Introduction:

In so far as the search for human happiness is concerned, it must be duly studied as to whether
all men can truly attain the said fulfillment or only a select few. It is, perhaps, more accurate for us to ask
whether the search for happiness and the final good is truly achievable or not. The search for happiness
actually brings about a bigger question. Can this happiness be universal? Or can it be attained only by
certain individuals? The problem arises because the search for happiness always involves a certain
resistance. Our desires seem endless and unquenchable. Satisfaction seemingly comes to us for but a
moment only, leaving us hungry and thirsty for more the next moment. Indeed, the restless heart must
truly fine that in which it might finally rest.

It must be said, however, that the most obvious and challenging resistance we might face is our
fellow-men. When we try to achieve our own happiness, we inevitably ‘step-over’, so to speak, our fellow
men’s rights. In such a case therefore, the enforcement of law is necessary. Ultimately, happiness is to be
sacrificed if we desire peace and order. But is such a goal really that difficult to achieve? Must happiness
really be sacrificed?

The former proposition, that which claims that enforcement of law is necessary in order to keep
peace, presupposes a very Hobbesian backdrop: man is essentially selfish, and that he needs the state to
regulate him. But even such a proposition which seemingly defines a more or less uniform natural
disposition of man is still ultimately reducible to the crux of relativism.

We can be more precise, however, if we try to discover a universal way of understanding things.
A system which is able to tell us that we do have freedom and that it is necessary that we pursue our
desires but that there is a defining factor to our capacity to freedom and pursuance of desire which is
indeed proper to us. This is precisely what St. Thomas’ Natural Law Theory provides us: a system which
will ensure us that “all men can conceivably achieve complete freedom”1 by defining the “natural
boundaries of action in the real conditions of life,”2 and thus ultimately strive for the goods and desires
appropriate to him so that he may be truly happy.

1
Thomas Aquinas, introduction to Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97, by Stanley Parry,
trans. English Dominican Fathers, (New York: Benziger Brothers Inc., 1947), ix.
2
Ibid., x
Background of the thinker: St. Thomas Aquinas and Medieval Scholasticism

At the start of the spread of Christianity, Plato’s philosophy has been a very crucial tool for the
development of Christian theology. His works provided Christians the necessary framework for their
advancements in terms of doctrine and dogma.3 From then on until the Medieval Ages, Platonism had
been a staple source for Catholic Christian philosophical and theological reflections.

However, when in the 8th century Islamic Spain was starting to develop, Aristotle’s influence over
those times’ scholars was becoming apparent. His philosophy, in the hands of the most notable Islamic
thinkers like Avicenna and Averroes, was the greatest legacy of Islamic Spain to Western thinking. In fact,
Avicenna was actually influential to St. Thomas’ development of philosophical thoughts.4

In 1245, St. Thomas arrived in Paris in order to study Aristotle. There, his teacher, Albert the Great,
recognized his talents and ushered him even further to the scholastic school of thought: Aristotle was to
be his guide. In the university, St. Thomas was exposed to Averroeists. He was impressed by their
passions, and admits that in some ways their conclusions may be valid. Ultimately however, he was
unconvinced as the followers of Averroes believed that religion is inferior to philosophical truths. Hence,
Ultimate truths cannot be known by ordinary people, and that religion is for them. For St. Thomas, the
message is the Gospels is meant for everyone. Likewise, every human beings deserve to know the whole
truth, the ultimate truths indeed. But the Averroists thesis was not simply a dispute between opposing
schools of thought in one university. This, in fact, is the primary presupposition that Faith and Reason are
always opposed to each other.5

Under the guidance of Albert the Great, Thomas began to learn Aristotle. Eventually, the angelic
doctor would begin to write prodigious commentaries on Aristotle’s works. Thus then, St. Thomas began
to synthesize Aristotle’s Philosophy, the representative of reason, and Christianity the representative of
faith.6 His Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles would total to over two million words. This
indeed is the product of a monumental reconciliation between learning and faith into one massive system
of thought.7

3
Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light: Plato Versus Aristotle, and the Struggle for the Soul of Western
Civilization, (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013), 151.
4
Ehsan Masood, Science and Islam: A History, (London: Icon Books, 2009), 77.
5
Herman, The Cave and the Light: Plato Versus Aristotle, and the Struggle for the Soul of Western
Civilization, 233.
6
Ibid., 234
7
Ibid.
Paradigmatic and Non-paradigmatic Natural Law

The Natural Law theory of Ethics I not actually exclusive to Aquinas and Aristotle. In fact, Cicero
and the Stoics, for example had their own views regarding the natural law.8 Perhaps it would be helpful
for us if, like St. Thomas himself, we would start by distinguishing between two schools of thought
involving the Natural Law theory.

