Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No.

L-533
Topics:

“A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.”—Canon 3, Code of
Professional Responsibility

“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility

Facts of the Case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients
who cannot afford the services of big law firms.

Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified phrases like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a
valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to
6:00pm 7th Floor Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.”

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star because it is composed of specialists that
can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is, especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.

Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this American Jurisprudence. According to him, there
is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to offer.

Issue:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Court Ruling:

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous jurisprudence,
practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret marriages, bigamous
marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An ordinary professional card (3.) Phone
directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.

Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

- December 23, 2012

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc.,to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of
the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject
of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for
which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of
the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda

People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Bidin, J.
Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was
filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused
filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is
vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No.
2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion
espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the
“law” contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A.
1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor
has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:
whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his
discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari
Held:
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in
the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-
Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even
assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the
Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the
respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1
of LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive
Branch of the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are
herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos
under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or
other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in
the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor
LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the
force and effect of law.
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked.

People vs Gacott GR No 116049 13

July 1995
11 WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case
was annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross ignorance of
law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge?
Decision: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matter or cases regardless of the sanctions,
imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.

Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her
public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all complainants in the
instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998,
complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a
student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED. She demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be
P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED.

Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath
as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from
persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their
private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring
the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find
that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon
finality of this decision.

Villasanta vs. Peralta Case Digest

0

Facts:

Respondent Hilarion, who was already married to Rizalina, courted Lilian who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of Lilian, Hilarion procured

the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document and made Lilian sign it. A week after, Hilarion brought the document back

to Lilian with the signatures of the judge, the civil registrar and two witnesses. Since they lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, Lilian

insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage. The two went to a priest who, relying on the falsified marriage contract, solemnized the marriage.

Lilian later discovered that Hilarion was previously married; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal

Code and a complaint for immorality before the Supreme Court, seeking to disqualify Hilarion, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to

the bar.

Held:

Respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case

involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is

still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required

by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. (Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313)

Dallong-Galicinao v. Castro A.C. No. 6396, 25 October 2005

Facts: Atty. Castro, a private practitioner, went to the office of Atty. Dallong-Galicinao, the clerk of court of Bambang (Nueva
Vizcaya) RTC, to inquire whether the complete records of a civil case had already been remanded to the court of origin. Atty. Castro
was not the counsel of record of either party in the said civil case. When denied such request, Atty. Castro hurled invectives at Atty.
Dallong-Galicinao which caused the same to file a complaint-affidavit against the former for unprofessional conduct. Due to Atty.
Castro’s public apology, Atty. Dallong-Galicinao expressed her desire not to appear on the next hearing.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable.

 Decision: Yes. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, Atty.
Castro has no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. Although the penalty should be tempered since Atty. Castro apologized
and Atty. Dallong-Galicinao accepted it. This is not to say that Atty. Castro should be absolved of his actuations. Atty. Castro is
ordered fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

Legal Ethics – Practice of Law

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed
to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for
at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in
the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average
general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least
some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the
full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

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Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term “practice of law” (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People
v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term
“practice of law”. (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books
or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting
legal documents and giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.

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Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his father’s law office. The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-
finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice,
except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsod’s track record which will show that he Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one
adviced and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
 CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary requirement of
practicing law for at least 10 years. However, despite Cayetano’s objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA) still
confirmed Monsod’s appointment.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s
appointment.

Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC chairman by the President is mandated by
the Constitution under Article IX, Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides:

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no occasion for the Supreme Court to
exercise its corrective power since COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion based on the evidence presented.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite
Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
 ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work
done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986
constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of
Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in
the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation
lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from
1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide
Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power
of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.
P

Case Digest: CAYETANO v. MONSOD

20 AUGUST 2017L. L.

CAYETANO v. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991
PARAS, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Commission on Appointments confirmed the said nomination. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the Constitutional qualification requirement.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:

(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the bar, worked in his father’s law office. After
then, he worked as operations officer in the World Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked
with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently rendered services to various companies either as legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
2. WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on Appointments regarding the confirmation of
nomination of Monsod.

