251.

GR. No. 70909. January 5, 1994

CONCHITA T. VDA. DE CHUA, THELMA CHUA v. THE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, VICENTE GO, VICTORIA T. GO, and HERMINIGILDA
HERRERA

FACTS: Herrera executed a Contract of Lease in favor of Tian On whereby the former leased to
the latter. The contract of lease contains a stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the leased
property. The lessee, Tian On, erected a residential house on the leased premises. Then Sy Tian
On executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Building in favor of Chua Bok. Chua Bok and defendant
executed a contract of lease. After the expiration of the contract of lease in question the plaintiffs
herein, continued possession of the premises.

Defendant Herrera through her attorney-in-fact sold the lots in question to defendants-spouses,
Vicente and Victoria Go. The defendants-spouses were able to have aforesaid sale registered with
the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu and the titles of the two parcels of land were transferred
in their names. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant case seeking the annulment of the said sale
between Herminigilda Herrera and spouses Vicente and Victoria Go, alleging that the conveyance
was in violation of the plaintiffs' right of option to buy the leased premises as provided in the
Contract of Lease. After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’
complaint and ordering them to vacate the lots in question and to remove the improvements they
had introduced in the premises.

Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-16589 in ordering their
ejectment from the leased premises and the removal of the improvements introduced thereon by
them. They claim that the action in Civil Case No. R-16589 was for the annulment of the sale of
the property by defendant Herrera to defendants-spouses Go, and not an appropriate case for an
ejectment. The right of possession of petitioners of the leased premises was squarely put in issue
by defendants-spouse Go in their counterclaim to petitioner's complaint, where they asked that ".
. . the plaintiff should vacate their premises as soon as feasible or as the Honorable Court may
direct"

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the right of possession of
the leased premises.
RULING: Yes. The said counterclaim in effect was an accion publiciana for the recovery of the
possession of the leased premises. Clearly the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court) had jurisdiction over actions which involve the possession of real property or any interest
therein, except forcible entry and detainer actions (Section 44[b], Judiciary Act of 1948). A
counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes
the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent action. Hence, the same rules on jurisdiction in an independent action apply to a
counterclaim.
252.
G.R. No. 75379. March 31, 1989

Spouses REYNALDO and ESTELITA JAVIER v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT and LEON S. GUTIERREZ, JR.
FACTS: The information against Leon S. Gutierrez, Jr. was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The civil case was not reserved. Gutierrez filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar. In this complaint, the
defendants were charged with having inveigled Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of
the criminal case in the Makati court. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of a cause of action and litis pendentia. The motion was denied. On the other hand, the private
respondent moved to suspend proceedings in Criminal pending the resolution of what was
claimed to be the prejudicial question raised in the civil case. The petitioners filed an opposition.
The motion was also to be denied later. Petitioners not having submitted their answer in the civil
case, the private respondent moved to declare them in default. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss but eventually this was denied. The
petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration based on the original two grounds and
alleging the additional ground of improper venue.
The respondent judged declared the petitioners in default and set the civil case for trial. Three
days later, the motion to suspend proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Makati was denied
and the criminal case was set for hearing on the merits.
The petitioners went to the Intermediate Appellate Court to question the orders of Judge Cesar R.
Cinco of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, denying their motion to dismiss
and their motion for reconsideration of the denial by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant can raise in a separate civil action for damages against the
petitioners in another court.
RULING: No. As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The applicable provision
is Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading in full as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right
to institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal
charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the
civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court
that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. This he
should have done in the form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the
petitioners. In fact, the counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private
respondent upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.
253.
G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS v. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND

ROLANDO OGSOS, JR.

FACTS: Petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas, and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, filed
a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Summons was served but respondent Ogsos, Jr. filed a motion to
admit answer and answer to complaint after two years that the complaint was filed. Petitioner
filed an opposition thereto, and moved to declare the respondents in default, which the RTC
granted. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration to the RTC, but was denied. The
respondents elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari to the CA, where the petition was
granted and remanded to the RTC. In their answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully
complied with their obligations as stated in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments.
Accordingly, the respondents filed a counterclaim for the lost profits plus damages.
Respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, which was granted by the
RTC. The petitioner and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and to file their pre-trial
brief. Thus, respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present evidence ex-parte, which
the RTC granted in an Order dated June 28, 2016. On October 17, 2006, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss respondents’ counterclaim, arguing that the same were permissive and that
respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, denied the said motion, declaring
respondents’ counterclaim as compulsory; thus holding that the payment of the required docket
fees was no longer necessary. The RTC granted respondents’ counterclaim, and ordered
petitioner to pay respondents. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that respondents’ counterclaim is not
permissive but compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondents’ counterclaim for damages is
compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required.

RULING: The Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is
because: (a) the issue in the main case, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim; (b)
since petitioner and respondents’ respective causes of action arouse from completely different
occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its
counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner’s claim that
respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to prove
respondents’ counterclaim that petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts
in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner’s claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof
of respondents’ counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
By reason of the respondents’ counterclaim being permissive, and not compulsory as held
by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified
that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of the counterclaim. Its non-payment at the time of the filing of the initiatory pleading
does not automatically causes its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable
period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their
counterclaim. The lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded
to rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents’ reliance on the findings of the courts a
quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees.
254.
GR No. L-12546, May 20, 1960

REPUBLIC v. LUCAS P. PAREDES 108 Phil. 57

FACTS: On September 20, 1956, plaintiff commenced an action against defendants Lucas P.
Paredes, Aurora C. Paredes and appellant Globe Assurance Company for the recovery of the
amount of P48,529.19, representing unpaid taxes and for the confiscation of Globe Bond No. 1226,
issued by the defendants in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In its amended answer which
was accepted by the trial court, appellant company included a cross-claim against Lucas and
Aurora, alleging that they had bound themselves to indemnify it (company) for any damages
which it may sustain as a result of the execution of said bond, and praying that in case judgment
was rendered against it on the complaint of plaintiff, Lucas and Aurora be condemned in the same
judgment jointly and severally to indemnify it in the same amount as that of the judgment. Lucas
and Aurora were declared in default and evidence against them was presented by plaintiff.
Appellant company likewise presented its evidence on the cross-claim against Lucas and Aurora.
The case between the plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant was submitted on a question of
law. After hearing, the trial court, on March 28, 1957 rendered a decision without however any
judgment on appellant's cross-claim.

