. Leovigildo Mijares III (Goldline‘s counsel) filed a
Petition for Relief with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel,
alleging that they were furnished with a copy of the
decision only in March 1999.
○ He failed to obtain a copy of the decision on
time because he moved to a new office and
omitted to inform the court of his change of
address. The notices, order of default and trial
court decision were not received by him; and
that he was withdrawing as counsel with the
conformity of his client, Goldline
● TC denied the petition for relief for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period
○ Computing the 60-day period provided for
under Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
from the time the defendant Goldline Transit,
Inc. learned of the Decision of the Court, that is,
on November 20, 1998 when a copy thereof
 was received by its counsel, the 60-day period
would expire on January 20, 1999.
HELD: petition for relief from judgment should NOT be
granted
● The Court: Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure lays down the requirements of a petition for
relief from judgment:
○ The party filing a petition for relief from
judgment must strictly comply with the two (2)
reglementary periods,i.e., the petition must be
filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be
set aside; and, within a fixed period of six (6)
months from entry of such judgment, order or
other proceeding.
○ Strict compliance with these periods is required
because a petition for relief from judgment is a
final act of liberality on the part of the State,
which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any
further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some
definite time, attain finality in order to put at last
an end to litigation.
○ Because the period fixed is itself devised to
meet a condition or contingency (fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the
equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another
and final chance, and failure to avail of such
chance within the grace period set by statute or
the Rules of Court is fatal.
● ITC: the records disclose that Atty. Mijares III was
furnished with a copy of the decision of the trial court by
registered mail on 20 November 1998 at his address of
record, as shown by the return card for its mailing.
○ The Petition for Relief with Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel, on the other hand, was filed on 8
April 1999. Although the petition was filed within
six (6) months, it was not within sixty (60) days,
but only after 139 days, from the time petitioner
learned of the judgment. The absence of one of
the two (2) mentioned periods, which are
concurring elements, precludes petitioner from
availing of the remedy of relief from judgment.
○ Evidence show that the return card bears the
signature of Atty. Mijares III, unequivocally
showing receipt of the assailed decision on 20
November 1998.
● Even assuming that counsel did not really receive a copy
of the trial court's decision, this circumstance would not
in any way improve petitioner's situation. The remedy of
relief from judgment can only be resorted to on any of
the grounds mentioned in the rules, namely, fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence,
to be "excusable," must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against.
City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, 2 July
2014
● MARAMBA was a grantee of a DENR miscellaneous
lease contract for a property in Poblacion, Dagupan City
for 25 years. She caused construction of a commercial
fish center on the property.
● CITY OF DAGUPAN (CITY) caused the demolition of the
commercial fish center, allegedly without giving direct
notice to MARAMBA with threat of taking over the
property.
● MARAMBA filed a complaint for injunction and damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
TRO. The complaint alleged that the demolition was
unlawful and the complete demolition and destruction of
the previous existing commercial fish center is valued at
P5M (P10,000,000) pesos. [The word ―ten‖ was
handwritten on top of the word ―five‖]. In the prayer,
she asked for a judgment ordering defendant to pay
P10,000 for the actual and present value of the
commercial fish center completely demolished by public
defendant. [The word ―million‖ was handwritten on
top of the word ―thousand‖ and an additional zero
was handwritten at the end of the numerical figure]
● RTC (through Judge LARON): IN FAVOR OF
MARAMBA - awarded P10M as actual damages; denied
CITY‘s MR for lack of notice of time and place of hearing
(MR not entitled to judicial cognizance)
● RTC (in separate order): granted MARAMBA‘s motion for
execution and ordered that a writ of execution be issued
in the case upon submission of the certificate of finality
● CITY filed a petition for relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction together with an affidavit of
merit - alleged that the decision, were it not for the City
Legal Officer‘s mistake, negligence and gross
incompetence, would not have been obtained by
MARAMBA, or should have been reconsidered or
otherwise overturned, the damage award in total amount
of P11M being not only unconscionable and
unreasonable but completely baseless [RTC DENIED
PETITION - ORDERED WRIT OF EXECUTION BE
IMPLEMENTED (negligence of counsel binds the client)]
CITY FILED MR
● RTC (through another Judge - CASTILLO): granted
petition for relief and modified its decision - reduced the
award from P10M to P750K and moral damages from
P500K to P20K and attorney‘s fees from P500K to P20K
(basis - Art 2199 ―One is entitled to an adequate
compensation for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
duly proved‖) - not able to prove P5M amount of
improvements made and travelling expenses and car
rental
● MARAMBA filed a petition for certiorari before CA -
argued RTC acted without jurisdiction as he had no
authority or legal power to substantially amend or correct
a final and executory judgment and in granting the
petition for relief filed by CITY on the 83rd day from
receipt of the judgment or 26 days late.
● CA: GRANTED PETITION - CITY‘s MR lacked a notice
of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll
the period to appeal. RTC decision penned by Judge
LARON became final and executor.
● CITY filed Rule 45 to SC
HELD: Petition GRANTED
● Courts may set aside final and executory judgments
provided that any of the grounds for their grant are
present - fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence
○ Excusable negligence as a ground for a
petition for relief requires that the negligence be
so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against it - must be
imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or
her counsel whose negligence binds his or her
client [binding effect of counsel‘s negligence
ensures against the resulting uncertainty
 and tentativeness of proceedings if clients
were allowed to merely disown their
counsel‘s conduct]
○ Court relaxed this rule on several occasions
such as: (1) where [the] reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when [the rule‘s] application
will result in outright deprivation of the client‘s
liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of
justice so require
● Fraud as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment
pertains to extrinsic or collateral fraud. The extrinsic or
collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be
such that it prevented the unsuccessful party from fully
and fairly presenting his case or defense and the losing
party from having an adversarial trial of the issue. There
is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fully
presenting his case to the court as when the lawyer
connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client‘s
interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel
against his client when the latter is prevented from
presenting his case to the court
● Mistake as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact not
mistake of law. A wrong choice in legal strategy or mode
of procedure will not be considered a mistake for
purposes of granting a petition for relief from judgment.
Mistake as a ground also ―does not apply and was never
intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might
have committed in the trial [since] such error may be
corrected by means of an appeal.‖ Mistake can be of
such nature as to cause substantial injustice to one of
the parties. It may be so palpable that it borders on
extrinsic fraud.
● ITC: CITY recounted the mistakes, negligence and
incompetence and suspicious acts/omissions of the
Legal Officer in the affidavit of merit signed by Mayor
Lim:
○ he did not present testimonial evidence for
the defense
○ he filed MR of a decision most prejudicial to
the City on the last day and did not even
base his arguments on the transcripts that
clearly show that MARAMBA had
presented absolutely no evidence/proof of
her claim for damages and attorney‘s fees
and did not directly attack the decision itself
where awards did not state the facts on
which they are based
○ He filed MR without the requisite notice
of hearing - his most grievous and fatal
error which resulted in the finality of the
decision and issuance of order of
execution
○ He kept the adverse decision, denial of MR
and order of execution from his affiant, his
immediate superior and relief on his own
devices
ATTY‘s mistake was fatal considering that RTC awarded a
total of P11M in favor of MARAMBA based merely on her
testimony that the actual cost of building through
improvements is P5M more or less; that her husband spent
$1,760 for a round trip business travel to PH to attend the
case and that for his accommodation and car rental, her
husband spent more or less P10K including round trip ticket
● nowhere in J LARON‘s decision did it state or refer to
any document presented to substantiate her claimed
costs - she testified on amounts that did not even add
up to P10M
● body of the RTC‘s decision mentioned MARAMBA was
entitled to P1M as moral damages and P500K as
attorney‘s fees which is inconsistent with dispositive that
awarded P500K as moral damages. The affidavit of
merit that discussed that MARAMBA testified on her
shock, sleepless nights, and mental anguish but she
never expressly asked for moral damages or specified
amount of P500K
The gross disparity between the award of actual
damages and the amount actually proved during the trial,
the magnitude of the award, the nature of the ―mistake‖
made, and that such negligence did not personally affect
the legal officer of the city all contributed to a conclusion
that the mistake or negligence committed by counsel
bordered on extrinsic fraud.
Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, 9 June
2014
Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome loaned
₱500,000.00 from Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina
N. Morales. To secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome
mortgaged a house and lot. They failed to pay. Spouses
Morales [RESP] filed with the RTC a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of a house and lot. Spouses Morales [RESP] filed
with the RTC a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house
and lot.
● December 22, 2009: TC ordered PETS to pay RESP or
else property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
● January 29, 2010: PETS received a copy of the decision
● February 8, 2010: filed MR - filed a request for a
Philippine National Police handwriting expert to examine
the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome‘s alleged
signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage
● May 25, 2010: TC ruled that MR and amendment were
pro forma as PETS failed to specify the findings and
conclusions in the decision that were not supported by
the evidence or contrary to law. Therefore, MR denied
● June 24, 2010: PETS receive copy of resolution on MR
(evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the
court)
● August 11, 2010: PETS filed notice of appeal → denied
due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out
of time
● September 24, 2010: PETS filed a petition for relief from
judgment
○ blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to
file the notice of appeal within the reglementary
period → mistake and an excusable negligence
due to their former lawyer‘s old age
April 27, 2011: TC denied petition for relief → filed beyond 60
days from the finality of the trial court‘s decision
HELD: Petition lacks merit
Petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to
file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial
court‘s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted
after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The
period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is
the six-month period.
C. Petition for Annulment of Judgment
Rule 47
Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and Resolutions
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts
for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. (n)
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of,
or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief. (n)
Section 3. Period for filing action. — If based on extrinsic
fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches or estoppel. (n)
Section 4. Filing and contents of petition. — The action shall
be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging therein
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for
annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible
copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the
number of respondents. A certified true copy of the judgment
or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as
such by the petitioner. The petitioner shall also submit
together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency if there is such other action or proceeding,
he must state the status of the same, and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom. (n)
Section 5. Action by the court. — Should the court find no
substantial merit in the petition, the same may be dismissed
outright with specific reasons for such dismissal. Should
prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be
given due course and summons shall be served on the
respondent. (n)
Section 6. Procedure. — The procedure in ordinary civil
cases shall be observed. Should trial be necessary, the
reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the
court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. (n)
Section 7. Effect of judgment. — A judgment of annulment
shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution and render the same null and void, without
prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. However, where the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. (n)
Section 8. Suspension prescriptive period. — The
prescriptive period for the refiling of the aforesaid original
action shall be deemed suspended from the filing of such
original action until the finality of the judgment of annulment.
However, the prescriptive period shall not be suspended
where the extrinsic-fraud is attributable to the plaintiff in the
original action. (n)
Section 9. Relief available. — The judgment of annulment
may include the award of damages, attorney's fees and other
relief. If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution
had already been executed the court may issue such orders
of restitution or other relief as justice and equity may warrant
under the circumstances. (n)
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of
Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a judgment or
final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It
shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3,
4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto. (n)
Section 9(2), BP 129
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgements of Regional Trial Courts
Alaban v. CA, G.R. No. 156021, 23 September 23, 2005
● November 2000 - Respondent Francisco Provido filed a
petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent)
● May 30, 2001 -RTC allowed the probate of the will of the
decedent and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent
● 4 months later (October 04, 2001) petitioners filed a
motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings and
an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary
to respondent
● RTC denied motion. It held that the decision was already
final and executory even before the filing of motion to
reopen.
● Petitioners sought the annulment of the RTC decision.
They claimed that they learned of the probate
proceedings only in July 2001, hence the filing of the
motion to reopen on October 04, 2001. They argued that
the RTC decision should be annulled for extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the respondent
offered a false compromise before filing of the petition to
prevent them from appearing and opposing the petition
for probate. They contend that they were not made party
to the case so they could not have availed of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from from
judgment and other appropriate remedies
HELD: THE RTC DECISION SHOULD NOT BE ANNULLED
● A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition
for relief from judgment are remedies available only to
parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment
is rendered
○ ITC: Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that
they are not / have not become parties to the
probate proceedings
 ○ Under the ROC, proceedings for the probate of
a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the
court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition
for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of
the notice of hearing.
● As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could
have validly availed of the remedies of motion for
new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief
from judgment
○ In fact, the Court noted that they filed a motion
to reopen → essentially a motion for new trial
● Conceding that petitioners became aware of the
Decision after it had become final, they could have still
filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of
their motion to reopen.
● For failure to make use without sufficient justification of
the said remedies available to them, petitioners could
no longer resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their
own inaction or negligence
● Even casting aside the procedural requisite, petition for
annulment of judgment must fail for failure to comply with
substantive requisites
● An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is
to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is based only
on two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process
○ An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic
or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. It is when the
litigant is prevented from having his day in
court.
● ITC: no extrinsic fraud.
○ According to the Rules, notice is required to be
personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. In the will, only
respondent was instituted as sole heir.
Petitioners as nephews and nieces of the
decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs entitled to be notified. Respondent did not
have legal obligation to metion them/ notify
them.
Even assuming such obligation exist, the infirmity would have
been cured by the publication of notice.
Lazaro v Rural Bank, G.R. No. 139895, 15 August 2003
● Lazaro obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Francisco
(RFBI). He failed to pay such loan. RFBI thus sued him
for collection of deficiency in the payment. Summons
was served upon Lazaro at the address given by RFBI.
He did not answer and was declared in default.
● RFBI then sought to enforce the judgment against
Lazaro‘s property. A writ of execution was served and
issued at Lazaro‘s actual residence.
● Lazaro then filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of judgments before CA on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation. He alleged that RFBI did not
indicate in its complaints his true address thereby
depriving him the opportunity to participate in the hearing
of said cases.
HELD: JUDGMENTS SHOULD NOT BE ANNULLED
● Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by
Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file
a petition for relief against said issuances or take other
appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault
attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those cited
remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort
to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for
otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or
negligence
● ITC: Lazaro failed to avail of the ordinary and appropriate
remedies in assailing the questioned judgments of the
trial courts. He also failed to show to the satisfaction of
this Court that he could not have availed of the ordinary
and appropriate remedies under the Rules.
○ If he indeed only found out about the judgments
when writs of execution were issued, he could
have moved to quash the writs of execution or
filed a petition for relief of judgment under Rule
38. Instead, Lazaro merely alleged that he
approached the banks counsel for clarification
and assistance.
● His failure to show explanation for why he failed to avail
of said remedies, which were still available to him at that
time is fatal to his cause.
● A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not
a substitute for one‘s own neglect in not availing of the
ordinary and appropriate remedies, but a peculiar
remedy granted under certain conditions to those who
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies without their fault.
● On alleged lack of jurisdiction: The Court held that,
despite Lazaro‘s contentions, respective summons were
properly served on him.
○ Service to be done personally does not mean
that service is possible only at the defendant‘s
actual residence. It is enough that defendant is
handed a copy of the summons in person by
anyone authorized by law
Lazaro was personally served summons in both cases →
attested to by the certified true copies of the process servers
returns, which are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
set out.
D. Ordinary Appeal
1. From MTC to RTC
Rule 40
Appeal From Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts
Section 1. Where to appeal. — An appeal from a judgment or
final order of a Municipal Trial Court may be taken to the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the area to
which the former pertains. The title of the case shall remain
as it was in the court of origin, but the party appealing the
case shall be further referred to as the appellant and the
adverse party as the appellee. (a)
Section 2. When to appeal. — An appeal may be taken within
fifteen (15) days after notice to the appellant of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of the
judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Section 3. How to appeal. — The appeal is taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from. The notice of appeal shall indicate
the parties to the appeal, the judgment or final order or part
thereof appealed from, and state the material dates showing
the timeliness of the appeal. A record on appeal shall be
required only in special proceedings and in other cases of
multiple or separate appeals. The form and contents of the
record on appeal shall be as provided in section 6, Rule 41.
Copies of the notice of appeal, and the record on appeal
where required, shall be served on the adverse party. (n)
Section 4. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — The
perfection of the appeal and the effect thereof shall be
governed by the provisions of section 9, Rule 41. (n)
Section 5. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. —
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be. (n)
Section 6. Duty of the clerk of court. — Within fifteen (15)
days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court or
the branch clerk of court of the lower court shall transmit the
original record or the record on appeal, together with the
transcripts and exhibits, which he shall certify as complete, to
the proper Regional Trial Court. A copy of his letter of
transmittal of the records to the appellate court shall be
furnished the parties. (n)
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. — (a) Upon
receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the
parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such
notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed
to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him
to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum
shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c) Upon the
filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of
the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted
for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of original and such memoranda as are filed. (n)
Section 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial;
lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of
the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as
the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try
the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with
it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional
Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in
accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence
in the interest of justice. (n)
Section 9. Applicability of Rule 41. — The other provisions of
Rule 41 shall apply to appeals provided for herein insofar as
they are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of this Rule. (n)
Section 24, RSC
SEC. 24. Decision.– After the hearing, the court shall render
its decision based on the facts established by the evidence
(Form 11- SCC), within twenty-four (24) hours from
termination of the hearing. The decision shall immediately be
entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil
cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. The
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable
2. From RTC to CA
a. Non-appealable orders
Section 1, Rule 41
Appeal From The Regional Trial Courts
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An
order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment; (c) An interlocutory order; (d)
An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) An order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of
execution; (g) A judgment or final order for or against one or
more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case
is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the
above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. (n)
b. Period
section 3, Rule 41
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
c. Notice of appeal vs. record on appeal
sections 5-8, Rule 41
Section 5. Notice of appeal. — The notice of appeal shall

indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or
final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to
which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates
showing the timeliness of the appeal. (4a)
Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. —
The full names of all the parties to the proceedings shall be
stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it shall
include the judgment or final order from which the appeal is
taken and, in chronological order, copies of only such
pleadings, petitions, motions and all interlocutory orders as
are related to the appealed judgment or final order for the
proper understanding of the issue involved, together with
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.
If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal, the record on
appeal shall include by reference all the evidence, testimonial
and documentary, taken upon the issue involved. The
reference shall specify the documentary evidence by the
exhibit numbers or letters by which it was identified when
admitted or offered at the hearing, and the testimonial
evidence by the names of the corresponding witnesses. If the
whole testimonial and documentary evidence in the case is to
be included, a statement to that effect will be sufficient
without mentioning the names of the witnesses or the
numbers or letters of exhibits. Every record on appeal
exceeding twenty (20) pages must contain a subject index.
(6a)
Section 7. Approval of record on appeal. — Upon the filing of
the record on appeal for approval and if no objection is filed
by the appellee within five (5) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, the trial court may approve it as presented or upon its
own motion or at the instance of the appellee, may direct its
amendment by the inclusion of any omitted matters which are
deemed essential to the determination of the issue of law or
fact involved in the appeal. If the trial court orders the
amendment of the record, the appellant, within the time
limited in the order, or such extension thereof as may be
granted, or if no time is fixed by the order within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, shall redraft the record by including
therein, in their proper chronological sequence, such
additional matters as the court may have directed him to
incorporate, and shall thereupon submit the redrafted record
for approval, upon notice to the appellee, in like manner as
the original draft. (7a)
Section 8. Joint record on appeal. — Where both parties are
appellants, they may file a joint record on appeal within the
time fixed by section 3 of this Rule, or that fixed by the court.
(8a)
Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, 7 September
2011
● PET Lebin relayed their offer to the administrator of the
Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase an asset of the Estate.
The administrator sought judicial approval of the offer
with the RTC, stating that PET is the actual occupant of
the lot. RTC granted administrator‘s motion for the
approval of the offer
● Meanwhile, RESP Vilma Mirasol also offered to
purchase the lot where her house stood
● When RESP learned of the RTC‘s approval of PET‘s
offer, she filed a petition for relief from the order
● RTC: declared each of the claimants owner where their
respective houses stand (ordered the estate to cause the
equal partition)
● PET → Moved for reconsideration and/or new trial
(DENIED)
● March 27, 1998: PET → Notice of appeal
● May 5, 1998: PET → Record on appeal
● January 25, 1999: PET presented an ex parte motion to
approve the record on appeal
● RESP Mirasol → MTD because the record on appeal
had been filed late
● RTC: Granted MTD → Dismissed case
HELD: RTC properly dismissed the petitioner‘s appeal for
failure to timely file a record on appeal
Notice of appeal Record of appeal
mode that envisions the enables the trial court to
elevation of the original continue with the rest of the
records to the appellate court case because the original
as to thereby obstruct the records remain with the trial
trial court in its further court even as it affords to the
proceedings regarding the appellate court the full
other parts of the case opportunity to review and
decide the appealed matter.
● BP 129 innovation: elimination of the record on appeal in
most cases, retaining the record on appeal only for
appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in
which the Rules of Court allows multiple appeals (Sec
39, BP 129)
● If an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong
procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss
the appeal.
○ If an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a
RTC by notice of appeal, that appeal can and
should never go to the SC, regardless of any
statement in the notice that the court of choice
is the SC.
○ Again, if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken
from the RTC to the CA and in the CA, the
appellant raises naught but issues of law, the
appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. (Because it is an appeal by
certiorari)
○ It is only through petitions for review on
certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
may properly be invoked.
● Judgment or final order in special proceedings -
appealed by record on appeal
○ ostensible reason for requiring a record on
appeal instead of only a notice of appeal → the
multi-part nature of nearly all special
proceedings, with each part susceptible of
being finally determined and terminated
independently of the other parts
● Proper remedy: RECORD ON APPEAL
● Period to file a record on appeal: 30 days
● Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by a
judgment or final order issued in special proceedings
should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy
of the notice of appeal and a record on appeal upon the
adverse party within the period; in addition, the appealing
party shall pay within the period for taking an appeal to
the clerk of the court that rendered the appealed
judgment or final order the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees
● ITC: PET - filed the record on appeal 43 days from
March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
○ petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995
order of the RTC on May 15, 1995. They filed a
 motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on
May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998, they were
served with the order dated March 2, 1998
(denying their motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial). Although they filed a notice of appeal
on March 27, 1998, they submitted the record
on appeal only on May 5, 1998
d. Perfection of appeal
section 9, Rule 41
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. A party's
appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him
with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval
of the record on appeal filed in due time. In appeals by notice
of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties. In appeals by record
on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal
filed in due time and the expiration of the appeal of the other
parties. In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a)
e. Residual jurisdiction
sections 9, 13, Rule 41
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. A party's
appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him
with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval
of the record on appeal filed in due time. In appeals by notice
of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties. In appeals by record
on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal
filed in due time and the expiration of the appeal of the other
parties. In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a)
Section 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of
the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate
court, the trial court may motu propio or on motion dismiss
the appeal for having been taken out of time. (14a)
f. Applicability of Rule 41 to Rule 40
section 8-9, Rule 40
Section 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial;
lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of
the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as
the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try
the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with
it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional
Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in
accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence
in the interest of justice. (n)
Section 9. Applicability of Rule 41. — The other provisions of
Rule 41 shall apply to appeals provided for herein insofar as
they are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of this Rule. (n)
section 1(7), Rule 41
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice
g. Appellant‘s brief
sections 7-13, Rule 44
Section 7. Appellant's brief. — It shall be the duty of the
appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and
documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of
his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with
proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.
(10a, R46)
Section 8. Appellee's brief. — Within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of the appellant's brief, the appellee shall file with the
court seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten,
mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2)
copies thereof upon the appellant. (11a, R46)
Section 9. Appellant's reply brief. — Within twenty (20) days
from receipt of the appellee's brief, the appellant may file a
reply brief answering points in the appellee's brief not
covered in his main brief. (12a, R46)
Section 10. Time of filing memoranda in special cases. — In
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their
respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all
the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to
the record. (13a, R46) The failure of the appellant to file his
memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal. (n)
Section 11. Several appellants or appellees or several
counsel for each party. — Where there are several appellants
or appellees, each counsel representing one or more but not
all of them shall be served with only one copy of the briefs.
When several counsel represent one appellant or appellee,
copies of the brief may be served upon any of them. (14a,
R46)
Section 12. Extension of time for filing briefs. — Extension of
time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good

and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is
filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
(15, R46)
Section 13. Contents of appellant's brief. — The appellant's
brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of
the arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
references to the pages where they are cited;
(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which
errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated
without repetition and numbered consecutively;
(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and
concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of
the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court,
the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary
to an understanding of the nature of the controversy with
page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and
concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by
both parties and of those in controversy, together with the
substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to
make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law
to be submitted, to the court for its judgment;
(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments
on each assignment of error with page references to the
record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page
of the report at which the case begins and the page of the
report on which the citation is found;
(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or
judgment which the appellant seeks; and
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the
appellant's brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the
judgment or final order appealed from. (16a, R46)
section 7(b)(c), Rule 40
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. —
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the
duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall
briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of
which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's memorandum,
the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the
appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the
expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide
the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of original and such memoranda as are filed.
(n)
h. Changing the theory of the case
Section 15, Rule 44
Section 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. —
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in
the court below he may include in his assignment of errors
any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
(18, R46)
Bote v. Veloso, G.R. No. 194270, 3 December 2012
● Baello owns subject property that was included in the
Dagat-Dagatan Project by Imelda Marcos. Armed military
personnel forcibly evicted the caretaker of the heirs of
BAELLO. NHA, as the government agency tasked to
undertake the Dagat-Dagatan Project, took possession
of the property and awarded the lots to chosen
beneficiaries.
● After the fall of MARCOS regime, the heirs of BAELLO
executed, an extrajudicial partition of their share of
the property
● NHA filed a complaint with RTC for expropriation of
the subject land
● BAELLO‘s heirs filed separate MTD which RTC granted
on the ground of lack of cause of action
● NHA filed another complaint with another RTC for
declaration of nullity of OCT
● RTC: Dismissed on the grounds of estoppel and res
judicata
● VELOSO was awarded a residential lot at the Dagat-
Dagatan Project. She constructed a house on the
property and leased the house to BOTE.
● BOTE executed a promissory note with undertaking to
pay VELOSO and her husband P850K as purchase price
of the property. BOTE failed to pay the purchase price
● VELOSO filed a complaint against BOTE for sum of
money and/or Recovery of Possession of Real
Property with Damages
● Pre-Trial Conference: parties agreed that the complaint
would only be be one for sum of money and no longer for
recovery of possession of the property
● RTC: Complaint DISMISSED - VELOSO failed to adduce
evidence to show a rightful claim over the property
● Before the CA, VELOSO interposed for the first time
their status as good faith and are thus entitled to
possession of the house
● CA: case remanded to RTC for determination of current
market value of the residential house in the lot - value
shall be paid by BOTE to VELOSO
HELD: CA erred in passing on the issue of possession when
the parties stipulated in the pre-trial conference to treat the
case purely as a sum of money
● an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor
raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
● ―THEORY OF THE CASE‖: A comprehensive and
orderly mental arrangement of principle and facts,
conceived and constructed for the purpose of securing a
judgment or decree of a court in favor of a litigant; the
particular line of reasoning of either party to a suit, the
purpose being to bring together certain facts of the case
in a logical sequence and to correlate them in a way that
produces in the decision maker‘s mind a definite result or
conclusion favored by the advocate [BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY]
○ It is the legal basis of the cause of action or
defense, which a party is not permitted to
change on appeal [AGPALO‘S LEGAL
WORDS AND PHRASES]
● A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the
cause of action he stands on and cannot be
permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his
theory and cause of action and adopt another and
seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same
forum or on appeal.
● RULE: Defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. A party cannot, on
appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in
the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain
theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change the same
on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be
unfair to the adverse party.
● EXCEPTION: When the factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party
in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory, the Court may give due course to the
petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein
i. Harmless error
section 6, Rule 51
Section 6. Harmless error. — No error in either the admission
or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court
or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or
for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. (5a)
j. Questions that may be decided
section 8, Rule 51
Section 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which
does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings
therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may
pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. (7a)
Abubakar v. Abubakar, 317 S 264 (1999)
● Petitioner Aminin L. Abubakar (hereafter AMININ) and
respondent Aurora A. Abubakar (hereafter AURORA)
were married in accordance with Islamic law. AURORA
filed before the CIRCUIT COURT a complaint against
AMININ for ―Divorce with Prayer for Support and
Damages.‖
● In its pre-trial order, the CIRCUIT COURT limited the
issue to be resolved at the trial to a determination of ―the
rights or the respective shares of the (parties) with
respect to the property subject of partition after divorce.‖
● CIRCUIT COURT issued an order dissolving the
marriage of AURORA and AMININ, distributing the
PROPERTIES equally between them as coowners
● AURORA duly filed a notice of appeal from this decision
but only ―as far as it involves the issue of partition of
property, and not to the grant of divorce and damages it
being in her favor.‖
● DISTRICT COURT affirmed the CIRCUIT COURT‘s
order with some modifications:award of moral damages
to the plaintiff, grant to her of support in arrears, partition
of land in Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur (THESE ISSUES
WERE NEVER RAISED BY THE
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT IN HER APPEAL)
HELD: DISTRICT COURT defeated the intent and content
of the pre-trial order and also went beyond the sphere of
its authority as delineated in the notice of appeal
● Pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in
this jurisdiction (clearly laid out in Rules 18 and 118 of
the Rules of Court)
○ procedural device meant to limit the issues to
be tackled and proved at the trial
○ A less cluttered case environment means that
there will be fewer points of contention for the
trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping
with the mandate of the Constitution according
every person the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases
○ If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to
trial—hence, the prefix ―pre‖—the court can
later concentrate on those which are seemingly
irreconcilable
○ PURPOSE: simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation
○ stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order
which legally binds the parties to honor the
same
● ITC, AMININ and AURORA ―agreed‖ on the divorce, the
‗idda, and the limitation of partition of assets to the
PROPERTIES. The pre-trial order —whose content and
validity were never questioned by either party—stated
the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this wise:
―What are the rights or the respective shares of the
herein plaintiff and defendant with respect to the property
subject of partition after divorce?‖
● ―The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and
assigned by a party will be considered by the court,
except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject
matter. To this exception has now been added errors
affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings there-in.‖
Five Star v. CA, 259 S 120 (1996)
● RESP Santos spouses filed for breach of contract of
carriage and damages before RTC against PET Five
Star Bus Co., Inc. and Carlos Salonga for indemnification
for the death of their twenty-two year old son, Joey
Santos, who died aboard a passenger bus owned and
operated by petitioner Five Star and driven by petitioner
Salonga
○ due to the ―gross and wanton negligence,
recklessness and imprudence‖ of the bus driver,
it hit an on-coming trailer truck
○ petitioner refused to pay them damages as
heirs of the deceased
● On the day of the pre-trial, PET and their counsel failed
to appear. Neither did they file a pre-trial brief. On motion
by RESP, the trial court declared PET as in default and
scheduled the reception of evidence
● TC rendered a decision in favor of RESP
● PET filed motion to set aside the order of default
(DENIED)
● CA affirmed the TC decision, but added an award of 50k
moral damages
HELD: the additional award of moral damages should not
have been granted by the CA because RESP did not appeal
the decision of the TC
Fairness dictates that a party who has not appealed from a
judgment of the trial court is bound by the terms of the
judgment. An appellee, who is not an appellant, may assign
errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the
judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if his
purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed, in PEZA liable for real property taxes to the Province of Bataan.
which case he must appeal. The CA ruled that Branch 115 gravely abused its discretion.
HELD: 1) The CA did not err in dismissing the City‘s appeal
k. Erroneous appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of law; 2) The
RTC of Pasay (Br 111) did not have jurisdiction to hear
sections 1-2, Rule 50
PEZA‘s petition for declaratory relief; 3) The CA did not have
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari filed by the PEZA
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or against Branch 115; 4) PEZA is exempt from real property
on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: taxes; and 5) the State owns the real properties under the
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the PEZA‘s title. Despite the procedural lapses, the SC found it
appeal was taken within the period fixed by these Rules; appropriate to rule on the merits in the interest of judicial
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal economy and avoidance of conflicting decisions involving the
within the period prescribed by these Rules; same issues.
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful
fees as provided in section 5, Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule DOCTRINE:
41; (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998) 1) Under Rule 50, Sec 2, an improper appeal before the CA
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the is dismissed outright and shall not be referred to the proper
approved record on appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule court.
44; 2) The filing of appeal in the wrong court does not toll the
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required period to appeal.
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time 3) The CTA, not the CA, has the exclusive original jurisdiction
provided by these Rules; over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's issued by the RTCs in a local tax case.
brief, or of page references to the record as required in
section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44;
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the
correction or completion of the record within the time limited Appellate Court
by the court in its order; RTC CA SC
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary MTC 40 - 41 45
conference under Rule 48 or to comply with orders, circulars, STAYED (Delegated (Delegated
or directives of the court without justifiable cause; and jurisdiction in jurisdiction
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not cadastral and in cadastral
appealable. (1a) land and land
registration registration
Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of cases, BP case, Rule
Appeals. — An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the 129 Sec.34) 41, Sec.2)
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only RTC 41 - STAYED 45
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not 42 - STAYED
Court of Origin

being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice UNLESS

of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate UNDER RSP
judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. (n) CA 45; 41 (122
Sec.3c)
section 6, Rule 56 QJ 43 -
Section 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — Except as EXECUTORY
provided in section 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion Note: An RSC judgment can no longer be appealed unless
perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal taken to the there is GAD.
Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed.
l. Withdrawal of appeal
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the
section 3, Rule 50
Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred
Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal. — An appeal may be
to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action.
withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of the
The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not
appellee's brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in
issues of fact are involved shall be final. (n)
the discretion of the court. (4a)

City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R.

