bUl~I=IUtN llAL

-€0HF I DEN'f I:A:Is 8500

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis of

Greece (7>
PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DECLASSIFIED Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
PER E.O. 13526 Jane E. Holl, Director for European Affairs,
~o1-t.?6'"Jg- Mil. NSC
~ II }tt(f I~ · Katherine X. ·stewart, Interpreter

Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister

Andreas Andrianopoulos, Minister of State
Dora Bakoyanni, Deputy Minister to the Prime
Minister
Christos Zacharakis, Ambassador of Greece
Loucas Tsilas, Diplomatic Adviser to the
Prime Minister
Anna Kirtsou, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 17, 1992, 2:00-2:45pm

AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I want to welcome my old friend Constantine

Mitsotakis to the White House and say how much I admire and
respect him. I have so enjoyed our dealings together. I am
sorry that we were not able to progress further on Cyprus. I
know how hard you have tried. We all got our hopes up. But be
assured, nobody will give up. (¢
I had a chance to disCuss some of the details of your lunchtime
conversation with Secretary Eagleburger and General
Scowcroft. But I am glad to have the chance to tell you Mr.
Prime Minister how much I value our friendship -- even though
issues have not always gone your way, but we have always had
frank talks. (r/)

We'll be here another two months. It's a long interregnum, and

while this may be the last time we meet officially, I hope that
in a private capacity, you will come back for a visit. The door
is open at the Bush estate. (~

€0HFih'l;bWTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAl
 slJUi~l IUEI~ I L~L
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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: First off, I want to thank you Mr.

President, for all you did for Greece and Greek-American
relations. I also really appreciate our personal contact and
friendship. You managed to bring relations between our two
countries to a level we wanted -- this is very important.
Definitely the atmosphere is much improved since you took office.
~
I would also like to add our appreciation for your efforts to
resolve the Cyprus dispute. In politics, not everything is
feasible. No doubt that useful steps were taken on this issue.
I reviewed this with Secretary Eagleburger. We agreed that our
objectives to settle Cyprus is a determined and constant one.
Despite present failures -- due to Denktash and the Turkish side
-- all hope has not vanished. On the contrary. Even this phase
contributed something positive. We'll continue this effort into
next March as you 1 Mr. President, have traced out. As I told
Secretary Eagleburger, we need a strong, fair solution. We
should not allow domestic events in Cyprus or in Greek-Turkish
relations to affect that. (~

The President: No, I know that the meeting in New York did not
go well, but all is not lost. Is there anything else you would
like to see us do? (~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Continue to give your support to a

positive message through the coming UN resolution -- it's
working. I think Secretary Eagleburger and President Vassiliou
have talked and more or less agree on its elements. You know
Cyprus goes for its elections in a few weeks, in January. (~

The President: How will that go? Is Vassiliou popular? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Vassiliou has good chances. However,

much depends on the UN resolution. Not just for Vassiliou, but
also for the Cypriot population as well. (~

The President: Who's the main opponent? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Clerides. He is a serious and

responsible man. I hope developments in Cyprus will be positive.
<¢
The President: Well let me assure you that we will continue to
stay involved. (~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We can get a good resolution. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: You know how important Turkey is to

us. But Cyprus must be settled. vt>
The President: We have told that to the Turks over and over
again. But I think it's hard for them to stand up to Denktash.
<1>

€0NFI];)EN'f'IA"b
CONFI OENT1Al
 bUI'~Fl UtJx l if-H:
emWIDE~B?IAb 3

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We believe even he realizes a

settlement must come, but he's not ready to pay the political
price. But we cannot allow internal developments in Turkey to
affect the possibility for settlement. Demirel appears pretty
stable. (f{>
The President: We have had good relations with Turkey. They
have been pleasant to work with in many ways. We'll continue to
try on Cyprus. I don't see any radical shift on U.S. policy
after the transition. (1)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I also talked about Yugoslavia with

Secretary Eagleburger and General Scowcroft at Lunch. (~

The President: I want to hear your views. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: As I told Secretary Eagleburger, the

situation is critical. My country, and me personally, are ready
to help find a solution to this difficult situation. We want to
place our traditionally good relations with Serbia in the service
of the common effort. We're ready to take up any action you
would like -- influence the Serbs to open roads, etc. (t)

The President: We encourage you to use your influence. We have

tried. We're very worried about the situation. It is really
terrible, especially for the children. Many people are
encouraging me to use all kinds of military force. But I'll be
.damned if I'll send one American kid into a situation that is
unclear and where we can't win. The humanitarian situation is
our greatest concern. These are historic rivalries. Greece
can't solve them; the U.S. can't solve them. ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The war in Bosnia won't end soon.

(/>
The President: Everybody hates each other so much. It's bad
enough in American politics. (ji!)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: In Kosovo, a very important effort
should be displayed to prevent spillover. (jt)

The President: It's like a boiling pot. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The most important thing in the whole

affair is to have frontiers respected. External and internal
frontiers. The solution in Kosovo could be an advanced state of
autonomy without going as far as self-determination. We think
the Albanians are beginning to understand this. A way should be
found to the Serbs and Albanians to reach an understanding. ~

The President: You are absolutely right. You may be in a better

place to help this happen. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: An issue most close to our Greek

hearts is the one of Skopje/Macedonia. We will be discussing
this in Edinburgh. (91
€01t~· IV:!!: NT IA"Et

'w-e C:l I J JJ ,._

 -bUJ~rfUtl~ IIAl:
CONFIDJ!i~lTIAL 4

The President: Are you optimistic? We have a lot of hope. {U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I'll make no forecasts. What I tried

to explain to Secretary Eagleburger and General Scowcroft is that
our approach is a positive one. We want this republic to exist
and we have taken several initiatives in this sense. For one,·
there is the border guarantees. Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia
all made this declaration. What we cannot accept is their
official name to include the term Macedonia. {~

I'll be very frank. If something like that were to happen, there

will be real destabilization. But this issue can be settled now
as a starting point for a positive approach. So far with
Yugoslavia we have had a lot of failures, why not success for
once? The inclusion of Macedonia in their official name is
desired by less that 50% of the people. A recent poll there
resulted in no more than 17% of the population wanting that name.
(¢)
The President: Then why does the administration of Macedonia get
so hung up on the name? (jl')
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: There is something behind it, from
the period under communism. It is not easy for the present
administration to release from old habits. Democracy in this
area will be an exaggeration. The old line communists under Tito
still hold power. But Gligorov is a serious man. A deal could
be reached with him. This is why the solution like we have
suggested is a good formula. {~

The President: I'll make a statement, and I would like you to

tell me what's wrong with it. But first, I do want to say that I
value our relations. Every American knows that our relations are
far, far better. ¢)
But my statement is this: This Republic has gone about the
achieving of its democracy and status in accord with Helsinki
principles. It has proceeded and conducted itself in an almost
exemplary way. So I'm saying two things: They've observed
Helsinki Accords and their performance has been exemplary. Do
you agree with those points, or do Greeks see things differently?
<¢>
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would not agree that they are an
exemplary democracy. But it is a republic we could tolerate.
<1>
The President: No, I'm not saying an exemplary democracy, but
rather that they have pursued it in an exemplary way. {~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree. Yes. This is precisely why

we have no problems with this republic and we want it to exist.
But we can't accept the name. After Lisbon -- which justified us
-- the reaction of Gligorov has been to provoke Greece. This
republic was set up by Tito and Stalin after WWII in order to

GQUf IDJ!i~tT IAL

CONFIDENT/At
QOHF H3EN'f IAL tUN~IOENTfAl
United States; my generation remembers it. But the people in
power in Skopje are the same -- when they use this name, we
become very suspicious. We want them to stop using this term and
implying they have claims on us. Even in their constitution they
have provision for nationals abroad, including in Greece. This
is why we make the single request that they chose another name.
We cannot accept this -- any Greek government could not.
Otherwise we would be destabilized. ~

The President: I wanted to be sure, there's nothing else that

would cause you problems. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Another problem I ask for U.S. to

help to prevent the admission of this country in the UN because
if they are admitted, this discussion is valueless. (~)

The President: But if you have no problem with the name, it can
go ahead. (~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I ask if you can help postpone. (~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We'll see what we can do. (~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is very important. It would be a

tragedy. I can't afford it. I don't exaggerate, I try to
compromise. But if this happens this would be a tragedy for
Greece and for me. <¢'>
The President: Is there any division of opinion on this at home
in Greece? <?>
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No. It is the only issue where
Papandreou and my ex-Foreign Minister Samaras and I agree.
~)

The President: We want to try to be helpful, maybe we can help

delay. <.;>
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: It won't be coming up before
Edinburgh. If a solution is found, there will be no problem.
<;/>
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is very important for us to delay
during interim period. <f>
The President: When is the next big Greek political event? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I don't know. Normally, May 1994.

But our economy is not doing well. ¢>
The President: Not you, not us -- we all ought to be Chinese
their economy is growing at 9% and here we are struggling.
Germany, everybody is having trouble. Part of my demise was
everybody thought we were worse off than everybody else. ~

CONFIDENTIAL
 J i f. ·.I

CONFIQI!;l'ITIAL

Germany, everybody is having trouble. Part of my demise was

everybody thought we were worse off than everybody else. (~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We are going through a graceless

period, we have to take very tough measures for our economy. (~

The President: Well, let us see where we can help. (~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I really count on you Mr. President.

<¢>
The President: Tell me, how long is the antiquities exhibit?
(U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Until March. (U)

The President: I hope to get to see it. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Let me tell you again, to please come

to Greece. (U)
-- End of Conversation --

--€0l?rF I BEH'f Il\:L

tONilOENTIAl
 CONFIDE~lTil\L
EONFIDENTIAl 4539

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
-a001- o7Ll'I-Hf<
~ 6/tB/IJ.,
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime

Minister of Greece (I)

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Prime Minister Contantine Mitsotakis
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME June 10, 1992, 8:39 - 8:45am EST

AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: How are you my friend? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you, I am fine. I am calling

you once again on Macedonia. First I want to thank you for all
you have done already in delaying the recognition of Skopje and
intervening on our behalf with the Moscow. (()

I believe that a fair solution is now at hand and I need your

help to see that it succeeds. The Portuguese have begun a new
initiative and I want you to know that we look on it favorably.
We want the Portuguese to discuss this proposal with Skopje. It
offers a chance to settle the problem and accommodate the desires
of both sides. (jl)

Skopje can call itself whatever they want but the rest of the
world would recognize it by some other name. But this initiative
will not succeed unless you exert your personal influence in
Skopje and let the Europeans know before they arrive in
Luxembourg on Monday., . (j!) .

