[G.R. No. L-8191. February 27, 1956.

]
DIOSDADO A. SITCHON, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of
Manila, Respondent-Appellee.

1. Case No. L-8191 (Case No. 21530 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) was instituted by Diosdado A. Sitchon, Luis Gavino
and Ponciano Adoremos, in their own behalf and in representation of twenty-two (22) persons, named in an annex to the
petition. In 1947 and 1948, said Petitioners occupied portions of the public street known as Calabash Road, City of Manila, and
constructed houses thereon, without the consent of the authorities. Later on, some of them paid “concession fees or damages,
for the use” of said portions of the street, to a collector of the city treasurer, who issued receipts with an annotation
reading: “without prejudice to the order to vacate.” On or about July 5, 1952, Respondent City Engineer advised and ordered
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them to vacate the place and remove their houses therefrom before August 5, 1952, with the warning that otherwise he would
effect the demolition of said houses at their expense. This notice having been unheeded, a demolition team of the office of the
City Engineer informed the Petitioners in December, 1953, that their houses would be removed, whereupon the case was
instituted for the purpose already stated. At the instance of Petitioners herein, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Petitioners contend that said decisions should be reversed upon the ground that, in trying to demolish their respective houses
without notice and hearing, the city engineer sought to deprive them of their property without due process of law, apart from
the fact that, under Articles 701 and 702 of the new Civil Code, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the district
health officer, not in Respondent city engineer. Respondent had advised and ordered the Petitioners to remove said houses, within the periods stated in the corresponding notices; that Petitioners do not cha n roblesvirtualawlibrary

question, and have not questioned, the reasonableness or sufficiency of said periods; chan r oblesvirtualawlibrary and that they have never asked Respondent herein to give them an opportunity to show that their houses do not constitute public nuisances.

ART. 694. — “A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary or
“(2) Annoys or offends the senses; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary or
“(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary or
“(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary or
“(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.”
ART. 695. — “Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is
not included in the foregoing definition.” (Italics supplied.)
It is true that Articles 700 and 702 of the same Code provide: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ART. 700. — “The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.”
ART. 702. — “The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.”

places upon the city engineer the duty, among others, “to have charge of the care of streets, canals and esteros ”; to “prevent the cralaw cralaw cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

encroachment of private buildings on the streets and public places ”; cralaw to “have supervision of all private docks, wharves, cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary cralaw

piers and other property bordering on the harbor, rivers, esteros and waterways and issue permits for the construction, repair and
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removal of the same and enforce all ordinances relating to the same”; to “have the care and custody of all sources of water chan roble svirtualawlibrary

supply ”; to “cause buildings dangerous to the public to be ”; torn down”; and to “order the removal of buildings and
cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

structures erected in violation of the ordinances ”. Obviously, articles 700 and 702 of Republic Act No. 386, should yield to said section
cralaw

31 of Republic Act No. 409, not only because the former preceded the latter, but, also, because said section 31 of Republic Act No. 409
is a special provision specifically designed for the City of Manila, whereas said Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code are general
provisions applicable throughout the Philippines. Moreover, section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (No. 1600)
explicitly authorizes the action sought to be taken by Respondent herein, by providing: chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Whenever the owner or person responsible for any unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the proper department,
refuse or neglect to remove the same within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a public nuisance, and the city
engineer is authorized to remove the same at the owner’s expense.”
Again, houses constructed, without governmental authority, on public streets and waterways, obstruct at all times the free use by the
public of said streets and waterways, and, accordingly, constitute nuisances per se, aside from public nuisances. As such, the summary
removal thereof, without judicial process or proceedings may be authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due
process clause. (66 C.J.S. 733-734.)
“The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a
public nuisance; and the legislature may authorize the summary abatement of a nuisance without judicial process or proceeding.
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

“ The remedy of summary abatement for violation of a municipal ordinance may be used against a public nuisance.” (66 C.J.S. 855,
cralaw

856.)
“When necessary to insure the public safety, the legislature may under its police power authorize municipal authorities summarily to
destroy property without legal process or previous notice to the owner.
“ It is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his
cralaw

property is subjected to restraint or destruction.” (12 Am. Jur. 356, 357.)