The Paradigmatic Natural law has some primary presuppositions. We shall expound it thus:9

1. The natural law is of Divine Origin in that it has its source in God.
2. Its authority is universally binding among all men.
3. It can be known by man by reason of his rational nature.
4. It holds that good is prior to right.
5. It holds that right action is conformity to the good.
6. That an action may be defective with respect to the good.
7. And that all above can be formulated into some general rules.

The presuppositions above-mentioned are most notably observed in Thomistic Natural Law
ethics. In fact, St. Thomas Aquinas is considered one of the most historically important paradigmatic
natural theorist. Other thinkers also include Thomas Hobbes in the category.10

As already mentioned above, some thinkers actually follow a certain brand of natural law. These
thinkers may admit a universal way by which things are ordered, but they may not necessarily admit all
of the suppositions numbered above. These thinkers may be categorized as under the non-paradigmatic
natural law tradition. Philosophers who belong to this category may include John Duns Scotus, Francisco
Suarez, and John Locke.11

The distinctions we have mentioned above may not be so significant in this exposition. However,
upon closer examination, I have realized that the distinction must be made clear in order that I might
make St. Thomas’ Natural Law Ethics stand out.

8
Maryanne Cline Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes,” Journey
of the History of Ideas, 35 (1974): 3.
9
Mark Murphy, "The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-
ethics/>.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
 At this point, it might be clear already that the ethics involving natural law has become quite
obscured in various interpretations and studies. Such obscuring is by no means a chance product of a long
history of traditions and thoughts. It is inevitable that in a long standing line of ethical traditions, the
struggle to come up with a more or less perfect paradigm for human action should result to the upheaval
of traditional thinking.

In fact, if we are to enter into a discussion concerning natural law, it would immediately arise as
a problem for us the real meaning of natural law. To proceed carelessly would be to build up a house on
sand. With shaky grounds, we cannot properly speak of natural law as a firm ethical theory from which
human actions may refer to as guidelines.

But indeed, both the paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic school of natural law ethics can provide
us with the proper guidelines for a way of living. Is it not simply a bias that we enter a certain ethical
thought in the light of one thinker and disregard the others?

But if we shall proceed to make an exposition of both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic natural
law ethical schools, it would do anything but help us in our endeavor. In fact, like the stars at night so
obscured already by the city-lights and becoming completely invisible in the night sky when covered by
the clouds, the ethical thought which we are now trying to set upon the world will ultimately be dismissed
as non-sense and obscure.

There is then a need for us to find a better way of proceeding. Evidently now, it is time for our
Philosopher to stand out. Indeed, “if any moral theory is a theory of natural law, it is Aquinas’ (every
introductory ethics anthology that includes material on natural law includes material by or about Aquinas;
every encyclopedia article on natural law thought refers to Aquinas).”12

Hence, if we are to make an exposition concerning natural law, we ought to consult one of the
most systematic thinkers who adhered to the ethical school of thought.

St. Thomas Aquinas should give us the grounds for such exposition. Of course, the Aristotelian
influence over our thinker should not be overlooked. It should therefore be fitting for us to consult
Thomas’ and Aristotle’s works for our primary sources.

12
Ibid.
Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Metaphysics and the Natural Law

Philosophers and historians are spontaneous in their chorus that Aristotle is the father of natural
law.13 And while this may be a contestable claim,14 it cannot be ignored that Aristotle has indeed espoused
a certain order of thinking which would more or less lean on the premises of the existence of a more or
less universally binding rule of action. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle proceeds by first distinguishing between
particular law and universal law. For him, particular laws are promulgated by the community and is applied
to its members. However, he ultimately points out that all men are still bound by the same universal rules
even if these men be alien to one another. This universal law, Aristotle says, is the law of nature or natural
law.15

Nature, however, as universally binding, must be understood in a metaphysical sense. Those who
might not be acquainted with Aristotelian metaphysics might not fully grasp the term. Upon spontaneous
conviction, nature might first and foremost remind us of trees, animals, and the environment as a whole.
Law of nature in this light becomes simply the way by which Mother Nature normally takes its course.
While this understanding may guide us in our acts in relation with the environment, it is not helpful when
it comes to acts involving our fellow men. Ultimately, this understanding of nature will not be able to give
us the proper guidelines as to what could constitute a good or evil act.