I am sending my Deputy Foreign Minister to Luxembourg with

specific instructions on all points plus an offer to provide $50
million in help to Skopje. (t)

Whatever happens next then will depend on the leadership in

Skopje. But I need your support. You are the only one who can
have an influence to solve this problem. You know I have tried
to be constructive. And now I believe a fair solution is at
hand. I am prepared to put the faith of my Government in this
solution but I need your full support. (1>
The President: Well first let me tell you one, that I appreciate
what you have been trying to do to solve this thing, and two,
that I'm leaving for Rio tomorrow and I'll have an opportunity to

-E!mlF IDJ!J"H'f' IAI:J

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I"\ A Uri nr~ITII\ I
 CONFIDENTIAL
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discuss this with the other Europeans. Have you raised this
proposal with Gligorov? (t)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No. We have no direct contacts with

Skopje, but the Portuguese are in contact with Gligorov and with
us. (¢)

The President: What has been Gligorov's reaction? (t)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I don't know. But if you ask him to

accept this formula, he will accept it. This is the only
solution now. U/>
The President: I respect what you are trying to do. I will talk
to my experts. It seems to me that it does offer a good chance
to solve this thing. I will take it up with the Europeans, but I
want to be sure to talk to my experts, those working on it before
I go to Gligorov. Let me get back to you on this. But I will
talk to the Europeans leaders in Rio. · (jl)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you. But please talk to

Gligorov. It is a proposal from Europeans friends. It is not a
Greek one. You must talk to Gligorov. (~)

The· President: I think it is a very reasonable proposal, but I

must talk to Secretary Baker and others. You are our friend and
we want this resolved. But before I tell you that I'll call
Gligorov, I must talk to our experts here. (j!)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is a good proposal, it is the
breakthrough we've all been waiting for. (I)

The President: It sounds encouraging. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If we succeed, a vote will be taken

in Monday in Luxembourg. (I)

The President: We will get started on it. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you again for all you have
done, my friend. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Give my regards to your wife. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of conversation --

cmJFIDmi'fih!T-
PANPIRf=MTIAI
 Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
.(George Bush Library)
DocumentNo. Subject/Title of Document Date
and Type

Memcon Re: Meeting with George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus 3/30/92 (b)(l) C
[FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)

Bush Presidential Records Document Partially Declassified

Scowcroft, Brent, Files (Copy of Document FolloWS)
Presidential Correspondence By ~ (NlGB) on .!i.ld£.,

Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

2009-0275-8 Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:
P-21P-5 Review Case #: Disposition Date:
ARCase#: MRCase#: 09-0651-MR(506)
MR Disposition: Released in part
MR
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.c. 2204(a)] Freedom ofInformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA)
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions containedJn donor's deed of
gift.
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(!) of the FOIAJ
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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€-OWFI13"E;:M'TIltL 2326

THE WHITE HOUSE

WAS H I NGTO N

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Vassiliou, President of Cyprus

The President.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Ambassador to Cyprus
Nelson Ledsky, Special Cyprus Coordinator
Jane E. Holl, Director European and Eurasian
f. NSC (Notetaker)

George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus

George Iaccovou, Minister
Michael Sherifis, Ambassador to the United.
States
Akis Fantis, Government Spokesman

DATE, TIME March 30, 1992, 4:00 p.m.

AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Welcome. I'm very glad to see you, sir. C~n we
talk about Macedonia ? What·is your view? I've been
talking with my good friend Constantine Mitsotakis, he asked us
for some time to work out the problem they are having with
Macedonia and we went along, but what is your view about what we
should be doing? How. do you see being resolved? (~

President Vassiliou: I went to Gieece to. help ~itsotakis solve

this problem. Sometimes it is good for someone from the outside
to come in and offer help. I wanted to help Mitsotakis address
the issue. All of the political parties see this as an
that needs to be solved. First, I would say that it is
important to make sure that there are no on the ory
of Greece, and second that. the propaganda about minorit 'must
cease. The entity that would be established should be guaranteed
because if Skopje c611apses that would be worse. It better to
have a small but neutral state that you can help develop and
grow. ¢)

That is the substance. As far as the psychological aspects go,

the name has too many connotations -- some compromise must be
worked out. Therefore an independent ic should be set up
and helped to develop and not be threatened with being taken
over. It cannot be developed as a source of tension in the
region, but as· a means of stability. ~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
-CONFIBEN'fIl'rI:i PER E.O. 13526
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~ Il, I,,,, liD
CONFI8EHTI}S;:L 2

The President: So the real problem is with the name. <./t)

President Vassiliou: Yes. Either it should be changed
completely, or if that is not possible then to find some kind of
compromise. (~).

The President: I know that Mitsotakis made it clear that a name

change was important. But do you think a compromise is possible?
(~

President Vassiliou: If enough persuasion is brought to bear,

they will compromise. ~)

The President: We do want to help but I don't know what leverage

or influence we can have. We've been under a lot of pressure
from ethnic Americans here -- Croatian Americans -- all kinds
really that say tha~ these people want their independence, and
you're not moving forward U.S. -- when is the U.S. going to
recognize their independence. I know it's not easy, but it's not
easy for us either. Tell that to Mitsotakis. He's a good man.
(~

President Vassiliou: I can tell you that he appreciates greatly

that you have given him some time. It is vital to make sure that
the independence of Skopje/Macedonia is secure and guaranteed by
everybody. There can be no irredentist. efforts. (~

The President: How about Cyprus? Where do we go from here? (U)

President Vassiliou: First, let me say how grateful I am for all

you have done. And I am gr·ateful for you seeing me today. (U)

The President: Let me just say that we have great respect for
you as a person and your background -- what you have been through
-- and for what you have done while you are in office. Second, I
would like to say that on our trip, when we sat with the Turks
and with the Greeks, I thought we'd really have something. Then
the Turkish political situation got us all caught up. I think
events have been not as we would have liked. I had thought we
would have had a settlement by now. (~

They want
to turn this into a bicommunal discussion. The UNSYG wants to
break the deadlock -- the Turks cannot wash their hands of Cyprus
-- but the UN Security Council and the SYG want to see real
progress made. They are not prepared to alwa s acce t this one
st forward and th n another back.

The Permanent Five met with me and they will see Mr. Oenktash
today. If they could set up a committee -- to be visibly
supportive of the SYG -~ then we will have a cause to make
progress. The U.S. should be behind this and I ask for your

r n \ ' r \r: I~ '. : -r; "l

(.,; I.. !. : ~ : t_, ,;...,.. l ~ 1 i : L.
QOHFIDIJN'fLih 3

ssues must
All of the chances for a so ut on are there -- th~y should
persuaded to negotiate. I will dedicate all of my efforts in the
next months. The international climate is such that it needs a
settlement. (j1!)

The President: I think it would be better without a lot of

public preSsure and posturing on Turkey. When Demirel was here
we had a good discussion. He's willing to give it a shot. But I
don't know him very well. What is your impression of him? Have
you met him? (/l!)

He indicated to me that he wanted to stay

We can remind him again after this visit.· Didn't
Demirel talk to Mitsotakis at Davos? (It)
President Vassiliou: Yes, but nothing substantive. You know it
is an illusion that Turkey could improve its relations with
Gr~ec~ without solving the Cyprus problem. But if there were a
1""

The President: You support the UNSYG efforts, do you want

another resolution or just ~hat the Security Council support the
SYG more? (~

President Vassiliou: I think it is very important that we have a

new resolution. ut)
The President: But we can't just beat up on Turkey -- that would
force Demirel to b~ck off. I think it would be counter-
product i ve. c,K.)
President Vassiliou: If you say nothing and not let it be known
who is responsible for the current lack of progress -- we must
say that we are disappointed with the lack of progress and that
this problem has to be addressed. ~

When I saw Prime Minister Demirel two weeks

ago, renewed his commitment to you. I don't think there is
any question that he wants a settlement. But he is concerned.
He says he cannot be seen to be pressured or seen to be
pressuring Mr. Denktash. I share President Vassiliou's view.that
the SYG should be active and that the Security Council support
his pos ion to get mor~ progress. ~

CON~ I 15J!:IH IaL

 4

President Vassiliou: If t
left out of the process --
there is no hope of a Cyprus

The President: I can be in touch with Demirel -- write to him

and say that I assured President Vassiliou of your commitment to
me and of your willingness and commitment, and that we think
progress can still be made. What do you think? (~

General Scowcroft: We can certainly do that. (U)

President Vassiliou: They have to be kept on the line - the

only way to be really kept moving -- if they don't cooperate l the
whole world will know it. (jij
The President: What is President Ozal's role? Can he be helpful
here? Because I have a very good relationship with him. (¢)

President Vassiliou: Yes. He has some role because the

opposition is in favor of a solution. But he does not have
executive powers. And Demirel doesn't like him. ~

The President: I like both of them. I wasn't sure, is Ozal

totally out of this question? He's coming here in a few weeks.
(!)

The only time there

progress was a er t. Then they cooperated.
shortly after that changed. (/it)

The President: Well, we will follow-up with Demirel. I donlt

think he'll try to wiggle out. But I don't know about his
foreign office. DO we have good contacts there? ~

Ambassador Ledsky: The Foreign Minister is good, and their

number two is very good. He's a friend. (¢),

General Scowcroft: I think a letter from you Mr. President will

help. <f1'
The President: We'll get that out right away. ~)

President Vassiliou: One more thing, Mr. Presid

on of the world is not the most stable.

The President: Well we appreciate it. It's a very generous

gesture. I just hope we don't have to take you up on it. ~
 COHFIDEH'FL"zL 5

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION

C9NiIDENTI?I ~
.e;gCRET 6016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WAS H I NGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with President Ozal of

Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Morton Abramowitz, Ambassador
James F. Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
Marc Grossman, Deputy Chief of Mission,
U.S. Embassy, Turkey
Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet and
and European Affairs
David Ransom, Director, Office of Southern
European Affairs, Department of State
(Notetaker)

Turgut Ozal, President

Mesut Yilmaz, Prime Minister
Safa Giray, Foreign Minister
Ozdem Sanberk, MFA Under Secretary
Nuzdet Kandemir, Ambassador to the U.S.
Barlas Dogu, Defense Minister
Engin Guner
Mithat Balkan, Presidential Advisor

DATE, TIME July 22, 1991; 8:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.