RULING:
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.Atty. Monsod’s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
2. NO. The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of the COMELEC Chairman by the president is mandated by
the Constitution. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion for has been clearly shown.
VELEZ VS DE VERA (496 SCRA 345)

Velez vs De Vera
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]

Facts: An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty.
de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given
authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a
check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. Atty. de Vera
vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and
that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days. Petitioner claims that such information was concealed by the respondent. Such and other circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent is not fit
to be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign
jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

Held: No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of
California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for
suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case
could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings
and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facieevidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

FIRST DIVISION

[ ADM. CASE NO. 3695, February 24, 1992 ]

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. FERNANDO

ALCANTARA AND JOSELITO LIM, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991,[1] complainant
Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty.
Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso
sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the
reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land.
The court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses
them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a
futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed against him in Adm. Matter No.
MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution of
September 8, 1988 for having become moot and academic Adm. Matter No.
MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after the
respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No
motion for reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant,
that resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a
relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge.[2] That those
charges are now being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as
an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in the
form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule
of res judicata.[3]
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely
performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827
when he did what is now complained of.[4]
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII,
Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda[5] for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No.
3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly
inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario
Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of
preliminary injunction against the "defendants, their agents,
representatives or other persons acting in their behalf, ordering them to
desist from threshing and carting away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of
the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, * * * until further order of this Court. * *
*"[6] This injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court
rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a
portion of the area in dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No. 3217
belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim[7] executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on
May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title to Lot No. 3217 was still
in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio,
Protacio Cabatino and Maxima Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the
portion being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident to
the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her
land. Relying therefore on the injunction issued by the lower court, she filed
through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in
contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case
No. 3827 was different from the area occupied by him. To resolve the issue,
the lower court with his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The
result of the resurvey showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot
occupied by him was the very same land involved in Civil Case No. 3827.
Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in an order
dated July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals
in a decision rendered on March 21, 1998.[8]
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot
and complainant is the successor-in-interest of the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for
complainant to claim that neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had
anything to do with said civil case. Being privies to the parties, they are
necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No.
3287.[9]After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty. Lim
moved for the execution of the affirmed judgment,[10] and when the writ of
execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to Require
Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to
Authorize the Latter to Execute s Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of
Plaintiffs."[11] That motion was granted by the lower court, but complainant
refused to surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty.
Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT 186299
Null and Void,"[12] which the lower court granted on July 31, 1989.
It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all
done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No.
3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over
the property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure
execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.[13] He shall serve his client with
competence and diligence,[14] and his duty of entire devotion to his client's
cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means
to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed.[15] An attorney's duty
to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until his
effective release from the case[16] or the final disposition of the whole
subject matter of the litigation.[17] During that period, he is expected to take
such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may
require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions
complained of. He should be commended, not condemned, for diligently
and competently performing his duties as an attorney.
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in Civil
Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a
matter that should have been litigated in said case instead of being raised
for the first time in these proceedings. In any case, there being no showing
that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception
against him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had
anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the
same reason he cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge
Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 19
Case: VALERIANA U. DALISAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
respondent. (A.C. No. 5655. January 23, 2006)
FACTS:
Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged
respondent’s
services as counsel in CivilCase No. 00-044. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and
attorneys fees,respondent never rendered legal services. As a result, she terminated theattorney-
client relationship and demanded the return of her money, butrespondent refused.