No. 184203 & 187583, 26 November 2014
The City of Lapu-Lapu demanded real property taxes from
PEZA. PEZA subsequently filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC of Pasay to rule that it was exempt from
paying taxes. The Province of Bataan followed suit. It served
a real property tax billing and later on conducted a public
auction since it was not able to collect from PEZA. RTC
Pasay (Branch 111) found PEZA exempt from payment of
real property taxes. The City of Lapu-Lapu (the City)
appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal for being the
wrong mode of Appeal. RTC Pasay (Branch 115) found
m. Voting
section 3, Rule 51
Section 3. Quorum and voting in the court. — The
participation of all three Justices of a division shall be
necessary at the deliberation and the unanimous vote of the
three Justices shall be required for the pronouncement of a
judgment or final resolution. If the three justices do not reach
a unanimous vote, the clerk shall enter the votes of the
dissenting Justices in the record. Thereafter, the Chairman of
the division shall refer the case, together with the minutes of
the deliberation, to the Presiding Justice who shall designate
two Justices chosen by raffle from among all the other
members of the court to sit temporarily with them, forming a
special division of five Justices. The participation of all the
five members of the special division shall be necessary for
the deliberation required in section 2 of this Rule and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be required
for the pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution. (2a)
section 7, Rule 57
Section 7. Attachment of real and personal property;
recording thereof. — Real and personal property shall be
attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following
manner:
(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, or any interest
therein, standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of
the province in the name of the party against whom
attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon such
records, or belonging to the party against whom attachment
is issued and held by any other person, or standing on the
records of the registry of deeds in the name of any other
person, by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of the order,
together with a description of the property attached, and a
notice that it is attached, or that such real property and any
interest therein held by or standing in the name of such other
person are attached, and by leaving a copy of such order,
description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if
any, or with such other person or his agent if found within the
province. Where the property has been brought under the
operation of either the Land Registration Act or the Property
Registration Decree, the notice shall contain a reference to
the number of the certificate of title, the volume and page in
the registration book where the certificate is registered, and
the registered owner or owners thereof.
The registrar of deeds must index attachments filed under
this section in the names of the applicant, the adverse party,
or the person by whom the property is held or in whose name
it stands in the records. If the attachment is not claimed on
the entire area of the land covered by the certificate of title, a
description sufficiently accurate for the identification of the
land or interest to be affected shall be included in the
registration of such attachment;
(b) Personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking
and safely keeping it in his custody, after issuing the
corresponding receipt therefor.
(c) Stocks or shares, or an interest in stocks or shares, of any
corporation or company, by leaving with the president or
managing agent thereof, a copy of the writ, and a notice
stating that the stock or interest of the party against whom the
attachment is issued is attached in pursuance of such writ;
(d) Debts and credits, including bank deposits, financial
interest, royalties, commissions and other personal property
not capable of manual delivery, by leaving with the person
owing such debts, or having in his possession or under his
control, such credits or other personal property, or with his
agent, a copy of the writ, and notice that the debts owing by
him to the party against whom attachment is issued, and the
credits and other personal property in his possession, or
under his control, belonging to said party, are attached in
pursuance of such writ;
(e) The interest of the party against whom attachment is
issued in property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
whether as heir, legatee, or devisee, by serving the executor
or administrator or other personal representative of the
decedent with a copy of the writ and notice that said interest
is attached. A copy of said writ of attachment and of said
notice shall also be filed in the office of the clerk of the court
in which said estate is being settled and served upon the heir,
legatee or devisee concerned.
If the property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a
copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper
court or quasi-judicial agency, and notice of the attachment
served upon the custodian of such property. (7a)
E. Extraordinary Appeals
1. From MTC to RTC to CA
Rule 42
Petition for Review From the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of
the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days. (n)
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in
seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for
the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
(a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material
dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely
a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same;
and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. —
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. (n)
Section 4. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals
may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition,
not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or
dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without
merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions
raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.
(n)
Section 5. Contents of comment. — The comment of the
respondent shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies,
accompanied by certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein together with other
supporting papers and shall (a) state whether or not he
accepts the statement of matters involved in the petition; (b)
point out such insufficiencies or inaccuracies as he believes
exist in petitioner's statement of matters involved but without
repetition; and (c) state the reasons why the petition should
not be given due course. A copy thereof shall be served on
the petitioner. (a)
Section 6. Due course. — If upon the filing of the comment or
such other pleadings as the court may allow or require, or
after the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without
such comment or pleading having been submitted, the Court
of Appeals finds prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modification of the appealed decision, it may accordingly
give due course to the petition. (n)
Section 7. Elevation of record. — Whenever the Court of
Appeals deems it necessary, it may order the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court to elevate the original record of the
case including the oral and documentary evidence within
fifteen (15) days from notice. (n)
Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — (a) Upon
the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to
the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of
Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a, R41)
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment or final order
unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall
provide otherwise. (a)
Section 9. Submission for decision. — If the petition is given
due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral
argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within
a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the
court itself. (n)
section 2(b), Rule 41
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
2. From RTC to SC
Rule 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a)
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and
served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable
reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within
which to file the petition. (1a, 5a)
Section 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of
petition. — Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner
shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to
the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the
petition. Proof of service of a copy, thereof on the lower court
concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted
together with the petition. (1a)
Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in
eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a)
state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner
and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the
lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the
denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a
statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or
arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a
certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution
certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the
requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material
portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e)
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (2a)
Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. — The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
 Paa v. CA, 282 S 448 (1997)
contents of and the documents which should accompany the Petitioner was the Administrative Officer of DOLE Regional
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Office XI. He was ordered dismissed from service. After
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition having his MR denied, he appealed to the CSC, which found
on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is him guilty of being Notoriously Undesirable and imposed
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (3a) accessories. Petitioner filed with the CA a a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari Under
Section 6. Review discretionary. — A review is not a matter Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asking for an extension of 30
of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted days from April 13, 1996 within which to file his petition (he
only when there are special and important reasons thereof. alleged that he received a copy of the Feb 13 CSC resolution
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the on March 29, 1996 and had then until 13 April 1996 within
court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which which to file a petition for review under Rule 45). CA denied
will be considered: motion for being the wrong mode of appeal. Hence this
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of petition to the SC, designating in both the copy and body as
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, one for certiorari under Rule 65 or Rule 45.
or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or HELD: PETITIONER AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY.
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI ORIGINAL ACTION FOR
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the
CERTIORARI
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
Based on questions of law raises the issue as to
sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an
which the appellant desires whether the lower court
exercise of the power of supervision. (4a)
the appellate court to acted without or in excess of
resolve. jurisdiction or with grave
Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required;
abuse of discretion.
sanctions. — For purposes of determining whether the
petition should be dismissed or denied pursuant to section 5
involves the review of the May be directed against an
of this Rule, or where the petition is given due course under
judgment, award or final interlocutory order of the
section 8 hereof, the Supreme Court may require or allow the
filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as order on the merits court prior to appeal from the
it may deem necessary within such periods and under such judgment or where there is
no appeal or any other plain,
conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the
speedy or adequate remedy.
corresponding sanctions in case of non-filing or unauthorized
filing of such pleadings and documents or non-compliance
with the conditions therefor. (n) Must be made within the May be filed not later than
reglementary period for sixty (60) days from notice of
Section 8. Due course; elevation of records. — If the petition appeal. An original action for the judgment, order or
is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the certiorari resolution sought to be
elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts assailed.
thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. (2a)
Stays the judgment, award or Unless a writ of preliminary
Section 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — order appealed from. injunction or a temporary
The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be restraining order shall have
applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal been issued, does not stay
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion the challenged proceeding.
perpetua or life imprisonment. (n)
Petitioner and respondent The parties are the
section 2(c), Rule 41 are the original parties to the aggrieved, party against the
Section 2. Modes of appeal. — action, and the lower court or lower court or quasi-judicial
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions quasi-judicial agency is not agency and the prevailing
of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the to be impleaded. parties, who thereby
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in respectively become the
accordance with the Rule 45. (n) petitioner and respondents.

section 6, Rule 56 The prior filing of a motion for A motion for reconsideration
Section 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — Except as reconsideration is not is a condition precedent
provided in section 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal required (Sec. 1, Rule 45); (Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello,
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion L-18957, April 23, 1963),
perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal taken to the subject to certain exceptions.
Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed.
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the The appellate court is in the The higher court exercises
Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred exercise of its appellate original jurisdiction under its
to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. jurisdiction and power of power of control and
The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not review supervision over the
issues of fact are involved shall be final. (n) proceedings of lower courts

section 5(2)(e), 1987 Const. ● Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7902, a party aggrieved
by any decision, final order or resolution of the Civil
Service Commission had only one remedy, namely, a
 special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (pursuant
to Sec 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution)
● Congress then passed R.A. No. 7902 vesting upon the
Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided or resolved by the CSC. Pursuant to Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the mode of appeal
from a decision of the Civil Service Commission, to bring
it within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
is a petition for review to be filed within the period therein
fixed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
took effect on 1 July 1997, a petition for review as a
mode of appeal to the CA from decision of quasi-judicial
bodies, including the CSC is governed by Rule 43.
● ITC: Considering that petitioner announced in his motion
for extension of time that he would be filing a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for peremptorily denying the
motion.
● he had lost his right to appeal by way of the intended
petition for review. A special civil action for certiorari will
not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
3. From CA to SC
Rule 45
section 2(c), Rule 41
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions
of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with the Rule 45. (n)
section 3(c), Rule 122
Section 3. How appeal taken. —
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section.
section 13(c), Rule 124
Section 13. Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of
cases to Supreme Court. — Three (3) Justices of the Court of
Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a
division. The unanimous vote of the three (3) Justices of a
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment or final resolution, which shall be reached in
consultation before the writing of the opinion by a member of
the division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not
reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall direct the
raffle committee of the Court to designate two (2) additional
Justices to sit temporarily with them, forming a special
division of five (5) members and the concurrence of a
majority of such division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution. The
designation of such additional Justices shall be made strictly
by raffle and rotation among all other Justices of the Court of
Appeals.
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be
imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence
and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as
the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from
entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case and
elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for
review. (13a)
4. From quasi-judicial agencies to CA
Rule 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi- judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. (n)
Section 3. Where to appeal. — An appeal under this Rule
may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in
the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
(n)
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity,
or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing
law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
Section 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by
filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies
with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy
thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a
quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of
Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the
clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other
lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of
Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds
therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
denial. (n)
Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners
or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts
and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to
therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein. (2a)
Section 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. —
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. (n)
Section 8. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals
may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition
not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or
dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without
merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
(6a)
Section 9. Contents of comment. — The comment shall be
filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible
copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to
therein together with other supporting papers. The comment
shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in
petitioner's statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the
reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A
copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of
such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. (9a)
Section 10. Due course. — If upon the filing of the comment
or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or
allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the
period for the filing thereof, and on the records the Court of
Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned
has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant
reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to
the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings
of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of
Appeals. (n)
Section 11. Transmittal of record. — Within fifteen (15) days
from notice that the petition has been given due course, the
Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned
to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the
entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to
be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to
the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit
subsequent correction of or addition to the record. (8a)
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
upon such terms as it may deem just. (10a)
Section 13. Submission for decision. — If the petition is given
due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral
argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within
a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the
court of Appeals. (n)
XVIII. Provisional remedies
A. Preliminary attachment
1. Grounds
- under Sec. 1, Rule 57:
o FRAUD (money, property)
 Causal fraud
 Incidental fraud
 Leave Ph
 Take property
 Estafa
 Hide property
o personal jurisdiction
- under Sec. 3, Rule 57:
o no other sufficient security for the claim sought
to be enforced by the action
o order = claim – counterclaim (PERMISSIVE)
 Note: if ex parte application, no
counterclam yet
section 1, Rule 57
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At
the commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of
money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a
cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract,
delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart
from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a
public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney,
factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary
capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly
or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the
property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed,
or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the
applicant or an authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which
the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed
of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his
creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (1a)
sections 14-16, Rule 14
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,
be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such time as
the court may order. (16a)
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to,
or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer. (17a)
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. —
When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section. (18a)
Liberty v. CA, 222 S 37 (1993)
● Imperial Organization entered into an agreement with
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines to promote two concerts
featuring "Earth, Wind and Fire". To ensure compliance
with the terms of the agreement, Coca-Cola required
Imperial Organizations to put up a performance bond.
● PET Liberty Insurance, upon application of Imperial
Organization, put up the performance bond in the
amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), the
principal condition of which was to "fully and faithfully
guarantee the terms and conditions" of the agreement
● The concerts took place but Imperial Organizations and
private respondents failed to comply with their
obligations to Coca Cola. PET then became liable upon
its performance bond paying Coca-Cola Three Million
Pesos
● PET filed Complaint for damages with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against Imperial, Arkin and Madlangbayan
● RTC: Issued an order allowing the issuance of the writ.
Private respondents committed fraud: they promised to
give as security or collateral to their Indemnity
Agreement, which caused the plaintiff to release the
security bond, when as it turned out, the Transfer
Certificate of Title of a parcel of land supposedly issued
by the Register of Deeds of Rizal turned out to be fake
HELD: WPA was properly or regularly issued
● To sustain attachment:
○ must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to
defraud the creditor
○ fraud must relate to the execution of the
agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise
given
○ fraud should be committed upon contracting the
obligation sued upon
○ A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived
plan or intention not to pay
● ITC: all the collaterals given by the respondent Arkin as
security for the bond were either fraudulent or heavily
encumbered
○ One of the TCTs used as a collateral - turned
out to be a fake and spurious
○ supposed lien-free motor vehicle offered as
collateral turned out to be heavily mortgaged
and was even disposed of without informing
petitioner
○ supposed lien-free motor vehicle offered as
collateral turned out to be heavily mortgaged
and was even disposed of without informing
petitioner
● It is therefore clear that fraud was present when private
respondent, among others, entered into an indemnity
agreement with petitioner
● Also, when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a
ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause
of action: defendant is not allowed to file a motion to
dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by
offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the
plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was
based and consequently that the writ based therein had
been improperly, or irregularly, issued
○ REASON: hearing on such motion for
dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a
trial on the merits
Wee v. Tankiansee, G.R. No. 171124, February 13, 2008
● WEE, a client of WESTMONT BANK, made several
money placements with the bank's affiliate, Westmont
Investment Corporation (WINCORP).
● WEE discovered that the company extended a loan
equal to his total money placement to a corporation
(POWER MERGE)
● Allegedly, through the false representations of
WINCORP and its officers and directors, WEE was
enticed to roll over his placements so that WINCORP
could loan the same to VIRATA/POWER MERGE
● WEE instituted a civil for damages with the RTC
● RTC: ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment
HELD: There was no sufficient basis for WEE‘s application
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
WEE‘s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that
respondent committed a fraud. The provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes
the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing
its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the
applicant, such that if the requisites for its grant are not
shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it,
for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its
jurisdiction.
2. Procedure for grant
Application  Order  Bond  Writ  Summons 
Levy  Discharge  Damages
Note:
- Order first before bond because the amount of the bond
will be indicated in the order
- The writ is the order to the sheriff to attach/levy
sections 2-4, Rule 57
Section 2. Issuance and contents of order. — An order of
attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion
with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is
pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of
the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is
issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to
satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party makes
deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount
equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the
property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive
of costs. Several writs may be issued at the same time to the
sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions. (2a)
Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. — An order of
attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the
affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who
personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action
exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in section 1
hereof, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due
to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession
of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for
which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The
affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding
section, must be duly filed with the court before the order
issues. (3a)
Section 4. Condition of applicant's bond. — The party
applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed
to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court in its
order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the
latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the
adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that
the applicant was not entitled thereto. (4a)
Cuartero v. CA, 212 S 260 (1992)
● Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC aganst RESP
Evangelista spouses, for a sum of money plus damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment
● RTC issued an order granting ex-parte the petitioner‘s
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment
● a copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the order,
the summons and the complaint were all simultaneously
served upon the private respondents at their residence
○ Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto
L. Sula levied, attached and pulled out the
properties in compliance with the court‘s
directive to attach all the properties of private
respondents not exempt from execution, or so
much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the
petitioner‘s principal claim
● RESP filed a motion to set aside the order and
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment for having
been irregularly and improperly issued
● RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
● RESP filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
● CA granted the petition for certiorari
○ neither service of summons with a copy of the
complaint nor voluntary appearance of
petitioners was had in this case before the trial
court issued the assailed order as well as the
writ of preliminary attachment
HELD:
● the only requisites for the issuance of the writ are the
affidavit and bond of the applicant
● no notice to the adverse party or hearing of the
application is required inasmuch as the time which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a
writ of attachment issues. In such a case, a hearing
would render nugatory the purpose of this provisional
remedy.
● The writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for and
granted at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter. In Davao Light and Power, Co., Inc. v.
CA, the phrase ―at the commencement of the action‖ is
interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of the
complaint which is a time before summons is served on
the defendant or even before summons issues. HENCE,
a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even
before summons is served upon the defendant
● BUT, the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant
until jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained
● the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
practically involves three stages:
1. court issues the order granting the application
2. writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting
the writ
3. the writ is implemented
● For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first
be obtained. However, once the implementation
commences, it is required that the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in
any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing
from the Court will not bind the defendant
● an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its
irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground
which is at the same time the applicant‘s cause of action
in the main case since an anomalous situation would
result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated
and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion
Davao Light v. CA, 204 S 303 (1991)
Davao Light filed a verified complaint for a recovery of a sum
of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and
Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. A day after,
Judge Nartatez issued an Order granting the ex parte
application and fixing the attachment bond. The attachment
bond having been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of
attachment issued. The summons and a copy of the
complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy of the
attachment bond were served on the defendants; and
pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to
the latter. Defendants filed a motion to discharge the
attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because
at the time the order was promulgated, and the attachment
writ issued, the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the cause and over the persons of the defendants.
HELD: a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte
against a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the
latter‘s person by service of summons or his voluntary
submission to the Court‘s authority
There is ordinarily some appreciable interval time between
the day of filing of the complaint and the day of service of
summons of the defendant. During the period, different acts
may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court which are of
unquestionable validity and propriety such as provisional
remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction,
receivership or replevin.
A preliminary attachment as the provisional remedy in virtue
of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have
the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the
court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be recovered. Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the
remedy ―at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter.‖ The reference is to a time before summons
is served on the defendant or even before summons is
issued.
Hence, after an action is properly commenced - by the filing
of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and
other fees - the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent
requisites, and that he may do so at any time either before or
after service of summons
When the sheriff commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not
only a copy of the applicant‘s affidavit and attachment bond,
and of the order of attachment (Sec. 5, Rule 57) but also the
summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of
the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem
if any.
Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant‘s person, but
also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant
of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment and grounds therefor, and thus
accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his
property by posting a counterbond in an equal amount of
plaintiff's claim or dissolving it by causing dismissal of the
complaint itself or demonstrating the insufficiency of the
applicant‘s affidavit/bond in accordance with Sec. 13, Rule
57.
3. Prior or contemporaneous service of summons
section 5, Rule 57
Section 5. Manner of attaching property. — The sheriff
enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable
diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the
action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the
party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's
demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court
from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond
executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond
fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of
the property to be attached, exclusive of costs. No levy on
attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof
shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
attachment the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order
and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the
Philippines.
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of
summons shall not apply where the summons could not be
served personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a
non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or
quasi in rem. (5a)
4. Duration, discharge:
sections 5, 12, 13, Rule 57
Section 5. Manner of attaching property. — The sheriff
enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable
diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the
action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the
party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's
demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court
from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond
executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond
fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of
the property to be attached, exclusive of costs. No levy on
attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof
shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
attachment the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order
and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the
Philippines.
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of
summons shall not apply where the summons could not be
served personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a
non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or
quasi in rem. (5a)
Section 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving
counter-bond. — After a writ of attachment has been
enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or the
person appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge
of the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The
court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge
of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files
a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk
of the court where the application is made, in an amount
equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment,
exclusive of costs. But if the attachment is sought to be
discharged with respect to a particular property, the
counter-bond shall be equal to the value of that property as
determined by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or
the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment
that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of