AND PLACE: Ciragan Palace, Istanbul, Turkey

The President: Let me begin by underscoring our view that

Turkish ties to Europe are not competitive with U.S. ties. In
fact we want to see Turkey in the EC. Second, we don't want to
see U.S. troops go back into combat in Iraq. We have no big
target list, as claimed by some UK papers. But we can't sit bac~
if Iraq goes against UN resolutions and tries to reconstruct its
nuclear capability. We have weapons with pinpoint accuracy, so -
hope Iraq stops its lying and cheating on nuclear issues. (~)

President Ozal: What was that big gun Iraq had? (~)

The President: A gun with a very long barrel to project shells

great distances. (?')

H:C\:ET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR PER E.O~ 12958,
AS AMENDED
CM SI~I@Qea
'llr:JCJ. ~~ F
SECRE~ 2
President Ozal: We got a piece being shipped through Turkey and
sent it back. Iraqis were angry. (~)

The President: Saddam Hussein says one thing, does another.

Hard to believe him. Hope his army acts against him. Then: I
want to give Iraq a chance. I'm not against Iraqi people. Even
if it's some army man who takes over, if he lives up to the UN
resolutions, I want him to know that Iraq has a future and won't
have to live as a pariah. (I)

President Ozal: Baker is with Israelis today. Any report? ~)

The President: Yes, we're getting mixed Israeli responses. It's

not totally negative. The Israelis are beginning to see reason
to give the Baker initiatives a chance. ($)

General Scowcroft: King Hussein has agreed to lift the boycott

in exchange for a settlement end. (~

The President: Hussein fortunately has company for this

position. Previously, he agreed with me to come to a peace
conference -- but after a visit to Syria he came back with
conditions. Now he's working on a joint delelgation. (~

General Scowcroft: That's not a firm commitment. ~)

The President: Let me say that in my talks with Gorbachev there

seems to be nothing which will be negative for Turkey. Arms
control will help lift the cloud of fear. And Gorbachev
understands now that the huge deals he wants in oil and
agriculture there has to be, first, a union treaty with the
republics. (7)

General Scowcroft: That might be in August, although the Ukraine

says that is too early. The Ukraine is working on tax and other
matters. They've voted to belong. ~)

The President: Gorbachev told me he was confident the Ukraine

would come along. I want to go to Kiev. Gorbachev does not want
me to go. If they persist, I won't go. (~

President Ozal: What about the Balkans? (U)

The President: I should ask you. We joined the world in calling

for the unity of Yugoslavia but shifted our position later to say
we could accept changes but wanted to see the peace kept. (U)

General Scowcroft: All parties seem to agree with Slovenian

independence. Now they are trying to negotiate a stand-down of
all militias and the withdrawal of the Army from Croatia.
It's very hard to separate the populations there. (~)

President Ozal: The only solution is a loose federation, but

Yugoslavia is going to lose a lot of income if Slovenia is out.
(r)
SEGRE~ 3

The President: Do you have much trade with Yugoslavia? (U)

President Ozal: Not so much but there are many Muslims there who
look to Turkey -- six or seven million, mostly Bosnians.
Then there are some Turks. I'm thinking of a Balkan tour. I'll
go to Romania too. (~

The President: Romania has been lagging but is corning on now.

We don't want to drag our feet. What about Albania? Baker had an
amazing reception there. It shows where the hearts of people are
in communist countries. (~)

President Ozal: And it will be the same in Iraq if there is an

election. Everyone wants to get rid of communist parties. (~

The President: Yeltsin was well-behaved in the States this time:

not demanding and defensive. The last time he held out in the
White House basement, insisting that General Scowcroft agree to
see an aide as well as him. Yeltsin backed down, but this time,
with a big vote under his belt, he seemed confident.
He seems reasonable now. For instance, I've told Gorbachev that
it's hard for us to consider aid to the Soviet Union when the
Soviets are still supplying Cuba with large amounts of aid. We
have a hemisphere of democracies now, less one, and that's no
small matter. Yeltsin is against aid to Cuba, and to
Afghanistan, and he wants to see the Baltics go. Gorbachev keeps
saying he has to find constitutional ways of doing that. So
Yeltsin gets our strong support. I don't know what will happen
with him in Moscow. When Baker invited him to our Embassy in
Moscow, he refused to corne. We'll treat him like any other
elected official. What about Armenians, in this regard? ~)

President Ozal: They want independence -- but they have old

enemies in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Their only way out is through
Turkey. We are giving it to them. ($)

General Scowcroft: Wouldn't they be safer staying in the Soviet

Union? (~)

President Ozal: Maybe, but they want out. They are an old
nation. (7)

Prime Minister Yilmaz: The solution for both Yugoslavia and the
USSR is the same: loose federation. (~

General Scowcroft: You're negotiating with the southern

republics. (~)

Prime Minister Yilmaz: We have agreements with five republics.

Nothing political, but with specific economic, cultural and trade
matters. (~)

President Ozal: The Yugoslavian outcome will reflect history.

In the fight between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the
Ottomans, the former got Slovenia and Croatia. Then the Russians
entered, siding with the Serbs, and made it a three power area.

SEGRe~
SECRE'f 4

In the end, the Ottomans lost everything. Slovenia and Croatia

may separate, but the others are more inclined to this side,
because there are more Muslims. (%)

General Scowcroft: What about Macedonia? (U)

President Ozal: The language is like Bulgarian, not Greek.

Macedonia is new, created after WW II. The Greeks say there is
no Macedonian nation. I think, in the end, Albania will benefit.
There are three million Muslims in Yugoslavia. This will be a
problem for the Greeks. (~)

The President: What is your political time-table? (U)

President Ozal: We must have elections by next November but

Parliament could decide by majority vote to do so earlier. It
will probably be sooner. Who will win in Britain? (m
The President: Tories aren't doing so well -- economic problems,
the Thatcher- Heath arguments from the left and the right of the
party. But Major does better personally than Kinnock in the
polls, so he thinks that will help his lagging party in the
elections. It's hard to say, but I'd bet on the Conservatives.
~
President Ozal: They've been too long in power. What about
France? (U)
General Scowcroft: There's a lot of candidates: Chirac,
Barre, Giscard. Rocard is a good man. (jn
President Ozal: We agree. (U)

The Bush: Mulroney is down in the polls but doing better.

Separatism is a problem there too, and he is criticised for
Meech Lake, and he is also criticised for his strong support of
the U.S. Elections could be tough. (~

President Ozal: Which is worse in an election: recession or

inflation? (U)

The President: Jobs 'are most important, by a wide margin, unless

inflation is very high. We have some differences with the
Central Bank on this. In the U.S. the question is whether we
have a robust recovery or slip back to a recession. People are
hurting in the U.S. although the recession isn't deep.
Fortunately, there is not much pressure for new spending
programs. People don't want them. The people are ahead of the
Congress on this. (fl)

Mr. Sununu: The Congress is confused politically on this.

The President: You have to understand that, in America, we

control nothing. Look at MFN for China. I think it's good for
us, for the G-7 and for Hong Kong, but some of my strongest
supporters in Congress, who campaigned hard for me, are leading
SECRE-'¥ 5

the fight against MFN due to human rights. We have to deal with
their motion, and defeat it with veto tactics -- one third plus
one, including Republicans. It's very hard to govern this way.
Because we must always deal with legislation from Congress, the
Times and the Post say we have no domestic program. It's not
true. Now, to add to all this, we have election year posturing
- the four year dance. Senator Bradley attacked me. I don't
think this will spillover on US-Turkish relations, but who
knows. At least there is no Armenian relation. ($)

Mr. Sununu: There could be spill-over in the textile area.

The President: That's true. We almost lost a big vote last

year. Another vote could come during the Mexico or Uruguay
rounds -- which might help -- and although it's going to be an
election year, we're so committed to openness that most
Republicans won't leave us. I'm not worried about running
against quotas. I did so in the prmaries in 1980, even in the
south, which is important to us. The problem is that the quota
crowd is well funded, and retailers, who might reflect the
public's desire for lower prices, are not much of a counter-
weight. (1)

President Ozal: Our problem is different, George. We have

become a consumer society. Even ten years ago there was still
only one black and white TV channel; now there are six, in color,
and with satellites you can get 30. All of our channels have
ads, so even remote villages have refrigerators and now everyone
wants cars~ The consumer drive is fueled by salaries. Ten years
ago 1.3 million Turks had government jobs, and it cost us $300
million dollars. Today 1.4 million have such jobs, but it costs
us $11 billion. To keep up, we need growth. I've been telling
the Prime Minister to worry about this more than inflation. We
did well last year -- 10.2% real growth, despite the Gulf crisis
-- but growth in the last quarter, when the Gulf business
slowdown caught up with us, was actually negative. So I'm
telling the Prime Minister to get the economy going. ~)

The President: Turgut, we're running out of time, so let me turn

to another subject. We had a small flap here when Mitsotakis had
his Ambassador in Ankara call Ambassador Abramowitz to say that
my press conference statement made it appear that he had accepted
a quadripartite conference. Now, I'm sometimes unclear, though
it is better than Dana Carver makes out on Saturday Night Live.
So we got back to Mitsotakis to say he was wrong in this
interpretation, and yesterday I told the press that there was no
agreement on the part of all the parties. But now I find out
that, after working on Mitsotakis, he is ready to come to a
meeting. So maybe we can issue a statement at the end of my
visit. This statement seems to be what Turkey wants~ (The
President hands the statement to President Ozal.) (~)

General Scowcroft: Mitsotakis based his decision on what you

said: "I am prepared to be flexible." (1)

GEORE'£'
BECRE':F

President Ozal: Yilmaz will go to this meeting, not me. I'll

work on it, of course. (~)

Prime Minister Yilmaz: We can't agree with the statement in this

form. There's nothing here about a quadripartite meeting, and
the Greek Cypriots just yesterday said they would turn down such
a meeting. This statement should mention that four parties are
corning -- and not others, though we accept the UNSYG in the
chair. (rt)

The President: The statement talks about the SYG,. and his
approach is for four parties. Let's not lose this opportunity.
We have turned the Greeks around. We can't be helpful if we lose
thi s chance. (~

Prime Minister Yilmaz: I'm afraid some other countries might

want to corne to the meeting. I don't like the phrase
international. (rt)

The President: But we've got to get something. Otherwise, to

heck with it. But we've got to try. (U)

Prime Minister Yilmaz: Look, we are sincere in our desire to

solve this problem. We want to work with you. We will be
forthcoming and flexible. But, the Greeks must give up the hope
that the USG will put pressure on Turkey. (~)

The President: I put pressure on Greece, and now I don't want to

see matters set back. (~)

Mr. Gompert: The Greeks went to Vassiliou to get agreement on

this statement. (~

Prime Minister Yilmaz: All we want is for the Turkish Cypriot

side to be treated as equals. The key word is quadripartite.
(~)

(Various drafting changes were passed back and forth across the
table. )

The President: We're. running out of time. (U)

President Ozal: This matter is very simple. These two

communities have repeatedly met. I have now proposed to add
Turkey and Greece. This is helpful. Why should the Greeks
reject this? (t)

(Note for the record: the meeting adjourned, and both sides
embarked for the airport, where agreement was reached on a text.)

