International Review of Sociology

Revue Internationale de Sociologie

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Bourdieu in hyperspace: from social topology to

the space of flows

Jean-Sébastien Guy

To cite this article: Jean-Sébastien Guy (2018): Bourdieu in hyperspace: from social topology to
the space of flows, International Review of Sociology, DOI: 10.1080/03906701.2018.1529074

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1529074

Published online: 05 Oct 2018.

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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE
https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1529074

Bourdieu in hyperspace: from social topology to the space of

flows
Jean-Sébastien Guy
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Marion McCain Arts and Social Sciences Building,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article focuses on Bourdieu’s topological conception of social Bourdieu; social topology;
space to expand on it and develop an alternative model. Bourdieu geometry; groups; flows
describes social space as topological because it consists of a set of
relative positions. Individuals in similar positions can come
together to form social groups, so that differences between
groups reveal or at least reflect the different positions in space.
For this reason, it is convenient to think of social space as
Bourdieu understands it as a space of groups. Yet there are other
kinds of geometry beside topology. The article examines the
difference between topology and Euclidean geometry to
determine how we can modify Bourdieu’s model to uncover other
potential features of social space. Rather than conceptualizing
social space as a space of groups, we can envision a flow that is
created as individuals relay one another so that the flow can go
on even though the same individuals never stay put. Flows can
arise by finding support on other flows. Thus arise structures in
space that cannot be ‘mapped onto’ social actors occupying
different positions because actors only sustain the flows through
their perpetual turnover.

My goal in this paper is to use Bourdieu’s ideas as a springboard to develop a new analyti-
cal framework larger than Bourdieu’s own. I do not wish to demonstrate that Bourdieu is
wrong or that his theory is incorrect. However, I seek to develop a framework in which
Bourdieu’s theoretical views are no longer exclusively valid, but reappear as one specific
case rather than the only possible one. In that sense, I would like to do to Bourdieu
what Einstein did to Newton: not so much to disprove his model, but to change its appli-
cation from general to particular. Ultimately, my purpose is to develop new analytical tools
to capture empirical aspects of social life that other theories, like Bourdieu’s, do not prop-
erly account for.
In a way, one could say that I oppose Bourdieu. Yet I plan on ‘overcoming’ his theory by
working precisely with what it has to offer. Specifically, I want to exploit his concept of
social space defined as social topology (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 196, 1990a, p. 126, 1991,
p. 229, 1998, p. 32, 2000, p. 134; see also Anheier, Gerhards, & Romo, 1995, p. 860;

CONTACT Jean-Sébastien Guy jsguy@dal.ca Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Marion McCain
Arts and Social Sciences Building, Dalhousie University, Room 1128, 6135 University Avenue, PO Box 15000, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, B3H 4R2, Canada
© 2018 University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’
2 J.-S. GUY

Fogle, 2011; Jenkins, 2002, p. 86; Mohr, 2013). On the topic of space, we know that there
are other geometries beside topology. For my project, I will make use of the difference
between topology and Euclidean geometry as a guiding metaphor.
Let me begin by quoting Bourdieu himself:
Why does it seem necessary and legitimate for me to introduce the notions of social space
and field of power into the lexicon of sociology? In the first place, to break with the ten-
dency to think of the social world in a substantialist manner. The notion of space contains,
in itself, the principle of a relational understanding of the social world. It affirms that every
‘reality’ it designates resides in the mutual exteriority of its composite elements. Apparent,
directly visible beings, whether individuals or groups, exist and subsist in and through
difference; that is, they occupy relative positions in a space of relations which, although
invisible and always difficult to show empirically, is the most real reality (the ens realissi-
mun as scholasticism would say) and the real principle of the behavior of individuals and
groups. (1998, p. 31)

Relationalism – as opposed to substantialism (Emirbayer, 1997) – is the reason why