“In the exercise of the police power the state may authorize its officers summarily to abate public nuisances without resort to legal
proceedings and without notice or a hearing.
Municipal Corporations generally have power to cause the abatement of public nuisances summarily without resort to legal
proceedings.” (39 Am. Jur. 455, 456, 457.)”
places upon the city engineer the duty, among others, “to have charge of the care of streets, canals and esteros ”; to “prevent the cralaw cralaw cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

encroachment of private buildings on the streets and public places ”; to “have supervision of all private docks, wharves,
cralaw cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary cralaw

piers and other property bordering on the harbor, rivers, esteros and waterways and issue permits for the construction, repair and
cralaw cralaw cralaw

removal of the same and enforce all ordinances relating to the same”; to “have the care and custody of all sources of water chan roble svirtualawlibrary

supply ”; to “cause buildings dangerous to the public to be ”; torn down”; and to “order the removal of buildings and
cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary cralaw chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

structures erected in violation of the ordinances ”. Obviously, articles 700 and 702 of Republic Act No. 386, should yield to said section
cralaw
31 of Republic Act No. 409, not only because the former preceded the latter, but, also, because said section 31 of Republic Act No. 409
is a special provision specifically designed for the City of Manila, whereas said Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code are general
provisions applicable throughout the Philippines. Moreover, section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (No. 1600)
explicitly authorizes the action sought to be taken by Respondent herein, by providing: chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Whenever the owner or person responsible for any unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the proper department,
refuse or neglect to remove the same within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a public nuisance, and the city
engineer is authorized to remove the same at the owner’s expense.”
Again, houses constructed, without governmental authority, on public streets and waterways, obstruct at all times the free use by the
public of said streets and waterways, and, accordingly, constitute nuisances per se, aside from public nuisances. As such, the summary
removal thereof, without judicial process or proceedings may be authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due
process clause. (66 C.J.S. 733-734.)
“The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a
public nuisance; and the legislature may authorize the summary abatement of a nuisance without judicial process or proceeding.
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

“ The remedy of summary abatement for violation of a municipal ordinance may be used against a public nuisance.” (66 C.J.S. 855,
cralaw

856.)
“When necessary to insure the public safety, the legislature may under its police power authorize municipal authorities summarily to
destroy property without legal process or previous notice to the owner.
“ It is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his
cralaw

property is subjected to restraint or destruction.” (12 Am. Jur. 356, 357.)

“In the exercise of the police power the state may authorize its officers summarily to abate public nuisances without resort to legal
proceedings and without notice or a hearing.
Municipal Corporations generally have power to cause the abatement of public nuisances summarily without resort to legal
proceedings.” (39 Am. Jur. 455, 456, 457.)”
Being in conformity with the facts and the law, the decisions appealed from are hereby affirmed in toto, and the writs of preliminary
injunction issued by the lower court dissolved, with costs against Petitioners-Appellants. It is SO ORDERED.
 Mendoza v. NHA 111 SCRA 837

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Santiago Mendoza, Carmen Urbano, Manuela Urbano, Renato De Guzman, Raquel De Guzman, Rosette De
Guzman, And Romeo De Guzman (Mendoza et.al.), petitioners, are occupants of certain portions of the Tatalon
Estate in Quezon City. They all claim ownership of their occupied lands:
– Santiago Mendoza: acquired from the DEUDORS, as evidenced by an AGREEMENT

– Carmen Urbano and Manuela Urbano : by virtue of a contract and denominated DEED OF TRANSFER
OFRIGHTSTO,INTERESTS IN AND POSSESSION OF A RESIDENTIAL LOT

– Renato, Raquel, Rosette, and Romeo, all surnamed de Guzman: inherited from their father Serafin de Guzman
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, took effect - authorized "the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly
owned by the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al.,"
for subdivision into small lots and its resale al cost to the bona fide occupants thereof

• Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was directed to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate

• Before the complaint for eminent domain could be filed, the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., claiming to be the
owner of the Tatalon Estate which was sought to be condemned, filed an action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the LTA, praying that Republic Act No. 2616 be declared unconstitutional: DENIED.