-- End of Conversation --

'SECRET
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,.

eBGRi3'i' 2395

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: The President

The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for the National Security Affairs
David Gompert, Senior Director, NSC Staf.f
Notetaker

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor

Peter Hartmann, Security Advisor to the
Chancellor
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's
Office
DATE, TIME March 21, 1992, 11:50am - 4:00pm
AND PLACE; Camp David

The President: Helmut, it is a pleasure to have you here. We

could start with our bilater~l relationship if you like, Or we
could talk about G-7 issues. Of course we have to get to the
GATT. (¢)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for this hospitality, George. We
appreciate this quiet talk in these turbulent times. My fingers
are crossed for you. (U)

The President: I think things will be alright. The big problem

is the slow economy. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We have the same phenomenon in Europe. Let's

be frank. Let me describe the situation in Europe for you
politically. Within three weeks there are important elections in
the UK, France and Italy. I think that John Major will get a
majority. (U)
The President: I hope. you are right. (U)

Chan¢ellor Kohli Your concerns about the other man are

justified. But the voters will prefer Major. The Tory party is
not so popular. The question is whether personalities will
emerge as more important than party politics in the final weeks.
On the basis of personality, John Major is certainly more

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

1,-Ito
;;>'008- (),., 0$- /1{<.
Declassify on: OADR
~ tr:'
 2

The Italian elections are on AprilS. They are even more

difficult to predict. The reason is that there is a general
grass-roots movement against the parties. Cossiga has started
this himself from the presidency. I think the federalist element
within Italy is going to be strengthened. I welcome this for
Europe. It's what we have in Germany, of course, and I think
things will be moving in the same direction in other countries.
(/l>
Jacques Delors told me that France also has to move toward
federalism. He said that to me in Paris, of all places. The new
generation won't accept one-person rule. Life is more complex, .
too complex for one person to command everything. So highly
centralized government is going to become more difficult.
Take Italy, where northern and southern Italy are so vastly
~--~----rdiff-erell t . S-o-rITe-re-wij:i.-m;-pres sure s to 1: ry to pue:-t"ni-ngs.----..m""o=r=e---
on a local basis. <I)
The President: What is the view now in Europe about the Alliance
and the EC? . (1)

Chancellor Kohl: I am coming to that. The Italians pin their

hopes on the regions of the EC getting more rights for their
region. This won't change the foundation of Italian politics,
but it will lead to changes within Italy. (j!>
Now, as far as the French elections tomorrow are concerned, these
are only regional elections but the implications are significant.
Because of their proportionate representation, the French
elections give an accurate view of the various segments: So it
is going to be very· interesting. ¢)

ut)
The President: I understand that Le Pen on one extreme and the
.Greens on the other are going to become stronger.

Chancellor Kohl: The most significant result will be the heavy

losses experienced by the Socialists. These are just my
predictions. I think the Socialists will be down to 20%. Chirac
and Giscard together will be around 32-35%. Communists 8-10%.
The Greens 12-14%. Incidentally, Mitterrand never believed me
when I told him to keep his eyes on the Greens". So now we have
at
 3
hard to predict, but my guess is that he will get between 12 and
15%. Its all too easy to say that they are neo-Nazis. They are
really populists. They complain about taxes; they complain about
Algerians, they complain about anything else that people are
upset about. They even complained about the new hunting rights.
Le Pen protested a new law affecting the hunters. They appeal to
this kind of thing, now he has all of the hunters on his side.
Matters like the future of NATO are absolutely irrelevant to
Ie like this. Le Pen is s a

If the election turns out as I suspect, there is going to be a

big hangover on Monday morning. There will be a second round in
another eight days, but it won't change the outcome. This will
bring down the

Now in Germany, on April 5 we have Laender elections. In

Schleswig-Holstein and in Baden-Wuertemmberg. These elections
won't be too easy, but not too difficult either. I'm really
looking ahead to 1994. We are seeing incredible changes taking
place in Germany. We've already privatized 3,000 of 6,000 of the
East German state firms from the communist system. This has been
an enormous undertaking. un
From 1949, when we launched the Marshall Plan, to 1953 before we
landed on our feet, it took a good four years. Then, the only
support we got was the money from you. So in a way, the East
Germans have it easier. We are giving enormous support.
Psychologically, however, it's different. After the war, all of
us Germans were in a bad situation. Today, we have a sharp
contrast between wealth on one side of the street and poverty on
the other. Let me tell you an anecdote. I was in a village in
the East recently. They used to have one telephone for every 200
flats. Now, the Deutsche Bundespost has installed as many
telephones in the former GDR in one year as they had installed in
all prior years. But now those without phones are much more
resentful than they use to be. That is the paradox. ~
 4

I think that in another 3 to 4 years everything will be okay.

Our e90nomy is difficult now, but we are still·growing at 2%.
The growth of the new Laender is at 10%. Inflation will soon be
brought down under 4%. A big problem is unemployment in the new
Laender. But the greatest danger of all that I face is the fight
that I have with the trade unions -- both public and private
sector unions. This is the toughest battle in 10 years. Right
now I am having the most difficulty with the public sector. They
want a 9% .wage increase and I am offering 3.5% which is roughly
the inflation rate. So we may have big strikes in store for us.
But I won't retreat. ~

The President: Is. the SPD against you on this? vn

Chancellor Kohl: Well they say yes and no. But they will
certainly blame me if there are strikes. The situation is
somewhat like what we had before the Pershing missile deployment.
With people out in the streets, the question is who is in charge?
Will it be the will of the streets that prevails, or is it the
government? There is a principle involved. ~

vn .
The President: Tell me about the changing perceptions in Germany
about U.S. troops and NATO.

Chancellor Kohl: Actually the latest opinion polls' look better

than 1990. We now have a clear majority in favor of maintaining
aU. S. presence. When the question is as.ked who is the most
~mportant guarantor o~ German secur~ty, 58% sa~d the u~-.-,-'1'8N%~--------
said France, 8% said Britain. The question is then asked should
the Americans stay? The clear majority says yes. Of course,
there will always be local complaints; but now even at the local
level there is more interest in maintaining the presence.
Foreign troops in Germany have been declining so fast that it has
had a local economic impact. If you can believe it, the mayors
. come and tell me that they want compensation for this. (~

But George, I think it would be foolish for you to leave. I

think it would not be in your interest. To be frank, I can
understand you want to reduce but it would

Now let's turn to the GATT. We have some notes and some ideas we
developed on the airplane that I would like to share with you
(paper attached). The first point I would make is that we can't
negotiate here. The second point is that we in Europe all want
an agreement. As y.ou will see from our paper, there are three
problems, export subsidies, cereal substitutes -- which just
cannot be unlimited -- and income supports. We have to come to
some form of agreement. I have been preaching this message to
Mitterrand lately. This paper reflects where we are in Europe.
I think it reflects the view of people like John Major. Apart
from the official talks, our people need to get to work on this.
Feiter is up on all of this, in fact, he is now in Washington
-- SgG~T 5

talking to one of your people. Let's face it, we can forget

about the developing countries if we cannot get a GATT agreement.
(J!)

The President: We want to get a deal done. It is in everybody's

interest. But I have political problems here too. Let me show
you the charts I have that illustrate the problem. What we have
to do is figure out how to bring this to a conclusion. We have
proposed a "safe box," so that you could new introduce the new
payments. We have been very forthcoming on this. It's a major
American concession. (~)

But we have trouble on corn glutens, on rebalancing. The fact is

that it is the only thing that sustains our exports. So this
\ will be very tough for me politically. ($)

Chancellor Kohl: We are not asking for cuts. You have a problem
with our wheat exports. But we have a problem with these cereal
substitutes. We are only asking for a freeze at the current
level. (~)

Secretary Baker: Let me summarize our probtem. We are trying to

find a way to bridge the differences. But different EC members
seem to have different interests. yn
The Dunkel paper is public. Even that was barely acceptable to
us. It has formed a base line. It is hard for us to walk away
from that now that we have been forthcoming on the "safe box,"
WhlCh we understand is good for Germany. The EC would avoi any
cuts on internal supports altogether for two years. We have also
offered just to put off internal supports.- This is a one-sided
agreement. If we do that, we have no flexibility on export
subsidies. Your paper doesn't even address what we have done~
We made a significant proposal which we understood to be
important to many members. We have also suggested that we defer
any action on internal supports for two years, as long as we
agree to negotiate the reductions by the end of two years. We
can't move away from the Dunkel text on the level of subsidized
export s. (,$')
Chancellor Kohl: I want to make clear that there is a single
European position -- not just on GATT-but on other matters. What
I don't understand on the second point is that we are not asking
for reductions but for a freeze. For us the problem is that we
are going to be reducing our export subsidies and getting nothing
in return. ~

Secretary Baker: David, would you like to explain the problem.