Bourdieu refers to topology. Contrary to what the name suggests though, relationalism
as Bourdieu understands it is not directly about relations or interactions between individ-
uals. Interactions are not completely excluded of course, yet for Bourdieu they are second-
ary to differences between positions (Bottero & Crossley, 2011, p. 101). When talking
about social space, Bourdieu is thinking about a field of force. Accordingly, it is not an
even space, nor is it a homogeneous one, quite the opposite. For Bourdieu, different points
or positions in space mark different amounts of force. In this model, the difference
between two points is therefore a ratio of forces.
Talking about social space in relational terms is a way to account to the external con-
ditions that individuals are exposed to at different moments of their lives. Over time, it is
possible for individuals to change positions and to move up or down along the social hier-
archy. For Bourdieu, the social world is quite dynamic as individuals are not only given a
synchronic position, but a diachronic trajectory as well (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 425–427).
While there is a continuous struggle among individuals to get ahead of each other, the
social space around them never ceases to be constructed in a relational manner. Individ-
uals in similar positions may come to form a coherent group, even though groups remain
contested entities (Wacquant, 2013). Still it is convenient to think of social space as Bour-
dieu conceives it as made out of groups (Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 203–204, p. 209) once
‘empirical individuals’ give way to ‘epistemic individuals’ in the analysis (Vandenberghe,
1999, p. 45; see also Anheier et al., 1995, p. 861).
In this paper, I want to show that there is more to the concept of social space that just
this. Without reverting back to substantialism, I want to uncover another type of social
space, this time made out of flows, which we can reconstitute by transforming key
aspects of the space of groups. The text ahead is divided in four sections. The first
one explains the difference between topology and Euclidean geometry. This will lay
down a map which I will follow afterwards to redefine Bourdieu’s concept of social
space in a non-topological way. In the second section, I offer a quick overview of Bour-
dieu’s sociological model so as to better understand the reasons he had for conceptua-
lizing social space like he does. Having established these reasons, I will work to modify
them so as to sketch out the space of flows. In the last two sections, I will detail this new
concept of space.
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 3

Topology and Euclidean geometry as metaphors

The topic of geometry itself – the science of space – is no doubt very complex. For my
present purpose, suffices for me to discuss briefly Felix Klein’s Erlangen Program (as in
‘research program’ – see Marquis, 2009). Klein (1849–1925) sought to bring unity in
the different geometries discovered in the course of the nineteenth century. In the past,
there used to be only one geometry: Euclidian geometry. In Klein’s lifetime however,
many other geometries had achieved recognition, like affine geometry and projective geo-
metry for instance. Klein’s contribution was to devise one common strategy to describe all
these various geometries in terms of transformations and invariants. Each geometry
defines a universe in which geometric objects can be submitted to certain transformations.
Some transformations leave these objects unaffected, whereas others alter their properties
and hence change them. It is, therefore, possible to understand each geometry in terms of
invariants depending on the objects’ properties that remain the same after transformation.
Henceforward we can classify all geometries with the help of group theory in mathematics,
i.e. we can organize the different geometries along one continuum from the geometry that
has the less invariants to the geometry that has the most.
Euclidian geometry is the geometry that has the less invariants. Consider angles, par-
allels and straight lines: Euclidian geometry is such that all these attributes must remain
identical for a geometric object to remain what it is. In affine geometry, you can already
let go of angles (Piaget, 1970, p. 20). More precisely, when objects are defined in accord-
ance with affine geometry, it is possible to modify their angles without altering the core
properties of the objects themselves simply because in affine geometry these properties
do not include angles. In projective geometry, you can let go of angles and parallels.
Finally, when you let go of straight lines as well, you enter into the realm of topology,
which is the geometry with the most invariants (Piaget, 1970, p. 21).
If we concentrate on Euclidian geometry and topology only, we can further describe the
difference between them in the following manner. In Euclidean geometry, space is con-
ceived as a container of infinite dimensions so that all geometric objects are embedded
in it. In topological geometry, however, space no longer contains all objects; instead
both space and objects are turned into surfaces (DeLanda, 2002, p. 12). From a topological
point of view, each object is like a self-contained space. The surface of that object is the only
space there is. To describe the spatial properties of that object, we can study the surface of
it by measuring its curvature with the help of the differential calculus, for example. As we
travel across the surface, the latter is either raising or falling or remaining flat. If we divide
the surface into distinct regions, the curvature thus marks the change or transition from
one region to the next.
In other words, objects in topological geometry are given intrinsic properties, whereas
in Euclidean geometry they are given extrinsic properties (DeLanda, 2002). Objects are
defined extrinsically in the second case because a difference is made between space and
objects-in-space, so that space itself is ‘located’ at a higher logical level than the latter.
We can then use any number of parameters or dimensions (N) to describe any object,
while space itself will always constitute a dimension supplementary to these (located at
level N + 1). In Euclidean geometry, the specific properties that an object possesses
make sense because the properties themselves are not defined in reference to the same
object, but in reference to space as a wider container. It is space at level N + 1 which allows
4 J.-S. GUY