• On September 15, 1978, the trial court recognized the Compromise Agreement made by the Republic of the
Philippines, now represented by the National Housing Authority, and the J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.

• On June 11, 1978, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 1472, authorizing the National
Housing Authority (NHA) to summarily eject any and all squatters from government resettlement projects
without the necessity of a judicial order.
• Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President of the Philippines declared the entire Metropolitan Manila Area as an
Urban Land Reform Zone, issued Proclamation No. 1967, proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila, including
the Tatalon Estate, described as "Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.

• On January 27, 1981, NHA wrote Manuela Urbano, informing her that her request for inclusion in the list of
Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could not be favorably considered, for being an absentee structure owner, and
demanding that she demolish her structure built on the Tatalon Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, NHA would summarily demolish her structure after the expiration of the period
without further notice.

• In a letter, dated June 5, 1981, NHA also informed Romeo de Guzman and Renato de Guzman that they cannot be
granted a lot in the Tatalon Estate after development because they were absentee structure owners, as well.
NHA, however, offered to buy their at a price to be determined by it in order to avoid economic waste, but that if
the owner was not willing to sell the structure, he should demolish the same within 10 days from notice,
otherwise NHA would summarily demolish the same without further notice.

• In a letter dated August 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority also ordered the petitioner Santiago Mendoza,
"to demolish the illegal extension of (his) structure located at the Tatalon Estate which encroaches to the
adjacent lot boundaries and pose obstruction/delay in the allocation process", within 10 days from receipt
thereof, otherwise the NHA would summarily demolish the illegal construction after the expiration of the period
without further notice.
• Due to the threat of demolition, Mendoza et.al.
filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order, to restrain the NHA from
the threatened demolition of the petitioners'
houses situated in Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City;
and to declare Presidential Decree No. 1472
unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Mendoza et.al. are entitled to a lot

allocation in the Tatalon Estate
RULING:

• No. They are not entitled to lot allocations.

– They falsely claim ownership over parcels of the Tatalon Estate. The subject land is a property of the
state after the expropriation proceedings. They even admitted the State’s title when they applied for
inclusion as beneficiaries.

– The petitioners, having actual knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate,should have
vindicated their claim of ownership to the land claimed by them in the expropriation proceedings, as
intimated by the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration.
• Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional due process
clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by
personal service or by posting the same in the lot or door of the apartment as the case may be at least 10
days before his
scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has been amply complied with

in the case of the petitioners. Here, notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it had been
determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters on the land
occupied by them.
DOCTRINE:
• Squatters are a public nuisance which can be abated even without judicial proceedings.
• Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

• Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or

(2) A civil action; or

(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Petitioners (Mendoza et.al)

• They are rightful possessors of parcels of land within the Tatalon Estate.
• The enforcement of Presidential Decree No. 1472 against them is illegal and unconstitutional as it would
deprive them of their property without due process of law.

Respondents (NHA)

• Urbano and the De Guzmans, being absentee structure owners, are not entitled to lot allocations as they
are bona fide occupants under P.D. 1261:
– “SECTION 3. Allocation of lots and/or housing units in the project area shall be made by the Authority
according to the following priority:

1. 1Present occupants who were listed in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants;
2. Present occupants as determined by the Authority in its 1976 Census Survey; and
3. Squatter families in the Tatalon Estate after the 1976 Census Survey.”
• Mendoza created an illegal extension of his structure on the subject lot and, thus, must demolish the same.