(U)

David Gompert: Mr. Chancellor, the negotiators of the EC

Commission have made it clear to us consistently that the EC's
highest priority is internal supports. We have therefore, as the
President and the Secretary have explained, worked vigorously and
have made significant concessions to address what we have
understood to be the highest priority. As a consequence, we have
laid out a plan that would permit the EC to implement its new
 6

program of income supports under a GATT agreement. But having

made these moves in response to the EC's stated priorities, we
a~e in no position now to offer further concessions. ~

Chancellor Kohl: Let me think out loud. What if we were to find

a system whereby we tied a certain level of wheat exports to your
level of exports to the EC of cereal substitutes. If we were to
have deeper cuts in wheat exports, this would affect the level of
cereal substitutes. This would be a flexible formula, providing
a linkage between the two. The nightmare is that we would reach
an agreement on a reduction in exports only to find ourselves
faced with a flood of noncerealimports. ~

The President: Perhaps we should leave things at this. I have

to be guided by my experts. I am not really ready to talk about
this kind of detail. un
Cha'ncellor Kohl: I understand that completely. I just wanted to
offer some specific ideas to make it clear that I am personally
committed. I could leave Feiter in Washington or I could send
him back. ($)

SecretarY Baker: I would just like to make clear that even if

the President were to determine that we could look at linkage of
the sort that. you suggest, it would have to be based on an export
subsidy level close to the Dunkel paper. We cannot give up on
al.1 three of ' these issues. We can be thinking about all of this.

Chancellor we will have to examine where we go in

the next 3 We need to try to r
f e official talks

The experts the r own veste erests.

You and I are not experts. We have to make the decisions.
Perhaps the most intelligent course would be to have Feiter come
back to Washington. We will get in touch with Brent about this.
(7)

The next issue we need to talk about and need to cooperate on

closely is the environment. This is a big political issue in all
of our countries. I don't want us to meet in Munich with a
detrimental effect from this issue. We have to cooperate
closely. I have another paper I just ,want to 1e~ve with you
(attached). ($)

The President: Our experts are talking on this and they should
continue talking. I believe that there are some areas in which
t~e u.s. and Germany are moving together, such as forests. Now,
I have to say that we have a major problem with this Rio
Conference. Given my schedule and the campaign I can't commit at
this time and I certainly I am not going to commit to things that
will halt our economy_ Maybe our experts can resolve these
problems. But we don't want a big bill at the end of the day. '

QE]COO'f
eBeRS'f ·7

W~ will continue to work in the run-up at this UN meeting. The

U.S. and Germany should work very closely together on this. This
conference is at a bad time for me politically. ~.

Chancellor Kohl: As a friend, George, my advice is that if we

prepare for the Conference carefully, we can get a partial
victory; then you should definitely go. This environmental
subject has real appeal. With regard to the management and
preservation of forests, I think we will be in agreement. There
may be a problem over finances especially from the Third World
countries. But the question is whether there can be compromises
in certain areas. If we don't go, we will definitely be
attacked. We should have something to show up for. ~

The President: How long will it last? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Three days, but actually I think I will be able

get it 'done in two days. (U)

The President: Well, we are talking about it. I've told Collor
that I may have problems with the timing. I agree that it is a
good political subject. But I can't go to Rio and get myself
embarrassed because we can't satisfy the demands of the LDCs and
the environmentalist advocates. We have a particular problem
with global warming commitments. All things being equal, I would
like to go, but I need to see more results from the working group
first. If I am not there, you can always blame things on me! (~

Chancellor Kohl: Well, you know that we can play different

roles.' In fact, I think we could play the ball for you from
Europe. I'd do that for you if you would like. Politically, I
think those who want to save what .God has given us will do well.
~)

The President: Maybe so, but not if I am criticized by accepting

far-out proposals. I also think that it is important that the
World Bank has control over the cost. (¢)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it will be about $3 billion but·the

timeframe for this $3 billion is not clear. I definitely want to
avoid having the U.S. and Europe on two different sides. ~

The President: I want to avoid the .same thing. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Now with respect to the G-7 summit itself, I

think the Sherpas are doing okay. We can always talk if there is
a problem. '$)

The President: Yeltsin ask me to discuss this with you. Can we

do something like we did with Gorbachev? ~

Chancellor Kohl: I will be open with you about this. I will

tell them that I will decide in a few weeks. I won't decide now.
I have a concern about the CIS. The Kiev conference looks like
it was a failure. What do we do in May if there is no CIS? ~.
.£ECMr 8
The President: Well, I think in that case we have to deal with
Russia. ($)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but what about Kravchuk? ($)

The President: That's true. And Nazarbayev? vn

Yeltsin is very sensitive to comparisons to Gorbachev. I'm not
arguing this one way or another. We may want to have him come
. afterwards as Gorbachev did. He may want to be therefor the
whole time. (;8')

Chancellor Kohl:. But George, he is going to ask you for money.

~
The Pres ident : He already has. ~

Chancellor Kohl: But at Munich his request will be much more

dramatic. <,.81
The President: I'm not sure what we will do if he corries with a
huge demand. (.Zj
Chancellor KOhl: And the problem for me is what will I do about
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania. I say let's
decide this in late April or early May. ~)

Secretary Baker: The longer you wait before deciding this, the
better. But ~t ~s important to begin to develop criteria as a
host between Russia and everyone else. Maybe you could say that
as Russia joins the IMF, the size of its economy is the basis for
their inclusion. This might have some potential. /;l!)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think so, not at the rate their economy
is going. We don't even know what's left of their economy. ~

(Conversation resumed over lunch, participants were the same.)

Secretary Baker: Let me ask· about the four-power proposal the

French have made. We have resisted because of you and also
because of the Italians, who have been vehement. The President
told Mitterrand that it would be okay for us to proceed. But
then we proposed that this be done at the Under Secretary level
and only once. Now the French are still pushing for ministerial
level. ($I

Chancellor Kohl: Let me give you a frank answer, Jim. Do

whatever you want. (U)
The President: I tried to help the man by giving him something
on this. I made him an offer. We offered to compromise, and now
I am told that he is upset with our offer. ~

With regard to the CIS, I spoke with Ter-Petrosian on Nagorno-

Karabakh this morning. They want a three-way group: Armenia,
 9

Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. We will be 'supportive at the

CSCE meeting. Ter-Petrosian says Turkey is not being fair. We
think the Turks are in fact being fair. The'Armenian and Turkish
Foreign Minister, Cetin, have had good talks. £.15)
Chancellor Kohl: I view CIS developments skeptically. There is
a danger of these republics drifting apart. This will have big
effects in the economic and security fields. Their economy can't
work. For 70 years, there was a centralized economy which
devised a division of labor among the old republics. one
republic provided coal, another one provided wheat, another one
provided tanks. I don't know how they will manage if they split
up. Another big problem is. that their nuclear power plants are
in terrible condition. Even within the republics, you've got
these tendencies for splitting up, such as Crimea and Tartarstan.
We have to try to help them. We have to give them advice and new
structures. It is very much in our interest to do so. I
understand that there are 20 reactors that are worse than
Chernobyl.' (;1)

The President: There is not enough money in the world to take on

that problem. I am told that the technology is so bad that many
of these reactors are not worth fixing. (~

Chancellor Kohl: I told Gorbachev not to speculate abovt things

getting worse and he has been pretty good about it. We do hope
for the success of Yeltsin. ~

Secretary Baker: I spoke with Shevardnadze recently. He is

ut)
going back to Georgia as the new leader and he would like to set
up diplomatic relations with us.

Chancellor Kohl: On the Middle East I have to say that you

risked a lot last year and now it is very .important that we don't
see you lose the peace. ~

The President: Let me discuss Iraq and then the Arab-Israeli

problem. On Iraq they continue to cheat but now they are moving
in the right direction again. There is still good support based
on internat10nal insistence that they comply with the
resolutions. So we have to keep the sanctions in' place, and we
have to keep the pressure on. When Ring Hussein was here, he
said he was supporting the sanctions. and the embargo, but they'
have a very leaky border. We will have to make Saddam Hussein
comply. We could use force if need be but we certainly hope we
don't have to. On the Arab-Israel front we are still talking.
The Israeli hardline positions on settlements are
counterproductive. (~

The President: Listen, I take great pride in the level of Jewish

immigration' to Israel. The American peop'le support us on the
 10

housing loans, by a factor of 80-20%. How are your relations in

general with Israel? ~)

secretary Baker: I am not sure that is right. 'I've heard that

the newest immigrants from the former USSR are backing Labor
because they believe that the policies that Likud has pursued are
making 'it more ~ifffcult to bring more Soviet immigrants. (,8")

Chancellor Kohl: . I hope you are right. (U)

The President: We are also worrie9 about Algeria and the

Maghreb. (2)

Chancellor Kohl: What about Iran? vn

Secretary Baker: We got a message recently that they wanted to'
have a discussion of economic relations on the side. Our
response is that we are prepared to discuss everything on a
formal basis, but we will not have a discussion of economic
issues unless we talk about political issues, tOOl especially the
question,of state-sponsored terrorism. (~

Chancellor Kohl: I'm told that there isa concern here about
Germany's policy on terrorism. I want to tell you that there is
absolutely no intention to change our position on the Hammadi
brothers. I want to be clear. I will not be blackmailed. ~)

The President: That's good. That will be well received he~e.

~)

The President: What is your view on Yugoslavia? ~

 6iCRil'f 11

Chancellor Kohl: I think lole are getting close now but the name
Macedonia is still a problem. (ft)

that much time. So the idea is that

early April we will go forward with Slovenia and Croatia and we
should both recognize Bosnia. Then we should ask the Greeks to
work out the problem with Macedonia. ~

Chancellor Kohl: I want to help Mitsotakis with the name. ~

Secretary Baker: The Portuguese are trying to broker a deal.