The Supreme Court in its Decision, found respondentguilty of malpractice and gross misconduct
and suspended him from thepractice of law for a period of six months.
Upon learning of the Court’s d
ecision, respondent verified the status ofCivil Case No. 00-044. He learned of the trial
court’s
Decision holding that thetax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official
records. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainantalleging
that complainant offered tampered evidence. The respondent then fileda motion for
reconsideration for the Supreme Court Decision and argued thatcomplainant did not engage his
services as counsel, and that complainantoffered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004,
prompting him to filefalsification cases against her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
HELD:
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
The Courtexplained that once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-
clientrelationship is established. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsifieddocumentary
evidence, it will not be sufficient to exonerate the respondent.Consistent with the mandate of
Canon 19 that a lawyer shall represent hisclient with zeal and only within the bounds of the law,
Rule 19.02 of the sameCanon specifically provides that a lawyer who has received information
that hisclients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon aperson or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, andfailing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordancewith the Rules of Court.As a lawyer,
respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead ofinaction, he should have confronted
complainant and asked her to rectify herfraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he
should terminatehis relationship with her.

Millare v. Montero
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Millare‘s mother, Pacifica Millare obtained a favorable judgement
from theMTC, Bangued, Abra which ordered Respondent Eustaquio Montero‘s client, Elsa Dy Co to
vacate the
premises which is the subject of the ejectment case. Thereafter, Montero filed numerous cases
in hopesof getting a favorable decision for Co. (1) Civil Case No. 344 which is an appeal from the
decisionrendered in civil case no. 844 of the MTC of Bangued, Abra with the RTC, Abra (2) CA-
G.R. CV No. 11404which is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, Abra (3) CA-G.R. SP No.
11690 which is an action for theannulment of decisions and/or reformation or novation of
decisions filed with the CA (4) G.R. No. 86084which is a petition for review on certiorari filed
with the Supreme Court (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 whichis an appeal and/or review by certiorari
filed with the CA as well (6) SP Civil Action No. 624 which is apetition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus with preliminary issuance of prohibitory order filed withthe RTC of Abra.ISSUE:WON
Montero violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:Yes. The rights of Co as Montero‘s client were fully protected and her defenses were properly
ventilated when Montero filed an appeal from the MTC to the RTC but Montero
thereafter resorted todevious and underhanded means to delay the execution of judgement by
the MTC adverse to Co.RATIO:Canon 12 of the CPR provides that a lawyer is required to exert
every effort and consider it hisduty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse orwrongfully use the judicial process, like filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolousappeals for the sole purpose of frustrating
and delaying the execution of a judgement.

CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)
ISSUE:
WN Christian Monsod has engaged in the
practice of law
for at least 10 years?
HELD:
YES
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC INC

2
Legal Ethics Cases (Alimurung)
2D 2012
FACTS:

Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or
of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381). Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of
said advertisement that claims that it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of
legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machine.
ISSUE:

W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law

Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of
HELD:

According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the
impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and that it renders legal
services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is
counseling illegal activities.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the
court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent clients in court since
law practice is not limited merely to court appearances.

Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession
Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. The proscription against advertising
of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.

Exceptions:
o
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon
o
Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of his name,
the law firm, address and branch of law practiced.

Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of
the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded with a warning that the
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

16OCT
[Per Curiam]

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend
his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint.
Complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the
Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the
land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer
may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados,
however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [citation omitted]. The execution
of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

The Case
: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer for
disbarment
Facts:
Respondent was the Pormento family s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family s
relationship with the respondentextends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.The rift between
complainant and respondent began when the complainant s counterclaim in a civil case filed
with the RTCof Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento
of the dismissal of his counterclaim whichresulted to the latter being deprived of his right to
appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento wasforced to hire a
new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject property.In a
separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. The Deed of
Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since
there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded
respondent s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his(complainant s) nephew
and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the
said property.Subsequently, complainant s nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the
former to file an ejectment case with theMunicipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros
Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant s nephew
Held/Ruling:Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of thefacts.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will requirethe attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether hewill be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another testto determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent anattorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness ordouble dealing in the performance thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the presentcontroversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of
the previous litigation in which he appeared for the formerclient. Conversely, he may properly
act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in amatter
wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of
interests. Where, however,the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer s new client
and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client s action, the
lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for
theformer client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel