The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information.
Facts:
In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two
(2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape stated as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
Issue:
Did the complaint or information for attempted rape sufficiently alleged the
specific acts or omissions constituting the offense?
Held:
No. For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not
satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a
conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him. (People vs. Dimaano, G.R. No.
168168, September 14, 2005)
Sasot vs. People GR No. 143193 (June 29,2005)
Posted on May 9, 2017
FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint filed by the NBA Properties, Inc. against petitioners
for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
competition. Based on the report from the NBI, they have conducted two
investigations due to the petitioners’ alleged participation in the manufacture,
printing, sale and distribution of counterfeit “NBA” garment products, which
led to the search and seizure of several items from petitioner’s
establishment.
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the ground
that, the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.
Petitioners contend that since the complainant is a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they
have been using the business name ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC.
since 1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design.
In the Comment/Opposition filed by the trial prosecutor of Manila
RTC Branch 1, it stated that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even
without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged
is a public crime, as provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied
petitioners’ motion to quash which lead to the filing of a special civil action
for Certiorari with the CA. According to the CA, the petition is not the
proper remedy in assailing the denial of the quashal motion, and that the
grounds raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the
merits.
Petitioners sought for the reconsideration of the Decision, but was
denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines and not licensed to do business in the Philippines have the right
to sue for unfair competition.
HELD: The petition must be denied.
While petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, their
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the
fiscal, complainants capacity to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses
against the crime of unfair competition.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code is a public crime. It is essentially an
act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured
party. The complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
Case Digest: Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
By ResIpsaLoquitor - August 03, 2013
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 184537 April 23, 2010
Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the
construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a
competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage
and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation
of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government.
The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage,
hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The
accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted
on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment
of the first information.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of
the information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense:
either by causing undue injury or by giving private person
unwarranted benefit. That accused may be charged under either
mode or under both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary.
Case Digest: Bonifacio et al., vs RTC Makati and Jessie John
Gimenez GR No 184800
By ResIpsaLoquitor - September 01, 2013
Bonifacio et al., vs RTC Makati and Jessie John Gimenez
GR No 184800 May 5, 2010
Facts:
Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of
Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co.,
(Malayan), a criminal complain for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in
relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling
Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific
Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously
purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect
thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns,
filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.
That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web
domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and
no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such
websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.
Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City,
pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.
Issue:
How should an online article be treated in relation to a written
defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided by law
specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?
Ruling:
Art. 360 of the RPC provides:
“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition
of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the
same.
xxxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the oofense. xxxx”
That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited only to:
1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was
used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published.
The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be
no way of determining the point of its printing and first publication. TO give
credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post
messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.
The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.
Case Digest: Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of
the Philippines GR Nos 172476-99
By ResIpsaLoquitor - September 01, 2013
Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines
GR Nos 172476-
99 September 15, 2010
Facts:
Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former
president of AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the
acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing
projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal
Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors
executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over the
subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After
the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed
a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property with a
purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was
presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the
Certificate of Title of the said property.
Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February
12, 1999 with a supplemental motion dated May 28, 1999 regarding
the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was
tasked to review the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal
Jr., indeed participated in an affixed his signature on the contracts and
found probable cause. The Ombudsman acted positively on the
findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal
Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on the
ground that there is a pending resolution of his second Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and
should hold his arraignment.
Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of
Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution
shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of
probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court are: unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a
pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in the
DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr.,
failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.
With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman
who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed
with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to
establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion,
thus, there is probable cause in the filing of the case.
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full
text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili
borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C.
Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of
the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the
checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure
of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but
to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson
for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred
that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed
several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents
showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those
appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.
In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion
was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant
to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary
Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had
not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's
office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting
on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject
offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations
of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to
it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription
of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a
proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant
petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error
in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition
before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four
(4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No.
3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings
for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed
periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had
already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August
1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions
and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable
cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is
also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE
ROBERTO L. AYCO
502 SCRA 446 (2006)
The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses
in the absence of public prosecutor or a private
prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the
Rules.
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South
Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case to present evidence
consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of
State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process,
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. so is the State.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his
refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being inability to attend the hearings or to file a motion for postponement
ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his
in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates
have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter
disregard of the Rules.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote
against Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Serious Misconduct.”