They are making a very good effort. They are exploring the
question of the name. (~

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to help him but I cannot postpone

this for six months. That said, it is important that we
stabilize Mitsotakis' government. (~

The President: I agree. Mitsotakis is very important. vn

Chancellor Kohl: On South Africa, we have to find away to help
de Klerk. (2')

The .President: I agree. I think we have only one sanction left

which is legislative. Otherwise we will want to lift all
----~----~s~anctioll$. ~)r--~~~----~----------------~------~~--------------------

.Chancellor Kohl: Is the question of your troop presence a

divisive political issue here? un
The President: No, not too divisive. The Democrats want to cut
the defense more than we do, and they will propose substantially
fewer American troops in Europe. But I don't think that the
American people will take this view. We have proposed forces on
the order' of 150,000. Cjt) ,
Chancellor Kohl: It's our feeling that it would be foolish if
the Americans left. We don't need to get 'into the figures here"
but a symbolic presence would make no sense. You need to have a
militarily significant capability. I am convinced there will be
more dramatic change in Europe. Within another nine or ten
months, we will have a single market. It will have an enormous
effect: 380 million people in one market. In 1995, Sweden,
Finland, Austria, and ,probably Norway will enter. I believe by
the end of the century Switzerland will, too. Then there may be
a break before Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia come in. Not
this decade. In this situation it is important to have an
American physical presence in Germany and in Europe, but the rest
of our relations should also be enlarged. This is why I,am
proposing a German-American Academy of Sciences. I think this
German connection, George, could actually help you with the
election. You can use it to show that the United States benefits
from your foreign policies. 'r am convinced that within European
integration, the French will gradually change their position 'in
 12
NATq. 'You can feel that with Mitterrand. 'The Franco-German
corps is moving in that direction. If Chirac or Delors becomes
the next president we may have new opportunities. I am prepared
to let the optics go in one direction as long as the real
developments go in the other direction. But this is no reason to
dim~nish the U.S. presence. We should have more links like
cultural links. We should recognize each other's diplomas, for
example. ($)

The President: With regard to the troops, I will make a strong

case. It would be helpful if you say while you are here that it
is important to have this presence. ~)

secretary Baker: From our perspective, the French attitude

toward NATO is not helpful. Bear in mind that the political
gebate in the United States could turn toward bringing the boys
home. If it appears that elements in Europe don't want or don't
count on our presence it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Whenever we advance ideas about NATO, France is always negative.
Maybe this is just left over from the past, but it makes things
very difficult. We have to renew NATO because without NATO there
will be no U.S. presence. Yet we always get French resistance.
($)

Chancellor Kohl: This is true, and its clear to all of us. (U)

The PreSident: How will this French-German corps work? Will it

--------~~Lct{A~e assl~ucd~,a-w~t-abOtt~th~cs-m~irc? ~~,------------

Chancellor Kohl: The German part of the corps that has been
NATO-assigned will remain NATO-assigned. We think we know what
is going to happen over time. This will work out. ~)

The President: Will tactical nuclear weapons be assigned also?

(7)
In my own party, there
want'to raise this issue.
It is of
great cost and no value. It can only hit Germany and Poland.
~)

The President: But if people here see developments outside of

NATO, they'll say.we're not needed. ~

Chancellor Kohl: The world has changed. Not long ago, FOTL was
the issue. Thatcher attacked me ,for weakness. Now the first
issue of the NATO summit was food aid to the CIS. From Lance to
food aid to Russia. Jews. were not getting' the food. A German
general solved this. ($)

Secretary Baker: In CSCE, we are stressing all three baskets and

don't want to lose flexibility. We are face to face with the
French proposal for a European security treaty. We don't support
it; it would be counter-productive with NATO. It also implies
security guarantees all, the way to the Chinese border. We think
 13
the U.S. and German views are same. It is directly· related to
U.S. presence. ~

Chancellor Kohl: Europe shouldn't underestimate American

strength. Germans will be the last to do so. We underestimated
you twice in this century and won't make that mistake again. ~
The President: There will be no turning inward. We'll stand up
for our presence there. ~

(Following lunch and the depa.rture of the Vice President,

Secretary Baker and David Gompert, discussions resumed.)
PARTICIPANTS: . The President
Chancellor. Kohl
Peter Hartmann
Brent Scowcroft
DATE, TIME March 22, 1992, 3:00 - 4:00 pm
AND 'PLACE: Camp David
The President: We have not talked much. about what to do for the
CIS and how to do it. ~

Chancellor Kohl: We must maintain differentiation between two

things: what they need to do, and what we need to do. They have
-~-----'tR0-h-e-l~cftem-s~e-1-ve:s-.-----T..fl-ey-ma-s-~~"tftei r------{}wfr-pc 1 i t-:i:-e-a-l-ee-l;;t.'E-ssC€c!-----
without coming under our tutelage. The Baltics are now
independent. But they belong together. It would be a tragedy if
they set up separate systems for currency, customs etc. Here is
an easy but· typical example. The Scandinavians set aside $100M
for the Baltics. We will also help, but the Nordic states are in
the best position to help without arousing fears of domination.
It appears that things are going badly between Russia and the
Ukraine, and also with the Central Asia Republics. (Z)

The President: They all call me trying to establish separate

status with us. ~)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but they have no idea how to build
separate economies. The international financial institutions
should be the basic means for helping them, because Germany is at
the ceiling of our bilateral aid. ($)

The President: We are nearly at the same point. I wanted to

talk to you about the GAB. Nick Brady says that it is set up for
just this sort of thing. What more reform do they need to do
before we offer a stabilization fund? u()
Chancellor Kohl: They have to know what they want. Yeltsin
wants to move fast. Kravchuk is moving more slowly. We can be
of most help in providing technical know-how. But there are many
advisors there now and there is no coordination. We should
improve this. This is very important. We also should improve
QEe~l' 14
our coordination within the international financial institutions.
Maybe we should us~ the Sherpas for this. ur)
The President: We agree with you. Russia needs to move on
privatization in sectors such as energy. They just don't seem to
move. There is almost instant hard currency to be made there.
We agree on the international financial institutions, and we will
try to get IMP replenishment through Congress. This is a bad
year for it, but I sense that there is a better mood on the
necessity to help CIS. (~

Chancellor Kohl: I recognize your problems here. But can't you

just point out that this is a repetition of 19451 We must also
agree 'what points to make with the press and what remarks you
think useful for me to make here. (.l!)

The President: Clearly, we should say that more reform is

needed. You could say that the U.S. is determined to do its
part. U!)
Chancellor Kohl: No, I just want to help and I am thinking out
loud. I wonder if I should say today is like 1945, when Germany
was in terrible shape. We received your aid and became a
flourishing democracy. Its an easy point for me to make. ~)

The President: I think we should make clear that we are

supporting Yel tsin. That Hoagland piece was very damaging. (,6)

GhaMe-ll-e-r:=¥s>h-:l : ye.s-,----e::'wr:e-n-Ge:r-eac-hev-s-a1-~-i4.,._I tp..i..n'"*ko--

our Sherpas can go over the ground-work. Koehler is my man on
this. (ft')

The President: Zoellick is mine, and we have. great confidence in

him. (fG)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps the two can get together. (U)

The President: The press will yell about Yeltsin coming to
Munich. (~)

Chancellor Kohl: That is not a problem.' The question is not

just Yeltsin, but G-7 coordination with the Commonwealth. ~)
The President: Yeltsin will expect something. ~.

Chancellor Kohl: Yeltsin will participate one way or another.

<t)
The President: The more forthcoming the better, but not in every
meeting. (7)

Chancellor Kohl: I will call him on Monday. (U)

The President: That is all you need to say to the press. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: We could also say that we will be discussing
this with all the others. (.Ji1'
 15

The President:' Good. They are all competing with each other in
CIS, especially Kravchuk. (.8')

Chancellor Kohl; Kravchuk will immediately say, how about me and

so will the East Europeans. ~

The President: Maybe we can find some rationale having to do

with the eight largest economies. ($)
General Scowcroft:' That might include the Chinese. (g)

The President: Maybe we could point to the eight largest

democratic states. Otherwise we will dilute the G-7. <)n
Chancellor Kohl: The summits have become distorted. We discuss
every topic supposedly and spend most of our time on a communique
we haven't even read. un
The President: What can we do about it? (U)
Chancellor Kohl: I plan to send a letter to the G-7 along these
lines. Let's get a list of issues so we can really discuss them,
and not just read the old and new testament to ,the press. '~
The President: Yes t the press looks for a discussion. Who is up
and who is down. Maybe we should not even have a communique.
It's too, bureaucratic. <...81
Chancellor Kohl: Mitterrand thinks the same way. I think MaJor
and Mulroney also. ~

The President: I ,think the Japanese might have a different view.

This is the only forum for them. ' ~)

Chancellor Kohl: I like the Japanese Prime Minister but that

should not affect this. ($)

The 'President: Why don't you send your letter to the rest of us?
What will you,do about expanding the BC? (Z)
Chancellor Kohl: There will be a natural limit in 1995. We will
have Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway. (~

The President; What about Turkey? ~

Apart from Great Britain, the most natural partner for the u.S.
is Germany. We are very close together, our ideas about the
fH]CR:E'3?
 16
economy, religion and so on. Having the U.S. as a close partner
will reduce fears of Germany in Europe. Close U.S.-German
relations will not arouse fear from the smaller countries of the
EC. So after the elections, we should talk we could do on a long-
term basis. Many Americans are already thinking along these
lines. They also observe how our new Laender are being
transformed. Our cooperation should go beyond the military. We
could also help you with Japan. Now about Kinnoch, it wouldn't
change much in the EC. It's mostly talk. ~

The presi~t: Isn't Labor more inclined toward integration with

the EC'? )
Chancellor Kohl: Not really. Thatcher gave that impression.
The British problem is like ours and France's. We have put an
engine on a track. Then we include countries who try to change
track, but the train goes right on. At the practical level the
c~anges are already taking place. In industry we already have
European entities. Nestle and Agnelli are fighting for Perrier.
All the companies, including American companies, are already
integl;'ating.This is the reality of what is happening. There is
no way to retreat from Maastricht. If I were American, I would
put all my eggs in this basket. ~)
Perhaps Feiter can come to Washington again on the 30th. I 'am
convinced that we could find a solution. The biggest problem is
rebalancing. We can't leave this to experts. We can let them do
what they can. I am not negotiating, but we should cpnclude this
--~~----~€-ene-Gf ~p~i~~h~~-e~~~e-w~-myst comp~~-se~I--w~]j~--~---------
discuss this with my colleagues. vn '
The President: Should we say that our experts will meet'?(>J')
Chancellor Kohl: No. I don't want to relieve the Commission
from its responsibilities. We need a GATT agreement in order to
boost the world economy, and this is better than aid for the
Third ·World. ,Let's call each other whenever it may be,necessary.
($)