On May 2, 1957, within the reglementary period, appellant filed a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and a motion to extend the period within which to file the record on appeal. On May
7, 1957, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, praying that the court render
judgment on its cross-claim. On May 15, 1957, the trial court granted the motion for extension but
denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in refusing to render judgment on the cross-claim of
defendant-appellant.

RULING: Yes. It is clear that the trial court erred in not passing upon and determining the, cross-
claim. The filing of a cross-claim is provided for in Rule 10, Sections 2 and 8 of the Rules of Court,
the purpose being to settle in a single proceeding all the claims of the different parties against
each other in the case in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. And appellant evidently did just that
to avoid multiplicity of suits; otherwise, it would have had to file a separate action against its co-
defendants for indemnity for any damages arising from the execution of the bond. In fact, the
filing of the cross-claim was permitted by the trial court.
Inasmuch as the co-defendants were declared in default, the evidence presented by the
defendant-appellant was not controverted, and the case was submitted on a question of law. It
was just a question of examining the exhibits presented, by the defendant-appellant, which were
the bond itself, the paragraph on indemnity, and the payment of interest in case of delay, in
payment, as well as the different letters of demand made by the defendant-appellant on its co-
defendants.
Considering that the record on appeal had not yet been approved, the record being still in its
custody and it had not that inasmuch as the notice of appeal, the corresponding appeal bond and
the record on appeal were all filed within the reglementary period, the said judgment was still
open to appeal which the appellate court could and should correct the error instead of remanding
the case to the trial court, to save time, the case being about four years old, and in the interest of
justice.
255.

G.R. No. L-37960 February 28, 1980

TEOFILA TORIBIO vs. ABDULWAHID BIDIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga City, and VICENTE COVARRUBIAS and CLARA MONTOJO, Spouses

FACTS: Teofila Toribio filed an action, in forma pauperis, with the Court of First Instance of
Instance of Zamboanga City against the spouses Vicente Covarrubias and Clara Montojo, for the
recovery of possession of a certain parcel of land. The respondent Judge rendered judgment,
dismissing the complaint. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on May 3, 1973,
and the next day, she filed a "Motion to Appeal" wherein she manifested her intention to appeal
the decision to the Court of Appeals. The motion was set for hearing on May 12, 1973, but since
the respondent Judge was on vacation, the hearing of the motion was reset to June 2, 1973.
However, on motion of the petitioner, the hearing was transferred to June 9, 1973. In the
meantime, the defendants therein, now private respondents, filed an opposition to the Motion to
Appeal, claiming that "that matters involved in said motion has become moot and academic since
the period in which to appeal has already lapsed and no appeal was perfected."

On June 27, 1973, the respondent Judge issued an order denying the "Motion to Appeal" for the
reason that the herein petitioner had not submitted a record on appeal within the reglementary
period so that "it would be an exercise in futility for this Court to grant plaintiffs' Motion to Appeal
as pauper since the decision sought to be appealed had become final." The petitioner filed a
motion for the reconsideration of this order upon the ground that the filing of her Motion to
Appeal suspended the period for the perfection of an appeal since a pauper litigant is not required
to file a record on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a pauper litigant is exempt from filing a record of appeal.

RULING: No. The authority to sue or appeal as pauper does not exempt the pauper litigant from
filing the notice of appeal and the record on appeal in due time. Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Sec. 22. Pauper litigant. - Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as
a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the
corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority once given
shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record
and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to
the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.

A pauper litigant is exempted from submitting a printed record on appeal. Both in appeals by
paupers and non-paupers, a record on appeal should be submitted. The only difference is that in
the case of the pauper, the latter need not print it. In the instant case, the decision of the trial
court appears to be correct so that the allowance of the appeal of the petitioner would serve no
useful purpose and would merely delay the administration of justice.
256.

G.R. No. L-53969 February 21, 1989

PURIFICACION SAMALA and LEONARDO ESGUERRA vs.

HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, CFI of Cavite, Br. II, EMERITA C. JUMANAN and
RICARDO JUMANAN

FACTS: Emerita C. Jumanan, assisted by her husband Ricardo Jumanan, filed before the CFI of
Cavite a complaint for damages arising from physical injuries suffered by her as a passenger of
the jeepney.While admitting to be the owners of the passenger jeepney, the spouses Garcia
nonetheless denied liability, alleging that the vehicular collision complained of was attributable
to the fault and negligence of the owner and driver of the Saint Raphael Transit passenger bus.
Consequently, a third-party complaint was filed by defendant spouses Garcia and Virgilio Profeta
against Purificacion Samala and Leonardo Esguerra, owner and driver, respectively, of the Saint
Raphael Transit Bus.After trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the defendants.
Third party defendants Purificacion Samala and Leonardo Esguerra moved to reconsider said
decision, but to no avail. Hence, third party defendants appealed by certiorari. Appellants argue
that since plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against the defendants on a breach of contract
of carriage, they cannot recover from the third-party defendants on a cause of action based on
quasi-delict. The third party defendants, they allege, are never parties liable with respect to
plaintiff s claim although they are with respect to the defendants for indemnification, subrogation,
contribution or other reliefs. Consequently, they are not directly liable to the plaintiffs. Their
liability commences only when the defendants are adjudged liable and not when they are absolved
from liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs can still recover from the third- party defendants on a cause
of action based on tort or quasi-delict since their cause of action is based on culpa contractual
against the defendants only.