What then is this nature which is universally binding? At this point, it shall be seen that St. Thomas
Aquinas actually takes from Aristotle his thoughts concerning natural law. In his work On Being and
Essence, Aquinas relates essence and nature.16 For St. Thomas, as an echo to Aristotle, essence is that
which constitutes the common nature of things which account for their being put into the same
categorization.17 Thus, the intellect apprehends the essence of a thing in order to know what a thing is.18
Proceeding thus from this understanding, another name for essence would also be nature. Essence takes
the name of nature when it pertains to the root of the proper operations to which a thing is ordained to

13
Max Salomon Shellens, “Aristotle on Natural Law” (1959), Natural Law Forum, Paper 40,
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/40, 72.
14
Aristotle himself points out that Sophocles’ play Antigone has more or less provided us with the idea of
a natural law as expounded on his Rhetoric.
15
Aristotle, “Rhetorica,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: Modern Library,
2001), 1370.
16
Thomas Aquinas “On Being and Essence,” in Medieval Philosohy: Essential Readings with Commentary,
ed. Gyula Klima (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 228.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid., 229
act.19 This understanding of the Metaphysics behind nature should now serve as our background for this
exposition.

Defining Natural Law:

We start by defining the term ‘natural’.

As already exposed above, essence, when pertaining to the root of the proper operations of the
thing in so far as they can be known in themselves according to their operations, is called nature. Hence,
by natural we mean here something which pertains to what is proper to a thing as ordained by its nature,
i.e. that which is the root of the thing’s operations.20

Further, by natural we do not only mean the root of a thing’s operations. As also exposed above
already, nature is that which is apprehended by the intellect so that it may know things as they are
properly in themselves. Hence, by natural, we mean those which are known by all with the faculty of
reason in so far as reason is able to apprehend nature.

We proceed to the term ‘law’.

Law may be translated in Latin as ‘lex’. This lex is derived from another Latin word which means
to bind: ‘ligare,’ because it binds one to act.21 Law therefore must have such a force as to give certain
obligations and restraints to man.22 But St. Thomas properly defines law as an “ordinance of reason for
the common good, made by him who has care for the community, and promulgated.”23

The above definitions are not actually independent of each other. In fact, St. Tomas’ definition of
law presupposes nature. While at the moment this might not seem apparent, let it suffice first for us to
say that an ordinance of reason presupposes obviously the role of reason apprehending and promulgating
law. Now, nature, insofar as it is essence, is apprehended by the intellect.24 The mind therefore knows
things according to what they are in themselves, and thus too the operations of the thing. This is simply
speculative reason at work. But at this point, seeing nature as common to a specific genus, reason must
unequivocally realize that the good too must be common for all insofar as they belong to the same genus.

19
Ibid.
20
See previous paragraphs.
21
Aquinas, Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97, trans. The English Dominican Fathers
(New York: Benziger Brothers Inc., 1947), 3.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid, 10-11.
24
Aquinas, On Being and Essence, 228.
 If, therefore, law is to seek the common good, the mind which makes binding laws must first
apprehend the nature of things. Only then can practical reason proceed to deliberate as to what action to
take. This then is the way by which law becomes an ordinance of reason.

Eternal Law, Natural Law, Human Law and Divine Law

While it might suffice for some to posit things as they are in themselves as the source for their
own perfection, the Christian that St. Thomas was needed a more ultimate answer, an answer that is
immanent and transcendent. And indeed, it shall be asked, “Why are things in such and such a way rather
than in those and that way?” Why indeed? For if things are ordained to act in a particular manner in
accordance to its nature, there must be that someone who primarily ordained everything accordingly
from eternity independent of time.25 This someone we know as God. Thus, all things are subject to that
Eternal Law which pre-ordains everything in so far as all things can be known by God in His all-knowing
nature. Nature, then, is ordained as such insofar as things partake in the Eternal Law.26 Natural Law,
therefore, as a product of man’s reason and apprehension of natures, must in some way, have access to
the Eternal Law. St. Thomas thus defines natural law in relation to the Eternal Law: “…natural law is
nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the Eternal Law.”27