Bun Tiong vs. Balboa Case Digest
ISSUE:
0
Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal
Procedure for allowing the defense to present evidence in the absence
of a prosecutor A separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases
of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed
HELD: ahead of the criminal case.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the ***********
public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no
public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing Facts:
by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the
Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps. Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline
court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the Siok Ching Teng:
absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3) post-dated
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines checks issued by Caroline in the total amount of P5,175,250.00. The
as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being
merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence Regional Trial Court found the spouses liable and ordered them to pay the
of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to amount.
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to
vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a Caroline covering the said three checks. The Municipal Trial Court acquitted
speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot
Caroline but held her civilly liable. On appeal, the RTC modified the MTC
Decision by deleting the award of civil damages.
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with forum-shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal cases constitute
forum-shopping.
Held:
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court
would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in
an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of
the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the
Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a
civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of
bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22
violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent
double payment of the claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides that "the criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action
separately shall be allowed or recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal case were
filed on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997, respectively, prior to the
adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. At
the time of filing of the cases, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the
civil case may proceed independently of the criminal cases and there is no
forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended rules, a separate
proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No.
22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. (Bun Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008)
Case Doctrines:
● The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal
cases. The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P.
Blg. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not the purpose for
which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.
● Filing a Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC after a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings was denied by the MTC constitute
forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of one party
against another, when an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or
by special civil action of certiorari.
Facts: Spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of
Carolina Jose’s (Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily
interest rate of 1% to 2% which was later on increased to
5% per day. Respondents were forced to accept because
they allegedly had no other option left. Purita would then
issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment of the amount
borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.
In 2004, Sps. Suarez filed a Complaint against Jose seeking
to nullify the 5% interest per day, alleging that same is
iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent
and imposed using undue influence by taking improper
advantage of their financial distress.
Thereafter, Jose filed several cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 against respondent Purita before the MTCC.
Purita, in turn filed motions to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.
Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest per month is
nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would
mean that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are
not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid.
The motion to suspend was denied. Hence, Sps. Suarez filed
before the RTC a “Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Temporary Restraining Order” seeking to restrain the
MTCCs from further proceeding with the B.P. Blg. 22 cases
on the ground of prejudicial question. The RTC granted the
motion. CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a prejudicial question exists such that the
outcome of the validity of the interest rate is determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the respondent spouses in the
criminal case.
2. Whether or not respondent spouses are guilty of forum
shopping.
Held:
1. No. There is none.
A prejudicial question has two essential elements: (i) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal
cases. The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P.
Blg. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not the purpose for
which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners
is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will
not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because
what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of
bouncing checks. The primordial question is whether the law
has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been
issued.
2. Yes. There is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already
been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in
other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of one party
against another, when an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or
by special civil action of certiorari; or the institution of two or
more acts or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in
the MTCCs hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases but unfortunately,
the same were denied. Failing to get the relief they wanted,
respondents sought before the RTC, the suspension of the
criminal proceedings which was granted. Respondents tried
to extricate themselves from the charge of forum shopping
by explaining that after the denial of their motions to
suspend, their only remedy was the application for
preliminary injunction in the civil case—a relief which they
had already asked for in their complaint and which was also
initially not granted to them. Any which way the situation is
viewed, respondents’ acts constituted forum shopping
since they sought a possibly favorable opinion from one
court after another had issued an order unfavorable to
them. (Sps. Carolina and Reynaldo Jose vs. Sps.
Laureano and Purita Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June
30, 2008)
Case Digest: Soriano vs People and BSP
By ResIpsaLoquitor - August 03, 2013
Soriano vs People and BSP
G.R. No. 162336 February
1, 2010
Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents for allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the name of
two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan
in the bank, nor did the bank's officers approved or had any
information about the said loan. The state prosecutor conducted a
Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of
Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2)
separate information against Soriano for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on
the ground:
1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for
the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the
complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath
of subscription and the signatories were not authorized
persons to file the complaint; and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the
commission of estafa uner par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is
inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec.
83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795), and therefore a
person cannot be charged of both offenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory
requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy in an order denying a Motion to Quash.
Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but
merely transmitted for preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not
the letter transmitting them initiated the preliminary investigation and
therefore is the complaint which substantially complied with the
manadory requirements of law.
No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a
plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.
SAMUEL U. LEE vs. KBC BANK, N.V.
G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010
Carpio, J.:
Facts: idas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000
loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank), a Belgian corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines. Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and
director of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a
deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed
Purchase Order No. MTC-548 issued by Otto Versand, a company based in
Germany, and covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans amounting to
$1,863,050 to KBC Bank. MDEC obtained another loan, amounting to
$65,000, from KBC Bank. Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant
secretary of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a
deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed
Purchase Order No. WC-128 issued by Otto Versand, and covered a
shipment of boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to $841,500 to KBC Bank.