RULING: Yes. The third party defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the
plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police
investigation of the vehicular collision.

As provided in Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party complaint as
a "claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim." Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action
may be impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the
ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-, or, (c) both (a) and (b). The situation in (a) is covered by
the phrase "for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are subsumed under
the catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim."

It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before
the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff. It is immaterial that the third-party
plaintiff asserts a cause of action against the third party defendant on a theory different from that
asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant. It has likewise been held that "a defendant in a
contract action may join as third-party defendants those liable to him in tort for the plaintiff s
claim against him or directly to the plaintiff.
257.

G.R. No. L-18911 April 27, 1967

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CLEOFE RAMOS, ET AL.

FACTS: Plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint containing two causes of action:
(1) for the annulment of the registration of Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-117285 in the name of
defendants, and for the reversion of said lot to the plaintiff as part of the public domain; and (2)
for an order prohibiting defendants from further excavating the Wawang Dapdap River and from
constructing works on the land covered by their Foreshore Lease Application bordering said river.
Defendants filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendants that it is not defendants
and third-party plaintiffs "who have illegally appropriated through artificial and illegal means
portion of the Wawang Dapdap River and Manila Bay, but the third-party defendants Felipe E.
Asuncion and his wife who have increased their holding from a mere 27-hectare to around 200-
hectare occupying almost half of the Wawang Dapdap River.
Third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. Over the opposition
of defendants and third-party plaintiffs, the lower court granted the motion, and reconsideration
of the order having been denied, appeal was seasonably made by them.1äwphï1.ñët

ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint is improper and states no cause of action.

RULING: Yes. The allowance of a third-party complaint is predicated on the need for expediency
and the avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits. But it should not be considered as an excuse for
indiscriminately filing any claim which a defendant may have against a third-party defendant,
although unrelated to the main action.
The fundamental issue herein presented is the propriety or impropriety of the third-party
complaint. Rule 6, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Third-party complaint." — A third-party complaint is a claim that a defendant party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
As the lower court said, "if the third-party plaintiffs could be held answerable for damages as per
allegation in the complaint of the plaintiff, it is due to their acts and no due to the acts of third-
party defendants." As far as may be gathered from the pertinent nations in the pleadings,
plaintiff's causes of action against defendants are unrelated to those of the latter against third-
party defendants. The latter would be liable, if at all, on an entirely separate ground, namely, that
the illegal constructions and excavations allegedly made by them on a parcel of land which was
altogether different had caused damages to third-party plaintiffs. There is no averment that the
latter's illegal acts were induced or rendered necessary by the illegal acts of third-party
defendants; or more specifically, that if no constructions or excavations had been made by third-
party defendants, Lot No. 2, Psu-117285, would not be part of the public domain at all. It is alleged,
in the third-party complaint that if not for those acts the river "would not have bent toward third-
party plaintiffs' property and become shallower and narrower." But it is not alleged how this
circumstance could affect plaintiff's cause of action against defendants, or render third-party
defendants liable for "contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief" in respect of
plaintiff's claim.
258.
G.R. No. L-20266 January 31, 1967

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE GAUDENCIO

CLORIBEL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and
HERMINIO G. TEVES

FACTS: Teves sued for prohibition and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila upon
a complaint dated August 18, 1962. Therein, he prayed for a restraining order against the (a)
Administrator of Economic Coordination requiring him to secure NARIC clearance on his
shipments aforesaid; (b) General Manager, Rice and Corn Administration, from acting on said
NARIC clearances, and (c) Commissioner of Customs, from referring the shipments which arrived
prior to January 12, 1962 to any office for ruling. Also, Teves moved the court to issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the Commissioner to cancel and/or cause to be
cancelled the bonds heretofore recited covering the 22 shipments or more, which arrived prior to
January 12, 1962. Then, Teves asked that, after hearing, all injunctions be declared permanent.
On August 27, 1962, the Commissioner registered written opposition against the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Respondent judge Gaudencio Cloribel made out an
order dated granting the injunctions prayed for, including a preliminary mandatory injunction
ordering the Commissioner "to cancel and/or cause to be cancelled the corresponding bonds of
the twenty-two (22) shipments and/or more of them consigned to NARIC-HERMINIO G. Judge
Cloribel issued another order (upon Teves’ urgent ex-parte manifestation filed on the same date
that the Commissioner had not yet obeyed the mandatory injunction) commanding said
Commissioner and those under him to comply with the writ.
Respondent judge denied the motion files by the Commissioner to quash the writ issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge abuse his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

RULING: Yes. Section 1, Rule 58, 1964 Rules of Court provided that a court, at any stage of an
action prior to final judgment, may "require the performance of a particular act, in which case it
shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction." A mandatory injunction "usually tends
to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction
prior to the final hearing." Per contra, it may issue "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s
favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the
parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."
Indeed, "the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free
from doubt and dispute."
We concede that the issuance of preliminary injunctions rests upon the sound discretion
of the Court. Nevertheless, as this Court pointed out in a recent case, sound judicial discretion,
however, no license to undo the law by defeating its objective. A clear case of abuse of discretion
is here present. Important to the issue here is the fact that the writ issued by the judge does not
maintain the status quo. Had the bonds not been posted by Teves, the goods he imported would
not have been released. The purpose of injunctions i. e., to restore the original situation of the
parties, is here absent. Not being present, the writ itself can hardly be sustained as equitable.
259.