But of course, a rule of action according to general principles based on those sanctioned by the
natural law cannot possibly have a uniform application in all particular cases.28 This is because human
reason cannot have a total participation in the divine law.29 Thus, it must be left to practical reason to
judge accordingly the proper way to deal with certain situations. This then necessitates the devising of
laws which takes into consideration other essential conditions observed by the human intellect. This law
is Human Law.30

However, it is not enough that we enact human laws according to the general principles of the
natural law. St. Thomas explains that there is still a need for a divine law.31 To this he cites four reasons.
(1) man is ordained to a higher end: eternal happiness. This can only be achieved through conformity with
the Divine Law. (2) Because man is imperfect, his judgments are bound to err. Therfore, in order for him

25
Aquinas, Treatise on Law Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97, 12.
26
Ibid., 15
27
Ibid., 16
28
Ibid., 19
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 18
31
Ibid., 20
to truly know what is right from wrong, he must be directed by the law given by God, i.e. Divine Law. (3)
Man cannot perfectly achieve virtue by himself. There is then a need for a Divine Law. (4) Since human
law cannot forbid all evil, Divine Law must intervene in this case.

Synderesis: The first principle of Practical Reason

First principles, I should say, are those principles from which the intelligibility of things proceed.
In which case, as the mind knows being primarily, so it should understand immediately that a being cannot
be a non-being at the same time and under the same respect.32 Speculative reason works this way insofar
as it is speculative reason, i.e. that practical reason also works accordingly in some first principles of
intelligibility of action.

But intelligibility can only come from being. Now St. Thomas says that every being, in so far as it
is being, is good because it possess in some way a certain perfection (Iae Q. V. Art. III). Now the intellect,
being able to apprehend being, should also be able to apprehend good. What is good, is therefore, known
first in the contact with being. Now perfection implies desirability and goodness (Iae Q. V. Art. III). In as
much as knowledge of being moves the intellect to know, and this therefore means that being perfects
the intellect, so also does good perfects the intellect. Good, then implies the aspect of an end (Iae Q. V.
Art. IV). A thing is good for another insofar as it is able to perfect the nature of another.

An act, therefore, may also be being insofar as it is good. But an act can only have being if it has
at least form. And what is form but the intelligibility of a thing? We are only able to grasp things if they
are determined in some way. Form is precisely that determination from which our definition and
understanding of things come from.33 What then is the form of an act? What is the principle of
intelligibility of acts?

This, then is Synderesis: that “good is to be done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided.”34 This
first principle of practical reason is the measure by which we are able to understand the intelligibility of
an action. For, if an action, even when deemed evil, is seen as good, is still an action done out of the
thought that a good is to come about from the act. Hence, if one were to hurt oneself with the thought
of only hurting himself, such a person is labeled as ‘abnormal.’ But even then, the masochists would hurt

32
Ibid., 59
33
Aristotle, Physica, 237.
34
Aquinas, Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97, 59-60.
themselves not solely because of their desire for pain, but because they take pleasure in pain. Indeed,
actions are always done in view of an end thought to be good.

But Synderesis does not so much apply to physical and sensual good as to the moral good. It must
first be asked what goods are and do we actually know these goods.

Knowledge of Basic Goods and Natural Good

Let us first review the good as mentioned above. We start with the premise that every being is
good insofar as these beings have in themselves a certain perfection (Iae Q. V. Art. III). It is this perfection
which is apprehended by the intellect. Being, therefore, perfects the intellect. Now, insofar as being is
also good, then good perfects the intellect. Good, too, is apprehended by the intellect. Therefore, if all
things exist, insofar as they exist, then they are good. And if all things35are good, then all that we are able
to know must be in one way or another good. This good which we apprehend is found in the nature of
things.

Now this nature is the root of a thing’s operations. But good also implies perfection and end (Iae
Q. V. Art. IV). And this is so because good is able to perfect nature. If nature, then is good, then it must
perfect, or at least facilitate the operations of a thing. Every agent, then acts towards that good which
should facilitate its own operations36 and perfect its own nature.

From our desire to have facilitation give in us a natural inclination to some basic goods. These
basic goods are not just deduced from some of our operations. They are, in fact, primary and evident
operations of man.

Firstly, that every being is always inclined to preserve itself and promote its own good. Whatever,
then, is a means at preserving life and promoting it must be desired by us, and anything which may impede
and become an obstacle to preserving life must be shunned.37

Second, there are in men somethings which nature has preordained in his operations insofar as
he is rational and animal.38 For example, animality dictates that we ought to desire sexual intercourse and
that rationality dictates that we ought to desire knowledge.

35
By thing here, we mean anything existing.
36
Aquinas, Treatise on Law Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97, 59.
37
Ibid., 60
38
Ibid.
 Lastly, there is in men an inclination to what is naturally good without conditions.39 Thus, St
Thomas proceeds to say that man always seeks a meaning higher than him. This explains man’s desire to
stull ultimately seek ultimate causes and underlying principles in the universe. Some still, desire to know
themselves better so that they may put meaning in their lives.

Virtue and the Rational Action

It must be said that since the natural is found in the hearts of men, then men must always be
inclined to the good.40 Hence, man are always inclined to virtue. Virtue, we must remember, derives its
goodness from the rule of reason, i.e. to be in the mean means reason has the appropriate control over
the passions (Iae IIae Q. LXIV Art. I). If this is so, then virtue must be and consequently the desire for good
also, must be in all men as all men are rational.

But of course, the fact that we all err in our moral judgment can always mean that not all men are
sufficiently rational. But is this really the case? St. Thomas answers this by making clear the distinction
between the practical intellect and the speculative intellect.41 For the speculative intellect, by means of
the first principles, conclusions are always uniform and the same for all even when it is not known to all.
For practical reason, this same thinking can only apply to the general.42

The conclusions proper to practical reason may not be the same rectitude applied to all.43 The
principles will, as we begin to descend to more particular situation, begin to become obscure, and will
begin to lose the character or particularity. Hence, it must be said that right action in all cases are not
necessarily the same.

How then must one proceed in various circumstances? At this point, St. Thomas offers us an
equally obscure answer. While he does not directly states this, this is what I seem to gather in his works.
Right action, must be rational. By rational here, I do not only mean an action carefully thought about.
Indeed, reason is always inclined to the good so that it ought to do actions which are truly and morally
good, and not merely good according to some exigence. Thus, the rational action must always be that
action proceeding from the desire to do what is truly good.

39
Ibid., 60-61
40
Ibid., 62
41
ibid., 66
42
Ibid., 66
43
Ibid.
 At this point, we now try to see whether we can have an infusion of the natural law into the
guidelines or rules used in English as Second Language Teaching. Below are the guidelines for ESL teaching.
DO
Use clear, normal speech in communicating
with ESL students. Moderate your speed if
you are a fast talker. It may be necessary to
repeat yourself or rephrase what you said.
Help to shape what the student wants to say.
Use non-verbal cues (such as gestures,
pictures and concrete objects) in your
teaching to assist comprehension.
Make sure that ESL students are seated
where they can see and hear well. Provide
them with maximum access to the
instructional and linguistic input that you are
providing. Involve them in some manner in
all classroom activities.
Fill your classroom environment with print
and with interesting things to talk about and
read and write about. Creating a language-
rich environment will allow your ESL students
to learn even when you aren’t directly
teaching them.
Keep in mind that the English to which ESL
students are exposed in your classroom is of
crucial importance to their language
development.
DON'T
Don’t use unnatural speech with ESL students,
such as baby talk, shouting or excessively slow
talking. Avoid using too many idioms or
colloquialisms.
Don’t assume that ESL students always
understand what you are saying or that they
are already familiar with school customs and
procedures (even if they act as if they do!)
Don’t separate and isolate students away from
the rest of the class - physically or
instructionally.
Don’t limit your ESL students’ access to
authentic, "advanced" materials (like library
books or magazines) in the belief that these
materials are too "hard" for them. If materials
are interesting, students at all levels will be able
to use them to learn English.
Don’t treat English as a separate subject for ESL
students to learn only in ESL lessons.
Encourage ESL students’ efforts to
participate by celebrating their contributions
and searching out opportunities for them to
take part directly in learning activities. But
allow for the "silent period" that some
students go through.
Correct the content of what they say, if
necessary.
Provide opportunities for ESL students to use
the language and concepts you are teaching
them in meaningful situations. Include a
variety of ways of participating in your
instruction, e.g. in cooperative groups.
Encourage all students to work with and help
ESL students.
Try to create opportunities for ESL students
to be successful. Praise their achievements.
Treat ESL students as full members of the
classroom community. Help them to feel
comfortable and integrate them as quickly as
possible. Refer to them often and make it
clear to them (and to the class) that you
expect them to work and learn just like
everyone else. Then ask for more and more
participation and work as these students
become able to accomplish it.
Learn as much about ESL students as you
can. The more you learn about them and
their backgrounds, the easier it will be for
you to incorporate them into your classroom,
and thereby enrich the lives and learning of
all the students.
Don’t put ESL students on the spot by asking
them to participate (e.g., give an answer in
front of the rest of the class) before they are
ready.
Don’t directly correct the grammar or
pronunciation of what they say. This may lead
to decreased participation and learning.
Don’t feed your ESL students on a diet of
worksheets.
Don’t laugh at their mistakes, however well-
intentioned you may be, or make jokes at their
expense. Do not allow other students to belittle
ESL students.
Don’t confuse low English proficiency with low
intelligence or lack of experience. Most ESL
students are normal cognitively and bring the
same rich set of feelings, experiences and ideas
to the classroom as their native-speaking peers.
They also bring many first language literacy
skills that can be transferred to their work in
the English language.
Don’t confuse low English-speaking proficiency
or lack of knowledge of the classroom culture
with uncooperativeness. If students can’t
understand what you want them to do or they
have never done it before, they will have
difficulties in carrying out your wishes.
 Relax! ESL students have a specific need but not an insurmountable disability. With a little patience,
kindness and determination on your part, you can play a large role in the ESL student’s successful
integration into the school and his or her language development!