MDEC was considered in default in paying the $65,000 loan on 30 January
1998. KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of
Confirmed Purchase Order Nos. MTC-548 and WC-128. Otto Versand sent a
facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the purchase
orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered by the purchase
orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC any amount.
In a complaint-affidavit, Liza M. Pajarillo, manager of the corporate division
of KBC Bank, charged Lee and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution, State
Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia) found the existence of
probable cause and recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against
Lee and Lim. Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim
were filed with the RTC. After finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M.
Dumayas (Judge Dumayas) of the RTC issued warrants of arrest against Lee
and Lim. Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of
Justice. In his Resolution, Secretary Hernando B. Perez (Secretary Perez)
directed the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim.
Secretary Perez held that the facsimile message constituted hearsay
evidence. KBC Bank filed a motion for reconsideration with the Department
of Justice. In a motion filed with the RTC, Assistant City Prosecutor Nora C.
Sibucao (Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for the withdrawal of the
informations filed against Lee and Lim. Judge Dumayas granted Assistant
City Prosecutor Sibucao’s motion to withdraw the informations against Lee
and Lim. KBC Bank filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution, the Court referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules
of Court. In his Resolution Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong denied KBC
Bank’s 2 August 2002 motion for reconsideration. In its 10 February 2004
Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003
Order holding that the Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case,
which is the authority to hear and determine the case. Hence, this present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court did not abdicate its duty to determine
the sufficiency of the prosecution’s reason for withdrawing the
informations.
Held: Court is not impressed. Whether the facsimile message is admissible
in evidence and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is
present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the
preliminary investigation.
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-
affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the
records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court
by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case
violates KBC Bank’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Judge Dumayas’ order granting the Motion to Withdraw the
informations is void.
Crim Pro Digest: OKABE V.
GUTIERREZ
Topic: Preliminary Investigation
OKABE V. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint
for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the
affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents
counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties
were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the
documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not
enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable
cause for estafa against her.
 The court denied the petitioners motions on the following
grounds:
(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the
Information, the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the
city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners
arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable
cause was made after the court had already found probable cause
and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter
filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion
was a mere surplusage;
In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause,
she posits that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutor’s resolution
in the determination of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
HELD:
NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not
rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not only
the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the
counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. The duty to make
such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing
judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of
the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary
investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as
amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the
Information.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed
with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make
a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under Section 1,
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating
prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of a case
cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is
for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and
public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the
filing of the Information against the respondent, he executes a
certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence
presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is,
by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the
RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging
Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe,
a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that
on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the
peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from
Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the
petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon,
and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but
later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant
submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J.
Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable
cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was
subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial
court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended
bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond
in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines
for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s
permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28,
2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and
returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private
prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the
issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court
approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a
verified motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging
that the only documents appended to the Information
submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor;
the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the
respondent’s counter-affidavit and the other evidence
adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On
July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent
Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July
17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan
for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing
there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
questioned the irregularity of the determination of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation
however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of
bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the
petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment,
petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court
left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition
for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order
however all the other motions were denied, hence this
case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed
reversible error in determining existence of probable
cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of
respondent Maruyama and the latter’s documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in
Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the
information or complaint. An information or complaint
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby
DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on
the complete records, as required under Section 8(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Crim Pro Digest: PEOPLE V.
LAGUIO
Topic: ARREST
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to
nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in criminal case,
granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to
Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges filed against him.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor
of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise
unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial
a court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now
posits that inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that
the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed
firearms in the accused possession had been validly made upon
probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission
of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the People
now contends that the warrantless search preceded the
warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the
general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and
seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private
respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying
illegal drugs.
Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the
police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of
arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case
did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car,
which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He
was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can
be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph
(a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b)
of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically
identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught
with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will
be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day,
May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may
be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the
arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description
of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is
that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless
search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
CASE DIGEST: VALDEZ
VS. PEOPLE
Leave a reply
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the
Philippines
G.R. No 170180
November 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the
violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous
drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three
barangay tanods who made a search on him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from
the bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested
to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the
three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered
to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were
found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on
appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the
warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant
supporting the arrest and the search.
None of the petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged
fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of
criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.