G.R. Nos. 164669-70 October 30, 2009

LIEZL CO vs. HAROLD LIM y GO and AVELINO UY GO

FACTS: On 2 July 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which sought the reversal of the Resolution dated 16 January 2006 of the Acting Secretary of the
Department of Justice directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the
information filed against the respondents. The petition was still pending with the Court of
Appeals when the petitioner filed the present petition with the Supreme Court assailing the
Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC dismissing the criminal
complaints against respondents.

Respondents alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping since she filed the present
petition assailing the Orders of the RTC after she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which disallows the deplorable practice of
forum shopping. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute wilful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: No. The petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.

Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is an identity
of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought.
Petitioner in this case is not guilty of forum shopping since there is no identity of relief and
cause of action in the present petition and in CA-G.R. SP No. 84703. The Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals questions the propriety of the
Resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice. The present petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 164669-
70 seeks the reversal of the Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC. The
determination made by the Acting Secretary of Justice that no prima facie case exists for the
prosecution of the case is distinct from the judicial determination of the RTC that there is no
probable cause for the continued hearing of the criminal case. These are two very different actions
which should be separately assailed. The former is pursuant to the powers and functions of the
Department of Justice as provided under Section 2, Chapter 1, Title III of the Revised
Administrative Code.
260.
G.R. No. 128464 June 20, 2006

REV. LUIS AO-AS vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The acts of the Batong group, as embodied in several board resolutions, have already
been raised and passed upon in other cases pending at the time the Ao-As group instituted the
present controversy. The board resolutions authorizing the dissolution of the LCP business office
and termination of the employees connected therewith was the subject of NLRC case pending
before the National Labor Relations Commission. The board resolution authorizing the transfer
of the LCP corporate records from the Sta. Mesa Office to the Caloocan Office was the subject of
Civil Case pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. On the other hand, the legality
of the composition of the eleven-member LCP Board was already the subject matter of SICD Case
No. 3524 which was appealed to the SEC En Banc.Clearly, the act of the Ao-as group in filing
multiple petitions involving the same issues constitutes forum shopping and should be sanctioned
with dismissal.
SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a petition for accounting with prayer for the appointment of a
management committee and the issuance of a writ of injunction. The causes of action under SEC-
SIDC Case No. 3857 are the following: First, the alleged non-liquidation and/or non-accounting
of a part of the proceeds of the La Trinidad land transaction in the amount of P64,000.00 by
petitioner Thomas Batong; Second, the alleged non-liquidation and/or unaccounting of cash
advances in the aggregate amount of P323,750.00 by petitioner Thomas Batong;Third, the alleged
dissipation and/or unaccounting of the LCP general fund in the amount of 4.8 million; Fourth,
the non-registration of the Leyte land purchased with LCP funds by petitioner Victorio
Saquilayan; Fifth, severance of church-partnership relationship with Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod (LCMS); and Sixth, the transfer of LCP corporate books from the Sta. Mesa office to the
Caloocan office.

ISSUE: Whether or not SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case of forum shopping.

RULING: No. It is not a case of forum shopping. The Ao-As group did not commit willful and
deliberate forum shopping in the filing of SEC-SIDC Case No. 3857.
If the forum shopping is not considered wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum
shopping is wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice.hi1.
The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are
entirely different from the causes of action in NLRC Case, Civil Cases and SEC-SICD Cases. It is
true that the causes of action in the latter cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857 for the appointment of the management committee and for accounting "of all
funds, properties and assets of LCP which may have come into their possession during their
incumbency as officers and/or directors of LCP." However, the creation of a management
committee and the prayer for accounting could not have been asked for in the labor case and
forcible entry cases.
It is not a case of wilful and deliberate forum shopping and, hence, the SEC-SICD Case No.
3857, which contains the earlier prayer to create a management committee, should not be
dismissed. The reason for this is the strict evidentiary requirement needed to grant a prayer to
create a management committee.
261.

G.R. No. 146717 May 19, 2006

TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC. v. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION,

FACTS: The Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda to dispose a
resolution. Luzon Hydro Corporation (LHC) claims that Transfield Philippines, Inc.(TPI) is guilty
of forum-shopping when it filed the following suits: Civil Case pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati and a case in ICC International Court of Arbitration; The case filed before
the International Court of Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) a request for
arbitration pursuant to the Turnkey Contract between LHC and TPI; G.R. No. 146717 which was
an appeal by certiorari with prayer for TRO/preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction,
of the Court of Appeals Decision.
On the other hand, TPI argues that LHC is relitigating in a civil case the very same causes
of action in the ICC Case and even manifesting therein that it will present evidence earlier
presented before the arbitral tribunal.
Meanwhile, ANZ Bank and Security Bank moved to be excused from filing a memorandum. They
claim that with the finality of the Courts Decision, any resolution by the Court on the issue of
forum-shopping will not materially affect their role as the banking entities involved are
concerned. The Court granted their respective motions.

ISSUE: Whether or not forum-shopping is committed.

RULING: There is no forum shopping committed.

There is no identity of causes of action between and among the arbitration case, the instant
petition, and Civil Case. The arbitration case is an arbitral proceeding commenced pursuant to
the Turnkey Contract between TPI and LHC. Together with the primary issue to be settled in the
arbitration case is the equally important question of monetary awards to the aggrieved party. On
the other hand, the civil case was filed to enjoin LHC from calling on the securities and respondent
banks from transferring or paying the securities in case LHC calls on them. Neither is there an
identity of parties between and among the three (3) cases. The ICC case only involves TPI and
LHC logically since they are the parties to the Turnkey Contract. In comparison, the instant
petition includes Security Bank and ANZ Bank, the banks sought to be enjoined from releasing
the funds of the letters of credit. The Civil Case, on the other hand, logically involves TPI and LHC
only, they being the parties to the arbitration agreement whose partial award is sought to be
enforced.