for the measurement of any object’s dimensions, rather than surface curvature as in
topology.
The point that I want to make is that while Euclidian geometry and topology are dis-
tinct from each other, it is nonetheless possible – in the wake of Felix Klein’s works – to
join them together along a symmetry scale (going from less to more invariants). In other
words, the distinction between these two geometries does not lie in different objects, but in
the different properties that they each ascribe to the same objects. The conclusion that I
want to draw from this is the following: not only is the gulf between topology and Eucli-
dian geometry not unbridgeable, but it turns out that we can learn more about the objects
under study by switching from one geometry to the other.
By starting with the association between Bourdieu’s concept of social space and top-
ology, I want to develop what would be the equivalent of Euclidean geometry in sociology.
My project is to search for the ‘knobs’ in Bourdieu’s theory that can be manipulated so as
to produce a different image of space in the light of which sociological objects will take on
new properties.

Bourdieu’s social topology

Since Bourdieu defines a social space as a ‘space of relative positions’ right from the begin-
ning, we can certainly agree with him when he goes on to evoke a social topology. Each
position or region in space only exists by virtue of the difference with its neighboring
regions: as higher than them, lower than them, etc. Pieced together, the many positions
create a coherent map.
Bourdieu was not interested in pure theory though. The concept of social space was
developed for the purpose of studying concretely the field of power across society (Bour-
dieu, 1984a, 1998) as well as particular fields or subfields like the literary field (Bourdieu,
1992), the academic field (Bourdieu, 1984b) or the journalistic field (Bourdieu, 2005) to
give a few examples. By modeling each field as a social space, we can analyze the strategies
enacted by each actor or agent in that field in terms of postures or stances (prises de pos-
ition) born out of the possibilities made available by the field depending on the actor’s
specific position at that moment as well as on the actor’s habitus (dispositions). The latter
depends on the actor’s past experiences as a matter of movement across the field. As in
Marx, actors make history – their own history, meaning that actors make themselves –
under circumstances that befell on them for better or worst. At times, what actors are
most motivated to do (due to their habitus as accumulated experiences) coincides with
what they are best equipped to do (thanks to their current position), but even then it is
up to the actors to make it happen (meaning that they can also fail).
Fields happen to be arenas of struggle. Within each field, there is a competition going
on as to how the field’s content and limits should be defined and circumscribed. Accord-
ingly, to be involved in a field is to have a stake in that field. Moreover, to gain dominance
in the field is to impose one’s vision of the field to others in the field. As it turns out, par-
ticular fields are torn between autonomy and heteronomy. Consider literature for instance
(Bourdieu, 1992). At one extreme, the value of cultural productions – books, novels, jour-
nals, etc. – is based exclusively on artistic criteria. ‘Great books’ are the ones that define
and embody esthetic styles. At the other extreme, the same productions are reassessed
in commercial terms: bestsellers are ‘great books’ by virtue of the fact that they sell the
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 5

best. This pole marks the heteronomous side of the field as literature increasingly blends
with economic activities and the wider field of power prevailing at the level of society. Yet
the heteronomous pole is still part of the literary field so that the latter include both actors
in favor of commercialism and those against it, which is exactly why the field functions as a
battlefield. Those who are not yet in the position of domination must challenge the ortho-
doxy, whereas those are already in this position must contain these heretic movements
challenging their rule. If the first ones ever become successful, they will get to form the
next orthodoxy – until a new heresy shall arise against them.
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework tends to create confusion at times, as he occasionally
admits himself (e.g. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 79). More precisely, Bourdieu’s for-
mulations seem to oscillate between what François Dépelteau defines as ‘co-determinism’
and ‘trans-actionalism’ (2008). Co-determinism implies that social structures not only
determine actors’ course of action, but that they are determined by them just as well
(Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1979; Giddens, 1984). Trans-actionalism eliminates the constraint
exercised by social structures to replace it with the constraint exercised by actors on each
other (King, 1999, 2006, 2007). If actors in a field are competing with each other, it is
tempting to read Bourdieu’s analyses as a form of trans-actionalism since a number of
actors must obviously interact together for any struggle to unfold. This interpretation is
all the more attractive considering Bourdieu’s evocation of topology. It makes sense to
define social space as a ‘space of relative positions’ when actors are fighting to gain dom-
inance over one another so that the entire field reappears as a network of dominant-sub-
ordinate dyadic relations.
In fact, Bourdieu dismisses this sort of trans-actionalism, notably because it tends to
erase the weight of history or the legacy of the past (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992,
p. 113, 136; De Nooy, 2003, pp. 317–319; see also Bottero & Crossley, 2011). While inter-
actions may define the present moment as an ongoing social situation, individuals have
already developed by that time a certain habitus, thus making for a certain inertia. This
is to say that the forces coming into play whenever individuals meet with each other
have their roots outside of that immediate encounter. For Bourdieu, the way an actor
interacts with other actors in personal settings is the function of something else, namely
the interplay between an actor’s position in the field and his habitus. For this reason, Bour-
dieu’s theory is best understood as a form of co-determinism (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 374,
384, 386, pp. 436–437). The actor’s position in the field presents that actor with certain
possibilities. It is then up to the actor to try to realize one or some of these possibilities.
For this selection, the actor is ‘guided’ by his habitus as extended practice shaped the
actor’s trajectory so far. In that sense, individuals do not lose or absorb themselves in
their present situations; rather they are constantly looking beyond them, thinking about
their next moves and pursuing long-term strategies. Finally, by realizing the potentialities
that their position has to offer, actors simultaneously ‘make something of themselves’ and
achieve symbolic power in the eyes of the others. All along though, the actual source of
that power remains for Bourdieu the entire field as objective structure (e.g. Bourdieu,
1992, p. 375).
While Bourdieu’s ideas have been interpreted in different ways (correctly or not), this
debate leaves untouched the articulation between social space and social groups that I
want to focus on. Positions in social space are to be occupied by individuals and individ-
uals in the same position can then associate themselves so as to form one group. Granted,
6 J.-S. GUY