However, the Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but
also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the
seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the
contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.
Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the
accused was thus acquitted.
The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The
accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the
only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
170180 November 23, 2007
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on Warrantless Arrest, Search and
Seizure, Fruit of a poisonous
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to tree
another. OCTOBER 25, 2017
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time
of the arrest.
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid
warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The
The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
arresting officer.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A.
No. 9165.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented three
barangay tanods namely, Bautista, Aratas and Ordoo, who arrested
petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he
was conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in the
said barangay together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed
that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking
for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly
attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and
thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Mercado,
where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the
police station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material
points. However, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the
contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was
petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders
from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was
ordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that
they saw the purported contents thereof.
The forensic chemist conducted the examination of the marijuana
allegedly confiscated from petitioner. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the
marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance
reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose
marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana
leaves.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by
the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in
newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner
denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with
imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As
petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged
with the instant offense.
The RTC rendered judgment against him.
The CA affirmed the challenged decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay
tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that
followed was likewise contrary to law.
Whether or not the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are
inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
RULING:
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was
without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the
only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant,
to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay
tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time
petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not
committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have
probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but
natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in
fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at
night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per
se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to
ones consciousness of guilt.
Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in
People v. Shabaz that flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently
ambiguous. Alone, and under the circumstances of this case,
petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation
as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, [t]he phrase in his
presence therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the
arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any
deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the
statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond
the cases specifically provided by law.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the
search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized
during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view
(3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught
in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in
hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was
in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based
on conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually
opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive
control of the public officials who had custody of him when the search
of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove
any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged “consent.” Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening
his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the
constitutional guarantee. As a result, petitioners lack of objection to
the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves
for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that
militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it
has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
following elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took
place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine
qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its
failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.
There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. As we
discussed in People v. Orteza, where we deemed the prosecution to
have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of
appellant for illegal sale of shabu.
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers
complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as
specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial
control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after
seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to
comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted
for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually
recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure
in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the
Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at
the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and
take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the
shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created
reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure to indubitably
show the identity of the shabu.
Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the
seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the
State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike
have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized
drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling,
storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the
evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person
who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it
was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to
prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of
the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the
very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot
by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights
enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every
accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.
Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to advance the cause of the
prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or more
inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the
other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the
accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of
moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to
overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners
exoneration from criminal liability.
Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his
car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A
manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by
the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police
forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his
right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that
such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant
lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of
The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules
and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the
shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he
was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested
him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and
accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by
the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after
the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any
“personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s
car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s
wife’s name. That information did not, however, constitute
“personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless
arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by
posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their
arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming
that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the
Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010.
17MAY
Third Division
[CORONA, J.]
FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for
the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction
to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised
“with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions
as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering Crim Pro Digest: LACHICA V. TORMIS
that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Topic: Bail
Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is LACHICA V. TORMIS
more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Facts:
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced
by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does
the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances Rosabella M Tormis of the Municipal Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV,
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of with abuse of authority. On July 2, 2003, accused Domugho was
Court? apprehended by the police at around 8:45pm and was brought to the
police station for booking and custody at 9:30pm.
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114
does not mean automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the
and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the accused that she was released from confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm.
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, Complainant inquired from the police station if an order of release was
such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial because of the phone call the respondent judge made telling the desk
court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent- officer that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the the case records but the expediente contained no copies of the order of
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule release. She was only shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was only on
114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found.
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting
the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and
the police. Only a notation that there was a posting of the cash bail bond
appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces
was entered therein.
a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in
spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will
make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to
receive the cash bail bond as the function belonged exclusively to the
office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said judge committed an
act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the
release of the accused.
Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order
of release at 7pm after accused posted the cash bond. She claimed that
such accused was released because of the order of release and not
because of the phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report
recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000
or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and
recommended the suspension of 3 months.
Issue:
WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally
receiving the cash bail bond for the accused.
Held:
Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states that:
“The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case…….”
Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to
receive such bail bond. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive
the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of
the judge.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her
judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the
accused and for deliberately misleading the court by making false
representations. She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary
and other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt more seriously.
Serapio vs Sandiganbayan
GR No 148468 28
January 2003
11
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Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the
SC; these are: 1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions
of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with
Former President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among
others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal
counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on
behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal
activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him
before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued.
Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the
PNP. Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such
motion is opposed by the prosecution for the reason that petitioner
should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on
Petitioner simultaneously filed a motion to quash.
The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings
filed by petitioner and the prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the
reason that the prosecution have waived their right to present
evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution
launched an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to
prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the
People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons,
he is still being deprived of his liberty.
Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the
Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.
Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted?
Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus. General rule applies.
“Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused
is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of
the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing
to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper
recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.”
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioner’s
restraint of liberty did not become arbitrary. His application for bail
has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned
solely to the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution because he
himself is partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an
officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do
so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by
the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to
a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to
its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
Olivarez vs Sandiganbayan
GR 118533 04
October 1995
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Facts: Paranaque Sanguaniang Bayan Resolution 744, approved by
Mayor Olivarez 6 Oct 1922, authorized Baclaran Credit Cooperative
Inc (BCCI) to set up a manfacturer’s night (Christmas Agro-
Industrial Fair sa Baclaran) during the Christmas fiesta celebration,
at Baclaran for 60 days, (11 Nov 92 to 15 Feb 93) for which they
will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard.
Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary
permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the permit unless BCCI
gives money to the latter.
On 15 Dec 1992, BCCI charged Olivarez with violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a
mayor’s permit deapite request and follow ups to implement SB
Resolution 744.
After preliminary investigations and pleadings before the
Sandiganbayan, the case was remanded to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, the Ombudsman found Olivarez liable
by giving unwarranted benefit though manifest impartiality to
another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply
for a business permit.
Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not Olivarez exhibited partiality in the
denial/inaction over BCCI’s license application
Decision: Olivarez issued a permit to an unidentified Baclaran-
based vendor’s association by the mere expedient of an executive
order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI
before it could be granted the same permit.
Worse, Olivarez failed to show that BCCI and the unidentified
association were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which the said
executive order was issued.
There was nothing to prevent Ollivarez from referring the BCCI
letter-application to the licensing department, but which
paradoxically, he refused.
Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the
power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for
any charitable or welfare purpose. Hence, he cannot really feign
total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.
AJOELP. LIBUIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 154363. September 13, 2005
Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa.
Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and
brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725)
valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or
operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was
received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused Joel,
once in possession of the said car, misappropriated,
converted and/or misapplied the said car to his own
personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands to
return the said car to the owner, accused refused.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in
May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for repair at the
Paeng Motorworks operated by the Joel. The car was
received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of
the Joel who assured the del Mundo that it would be safe
in his motor shop.
When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January
1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the engine was
inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was
pulled out because it also needed repairs. Joel and
Bautista assured him that they would finish the repair
work and deliver the car to del Mundo’s house after two
weeks. However, Joel failed to deliver the car. Del Mundo
gave him another two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo
returned to the motor shop and found that his car was
already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who
discovered that Joel had sold the car’s differential and
cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.
Joel testified on direct examination. However, his defense
counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew from the case
after his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his
cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage
the services of another counsel. Joel eventually secured
the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to
appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution,
court issued an order striking from the records Joel's
direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.
Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial
court. CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel of
his right to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de
parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said counsel
withdrew, the trial court allowed the resetting of Joel's
cross-examination to give him time to engage the services
of another counsel. It ordered the striking of his testimony
from the records only after his new counsel failed to
appear at the subsequent hearings.
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?
Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have
appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel
consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to
employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time
of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused
has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a
counsel of his own choice. When the time for the
presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and Joel
appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable.
Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the
arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed
duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after his
initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the
motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage
the services of another counsel.
The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to
appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking
from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter
render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In
fact, the repeated failure to appear of Joel's counsel may
even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s
proceedings.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like
the present case would be discretionary with the trial
court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the
trial court had been liberal in granting postponements
asked by the petitioner himself. We think that such
liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition is denied.
dvertisements
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS,
Complainant, vs.
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005
Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and
incompetence of official duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; and directly and indirectly having financial and
material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in
the service of the order of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of
Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond
was approved in a Resolution where the appellate court directed the
issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought
to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the
National Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor,
who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative, asking how much more they had
to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the help
of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a
balance. When Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile number of
respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text
messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for the Lagua’s
provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that the respondent did
not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon
the accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art
Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When
confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s
release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of
resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art
Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint against the respondent in
a Letter dated November 14, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a
violation of right to privacy of the accused?

Held:

No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as
evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is
unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic
communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to
the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the
respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the
sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v.
Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages
addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a
favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the
occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the
same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations,

text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence
of which is not recorded or retained.”