the deposit shall forthwith be served on the attaching party.
Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the
provisions of this section, the property attached, or the
proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party
making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to the
person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond
aforesaid standing in place of the property so released.
Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be or
become insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to
file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply
for a new order of attachment. (12a)
Section 13. Discharge of attachment on other grounds. —
The party whose property has been ordered attached may file
a motion with the court in which he action is pending, before
or after levy or even after the release of the attached
property, for an order to set aside or discharge the
attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or
irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient.
If the attachment is excessive, the discharge shall be limited
to the excess. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part
of the movant but not otherwise, the attaching party may
oppose the motion by counter-affidavits or other evidence in
addition to that on which the attachment was made. After due
notice and hearing, the court shall order the setting aside or
the corresponding discharge of the attachment if it appears
that it was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that
the bond is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive,
and the defect is not cured forthwith. (13a)
Adlawan v. Tomol (RTC Presiding Judge), 184 S 31 (1990)
Adlawan was a private contractor awarded by the
government contracts for the construction of various
infrastructure projects. To perform his obligations, he sought
financial assistance and support from private respondent
Aboitiz. For failure to pay his installments and amortizations,
respondent filed before CFI Cebu a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money and damages including an ex-
parte application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the property of petitioner. Writs of
preliminary attachment were issued. On the strength of the
writ of preliminary attachment, the bulk of petitioner's property
in Davao City was attached. Respondent eventually filed a
Notice of Dismissal or Withdrawal of Complaint, which
was granted.
HELD: the properties should have been released to petitioner
● Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its
own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to
realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in
the main action. It is adjunct to the main suit; it can have
no independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of
the plaintiff against the defendant.
● the writ of preliminary attachment issued is already
dissolved and rendered non-existent in view of the
withdrawal of the complaint by respondent. When
respondent withdrew its complaint, the attachment
ceased to have a leg to stand on. The attached
properties should be returned to petitioner.
Tijam v Sibonghanoy, supra
[relevant part]: The Court first noted that although the action,
originally, was exclusively filed against the Sibonghanoy
spouses, the Surety became a quasi-party since July 31,
1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the
writ of attachment issued by the court of origin. Since then, it
acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in
connection with the pending case.
5. Damages
sections 17, 20, Rule 57
Section 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond. — When the
judgment has become executory, the surety or sureties on
any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this
Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become
charged on such counter-bond and bound to pay the
judgment obligee upon demand the amount due under the
judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety
or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same
action. (17a)
Section 20. Claim for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment. — An application for
damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is
perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with
due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties
setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the
amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after
proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the
main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment was issued he must claim
damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by
filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to the
party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety
or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court
becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the
application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against
whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the
same action the damages awarded to him from any property
of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the
bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to
fully satisfy the award. (20a)
Del Rosario v. Nava, G.R. No. L-5513, 18 August 1954
● Domingo del Rosario instituted an ejectment suit against
Gonzalo P. Nava. Attachment was levied (upon due
application and the filing of an attachment bond for
P5,000) and after the case was tried, the MTC rendered
judgment against the defendant Nava.
● In the CFI, Nava filed a new answer with a counterclaim,
alleging that the writ of attachment was obtained
maliciously, wrongfully, and without sufficient cause, and
that its levy had caused him damages amounting to
P5,000. No notice of this counterclaim was served upon
the surety of the attachment bond, Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc
● CFI found that the attachment was improperly obtained,
and awarded P5,000 damages and costs to the
defendant Nava
● judgment having become final, a writ of execution was
issued, but it had to be returned unsatisfied because no
leviable property of the plaintiff Del Rosario could be
found
● Nava filed, through counsel, a motion in Court setting
forth the facts and praying that the Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. be required to show cause why it
 should not respond for the damages adjudged in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff.
● ALTO SURETY opposed on the ground that the
application was filed out of time, it being claimed that
under sec. 20, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, the
application and notice to the surety should be made
before trial, or at the latest, before entry of the final
judgment.
HELD: a notice to the sureties made after the award of
damages against the principal in the attachment bond
has become final is considered filed OUT OF TIME
● the application for damages and the notice to the
sureties should be filed in the trial court by the party
damnified by the wrongful or improper attachment either
"before the trial" or, at the latest, "before entry of the final
judgment", which means not later than the date when the
judgment becomes final and executory
● The rule plainly calls for only one judgment for damages
against the attaching party and his sureties; which is
explained by the fact that the attachment bond is a
solidary obligation. Since a judicial bondsman has no
right to demand the exhaustion of the property of the
principal debtor, there is no justification for the entering
of separate judgments against them. With a single
judgment against principal and sureties, the prevailing
party may choose, at his discretion, to enforce the award
of damages against whomsoever he considers in a
better situation to pay it.
● Requirements under the Rules appear designed to avoid
a multiplicity of suits. But to enable the defendant to
secure a hearing and judgment against the sureties in
the attachment bond, even after the judgment for
damages against the principal has become final, would
result in as great a multiplicity of actions as would flow
from enabling him to sue the principal and the sureties in
separate proceedings.
● while the prevailing party may apply for an award of
damages against the surety even after an award has
been already obtained against the principal, still the
application and notice against the surety must be
made before the judgment against the principal
becomes final and executory, so that all awards for
damages may be included in the final judgment.
Philippine Charter Insurance v. CA, G.R. No. 88379, 15
November 1989
LEARJET commenced suit in RTC against GATES CORP.
The court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against
DEFENDANTS‘ properties. The RTC ruled IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFFs. CA reversed. DEFENDANTS filed with CA an
Urgent Petition to have Damages Awarded on Account of
Illegal Attachment Executed Against the Attachment Bond
Issued. CA noted DEFENDANTS‘ application or claim for
damages against the surety and RESOLVED to refer claim or
application to RTC and allow it to hear and decide the same
pursuant to Sec 20 Rule 57. The RTC then ordered execution
of the judgment against PLAINTIFF. The Sheriff sought to
enforce the writ also against the surety. The surety sought to
nullify the Notice of Enforcement of Writ of Execution,
contending that there was no judgment against it due to the
wrongful attachment of the aircraft since neither Sec 20 Rule
57 of ROC nor CA resolution had been complied with, there
existed no award of damages against it under its attachment
bond, and enforcement of execution against said bond would
be contrary to due process.
HELD: the application for damages can be executed against
the attachment bond made by the surety
● RULE: A writ of preliminary attachment may issue once
the Court is satisfied on consideration ex parte of the
application and its supporting affidavits and documents
or after hearing, as the court may in its discretion
consider proper, that any of the grounds specified by law
exists, and an acceptable bond is given by the applicant
● The filing of the attachment bond by a surety connotes
and operates as a voluntary submission by it to the
Court‘s jurisdiction and binds it to faithfully comply with
its specific obligations under its bond
○ Surety does not become liable on its bond
simply because judgment is subsequently
rendered against the party who obtained the
preliminary attachment - it becomes liable only
when and if the court shall finally adjudge
that the applicant was not entitled to the
attachment
○ This is regardless of the nature and character of
the judgment on the merits of the principal
claims, counterclaims or cross-claims, etc.
asserted by the parties against each other.
Since an applicant‘s cause of action may be
entirely different from the ground relied upon by
him for a preliminary attachment, although the
evidence warrants judgment in favor of
applicant, the proofs may nevertheless also
establish that said applicant's proferred ground
for attachment was inexistent or specious and
hence, the writ should not have issued at all;
i.e., he was not entitled thereto in the first place.
● Surety, by submitting its attachment bond, binds
itself solidarily to make the same payments which its
— principal the party at whose instance the
attachment issues — may be condemned to make, to
compensate for the damages resulting from the
wrongful attachment, although unlike its principal,
its liability is limited to the amount stated in its bond.
● Summary hearing is not rendered unnecessary or
superfluous by the fact that the matter of damages was
among the issues tried during the hearings on the merits,
unless of course, the surety had previously been duly
impleaded as a party, or otherwise earlier notified and
given opportunity to be present and ventilate its side on
the matter during the trial. The procedure for the
rendition of a binding directive on the surety upon its
solidarily liability for damages for wrongful attachment is
indicated in Section 20, Rule 57
● RULE: A party against whom a writ of preliminary
attachment issues may impugn the writ by alleging and
proving inter alia that the applicant was not entitled
thereto, i.e., that the asserted ground for attachment was
inexistent, or the amount for which the writ was sought
was excessive, etc., this, by appropriate motion. He may
also claim damages on account of the wrongful
attachment through an appropriate pleading, such as a
counterclaim, or other form of application.
● IMPORTANT: Application must be filed before trial or
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching
creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts
showing his right to damages and the amount thereof
● ITC: Since RTC‘s decision had gone against
DEFENDANTS and no irregularity had been adjudged as
regards the preliminary attachment, it had no occasion to
apply for damages from wrongful attachment - although
they could have applied because it is entirely possible
under the law that an applicant for preliminary
 attachment be adjudged entitled to relief on his basic
claim and pronounced as not entitled to the attachment
● The surety's liability may be enforced whether the
application for damages for wrongful attachment be
submitted in the original proceedings before the Trial
Court, or on appeal, so long as the judgment has not
become executory. The surety's liability is not and
cannot be limited to the damages caused by the
improper attachment only during the pendency of the
appeal.
● SURETY shall answer for all damages that the party
may suffer as a result of the illicit attachment, for all
the time that the attachment was in force; from levy
to dissolution
○ The fact that the attachment was initially (and
erroneously) deemed correct by the Trial Court,
and it was only on appeal that it was
pronounced improper, cannot restrict recovery
on the bond only to such damages as might
have been sustained during the appeal.
B. Preliminary injunction
1. Grounds
sections 3, Rule 58
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. —
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
(3a)
Marquez v. Sanchez, 515 SCRA 577 (2007)
Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena
Entrepreneur and Agri-Industrial Development Corporation
(LEAD). He applied for a loan with respondent DBP; which
was granted. LEAD was not able to pay. DBP filed w/ the
RTC an application for foreclosure sale of the REMs
constituted to secure its loan. Marquez instituted the instant
action for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and Certiorari
with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Restraining Order to forestall the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the property, alleging that LEAD‘s
involvement in purse seine fishing was premised substantially
on a ―partnership‖ with DBP and not that of a simple debtor–
creditor relationship and that the loan contracts and REM
constituted for them were legally impaired, bereft of
consideration, and did not reflect the true and proper
relationship between LEAD and DBP. Judge Sanchez issued
an Order granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and set the
hearing. DBP filed its Answer with counterclaims against
Marquez. Judge issued the Order denying Marquez‘s prayed
for injunctive writ.
HELD: trial court correctly refused to grant an injunction
against the threatened extrajudicial foreclosure sale by
DBP
● The writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon
a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is
violated. Moreover, an urgent necessity for its
issuance must be shown by the applicant
● the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
may be granted if the following grounds are
established
○ That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
○ That the commission, continuance or
nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
○ That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual
● the requisites of preliminary injunction whether
mandatory or prohibitory are the following:
1. the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable
right, that is a right in esse;
2. there is a material and substantial invasion of such
right;
3. there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant (incapable of
pecuniary estimation);
4. and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury
● ITC: Requisites for injunctive writ not present.
Petitioners failed to show a right in esse to be
protected.
Note: The effect of WPI is to preserve the STATUS QUO
ANTE LITEM MOTAM- last actual peaceable uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy  BEFORE FILING
OF THE CASE
PEZA v. Vianzon, 336 S 309 (2000)
PEZA and private respondent, Saffirou Seacrafts, Inc. (PR)
entered into a 15Y registration Agreement where petitioner
leased to PR 1,500sqm of land in the Bataan Export
Processing Zone for PR‘s business of manufacture and repair
of seacrafts. PR failed to comply with the provisions of the
agreement. Hence the Board of Trustees promulgated a
resolution cancelling the agreements and demanded from PR
to vacate the leased premises. PR filed in the RTC a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for
TRO and preliminary injunction against pet and its officer.
RTC issued a TRO and eventually issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining and retraining PEZA from enforcing and
implementing its Board Resolution and the ―Notice of
Cancellation, Termination, and Demand to Vacate‖ pending
the hearing of the case and until further notice from the court.
PEZA appealed the issuance of the injunction, arguing that
PR had no factual or legal basis for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction for said writ may only be issued if it is
shown that the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right
to protect. It cannot be granted when the alleged right is
doubtful or disputed. PEZA added that PR lost its right to
occupy the leased premises when it violated the terms of its
agreement with PEZA.
HELD: TC properly issued an injunction
SSI has a clear and unmistakable right to protect its
contractual right to lease the property lest it suffer business
losses from its investments within the processing zone. There
was sufficient ground for the issuance since:
- PR is is simply protecting its right under the Registration
Agreement and Supplemental Agreement which states
that PR has the right to lease the premises from 1992 to
2007. When Petitioner demanded PR to vacate the
leased premises in 1997, the latter still had 10 years to
go under the agreement.
- PR‘s right as a lessee is clear and unmistakable as
evidenced by the Retainer (sic) Agreement and
Supplemental Agreement.
- PR is also questioning pet‘s basis in revoking the
agreement, aggravated by lack of proper hearing even
on the administrative level. This is where the regular
court comes in as to the validity of the ground of the
petitioner in revoking the agreements.
The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy, in the case at bar,
SSI was still a lessee of PEZA, as determined by the CA.
Social Security Commission v. Bayona, G.R. No. L-13555,
30 May 1962
● Faculty Club of UST and San Beda filed a petition for
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction before the
CFI alleging in substance that they have existing
agreements with their respective employers for the
establishment of gratuity and retirement funds which
have been in operation prior to September 1, 1957
○ Social Security Commission tried to compel
them to integrate their private system into the
Social Security System
○ inasmuch as their private systems grant more
benefits to the members than the Social
Security System the integration of their private
systems would deprive their members of
property without due process of law
● Judge Froilan Bayona issued ex parte a writ of
preliminary injunction
● Social Security Commission moved to dissolve the
preliminary injunction
HELD: There is no irreparable injury to be the main basis
of the issuance of the writ
● Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy
● An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists
of "a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property
it affects, either physically or in the character in which it
has been held and enjoined, or when the property has
some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value
will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof"
● Respondent corporations made a lengthy discourse on
the matter of irreparable injury they may suffer if the
injunction were not issued, but the array of figures they
have laid out merely succeeded in proving that the
damage, if any they may suffer, is susceptible of
mathematical computation. It is not then irreparable
● If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages,
equity will not apply the remedy of injunction
● The most that can happen would be a diminution of
benefits in proportion to the reduction of the contributions
to their private systems. But while they may suffer such
reduction in benefits they also stand to benefit under the
government system.
○ the integration does not mean the
discontinuance of the private system for under
the law three alternatives are open to
respondents in effecting the integration
2. Procedure for grant
Notes:
- a 72-hour TRO is effective upon issuance
- a 20-day TRO is effective upon service
Scenaro 1: ex parte application for 72-hour TRO, 20-day
TRO in a multiple-sala court
Procedure: application  72 hour TRO ex-parte (issued by
the executive judge)  summons  raffle  summary
hearing  20-day TRO (sala)  full hearing  order  bond
 WPI  discharge  damages
Scenario 2: ex parte application for 20-day TRO in a
multiple-sala court
Procedure: application  summons  raffle  20-day TRO
 full hearing  order  bond  WPI  discharge 
damages
Scenario 3: normal (not ex parte) application for 20-day TRO
in a multiple-sala court
Procedure: application  summons  raffle  summary
hearing  20 day TRO  full hearing  order  bond 
WPI  discharge  damages
sections 1-2, 4-5, Rule 58
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall
be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (1a)
Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is
pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it
may be issued by said court or any member thereof. (2a)
Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. — A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only
when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and
shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded;
and
(b) Unless exempted by the court the applicant files with the
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to
such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued. (4a)
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or
any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala
court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence
of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any
event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy
of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or
the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement
of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not
apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the sheriff's return of service and/or the
records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to
which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except
as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the
court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue
the corresponding order. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February
1998)
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding
sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance
but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can
be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed, automatically vacated. The
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no
court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the
same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member
thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for
sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to
be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme
Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders. (5a)
section 2, Rule 20
Section 2. Assignment of cases. — The assignment of cases
to the different branches of a court shall be done exclusively
by raffle. The assignment shall be done in open session of
which adequate notice shall be given so as to afford
interested parties the opportunity to be present. (7a, R22)
Gonzales v. State Properties Corp., G.R. No. 140765, 25
January 2001
Respondent filed a verified complaint for Recovery of
Property based on ownership with RTC Las Pinas against
petitioner and his siblings, all heirs of Benito Gonzales. The
complaint was accompanied by an application for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction. The case was first raffled to Branch
253; summons was served on petitioner. Petitioner then filed
an Omnibus Motion, praying among others, that another raffle
be held because the other defendants therein did not receive
any notice of raffle. Respondent filed a Motion for Service of
Summons by Publication on all the defendants therein,
except Petitioner. This was granted. He then received a
Notice of Raffle. On the day of raffle, petitioner and counsel
of private respondent appeared but petitioner‘s counsel
opposed the holding of the raffle on the ground that the other
defendants were not duly notified of the raffle
HELD: A CASE MAY BE RAFFLED EVEN WHEN SOME
OF THE PARTIES COULD NOT BE SERVED NOTICE
SINCE THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN
● the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when there is a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order are (a) notice to and (b) presence of the
adverse party or person to be enjoined.
● the required prior or contemporaneous service of
summons may be dispensed with in the following
instances: (a) when the summons cannot be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, (b) when the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when
such party is a nonresident.In such event, the notice of
raffle and the presence of the adverse party must also be
dispensed with.
ITC: the other heirs‘ whereabouts were unknown and that
summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons
prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The
raffle, therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the
presence of the said adverse parties.
3. Duration, dissolution
sections 5, 6, Rule 58
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought

to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except
as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the
court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue
the corresponding order. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February
1998)
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding
sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance
but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can
be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed, automatically vacated. The
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no
court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the
same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member
thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for
sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to
be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme
Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders. (5a)
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of
dissolution of, injunction or restraining order. — The
application for injunction or restraining order may be denied,
upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or
restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be
dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or
person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also
by affidavits. It may further be denied, or if granted, may be
dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the
issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would
cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined
while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an
amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the
dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears
that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining
order granted is too great, it may be modified. (6a)
Federation v. CA, 246 S 175 (1995)
Respondent Jaime Torres was ordered by the Secretary of
DENR to vacate a parcel of land. Torres refused and instead
filed a complaint for injunction before RTC. The RTC issued
an order setting the hearing of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. To prevent the application from
becoming moot and academic (taking into consideration the
length of time to resolve the same), TC issued an order for
the maintenance of the status quo and restrained the
defendants from ejecting Torres. Upon agreement of the
parties, TC ordered that status quo be maintained and
created a committee to pinpoint areas allegedly titled in
Torres‘ name. FLRP filed a motion for intervention on ground
that it had entered into a MOA with DENR for the lease of a
portion of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. FLRP filed
motion to declare without force and effect the restraining
order issued by TC, citing Sec 5 Rule 58 ROC which says
that a TRO has a lifespan of only 20 days, and that its failure
to decide whether to grant the writ within said period barred it
from granting the same. TC denied the motion, and held that
while it‘s true that a restraining order is good for 20 days, the
parties agreed to maintain the status quo before the incident
on preliminary injunction could be resolved by the court
HELD: TC could extend the TRO beyond the 20-day
period
Generally, the efficacy of a TRO is non-extendible and the
courts have no discretion to extend the same considering the
mandatory tenor of the Rule. No reason however to prevent a
court from extending the 20-day period when the parties
themselves ask for such extension or for the maintenance of
the status quo.
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 S 633 (1993)
A criminal case under RA 3019 was initiated against Miriam
Defensor Santiago. MDS filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
Cases as her arraignment was inexplicably advanced. SC
granted TRO, but eventually dismissed the petition. Thus,
MDS filed a MR. Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan issued a Hold
Departure Order against MDS. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Sandiganbayan correctly issued the hold departure
order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with this Court. There was no TRO by the SC
to speak of at the time the HDO was issued by SB. SB validly
exercised its jurisdiction.
A temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action. This is the case even if it was
appealed. An order of dissolution of an injunction may be
immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal,
discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining
order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction
and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such
dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is
necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must
be a new exercise of judicial power.
Buyco v. Baraquia, G.R. No. 177486, 21 December 2009
● Baraquia (RESP) filed before the RTC a complaint
against Buycos, for the establishment of a permanent
right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin the
Buycos from closing off a private road within their
property which he has been using to go to and from the
public highway to access his poultry farm
● RTC dismissed respondent‘s complaint for failure to
establish the concurrence of the essential requisites for
the establishment of an easement of right of way; lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction
● RESP later filed w/ the TC a motion to cite petitioner and
his brother Gonzalo in contempt, alleging that they had
closed off the subject road, thus violating the writ of
preliminary injunction
HELD: the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to
the dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory,
even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal
The present case having been heard and found dismissible
as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is
deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having
been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. A
dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a
restraining order or temporary injunction has
been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining
order or temporary injunction, regardless of whether the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The
rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is
taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits,
the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the
general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates
automatically on the dismissal of the action.
UCPB v. United Alloy, G.R. No. 152238, 28 January 2005
United Alloy filed a Complaint for ―annulment and/or
reformation of contract and damages, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order‖ against
UCPB. Trial Court, on the same day, issued a TRO. Upon
UCPB‘s motion, the RTC dismissed Unialloy‘s complaint. By
virtue of a Motion for Immediate Execution filed by UCPB, the
same court issued an Order of Execution for the turnover to
the bank of the property, subject of the Contract sought to be
annulled or reformed. Unialloy filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus before the CA, which issued a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of Unialloy. UCPB
filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging GAD on the part of the CA.
HELD:
● Section 1(f) of Rule 41 of the Rules unequivocally states
that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.
Rule 41 adds that in instances in which an order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party‘s recourse is a special
civil action under Rule 65.
● Hence, an order of execution, when issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may be the subject of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65
● the CA Resolution granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction was sufficient in form. A
resolution granting/denying application of TRO need
not contain the factual and legal basis
● The grant or denial of a prayer for preliminary injunction
lies in the sound discretion of the issuing court.
● It is not intended to correct a wrong done in the past, in
the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to
prevent further injury.
○ The sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard
4. Damages
sections 8, Rule 58
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against party and
sureties. — At the trial, the amount of damages to be
awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse party,
shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same
procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (9a)
Paramount v. CA, 310 S 377 (1999)
 McAdore entered into an agreement with DECORP for
the latter to supply electricity to their hotel. DECORP
noticed that the actual monthly billing and estimated
monthly billings of McAdore had discrepancies. Upon
investigation, it was found that the meters of McAdore
were tampered with. DECORP issued a corrected bill but
McADORE refused to pay, so they eventually
disconnected the power to the hotel.
 McAdore commenced a suit against DECORP for
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
For the WPI, McAdore posted injunction bonds from
several sureties, one of which was petitioner Paramount.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued, which
restrained DECORP from disconnecting the power.
 RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered McAdore (and
its sureties, jointly and severally) to pay
 McAdore didn't appeal. Paramount appealed to the CA
saying that it was not given its day in court because no
evidence re. damages suffered by private respondent as
a result of the injunction was ever presented
HELD: Paramount is liable to all damages
A separate hearing for the purpose of presenting
evidence on the alleged damages claimed by DECORP
on petitioners injunction bond is NOT needed. The the
surety‘s counsel was already present in the previous hearing
and was notified of the date of the next hearing. It is not
required that there should be a separate hearing in order that
damages upon the bond can be claimed, as per Rule 57,
Section 20 (in relation with Sec. 8, Rule 58). It is deemed
complied with as long as the other party had been apprised of
the notice (even if not specifically for the determination of
damages) and evidence was presented in hearing.
 [GENERAL RULE] While the general rule is that a
summary hearing to determine the extent of a surety‘s
liability is not a superfluity, [EXCEPTION] it may
become so when the surety had been impleaded as a
party, or otherwise earlier notified and given opportunity
to be present its side during the trial. (The exception
applies in this case.)
 ITC, DECORP filed its Answer raising compulsory
counterclaims for rescission of contract, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. Atty. Cordero representing
Paramount, was present during the March 22, 1985
hearing and was notified that the next hearing would be
April 26. (It was in the April 26 hearing that the evidence
of DECORP for its counterclaim for damages was
presented -- note: not stated but can be inferred from
case). Given such facts, it cannot be said that
Paramount was not notified as per the Rules. What is
necessary is for the attaching party and his surety or
sureties to be duly notified and given the opportunity to
be heard.
 The bond liable to ALL damages, not just ACTUAL, as
per Sec. 4(b), Rule 58.
 Mendoza v. Cruz: It is designed to cover all damages
which the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its
principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against
loss or damage by reason of an injunction.
5. No injunctions
OCA Circular No. 79-03:
- Labor related cases (Art. 254, LC: Injunction prohibited)
o Enforcement of decisions or awards rendered
by the NLRC
o Issues involved are interwoven with ULP
- Matters involving concessions, licenses, and other
permits issued by public administrative bodies or officials
(PD 605)
- Dispute or controversy arising from or in connection with
application, implementation or interpretation of the laws
on agrarian reform (RA 6657, Sec. 55 and 68)
- Foreclosure proceeding initiated by government financial
institutions (PD 385)
- Sale or disposition of assets acquired by GSIS (PD
8921)
- Execution and implementation of the infrastructure and
natural resources development projects or the operation
of public utlity by the Government (PD 1818)
- Implementation of the projects of the conversion of
military reservations (RA 7227)
- Orders or decisions of the PCGG
- Orders or decisions of the patent office
- Orders or decisions of SSS
- Orders or decisions of the Bureau of Forestry
- Orders or decisions of the Bureau of Customs
- Investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, unless
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman (RA 6770)
- In criminal prosecution and in cases under preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation
- Any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative
exercising the right and authority to disconnect electric
service (RA 7832)
- Government infrastructure projects (RA 8975)
- Acts of the Privatization Council in pursuance of its
mandate (Proclamation 50-A)
Philippine Ports v. CA, 253 S 212 (1996)
PD1818 was issued. It banned courts from issuing
preliminary injunctions in cases involving concessions,
licenses and other permits issued by public administrative
officials or bodies for the exploitation of natural resources so
as not hamper essential government projects. Invoking such,
petitioners herein question the issuance by the Court of
Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction which, in
effect, enjoins the implementation of a contract between
petitioners Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and Manila
Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR) for the setting up of
floating bulk terminal facilities at the South Harbor of the Port
of Manila.
PPA and Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) entered into a
management contract whereby the former granted the latter
the exclusive right to manage and operate stevedoring
services at the South Harbor.
PPA also granted the Marina Port Services, Inc. (MPSI) the
exclusive management and operation of arrastre and
container terminal handling services in all piers, slips and
wharves at the South Harbor Terminal, Port of Manila.
PPA entered into a contract with petitioner MAFSICOR
whereby it granted MAFSICOR the right, privilege,
responsibility and authority to provide, operate and manage
floating bulk terminal facilities for bulk cargoes bound for
South Harbor, Port of Manila.
MPSI FILED A PETITION against PPA and MAFSICOR for
declaratory relief, final injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They
alleged that the PPA-MAFSICOR contract is in complete
derogation of MPSIs rights and only serves to promote
chaos, instability and labor unrest in the South Harbor, and
that it would lose 50% of its projected gross revenues.
TRIAL COURT issued a TRO but eventually denied the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because:
1. Injunctive relief may not be granted in the action for
declaratory relief which merely seeks the construction or
interpretation of the contract between PPA and MPSI; and
2. Contract between PPA and MAFSICOR was an
accomplished act which cannot be the subject of a restraining
order because there is yet no irreparable injury caused to the
plaintiffs right as the floating grains terminal has not yet been
deposited in the South Harbor and the injury insisted by the
petitioner are merely speculative
Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA), the
bargaining agent for the 4,000 stevedores employed by
MPSI, filed a complaint against MPSI, PPA and MAFSICOR
for the annulment of the PPA-MAFSICOR contract saying
that:
1. The floating grains terminal would duplicate their
function of stevedoring in the South Harbor; and
2. MAFSICORs requirement of trained and qualified
stevedores would certainly deprive some of plaintiffs
member employees of their employment.
CA issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo.
HELD: issuance of the injunction violated PD 1818.
To authorize the issuance of an injunction, the terms of the
agreement involved must be so precise that neither party
could misunderstand them. When MPSI filed the petition for
declaratory relief below with the specific prayer that it
contractual and vested rights under the PPA-MPSI contract
be declared and respected, MPSI in effect manifested its
uncertainty as to the exclusivity of said contract with respect
to stevedoring operations.
F. Forcible Entry / Unlawful Detainer
1. Grounds
sections 1-2, Rule 70
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. —
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs. (1a)
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after
demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the
lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made
upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand
upon the person found on the premises if no person be found
thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen
(15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of
buildings. (2a)
Sy Oh v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-29328, 30 June 1969
● July 21, 1967: Resp → ejectment suit against the
petitioners
● Petitioners → MTD
○ Ground: Lack of jurisdiction
○ First notice or demand sent to them as far back
as April 27, 1964
● City Court of Manila: Denied MTD
○ final letter of demand or notice to vacate was in
the case of petitioner Sy Oh sent on Sept. 30,
1966 and Lim Chi on September 29, 1966
○ Both cases are therefore within the one-year
period
HELD: City Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the case
In the event that there are various letters of demand, the one-
year period in ejectment suits should be counted from the last
one sent to the lessee.
Maddammu v. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, G.R.
No. 48940, 22 June 1943
● Plaintiff Nicasio Sanchez bought a house. Before he
could take possession of and occupy said house,
MADDAMMU surreptitiously and maliciously occupied
same without the knowledge and consent of SANCHEZ.
● after demanding payment of rents and attorney's fees,
he prayed for either of the following reliefs:
(a) Defendant to deliver to plaintiff the
possession of the house, with plaintiff promising to pay
the reasonable rent for the use of the lot; or,
(b) Defendant permits, plaintiff to remove the
house from defendant's lot, with plaintiff paying for any
undue damage which may be caused to said lot; or.
(c) Defendant pays plaintiff the reasonable
value of the house in the amount of P150.
● MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA: declared that by
virtue of the sales contract, Nicasio Sanchez became the
owner of the house and that by virtue of his ownership;
Nicasio Sanchez has the right to the possession of said
house at the time the sale was consummated
HELD:
● The complaint in the Municipal Court purports to be one
for forcible entry, but the facts alleged therein fail to show
that such is the nature of the action. In forcible entry
cases, the only issue is physical possession or
possession de facto of a real property.
● To confer jurisdiction upon the RESP Court the
complaint should have alleged prior physical
possession of the house by plaintiff or by his vendors
and deprivation of such possession by defendant
through any of the means specified by the Rule. (Rule
72, sec. 1).
● ITC: Had Maddammu alleged that Sanchez unlawfully
turned him out of possession of the property in litigation,
the allegation would have been sufficient, because
Maddammu's prior physical possession may then be
implied therefrom. But no such allegation has been
made.
Optimum Development Bank v. Spouses Jovellanos, G.R.
No. 189145, 4 December 2013
Sps. Jovellanos entered into a Contract to Sell with Palmera
Homes, Inc. for the purchase of a residential house and lot.
Sps. Jovellanos took possession of the subject property upon
a down payment. Palmera Homes assigned all its rights, title
and interest in the Contract to Sell in favor of petitioner
Optimum Development Bank through a Deed of Assignment.
Optimum issued a Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of
Contract to Sell for Sps. Jovellanos‘s failure to pay their
monthly installments despite several written and verbal
notices. In a final Demand Letter Optimum required Sps.
Jovellanos to vacate and deliver possession of the subject
property within 7 days which, however, remained unheeded.
Hence, Optimum filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC. MeTC ordered Sps. Jovellanos to
vacate the subject property and pay Optimum reasonable
compensation of P5,000.00 for its use and occupation until
possession has been surrendered. It held that Sps.
Jovellanos‘s possession of the said property was by virtue of
a Contract to Sell which had already been cancelled for non-
payment of the stipulated monthly installment payments. As
such, their "rights of possession over the subject property
necessarily terminated or expired and hence, their continued
possession thereof constitute[d] unlawful detainer.‖ RTC
affirmed; CA reversed, ruling to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. It found that the controversy does not only
involve the issue of possession but also the validity of the
cancellation of the Contract to Sell and the determination of
the rights of the parties thereunder as well as the governing
law, among others, RA 6552. Accordingly, it concluded that
the subject matter is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
HELD: the case is for unlawful detainer and is within the
MeTC jurisdiction
 Metropolitan Trial Courts are conditionally vested with
authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as
an incident in an ejectment case where the determination
is essential to a complete adjudication of the issue of
possession. Concomitant to the ejectment court‘s
authority to look into the claim of ownership for purposes
of resolving the issue of possession is its authority to
interpret the contract or agreement upon which the claim
is premised. The authority granted to the MeTC to
preliminarily resolve the issue of ownership to determine
the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret
and enforce the contract or agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the MeTC
jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of
possession requires the interpretation of a contract will
effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy. As
stated, in an action for unlawful detainer, the defendant‘s
right to possess the property may be by virtue of a
contract, express or implied; corollarily, the termination of
the defendant‘s right to possess would be governed by
the terms of the same contract.
 Interpretation of the contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant is inevitable because it is the contract that
initially granted the defendant the right to possess the
property; it is this same contract that the plaintiff
subsequently claims was violated or extinguished,
terminating the defendant‘s right to possess. The
MeTC‘s ruling on the rights of the parties based on its
interpretation of their contract is, of course, not
conclusive, but is merely provisional and is binding only
with respect to the issue of possession.
 Known as the Maceda Law, R.A. No. 6552 recognizes in 2. Preliminary mandatory injunction
conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial,
section 15, 20, Rule 70
commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel
Section 15. Preliminary injunction. — The court may
the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the
grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions
buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the
of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
binding force. It also provides the right of the buyer on
installments in case he defaults in the payment of
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible from
succeeding installments.
the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for
 In the present case, the 60-day grace period
forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of
automatically operated in favor of the buyers, Sps.
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
Jovellanos, and took effect from the time that the
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty
maturity dates of the installment payments lapsed. With
(30) days from the filing thereof
the said grace period having expired bereft of any
installment payment on the part of Sps.
Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of
Jovellanos, Optimum then issued a Notice of
appeal. — Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days
Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract on April 10,
from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court,
2006. Finally, in proceeding with the actual cancellation
the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
of the contract to sell, Optimum gave Sps. Jovellanos an
to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied
additional thirty days within which to settle their arrears
that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or dilatory or that the
and reinstate the contract, or sell or assign their rights to
appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious.
another.
 It was only after the expiration of the thirty day period did
Optimum treat the contract to sell as effectively cancelled 3. Judgment
– making a final demand upon Sps. Jovellanos to vacate
section 18, Rule 70
the subject property. Thus, there was a valid and
effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell in
accordance with Section 4 of RA 6552 and since Sps. Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession;
not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — The
Jovellanos had already lost their right to retain
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
possession of the subject property as a consequence of
shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and
such cancellation, their refusal to vacate makes out a
valid case for unlawful detainer as properly adjudged by shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
the MeTC.
between the same parties respecting title to the land or
Note: an action for FE/UD = action for provisional rescission building.

section 33(2), BP 129

Cebu Automatic Motors, Inc. v. General Milling Corp.,
G.R. No. 151168, 25 August 2010
GMC entered into a contract with CAMI for the lease of
commercial space within GMC‘s building. CAMI allegedly
violated the provisions when CAMI subleased a portion
without securing GMCs prior written consent, by introducing
improvements to leased premises again without consent, and
for failing to deliver the required advance rental. CAMI was
informed through a letter that the lease contract was
terminated and that the same was to vacate the premises
and settle all its unpaid accounts before the end of that
month. GMC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTCC against CAMI asserting that it terminated the lease
contract due to CAMIs violation.
HELD: Demand is required before the ejectment suit may
be filed
GMC‘s letter did not demand compliance with the terms of
the lease; GMC was past this point as it had rescinded the
contract of lease and was already demanding that the leased
premises be vacated and the amounts owing be paid. Thus,
whether or not the amounts due were paid, the lease
remained terminated because of the cited violations. GMC
did not fully comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule
70. Technically, no extrajudicial rescission effectively took
place as a result of the cited violations until the demand to
pay or comply was duly served and was rejected or
disregarded by the lessee. This aspect of the demand letter
missing in the demand letter and whose rejection would have
triggered the demand to vacate gave GMC no effective cause
of action to judicially demand the lessees ejectment.
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases,
the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession;
4. Execution
Notes:
Decision of the MTC immediately executory but not yet final
because still appealable
Defendant can do the ff to prevent execution:
- Supersedeas bond
- Deposit amount of rent/reasonable compensation with
RTC
- Perfection of appeal
If judgment is still rendered against the defendant upon
appeal, the execution can no longer be stayed because the
decision is immediately executory.