The President: Rebalancing is a big problem for us. It is a big

step back from free trade. We gave on the "safe box." We will
try but it will be very tough. ~)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand.' Let's continue to talk. Is

there anything I can say to be helpful to you? ($)
The President: Well, no one is really focused now. Perhaps
around the time of the summit. ~)

Chancellor Kohl: What are the themes that the Democrats are
using? (JZ')

The President: They say it is a time for change, and they also
say they can fix the economy. The only chance for the Democrats
is ~f the economy turns down again. The Democrats will say they
can cure and turn around the economy. ~
SECRET 17
Chancellor Kohl: Are you saying that foreign policy will play no
role? (JZ1
The President: It will in the Fall. And our role in the global
economy will be important. Also people are now' asking, without
the·Soviet Union, why do we have NATO? And why do we need
military strength? But this will change in t~e fall. I feel
confident. But it is an ugly period. But the economy will
improve and dilute the Democrats' arguments. Foreign policy will
a'ssume its rightful importance. <!J
.
Chancellor Kohl: Who will his vice presidential nominee be? (,It)
The President: I don't know. Not a Southerner. He needs
Cal.ifornia. Maybe Cuomo, even Tsongas? (U)
Chancellor Kohl: Would Cuomo accept the Vice Presidency? ~

The President: Maybe not. But he is the governor of a big

Northeast state, and that would be good for them. ~
Chancellor Kohl: There is one more impprtant point I want to
make. I will be coming to make a speech in New York in May at
the American Newspaper Publishers' Association. Who should I
talk to discreetly? Obviously, I will discuss unification and
all the Presidents who have helped Germany from Truman to Bush.
Then I can really set out what you did for us. (~

~p~~jdent: .That wau~~~~~p£Ul. I would say, talk to

Sulzberger. ~> .
Chancellor Kohl: I would like to talk quietly to someone on your
staff and coordinate ideas. ct>
The President: Talk to Brent. (U)
General Scowcroft: I can work with Peter on this. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: What should we say to the press? (~

The President: Do I have a statement? ~

General SCQwcrQft: Yes, you have an outline of what was

discussed. U!!)
.
-~ End of Conversation --
 8E6REI
THE WHITE HOUSE 4619
WASHINGTON
/

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting and Lunch with Prime Minister Mitsotakis

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Michael G. Sotirhos, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet and European
Multilateral Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis

Andonis Samaras, Foreign Minister
Stavros Dimas, Minister of Industry, Energy and
Technology
DECLASSIFIED Christos Zacharakis, Ambassador of Greece to the
U.S.
PER EwO. 12958, Mrs. Dora Bakoyiannis, Member of Parliament
AS AMENDED Viron Polyadoras, Press Spokesman for the Prime
Cf{ B/'2.1 fZlot1 Minister
Dimitrios Argyriadis, Director of the Prime
2.cco·O~F Minister's Diplomatic Office (Notetaker)

Date, Time June 6, 1990, 11:30-1:00 p.m.

and Place Cabinet Room and Old Family Dining Room

The President: Welcom~. There has been great interest in this

visit in both of our countries, and I have looked forward to it.
This is my first chance to see you after your victory and to
congratulate you for it. I know this is also a special week for
your family. I only wish your son were here so that I could
congratulate him for his graduation from Harvard. I would like
to welcome, as well, your daughter, to this meeting. v()
I think it is important for the U.S. to have a good, strong
relationship with Greece. And so I think it would be a good idea
for you to come back sometime in the future on an official visit.
Our people will stay in touch to work out the details. I
understand from my staff that you are the first Greek Prime
Minister in twenty-six years to visit the White House. That is
hard to believe, and is not good enough. We'll do better. I
M;G~'J;
Declassify' on: OADR
SEGRE:l
£ECREl'

hope this meeting starts a new pattern of closer relations

between us. So, I would like to say welcome again, and will turn
the floor over to you. (1)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If you don't mind, I will speak in

Greek since my English is a little rusty. First, I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to visit during the first months of
my term. It is a great pleasure and an honor. (Z)

I also thank you for the opportunity to return in the future on

an official visit. I accept your invitation. All of us here
today are representing the Greek President, Mr. Karamanlis, who
sends you his best regards. He and I would like to invite you to
visit Greece. The Greek people would be delighted by such a
visit. ($)

I would like to talk about the situation in Greece. As you know,

there has been a great political change after eight years of
Papandreou. During the last year, we had three elections, and
two of them were fruitless due to the new electoral law imposed
by Papandreou to make attaining a majority difficult. While we
have a small majority in Parliament, we have a big one with the
people. I won 47 % of the vote in the April election--the
largest percentage of any governing party in Europe. We feel
strong, and will do what is right. ~

During the campaign, we told the truth to the people on both

foreign and domestic policy. We are now set to tackle these
important problems. We worry about our economy which poses a
difficult situation. We have a big public sector deficit,
amounting to 22% of GNP. There is heavy borrowing, dangerous
inflation and stagnation--there is no development in the economy.
We have taken reform measures--privatization, restriction of
expenditures, new taxes and an increase in public utility
charges. Our effort will require time. ~

In foreign policy we have made major changes within our first

fifty days in office. First, we initialled the bases agreement
with you. Second, we established full, diplomatic relations with
Israel. Third, we have made it clear that Greece will accept all
of its obligations as a member of NATO. And, I should remind you
that it was the New Democracy party under the leadership of
Constantine Karamanlis which obtained EC membership for Greece.
We intend to follow a policy of promoting European unity. ~)

I can tell you with great satisfaction that the Greek people
support our new policies. They know we are determined to restore
the credibility of our country abroad. '$)

We are also determined to normalize our relations with your

country. We share the same ideals and a history of friendship.
I can tell you that our people feel friendship and love for the
American people. Papandreou's policies only diminished that
friendship superficially. (j)
Relations with Turkey, of course, will be a difficult issue to

SEGReT
3ECREf SEGREf
handle. My policy will be one of dialogue and friendship. I've
always had this view which led Papandreou to accuse me of treason
for having advocated dialogue with the Turks. I am ready to take
the necessary steps and I've told the Turks we'll pursue a
dialogue, and that I will go to Ankara, if necessary, as long as
the trip is well prepared to insure its success. We know Turkey
is a valuable ally of yours and we don't want to cause problems
between the two of you. And we are not asking you to intervene
between us. But it would be helpful if you could give advice to
both of us. We don't want to create an Ankara-Athens-Washington
triangle in which you are the intermediary. We believe our
problems should be resolved directly. <In
Cyprus is an important issue for us. I am an old-timer, having
been a member of Parliament since 1946 and having lived with the
problem during all those years. I believe an opportunity exists
for a solution. Vassiliou is a good man and a valuable ally with
a positive approach. But we have to find a way to break the
circle, and accomplish something. I have launched an idea to
reduce the number of occupation forces which would be a symbolic
step. But I don't insist on this idea. It might be better for
Turkey to return Famagusta, as they were ready to do so before.
~
Turkey has many problems. As its neighbor, we don't want Turkey
to fall under the dominance of Moslem extremism. We would rather
see Turkey's European orientation strengthened. We think the
u.s. can play an important role in this regard. un
I've spoken to many European leaders about Cyprus and have been
assured it will be on the EC summit agenda later this month. I
also think the u.s. will playa major role in the world, and that
you are stronger than ever. The Cyprus problem requires American
help to be resolved. I also believe that, with your help and
engagement, the Greek-Turkish dialogue on other problems will be
enhanced. This will help Greece, NATO, and the U.S., but mainly
Turkey. So, my approach on Cyprus is not antagonistic. I want
to convince Turkey to settle the problem. But we are running out
of time after sixteen years of occupation. There is now a new
generation of Cypriots who have not lived in a united Cyprus.
~
Vassiliou is already being criticized for producing no results.
He has only two years left. My own government also needs a
success. We hope to do well, but it will be a tough road. This
is why, Mr. President, I wanted to put the Cyprus question before
you today, in order to ask for your support. <;1
The President: Thanks very much for your remarks. You have
covered several subjects, and I will try to respond. ~
First, on your economic situation, welcome to the United States.
We are fighting many of the same problems, and I agree that many
of them are tough ones. I also agree that your private sector
reforms are the answer. We start from the same common ground.
~)
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Second, we view our overall relations as important and feel
comfortable with your policy changes since taking office. We
have a strong and fascinating Greek community in the U.S. who
approve of the improvement in relations and who have great hope
for our success. ~

Third, on Cyprus, I am flattered that you think we can play an

important role. I know that we have not been as effective in the
past as we might have been. But we have been engaged in the
problem. We have a good man, Nelson Ledsky, who is in the region
now. I am amenable to your suggestions. I also have great
respect for Vassiliou. He is a good man, and I understand why he
is frustrated. ~

I think the Turkish President is more reasonable than some of the

others. We have some differences with the Turks, but we are also
friends. We want to solve the Cyprus problem and are impressed
with the importance of the need for action. Famagusta could be a
confidence-building measure if the Turks think they can do it.
But they might want something in return. We are intrigued by it.
~
As for our overall policy, we support the UN Secretary General in
his mandate. We have spoken to him about this recently and think
this is the best way to go forward. We do care about Cyprus. We
would be interested in having our Foreign Ministers explore what
we could do. Our Ambassadors could also be helpful in working
out some ideas. If our Foreign Ministers could corne up with
something, we could consider it. We want to see you and
Vassiliou succeed and resolve this problem. (21
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have some comments to make on what
you have said. I accept that Ozal is a reasonable man. We have
met several times. But he is weak today. I am opening a path to
dialogue and also want contacts with Demirel and Inonu, the
leaders of the two other parties. I am old acquaintances with
them. There is no doubt about the importance of the UN role, but
Perez de Cuellar is desperate. He doesn't know what to do, and
we must help him. I spoke with Ledsky about these matters. ~)

I believe that Famagusta could act as a catalyst and that we

should try to influence the Turks in this direction. I believe
our Foreign Ministers should maintain contact with each other.
Our Ambassadors are also helpful. We are very happy with
Ambassador Sotirhos. All Greeks like him. We must find a way--
one step forward. We would like the press release describing
this meeting to give impetus to the Cyprus problem and underline
our commitment to finding a solution. (~

The President: Before we go to lunch, I want to tell Dora (Mrs.

Bakoyiannis) in front of everyone here that our hearts go out to
you. We think you are courageous and we know you are motivated
by this tragedy to reduce the terrible scourge of terrorism. We
just feel terribly for you. ~

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In that regard, I want you to know we will combat terrorism. Our
position is firm on the Rashid case (end of conversation in
Cabinet Room) . vn
(Conversation resumed in the Old Family Dining Room over lunch) .

The President: What do you think of Yeltsin? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I am impressed by him. I hear many

negative comments about him, but I do not share all of them. ~)

The President: Our impression, in brief, is not particularly

favorable. He came to the White House and refused to see General
Scowcroft without bringing four people along. It colored the
visit. y()
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: My wife told me he reminded her of
Papandreou. But I think he will play an important role. ~

What are your impressions of Germany? (~

The President: We favor a unified Germany in NATO. We may have

made progress in convincing Gorbachev that this would be less of
a threat than singularizing Germany. Gorbachev should be more
worried about a Germany isolated after fifty years of division.
This is our view. Germany, of course, is cooperating with the
Soviets on the economic side. We understand why the USSR would
be suspicious after having lost twenty seven million people in
the Second World War. But I wonder how long Germany must do
penance before it is accepted as a democratic country. What is
your view? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree with everything you have

said. I am a good friend of Kohl and will see him at Harvard. I
believe he will win the elections of a unified Germany. We too
have suffered at German hands. I, for example, was sentenced to
death twice by the Germans. But the Greek people support
unification. u()
The President: Are all Greek parties united on this? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakls: All the parties agree that Germany

should be united. But the issue of Germany in NATO has not been
widely discussed. I think the opposition will disagree with us
on that. ~)

The President: We need to convince them that NATO won't

necessarily be the same organization. Article 2 provides
language on the purpose of NATO that conveys a broader, more
political role. We will have to figure out how to cast the new
NATO, while keeping Dick Cheney's forces there. We believe U.S.
forces are a stabilizing presence in Europe. Our troops must be
wanted, however, or they will come home. We need European
support in order to maintain support at home. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I believe the Soviets agree with what

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you have said. We have seen an important change in the

psychology of the East European countries. Our opposition, and
the Greek communists, who are still Stalinists, are lagging
behind these changes. We have good relations with the Balkan
countries and I was recently impressed during a visit to Eastern
Europe. (j5)

The President: How do the East Europeans in general view a u.S.

presence in Europe? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The prestige of the U.S. in Eastern

Europe is enormous--probably greater in Eastern Europe than in
Western Europe. I think their decision to turn toward democracy
is final. They also want free markets but are a little confused
about how to manage the transition. Each of the countries, of
course, is different. Bulgaria will have free elections. We are
helping the opposition parties, and there will be some balance
after the elections. In Romania, the President's victory was
large, but the elections were unfair. un
The President: Do you know Iliescu? ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No, I do not. But I have good

relations with the Bulgarians. Bulgaria is stable and will help
us in the Balkans. vr)
The President: If you were asked at a press conference in Greece
about the Baltics, what would you say? ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would say that Greece never

recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR.
I would say Lithuania could become independent but that reality
must also be respected. .Gorbachev is doing the maximum now. I
have a feeling that Gorbachev is doing his best, and that we must
all help him. If Gorbachev falls, and we inherit Yeltsin, it
will be an adventure. ~

The President: Do the East Europeans want Gorbachev to succeed?

(Z)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Yes, they all do but they are worried
about his internal problems. The Yugoslavs also find themselves
in a difficult spot. The revival of nationalism in the region
has hurt Yugoslavia and makes it difficult to maintain its unity.
We are being careful not to excite the Macedonian minority. (;1
I also think there could be developments in Albania. ~

The President: Perez de Cuellar said the same thing. ($)

Foreign Minister Samaras: There are 400,000 Albanians of Greek

origin. ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Albania has a terrible regime, with a

very poor human rights record. ($)

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The President: How do you account for the changes inside

Albania? ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: There has been an internal reaction

inside against the regime which is now shaky. ~

The President: I hope they shake Castro too, although even Cuba
is not as bad a place as Albania. (j5')
Foreign Minister Samaras: There is not one functioning church in
Albania. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We want to work closely with you on

terrorism and narcotics. This is of great interest to us. (21
The President: Both are vitally important to us. What is your
thinking on this complicated Rashid case? ~)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We must make a decision by September.

It is out of the question to release him. Either we will
extradite him to the u.S. or try him in Greece. Personally, I
would like to hand him over to you because his trial will be an
adventure. But I must consider the political situation in
Greece. I will give you a clear answer soon. yn
The President: I wasn't pressing today for a clear answer, and
will await your response. The raid on the Israeli coast
undermines the Palestinian cause and plays into Shamir's hands.
It gets Shamir off the hook. vn
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Shamir's policy is too extreme. un
The President: That's right. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have resumed full diplomatic

relations with Israel which we think will make us more effective
in the Middle East. But Israel must learn to coexist with the
Arabs for its long-term su:r:'vi val. (,8")
The President: It is a very difficult and unpromising situation.
~
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It would be easier for the Israelis
if they changed their electoral law. ~

The President: They need to do something--the situation is

frozen. What type of electoral laws were changed in Greece by
Papandreou? ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Its simple. I need 50 % to win which

is not possible in our system without coalition partners. Felipe
Gonzalez has the same percentage as me. ~

The President: What did Ronald Reagan' receive in the 1980

election? John Anderson's candidacy reduced his winning
percentage. ($)

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eECPET

secretary Cheney: I think President Reagan received barely 50%

of the vote. Lincoln never achieved a majority. (~

The President: So don't let your opposition cite the u.s. as an

example--we've had Presidents with less than 50% of the vote.
($)

I don't want to probe into your internal affairs, but, having

said that, whatever happened to the first Mrs. Papandreou? (;n
Mrs. Bakoyiannis: She lives in Athens, and is planning to
remarry--an American, actually. (~)

The President: Is she still less than infatuated with the u.s.?
(ji!)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: Well, she is marrying an American. (In

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would like to raise one last issue
and ask Mr. Samaras to present it to you. ~)

Foreion Minister Samaras: In the CFE talks, we have problems in

the negotiations of the areas of application. The Turks want the
port of Mersin, from which they invaded Cyprus, to be
militarized. We want Mercin to be demilitarized. Mr.
Bartholomew and our Ambassador have been discussing the issue and
we would appreciate your weighing in with Bartholomew and others
that we need to find a solution to this problem. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: This is a very important issue for

us. (7)

The President: I'm afraid I am not aware of the details of this

issue. Brent, can you discuss it? ($)

General Scowcroft: No sir, I cannot discuss it either. ~)

Mr. Kimmitt: Our position is that Mersin should be excluded. We

can discuss it with you, but we cannot chang~ our basic decision.
(I)

The President: We disagree with the Greek position? ($)

Mr. Kimmitt: Yes sir. (jn

The President: Why are the Turks insisting on it? (7)

Prime Mini~t~r MitsQtaki~: As a provocation. (~)

The President: We'll take a look at it. But we do want CFE to

be concluded without many delays. Jim Baker called me last night
to say we may have more options with the Soviets. They have
accepted the premise of some of our ideas, and we find this
encouraging . ~

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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is a very important issue. Please
try to do something. (1)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: This is an important issue for the Greek

puplic. People know about this. It is politically important.
(16)

Foreign Minister Samaras: This is a huge problem for us. The

area of exclusion is three times the size of Greece, and all of
Greece will be demilitarized. yt>
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I am establishing a special task
force on terrorism to see what we can do. We hope to achieve
results from this change in emphasis. There was no certainty
before that the government wanted to combat terrorism. Now we've
changed that. We would like closer cooperation with you. (;n
The President: I am delighted to hear that. We're ready to
assist you. We are working on new technologies for airport
security. There are no perfect defenses and it is very
expensive. Sharing intelligence information will also be
important. yt>
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We need technical assistance in
counter-terrorism. ~

The President: We have just finished the Pan Am 103

investigation on the plane that went down over Scotland. Is that
report available, Brent? (~

General Scowcroft: Yes it is sir. (~>

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: Is there a way to detect plastic explosives?

~>
General Scowcroft: Not well enough. vn
The President: We are trying to develop technology to detect
plastics. ut>
General Scowcroft: The problem is that to detect plastic, you
generally need to have' an amount of plastic larger than what is
used in most bombs. ($'>
Mr. Dobbins: The detection devises are also very large and
expensive. ~

The President: Cooperation will be important. ~>

Foreign Minister Samaras: November 17 is a terrible

organization. They have killed both Greeks and Americans,
including Richard Welch in 1975. ~

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: They kill people without security, it is easy

for them. vt>

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 SE6;REl
The President: The Germans also lost Herrhausen. (~

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: And he had security. In Greece, they attack

defenseless people. ~

The President: Do you know who they are? ($')

Foreign Minister Samaras: No. And we don't even want to venture

a guess in public. {.Z)

The President: This is a cowardly and shadowy business. There

seems to be a better chance for improved relations with Iran with
the release of the two hostages. They now want me to do more.
But we have four other hostages still there. What do they want
me to do? I am not ungrateful, but I don't want to rush out to
congratulate them when they are still holding other Americans.
($)

Ambassador Argyriadis: I was in Iran recently. I think

Rafsanjani has to improve Iran's foreign relations. But there is
a strong internal reaction and he also has to survive. The
hardliners are strong and are doing everything possible to keep
the two great Satans, the U.S. and the USSR, out of Iran. So, I
have a feeling Rafsanjani will try to become the single, strong
leader. ~ .

The President: People say Velayati is reasonable. ~)

Ambassador Argyriadis: Yes, but he doesn't have much power,

especially compared to the Interior Minister. The hopes are on
Rafsanjani. There is also a hardening of the situation of women.
The pretext is the Imam's line. They really want to keep people
at a distance from their increasing economic problems. ~)

The President: I have enjoyed this. I think we have covered

most of the ground. And congratulations to the Prime Minister on
his 37th wedding anniversary. ($')

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have covered all issues of

interest. We are entering a new era in our relations. I want
you to know that we'll continue to follow this course. ~

The President: We will also follow through on our part. ~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Don't forget Mersin. It may blow up

on us. ~)

The President: You have made that clear. ~

- End of Conversation -

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