Bourdieu warns us about the difference between class on paper and class in reality. There is
a risk for the researcher as an external observer to see a group where there is none, for
groups do not emerge automatically whenever a large enough number of individuals hap-
pen to share the same conditions: it is up to the individuals themselves to present them-
selves as one group, while this self-styling process must be carried out by the concerned
actors amidst the competition with other actors in the same field (Bourdieu, 1985; Wac-
quant, 2013).
But even though the outcomes are not guaranteed and therefore variable, so that
researchers must yield to empirical observations on a case-by-case basis, Bourdieu’s
model is such that his analysis will inevitably be ‘reminiscent’ of differences between
groups. Secondary literature on the operationalization of Bourdieu’s model (Anheier
et al., 1995; Lebaron, 2009; Lebaron & Le Roux, 2013) or the compatibility between his
research method (correspondence analysis) and other methods (De Nooy, 2003) confirms
this. Yet this is not a hard criticism of Bourdieu’s sociology or a direct attack against it.
That is, I do not mean to suggest that Bourdieu is mistaken or that he fails to observe accu-
rately what he says he wants to observe. My point is simply that observing what Bourdieu
claims to be observing for our benefit is not everything there is for us to observe in social
reality. Naturally enough, to observe something different, we must look for something else
than groups based on positions in social space occupied by individuals. This brings me to
the questions I want to raise here: must social space be conceived in topological terms
exclusively? Can we not admit other types of social space? What could these other
types be exactly?

From groups to flows

In this section, I proceed to alter Bourdieu’s sociological model so as to extract an alterna-
tive approach to social space out of it. In Bourdieu’s sociology, different social groups mark
as many regions in space. To put it the other way around, social groups constitute space as
composed of many regions linked together like neighborhoods. All points in space belong
to one region or another. There is no point in space that is not included in one region or
another. For this reason, individuals are absorbed by their positions. All individuals must
occupy one position or another. An individual without a position is impossible. Conver-
sely, for positions to exist, they must be effectively occupied. A position without an occu-
pant has no reality. The lesson here is that we can construct a different geometry by
transforming the interconnections between individuals, groups and space. My main strat-
egy toward this goal is to replace groups with flows.
The concept of ‘space of flows’ has been discussed previously in the sociological litera-
ture on globalization (Castells, 1996; see also Appadurai, 1996; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt,
& Perraton, 1999; Rey & Ritzer, 2010; Urry, 2000). In this context, flows have been primar-
ily understood in reference to international networks which in turn have been conceptu-
alized in opposition with state territories. A state’s territory is all the space there is within
its own boundaries. Outside these boundaries lie other states with their own territories.
Consequently, the world map appears to us as a patchwork of many different colors,
which one sovereign state for each patch of color. In that sense, territories fill up space.
By contrast, networks project or embody a very different form of spatial organization
since they are made out of relations between nodes that need not be contiguous or
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 7

physically close to each other. In the case of globalization, we are indeed looking at social
activities (global finance, free trade exchanges, patterns of international migration, cultural
hybridity, etc.) that connect places located in different states on different continents. It is
therefore appropriate to speak of networks when examining globalization. We call flows
whatever circulates within these networks from one node to the other, be it money, com-
modities, ideas, germs or living human beings.
As for myself, I wish to talk about flows without referring to networks. It is enough for
me that things are in movement, i.e. that a traffic is created and that this traffic can vary in
speed and volume. Points of origin and points of arrival play no role in my model. For
more clarity, imagine the flow of vehicles on a highway. Such a flow can be sliced up in
multiple sections. Now it is possible for a traffic jam to occur at one section of the flow.
The jam really marks a section of the flow itself – as opposed to a section of the highway
as infrastructure – inasmuch as it coincides with an increase of volume and a change of
speed for the vehicles. What I want to bring into relief is this congestion phenomenon
inside the flow. What is most significant for me is that this phenomenon can continue
to exist even though the vehicles that enter the congestion zone eventually manage to
cross it and leave it. The traffic jam will endure in time as a distinct section along the
flow if more vehicles continue to penetrate in it while others exit out of it. This is a meta-
phor of course since I do not want study vehicles driving on the road – or at least not only
that! The metaphor is important for me though as it indicates something real – the traffic
jam as a phenomenon extending in time – that cannot be tied back in a direct manner to
specific individuals (with their habitus, their trajectories, their resources measured in capi-
tals, etc.). To repeat, the vehicles making up the congestion zone may never be the same:
they can each enter the jam, cross it, leave it and never come back so long as other vehicles
replace them immediately, thus feeding the traffic jam and sustaining its existence via a
continuous turnover effect.
A good example of social phenomena that is best understood in terms of flows is the
diffusion of technologies. A technology is diffusing itself as more and more individuals
within a population use that technology. All along, individual users may have many differ-
ent reasons for adopting that technology. Simultaneously, there might be other individuals
who are abandoning the same technology. Beyond these individual choices and personal
motivations, we can actually calculate the rate of diffusion, i.e. how fast (or how slow) the
technology is diffusing. What I describe as a flow is not only the level of diffusion at any
one moment in time, but also whether this level happens to be rising or falling.
To the extent that a technology’s level of diffusion is on the rise, we can envision this
phenomenon like a wave in motion. We may tend to think that new technologies simply
replace older ones, but in fact there is no technological system that exists completely on its
own. Thus technological systems develop amidst other technological systems. Accord-
ingly, the diffusion of any new technology finds support on the preliminary diffusion of
other older technologies, like a wave riding on another wave. In turn, the latest technol-
ogies will eventually enable the development of even newer technologies. As everybody
knows, the increasing use of personal computers in the 1980s made possible the increasing
use of the Internet in the 1990s, while the latter made possible the increasing use of social
media platforms at the beginning of the new millennium. Finally, all of the above paved
the way for the increasing use of smart phones in 2010s. Today, the pervading presence
of these technologies is such that it spurs teachers and instructors to change the way
8 J.-S. GUY

they engage students in the classroom. A wave is never fixed, but always moving. What is
important is not the wave’s position at any moment in time, but whether its trajectory is
rising up or falling down: not the point on a graph in a Cartesian plane, but the slope of the
curve at that point.
Another example of social phenomena that takes on the form of a flow, or a succession
of flows, is the evolution of modern legal systems. As Luhmann explains (2004), legal sys-
tems are autopoietic systems. Their function in modern society is to produce decisions so
as to distinguish between what is legal and what is not. Any decision produced by a legal
system must refer to the other decisions previously made inside the same system. Any case
brought in front of the tribunals can potentially create a precedent if it alters the interpret-
ation of the law that has been prevailing until then. The system evolves when the decisions
produced in the present modify the decisions produced in the past. The whole process
does not stop with the decision itself though. What is necessary is for that decision to
be replicated again and again throughout the system in order to launch a wave which
will open the door for more transformations in the future. The duplication of that decision
amounts to the creation of a flow inside the system. As with technology diffusion, we
notice that change happen incrementally, which each new flow finding support on the pre-
vious flows.
The evolution of scientific knowledge can also be understood in terms of flows. Science
does not progress by uncovering the Truth with a capital T, but moves from one problem
to another (Kuhn, 2012). That is, science periodically undermines itself. However, this
cycle is more than a simple oscillation between normal science and crisis or revolution.
What is essential for the solution of any problem to release new possibilities for the pur-
pose of scientific activities: new research objects, new methods, new hypotheses, and so on.
There is more: the transformation of scientific knowledge requires not only new discov-
eries (how to solve the problem of the day), but also the transmission of these discoveries.
In other words, we are not only dealing with pure ideas or pure propositions (which turn
out to be either true or false, correct or incorrect), but with the rate of diffusion of these
ideas. Internally, science is animated by the circulation of many different ideas competing
with each other. For any idea to become prevalent, it must diffuse itself across the scientific
system or the scientific community faster or deeper than any other one. But an idea only
becomes ‘dominant’ (as a flow) so as to lead to the development of still more ideas (more
flows).
Finally, for a fourth example of flows, we just have to think about economic inflation.
As consumers continue to pay for the goods and the services that they use, the cost of liv-
ing begins to rise up. Inflation is a flow made possible by other flows. We only live in the
present and yet this one point of time is constantly moving.
I must remind the reader that my goal is not to prove Bourdieu wrong, but to enlarge
our intellectual horizon by making room for sociological forms for which Bourdieu’s con-
cept of social space is poorly adapted as an analytical tool. I am not suggesting that soci-
ologists have to choose in a dramatic fashion between groups and flows. Social reality
involves both. The challenge is to properly distinguish them. Sociologists have long trained
to detect the existence of social groups – and with good reasons, for social groups are real!
As a result of this, however, sociologists have become prone to a particular kind of scien-
tific mistake: intellectual laziness. Now that sociologists have become experts in detecting
social groups, lots of them come to believe that they have detected everything there is in
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 9

social reality and that there is nothing left for them to detect! Sociologists have become
content with what they already know. They have lost their curiosity, so much so that
they are falling victims of their own lack of imagination. It is this mistake that I want
to correct in this paper.

Four differences
If flows are different than groups, how can we define the former’s properties in contrast
with the latter’s? What must be modified in Bourdieu’s model (focusing on groups occu-
pying different positions) to open up the alternative approach that I am talking about
(focusing on flows disconnected from specific individuals)? What are the knobs in Bour-
dieu’s model that must be manipulated to precipitate a switch from topology to Euclidean
geometry? I shall offer an answer to these questions in four points.
First, whereas the concept of group stresses inequalities between individuals (a differ-
ence, however benign, must be enforced and maintained between insiders and outsiders
or between members and non-members), the concept of flow treat all of them as equal.
In a world of flows, differences do not disappear entirely, of course, although they are
no longer attributed to individuals and enacted by individuals in their relations with
others. Instead, differences are ascribed to flows inasmuch as they continuously vary.
Contrary to groups – and this is already my second point – flows are matters of speed,
volume, density. They are accelerating or decelerating, expanding or shrinking down. It is
true that any group can be large or small. However, groups of different sizes embody the
same logic: they each establish an identity for their members to share or fight over. The
number of members in a group – whether the group is large or small – does not alter
this logic. On the other hand, flows of different speeds or different volumes are really
different as flows.
The first two points are closely connected. We see that it is necessary to grant equality to
all individuals so that we can use them as measuring units for determining the speed and
volume of any flow at any moment. The sort of equality that I have in mind is purely oper-
ational. As explained earlier, a flow arises when multiple individuals relay each other to
replay the same punctual operation over and over again. The flow is brought to life by
the movement of individuals, yet the flow itself is not exactly the same as this movement.
More precisely, the flow is born out of the repetition of the same operation. Individuals are
seen as equal to each other because what matters in this perspective is the operation itself
and nothing else. But even repetition of the same operation allows for variation. For
instance, the operation can repeat itself at a pace that goes faster and faster or slower
and slower. The operation can be produced (or released, like a signal) by one source
only or more and more sources at the same time.
My last two points are reminiscent of Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘dividual’ (1992).
Referring to Foucault’s works of discipline, Deleuze notes that since the late twentieth cen-
tury individuals are no longer regulated as parts of a mass. Rather they are decomposed
and recomposed through information or data series made available about them thanks
to the dissemination of codes operating with the help of computers. The general objective
at the societal level is not to achieve surveillance over all individuals, but to steer each of
them toward his or her self-transformation by making use of these series (i.e. these flows)
that keeps varying. Deleuze suggests that the individual does not stand in opposition to
10 J.-S. GUY

these series like he previously stood in opposition to the mass understood as totality. In
today’s ‘society of control’, we must abandon the concept of individual in itself and replace
it with that of dividual, considering how human beings have been turned into a pliable
substance.
Albeit inelegant, Deleuze’s concept of dividual is nonetheless a good expression of what
I have in mind myself, although I do not embrace the rest of Deleuze’s reflection in his text.
Unlike Deleuze, I do not envision society as moving along a linear sequence by going
through different ‘types’ (from sovereignty, to discipline, to control). Moreover, I do
not fully share Deleuze’s critical concerns. To keep things simple, let me just say that I
do not conceive the transition from individual to dividual as a moral catastrophe. What
I find most interesting in the concept of dividual is not primarily the decomposition
side (the end of the individual, which admittedly evokes a loss of humanity), but that
side and the other side, namely the composition of series as a positive event along with
their subsequent recompositions. In other words, decomposition must be understood as
a prerequisite for recombination (Luhmann, 1989, p. 79), which is the power of flows
as I define them here. The point is not so much, or not only, that ‘the individual’ is decom-
posed, as if he was turned into subatomic particles (bits of information), but that the pro-
duct of this decomposition can be then used as construction material to erect social
structures like flows.
This brings me to my third point. For a group to be properly constituted, individuals
must be mobilized on a permanent basis or else for an indefinite period of time. It is indeed
the pairing of one individual to another (and another, and another, etc.) that creates the
group. In a flow however, individuals are not mobilized permanently or indefinitely, but
for a brief instant only. What is expected of individuals is not that they adopt a social iden-
tity or that they embrace a predetermined lifestyle (so as to demonstrate their membership
to the other individuals inside the group as well as to the other individuals outside of it),
but that they do what has to be done for the operation feeding the flow to be completed.
Individuals are not even asked to come back afterwards! Other individuals will come and
relay them – and then leave as well …
My fourth point is a slight variation on the previous one. As we have seen, individuals
do not have the same temporal relation with flows as with groups, since individuals do
not ‘take residence’ in flows in the same way that they attach themselves to groups and
use them as ‘addresses.’ We can make the same point by looking at the way human bodies
are ‘put to work’ in the construction of flows or groups. In groups, the body is used in its
totality or as one block. If groups compose as many regions in space, then my body can
only occupy one region at a time. Once I become the member of a group, I cease to be a
non-member of that same group. I cannot be a member and a non-member simul-
taneously. My body must be integrated within the group, along with the other members’
bodies, or it must fall on the other side of the fence, namely the other regions in space.
Things are different with flows. A flow does not ‘grab’ one’s entire body, but ‘runs
through’ a part of it: the one part that is involved in the operation feeding the flow.
Put differently, flows are not made out of masses of generic bodies, but of series of
specialized acts.
This brings us back to my second point above: flows vary in a way that groups do not.
While there are many particular groups in social reality, all of them function in a similar
fashion on a general level: all of them project a collective identity on their members by
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 11

setting up a symbolic boundary between them and non-members. Through this organiz-
ation, a social space is created as divided into zones constituting different positions. On the
other hand, flows are distinct from each other insofar as metric differences (size, volume,
speed, etc.) cannot be ignored anymore: if one flow is going at a lesser or a greater speed
than the next one, it follows that these two flows are not behaving in the same way. By
opposition, even though we can make a difference between small groups and large groups,
this does not imply that the two groups are obeying different logics. The conclusion is that,
while flows are sensitive to metric differences, groups react to nonmetric differences only
(Guy, 2017).
Nonmetric differences are intrinsic properties whereas metric differences are extrinsic
properties. Flows indicate a Euclidean geometry because their properties entail a space at
level N + 1. This space is larger than any flows; all flows are contained within it. This space
actually consists in the coordinate system that accompanies the production of operations
feeding each flow (like the distinction legal/illegal as master code in the legal system
according to Niklas Luhmann to use that example again). Hence the properties of the
flows (see Appendix for a recapitulation of the four points discussed in the text) are sim-
ultaneously the properties of the operations behind these flows. In a space of flows, the
specificities of operations take priority over the identity of the operators.

Conclusion
I insist that the space of flows is no less real than the space of groups. Moreover, the space
of flows is just as much social in nature as its counterpart. We are looking at different
points in space, but rather than imagining these points as being occupied by individuals,
like Bourdieu wants us to do, we can think of these points as ‘holes’ through which indi-
viduals are passing (flowing) through. ‘Passing through’ means performing the operation
feeding a flow. Without individuals, there would be no flows. Nevertheless, the character-
istics of these flows are not to be confused with the characteristics of the individuals feed-
ing them. Flows create a reality of their own alongside the reality of groups, because these
flows cannot be stopped or diverted at will. It takes time and energy to achieve this. In
addition, attempts made at changing flows are likely to trigger unintended consequences
– with real effects!
Having distinguished flows from groups, let me finish by examining how they might
interact since they coexist in social reality. Above all, I content that flows are just as active
as groups are. Accordingly, we must consider at least four types of interaction:

(1) The impact of one group on another group.

(2) The impact of groups on flows.
(3) The impact of flows on groups.
(4) The impact of one flow on another flow.

The first case is obvious: it is not unusual for groups to enter in conflict with each other,
especially when they are competing for the same resources or if they stand for cultural
values that contradict each other. On other occasions, groups can also cooperate together
if they have a common interest to do so.
12 J.-S. GUY

The second case is non-problematic as well: groups can try to block or unblock flows as
a strategy to achieve their own objectives. In this perspective, flows are like ‘external
resources’ that groups manipulate instrumentally.
The third case displaces this actor-centric perspective: now flows can be seen as ‘histori-
cal conjunctures’ influencing the rise or demise of social groups. This connects with the
first case, for the fate of any group must be appreciated in relation with that of the
other groups around it: if one group is winning the war, another one must be losing it.
It is really the fourth case that is the most special. In fact, it is this case which justifies the
entire project behind this paper. Why does it matter to forge a Euclidean sociology out of
Bourdieu’s topological model? It is very important because we can now see that groups, as
collective actors or aggregate of individual actors, do not hold a monopoly on social
change. There are situations where social change is triggered by the action of flows
alone. This is the fourth case that I want to talk about: when flows transform themselves
in contact with other flows.
Flows are heterogeneous. As with the diffusion of technologies, any flow exists among
many other flows. Furthermore, flows react to each other. When two flows intersect, they
can either inhibit or stimulate each other. Since flows are already in movement to start
with, they can either push against each other or pull one another in the same direction.
This relation between flows happens instantaneously whether social actors are aware of
it or not. That is, even though flows still depends on human beings to carry them, they
are not bound by the latter’s understanding of them. As in the case of a traffic jam on
the highway, the individual car drivers cannot figure out the situation as a whole: they
can only see what is happening in front of them and whether they can step on the accel-
erator or must apply the break.
In sum, groups and flows offer different perspectives on social situations. Both perspec-
tives are available within the same situation insofar as both are implied in the construction
of that situation. As perspectives, groups and flows reveal their own features in reverse. On
one side, when the actors engaged in a situation take a group-perspective on themselves,
they envision their reality in extrinsic terms – even though topology sets up intrinsic
characteristics! This is in accordance with Bourdieu’s ideas. As explained, Bourdieu
wants to demonstrate that ‘the dominants’ do not dominate naturally by the virtue of
their inherent personal qualities. Domination is a matter of relations or differences
between positions in social space. The power of the dominants – their symbolic capital,
charisma or prestige – does not exist extrinsically, as if power was something like an innate
talent. Power is intrinsic in the sense that it is coextensive with the entire structure of social
space. However, for the actors inside that space, the power of the dominants is really
experienced as something that they ‘possess’ in individuals.
On the other side, when actors take a flow-perspective on the situation they are in, they
envision their reality in intrinsic terms – even though Euclidean geometry defines objects
extrinsically. What matters is not the difference between positions in social space, but the
flows’ instantaneous measurements, which actors may ignore but cannot deny. Unlike the
so-called dominants who do not really possess the power we think they have, a flow really
possesses a speed for instance. That speed defines an essential aspect of that flow.
At any moment, it is always possible for an observer to ‘cut’ the flow, i.e. to suspend its
movement in order to search for the causes at the source of it. However, this is cheating:
this is dealing with the fourth case by turning it into the second one. Of course, it is
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 13

plausible that certain groups benefit from the expansion of certain flows as in the third
case. However, by turning the fourth case into the second one, we betray the unique nature
of flows. Theirs is no ‘stop-and-go’ logic: flows do not ‘go on’ on the sole condition that
they continue to be supported by causes external to them, like the interests of certain
groups or the belief in certain values. Flows must be appreciated for their own spatial
(and temporal) qualities and this is why geometry is an appropriate metaphor. Since
space is variable, we can consider multiple types of space to distinguish between different
types of social phenomena. Topology is just one possibility (contra Bourdieu). Another
possibility is Euclidean geometry or the space of flows.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Jean-Sébastien Guy is assistant professor in the department of sociology and social anthropology at
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. He has published in Current Sociology, Current Perspec-
tives in Social Theory and the European Journal of Social Theory. He is currently writing a book
on the distinction between metric and nonmetric in sociology.

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Appendix

Table A1. Properties of groups and flows.

Groups (topology) Flows (Euclidean geometry)
1 Inequality (between members and non-members) Equality (between users or operators)
2 Nonmetric differences (e.g. identity) Metric differences (e.g. size, speed, volume)
3 Permanent use of body Temporary use of body
4 Use the entire body Use one part of the body only