The claim of TPI that it was LHC which committed forum-shopping, suffice it to say that
its bare allegations are not sufficient to sustain the charge. The Court resolves to dismiss the
charges of forum-shopping filed by both parties against each other.
262.
G.R. No. 121962. April 30, 1999

ESPERANZA C. ESCORPIZO, and UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO FACULTY

EDUCATION WORKERS UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO and VIRGILIO C.
BAUTISTA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Esperanza Escorpizo was initially hired by respondent university as a high school
classroom teacher. Under the rules of the respondent university, appointment to teach during the
first two years at the university is probationary in nature. Escorpizo failed to pass the
PBET. Respondent university no longer renewed Escorpizos contract of employment on the
ground that she failed to qualify as a regular teacher. This prompted Escorpizo to fille a complaint
for illegal dismissal, payment of backwages and reinstatement against private respondents.
The labor arbiter ruled that respondent university had a permissible reason in not renewing the
employment contract of Escorpizo. She appealed to the NLRC but the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, she filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action is proper for filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65
instead of filing a motion for reconsideration.
RULING: No. The precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we
consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords
the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to
the courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondents. The plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned
resolution, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10)
days from receipt of the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is
jurisdictional. Hence, original action of certiorari, as in this case, will not prosper. Further, it
should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day
reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Consequently, the merits of the case
can no longer be reviewed to determine if the public respondent had committed any grave abuse
of discretion.
 263.
G.R. No. 86568. March 22, 1990

IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC.

FACTS: An action for the collection of a sum of money that was filed by the private respondent
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The promissory note was
attached to the complaint.

An answer to the complaint was filed by petitioner. The petitioner denied liability and alleged that
one Julio Tan had no authority to negotiate and obtain a loan on its behalf. While defendant
specifically denied the aforestated promissory note alleged in the complaint, the answer was not
verified. For this reason, in due course, a decision was rendered by the trial court ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff. Petitioner brought an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court
Appeals affirmed the judgement appealed. A motion for reconsideration of said decision was
likewise denied by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is devoid of merit.

RULING: Yes. No rule is more settled than that in an action based on a written instrument
attached to the complaint, if the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument the same is deemed admitted.

Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is explicit in that there are two ways of pleading an
actionable document, namely: By alleging the substance of such written instrument in the
pleading and attaching a copy to the pleading; and by copying the instrument in the pleading.

The complaint in the present case complied with the first situation under paragraph (a). The
complaint alleged the substance of the promissory note subject of the litigation and a copy of the
promissory note was attached.

There is no question likewise that the petitioner failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note subject of the complaint. By its omission,
petitioner clearly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the document and that the
party whose signature appears thereon had indeed signed the same and that he has the authority
to sign the same and that the agreement between the parties is what was in words and figures in
the document. Defenses which are inconsistent with the due execution and genuineness of the
written instrument are cut-off by such admission.

The claim of petitioner is that its failure to specifically deny under oath the actionable document
does not prevent it from showing that one Julio Tan was not authorized to enter into the
transaction and to sign the promissory note for and in behalf of the petitioner. But precisely, the
petitioner is a party to the instrument represented by Julio Tan so that it may not now deny the
authority of Julio Tan to so represent it. The due execution and genuineness of the document have
thereby been conclusively established.
264.
G.R. No. 114942. November 27, 2000
MAUNLAD SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and VICTOR T. NUBLA

FACTS: Petitioner Maunlad Savings instituted a complaint for sum of money against private
respondent Victor T. Nubla and Vicente Nubla on the basis of a promissory note. Petitioner
presented its evidence relying on the admission by the Nublas of the genuineness and due
execution of the subject promissory note inasmuch as their answer was not under oath as required
by Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
On March 24, 1992, the Nublas filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer. In seeking
admission of their amended answer, the Nublas cite Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which
allows the amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence.The Nublas likewise filed a Motion
for Submission of Plaintiffs Documents Marked by Defendants as Their Evidence after realizing
that they failed to include in their Offer of Evidence the Offering Ticket and the Deed of
Assignment earlier marked for the defense.
Petitioner filed its opposition to the twin motions on May 22, 1992. Both motions were denied
by the trial court ratiocinating that the proposed amendment in the amended answer will
ultimately change or alter the theory of the defense and thus cannot be allowed under Section 3,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Nubla interposed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Court of Appeals contending that the trial courts denial of his twin
motions amounted to grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court issued its decision reversing
the challenged Orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the amendment of private
respondents answer to the complaint after he had already formally offered his evidence.

RULING: No. Under Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is anchored
on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly
admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims
to be the facts.
In the instant case, while the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath and
thus gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of the contents of
the promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able to put in issue and present
parol evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory note, which are essentially the bedrock
of his defense. The presentation of the contrariant evidence for and against imputations of
genuineness and due execution undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may be,
whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented
in the original answer. Hence, the amended answer should have been admitted by trial court,
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10.
265.

G.R. No. L-24488 December 28, 1925

ASIA BANKING CORPORATION vs. WALTER E. OLSEN & CO. INC., ET AL.

FACTS: About February 6, 1920 the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. obtained a loan of
P200,00 from the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land in Tondo. On account of
this loan the other defendant and Mr. A. D. Gibbs — all stockholders of the defendant corporation
— executed jointly and severally a promissory note for the amount of P200,00 in favor of the
plaintiff. On April 25, 1921, the defendant corporation through its president and treasurer, Mr.
Walter E. Olsen, one of the defendants, mortgaged the same land to the plaintiff to secure the
payment of the loan of P200, 000. Due to the fact that this land, as already stated, was mortgaged
by the defendant corporation to its codefendants and to Mr. A. D. Gibbs, the mortgage in favor of
the plaintiff has not been paid until this date. These are the facts appearing from the record and
the documents accompanying the complaint as a part thereof.

The complaint prays that judgment be rendered against defendants and each and every
one of them jointly and severally for the sum of P200, 000, with interest. All the defendants,
except Mr. Walter E. Olsen, subscribed a document wherein they agreed that a judgment be
rendered prayed for in complaint. An error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower
court took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without
having been expressly introduced in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents attached to the complaint without having been introduced
in evidence shall be admitted.

RULING:

Yes. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of
these documents. Under section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity be deemed
admitted. The effect of this to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such
documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider,
without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. The judgment appealed
from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
266.

G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006

MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO v. GUIA W. CANLAS

FACTS: Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and she received the
consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00. The petitioners' inaction for three
years before the filing of the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt of the
consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim. And that the deed of real estate
mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the character of a public instrument.On September 2,
1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process
when the RTC decided the case without petitioners' evidence. On October 16, 1998, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given ample opportunity to
hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce evidence, which they took for granted and they should
bear the fault. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Since Milagros admitted the existence, due execution,
authenticity and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference on
June 7, 1995, absence of consideration is no longer an issue. The amount of P220, 000.00 was
actually received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia. The petitioners slept on their rights, if
they had any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and preserve their alleged rights and
interests. The respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for impleading
the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against it.
She further points out that the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping,
a copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any specific question of law but only presents
and discusses an "assignment of errors."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed outright due to procedural
defects.
RULING: No. The Court agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed
decision. However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the Petition for Review
on Certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the
dismissal of the petition. Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has
encountered previous Petitions for Review on Certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA. In
those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners' attention to the defects and proceeded to
resolve the case on their merits.
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case.
While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective,
sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on
technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. As to respondent's claim
that the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping and a copy of the
assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully examined the rollo of the case and found them to be
attached to the petition. As to respondent's submission that the petition failed to raise a question
of law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Petitioners'
contention that they were denied substantive due process is a pure question of law.
267.
G.R. No. 150731 September 14, 2007
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. PHILBANKING CORPORATION

FACTS: Casent Realty Development Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare
Realty. These promissory notes were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that Rare Realty
obtained from Philbanking wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed. When Rare Realty failed
to pay its debt, the bank went after the security of the loan. The bank demanded payment based
on the promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of
assignment. On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its obligation by
executing a Dacion en pago.
Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of payment against Casent based on the
promissory notes. Casent Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already executed
which extinguished its obligation. Philbanking failed to file a reply. Casent Realty points out that
the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the Answer, should
have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of
the Rules of Court. Its failure constituted an admission on the part of the bank. Philbanking
claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are
deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts
in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or
make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged
in the answer are deemed controverted.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure of plaintiff to deny genuineness and due execution of a document
constitutes judicial admission

RULING: Yes. Since respondent failed to file a reply, in effect, respondent admitted the
genuineness and due execution of said documents. This judicial admission has been considered
by the appellate court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.

Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written

instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10
which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the answer
is based on an actionable document, a reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since
respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.
v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed
admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the
instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact."
268.
G.R. No. L-42408 September 21, 1984

ISIDRA P. CADIRAO vs. THE HONORABLE NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Judge,

Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

FACTS: Private respondent Juanita M. Diego filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a
complaint against petitioners to Quiet Title and Remove Clouds of Ownership of Real Property
with Damages. The complaint alleged that private respondent is the only child and exclusive legal
heir of the deceased Eusebio Mueda and she is the sole and exclusive owner of the afore-described
parcel of land. Answering the complaint, petitioners (then defendants) denied the material
averments thereof and set up by way of special and affirmative defenses that the parcel of land
described in the complaint is exclusively owned by them. The issues having been joined, the case
was thereafter set for pre-trial on September 8, 1975, during which date, the trial court, then
presided by the Hon. respondent Judge Numeriano G. Estenzo, required the parties to submit
affidavits of their witnesses and their exhibits in order to enable the court to determine the
propriety of rendering a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioners, (then defendants) moved to reconsider the Summary Judgment in question

contending that the document referred to as Annex "A" in the judgment, appears to have been
signed by the late Rafael Paguntalan who is not a party to the case and therefore, petitioners who
are not signatories thereto are not bound to make a denial under oath pursuant to the concluding
sentence of Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in disposing the case by
Summary Judgment.

RULING: Yes. The rendition of a summary judgment is not proper when the defending party's
pleading tenders vital issues which calls for the presentation of evidence.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when on motion
of the plaintiff, after the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear at the hearing
for such a judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the winning party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, the issue
of ownership, thus raised by the parties may not be categorized as frivolous and sham so as to
dispense with the presentation of evidence in a formal trial. Reliance by the trial court on Section
8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as its basis for the rendition of the challenged Summary Judgment
is misplaced and without legal support.

The nullity of the assailed Summary Judgment stems not only from the circumstances that
such kind of a judgment is not proper under the state of pleadings obtaining in the instant case,
but also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a
judgment. Contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Rules, no motion for a summary
judgment was filed by private respondent. Consequently, no notice or hearing for the purpose was
ever conducted by the trial court. The trial court merely required the parties to submit their
affidavits and exhibits, together with their respective memoranda, and without conducting any
hearing, although the parties presented opposing claims of ownership and possession, hastily
rendered a Summary Judgment. The trial court was decidedly in error in cursorily issuing the said
Judgment.
 269.
G.R. No. L-10100 August 15, 1916

GALO ABRENICA vs. MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA

FACTS: The plaintiff brought the proceedings to compel the defendant to return to him the two
parcels which he alleges were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on February
21, 1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of seven years. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant refused to deliver said property to him when, upon the expiration of the period
mentioned, he endeavored to redeem the same and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum
aforesaid. Manuel Gonda alleged that about 19 years ago he was the sole possessor and owner of
said parcels, and in the course of the trial endeavored to prove that they had been sold to him by
the plaintiff and his mother.

The justice of the peace of the provincial capital, who tried the case by assignment of the
judge of the Court of First Instance of the same province, heard the evidence introduced by the
parties and after making a sufficiently clear summary of and duly considering the same. A
judgment was rendered in behalf of the plaintiff and against the two defendants whereby he
ordered each and both of them to return and deliver to the plaintiff the parcels of land claimed by
him.
Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the defendant did in fact challenge the jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace of the provincial capital to try the case at bar, on the ground that Act
No. 2041 of the Philippine Legislature is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justice of peace of the provincial capital has jurisdiction to try the
case.

RULING: Yes. This Supreme Court has held on various occasions, among them in the decision
rendered on December 24, 1914, in the case of Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29 Phil. Rep., 116) that
said Act No. 2041 is valid and does not conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902; that a justice of the peace, acting under the designation under the law just referred to,
acts not as a justice of the peace or holds a justice's court, but acts as a judge of the zone of first
instance and holds, in effect, a Court of First Instance; and finally, that for this reason the
objection that this case falls within that of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the
one cited by the appellants in their brief to show that the error aforementioned was incurred), is
not well taken. This assignment of error cannot, therefore, be sustained.
270.
G.R. No. 126863. January 16, 2003

SPOUSES NAPOLEON L. GAZA and EVELYN GAZA vs. RAMON J. LIM and AGNES
J. LIM

FACTS: Napoleon Gaza purchased a parcel of land from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Thereafter,
Napoleon Gaza and his wife Evelyn constructed a huge lumber shed on the property and installed
engines, machinery and tools for a lumber mill. They also utilized a portion of the property as
storage for copra. In 1975, they ceased engaging in business. They padlocked the gates of the
property, leaving it to the care of Numeriano Ernesto. On the other hand, Ramon and Agnes Lim,
both half-siblings of Napoleon Gaza, claimed that they have used the same lot for their lumber
and copra business since 1975. Sometime in November 1993, they designated Emilio Herrera as
caretaker of the property. On November 28, 1993, the padlock of the main gate was
destroyed. According to Napoleon Gaza, the siblings Ramon and Agnes Lim and Emilio Herrera,
entered the property by breaking the lock of the main gate. Thereafter, they occupied a room on
the second floor of the warehouse without the consent of Renato Petil who was then outside the
premises.
Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauag, Quezon an
action for forcible entry against spouses Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza. Spouses Gaza filed with the
same court their answer with compulsory counterclaim. The MTC dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTC Decision. Ramon and
Agnes Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. The Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the Decision of the RTC. Spouses Gaza filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, they filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred to rule that petitioners impliedly admitted
respondents' allegation that they have prior and continuous possession of the property

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that herein petitioners impliedly admitted
respondents' allegation that they have prior and continuous possession of the property.
Petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint that respondents have prior
and continuous possession of the disputed property which they used for their lumber and copra
business. Petitioners did not merely allege they have no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to truth of those allegations in the complaint.
Petitioners’ possession of the property has been sufficiently established by evidence. The
title to the property is in the name of petitioner Napoleon Gaza. On record is a deed of sale
showing that he bought the land in 1961 from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Petitioner also presented
receipts of payment of realty taxes. Thus, the petition is granted and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
271.
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first
Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office
after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting
the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in
the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should
now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government
initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such
cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural side tracks.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as president
during his term of office.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or
(c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Thus, facts pleaded in the
petition and answer are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are
not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with
such admissions.
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which
their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos
as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities. Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos
as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or
any other source. In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations
to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.
 272.
G.R. No. 207970 January 20 2016
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS: The FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES is a domestic corporation dealing with
medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at
the Wesleyan University's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3
57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00. However, they entered into an agreement
whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation
on installment. Due to the respondent’s failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its
complaint for sum of money in the RTC.
The respondent expressly admitted the following in relation to petitioner’s allegations on:
(a) the four transactions for the delivery and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the
total liability of the Wesleyan University; (c) the payments made by the Wesleyan Universitys; (d)
the balance still due to the FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES; and (e) the execution of the
February 11, 2009 agreement. The Wesleyan University denied the rest of the complaint "for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch
as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of
defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines. The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint but
the RTC denied the motion. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings, stating that the Wesleyan University had admitted the material
allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The
respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had
specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer
by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying
on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the
petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the
answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material
allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of
the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance
to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held
that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on
the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-
122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if
only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's
denial of liability as insincere.
273.
G.R. No. 180157 February 8, 2012
EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. vs. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO
FACTS: Petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. (ECI) alleged in its complaint that respondent
Josefa B. Capistrano (Mrs. Capistrano) applied for membership at the Manila Yacht Club (MYC)
under the latters widow-membership program. ECI further alleged that Mrs. Capistrano
authorized her daughter, Valentina C. Redulla (Mrs. Redulla), to claim from ECI her credit card
and ATM application form. Mrs. Redulla signed the acknowledgment receipt on behalf of her
mother, Mrs. Capistrano. After Mrs. Capistrano got hold of the card, she supposedly started using
it. Because Mrs. Capistrano was unable to settle her P217,235.36 bill, ECI demanded payment
from her. But she refused to pay, prompting ECI to file a collection suit against her before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.
Answering the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano denied ever applying for MYC membership and
ECI credit card; that Mrs. Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or
anyone to claim a credit card for her.
After trial, the RTC ruled that, having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of ECIs actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano
impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents. Mrs. Capistrano
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and
dismissed ECIs complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed
to make an effective specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she
overcame this omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object.
.