sections 19, 21, Rule 70
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to
stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by
the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff
to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court
the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the
Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period
at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on
or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.
The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal
Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial
Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited
with said court or authorized government depositary bank,
and shall be held there until the final disposition of the
appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested
parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of
opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons,
shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of
the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the
restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a
bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition
thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any
money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the
stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case wherein it appears that the defendant has been
deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending
the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of
possession and restoration of possession and restoration of
possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court. — The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom.
Ferrer v. Rabaca, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580, 6 October 2010
Lourdes Ferrer and Prosperidad Arandez are representatives
(Executive Director and President) of the Young Women
Christian Association, Inc (YWCA). YWCA is the plaintiff and
winner in an ejectment suit against Conrado Cano.
Respondent is the MTC Judge who decided this case on
June 22, 2004. On July 9, 2004, Cano seasonably filed a
notice of appeal without filing a supersedeas bond. On July
12, 2004, YWCA filed a motion for immediate execution and
cited Sec. 19, Rule 70. Judge denied this motion on July 14,
2004 citing that notice of appeal has seasonably been filed
removing him of jurisdiction over the case. MR filed and
subsequently denied. Ferrer and Arandez filed an
administrative case against the judge for ignorance of the
law, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order and
violation of the Code of Conduct of Government Officials.
HELD:
It is a basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and
mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in
a number of cases involving the same issue posed before the
respondent judge.
Sec. 19 Rule 41 is very clear: If judgment is rendered against
the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion
unless an appeal has been perfected AND the defendant to
STAY execution files a SUPERSEDEAS BOND, and deposit
rent to appellate court from time to time during the pendency
of the appeal. The perfection of the appeal of defendants did
not forbid a favorable action on motion for immediate
execution.
Judge is expected to know this and he is liable for denying
the motion of the complainants.
Section 9, Rule 41 (relied on by the judge) clearly states that:
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon perfection of the appeals filed on due
time and the EXPIRATION OF THE TIME TO APPEAL OF
OTHER PARTIES"
ITC, the period to appeal for the plaintiff had not yet lapsed
as the plaintiff has its own period to appeal hence, jurisdiction
of the court is not yet lost. Moreover, when the Motion for
Execution was filed by the complainants, notice of appeal
was not yet filed (the last sentence seems wrong from the
dates mentioned in this case)
Given all of these the Judge was found guilty of ignorance of
the law
Acbang v. Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 164246, 15 January 2014
● Respondents Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Sps. Lopez)
commenced an ejectment suit against petitioner
Herminia, her son Benjamin and his wife Jean in MTC
Cagayan. The defendants did not file their answer. MTC
rendered a decision in favor of Sps. Lopez.
● Herminia Acbang appealed to the RTC*. Meanwhile,
Sps. Lopez moved for execution of the decision pending
appeal in the RTC.
○ They alleged that Acbangs had not filed a
supersedeas bond to stay the execution.
○ Acbang opposed the motion as the failure of
Sps. Lopez to move for execution in the MTC
constituted a waiver of the right to immediate
execution. The supersedeas bond was
unnecessary.
● Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate
execution.
○ Ground being there was no motion to fix
supersedeas bond by the Acbangs.
● Herminia moved for reconsideration, stressing that the
filing of the supersedeas bond was for the purpose of
staying the execution; and that she would not be in a
position to stay the execution unless she was notified of
the filing of the motion for immediate execution. RTC
denied this MR, reiterating that no supersedeas bond
was filed.
● Herminia brought the petition for prohibition before the
SC, alleging that Judge Luczon committed grave error.
○ Herminia claims that Sps. Lopez motion for
execution pending appeal should be filed
before she posted a supersedeas bond. She
 repeated the argument that the Sps. Lopez had
waived their right to immediate execution.
HELD:
● Judgment is immediately executory. To stay its
immediate execution: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the
rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.
● Herminia Acbang correctly states that the Sps. Lopez
should file a motion for execution pending appeal before
the court may issue an order for the immediate execution
but the Sps. Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that
they were entitled to immediate execution as the
Acbangs‘ failed to comply with all three requisites for
staying immediate execution.
● Filing of the notice of appeal perfected the appeal but did
not stay the immediate execution without the filing of the
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the
accruing rentals.
Note: Plaintiff can file motion for execution with RTC instead
of MTC.
Aznar Brothers v. CA, G.R. No. 128102, 7 March 2000
● Aznar acquired a lot (Lot No. 4399) from the heirs of
Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
● Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to
occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance
provided that they leave the land in the event that the
company would use the property for its purposes
● Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia
Realty Development Corporation for the development of
the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing
subdivision and beach resort.
● When its demands for the private respondents to vacate
the land failed, AZNAR filed with the MTCC a case for
unlawful detainer and damages
● MTCC ruled in favor of Aznar
● private respondents appealed to the RTC
● During the pendency of the appeal, the RTC, upon
Aznar‘s ex parte motion, issued an order granting the
issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 70 in view of the failure of private respondents to
put up a supersedeas bond.
● the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered
the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the sheriff to
demolish private respondents houses and other
improvements which might be found on the subject
premises
● CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC;
declared the private respondents as the rightful
possessors de facto of the land in question; and
permanently enjoined Sheriff from effectuating the
demolition of the houses of the private respondents.
HELD: the decision of the MTCC did not become final and
immediately executory in view of the undisputed failure of the
private respondents to post a supersedeas bond as required
by Section 8, Rule 70. It was error for the RTC to order the
execution of the judgment of the MTCC. (But the RTC
decision had become final and executory prior to the appeal
to the CA).
● Since the private respondents had seasonably filed an
appeal with the RTC, the judgment of the MTCC did not
become final. The perfection of the appeal was enough
to stay the execution of the MTCC decision.
● Under the former Section 8, Rule 70, if the judgment of
the MTC in an ejectment case is adverse to the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately. To stay
the immediate execution of the judgment, the defendant
must:
(1) perfect his appeal;
(2) file a supersedeas bond to answer for the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time
of the judgment appealed from; and
(3) periodically deposit the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal.
● GR: the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory
and if not filed, the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate execution of the judgment.
○ EX: where the trial court did not make any
findings with respect to any amount in
arrears, damages or costs against the
defendant (no bond is necessary to stay the
execution of the judgment.)
● ITC: there was no need for the private respondents to file
a supersedeas bond because the judgment of the MTCC
did not award rentals in arrears or damages.
○ The attorneys fees of P8,000 and the litigation
expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor of the
petitioner need not be covered by a bond, as
these are not the damages contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 70
○ The damages referred to therein are the
reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property which are generally
measured by its fair rental value and cannot
refer to other damages which are foreign to the
enjoyment or material possession of the
property
○ Neither were the private respondents obliged to
deposit the rentals falling due during the
pendency of the appeal in order to secure a
stay of execution because the appealed
judgment did not fix the reasonable rental or
compensation for the use of the premises.
● BUT, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure, the decision of the RTC affirming
the decision of the MTCC has become immediately
executory, without prejudice to the appeal before the CA.
○ Section 21, RSP repealed Section 10 of the
Rules of Court allowing during the pendency of
the appeal with the CA a stay of execution of
the RTC judgment with respect to the
restoration of possession where the defendant
makes a periodic deposit of rentals. Thus,
immediate execution of the judgment becomes
a ministerial duty of the court. No new writ of
execution was, however, issued. Nevertheless,
the writ of demolition thereafter issued was
sufficient to constitute a writ of execution, as it
substantially complied with the form and
contents of a writ of execution as provided for
under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, private respondents were duly
notified and heard on the omnibus motion for
the issuance of the writ of demolition and were
given five days to remove their houses
XI. Discovery
Rule 25 Rule 26 (Request for Rule 27 (Production or Rule 28 (Physical and
(Interrogatories) Admission) inspection of Mental Examination of
documents of things) Persons)
Require Leave of DEPENDS NO NO Yes
Court?
Who may avail Any party Any party Any party Any party
Against whom Adverse party Adverse party Adverse party Adverse party
When With Leave: after Any time after issues Upon motion for good Upon motion for good
jurisdiction has been have been joined cause cause
obtained
Without Leave: after
answer has been served
Purpose Fish for information Requesting party is
(basically a shortened asking confirmation of
deposition; testimonial facts which he already
already) knows
Penalties for non- Party not served with Shall not be permitted to None None
availment written interrogatories present evidence on
may not be compelled such facts
by the adverse party to
give testimony in open
court, or to give a
deposition pending
appeal
Penalties for non- Compel an answer Admitted (Rule 26) Compel Compel
compliance Costs Shall not be permitted to Shall not be permitted to
Default judgment present evidence on present evidence on
Dismissal such facts Default such facts Default
Arrest judgment judgment
Contempt Arrest (Rule 29.3) Arrest (Rule 29.3)
(Rule 25, Rule 29)
Availment Within 5 days from Within 5 days from
answer answer (A. M. 03-1-09)
(A. M. 03-1-09)

Notes:
 Rules 23 (Depositions Pending Action) and 25 (Interrogatories) may only be availed of with leave before answer because if it
has the effect of shortening the period to answer, the will deny it. Otherwise, the court will grant it
 Rule 25 (Interrogatories) is preferred over Rule 26 (Request for admission) because the former is more extensive than the latter
 Rules 23 (Depositions Pending Action) is preferred over 25 (Interrogatories) because in the former, you can directly ask the
person being examined and you can also depose even those who are not parties to the case.
A. Interrogatories to parties
Rule 25
Section 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. —
Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23,
any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from
any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership
or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in
its behalf. (1a)
Section 2. Answer to interrogatories. — The
interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be
signed and sworn to by the person making them. The party
upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file
and serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service thereof
unless the court on motion and for good cause shown,
extends or shortens the time. (2a)
Section 3. Objections to interrogatories. — Objections to
any interrogatories may be presented to the court within ten
(10) days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a
motion; and answers shall be deferred until the objections are
resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable.
(3a)
Section 4. Number of interrogatories. — No party may,
without leave of court, serve more than one set of
interrogatories to be answered by the same party. (4)
Section 5. Scope and use of interrogatories. —
Interrogatories may relate to any matters that can be inquired
into under section 2 of Rule 23, and the answers may be
used for the same purposes provided in section 4 of the
same Rule. (5a)
Section 6. Effect of failure to serve written
interrogatories. — Unless thereafter allowed by the court for
good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party
not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled
by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to
give a deposition pending appeal. (n)
sections 1, 5 , Rule 29
Section 1. Refusal to answer. — If a party or other
deponent refuses to answer any question upon oral
examination, the examination may be completed on other
matters or adjourned as the proponent of the question may
prefer. The proponent may thereafter apply to the proper
court of the place where the deposition is being taken, for an
order to compel an answer. The same procedure may be
availed of when a party or a witness refuses to answer any
interrogatory submitted under Rules 23 or 25.
Section 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. —
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully
fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition,
after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve
answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after
proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion
and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of
that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and
in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses
incurred by the other, including attorney's fees. (5)
section 1.2, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
Within one day from receipt of the complaint: The court shall
issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by
adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use
of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules
27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. A
copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
Notes:
 Any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts
from any adverse party shall file and serve upon the
adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by
the party served.
 Written interrogatories and the answers thereto must
both be filed and served. [Sec. 2, Rule 25] Hence, the
answers may constitute as judicial admissions [Sec. 4,
Rule 129]
 Objections may be presented to the court within 10 days
after service of the interrogatories, with notice as in case
of a motion. [Sec. 3, Rule 25]
o Effect: Answers shall be deferred until
objections are resolved
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, 21
November 1991
PCGG initiated a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago (respondents),
together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria
Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda before the Sandiganbayan. Instead
of filing their answers, respondents jointly filed a ―Motion to
Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and for Bill of
Particulars of Other Portions‖. The SB gave the PCGG forty-
five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific
certain allegations. Respondents then presented a ―Motion to
Leave to File Interrogatories under Rule 25‖ and
―Interrogatories under Rule 25‖. The SB denied the motion to
strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file
interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual
basis. The case was set for pre-trial. All parties were required
to submit their pre-trial briefs. The respondents then filed with
SB a pleading, ―Interrogatories to Plaintiff‖ and an ―Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff‖ as well as as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. The SB admitted
the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. The PCGG filed an
opposition to the Amended Interrogatories alleging that they
are not specific and do not name the person to whom they
are propounded; they delved into factual matters which had
already been decreed as part of the proof of the Complaint
upon trial; they are frivolous, inquiring about matters of fact
which they already sought to extract through their prior
Motion for Bill of Particulars; they are are really in the nature
of a deposition.
HELD: THE PETITIONER CANNOT OBJECT TO THE
INTERROGATORIES SERVED TO IT
● The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired
into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it
is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties —
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial —
should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to adversaries; hence,
there are deposition-discovery mechanisms set forth in
Rules 24 to 29.
● With this, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can
 the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent's case.
● On the other hand, to ensure that availment of the
modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and
efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing
the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the
party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery;
taking the matters inquired into as established in
accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose
designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or
parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
● It s the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to
proper litigation.
● Thus, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage
at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced
from the time of trial to the period preceding it
Dela Torre v. Pepsi, 298 S 366 (1998)
● PET are holders of bottle caps that won in a contest
sponsored by RESP. Due to the refusal of RESP to
deliver the prizes, PET filed separate complaints for
specific performance and damages in the Makati RTC
● PET filed separate motions for authority to litigate in
forma pauperis
● RESP sent written interrogatories to PET consisting of
59 questions aimed at determining their eligibility to
litigate as paupers.
● RTC issued order suspending proceedings until PET
could complete the documents required for establishing
their right to litigate as paupers
● PET did not answer the written interrogatories because
they thought that the order of the court suspended all
matters connected with the case except those relating to
the submission of the papers showing their qualifications
to litigate as paupers
● RESP filed MTD otg of refusal of PET to make discovery
● RTC granted MTD
HELD: The case should not have been dismissed
● Under Rule 24, §1 and Rule 25, §1 of the 1964 Rules of
Court, a litigant may serve, with leave of court and after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or,
even without such leave, after an answer has been
served, written interrogatories on the adverse party. Like
the other modes of discovery authorized by the Rules of
Court, the purpose of written interrogatories is to
assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in
ascertaining the facts involved in a case
○ What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery
of every bit of information which may be
useful in the preparation for trial, such as the
identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant
facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, and other
tangible things. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan)
● To ensure the efficacy of the various modes of discovery,
the Rules provide sanctions against a party who refuses
to make discovery. Rule 29, §5 for example allows the
court to strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party,
and in its discretion, order him to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred by the other, including attorney‘s fees.
● In several cases, the court has also upheld the dismissal
of an action due to the refusal of the plaintiff to make
discovery
○ The matter of how, and when, the above
sanctions should be applied is one that
primarily rests on the sound discretion of
the court where the case pends, having
always in mind the paramount and
overriding interest of justice. For while the
modes of discovery are intended to attain
the resolution of litigations with great
expediency, they are not contemplated,
however, ultimately to be causes of
injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine
well the circumstances of each case and to
make their considered determination thereafter.
( Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals)
● ITC: The written interrogatories served by RESP on PET
dealt with ancillary matters which, although may be
inquired into through the proper modes of discovery
provided in the Rules of Court, are not directly
related to the main issues in the suit
○ the written interrogatories sent by RESP to PET
were for the purpose of finding out if the latter
were entitled to litigate as paupers, that is,
whether they should be exempted from paying
docket fees
● Since the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, RESP
was certainly entitled to know whether petitioners were
eligible to litigate as paupers. But PET was eventually
able to submit affidavits, documents, and other
supporting papers on this matter.
Furthermore, it appears that PET‘s failure to answer the
written interrogatories was due, not to intransigence, but to a
misapprehension of the scope of the order issued by the
RTC. PET thought that the order had the effect of suspending
all other matters connected with the case, including the
service of answers to the written interrogatories of private
respondent PI and for this reason did not respond to the
same
Producer’s Bank v. CA, 285 S 385 (1998)
Respondent SIHI filed a complaint for sum of money against
petitioner PBP involving two causes of action: for unpaid
interest of five certificates of time deposit (CTD); and the
principal amount thereof. Trial on the merits started wherein
SIHI presented evidence to prove that PBP failed to pay the
interest and the principal amount. As its defense, PBP
presented evidence to prove that it had already paid the
interest to SIHI. With regard to 2 CTDs, it claimed that the
same were issued, not in the name of SIHI but of a certain
Johnny Lu. Moreover, it claimed that payment had already
been made, hence, it had no more liability. SIHI presented its
rebuttal evidence when it recalled its first witness, Anthony
Oco, an employee of SIHI. Thereafter, it served written
interrogatories to PBP about any criminal or civil action
involving Mr. Johnny Y. Lu, outstanding obligations of Mr. Lu
with PBP, etc. Upon receipt of the interrogatories, PBP filed a
motion to quash the same on the ground that they were
improper since the trial was about to be terminated. The trial
court, however, denied the motion and admitted the written
interrogatories on the ground that they will help facilitate the
early disposition of the case and will assist the court in
determining the truth, thus, the ends of justice will be
subserved.
HELD: the court a quo was correct in allowing the admission
of the written interrogatories filed by SIHI at the rebuttal stage
of the proceedings
● Sec. 1, Rule 23 does not provide for any time frame
within which modes of discovery (in this case, written
interrogatories) can be utilized, other than by stating that
the same should be availed of with leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant, or
without such leave after an answer has been served.
● Since the rules are silent as to the period within which
written interrogatories may still be requested, it is
necessary for the resolution of this case to determine
the purpose of written interrogatories. It is likewise
essential to determine whether, based on the stage of
the proceedings and evidence presented thus far,
allowing written interrogatories to be served is proper
and would facilitate the disposition of the case.
Additionally, it should be determined whether the trial
courts action unduly prejudiced the substantial rights of
PBP.
● The use of discovery is encouraged, for it operates
with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of
the trial court. Under statutes and procedural rules, the
trial court enjoys considerable leeway in matters
pertaining to discovery, and the exercise of such
discretion will not be set aside in the absence of abuse,
or unless the trial courts disposition of matters of
discovery was improvident and affected the substantial
rights of the parties.
 ITC: PBP alleged 2 CTDs which is the subject of one of
the causes of action of SIHI against PBP, were issued in
the name of a certain Mr. Johnny Lu and that they had
already paid the principal amount covered by said CTDs
to Johnny Lu. Thus, it had no more liability with regard to
the subject CTDs. The questions propounded in the
written interrogatories served by SIHI to PBP were
meant to elicit information pertinent to the nature of the
latter‘s defense, that is, that it had already paid the
principal amount of P2,000,000.00 covered by the two
CTDs. Thus, having allowed the written interrogatories to
be served upon PBP, the trial court was in a better
position to examine the evidence already presented and
to determine whether the information sought by SIHI
would expedite the resolution of the case.
Note: Doctrine in the Producers Bank case has been
modified by A.M. 03-1-09 Sec. 1.2.
B. Requests for admission
Rule 26
Admission by Adverse Party
Section 1. Request for admission. — At any time after
issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any
other party may file and serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of
any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copy
have already been furnished. (1a)
Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall
not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the
party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon
the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Objections to
any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by
the party requested within the period for and prior to the filing
of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding
paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred
until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be
made as early as practicable. (2a)
Section 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by
a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the
pending action only and shall not constitute an admission by
him for any other purpose nor may the same be used against
him in any other proceeding. (3)
Section 4. Withdrawal. — The court may allow the party
making an admission under the Rule, whether express or
implied, to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be
just. (4)
Section 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for
admission. — Unless otherwise allowed by the court for
good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice a party
who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the
adverse party of material and relevant facts at issue which
are, or ought to be, within the personal knowledge of the
latter, shall not be permitted to present evidence on such
facts. (n)
section 4, Rule 29
Section 4. Expenses on refusal to admit. — If a party after
being served with a request under Rule 26 to admit the
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter of
fact serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting
the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of such
document or the truth of any such matter of fact, he may
apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay
him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof,
including attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there
were good reasons for the denial or that admissions sought
were of no substantial importance, such order shall be
issued. (4a)
section 1.2, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
Within one day from receipt of the complaint: The court shall
issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by
adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use
of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules
27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. A
copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
Notes:
 The request for admission must be served on the party,
not the counsel. This is an exception to the general rule
that notices shall be served upon counsel and not upon
the party.
Lanada v. CA, 375 S 543 (2002)
UFE declared a strike and put up a picket line in front of
NESTLE‘s factory. Nestle arranged with Capt. Lanada and
some PC soldiers to have its truck deliver some goods. The
truck was attacked by the strikers who were throwing stones.
To avoid the stones, the driver of the truck was driving in a
crouching position but considering the length of the truck that
was also overloaded, he lost control. The truck bumped the
car of DR HEMEDEZ and dragged it until the car turned
upside down. When the cargo was finally unloaded and DR
HEMEDEZ was finally pulled out from under the truck he was
brought to the Hospital where he died after arrival. Parents of
DR HEMEDEZ field a case in RTC against NESTLE et al.
HEMEDEZ SPS SERVED DEFENDANTS A REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION OF THE TRUTH OF THE FACTS SET FORTH
IN THE COMPLAINT AND GENUINENESS OF EACH OF
THE DOCUMENTS APPENDED THERETO. NESTLE and
SANTOS, CAPT LANADA, and owner and driver of truck filed
their verified answer to the request for admission. HEMEDEZ
SPS sought striking out of the answers filed, arguing that
under Sec 2 Rule 26, the parties themselves and not their
counsel should personally answer the request for admission
and hence the answer filed by the counsel in their behalf was
by nature based on hearsay.
HELD: an answer to a request for admission signed and
sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is sufficient
compliance with the provisions of Rule 26
● when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the
request for admission, it should not be restrictively
construed to mean that a party may not engage the
services of counsel to make the response in his behalf
Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. v. Toledo, G.R. No.
190818, 5 June 2013
 Liberty Toledo (R), the treasurer of the City of Manila,
assessed Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp and other
petitioner companies (P) for their fourth quarter local
business taxes pursuant to the Revenue Code of the
City of Manila.
 P paid P5,104, 281.26 in taxes under protest and filed
with the RTC their complaint for a refund since they
claimed that Sec. 21 of the Code was void.
 R: Filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer claiming that
P failed to file any written claim for tax refund or credit
with the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila.
 P: Sent the RTC and R a Request for Admission &
Interrogatories which requested the admission of the
fact that P filed a written protest to R. R did not respond.
 RTC: Section 21 was null and void, P is entitled to a tax
refund since the Court said in Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil.
Inc v. City of Manila that certain related city ordinances
(which were the amendatory ordinances which made
petitioners liable for local business taxes) under the
present Manila Revenue Code were void.
 CTA reversed the RTC‘s ruling and denied the request
for refund, saying that P failed to file any written claim
for tax refund or credit because the letter it submitted
was a mere protest letter and as such, could not be
treated as a written claim for refund.
HELD: Petitioners are not entitled to a refund
 GENERAL RULE: Based on R26, ROC, S1 if a request
for admission was filed regarding the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact, the party to
whom such request is served is given a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn
statement answering the same. S2 says that should
the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of
the matters of which admission is requested shall
be deemed admitted.
 EXCEPTION: when the party to whom the request for
admission was served had already controverted the
matters subject of such request in an earlier
pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request
for admission have already been admitted or denied in
previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter
cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In
turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a
response to the request
 RATIO: admissions by the adverse party as a mode of
discovery contemplates interrogatories that will clarify
and shed light on the truth or falsity of allegations in the
pleadings – thus, a mere reiteration of what has already
been alleged in the pleadings, otherwise useless. One
nd
should not have to make a 2 denial of matters
already denied in its answers.
ITC: while the case was filed within 2 years from payment,
they failed to prove they filed a written claim for refund with
the local treasurer. Even if P filed their Request for Admission
that they filed a written claim for refund with the City treasurer
in the RTC and served it to R, R did not need to reply since
they have already stated in their Motion to Dismiss and
Answer that petitioners failed to file any written claim for
tax refund or credit.
C. Production or inspection of documents or things
Rule 27 SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection;
order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved
in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object
or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions
as are just."
1.2, A.M. No. 03- 1-09-SC
The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and request for
admission by adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other
measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five days from the
filing of the answer. A copy of the order shall be served upon
the defendant together with the summons and upon the
plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff
must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial
conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the
given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
Security Bank v. CA, 323 S 330 (2000)
● Plaintiffs Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc
Ten sought to enjoin Security Bank Corporation (SBC)
from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage over a piece of property
● Before filing his answer to defendant SBCs cross-claim,
defendant Domingo P. Uy filed an Omnibus Motion
(Production of Documents and Suspension and/or
Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim) on the
ground that all documents, papers and instruments made
and executed by SBC on the evaluation, processing and
approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., the
real estate mortgages (REM) and the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) themselves must first be produced before
he could prepare and file the answer to SBCs cross-
claim.
● RTC denied motion
● CA reversed and held that respondent Domingo Uy has
shown good cause for the production of such
documents: that of being able to intelligently prepare his
defenses against the cross-claim of petitioner SBC.
HELD: SC affirmed CA, grant the two Motions for production
and inspection of documents
● the Motion of Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc
Ten was for a good cause, because the said documents
were "necessary for a full determination of the issues
raised.
● R27 aims to enable the parties to inform themselves,
even before the trial, of all the facts relevant to the
action, including those known only to the other litigants.
Through this procedure, "civil trials should not be carried
on in the dark." (Republic v. Sandiganbayan)
● Petitioner points out that a party may be compelled to
produce or allow the inspection of documents if six
procedural requisites are complied with:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or
inspection of documents or things, showing good cause
therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of
the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(d) Such documents, etc. are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc. constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action; and
(f) Such documents, etc. are in the possession, custody or
control of the other party."
● Petitioner contends that requisite "e" has not been
satisfied, arguing that respondents have not shown the
relevancy or materiality of the documents subject of the
Motions.
● These arguments are not persuasive. Section 1 of Rule
27 clearly provides that the documents sought must be
"material to any matter involved in the action."
Respondents have shown that the subject documents
are indeed material to the present action.
Chan v. Chan, G.R. 179786, 24 July 2013
Petitioner Josielene filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Respondent Johnny with the RTC, alleging
that respondent failed in his duty to care for his family and
was diagnosed to be mentally deficient due to drinking and
drug abuse. Respondent opposed the petition, saying in his
answer that he was confined against his will in the hospital
and attached a philhealth claim form with a note from his
physician that he suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse" . Petitioner sought the rest of her husband‘s
hospital records via request for issuance of subpoena duces
tecum, saying that since he disclosed a portion of his records,
such can be considered a waiver for the rest of the records
(Sec. 17, R132). RTC and CA denied the motion, hence this
petition for certiorari.
HELD: DENY the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny‘s hospital records on the ground that these
are covered by the privileged character of the physician-
patient communication
 the right to compel the production of documents
under R27 has a limitation: that the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged‖. ITC, the records
Josielene sought to obtain may be considered as
privileged information under Sec. 24(c), Rule 130.
 the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records, which are not testimonial (test
results, etc.), would still be to allow access to
evidence that is inadmissible without the patient‘s
consent.
D. Physical and mental examination of persons
Rule 28
Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
Section 1. When examination may be ordered. — In an
action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is
in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may in
its discretion order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician. (1)
Section 2. Order for examination. — The order for
examination may be made only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all
other parties, and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions and scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made. (2)
Section 3. Report of findings. — If requested by the party
examined, the party causing the examination to be made
shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions.
After such request and delivery, the party causing the
examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to
receive from the party examined a like report of any
examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same
mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to
deliver such report, the court on motion and notice may make
an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may
exclude his testimony if offered at the trial. (3a)
Section 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and
obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking
the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives
any privilege he may have in that action or any other
involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of
every other person who has examined or may thereafter
examine him in respect of the same mental or physical
examination. (4)
section 1.2, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
Within one day from receipt of the complaint: The court shall
issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by
adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use
of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules
27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. A
copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
Notes:
- Party causing the examination has the right to the
st
physician‘s report as his evidence (1 report)
- Party examined may only get a copy of said report upon
request
o By requesting this, party examined waives the
patient-physician privilege in that action or any
other action involving the same condition. This
means that the party who caused the
examination may also get a copy of any
nd
medical report (2 report) obtained by the party
examined.
- RATIO: party examined discovered the evidence of the
party causing examination; for mutuality, both reports
may already be used by either party
E. Depositions pending action
Rule23
sections2(b),5,Rule21
Section 2. By whom issued. — The subpoena may be
issued by —
(a) the court before whom the witness is required to attend;
(b) the court of the place where the deposition is to be taken;
(c) the officer or body authorized by law to do so in
connection with investigations conducted by said officer or
body; or
(d) any Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals in any case or investigation pending within the
Philippines. When application for a subpoena to a prisoner is
made, the judge or officer shall examine and study carefully
such application to determine whether the same is made for a
valid purpose. No prisoner sentenced to death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment and who is confined in any
penal institution shall be brought outside the said penal
institution for appearance or attendance in any court unless
authorized by the Supreme Court (2a, R23)
Section 5. Subpoena for depositions. — Proof of service of
a notice to take a deposition, as provided in sections 15 and
25 of Rule 23, shall constitute sufficient authorization for the
issuance of subpoenas for the persons named in said notice
by the clerk of the court of the place in which the deposition is
to be taken. The clerk shall not, however, issue a subpoena
duces tecum to any such person without an order of the
court. (5a, R23)
section3(f), Rule 71
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
sections 10-14, Rule 132
Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A
question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a leading question. It is not
allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child
of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation
or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact
not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he
has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5a, 6a, and 8a)
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.
— A witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Section 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. —
Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d)
and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not
allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness
who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He
may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of
the times and places and the persons present, and he must
be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them. (16)
Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. —
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible
until such character has been impeached. (17)
section 1.2, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
Within one day from receipt of the complaint: The court shall
issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by
adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use
of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules
27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. A
copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
sections 12, 13, 15, Rule 119
Section 12. Application for examination of witness for
accused before trial. — When the accused has been held to
answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the
other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his
behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of
the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that
the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for
believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or resides
more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of
trial and has no means to attend the same, or that other
similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable

or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be
supported by an affidavit of the accused and such other
evidence as the court may require. (4a)
Section 13. Examination of defense witness; how made.
— If the court is satisfied that the examination of a witness for
the accused is necessary, an order will be made directing
that the witness be examined at a specified date, time and
place and that a copy of the order be served on the
prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled
examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge,
or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing
so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be
made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior
court to be designated therein. The examination shall
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor
provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A written record
of the testimony shall be taken. (5a)
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.
— When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the order of the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith
be conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused,
or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice
shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)
Notes:
4 STAGES OF DEPOSITION (RULE 23)
1. INITIATION OF DEPOSITION
 WHEN: with leave (Sec. 1) or upon notice (Sec. 15)
 BY WHOM:
o Philippines (Sec. 10): judge, notary public,
stipulated before any person authorized to
administer oaths (Sec. 14)
o Abroad (Sec. 11):
 on notice: secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the RP
 before such person or officer as may
be appointed by commission or under
letters rogatory
 commission – order
appointing/authorizing a rogatory be issued addressed to Director
person abroad to take
deposition
 letter rogatory – requesting a
court abroad to take
deposition (Sec. 12)
 stipulated before any person
authorized to administer
oaths (Sec. 14)
 OBJECTION: protective order (Sec. 28)
 MANNER: oral or written
 SUBPOENA: not required but preferred because if the
other party attended the deposition and the deponent
does not appear, you must pay for the reasonable
expenses of the other party (Sec. 24)
2. TAKING OF DEPOSITION (Sec. 17)
a. oath
b. recording of deposition stenographically or otherwise
agreed
c. objections shall be noted (unless there was a motion to
terminate or limit examination – Sec. 18)
d. transcription
3. POST-TAKING (Sec. 19)
a. examination of transcription by deponent
b. changes
c. certify
d. seal
e. file
f. copy
4. TRIAL (Sec. 4)
a. to contradict/impeach the testimony of the deponent as a
witness
i. impeach credibility – of witness of adverse party (if
you want to impeach credibility of your own witness,
have him/her declared as an adverse witness first) –
Rule 132 Sec. 12
ii. impeach testimony – of your own witness or
witness of adverse party (Rule 132 Sec. 11)
b. for any purpose (to be used as testimony or admission of
the adverse party) – but must still be called to the witness
stand
c. for any purpose as a substitute for the testimony of any
witness
Dasmarinas Garments Inc. v. Hon. Ruben Reyes, et al.,
G.R. No. 108229, 24 August 1993
 American President Lines Ltd (APL) sued Dasmariñas
Garments Inc to recover a sum of money
 APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the
depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, commission or
letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines in Taipei
o the Philippine Government has no consulate
office in Taiwan in view of its ―one--China
policy‖
o In lieu thereof, an office was set up by the
President presently occupied by Director
Joaquin Roces which is the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc.
o APL prayed that ―that commission or letters
Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian
Executive Exchange Center, Inc. to hear and
take the oral deposition of the aforenamed
persons
 Dasmariñas: OPPOSED the motion
o Motion was fatally defective in that it doesn‘t
seek that a foreign court examine a person
within its jurisdiction
o Issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary
because the witnesses can be examined before
the Philippine Court
o Rules of Court expressly require that the
testimony of a witness must be taken orally in
open court and not by deposition
 RTC: Granted APL‘s motion
HELD: deposition may be taken in Taiwan by AEC
● Depositions are generally NOT meant to be a substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness
● As a rule, the deponent must be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing (Rule
132, Section 1)
● Therefore, any deposition offered to prove the facts
therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the
actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may
be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay
○ Because party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross- examine the deponent at
the time that his testimony is offered
○ opportunity for cross- examination must be
accorded to a party at the time that the
testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing
● However, depositions may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent under certain conditions (Rule 24, Section 4)
○ Therefore, it is apparent that the deposition of
any person may be taken wherever he may be,
in the Philippines or abroad.
● If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition
―shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary
public‖ (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court).
● If in a foreign state or country, the deposition ―shall be
taken:
○ on notice before a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice--consul,
or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, or
○ before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory‖ (Sec. 11, Rule 24)
● Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country
where the Philippines has no ―secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice--consul, or
consular agent,‖ then obviously it may be taken only
―before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory.
● Section 12, Rule 24 provides the rule for commission or
letters rogatory
○ commission or letters rogatory shall be issued
only when necessary or convenient, on
application and notice, and on such terms and
with such directions as are just and appropriate.
○ Officers may be designated in notices or
commissions either by name or descriptive title
and letters rogatory may be addressed ‗To the
Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the
country).‖
● Commission: ―(a)n instrument issued by a court of
justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person
to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of
such court or tribunal‖
● Letters rogatory: ―(a)n instrument sent in the name and
by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting
the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories
filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who
is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom
such letters are addressed‖
● ITC: RTC has issued a commission to the ―Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces‖
Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Spouses
Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, 16 August 2004
● Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed
a Complaint for damages against Jonathan Landoil
International Co., Inc. (JLI).
● Trial proceeded without the participation of JLI, whose
absence during the pretrial had led the trial court to
declare it in default.
● JLI received a copy of the RTC Decision and it filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue.
(DENIED)
● JLI received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it
had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the
Omnibus Motion for New Trial, JLI filed a Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution
● JLI personally served counsel for respondents a Notice
to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. The
Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not
received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial.
● The deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled. The
same day, respondents sent JLI a fax message advising
it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the
records the Notice to Take Deposition; and asking it not
to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion
HELD: petitioner can still avail of the taking of oral
depositions under Rule 23
● The ROC do not restrict a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be
taken even after trial has commenced and may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness
stand.
● Depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-
taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after
pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing
them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of
fact have become numerous or complicated.
● Depositions are allowed as a departure from the
accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge. Depositions are allowed,
provided they are taken in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of
court if the summons have been served, without leave of
court if an answer has been submitted); and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).
● However, when a deposition does not conform to the
essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause
material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not
be allowed.
● The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to
ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to
their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same
reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness
were present and had testified in court; and for errors
and irregularities in the deposition. As a rule, depositions
should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them
would prejudice any party.
● ITC: it fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the
witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond
100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing.
 Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion
to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of
proving that the trial court‘s Decision was not yet final. As
previously explained, despite the fact that trial has
already been terminated, a deposition can still be
properly taken.
Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, 28 August
2008
● Respondents were charged with Estafa through
Falsification of a Public Document before RTC of Cebu
City
● Petitioner Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu, was
confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper
gastro-intestinal bleeding while on vacation in Manila.
She was advised to stay there for further treatment.
● Counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter‘s
deposition
○ Granted by TC, and directed that Concepcion‘s
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of
Makati
○ Held that procedural technicalities should be
brushed aside because of the urgency of the
situation, since Concepcion was already of
advanced age
○ Concepcion‘s deposition was taken at her
residence
● CA reversed and set aside the order upon motion of
respondents
○ Concepcion‘s deposition should have been
taken before the judge or the court where the
case is pending, which is RTC Cebu and not
the Clerk of Court of Makati
HELD: Rule 23 does not apply to the case
● All witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the
case in the presence of the judge
○ Exceptions: Rule 23 to 28 of ROC provide for
different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action
○ Sec 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119 of Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the
conditional examination of both defense and
prosecution witnesses in criminal proceedings
● ITC: petitioners contend that Concepcion‘s advanced
age and health condition exempt her from the application
of sec 15 rule 119, thus calling for application of rule 23
of ROC
○ The very reason offered by petitioners to
exempt her from coverage of rule 119 is at once
the ground which places her within the
coverage of the same provision
○ Had Concepcion not been too sick at that time,
her motion would have been denied and she
would have been compelled to appear before
the court for examination during the trial proper
● Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined:
○ If the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at
the trial; or
○ If the witness has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning
● The procedure set forth in rule 119 requires that the
conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending
○ It is also necessary that the accused be notified
so that he can attend the examination, subject
to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice
○ As to the manner of examination, it must be
conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is through question
and answer
● To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should
be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending
○ If the deposition is made elsewhere, the
accused may not be able to attend, as when he
is under detention
○ Ensures that the judge would be able to
observe the witness deportment to enable him
to properly assess his credibility
Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, 18 July 2012
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo, and Jane Go
were charged by Cambodian businessman Li Luen Ping
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila with
Other Deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC. Complainant Ping
traveled from Cambodia to the Philippines in order to attend
the hearing. Trial dates, however, were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability. Prosecution filed a
Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping (by taking the
deposition before the Philippine consular office in Laos,
Cambodia) because he was being treated for lung infection in
Cambodia and per doctor‘s advice, he cannot engage in long
travels due to ill health. MeTC granted the motion upon
submission of Ping‘s medical certificate. The Regional Trial
Court, however, reversed the MeTC decision. Prosecution
appealed to the CA which granted the appeal and instituted
MeTC order allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining
witness.
HELD: Rule 23 does not apply to the case
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases
where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to
face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test
the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment
while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,
notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized
to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no
additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party. But for purposes of taking the deposition
in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial,
the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers
the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to
apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13
December 2011
 PCGG filed a complaint against Jose L. Africa, Manuel
H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile and
Potenciano Ilusorio for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages before the
Sandiganbayan. Allegedly, the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of
Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which
shareholdings Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for
themselves and through their holdings and the
corporations they organized, beneficially for Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda Marcos (Civil Case No. 0009)
o Victor Africa, son of the late Jose L. Africa, was
not impleaded in and thus, not a party to Civil
Case No. 0009.
 However, this case spawned numerous incidental cases,
among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The present
respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case
No. 0130
 In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of
Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-
trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General
Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London,
England
 As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion to
adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in Civil Case No.
0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane
which was denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution
because he was not available for cross-examination
ISSUE: WoN the Bane deposition is admissible – NO
1. The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil
Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites
of admissibility
 petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be
admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of
Section 47, Rule 130; claiming that in light of the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No.
0130, among others, the former case or proceeding that
Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
 Rule 31, the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos.
0009 and 0130 were consolidated provided that: When
actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay
o Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of
consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the
parties and the causes of action involved; and
on the evidence presented in the consolidated
cases
o while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion
either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order
the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will
show that the term consolidation is used
generically and even synonymously with joint
hearing or trial of several causes
 In the context of legal procedure, the term consolidation
is used in three different senses:
o Where all except one of several actions are
stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the
others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
o Where several actions are combined into one,
lose their separate identity, and become a
single action in which a single judgment is
rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same
parties stating claims which might have been
set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)  actions become fused and
unidentifiable from one another and where the
evidence appreciated in one action is also
appreciated in another action
o Where several actions are ordered to be tried
together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
This type of consolidation does not merge the
suits into a single action, or cause the parties to
one action to be parties to the other.
(consolidation for trial)
 ITC: consolidation for trial only
o the consolidated actions were originally
independent of one another and the fact that in
the present case the party respondents to Civil
Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance,
accounting, restitution and damages)
are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a
special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder
involving a corporate squabble within ETPI)
o to impose upon the respondents the effects of
an actual consolidation results in an outright
deprivation of the petitioner‘s right to due
process
o also, ITC, the evidence sought to be admitted
is not simply a testimony taken in one of the
several cases, but a deposition upon oral
examination taken in another jurisdiction and
whose admission is governed by specific
provisions on our rules on evidence.
2. Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a
former testimony under Section 47, Rule 130
 Section 47, Rule 130 is the rule on the admissibility of
testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding
 Petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 must
prevail over Section 47, Rule 13
 Section 4, Rule 23: Use of depositions. At the trial or
upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used
against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds:
xxx
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment
 Section 47, Rule 130: Testimony or deposition at a
former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former
 case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him
 Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at
the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court does not only require due observance of
its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a
condition for admissibility, compliance with the rules on
evidence. Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may
be used in evidence
 Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in
both cases must, at least, be substantially the same;
otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former
statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested
by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so
3. Unavailability of witness
 The phrase unable to testify appearing in both Rule 23
and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical
inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a
testimony
 Where the deposition is taken not for discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then
the deposition should be rejected in evidence
 Although the testimony of a witness has been given in
the course of a former proceeding between the parties to
a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its
admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available,
must be produced in court as if he were testifying de
novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere
hearsay
4. The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to
cross-examine; identity of parties; and identity of subject
matter
 In resolving the question of whether the requirement of
opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied, we
have to consider first the required identity of parties as
the present opponent to the admission of the Bane
deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is imputed may not after all be the same
adverse party who actually had such opportunity.
 To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later
trial or action, the parties to the first proceeding must be
the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical
identity, however, is not required; substantial identity or
identity of interests suffices, as where the subsequent
proceeding is between persons who represent the
parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood,
or in estate. The term privity denotes mutual or
successive relationships to the same rights of property
 ITC: petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the
identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the
respondents. While Africa is the son of the late
respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should
be admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder
who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case
No. 0130. While Africa and the respondents are all ETPI
stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all
any privity between them
F. Depositions before action or pending appeal
PROCEDURE (Rule 24, Sec. 3 to 4):
1. Notice served upon each person named in the petition as
an adverse party together with a copy of the petition, stating
that the petitioner will apply to the court, at a time and place
named therein, for the order described in the petition
2. Petition filed with the court
3. Notice of the hearing shall be served on the parties and
prospective deponents in the manner provided for service of
summons
4. Hearing at least 20 days after notice, to see if the
perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay
of justice
5. Order is issued by the court, designating or describing the
persons whose deposition may be taken and specifying the
subject matter of the examination and whether the
depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written
interrogatories
6. Depositions may then be taken in accordance with Rule 23
before the hearing.
Rule 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal
Section 1. Depositions before action; petition. — A person
who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of
another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable
in any court of the Philippines may file a verified petition in
the court of the place of the residence of any expected
adverse party. (1a R134)
Section 2. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be
entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show: (a) that
the petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of
the Philippines but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to
be brought; (b) the subject matter of the expected action and
his interest therein; (c) the facts which he desires to establish
by the proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to
perpetuate it; (d) the names or a description of the persons
he expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far
as known; and (e) the names and addresses of the persons
to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he
expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order
authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the
persons to be examined named in the petition for the purpose
of perpetuating their testimony. (2, R134)
Section 3. Notice and service. — The petitioner shall serve a
notice upon each person named in the petition as an
expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition,
stating that the petitioner will apply to the court, at a time and
place named therein, for the order described in the petition.
At least twenty (20) days before the date of the hearing, the
court shall cause notice thereof to be served on the parties
and prospective deponents in the manner provided for
service of summons. (3a, R134)
Section 4. Order and examination. — If the court is satisfied
that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or
delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or
describing the persons whose deposition may be taken and
specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether
the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or
written interrogatories. The depositions may be taken in
accordance with Rule 23 before the hearing. (4a, R134)
Section 5. Reference to court. — For the purpose of applying
Rule 23 to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each
reference therein to the court in which the action is pending
shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the petition for
such deposition was filed. (5a, R134)
Section 6. Use of deposition. — If a deposition to perpetuate
testimony is taken under this Rule, or if, although not so
taken, it would be admissible in evidence, it may be used in
any action involving the same subject matter sub-sequently
brought in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5
of Rule 23. (6a, R134)
Section 7. Depositions pending appeal. — If an appeal has
been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of
Appeals in proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if
the time therefor has not expired, the court in which the
judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions
of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for in the event of
further proceedings in the said court. In such case the party
who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion
in the said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the
same notice and service thereof as if the action was pending
therein. The motion shall state (a) the names and addresses
of the persons to be examined and the substance of the
testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and (b) the
reason for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that
the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure
or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the
deposition to be taken, and thereupon the depositions may
be taken and used in the same manner and under the same
conditions as are prescribed in these Rules for depositions
taken in pending actions. (7a, R134)
section 47, Rule 130
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.
— The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
San Luis v. Rojas, 547 S 345 (2008)
Berdex International, Inc (Private Respondent), a foreign
corporation organized and based in San Francisco, USA,
filed a petition in the RTC on an isolated transaction with
Ramon San Luis (Petitioner). Private Respondent filed a
Motion to Authorize Deposition-Taking, Through Written,
Interrogatories as all its witnesses are residents and citizens
of USA and that one of them is already of advance age, and
a perceived danger to them because of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks
HELD: the ROC allows a non-resident foreign corporation the
privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are
foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written
interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral
contract
● The rule does not make any distinction or restriction as
to who can avail of deposition. The fact that private
respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is
immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony
of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of
any party.
● As to cross-examination, the petitioner may still submit
cross-interrogatories as provided in Section 25, Rule 23.
Dasmarinas v. Reyes, supra
Northwest v. Cruz, 317 S 761 (1999)
 Cruz filed a complaint against petitioner Northwest
Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of carriage committed
when petitioner changed her original itinerary.
Northwest‘s counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one
Mario Garza, witness for petitioner, in New York. He was
the customer service supervisor and instructor for
Northwest. Cruz filed her opposition and suggested
written interrogatories instead. TC allowed the deposition
to proceed.
 Northwest presented the deposition record of its witness.
Cruz reserved her right to cross-examine and present
rebuttal evidence. She also questioned the conduct of
the oral deposition as irregular and moved for
suppression for the reason it was improperly and
irregularly taken because:
o deposition took place two days before the
issuance of the order allowing the deposition to
proceed
o no certification given by the officer taking the
deposition that the same is a true record of the
testimony given by the deponent
o not securely sealed in an envelope indorsed
with the title of the action and marked
o officer taking the deposition did not give any
notice to the plaintiff of the filing of the
deposition
o person designated as deposition officer is not
among those persons authorized to take
deposition in foreign countries
o no showing on record that the deponent read
and signed the deposition
 TC admitted Northwest‘s formal offer of evidence. Cruz
filed a manifestation and motion stating that the court
failed to rule on its motion to suppress deposition and to
grant her the right to cross-examine petitioner‘s
deponent. TC denied private respondent‘s manifestation
and motion. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, which granted the petition. Hence, this appeal by
Northwest
HELD: SC ruled in favor of Cruz
 The locus of oral deposition is not easily within reach of
ordinary citizens for it requires time to get a travel visa to
the United States, book a flight in July to the United
States, and more importantly substantial travel fare is
needed to obtain a round trip ticket. As an international
carrier, Northwest could very conveniently send its
counsel to New York. However, the ends of justice would
have been better served if the witness were instead
brought to the Philippines.
 The objections raised by Cruz, in the light of the above
considerations, take on a greater weight.
 Objections to the oral deposition will be waived unless
the objections are made with reasonable promptness.
 It has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or
correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is
because, like other discovery orders, orders made under
Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable
considering that they do not finally dispose of the
proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it.
However, such rules are subject to the exception that
discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court
or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not
 conform to essential requirements of law and may
reasonably cause material injury throughout the
subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal
will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious
abuse of discretion.
XII. Subpoena
Rule 21
Section 1. Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. —
Subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to
attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or
at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for
the taking of his deposition. It may also require him to bring
with him any books, documents, or other things under his
control, in which case it is called a subpoena duces tecum.
(1a, R23)
Section 2. By whom issued. — The subpoena may be issued
by — (a) the court before whom the witness is required to
attend; (b) the court of the place where the deposition is to be
taken; (c) the officer or body authorized by law to do so in
connection with investigations conducted by said officer or
body; or (d) any Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court
of Appeals in any case or investigation pending within the
Philippines. When application for a subpoena to a prisoner is
made, the judge or officer shall examine and study carefully
such application to determine whether the same is made for a
valid purpose. No prisoner sentenced to death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment and who is confined in any
penal institution shall be brought outside the said penal
institution for appearance or attendance in any court unless
authorized by the Supreme Court (2a, R23)
Section 3. Form and contents. — A subpoena shall state the
name of the court and the title of the action or investigation,
shall be directed to the person whose attendance is required,
and in the case of a subpoena duces tecum, it shall also
contain a reasonable description of the books, documents or
things demanded which must appear to the court prima facie
relevant. (3a, R23)
Section 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a
subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in
any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the person in
whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof. The court may
quash a subpoena ad testificandum on the ground that the
witness is not bound thereby. In either case, the subpoena
may be quashed on the ground that the witness fees and
kilometrage allowed by these Rules were not tendered when
the subpoena was served. (4a, R23)
Section 5. Subpoena for depositions. — Proof of service of a
notice to take a deposition, as provided in sections 15 and 25
of Rule 23, shall constitute sufficient authorization for the
issuance of subpoenas for the persons named in said notice
by the clerk of the court of the place in which the deposition is
to be taken. The clerk shall not, however, issue a subpoena
duces tecum to any such person without an order of the
court. (5a, R23)
Section 6. Service. — Service of a subpoena shall be made
in the same manner as personal or substituted service of
summons. The original shall be exhibited and a copy thereof
delivered to the person on whom it is served, tendering to him
the fees for one day's attendance and the kilometrage
allowed by these Rules, except that, when a subpoena is
issued by or on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines or an
officer or agency thereof, the tender need not be made. The
service must be made so as to allow the witness a
reasonable time for preparation and travel to the place of
attendance. If the subpoena is duces tecum, the reasonable
cost of producing the books, documents or things demanded
shall also be tendered. (6a, R23)
Section 7. Personal appearance in court. — A person present
in court before a judicial officer may be required to testify as if
he were in attendance upon a subpoena is sued by such
court or officer. (10, R23)
Section 8. Compelling attendance. — In case of failure of a
witness to attend, the court or judge issuing the subpoena,
upon proof of the service thereof and of the failure of the
witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or
his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the
court or officer where his attendance is required, and the cost
of such warrant and seizure of such witness shall be paid by
the witness if the court issuing it shall determine that his
failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without just
excuse. (11, R23)
Section 9. Contempt. — Failure by any person without
adequate cause to obey a subpoena served upon him shall
be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena
is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a court, the
disobedience thereto shall be punished in accordance with
the applicable law or Rule. (12a R23)
Section 10. Exceptions. — The provisions of sections 8 and 9
of this Rule shall not apply to a witness who resides more
than one hundred (100) kilometers from his residence to the
place where he is to testify by the ordinary course of travel, or
to a detention prisoner if no permission of the court in which
his case is pending was obtained. (9a, R23)
In re: Cruz v. Sison, G.R. Nos. L-15902, L-15903, 23
December 1964
● Cruz Jr., the Assistant Fiscal of Manila filed two petitions
for contempt in CFI Manila against Dolores Sison and
Benjamin Ravanera. Sison and Ravanera (both
Secretaries of companies in Naga City) refused to
receive the subpoenas duces tecum issued to them by
Cruz and failed to appear before Cruz to give evidence in
a criminal case.
● CFI dismissed both petitions on the ground that the
respondents were not bound by the processes issued by
petitioner as their residences were more than 50km
away from where the investigation was being conducted.
HELD: CFI correctly dismissed the petitions
● Petitions for contempt were prematurely filed and the
dismissal was in order.
● Cruz issued the subpoenas based on RA 409 as
amended by RA 1201, authorizing fiscals to conduct
investigations and for such purposes, issue subpoenas
to summon witnesses to testify. However, the SC
clarified that fiscals have that power but that subpoena
can only be enforced by application to the proper Court.
The person subpoenaed should be given the chance to
question that validity, propriety, and reasonableness of
the subpoena. Under the rules, there are also grounds to
quash a subpoena.
○ If the person subpoenaed may question the
propriety of writ issued by the Court, then in the
same manner he should be afforded the
opportunity to question the propriety of a similar
process issues by the fiscal. This chance is
afforded when the fiscal applies to the proper
court for enforcement of the subpoena. It is only
 upon failure to comply with the subpoena that a
contempt proceeding would lie.
● In this case, the contempt proceedings were instituted
without an application to the Court for enforcement of the
subpoenas. Thus, they were premature.
Ge orga v. uitain, A. . No. 981-CFI (Resolution), 29
July 29, 1977
● Administrative charge against Judge Quitain for grave
abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge
● Dr. Gil Geñorga was the former municipal health officer
of Claveria, Masbate and assigned thereafter to
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Despite a subpoena, he failed
to appear as government medico-legal witness in a
pending murder case before Judge. Quitain of CFI
Masbate
● Geñorga argued that his non-apperance was the fact
that he had previously sent a telegram to respondent
judge seeking information as to WoN he would be
reimbursed for the traveling expenses to be incurred,
and he received no reply.
● Because of his non-appearance, Judge Quitan issued a
warrant and ordered the arrest of Geñorga
● Geñorga alleged that he ―terribly suffered from the
humiliation of having been arrested and confined in by
the Philippine Constabulary as if he were a criminal‖
● Judge Quitan explained that he did not reply to
Geñorga‘s inquiry about the traveling expenses since he
is not duty bound to advise complainant in the matter.
―As a national employee, the complainant knows that he
is entitled to traveling expenses, per diems and official
time, every time he complies with a subpoena. This must
be the reason why he secured from the Clerk of Court a
Certificate of Appearance which was accordingly issued
to him.‖
HELD: administrative charge dismissed
 Sec. 9 of Rule 23 (viatory right) is applied solely to civil
cases. The provision states that a witness is not bound
to attend a hearing if held outside the province he
resides unless the distance be less than 50KM from his
residence to the place of trial
Notes:
 If subpoena is issued in behalf of the government, the
government is not required to pay witness or kilometrage
fees.
XIII. Pre-Trial
Rule 18
Section 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading has
been served and filed, if shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial (5a,
R20)
Section 2. Nature and purpose. — The pre-trial is
mandatory. The court shall consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a
submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the
proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of
the action. (1a, R20)
Section 3. Notice of pre-trial. — The notice of pre-trial shall
be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel.
The counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty
of notifying the party represented by him. (n)
Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of
the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The
non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid
cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in
his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents. (n)
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the
plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof. (2a, R20)
Section 6. Pre-trial brief. — The parties shall file with the
court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as
shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days
before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs
which shall contain, among others:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable
settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of
facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the
purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to
avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the
substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as
failure to appear at the pre-trial. (n)
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-
trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court
shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters
taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall,
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents
of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a,
R20)
section 3, Rule 118
Section 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. — If the
counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at
the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose
proper sanctions or penalties. (se. 5, cir. 38-98)
section 5, Rule 30
Section 5. Order of trial. — Subject to the provisions of
section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons
otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated
in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his
complaint;
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of
his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaints;
(c) The third-party defendant if any, shall adduce evidence of
his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party
complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce
evidence of the material facts pleaded by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim
has been pleaded, shall adduce evidence in support of their
defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the
furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon
their original case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the
parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or
any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth,
having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the
court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their
evidence. (1a, R30)
sections I(A)(1) to I(A)(9), A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder
to defendant to observe restraint in filing a motion to dismiss
and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses in the
Answer, in conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy
Guidelines dated March 12, 2002. A copy of the summons is
hereto attached as Annex "A;" and
1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to
avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and request
for admission by adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other
measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five days from the
filing of the answer. A copy of the order shall be served upon
the defendant together with the summons and upon the
plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff
must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial
conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the
given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the
pre-trial, pre-trial briefs containing the following:
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable
settlement indicating the desired terms thereof or to submit
the case to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of
facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the
purpose thereof. (No evidence shall be allowed to be
presented and offered during the trial in support of a
party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been
earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial,
except if allowed by the court for good cause shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to
avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners; and
f. The number and names of the witnesses, the substance of
their testimonies, and the approximate number of hours that
will be required by the parties for the presentation of their
respective witnesses.
A copy of the Notice of Pre-trial Conference is hereto
attached as Annex "B."
The rule on the contents of the pre-trial brief must strictly be
complied with.
The parties are bound by the representations and statements
in their respective pre-trial briefs.
3. At the start of the pre-trial conference, the judge shall
immediately refer the parties and/or their counsel if
authorized by their clients to the PMC mediation unit for
purposes of mediation if available. If mediation fails, the
judge will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial
conference. Before the continuance, the Judge may refer the
case to the Branch COC for a preliminary conference to
assist the parties in reaching a settlement, to mark the
documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and
copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison
and to consider such other matters as may aid in its prompt
disposition.
During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall
also ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of the
documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during the
preliminary conference shall be recorded in the "Minutes of
Preliminary Conference" to be signed by both parties and/or
counsel, the form of which is hereto attached as Annex. "C".
The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits shall
be attached by the Branch COC to the case record before the
pre-trial.
4. Before the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the
judge must study all the pleadings of the case, and determine
the issues thereof and the respective positions of the parties
thereon to enable him to intelligently steer the parties toward
a possible amicable settlement of the case, or, at the very
least, to help reduce and limit the issues. The judge should
not allow the termination of pre-trial simply because of the
manifestation of the parties that they cannot settle the case.
He should expose the parties to the advantages of pre-trial.
He must also be mindful that there are other important
aspects of the pre-trial that ought to be taken up to expedite
the disposition of the case.
The Judge with all tact, patience, impartiality and with due
regard to the rights of the parties shall endeavor to persuade
them to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The court shall
initially ask the parties and their lawyers if an amicable
settlement of the case is possible. If not, the judge may
confer with the parties with the opposing counsel to consider
the following:
a. Given the evidence of the plaintiff presented in his pre-trial
brief to support his claim, what manner of compromise is
considered acceptable to the defendant at the present stage?
b. Given the evidence of the defendant described in his pre-
trial brief to support his defense, what manner of compromise
is considered acceptable to the plaintiff at the present stage?
If not successful, the court shall confer with the party and his
counsel separately.
If the manner of compromise is not acceptable, the judge
shall confer with the parties without their counsel for the
same purpose of settlement.
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the
pre-trial proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or
substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness
and due execution of documents;
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts
pending before other courts and order its consolidation if
warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the
amendments if necessary;
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the
same;
e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties;
f. Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint, answer
and other pleadings and attachments thereto and the
contents of documents and all other evidence identified and
pre-marked during pre-trial in determining further admissions
of facts and documents. To obtain admissions, the Court
shall ask the parties to submit the depositions taken under
Rule 23, the answers to written interrogatories under Rule 25
and the answers to request for admissions by the adverse
party under Rule 26. It may also require the production of
documents or things requested by a party under Rule 27 and
the results of the physical and mental examination of persons
under Rule 28;
g. Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising
from the pleadings. Uncontroverted issues and frivolous
claims or defenses should be eliminated. For each factual
issue, the parties/counsel shall state all the evidence to
support their positions thereon. For each legal issue,
parties/counsel shall state the applicable law and
jurisprudence supporting their respective positions thereon. If
only legal issues are presented, the judge shall require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda and the court
9
can proceed to render judgment;
h. Determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment
dismissing the case based on the disclosures made at the
pre-trial or a judgment based on the pleadings, evidence
10
identified and admissions made during pre-trial;
i. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for
continuous trial in accordance with Circular No. 1-89 dated
January 19, 1989; adhere to the case flow chart determined
by the court, which shall contain the different stages of the
proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and use
the time frame for each stage in setting the trial dates. The
One-Day Examination of Witness Rule, that is, a witness has
to be fully examined in one (1) day only, shall be strictly
adhered to subject to the courts' discretion during trial on
whether or not to extend the direct and/or cross-examination
for justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for
each party, he is required to make his formal offer of
evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the
opposing party is required to immediately interpose his
objection thereto. Thereafter, the Judge shall make the ruling
on the offer of evidence in open court. However the judge has
the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in
conformity with Section 35, Rule 132;
j. Determine the most important witnesses to be heard and
limit the number of witnesses (Most Important Witness Rule).
The facts to be proven by each witness and the approximate
number of hours per witness shall be fixed;
k. At his discretion, order the parties to use the affidavits of
witnesses as direct testimonies subject to the right to object
to inadmissible portions thereof and to the right of cross-
examination by the other party. The affidavits shall be based
on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
The affidavits shall be in question and answer form, and shall
comply with the rules on admissibility of evidence;
l. Require the parties and/or counsel to submit to the Branch
COC the names, addresses and contact numbers of the
witnesses to be summoned by subpoena;
m. Order the delegation of the reception of evidence to the
Branch COC under Rule 30; and
n. Refer the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32.
During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask
questions on issues raised therein and all questions or
comments by counsel or parties must be directed to the judge
to avoid hostilities between the parties.
6. The trial judge shall schedule the pre-trial in the afternoon
sessions and set as many pre-trial conferences as may be
necessary.
7. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The
minutes of each pre-trial conference shall contain matters
taken up therein more particularly admissions of facts and
exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel.
8. The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order within
ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial. Said Order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of
and control the course of the action during the trial. A sample
Pre-Trial Order is hereto attached as Annex "D."
However, the Court may opt to dictate the Pre-Trial Order in
open court in the presence of the parties and their counsel
and with the use of a computer, shall have the same
immediately finalized and printed. Once finished, the parties
and/or their counsel shall sign the same to manifest their
conformity thereto.
9. The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to an
equitable compromise or settlement at any stage of the
proceedings before rendition of judgment.
A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA
The diversion of pending court cases both to Court- Annexed
Mediation (CAM) and to Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) is
plainly intended to put an end to pending litigation through a
compromise agreement of the parties and thereby help solve
the ever-pressing problem of court docket congestion. It is
also intended to empower the parties to resolve their own
disputes.
The Three Stages of Diversion
The first stage is the CAM where the judge refers the parties
to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for the mediation of
their dispute by trained and accredited mediators. Upon
failing to secure a settlement of the dispute during the first
stage, a second attempt is made at the JDR stage. There, the
JDR judge sequentially becomes a mediator- conciliator-early
neutral evaluator in a continuing effort to secure a settlement.
Still failing that second attempt, the mediator-judge must turn
over the case to another judge (a new one by raffle or
nearest/pair judge) who will try the unsettled case. The trial
judge shall continue with the pre-trial proper and, thereafter,
proceed to try and decide the case. The third stage is during
the appeal where covered cases are referred to the PMC-
Appeals Court Mediation (ACM) unit for mediation.