Adapted from: Enright. (1992) Supporting Children’s English Language Development (Focus on the
Learner). Prentice Hall.

Natural Law and ESL

It would be humorous of course if we would suddenly insert in the guidelines some premises
pertaining to natural law ethics. A seemingly careful and academically inclined guideline which focuses on
the learner seems for us a remote topic for natural law. However, upon closer analysis, these guidelines
actually reveal to us some of the aspirations of ESL.

First, the desire to make the learners comfortable in learning English. In fact, all of the guidelines
above can be reducible to that one premise: make learning the English language comfortable and
facilitated among foreigners. We then automatically see a good earlier described in the natural law. A
facilitation of operations, in this case the operation of learning. But learning is the activity of reason.
Hence, the facilitation offered by ESL teaching is not just any good. It is in fact a natural good.

The scope of the effect of the natural law is also strengthened in this case. If people of other
nationalities i.e. people of different customs and cultures would indeed learn from the ESL system of
teaching, it will be seen that what is good may be more or less uniform among the species of humanity.
St. Thomas is thus right when he establishes the good as common among things belonging to the same
genus.

Moreover, the desire for learning reveals to us a common nature among man. Not only does man
desire to learn. He desires to be incorporated in a community. But one can only desire to belong to a
community if that community is able to bring about to its members a good necessary for them. These
goods must then be a common good. Therefore, at the ultimate analysis, ESL teaching would even
acknowledge the good of the community or the common good.

I therefore find no need for me to insert yet again another ruling above. ESL teaching is already
manifesting the natural law. It might be said in the onset that the guideline in ESL teaching needs only to
be fulfilled so that it may contribute to the common good.
Bibliography:

Aquinas, Thomas. “On Being and Essence” in Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings with
Commentary, edited by Gyula Klima. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 227-249

Aquinas, Thomas. Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica Questions 90-97. Translated by English
Dominican Fathers. New York: Benziger Brothers Inc., 1947.

Aristotle. “Physica” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern
Library, 2001. 218-394

Aristotle. “Rhetorica” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern
Library, 2001. 1325-1451

Herman, Arthur. The Cave and the Light: Plate versus Aristotle and the Struggle for the Soul of Western
Civilization. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013.

Horowitz, Maryanne Cline. “The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes.”
Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 3-16.

Masood, Ehsan. Science and Islam: a History. London: Icon Books, 2009.

Murphy, Mark. "The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-ethics/>.

Shellens, Max Salomon, “Aristotle on Natural Law” (1959). Natural Law Forum. Paper 40.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/40