RULING: Yes. It is of no moment that plaintiff ECI failed to object to Mrs. Capistranos evidence
at the trial that the subject documents were forgeries. The Court holds that the CA correctly
ordered the dismissal of ECIs action since, contrary to the RTCs finding, Mrs. Capistrano
effectively denied the genuineness and due execution of ECIs actionable documents. Mrs.
Capistrano denied ECIs actionable documents merely for lack of knowledge which denial, as
pointed out above, is inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the truth of the
allegations regarding those documents. But this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that
she was also denying the allegations regarding those actionable documents for the reasons as
stated in her special and affirmative defenses. Since Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that
she had no part in those transactions, she in effect denied under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the documents supporting them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing
evidence that those documents were forged. Wherefore, the Court affirms the order of the Court
of Appeals.
274.
G.R. No. 171805 May 30, 2011
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MERELO B. AZNAR

FACTS: In 1958, RISCO ceased operation due to business reverses. In plaintiffs desire to
rehabilitate RISCO, they contributed a total amount of P212,720.00 which was used in the
purchase of the three (3) parcels of land . After the purchase of the above lots, titles were issued
in the name of RISCO. The amount contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and
encumbrances on the aforementioned properties as annotated in the titles of said lots. Thereafter,
various subsequent annotations were made on the same titles, including the Notice of Attachment
and Writ of Execution in favor of herein defendant PNB. As a result, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of Philippine National Bank, being the lone and highest bidder of the three (3)
parcels of land. The plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint seeking the quieting of their supposed
title to the subject properties, declaratory relief, cancellation of TCT and reconveyance with
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Defendant PNB on the other hand
countered that the issuance of titles to PNB had already become final and executory and their
validity cannot be attacked except in a direct proceeding for their annulment.
Aznar, et al., filed a Manifestation and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Thus, the
trial court rendered the Decision, which ruled against PNB. PNB appealed, although the Court of
Appeals agreed with the trial court that a judgment on the pleadings was proper, the appellate
court opined that the monetary contributions made by Aznar, et al., to RISCO.
PNB argues that a judgment on the pleadings was not proper because its answer which it
filed during the trial court proceedings of this case, tendered genuine issues of fact since it did not
only deny material allegations in Aznar, et al. complaint but also set up special and affirmative
defenses. Furthermore, PNB maintains that, by virtue of the trial courts judgment on the
pleadings, it was denied its right to present evidence and, therefore, it was denied due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that
a judgment on the pleadings was warranted despite the existence of genuine issues of facts alleged
in the petitioner’s answer.

Ruling: Yes. The legal basis for rendering a judgment on the pleadings can be found in Section
1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court which states that [w]here an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.
However, a careful reading of Aznar, et al.s Complaint and of PNBs Answer would reveal
that both parties raised several claims and defenses, respectively, other than what was cited by
the Court of Appeals, which requires the presentation of evidence for resolution.
It was error for the trial court to render a judgment on the pleadings and, in effect, resulted in a
denial of due process on the part of PNB because it was denied its right to present evidence. A
remand of this case would ordinarily be the appropriate course of action. A thorough and
comprehensive scrutiny of the records would reveal that this case should be dismissed because
Aznar, et al., have no title to quiet over the subject properties and their true cause of action is
already barred by prescription.
275.

G.R. No. 167399 June 22, 2006

ERNESTINA L. CRISOLOGO-JOSE vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of hectares of land which used to form part of a larger expanse
situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by a TCT. She is also the owner of several parcels
of land situated in the same municipality and covered by 12 separate titles. According to the
petitioner, respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) gave these landholdings – which she
inherited from her uncle Lim – a measly valuation of P9,000.00 per hectare (regarding
implementation of the agrarian reform program which partakes of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain). Excepting from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner filed, a petition
for determination of just compensation respecting her landholdings aforementioned.
It appears that in the midst of petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the trial court admitted
LBP’s answer. The trial court, after due proceedings, rendered judgment fixing the fair market
value of the land in question. Following the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
LBP went on appeal to the CA. Eventually, the CA reversed that of the trial court. In time,
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion. Hence this petition for review
under Rule 45, on both procedural and substantive grounds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in admitting respondent’s answer

Ruling: No. On the procedural angle, petitioner faults the appellate court for relying on and
lending credence to the allegations and defenses that respondent averred in its answer which
it filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the ROC. Petitioner also
blames the trial court for admitting, instead of expunging from the records, said answer and for
not declaring the respondent in default.
To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules authorizes the court to accept
answer though filed late, thus:
SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the
court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time
fixed by these Rules. And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education
teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared
in default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner has not
demonstrated how the admission by the trial court of respondent’s answer was prejudicial to her
case which, at bottom, involves only the determination of the fair market value of her property.
Given Indiana Aerospace and other related cases cited therein virtually all of which is one in
saying that default orders should be avoided, petitioner’s lament about the trial court not
declaring the respondent in default for alleged belated filing of answer should be denied cogency.
A declaration of default, if proper, shall not issue unless the claiming party asked for it.