Notes:
 A judgment on the compromise agreement is better than
just dismissing the case when the parties reach a
compromise because the parties may seek the
enforcement of the judgment on the compromise
through a writ of execution
Son v. Son, supra
Ramnani v. CA, 221 S 582 (1993)
 Sps. Juliette Dizon and Cenen Dizon filed a complaint in
the RTC of Makati against the Sps. Josephine Anne
Ramnani and Bhagwan Ramnani for the collection of a
sum of money representing the alleged unremitted value
of jewelry received by Josephine from Juliette on
consignment basis
 TC set the case for pre-trial but the Ramnanis did not
appear. Consequently, they were declared in default.
They filed a motion to lift the order of default, but this
was denied
 Conformably to the default order, evidence of the Dizon
spouses was received ex parte. RTC rendered judgment
against the Ramnanis
HELD: TC was correct in refusing to set aside the order
of default and the default judgment thereafter issued.
 A satisfactory showing by the movant of the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect is an
indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a
judgment of default or the order of default
Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Spouses
Mangudadatu, supra
XVI. Execution
Rule 39
1144(3), NCC
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Notes:
 Execution is the legal remedy for the enforcement of a
judgment. It is not an action but is included in the
phrase ―Process in an action‖ – part of the proceedings
considered as still pending.
 Writ of Execution – a judicial writ issued to an officer
authorizing and requiring him to execute the judgment
of the court.
 A judgment is final if it disposes of the action as
distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves
something to be done with respect to the merits of the
case, and it is executory if the period to appeal has
expired and no appeal is taken. [Herrera]
 Finality for purposes of appeal refers to the distinction
between ―final judgments or orders‖ and ―interlocutory
orders,‖ which cannot be appealed. [Sec. 1(b), Rule 41]
 Once rendered, the task of the court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the court except to await the
parties' next move (such as filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, to cause the execution of the judgment once
it becomes 'final and executory.‘
A. Matter of right and discretionary execution
Notes:
EXECUTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
 A judgment becomes final and executory by operation
of law, not by judicial declaration. The prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, and
the issuance thereof is a ministerial duty and
compellable by mandamus. [Herrera]
 Execution as a matter of right is available in two
instances:
(1) No appeal has been perfected or period of appeal
has expired
(2) Appeal has been perfected and finally resolved
 Some judgments are not appealable, e.g. Small Claims
judgments, compromise judgments, etc
 Execution may only issue upon motion with notice of
hearing.
HOW DONE
1) If no appeal is perfected, prevailing party applies by
motion for a writ of execution
2) If an appeal has been perfected and finally resolved –
a) prevailing party files a motion in the court of origin
b) appellate court may also direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution, upon motion in the same
case, when the interest of justice so requires.
GR: Issuance of the writ of execution is a matter of right on
the part of the prevailing party when the judgment or order
becomes executory. The court cannot refuse execution.
EX: The issuance of a writ of execution which issues as a
matter of right can be countered in any of the following cases:
(1) When the judgment has already been executed by the
voluntary compliance thereof by the parties;
(2) When a judgment has been novated by the parties;
(3) When a petition for review is filed and preliminary
injunction is granted; Also, when execution of the
judgment has been enjoined by a higher court;
(4) When the judgment sought to be executed is conditional
or incomplete;
(5) When facts and circumstances transpire which would
render execution inequitable or unjust;
(6) When execution is sought more than five (5) years from
its entry without it having been revived;
(7) When execution is sought against property exempt from
execution;
(8) When refusal to execute the judgment has become
imperative in the higher interest of justice. [Riano]
SUPERVENING EVENT DOCTRINE
A supervening event can be invoked for the modification or
alteration of a final judgment. This refers to:
(1) Facts which transpire after judgment has become final
and executory;
(2) New circumstances which developed after the
judgment has acquired finality;
(3) Matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or
during the trial as they were not yet in existence at
that time.
(4) The supervening facts or circumstances must either
bear a direct effect upon the matters already litigated
and settled or create a substantial change in the rights
 or relations of the parties therein which render
execution of the final judgment unjust or impossible
[Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. L36786 (1989)]
DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
Discretionary execution Execution as a matter of
right
May issue before the lapse Period to appeal has already
of period to appeal, and even lapsed and no appeal is
during appeal perfected, or there is no
appeal
Discretionary upon the court Ministerial duty of the court
Upon showing of good Provided there are no
reason for execution supervening events
 The court which rendered the decision can grant an
execution pending appeal if it still retains jurisdiction
over the case and is in possession of the records at the
time of the filing of the motion; otherwise, the motion
shall be acted upon by the appellate court.
 Discretionary Execution is not applicable in the case of
the Court of Appeals
o The Rule on Discretionary Execution
contemplates a situation where a judgment
or final order rendered in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction and the prevailing party
in said decision seeks immediate execution
during the pendency of an appeal.
o The CA has no authority to issue
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL OF ITS OWN DECISIONS
THEREIN
REQUISITES FOR DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
(1) There must be a motion filed by prevailing party with
notice to adverse party
(2) There must be a hearing of the motion for discretionary
execution
(3) There must be good reasons to justify the discretionary
execution
(4) These good reasons must be stated in a special order
after due hearing
WHEN FILED
The motion for discretionary execution shall be filed with the
trial court while
(1) it has jurisdiction over the case; and
(2) it is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion may be
filed in the appellate court. [Bangkok Bank Public Company,
Ltd. v. Lee, G.R. No.159806 (2006)]
STAY OF DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
Discretionary execution may be stayed upon approval by the
proper court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the
party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the
performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed
in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part
If judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled
The trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may
warrant under the circumstances
Remedy against Discretionary Execution
The remedy is certiorari by Rule 65. The fact that the losing
party has also appealed from the judgment does not bar
certiorari proceedings as the appeal could not be an
adequate remedy from such premature execution. [Hererra]
sections 1-3, Rule 39
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a) If the appeal has been
duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to
be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the
same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)
Section 2. Discretionary execution. —
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending
appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction
over the case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the
time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial
court has lost jurisdiction the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary
execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.
— A several, separate or partial judgment may be executed
under the same terms and conditions as execution of a
judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a)
Section 3. Stay of discretionary execution. —
Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section
may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a
sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the party against whom it
is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the
judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be
finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may
be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.
(3a)
section 11, Rule 51
Section 11. Execution of judgment. — Except where the
judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is
ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its
execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution
shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the entry of
judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate
officer for its enforcement. In appealed cases, where the
motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of
Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the original record
or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such motion
shall be transmitted to the lower court from which the case
originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment
or final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of
origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement. (n)
Philippine Bank of Communications v. CA, G.R. 126158,
23 September 1997
 Falcon Garments Corporation (Falcon) opened a current
account with Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom). Subsequently, Falcon obtained a loan from
PBCom
 Falcon filed a complaint for the restoration to Falcon‘s
current account of alleged unauthorized withdrawals.
Case was raffled to Branch 78
 PBCom denied liability and interposed a compulsory
counterclaim for the unpaid loan of Falcon
 RTC granted both Falcon‘s complaint and PBCom‘s
counterclaim
 PBCom seasonably filed a notice of appeal, while Falcon
filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
 Before Branch 78 could resolve said motion, Judge
Lopez inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled to
Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro T. Santiago.
 Falcon filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
claiming that with its strained relations with PBCom, it
was no longer practicable to bank with petitioner, and
prayed that the money judgment be not restored to its
current account but instead be directly paid to it
 On the very same day of the filing of the motion, Judge
Santiago granted the same and authorized the issuance
of a writ of execution pending appeal.
 Writ was issued and served upon PBCom which sought
the intercession of the CA.
 CA upheld the validity of the writ of execution pending
appeal
 PBComm filed petition for certiorari with SC
HELD: The order of execution is null and void
● GENERAL RULE: Normally, execution of a judgment
should not be had until and unless it has become final
and executory—i.e., the right of appeal has been
renounced or waived, the period for appeal has lapsed
without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having
been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of
origin—in which case, execution ―shall issue as a matter
of right.
● EXCEPTION: Discretionary execution is permissible only
when good reasons exist for immediately executing the
judgment before finality or pending appeal or even
before the expiration of the time to appeal
● Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying the immediate execution lest judgment
becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the
lapse of time become unable to enjoy it, considering the
tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no
case except to delay. Examples:
○ advanced age of the prevailing party
○ When the defeated party is in imminent danger
of insolvency
○ When the appeal is dilatory and the losing party
intends to encumber and/or dispose of the
property subject of the case during the
pendency of the appeal in order to defraud or
deprive the plaintiff of proprietary rights and
defeat the ends of justice
○ Deterioration of commodities subject of litigation
● ITC, there are no good reasons that would justify the
discretionary execution. The reasons cited are:
○ Falcon is being sued for non-payment of its loan
with Solidbank, another Creditor
○ The checks issued by Falcon to Solidbank
bounced for being drawn against insufficient
funds
○ Solidbank seized the machineries, office and
factory equipment of Falcon
○ With the seizure of Falcon‘s instruments in the
operation of its business, the filing of collection
cases against it, the threat of criminal
prosecution against its officers, the imminent
threat to its industrial peace, it is not remote that
Falcon‘s survival hangs on the balance → ―its
only hope for survival and arresting threats of
civil and criminal cases, is the immediate
execution of the judgment against PBCom‖
● Falcon is a juridical entity and not a natural person. Even
assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on
the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the
immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending
appeal cannot be justified as Falcon‘s situation may not
be likened to a case of a natural person who may be ill or
may be of advanced age.
● Even the danger of extinction of the corporation will not
per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are
showings of other good reasons, such as for instance,
impending insolvency of the adverse party
● Also, the order of execution issued by Judge Santiago
deliberately modified and failed to conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision rendered by Judge
Lopez, which is the decision Judge Santiago‘s order
intended to execute
● a writ of execution must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated.
Execution which is not in harmony with the judgment is
bereft of validity. It must conform particularly to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision
Planters Products v. CA, 317 S 195 (1999)
 For the purpose of rehabilitating Philippine Planters, Inc.,
the then President Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction
which imposed a charge per bag of fertilizer on all
domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines. Respondent
Fertiphil Corporation questioned its constitutionality and
brought an action to recover its accumulated payment
thereunder. The court of origin declared the LOI
unconstitutional and ordered the petitioner to pay the
private respondent the amount it paid pursuant thereto.
 Simultaneously with the filing of petitioner‘s notice of
appeal, the private respondent presented a motion to
execute the said decision pending appeal, but the motion
was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that there
was no good reason to warrant execution pending
appeal.
 The lower court granted the motion for execution
pending appeal and directed the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution upon the posting by
private respondent of a bond
HELD: execution pending appeal was improper
 The prevailing doctrine is that discretionary execution is
permissible when good reasons exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal
or even before the expiration of the time to appeal.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying the immediate execution lest the judgment
becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the
lapse of time become unable to enjoy it
 In the present case, the supposed good reasons relied
upon by the trial court in granting execution pending
appeal are that: 1) The appeal is frivolous and dilatory
because LOI is unconstitutional; and 2) Fertiphil posted
a bond.
 That the appeal was merely dilatory because the
assailed letter of instruction is unconstitutional, does not
constitute good reason to justify execution pending
appeal. Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial
court to determine the merit of a decision it rendered as
this is the role of the appellate Court.Hence, it is not
within the competence of the trial court, in resolving the
motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the
appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as the
basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.
 So also, mere issuance of a bond to answer for
damages is no longer considered a good reason for
execution pending appeal. To consider the mere posting
of a bond as a good reason would precisely make
immediate execution of judgment pending appeal
routinary, the rule rather than the exception
 The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly
construed being an exception to the general rule. To
rule otherwise would be to make the remedy of
execution pending appeal a tool of oppression and
inequity instead of being an instrument of solicitude and
justice.
Heirs of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 135180-81
& 135425-26, 16 August 2000
An ejectment case was filed by the HEIRS against MMB INC,
the lessee of their predecessors‘ property. The MTC ruled in
favor of the HEIRS, and granted a motion for execution to
eject MMB from the property. The RTC dismissed Manila
Builder‘s appeal and denied their application for injunctive
relief from the MTC‘s judgment. The CA restrained the
enforcement of the writ of execution, and later set aside the
decision of the MTC. The HEIRS appealed to the SC.
Pending such appeal,upon motion by MMB INC, the CA
granted a motion for execution of its own judgment, including
appointing a sheriff to carry out the judgment. SC reversed
HELD: There was no need for judicial rescission of the
contract of lease before MMB INC may be compelled to
move out of the leased premises
● CA erred when it immediately enforced its decision
pending appeal restoring MMB INC in possession of
the leased premises and appointed a special sheriff
to carry out the writ of execution
● CA had no authority to issue immediate execution
pending of its own decision
● Discretionary execution under Rule 39 Sec 2(a) is
allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of
the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing
● A judgment of CA cannot be executed pending appeal.
Once final and executory, the judgment must be
remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its
execution may be filed only after its entry. Before its
finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can be
no discretionary execution of a decision of CA.
Navarosa v. COMELEC. G.R. No. 157957, 18 September
2003
 Navarosa (P) and Esto (R) were candidates for mayor of
Libacao, Aklan in the 2001 elections. The COMELEC
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed P
as the winner with 3 votes over R.
 R filed an election protest before RTC Kalibo, Aklan,
arguing that there were irregularities in the canvassing of
ballots. P filed a counter-protest.
● After revision of the contested ballots, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of R as the rightful mayor (4,595-
4,553). The Court also ordered damages to be paid.
● P appealed to COMELEC while R filed a motion for
execution of judgement pending appeal.
● P opposed the motion and in the alternative, offered to
file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending
appeal, should the RTC grant R‘s motion
● RTC granted R‘s motion to execute, subject to a 300,000
bond. However, in the same order, the RTC also granted
P‘s prayer to stay the execution pending appeal upon
filing a P600,000 bond
HELD: P is the rightful mayor; R was not entitled to a stay of
execution pending appeal
 To grant execution pending appeal in election protest
cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for
the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order
granting execution pending appeal must state the good
reasons.
● In Ramas v. COMELEC, the circumstances qualifying
as good decisions justifying execution pending
appeal are (a combination of two or more of them will
suffice to grant execution pending appeal): (1) the public
interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the
shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the
contested office; and (3) the length of time that the
election contest has been pending.
● COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that in the
absence of any applicable provision in the Rules, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect
● The purpose of allowing execution pending appeal is
of public interest
● ITC: In insisting that by simply posting a supersedeas
bond, P does not offer a better policy consideration that
would warrant the stay of execution
● a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully
protect the interests of the prevailing party in
election protest cases. A supersedeas bond secures
the performance of the judgment or order appealed from
in case the other party wins in appeal. Section 3 finds
application in ordinary civil actions where the
interest of the prevailing party is capable of
pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of
protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond.
It does not find application in election protest cases
where judgments include orders which are not capable of
pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and
perform its functions. In an election protest case, such
bond, cannot adequately answer for the deprivation
of a duly elected candidate of his post, and his
constituents of their leader of choice, such
deprivation being unquantifiable.
Notes:
 Finality for purposes of execution refers to the judgment
being ―final and executory‖ upon the lapse of the appeal
period if no appeal is taken, upon which execution shall
issue as a matter of right. [Sec. 1, Rule 39]
 A judgment becomes ―final and executory‖ by operation award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
of law. Finality becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. upon such terms as it may deem just. (10a)
Final judgments Final and executory section 8(b), Rule 42
judgments Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — (a) Upon
- They finally dispose of, - Judgments become final the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
adjudicate, or determine and executory by corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is
the rights of the parties, operation of law. deemed perfected as to the petitioner.
HOWEVER, they are - After the lapse of the The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
not yet ―final and reglementary period to the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
executory‖ pending the appeal, the prevailing expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
expiration of the party is entitled to a writ However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to
reglementary period for of execution, and the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the
appeal. issuance thereof is a protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
- During that period, the ministerial duty of the do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
winning party cannot court compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
demand the execution execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of
of the judgment yet as a Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a, R41)
right (b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment or final order
WHEN EXECUTION SHALL ISSUE unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall
GR: Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, provide otherwise. (a)
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal section 21, RSP
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be
has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall
may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in
copies of the judgment/s or final order/s sought to be civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without
party prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
EX: Execution may Issue even if judgment not final in the Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
following cases: (1) Support pendente lite (2) Judgments of
inferior courts in ejectment cases (3) Execution pending
appeal (4) Injunction, accounting, receivership, support [Sec. C. Final but not executory judgments
4, Rule 39] (5) Decision of the RTC in appealed civil cases section 8, Rule 37
under Summary Procedure, including forcible entry and Section 8. Effect of order for partial new trial. — When less
unlawful detainer (6) Decision of the LA reinstating dismissed than all of the issues are ordered retried, the court may either
employee, insofar as reinstatement aspect is concerned enter a judgment or final order as to the rest, or stay the
enforcement of such judgment or final order until after the
new trial. (7a)
B. Executory but not final judgments
sections 4-5, Rule 39 D. Immediately executory and final judgments
Section 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in
actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, section 23, RSC
and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be Section 23. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall
declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
after their rendition and shall not, be stayed by an appeal established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision
taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the
On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith
make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting served on the parties.
the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or The decision shall be final and unappealable.
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party. (4a)
Gadrinab v. Salamanca
Section 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. — Where  Nora Salamanca, Antonio Talao, Elena Lopez,
the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao are siblings. Sps
annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on Talao died intestate, leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana,
motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of Manila. The Talao children divided the property among
damages as equity and justice may warrant under the themselves extrajudicially. Arsenia waived her share.
circumstances. (5a)  Nora Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against
her siblings. All parties claimed their respectives shares
section 12, Rule 43 (1/4) and rentals for the duplex on the property. They
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the were referred to mediation and entered into a
 compromise agreement. RTC approved the compromise
agreement and the case became final and executory on
April 10, 2003.
 Nestor Gadrinab (heir of Adoracion and petitioner) filed a
motion for execution of the compromise agreement,
demanding his ¼ share. During hearing, parties agreed
that rentals would be divided into three since Nestor
already occupied a duplex unit.
o Nestor refused to vacate that unit and it
remained unsold.
 Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, Salamanca
moved for physical partition of the property.
o Nestor opposed the motion, claiming that the
judgment on the compromise agreement had
become final and executory and had the effect
of res judicata.
HELD: Motion for physical partition granted
 Salamanca filed two actions for physical partition. First
was settled through judicial compromise agreement.
Second was filed after the co-heirs were uncooperative
in complying with the compromise agreement.
 Article 2037: A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise
 ITC, there was bar by prior judgment. Respondents
cannot file another action for partition after final judgment
on compromise had already been rendered in a previous
action.
 Judicial compromise agreement is both an agreement
between parties and judgment on the merits; it is
covered by provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on
rounds that may avoid an ordinary contract. Therefore,
courts cannot entertain actions involving the same CoA,
parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines
on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments
UNLESS there is evidence that the agreement was void,
obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent or
would disrupt substantial justice
 REMEDIES IF PARTIES REFUSE TO ABIDE BY
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT:
o motion for execution of judgment or
o action for indirect contempt
E. Revival of judgment
section 6, Rule 39
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. —
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
section 10, Rule 51
Section 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. — If no
appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within
the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book
of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of
its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory. (2a, R36)
Notes:
Execution upon motion Execution by independent
action
Within 5 years from date of After the lapse of 5 years
entry of judgment from date of entry and before
it is barred by statute of
limitations which is 10 years
from date of entry (Art.
1144(3))
 The revived judgment may be enforced by motion within
5 years from date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by statute of limitations.
 Once the judgment is revived, the 10-year prescriptive
period commences to run from the date of finality of the
revived judgment and not the original judgment. [PNB v.
Bondoc, G.R. No. L-20236 (1965)]
Republic v. CA, 260 S 344 (1996)
 Laureano Brothers, Inc., undertook to supply NAWASA
with plumbing materials. All the materials delivered were
rejected because respondent did not conform to the
agreed specifications. Refusing to refund the money,
Laureano Brothers was sued by the Republic
 Before the CFI, they arrived at a compromise agreement.
Laureano Brothers agreed to pay petitioner
US$358,882.02. This judgment became final and
executory on July 27, 1968. Upon motion of petitioner, a
writ of execution was issued on September 2, 1972
 actual enforcement of the writ was delayed because of
several alternative payment proposals made by private
respondent, including several extensions of the time to
pay
 NEDA authorized respondent to look for buyers of the
attached property.
 Attached property sold but NEDA filed an action to annul
the sale. CFI nullified the sale
 Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution on May 12, 1986. TC DENIED otg that the
five-year period allowed by the Rules has lapsed, the
running of said period not having been interrupted or
suspended while the question of the legality of the sale
of respondent‘s property was pending in the CA and SC
HELD: the five-year period within which to enforce the
decision in the first case was interrupted by the period when
the question of the legality of the sale of respondent‘s
properties was pending in the CA and SC
 a judgment may be executed within 5 years from the
date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. BUT the Court allows execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
meritorious grounds. All the exceptions have one
common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.
 ITC: the concerned officers of the Republic could be
faulted for their inaction or neglect BUT while the delay
may not have been caused by direct acts of said debtor,
 it was nevertheless occasioned by said debtors own
initiatives resulting in immeasurable benefits to it
 THEREFORE, under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, that (a) a writ having been issued within the five-
year period, (b) an attachment on real property having
been duly made, (c) sale thereof having been made
through the active intervention of the judgment debtor
who selected the buyer and earned a commission in the
process, and (d) the delayed enforcement having been
indirectly caused by the importunings of the judgment
debtor, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of
the judgment by motion, and for that matter, the ten-year
prescriptive period allowed by law for enforcement by
action, are deemed to have been effectively interrupted
or suspended by the period during which the legality or
validity of the sale was being litigated.
 To rule otherwise would deprive the Republic of any
remedy to enforce a clear and adjudged right and would
encourage judgment debtors to escape the payment of
their firm obligations through trickery, chicanery,
gimmickry or other modes of persuasion
 The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors
from sleeping on their rights. The Republic ITC
meticulously pursued its rights of action
Terry v. People, 314 S 669 (1999)
 August 13, 1979: in the case of Eugenio Arcilla vs. Pedro
Arcilla, the CFI decided in favor of Pedro and Leoncia
Arcilla and against plaintiffs Eugenio and Maria Arcilla
and third party defendant Loreño Terry, declaring Pedro
and Leoncia Arcilla the lawful owners of the lots in
question
 November 22, 1979: CFI issued a writ of execution
against petitioner. Apparently, the writ was not served on
petitioner and became stale by operation of law five
years thereafter
 December 9, 1985: after the lapse of more than six (6)
years RTC issued an alias writ of execution
 Jan 13 1986: sheriff submitted his sheriff‘s return stating
that upon service of the alias writ upon petitioner, ―he
learned that petitioner was no longer in occupation over
the aforesaid Lot
 January 13, 1986: Deputy Sheriff certified that pursuant
to the alias writ of execution, possession of the lots was
turned over to Leoncia S. Arcilla
 July 5, 1991: Leoncia S. Arcilla filed with the RTC an
action for reconveyance or annulment of sale, recovery
of possession and damages against petitioner
 October 27, 1992: RTC dismissed the case. By filing
such action for reconveyance and recovery of
possession, Leoncia Arcilla acknowledged that petitioner
was occupying the lots in question
 March 27, 1995: Leoncia Arcilla filed with the RTC a
motion for contempt against petitioner for re-occupying
the lot
 March 19, 1996: RTC issued an order finding petitioner
guilty of contempt
HELD: not in contempt
 When the RTC issued an alias writ of execution on
December 9, 1985, this could no longer be lawfully done.
The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution
by motion within five (5) years from finality of the
decision, which in this case was in 1979. A writ of
execution issued after the expiration of that period is null
and void. There is a need for the interested party to file
an independent action for revival of judgment. The
judgment may be enforced after the lapse of this period
and before the same is barred by the statute of
limitations, by instituting an ordinary civil action. ―The
reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period, the
judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which
judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions,
by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such
action must be filed within ten (10) years from the date
the judgment became final.‖ Assuming that the decision
became final and executory on November 22, 1979,
when the trial court issued the original writ of execution,
the court could no longer issue an alias writ of execution,
by motion, on December 5, 1985, six (6) years later. And
the Sheriff could not lawfully enforce and execute such
invalid writ on January 13, 1986. Indeed, even the trial
court‘s original decision dated August 13, 1979 had
become stale in September, 1989, ten (10) years after its
finality.
 Consequently, on March 27, 1995, when Leoncia Arcilla
filed a motion for contempt, the RTC no longer had
jurisdiction over the case
Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, 17 November 2010
 Sps Topacio obtained a P400,000 loan from the bank
and gave an REM as security. They failed to pay
prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose. To
satisfy the obligation, the provincial sheriff sold in auction
the mortgaged the property, where bank emerged as
highest bidder. A Cert of Sale was issued to the bank
and was registered with ROD.
 Bank filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, which RTC granted conditioned on the
posting of P100,000 bond, which bank posted.
 Writ of possession was not implemented because of Sps
Topacio‘s Writ to set aside auction sale and writ of
possession. RTC thereafter issued TRO and writ of
prelim injunction sheriff from implementing writ of
possession.
 Bank filed an Answer to dissolve the writ of prelim
injunction, to which Sps Topacio filed a reply for its
maintenance
 More than 2 years after and several postponements, the
Judge dismissed bank‘s petition for ―failure to prosecute‖.
However, no copy of this decision was served on
respondent bank, whose operations were shut down by
Monetary Bank
 Nearly 6 years later, bank filed a motion to clarify the
order of dismissal and moved for issuance of an alias
writ of possession, which was denied.
HELD: Writ of possession may be enforced
 There is no res judicata in this case because the
Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final
and executory in view of the absence of a valid service,
whether personally or via registered mail, on the
respondent‘s counsel.
 ITC, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance of
the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a
civil action governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure
but a judicial proceeding governed separately by
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the
methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage
 The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in
nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the
transfer of title.
Republic v. Nillas, G.R. No. 159595, 23 January 2007
On 10 April 1997, respondent Nillas filed a Petition for
Revival of Judgment with the RTC. It was alleged therein that
on 17 July 1941, the then CFI, acting as a cadastral court,
adjudicated several lots, in favor of named oppositors who
had established their title to their respective lots and their
continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and
ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. Among these lots was Lot No. 771 hich
was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion. further alleged that
her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually
acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. These purchases from
Eugenia were evidenced by three separate Deeds of
Absolute Sale. In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her
parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994.
Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra
spouses have been in open and continuous possession of
the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of
registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite
the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought
the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771.
HELD: the 1941 CFI judgment has not yet prescribed
 The provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and
after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39), does not apply. This provision of the Rules
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately
enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
 In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings,
the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought
to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
 Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land
Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the
execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue
of a writ of possession.
 The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the
period for perfecting an appeal.
 There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason
is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character
and does not need to be asserted or enforced against
the adverse party.
 Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has
been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in
whom the land is ordered to be registered.
F. Execution after death
section 7, Rule 39
Section 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of
the death of a party, execution may issue or be enforced in
the following manner:
(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the
application of his executor or administrator, or successor in
interest;
(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his
executor or administrator or successor in interest, if the
judgment be for the recovery of real or personal property, or
the enforcement of a lien thereon;
(c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the
same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment
obligation, and the officer making the sale shall account to
the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in
his hands. (7a)
section 5, Rule 86
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the
decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent,
instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
section 20, Rule 3
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When
the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of
final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at
the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(21a)
section 7(e), Rule 57
Section 7. Attachment of real and personal property;
recording thereof. — Real and personal property shall be
attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following
manner:
(e) The interest of the party against whom attachment is
issued in property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
whether as heir, legatee, or devisee, by serving the executor
or administrator or other personal representative of the
decedent with a copy of the writ and notice that said interest
is attached. A copy of said writ of attachment and of said
notice shall also be filed in the office of the clerk of the court
in which said estate is being settled and served upon the heir,
legatee or devisee concerned.
If the property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a
copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper
court or quasi-judicial agency, and notice of the attachment
served upon the custodian of such property. (7a)
G. Formalities
sections 8, 14-15, 17-22, 44-45, Rule 39
Section 8. Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution.
— The writ of execution shall: (1) issue in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines from the court which granted the
motion; (2) state the name of the court, the case number and
title, the dispositive part of the subject judgment or order; and
(3) require the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is
directed to enforce the writ according to its terms, in the
manner hereinafter provided:
(a) If the execution be against the property of the judgment
obligor, to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the real or
personal property of such judgment obligor;
(b) If it be against real or personal property in the hands of
personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants,
or trustees of the judgment obligor, to satisfy the judgment,
with interest, out of such property;
(c) If it be for the sale of real or personal property to sell such
property describing it, and apply the proceeds in conformity
with the judgment, the material parts of which shall be recited
in the writ of execution;
(d) If it be for the delivery of the possession of real or
personal property, to deliver the possession of the same,
describing it, to the party entitled thereto, and to satisfy any
costs, damages, rents, or profits covered by the judgment out
of the personal property of the person against whom it was
rendered, and if sufficient personal property cannot be found,
then out of the real property; and
(e) In all cases, the writ of execution shall specifically state
the amount of the interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits
due as of the date of the issuance of the writ, aside from the
principal obligation under the judgment. For this purpose, the
motion for execution shall specify the amounts of the
foregoing reliefs sought by the movant.(8a)
Section 14. Return of writ of execution. — The writ of
execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in
full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30)
days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the
court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue
in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the
court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon
until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.
The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and
copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. (11a)
Section 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. — Before
the sale of property on execution, notice thereof must be
given as follows:
(a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of
the time and place of the sale in three (3) public places,
preferably in conspicuous areas of the municipal or city hall,
post office and public market in the municipality or city where
the sale is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable,
considering the character and condition of the property;
(b) In case of other personal property, by posting a similar
notice in the three (3) public places abovementioned for not
less than five (5) days;
(c) In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in
the three (3) public places abovementioned a similar notice
particularly describing the property and stating where the
property is to be sold, and if the assessed value of the
property exceeds fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, by
publishing a copy of the notice once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in one newspaper selected by raffle,
whether in English, Filipino, or any major regional language
published, edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof,
having general circulation in the province or city;
(d) In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the
judgment obligor, at least three (3) days before the sale,
except as provided in paragraph (a) hereof where notice shall
be given the same manner as personal service of pleadings
and other papers as provided by section 6 of Rule 13.
The notice shall specify the place, date and exact time of the
sale which should not be earlier than nine o'clock in the
morning and not later than two o'clock in the afternoon. The
place of the sale may be agreed upon by the parties. In the
absence of such agreement, the sale of the property or
personal property not capable of manual delivery shall be
held in the office of the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court or the Municipal Trial Court which issued the writ of or
which was designated by the appellate court. In the case of
personal property capable of manual delivery, the sale shall
be held in the place where the property is located. (18a)
Section 17. Penalty for selling without notice, or removing or
defacing notice. — An officer selling without the notice
prescribed by section 15 of this Rule shall be liable to pay
punitive damages in the amount of five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos to any person injured thereby, in addition to his actual
damages, both to be recovered by motion in the same action;
and a person willfully removing or defacing the notice posted,
if done before the sale, or before the satisfaction of the
judgment if it be satisfied before the sale, shall be liable to
pay five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos to any person injured by
reason thereof, in addition to his actual damages, to be
recovered by motion in the same action. (19a)
Section 18. No sale if judgment and costs paid. — At any
time before the sale of property on execution, the judgment
obligor may prevent the sale by paying the amount required
by the execution and the costs that have been incurred
therein. (20a)
Section 19. How property sold on execution; who may direct
manner and order of sale. — All sales of property under
execution must be made at public auction, to the highest
bidder, to start at the exact time fixed in the notice. After
sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no
more shall be sold and any excess property or proceeds of
the sale shall be promptly delivered to the judgment obligor or
his authorized representative, unless otherwise directed by
the judgment or order of the court. When the sale is of real
property, consisting of several known lots, they must be sold
separately; or, when a portion of such real property is claimed
by a third person, he may require it to be sold separately.
When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery, it must be sold within view of those attending the
same and in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest
price. The judgment obligor, if present at the sale, may direct
the order in which property, real or personal shall be sold,
when such property consists of several known lots or parcels
which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the
officer conducting the execution sale, nor his deputies, can
become a purchaser, nor be interested directly or indirectly in
any purchase at such sale. (21a)
Section 20. Refusal of purchaser to pay. — If a purchaser
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for property struck off to
him at a sale under execution, the officer may again sell the
property to the highest bidder and shall not be responsible for
any loss occasioned thereby; but the court may order the
refusing purchaser to pay into the court the amount of such
loss, with costs, and may punish him for contempt if he
disobeys the order. The amount of such payment shall be for
the benefit of the person entitled to the proceeds of the
execution, unless the execution has been fully satisfied, in
which event such proceeds shall be for the benefit of the
judgment obligor. The officer may thereafter reject any
subsequent bid of such purchaser who refuses to pay. (22a)
Section 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser. — When the
purchaser is the judgment obligee, and no thirdparty claim
has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it
does not exceed the amount of his judgment. If it does, he
shall pay only the excess. (23a)
Section 22. Adjournment of sale. — By written consent of the
judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized
representatives, the officer may adjourn the sale to any date
and time agreed upon by them. Without such agreement, he
may adjourn the sale from day to day if it becomes necessary
to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed
in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. (24a)
Section 44. Entry of satisfaction of judgment by clerk of court.
— Satisfaction of a judgment shall be entered by the clerk of
court in the court docket, and in the execution book, upon the
return of a writ of execution showing the full satisfaction of the
judgment, or upon the filing of an admission to the
satisfaction of the judgment executed and acknowledged in
the same manner as a conveyance of real property by the
judgment obligee or by his counsel unless a revocation of his
authority is filed, or upon the endorsement of such admission
by the judgment obligee or his counsel, on the face of the
record of the judgment. (46a)
Section 45. Entry of satisfaction with or without admission. —
Whenever a judgment is satisfied in fact, or otherwise than
upon an execution on demand of the judgment obligor, the
judgment obligee or his counsel must execute and
acknowledge, or indorse an admission of the satisfaction as
provided in the last preceding section, and after notice and
upon motion the court may order either the judgment obligee
or his counsel to do so, or may order the entry of satisfaction
to be made without such admission. (47a)
H. Kinds of execution
sections 9-11, 39-43, Rule 39
Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced.
—
(a) Immediate payment on demand. — The officer shall
enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding
from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full
amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The
judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check
payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of
payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment
debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or
his authorized representative if present at the time of
payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper
receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said
amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court
that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not
present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver
the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter
shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession
within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that
issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said
amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government
depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the
remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that
issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said
payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the
judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the
clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case
shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by
check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay
all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee,
the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed, of for value and not otherwise exempt from
execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient
to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal
properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal
or real property of the judgment obligor which has been
levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell
only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other
personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like
effect as under a writ of attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The officer may levy
on debts due the judgment obligor and other credits,
including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties,
commissions and other personal property not capable of
manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties.
Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing
such debts or having in his possession or control such credits
to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and
all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within
five (5) days from service of the notice of garnishment stating
whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or
credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report
shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for
the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or
certified bank check issued in the name of the judgment
obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee
within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said
garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees
which shall be paid directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding
deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate
the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver
the amount due, otherwise, the choice shall be made by the
judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure
under paragraph (a) with respect to delivery of payment to
the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —
(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts;
vesting title. — If a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds
or other documents, or to perform, any other specific act in
connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the
time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the
cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed
by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect
as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated
within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may by an order divest the title of any
party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and
effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. (10a)
(b) Sale of real or personal property. — If the judgment be for
the sale of real or personal property, to sell such property,
describing it, and apply the proceeds in conformity with the
judgment. (8[c]a)
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall
demand of the person against whom the judgment for the
delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all
persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the
property within three (3) working days, and restore
possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, the
officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the
assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and
employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to
retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in
possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the
same manner as a judgment for money. (13a)
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. — When the property subject of the execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements except upon special
order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after the hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
(14a)
(e) Delivery of personal property. — In judgment for the
delivery of personal property, the officer shall take
possession of the same and forthwith deliver it to the party
entitled thereto and satisfy any judgment for money as
therein provided. (8a)
Section 11. Execution of special judgments. — When a
judgment requires the performance of any act other than
those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of
execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party
against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other
person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and
such party or person may be punished for contempt if he
disobeys such judgment. (9a)
Section 39. Obligor may pay execution against obligee. —
After a writ of execution against property has been issued, a
person indebted to the judgment obligor may pay to the
sheriff holding the writ of execution the amount of his debt or
so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the
judgment, in the manner prescribed in section 9 of this Rule,
and the sheriff's receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for the
amount so paid or directed to be credited by the judgment
obligee on the execution. (41a)
Section 40. Order for application of property and income to
satisfaction of judgment. — The court may order any property
of the judgment obligor, or money due him, not exempt from
execution, in the hands of either himself or another person, or
of a corporation or other juridical entity, to be applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment, subject to any prior rights over
such property.
If, upon investigation of his current income and expenses, it
appears that the earnings of the judgment obligor for his
personal services are more than necessary for the support of
his family, the court may order that he pay the judgment in
fixed monthly installments, and upon his failure to pay any
such installment when due without good excuse, may punish
him for indirect contempt. (42a)
Section 41. Appointment of receiver. — The court may
appoint a receiver of the property of the judgment obligor;
and it may also forbid a transfer or other disposition of, or any
interference with, the property of the judgment obligor not
exempt from execution. (43a)
Section 42. Sale of ascertainable interest of judgment obligor
in real estate. — If it appears that the judgment obligor has
an interest in real estate in the place in which proceedings
are had, as mortgagor or mortgagee or other wise, and his
interest therein can be ascertained without controversy the
receiver may be ordered to sell and convey such real estate
or the interest of the obligor therein; and such sale shall be
conducted in all respects in the same manner as is provided
for the sale of real state upon execution, and the proceedings
thereon shall be approved by the court before the execution
of the deed. (34a)
Section 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or
another person claims the property. — If it appears that a
person or corporation, alleged to have property of the
judgment obligor or to be indebted to him, claims an interest
in the property adverse to him or denied the debt, the court
may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment
obligee to institute an action against such person or
corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a
transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within
one hundred twenty (120) days from notice of the order, and
may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt.
Such order may be modified or vacated at any time by the
court which issued it, or by the court in which the action is
brought, upon such terms as may be just. (45a)
Perla v. Ramolete, 203 S 487 (1991)
 CFI adjudged Nelia Enriquez to pay damages to the
Private Respondent Primitiva Palmes after Enriquez‘s
passenger jeepney hit Palmes‘s private jeepney, which
resulted in the death of Calixto Palmes (Primitiva‘s
husband).
 Judgement became final and executory, and a writ of
execution was issued. It was returned unsatisfied.
 Enriquez was summoned to court, and she declared
under oath that the PUJ she owned was covered by a
third party liability insurance issued by Petitioner Perla.
 As such, PR Palmes filed a motion for garnishment,
praying that an order for garnishment be issued against
the insurance policy.
 Petitioner Perla appeared before court with an MR and
Motion to Quash the writ of garnishment, saying that writ
was void because
o Perla was not party to the case, not having
been served summons - Court never acquired
jurisdiction over the person
 Court denied the motion and gave an order for the
issuance of alias writ of garnishment.
 Petitioner Perla filed present Petition for Certiorari
o Grave abuse of discretion by Judge Ramolete
in ordering the garnishment of the insurance
contract
o Petitioner wasn‘t given opportunity to set up it's
defenses which it may have under the
insurance contract
o Under Sec. 45 Rule 39, the Court may only
authorize the judgment creditor to institute an
action against a third person who holds property
belonging to the judgment debtor.
HELD: The court sufficiently acquired jurisdiction over
Perla thru the writ, and there was no need for a separate
case filed by the private respondent against Perla.
 It is not necessary to serve summons on the
garnishee in order that the Court may acquire
jurisdiction to bind him. He need not be impleaded
as a party to the case. All that is necessary is service
upon him of writ of garnishment.
 The service of the writ makes the garnishee a ―virtual
party‖ or a ―forced intervenor‖ in the case, and the trial
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to comply
with the orders of the Court.
o Sec. 15 Rule 39
o Sec. 7(e) Rule 57
 Meanwhile, the assets garnished are subjected to a
specific lien. As per RCBC v De Castro, it operates as an
attachment upon a property, and the property is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the writ.
 ITC, trial Court acquired jurisdiction over Perla when it
was served the writ of garnishment over the third-party
liability insurance contract.
o Note: third party liability insurance contract -
issuer assume liability as soon as the liability of
the insured to the injured third person attaches
orta, Sr. v. Sa e , A. . No. RTJ-00-1593, 16 October
2000
 PET Morta Sr. et al - built residential houses on lots 991
and 997
 They were defendants in Civil Case No. 962, an action
for Unlawful Detainer filed by Josefina Baraclan before
the MTC Albay
 In Civil Case No. 962, the MTC rendered judgment
ordering the defendants to vacate. Defendants (Morta)
appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC decision.
Defendants appealed to CA
 in the mean time, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 962
filed a Motion for execution pending appeal. RTC
granted motion and ordered the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution
 PET opposed the writ of execution, contending that they
received a copy of the motion 3 days after the hearing
and granting of said motion
 Deputy Sheriff served the writ of execution and gave the
defendants a grace period of 20 days to vacate
 PET REFUSED to vacate. Hence, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 962 filed a motion for issuance of writ of
demolition
 Motion was granted by RESP Judge Sañez; writ of
demolition issued
HELD: Judge Jose S. Sañez is found GUILTY of abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law
 When a party refuses to yield possession of a property
as ordered by a writ of execution, contempt is not the
proper remedy. The sheriff must oust the deforciant
from subject property. If a demolition is necessary, there
must be a hearing, upon motion and with due notice, for
the issuance of a Special Order under Sec. 14 (now
Sec. 10 [d]) of Rule 39.
 Paragraph (d), Section 10 contemplates the only
instance when a special ―breakopen‖ order is required.
It is only when there is no occupant in the premises that
the sheriff may lawfully cause a demolition without the
need of securing a ―breakopen‖ order.
Notes:
BEFORE A DEMOLITION ORDER IS ISSUED
1. Motion
2. Hearing
3. Reasonable Time
WRIT OF POSSESSION ISSUED UNDER THE FF.
CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. Land registration proceedings under Sec. 17, Act No.
496, otherwise known as ―The Land Registration Act‖
2. Judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person,
not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened;
3. Extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Sec. 7, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118
4. Execution sales
Bermudez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 132810, 11 December
2000
 November 28, 1968: Severo Sales and his daughter,
Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed with the CFI Tarlac a
complaint for Annulment of Deed against Leonilo
Gonzales
 They alleged that Severo was the owner of an
unregistered parcel of land and hat on December 24,
1968, Severo donated a portion of property to
Esperanza.
o January 1959: Severo entered into an
agreement with the late Ernesto Gonzales for
the lease of the remaining portion of the land for
P2,700.00. Pursuant to this lease agreement,
Ernesto Gonzales made Severo and his wife,
Margarita Ferrer sign a document. They were
not given a copy of this document.
o October 1968: Severo received a copy of a
Deed of Sale signed by him and his wife at San
Manuel, Tarlac and ratified before a Notary
Public. Severo claimed that he never signed the
deed of sale and that if ever there was a
transaction over the subject land, it was one of
mortgage and not of sale, thus the complaint
for Annulment of Deed.
 In Answer, Leonilo, the son and predecessor-in-interest
of the late Ernesto Gonzales, claimed that the subject
land was transferred to him by virtue of the assailed
Deed of Sale; that Severo and Esperanza have been
staying on the said land not as its owners but as ordinary
occupants, without rent and only because of his
tolerance; and that he paid for the real estate taxes on
the said land from 1960 to 1968.
 CFI: decided the case in favor of Leonilo
 CA: affirmed decision. SC affirmed the CA decision. The
decision became final and executory and entry of
judgment was made.
 August 11, 1993: Leonilos heirs filed with the trial court a
Notice of Substitution of Parties.
 August 20, 1993: petitioner received copy of the notice of
substitution.
 March 3, 1994: the trial court granted respondents
Motion for Execution and Appointment of Special Sheriff.
 October 21, 1994: RTC issued a writ of execution
 June 20, 1995: the trial court issued an Alias Writ of
Execution in favor of respondents.
 August 3, 1995: Sheriffs Leano and Toquero issued a
certification to the effect that respondents were placed in
possession of the subject land by virtue of the June 20,
1995, alias writ of execution.
 November 2, 1995: REPS filed with the RTC, a Petition
for Demolition alleging that Severo and petitioner
Esperanza were given thirty (30) days from August 3,
1995, to remove and transfer their house erected on the
subject property, but since then and up to now, there is
no visible effort on the part of the said parties to comply
with the execution conducted.
 Severo and petitioner filed their opposition to the petition
for demolition.
 June 21, 1996: the trial court issued an order of
demolition.
 CA affirmed
HELD: CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ
of demolition without allowing her to prove her rights as a
builder in good faith under Article 448[28] of the Civil Code
Before demolition could be effected, the parties concerned
should at least be given a chance to be heard concerning the
interest they claim to possess on said properties. If demolition
is involved, there must be a hearing on the motion and due
notice.
Sia v. Arcenas, G.R. Nos. 209672-74, 14 January 2015
 Due to real property tax delinquencies of Panay
Railways, Inc (PRI) over two parcels of land in Capiz, the
City Treasurer of Roxas City auctioned the lots, with
petitioner Edmund Sia as the highest bidder. A
Certificate of Sale was then issued in his favor.
o Petitioner was unable to take possession
because the City Treasurer refused to issue a
final bill of sale despite the lapse of the 1-yr
redemption period
o The then-mayor of Roxas City issued EO 08-97
which nullified the auction sale
 Petitioner filed for annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus,
and damages against the City Treasurer, Mayor, City
Council members, Roxas City gov‘t, and PRI before RTC
Roxas City, ultimately seeking that a final bill of sale over
the lots be issued to him
o RTC ruled in petitioner‘s favor; CA affirmed.
o SC denied PRI‘s appeal for having been filed
beyond 15-day reglementary period and failure
to pay docket fees
o SC‘s ruling became final and executory
 Petitioner moved for execution before TC and was
granted the corresponding writ
o City Treasurer still refused to issue final bill of
sale, positing that petitioner had to settle the
delinquent real property taxes over the lots
which accrued during the pendency of the case
o Instead of paying, petitioner filed a Motion for
Order divesting PRI of title and vesting title to
him, which was granted by the TC
 Petitioner moved for the delivery and possession of the
lots, as they were already being occupied by third
parties, including respondents Arcenas, Lopez and
Rafanan
o A writ of possession and a writ of demolition
were issued in in petitioner‘s favor
 Respondents, who are lessees of PRI, moved for the
quashal of the writs
o Contended that Decision sought to be
executed arose from a mandamus petition
where a writ of possession is proscribed, and
that the execution of a final judgment in a
mandamus case is similar to the execution of
special judgments provided in sec 11 rule 39
HELD: the writ of possession and writ of demolition
issued by the RTC are null and void
 Service and execution of a special judgment, such
as a favorable judgment in mandamus should be
deemed to be limited to directing compliance with
the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to have the
disobedient person required by law to obey such
judgment punished with contempt.
 ITC: City Treasurer obstinately refused to issue the final
bill of sale in petitioner‘s favor, despite the finality of
judgment in the first case, as well as the issuance and
service of the writ of execution commanding him to do
so.
o In view of such refusal, RTC should have cited
the City Treasurer in contempt in order to
 enforce obedience to said judgment. Instead of
just doing so, it granted petitioner‘s numerous
motions
 Writ of possession - writ of execution employed to
enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under judgment
o Issuance of this writ is only proper in order to
execute judgments ordering the delivery of
specific properties to a litigant, in accordance
with sec 10, rule 39 RoC
o ITC: Judgment in the case sought only to
declare valid the auction sale where petitioner
bought the lots, and accordingly ordered the
City Treasurer to issue a final bill of sale to
petitioner. Since said judgment did not order
that possession of the lots be vested unto
petitioner, RTC varied the terms of aforesaid
judgment and exceeded its authority in issuing
the writs of demolition and possession in favor
of petitioner.‘
o Had petitioner pursued an action for ejectment
or reconveyance, the issuance of writs of
possession and demolition would have been
proper, but not in a special civil action for
mandamus, as in the case
 Orders pertaining to the execution of judgments must
substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary,
or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce
o Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it
has no validity.
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation v. Abayari,
G.R. No. 166508, 2 October 2009
 Respondents are rank-and-file employees of petitioner
NHMFC. They filed a petition for mandamus to compel
petitioner to pay them meal, rice, medical, dental, optical
and children‘s allowances, as well as longevity pay,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as
The Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989
 TC ruled favorably and ordered petitioner to pay
respondents the allowances prayed for, retroactive to the
respective dates of appointment
 motion for execution was withdrawn when petitioner and
respondents executed a Compromise Agreement in
which petitioner bound itself to comply with the decision
rendered int he case. However, DBM disallowed the
payment of certain allowances.
 Resp filed for the second time a motion for a writ of
execution of the trial court‘s decision
 TC directed the execution. Bent on preventing execution,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
HELD: Mandamus was proper
 A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action
for mandamus is in the nature of a special judgment. As
such, it requires the performance of any other act than
the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or
personal property the execution of which is governed by
Section 11, Rule 39.
 While Decision of the trial court ordered petitioner to pay
the benefits claimed by respondents, it by no means
ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and
instead merely directed petitioner to extend to
respondents the benefits under R.A. No. 6758 and its
implementing rules.
 Being a special judgment, the decision may not be
executed in the same way as a judgment for money
handed down in an ordinary civil case governed by
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules Court which sanctions
garnishment of debts and credits to satisfy a monetary
award.
 Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be
enforced is one for payment of a sum of money. It cannot
be employed to implement a special judgment such as
that rendered in a special civil action for mandamus.
Equitable v. Bellones, et al., A.M. No. P-05-1973, 18 March
2005
 Equitable was a defendant in a case filed by Ken
Appliance for Annulment or reformation of documents
and contracts. Judgment was ordered against Equitable
and a writ of execution was issued
 Respondent sheriffs served the letter of demand to pay
the money judgment on the strength of the writ of
execution
 Equitable was unable to pay by way of managers check,
but offered for levy sufficient real estate properties to
satisfy its judgment obligations (exercised the option
granted by Section 39 paragraph B of the RoC to
immediately choose which property or part may be levied
upon)
 BUT Sheriffs still proceeded to levy and garnish
Equitable accounts maintained at Citibank and HSBC
HELD: respondent sheriffs liable for grave abuse of authority
 the officer executing the writ of execution shall demand
from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution and all legal
fees. The payment shall be in cash, certified bank check
payable to the judgment obligee, or in any form
acceptable to the latter. If the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee,
he is given the option to immediately choose which of his
property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from
execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the
option immediately, it is only then that the sheriff/officer
enforcing the judgment for money can garnish debts due
the judgment obligor and other credits, or levy on the
personal or real property of the latter.
 ITC, Sheriff Regalado failed to comply with the
procedure outlined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. It is evident from the comment of Sheriff Regalado
that when the demand to pay was served on EPCIB by
Sheriff Bellones, he was not there because he was
serving the Notice of Garnishment on Citibank, N.A.
Thus, he served a Notice of Garnishment even before he
has knowledge as to how EPCIB will pay the judgment
debt.
 By serving notices of garnishment on Citibank, N.A.,
HSBC and PNB, Sheriff Regalado violated EPCIBs right
to choose which property may be levied upon to be sold
at auction for the satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Notes:
 Who will make the determination if the judgment
obligor cannot pay immediately? Judgment
 obligor. The sheriff cannot and should not be the
one to determine if the judgment obligor cannot
immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor
who is in the best position to know if he can
immediately pay by way of cash, certified bank
check or any other mode of payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee
China Banking v. Ortega, G.R. No. L-34964, 13 January
1973
 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development
Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a
sum of money. Defendants were declared in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period.
Judgment by default was rendered against the
defendants.
 Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B
& B Forest Development Corporation with the China
Banking Corporation. A notice of garnishment was
issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served
on said bank
 The bank invoked RA 1405 (The Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits) allegedly prohibiting the disclosure of
any information relative to bank deposits.
 RTC ordered China Bank to inform the Court whether or
not there is a deposit belonging to B & B Forest
Development Corporation, and if there is any, to hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order from this Court. MR denied. This petition was filed.
 Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information
required by the court does not fall within any of the four
(4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that
compliance to the order of the court is a crime under
Section 5 of RA 1405. In effect, bank deposits can never
be garnished.
HELD: A bank may not refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405
The prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. There is no
real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit
is disclosed, it is purely incidental to the execution process.
The law was not crafted for the purpose of evading
satisfaction of debts.
I. Exempt properties
section 12, Rule 39
Section 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third
person. — The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor
of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the
judgment obligor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. (16a)
Section 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
(a) The judgment obligor's family home as provided by law, or
the homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily
used in connection therewith;
(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in
his trade, employment, or livelihood;
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other
beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor may select
necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation;
(d) His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal
use, excluding jewelry;
(e) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the judgment
obligor and his family, such as the judgment obligor may
select, of a value not exceeding one hundred thousand
pesos;
(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four
months;
(g) The professional libraries and equipment of judges,
lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers,
surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not
exceeding three hundred thousand pesos in value;
(h) One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding the total
value of one hundred thousand pesos owned by a fisherman
and by the lawful use of which he earns his livelihood;
(i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of the
judgment obligor for his personal services within the four
months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support
of his family;
(j) Lettered gravestones;
(k) Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in
any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property
obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government;
(m) Properties specially exempted by law.
But no article or species of property mentioned in this section
shall be exempt from execution issued upon a judgment
recovered for its price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a
mortgage thereon. (12a)
Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060, 27 November 2008
Petitioner Albino Josef was defendant in Civil Case No. 95-
110-MK, a case for collection of sum of money filed by
respondent Otelio Santos. Respondent Santos claimed that
Josef failed to pay the shoe materials he bought on credit
from him. RTC found Josef liable for payment to Santos. CA
affirmed RTC. SC affirmed CA. The Judgment became final
and executory on May 21, 2002. Santos moved for issuance
of a writ of execution on February 17, 2003. RTC granted the
Santos‘ motion for issuance of writ of execution on July 16,
2003. The sheriff was commanded to execute the decision.
Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with the CA
questioning the sheriff‘s levy and sale. He claimed that the
personal properties did not belong to him but to his children;
and that the real property was his family home thus exempt
from execution.
HELD: the personal belongings of Josef‘s children and
his family home are exempt from execution
 As early as during proceedings prior to the issuance of
the writ of execution, petitioner brought to the fore the
issue of exemption from execution of his home, which he
claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the civil
law.
 The family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over
the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated,
which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy
such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.
 Upon being apprised that the property subject of
execution allegedly constitutes petitioner‘s family home,
 the trial court should have observed the following
procedure:
1) Determine if petitioner‘s obligation to respondent falls
under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of the
Family Code;
2) Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner‘s claim that
the property was his family home; conduct an ocular
inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an
interview of members of the community where the
alleged family home is located, in order to determine if
petitioner actually resided within the premises of the
claimed family home; order a submission of photographs
of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper
individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the
petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same
time, the respondent is given the opportunity to cross-
examine and present evidence to the contrary;
3) If the property is accordingly found to constitute
petitioner‘s family home, the court should determine:
a. if the obligation sued upon was contracted
or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity
of the Family Code;
b. if petitioner‘s spouse is still alive, as well as
if there are other beneficiaries of the family
home;
c. if the petitioner has more than one
residence for the purpose of determining
which of them, if any, is his family home;
and
d. its actual location and value, for the
purpose of applying the provisions of
Articles 157 and 160 of the Family Code.
 On the personal properties— Despite petitioner‘s
allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make
an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether
the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether
they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
 The trial court is called to observe the procedure as
herein laid out. The respondent should observe the
procedure prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code,
that is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution of the
petitioner‘s family home, if so, and apply the proceeds –
less the maximum amount allowed by law under Article
157 of the Code which should remain with the petitioner
for the rebuilding of his family home – to his judgment
credit.
Spouses Oliva-De Mesa v. Spouses Acero, Jr., G.R. No.
185064, 16 January 2012
 Parcel of land in Forbes St., Meycauayan, Bulacan was
owned and registered under Araceli Oliva De Mesa‘s
(PET). Sps De Mesa purchased the property in 1984,
constructed a house and occupied it as their family
home in Jan 1987.
 In 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio Acero of
100k and constituted a mortgage over the subject
property. Aracela issued a check that was dishonored.
Claudio filed a BP 22 case 2 years later. RTC acquitted
Sps De Mesa but ordered them to pay Claudio the 100k
(with legal interest).
 In 1993, writ of execution was issued and Sheriff
Samonte levied upon the subject property. It was sold on
public auction in 1994 wherein Claudio was the highest
bidder.
 In 1995, Claudio leased the property to Sps De Mesa for
a monthly rent (5.5k) but the Sps defaulted again.
 A Final Deed of Sale was also issued to Claudio and a
new TCT was issued in his favor. Claudio and his wife,
Rufina (Sps Acero) then filed an ejectment case against
Sps De Mesa. Sps De Mesa claimed they were the
lawful owners and could not be evicted.
o MTC favored Sps Acero. Sps De Mesa
appealed to the RTC but case was dismissed
for failure to submit their memorandum. Sps De
Mesa then filed petition for review with CA. CA
denied it and decision became final in 2007.
 In 1999, Sps De Mesa filed a complaint to nullify the TCT
of Claudio, asserting that the subject property was
their family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code.
o RTC dismissed the complaint. Exemption
doesn‘t apply. Mortgage was constituted and it
was levied upon as payment. CA affirmed this.
It added that exemption is not automatic and
should be proved to the Sherriff prior to
execution. Sps De Mesa then filed this petition
for review, insisting the execution sale was a
nullity as the property was a family home.
HELD: It was a family home BUT exemption is not
automatic
 exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction.
 Appellants did not assert their claim for exemption within
a reasonable time. ―Reasonable time‖, the CA had ruled,
would be the one-year period provided under Rule 39.30
for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on
execution. SC agreed
J. Third party claim (terceria)
RD
3 INSTANCES OF 3 PARTY CLAIM IN ROC:
Execution Replevin Attachment
(section 16, Rule (Section 7, Rule (section 14, Rule
39) 60) 57)
third person may third person may third person may
vindicate his claim vindicate his claim vindicate his claim
to the property in to the property in to the property in
a separate action the same or the same or
separate action separate action
For execution, third party may no longer vindicate his claim in
the same action because in execution, there is no more
pending action. The decision has become final and executory
Philippine Bank of Communications v. CA (1997)
Petitioner filed collection suits against surety Joseph Chua,
who had property in Makati. It was discovered the property
was transferred to JALECO, but such transfer to Deed of
Exchange was later held to be in fraud of petitioners
(creditors) in a separate case. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners in the collection suits. The property was levied and
the auction was set.Private respondent then filed a third party
claim against the property, claiming that the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership. SC held that 1.) she gave her
marital consent to the fraudulent Deed of Exchange making
her a party to the instrument, 2.) she is estopped from
asserting a third party claim when she conceded in the Deed
of Exchange that the property was solely owned by her
husband.
HELD: A stranger is a third-party who is any person other
than the judgment debtor or his agent

K. Transfer of ownership
sections 23-26, 33, Rule 39
Section 23. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property
capable of manual delivery. — When the purchaser of any
personal property, capable of manual delivery, pays the
purchase price, the officer making the sale must deliver the
property to the purchaser and, if desired, execute and deliver
to him a certificate of sale. The sale conveys to the purchaser
all the rights which the judgment obligor had in such property
as of the date of the levy on execution or preliminary
attachment. (25a)
Section 24. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property
not capable of manual delivery. — When the purchaser of
any personal property, not capable of manual delivery, pays
the purchase price, the officer making the sale must execute
and deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale. Such
certificate conveys to the purchaser all the rights which the
judgment obligor had in such property as of the date of the
levy on execution or preliminary attachment. (26a)
Section 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof
given to purchaser and filed with registry of deeds. — Upon a
sale of real property, the officer must give to the purchaser a
certificate of sale containing:
(a) A particular description of the real property sold;
(b) The price paid for each distinct lot or parcel;
(c) The whole price paid by him;
(d) A statement that the right of redemption expires one (1)
year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale.
Such certificate must be registered in the registry of deeds of
the place where the property is situated. (27 a)
Section 26. Certificate of sale where property claimed by third
person. — When a property sold by virtue of a writ of
execution has been claimed by a third person, the certificate
of sale to be issued by the sheriff pursuant to sections 23, 24
and 25 of this Rule shall make express mention of the
existence of such thirdparty claim. (28a)
Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of
redemption period; by whom executed or given. — If no
redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled
to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so
redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no
other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given,
and the time for redemption has expired, the last
redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession;
but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire
period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the
sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by
the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and
in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the
officer making the sale had continued in office and executed
it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser
or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the
rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the
property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner
by the same officer unless a third party adversely to the
judgment obligor. (35a)
Notes:
Kind of property When ownership
transferred
Personal property capable As of the date of the levy
of manual delivery
Personal property not Upon delivery of certificate of
capable of manual delivery sale
Real property Upon expiration of
redemption period
L. Redemption
sections 27-33, Rule 39
Section 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real
property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any
part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner
hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment obligor; or his successor in interest in the
whole or any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment,
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part
thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the property was
sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
(29a)
Section 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on,
successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. — The
judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property
from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with the per centum
per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or
taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the
same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a
prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
under which such purchase was made, the amount of such
other lien, with interest.
Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty
(60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum
paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in
addition and the amount of any assessments or taxes which
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after
redemption by him, with interest on such last named amount,
and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may
be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed,
redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60)
days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the
last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in
addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which
the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption
thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens
held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer
who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of
deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid
by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other
than that upon which the redemption was made, notice
thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed
with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the
property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a)
Section 29. Effect of redemption by judgment obligor, and a
certificate to be delivered and recorded thereupon; to whom
 Scenario Redeemed by Price
payments on redemption made. — If the judgment obligor
C1 forecloses, D For 1k
redeems he must make the same payments as are required
purchases for 1k C2 For 1k (same
to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon, no
further redemption shall be allowed and he is restored to his judgment)
estate. The person to whom the redemption payment is made C1 forecloses, C2 C3 For 51k (different
must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption purchases for 1k judgment)
acknowledged before a notary public or other officer C1 forecloses, 3P D For 1k
authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real purchases for 1k C2 For 1k
property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the
registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated Note that if C2 forecloses, C1 may still foreclose in another
and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the action because he has a prior right in the mortgaged
margin of the record of the certificate of sale. The payments property. C1 is not a redemptioner as described in the rules
mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be
made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the WHEN REDEMPTION CAN BE MADE
officer who made the sale. (31a) By the JUDGMENT Within 1 year from date of
DEBTOR registration of certificate of
Section 30. Proof required of redemptioner. — A sale
redemptioner must produce to the officer, or person from By FIRST REDEMPTIONER Within 1 year from date of
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice to the registration of certificate of
officer a copy of the judgment or final order under which he sale
claims the right to redeem, certified by the clerk of the court BY ALL SUBSEQUENT Within 60 days from last
wherein the judgment or final order is entered, or, if he REDEMPTIONERS redemption PROVIDED that
redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of judgment debtor has not
the record thereof, certified by the registrar of deeds, or an exercised his right of
original or certified copy of any assignment necessary to redemption
establish his claim; and an affidavit executed by him or his - In all cases, judgment debtor shall have the entire 1 year
agent, showing the amount then actually due on the lien. period from date of registration of sale to redeem the
(32a) property. If judgment debtor redeems, no further
redemption is allowed [Sec. 29].
Section 31. Manner of using premises pending redemption; - There is no extension or interruption of redemption
waste restrained. — Until the expiration of the time allowed period
for redemption, the court may, as in other proper cases,
restrain the commission of waste on the property by REDEMPTION PRICE
injunction, on the application of the purchaser or the 1) By the Judgment Debtor or First Redemptioner:
judgment obligee, with or without notice; but it is not waste for a) Purchase PRICE
a person in possession of the property at the time of the sale, b) 1% INTEREST thereon up to time of redemption
or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period c) Any amount of ASSESSMENTS OR TAXES which
allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same purchaser may have paid after purchase as well as
manner in which it was previously used, or to use it in the interest on such last named amount at the same rate
ordinary course of husbandry; or to make the necessary d) If purchaser is also a creditor having a PRIOR LIEN
repairs to buildings thereon while he occupies the property. to that of redemptioner, other than the judgment
(33a) under which such purchase was made, the
AMOUNT of such OTHER LIEN, also with interest
Section 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending 2) By all Subsequent Redemptioners
redemption. — The purchaser or a redemptioner shall not be a) AMOUNT paid on last redemption
entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income of the b) 2% INTEREST thereon
property sold on execution, or the value of the use and c) Any amount of ASSESSMENTS OR TAXES which
occupation thereof when such property is in the possession purchaser may have paid after purchase as well as
of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the interest on such last named amount at the same
property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment rate
obligor until the expiration of his period of redemption. (34a) d) Amount of any LIENS held by said last redemptioner
prior to his own, also with interest
Payment of redemption price may be made to the: (1)
Notes: Purchaser or redemptioner, or (2) For him to the officer who
made the sale. The person to whom redemption payment is
WHEN REDEMPTION IS AVAILABLE made must execute and deliver to him a CERTIFICATE OF
(1) For personal property – there is NO right of redemption as REDEMPTION.
the sale is absolute
(2) For real property – right of redemption is available RIGHTS PENDING REDEMPTION [Secs. 31-32, Rule 39]
Right of Judgment Creditor Pending Redemption
APPLICATION OF SEC. 28, RULE 39 (1) Apply for injunction to restrain the commission of waste on
Take for instance a scenario where there are three the property
creditors/mortgagees (C1, C2, C3) with whom the Debtor (D)
has a secured debt amounting to 50k each. Note that during Rights of the Judgment Debtor Pending Redemption
the foreclosure, a third party (3P) may purchase the property (1)Remain in possession of the property
foreclosed. (2)Cannot be ejected
(3)Use the property in the same manner it was previously
used
(4)Make necessary repairs to buildings thereon while he
occupies the property
(5)Use it in the ordinary course of husbandry [Sec. 31]; and
(6)Collect rents, earning and income derived from property
until the expiration of period of redemption
M. Revival of judgment
section 34, Rule 39
Section 34. Recovery of price if sale not effective; revival of
judgment. — If the purchaser of real property sold on
execution, or his successor in interest, fails to recover the
possession thereof, or is evicted therefrom, in consequence
of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or
because the judgment has been reversed or set aside, or
because the property sold was exempt from execution, or
because a third person has vindicated his claim to the
property, he may on motion in the same action or in a
separate action recover from the judgment obligee the price
paid, with interest, or so much thereof as has not been
delivered to the judgment obligor, or he may, on motion, have
the original judgment revived in his name for the whole price
with interest, or so much thereof as has been delivered to the
judgment obligor. The judgment so revived shall have the
same force and effect as an original judgment would have as
of the date of the revival and no more. (36a)
N. Right against co-defendants or third parties
sections 35, 12, 46, Rule 39
Section 35. Right to contribution or reimbursement. — When
property liable to an execution against several persons is sold
thereon, and more than a due proportion of the judgment is
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one
of them, or one of them pays, without a sale, more than his
proportion, he may compel a contribution from the others;
and when a judgment is upon an obligation of one of them, as
security for another, and the surety pays the amount, or any
part thereof, either by sale of his property or before sale, he
may compel repayment from the principal. (37a)
Section 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third person. —
The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the
judgment obligor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. (16a)
Section 46. When principal bound by judgment against
surety. — When a judgment is rendered against a party who
stands as surety for another, the latter is also bound from the
time that he has notice of the action or proceeding, and an
opportunity at the surety's request to join in the defense.
(48a)
O. Discovery
sections 36-38, Rule 39
Section 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment
unsatisfied. — When the return of a writ of execution issued
against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several
obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment
remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee,
at any time after such return is made, shall be entitled to an
order from the court which rendered the said judgment,
requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined
concerning his property and income before such court or
before a commissioner appointed by it at a specified time and
place; and proceedings may thereupon be had for the
application of the property and income of the judgment
obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no
judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a
court or commissioner outside the province or city in which
such obligor resides or is found. (38a)
Section 37. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor. —
When the return of a writ of execution against the property of
a judgment obligor shows that the judgment remain
unsatisfied, in whole or in part, and upon proof to the
satisfaction of the court which issued the writ, that a person,
corporation, or other juridical entity has property of such
judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the court may, by an
order, require such person, corporation, or other juridical
entity, or any officer, or member thereof, to appear before the
court or a commissioner appointed by it, at a time and place
within the province or city where such debtor resides or is
found, and be examined concerning the same. The service of
the order shall bind all credits due the judgment obligor and
all money and property of the judgment obligor in the
possession or in the control of such person corporation, or
juridical entity from the time of service; and the court may
also require notice of such proceedings to be given to any
party to the action in such manner as it may deem proper.
(39a)
Section 38. Enforcement of attendance and conduct of
examination. — A party or other person may be compelled,
by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or
commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding
sections, and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or
to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his
deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases.
Examinations shall not be unduly prolonged, but the
proceedings may be adjourned from time to time, until they
are completed. If the examination is before a commissioner,
he must take it in writing and certify it to the court. All
examinations and answers before a court commissioner must
be under oath, and when a corporation or other juridical entity
answers, it must be on the oath of an authorized officer or
agent thereof. (40a)
XIX. Special Civil Actions
B. Foreclosure
Rule 68
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. — In an action
for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance upon
real estate, the complaint shall set forth the date and due
execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names
and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a
description of the mortgaged property; a statement of the
date of the note or other documentary evidence of the
obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to
be unpaid thereon; and the names and residences of all
persons having or claiming an interest in the property
subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all
of whom shall be made defendants in the action. (1a)
Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — If
upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set
forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount
due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the
court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so
found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to
the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety
(90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from
the entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment the
property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment. (2a)
Section 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. — When the
defendant, after being directed to do so as provided in the
next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of the
judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon
motion, shall order the property to be sold in the manner and
under the provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations
governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale
shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior
encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when
confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall
operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the
expiration of the period of redemption when allowed by law,
the purchaser at the auction sale or last redemptioner, if any,
shall be entitled to the possession of the property unless a
third party is actually holding the same adversely to the
judgment obligor. The said purchaser or last redemptioner
may secure a writ of possession, upon motion, from the court
which ordered the foreclosure. (3a) Section 4. Disposition of
proceeds of sale. — The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after
deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person
foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any
balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due,
the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order
of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be
no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue
after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly
authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. (4a)
Section 5. How sale to proceed in case the debt is not all
due. — If the debt for which the mortgage or encumbrance
was held is not all due as provided in the judgment as soon
as a sufficient portion of the property has been sold to pay
the total amount and the costs due, the sale shall terminate;
and afterwards as often as more becomes due for principal or
interest and other valid charges, the court may, on motion,
order more to be sold. But if the property cannot be sold in
portions without prejudice to the parties, the whole shall be
ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt
and costs shall be paid, if the proceeds of the sale be
sufficient therefor, there being a rebate of interest where such
rebate is proper. (5a)
Section 6. Deficiency judgment. — If upon the sale of any
real property as provided in the next preceding section there
be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the proceeds
of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment
against the defendant for any such balance for which, by the
record of the case, he may be personally liable to the plaintiff,
upon which execution may issue immediately if the balance is
all due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise;
the plaintiff shall be entitled to execution at such time as the
balance remaining becomes due under the terms of the
original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment.
(6a)
Section 7. Registration. — A certified copy of the final order
of the court confirming the sale shall be registered in the
registry of deeds. If no right of redemption exists, the
certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be
cancelled, and a new one issued in the name of the
purchaser.
Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in
the name of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the
certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be
registered and a brief memorandum thereof made by the
registrar of deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the
property is redeemed, the deed of redemption shall be
registered with the registry of deeds, and a brief
memorandum thereof shall be made by the registrar of deeds
on said certificate of title. If the property is not redeemed, the
final deed of sale executed by the sheriff in favor of the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale shall be registered with the
registry of deeds; whereupon the certificate of title in the
name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled and a new one
issued in the name of the purchaser. (n)
Section 8. Applicability of other provisions. — The provisions
of sections 31, 32 and 34 of Rule 39 shall be applicable to the
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages under this Rule
insofar as the former are not inconsistent with or may serve
to supplement the provisions of the latter. (8a)
General Banking Law Sec. 47
SECTION 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. — In the
event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of
any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan or
other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor
whose real property has been sold for the full or partial
payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year
after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property by
paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with
interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all
the costs and expenses incurred by the bank or institution
from the sale and custody of said property less the income
derived therefrom. However, the purchaser at the auction
sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial
foreclosure shall have the right to enter upon and take
possession of such property immediately after the date of the
confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in
accordance with law. Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain
the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted pursuant to
this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing
by the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court
conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank
may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure
proceeding. Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons
whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial
foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in
accordance with this provision until, but not after, the
registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the
applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more
than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier.
Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale
prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption
rights until their expiration. (78a)

Act 3135 Sec. 7
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent
to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was
made without violating the mortgage or without complying
with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any
other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly
registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance
with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court
shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified
in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of
Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by
Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the
court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
A.M. 99-10-05-O
(AS FURTHER AMENDED, AUGUST 7, 2001)
PROCEDURE IN EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF
MORTGAGE
In line with the responsibility of an Executive Judge under
Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, for the
management of courts within his administrative area,
included in which is the task of supervising directly the work
of the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex-Office Sheriff, and
his staff, and the issuance of commissions to notaries public
and enforcement of their duties under the law, the following
procedures are hereby prescribed in extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgages:
1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage
whether under the direction of the sheriff or a notary public,
pursuant to Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, and Act
1508, as amended, shall be filed with the Executive Judge,
through the Clerk of court who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
2. Upon receipt of an application for extra-judicial foreclosure
of mortgage, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of Court to:
a) receive and docket said application and to stamp thereon
the corresponding file number, date and time of filing;
b) collect the filing fees therefore pursuant to rule 141,
Section 7(c), as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, and issue
the corresponding official receipt;
c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure,
whether the applicant has complied with all the requirements
before the public auction is conducted under the direction of
the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Sec. 4 of Act 3135,
as amended;
d) sign and issue the certificate of sale, subject to the
approval of the Executive Judge, or in his absence, the Vice-
Executive Judge. No certificate of sale shall be issued in
favor of the highest bidder until all fees provided for in the
aforementioned sections and in Rule 141, Section 9(1), as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, shall have been paid;
Provided, that in no case shall the amount payable under
Rule 141, Section 9(1), as amended, exceed P100,000.00;
e) after the certificate of sale has been issued to the highest
bidder, keep the complete records, while awaiting any
redemption within a period of one (1) year from date of
registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of
Deeds concerned, after which, the records shall be archived.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, juridical persons
whose property is sold pursuant to an extra-judicial
foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property until,
but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure
sale which in no case shall be more than three (3) months
after foreclosure, whichever is earlier, as provided in Section
47 of Republic Act No. 8791 (as amended, Res. Of August 7,
2001).
Where the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgages of real estates and/or chattels in different
locations covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee
corresponding to such indebtedness shall be collected. The
collecting Clerk of Court shall, apart from the official receipt of
the fees, issue a certificate of payment indicating the amount
of indebtedness, the filing fees collected, the mortgages
sought to be foreclosed, the real estates and/or chattels
mortgaged and their respective locations, which certificate
shall serve the purpose of having the application docketed
with the Clerks of Court of the places where the other
properties are located and of allowing the extrajudicial
foreclosures to proceed thereat.
3. The notices of auction sale in extrajudicial foreclosure for
publication by the sheriff or by a notary public shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to
Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1079, dated January 2,
1977, and noncompliance therewith shall constitute a
violation of Section 6 thereof.
4. The Executive Judge shall, with the assistance of the Clerk
of Court, raffle applications for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under the direction of the sheriff among all sheriffs,
including those assigned to the Office of the Clerk of Court
and Sheriffs IV assigned in the branches.
5. The name/s of the bidder/s shall be reported by the sheriff
or the notary public who conducted the sale to the Clerk of
Court before the issuance of the certificate of sale
Notes:
 A judicial foreclosure is initiated by a complaint.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: the right of the mortgagor to
extinguish the collateral and retain ownership of it.
 Exercised after default in the performance of the
condition of the mortgage but before the foreclosure
sale of the collateral
 Exercised by paying the mortgage obligation
 Period is no less than 90 days but no more than 120
days from the entry of judgment (Rule 68, Sec. 2)
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION ON MORTGAGOR‘S
SUCCESSORS-ININTEREST: All junior lien-holders acquire
the right to subordinate to the superior lien of the 1st
mortgagee.
UNFORECLOSED EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: A decree of
foreclosure where junior lien-holders are not parties, the
equity of redemption in their favor remains unforeclosed and
unaffected. A separate foreclosure proceeding should be
brought to require them to redeem from the first mortgagee
under penalty of losing the prerogative to redeem
Whose rights are defeated? Mortgagee‘s right to
foreclose (or assignee‘s)
Mortgagee: entitled to deficiency judgment (by Motion for
Deficiency Judgment for the balance)
IN CASE THE MORTGAGOR DIES
The right to recover deficiencies by the mortgagee extends to
the judicial foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement
of an estate (Rule 86), and it gives the mortgagee 3 distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies:
1. Waive mortgage and claim the principal obligation from the
estate as an ordinary claim
2. Judicial foreclosure and prove deficiency as an ordinary
claim
3. Rely on the mortgage exclusively without the right to
deficiency

PROCEDURE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE: May be exercised only if

1. Demand by the creditor or failure to pay within the period there is a special power inserted or attached to the document
2. File a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage, indicating in which the REM appears, and only in accordance with the
3. If the court finds the facts in the complaint to be true, it provisions of Act No. 3135
shall:
a. Ascertain amount due to the plaintiff (judgment RIGHT OF REDEMPTION: a statutory right generally
oblige) conferred on the mortgagor but may be exercised by other
b. Order that the same be paid to the court or judgment persons. It extinguishes the inchoate right of the purchaser
oblige within a period of not less than 90 days and that is acquired at the foreclosure sale
not more than 120 days (equity of redemption)  An - The right acquired by a purchaser at the foreclosure sale
order presupposes a trial was conducted is merely inchoate. The ownership remains with the
4. Equity of redemption (90-120 days period of grace) mortgagor until expiration of the grace period for the
expires (assuming judgment obligor did not pay) right of redemption. For the party to claim the right of
5. Sale will be conducted, where the purchaser is the redemption, there must be a specific law that
highest bidder - Acceptance of a bid at the foreclosure exceptionally allows it.
sale confers no title on the purchaser - Until the court - Upon its expiration, without the mortgagor having
has validly confirmed the foreclosure sale, the purchaser exercised the right of redemption, the ownership
is nothing more than a preferred bidder becomes consolidated in the purchaser (not inchoate
6. A hearing will be conducted for interested parties to right anymore)
show cause why the sale should not be confirmed 7.
Court will issue a confirmation order (upon MOTION) WHO MAY REDEEM
(Rule 68, Sec. 3) - The order of confirmation operates to Extrajudicial foreclosure Judicial foreclosure (Rule
divest the mortgagor‘s rights in the property and vests it (Act No. 3135, Sec. 6) 39, Sec. 27, ROC)
in the purchaser, subject only to right of redemption (if it 1. Debtors 1. Judgment obligor, or his
exists) - Purchaser acquires certain rights 2. Successors in interest 3. successor in interest in the
7. Finality of confirmation order or expiration of redemption Any judicial creditor or whole or any part of the
period (if there is a right of redemption) - Consequence: judgment creditor of said property
purchaser is entitled to possession unless a third party is debtor 2. Creditor having a lien by
actually holding the same adversely to the judgment 4. Any person having a lien virtue of an attachment,
obligor (mortgagor). In such a case, the possession will on the property subsequent judgment or mortgage on the
also have to be litigated to the mortgage or deed of property sold, or on some
8. Proceeds of the sale paid in this order: a. Costs of the trust under wh part therefor, subsequent to
sale b. Mortgage debt specified in the contract c. Junior the lien under which the
encumbrancers in order of priority d. Mortgagor property was sold. Such
9. Registration: at the Register of Deeds, present the final redeeming creditor is termed
order of court confirming the sale a redemptioner
a. No right of redemption: Certificate of title is
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the 1. Successor in interest: includes, but not limited to
purchaser a. One to whom the mortgagor has transferred the
b. Right of redemption exists: statutory right of redemption
i. Certificate is not cancelled: (1) certificate of sale b. One to whom the mortgagor has conveyed its interest in
and (2) confirmation order are registered and a the collateral for the purpose of redemption
brief memo made by registrar of deeds c. One who succeeds to the interest of the mortgagor by
ii. Redeemed: deed of redemption registered operation of law
iii. Not redeemed: final deed of sale registered and d. One or more joint debtor-mortgagors who were joint
new certificate of title issued owners of the collateral sold
10. Move for the court to render judgment on deficiency, if - Note: A surety CANNOT redeem the collateral of the
any debtor-mortgagor because the surety, by paying the
debt of the debtor-mortgagor, stands in the place of the
RIGHT TO SURPLUS OR DEFICIENCY creditor, not the debtor-mortgagor, and consequently is
Mortgagor: entitled to surplus NOT a successor in interest in the collateral
2. Redemptioner: a creditor of the mortgagor with a lien on
the collateral subsequent to the lien was the basis of the
foreclosure sale (said creditor is called a junior
encumbrancer) (example: second mortgagee)
- If the lien of the creditor is PRIOR to the lien under
which the collateral was sold (senior encumbrancer as,
for example, a senior mortgagee), it is NOT a
redemptioner and cannot redeem
o But said senior encumbrancer is fully
protected, since any purchaser at the
foreclosure sale of the collateral takes the
property subject to such prior lien
(mortgage follows the property), which
must first be satisfied
- Unlike a mortgagor, a redemptioner must PROVE its
right to redeem by producing the documents required by
Rule 39
WHEN
1. Act 3135: 1 year from date of registration of certificate of
sale
2. RA 8791: After the foreclosure or before registration of
certificate of foreclosure, whichever is earlier (which shall not
exceed 3 months) – bank must be the mortgagee
GR: When a REM is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135
grants the right of redemption within 1 year from the date of
registration of the certificate of the foreclosure sale -
Provision says from date of sale, but jurisprudence
interpreted it to be from date of registration
EX: RA 8791 (General Banking Law of 2000) provides that
when the REM is foreclosed extrajudicially by a bank, quasi-
bank or trust entity, juridical mortgagors are granted the right
to redeem until, but not later than the registration of the
certificate of foreclosure sale (in no case shall be more than 3
months after foreclosure)
REQUISITES FOR A VALID REDEMPTION:
1. The redemption must be made within 12 months from
the date of registration of the sale in the Office of the
Register of Deeds
2. Payment of the purchase price of the collateral involved,
plus 1% interest per month, together with the amount of
any assessments or taxes if any, paid by the purchaser
after the sale with the same rate of interest
- Under RA 8791, Art. III, Sec. 47, the right to redeem is
exercised by paying the amount due under the mortgage
deed (not the purchase price, as above indicated)
3. Written notice of the redemption must be served on the
officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the
Register of Deeds of the province
GR: Not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests
its desire to do so; actual and simultaneous tender of
payment must accompany the statement of intention
- Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable
and valid tender of the entire redemption price;
otherwise, the rule on the redemption period may easily
be circumvented
BUT filing of a judicial action, made simultaneously with the
deposit of the redemption price, within the redemption period,
may be necessary to preserve the right of redemption for
future enforcement even beyond such period
- Filing of a complaint to enforce redemption, within the
redemption period, is equivalent to an offer to redeem
and has the effect of preserving the right of redemption
- Nothing in the law prohibits piecemeal redemption of
collateral sold at a foreclosure
Heirs of Maglasang v. Manila Banking, G.R. No. 171206,
23 September 2013
Flaviano had a loan with MBC. His loan was secured by a
real estate mortgage. He died. Respondent (substitute of
MBC) extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. There was a
deficiency in the proceeds. Respondent wanted to recover
the deficiency
HELD: The remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure under
Section 7, Rule 86, ROC does not give the
creditor/mortgagee the right to recover any deficiency in the
proceeds of the foreclosure.
 Flaviano was a deceased debtor of the respondent,
whose loan was secured by mortgage. This case fell
squarely under Sec. 7, Rule 86, ROC. Act No. 3135
does not entirely discount the application of Section 7,
Rule 86, ROC, or vice versa; they complement each
other. Sec. 7, Rule 86, ROC lays down the options for
the secured creditor to claim against the estate.
 Act No. 3135 provides for, after extra-judicial
foreclosure is chose, the procedure governing the
manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure should
proceed. This is because Sec. 7, Rule 86, ROC is a
special rule applicable to claims against the estate, and
at the same time, since this provision does not detail the
procedure for extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities
governing the same must be governed by the said act.
 Under Sec. 7, Rule 86, ROC, the secured creditor has
three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt
for the satisfaction of his credit: a) waive the mortgage
and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; b) foreclose the
mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and c) rely on the mortgage exclusively,
or other security and foreclose the same before it is
barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for
any deficiency.
 The remedies are distinct and independent and mutually
exclusive from each other. Election of 1 effectively bars
the exercise of the others
 ITC, respondent chose the third option, i.e., extra-
judicial foreclosure. It did not choose the first option of
directly filing a claim against the estate since it merely
notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of
its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was
currently restructuring the account.
 The plain result of adopting the third option is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from
the estate
TYPE OF BY WHOM AGAINST WHOM TYPE OF WHEN LEGAL BASIS
FORECLOSURE REDEMPTION
JUDICIAL BANK Corporation Right of Within 1 year after Sec. 47, RA 8791
Individual redemption the sale
NON-BANK Corporation Equity of within a period of Sec. 2, Rule 68
Individual redemption not less than ninety
(90) days nor more
than one hundred
twenty (120) days
from the entry of
judgment
EXTRAJUDICIAL BANK Corporation Right of until, but not after,
redemption the registration of
the certificate of
foreclosure sale
with the applicable
Register of Deeds
which in no case
shall be more than
three (3) months
after foreclosure,
whichever is earlier
Individual Within 1 year after Sec. 47, RA 8791
the sale
NON-BANK Corporation Right of Within 1 year after Sec. 6, Act No.
Individual redemption the sale 3135
C. Contempt
both a civil and criminal action is a proceeding in that
People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908, 29 March 1995 proceeding but really action. While proceeding is
There was a pending rape case under automatic review of constituting neither auxiliary to the main case in
the SC where Mia alleged that Godoy, her Physics teacher that it proceeds out of the
and a married man, raped her multiple times. As an incident original case, it is essentially a
arising from this case, a complaint was filed by JUDGE new and independent
GACOTT against REYNOSO JR (columnist) and EVA P. proceeding that it involves new
PONCE DE LEON (publisher and chairman of the editorial issues and must be initiated by
board) of Palawan Times to cite for indirect contempt based the issuance of service of new
on his column ―On the Beat‖ published which tends to process
impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice, that the article contains averments Conducted in accordance Rules of procedure governing
which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and with the principles and criminal contempt proceedings,
derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the rules applicable to criminal or criminal prosecutions are
integrity nad honesty of complainant as a judge and on his cases in so far as such inapplicable to civil contempt
ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is procedure is consistent proceedings
an imputation that he is biased and he pre-judges the cases with the summary nature of
filed before him, and that the article is sub judice because it is contempt proceedings -
still pending automatic review. strict rules that govern
HELD: criminal prosecutions apply
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has to a prosecution for
dual aspect: (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party criminal contempt
for his disrespect to the court and (2) his compulsory
performance of some act or duty required of him by the State is the real prosecutor Instituted by an aggrieved
court and which he refuses to perform. party, or his successor, or
someone who has a pecuniary
CRIMINAL CIVIL interest in the right protected

Conduct that is directed Consists in failing to do Defendant is presumed No presumption - burden of

against the dignity and
authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially. An
act obstructing the
administration of justice
which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or
disrespect
Being directed against the
dignity and authority of the
court, is an offense
against organized
society and is also held to
be an offense against
public justice - the court
proceedings to punish it
are punitive
INTENT - it must be clear
that he intended to commit
it
To preserve the court‘s
authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders
In the nature of criminal or
quasi-criminal actions
Not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though
the contemptuous act
involved is also a crime
Sui generis - partaking of
some of the element of
something ordered to be done
by a court in a civil action for
the benefit of the opposing
party and is an offense against
the party in whose behalf the
violated order is made
Proceedings to punish are
remedial and for the purpose
of the preservation of the
right of private persons -
neither a felony nor a
misdemeanor but a power of
INTENT is immaterial - good
faith or the absence of intent to
violate court‘s order is not a
defense
To provide a remedy for an
injured suitor and to coerce
compliance with an order
Remedial or civil in nature -
proceedings for the
enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for
coercing a person to do the
thing require
A proceeding for contempt to
enforce a remedy in a civil
innocent and the burden is proof is on complainant; not
on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt but
the charges beyond must be more than a mere
reasonable doubt preponderance of evidence
Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, 31
August 2011
 The Distribution Management Association of the
Philippines (DMAP) filed with the CA a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the
constitutionality of EO 213 (Deregulating Domestic
Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel Ramos),
MARINA Circular advising DMAP that a computation of
the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no
longer required for freight rates officially considered or
declared deregulated. DMAP was assailing the
deregulation of shipping rates because the shipping
companies are planning to increase freight rates by 20%
 CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and
the Letter-Resolution; MR also denied. SC denied
DMAP‘s petition for review on certiorari for failure to take
the appeal within the reglementary period of 15 days and
pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission
SC also denied MR
 DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) and
publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update which
informed its members:
o That the SC denied DMAP‘s MR based on
―small technical matters‖ and not on the legal
issue DMAP presented; and
o that the SC issued its ruling in one month only,
while normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.
 Petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt,
insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update
constituted indirect contempt of court for insinuating that
the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse,
that the publication unfairly debased the SC by making
scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo
to the effect that the SC had allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents
to conclude that the SC ruling issued in one month only,
normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.
o They averred that the respondents purpose,
taken in the context of the entire publication,
was to defy the decision, for it was based on
technicalities, and the SC was influenced
HELD: the statements in the Sea Transport Update did
NOT amount to indirect contempt
 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial
system.
o courts have the power by virtue of their very
creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves
and their officers from the approach and insults
of pollution
o power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice.
o The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the
courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation
 TWO KINDS OF CONTEMPT:
o DIRECT CONTEMPT, which is committed in
the presence of or so near the judge as to
obstruct him in the administration of justice (in-
court contempts)
 punishment is generally summary and
immediate, and no process or
evidence is necessary because the act
is committed in facie curiae.
 need not be committed in the
immediate presence of the court, if it
tends to obstruct justice or to interfere
with the actions of the court in the
courtroom itself
 it is advisable to proceed by requiring
the person charged to appear and
show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without
personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only
by a confession of the contemnor or by
testimony under oath of other persons.
o constructive or INDIRECT CONTEMPT, which
consists of willful disobedience of the lawful
process or order of the court (out-of-court
contempts)
 proceedings for the punishment of the
contumacious act committed outside
the personal knowledge of the judge
generally need the observance of all
the elements of due process of law,
that is, notice, written charges, and an
opportunity to deny and to defend such
charges before guilt is adjudged and
sentence imposed
 in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered. Where the act
complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on
its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party
is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or
absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances,
held to be determinative of its character
o A person should not be condemned for
contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes
proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his
rights
o To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose
 every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize
the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority (In re Almacen)
 The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety
 ITC: the statements in the Sea Transport Update are not
critical of the Court. The unmistakable intent behind the
phrases was to inform DMAPs members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next
viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues
o the Sea Transport Update was not
disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety
 the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and
only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail
o As judges we ought to exercise our power to
punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for
retaliation or vindictiveness
D. Quo Warranto
1. Public action
sections 1-3, Rule 66
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An
action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act. (1a)
 The action may also be instituted by an individual in his
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must own name who claims to be entitled to the public office
commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, another.
or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the preceding section can
 However, where the action is filed by a private
person, he must prove that he is entitled to the
be established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)
controverted position, otherwise respondent has
Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may
a right to the undisturbed possession of the
commence action with permission of court. — The Solicitor
office. If the court finds for the respondent, the
General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of
judgment should simply state that the
the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such
respondent is entitled to the office.
an action at the request and upon the relation of another
person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first  In this case, respondent Allas usurped the
require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action position of "Director III‖. But decision still
in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by cannot be executed.
the person at whose request and upon whose relation the
same is brought. (4a) Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a
public right binds his successor in office.
 This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto
2. Private action cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind
section 5, Rule 66 the respondent's successor in office, even though
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an such successor may trace his title to the same
action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or source. This follows from the nature of the writ of
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer
may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6) as such, but always against the person-- to
determine whether he is constitutionally and legally
authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any
Mendoza v. Allas, G.R. No. 131977, 4 February 1999 function of the office to which he lays claim.
 Petitioner was appointed as Bureau of Customs "Director
III‖ of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service  In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was
(CIIS). Then, petitioner was temporarily designated as filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas.
Acting District Collector. In his place, respondent Ray What was threshed out before the trial court was the
Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III". Despite qualification and right of petitioner to the contested
petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, position as against respondent Ray Allas, not
however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did
of the position of Director III. not err in denying execution of the trial court's
 Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the Deputy decision.
Customs Commissioner informing him of his termination,
in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III
by President Ramos.
 Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding
his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss
of seniority rights. No reply was made.
 Thus, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against
respondent Allas.
HELD: While the quo warranto petition was rightfully granted,
it can no longer be executed.
Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some
individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise
some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which,
according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they
cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority
from the state.
 In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a
proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-
founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege.

The action may be commenced for the Government by the

Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a
public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a
ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an
association which acts as a corporation without being legally
incorporated.