NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994
ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY
ONG, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN,
respondents.
Bautista, Salva, Arrieta, Salva for petitioner.
Arthem Maceda Potian for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
15, 1993, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28391-92.
I
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of
land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to
private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of
Ong Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, died in January 1983; while
petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.
The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed
of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the
document was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated September
2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted
the administration of the lot and building to
petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband
settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she
demanded that the lot be vacated because she was
going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners
refused to vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a
case for unlawful detainer against petitioner
Ong Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court
dismissed her case. The dismissal was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was,
in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition. The decision of the
Court of Appeals became final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on
July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought
the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The
sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of
Sale written in Chinese with the letter head
"Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B"). An English
translation of said document (Exh. "C") read as
follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale
hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot
located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas
an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters
including a one-story house erected thereon unto
Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me
and consequently I have executed and signed the
government registered title (sic) the said lot
inclusive of the house erected thereon, now
belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally.
And the purpose of this document is to precisely
serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr.
Ong Ching Po into signing another document in
favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino
wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for
the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the
new title by the City Register of Deeds and for
the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I
certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)
On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong,
the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to
private respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985,
petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David
Ong filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against private respondent in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No.
85-33962.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an
action for quieting of title against petitioners
Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok
Lian, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
86-36818. Upon her motion, the case was
consolidated with Civil Case No.
Page 1 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
85-33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent. On appeal by petitioners to the
Court of Appeals, the said court affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, this petition.
II
According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals
erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the
Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh.
"B" and its translation, Exh. "C") in favor of
petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of
petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied
trust existed between petitioners and private
respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).
As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in
dispute ". . . is not so much as to which between
Exhibit "A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty,
but whether this document is what it purports
to be (i.e., a deed of conveyance in favor of
Soledad Parian [private respondent] or it was
only resorted to or executed as a subterfuge
because the real buyer (Ong Ching Po) was an
alien and it was agreed upon between Ong Ching
Po and his brother (Ong Yee, Soledad Parian's
husband) that the land be registered in the name
of Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal
complications and to facilitate registration
and transfer and that the said title would be
transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or his
successors-in-interest and that she would be
holding the title in trust for him" (Rollo, pp.
19-20).
We cannot go along with the claim that
petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private
respondent as a dummy to have the title over the
parcel of land registered in her name because
being an alien he was disqualified to own real
property in the Philippines. To sustain such an
outrageous contention would be giving a high
premium to a violation of our nationalization
laws.
Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and
that it was duly executed, still petitioners
cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by
virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
in the public domain.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
in the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made
dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities "qualified to acquire lands of the
public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of
the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to
participate in the "disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization" of all "lands of
the public domain and other natural resources
of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen;
therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring
and owning real property. Assuming that the
genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has
Page 2 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
been established, the same is null and void, it
being contrary to law.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed
of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of
private respondent (Exh. "A") is a notarized
document.
To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law
on said document, petitioners claim that private
respondent admitted that she did not pay
anything as consideration for the purported sale
in her favor. In the same breath, petitioners
said that private respondent implied in her
deposition that it was her husband who paid for
the property. It appears, therefore, that the
sale was financed out of conjugal funds and that
it was her husband who handled the transaction
for the purchase of the property. Such
transaction is a common practice in Filipino-
family affairs.
It is not correct to say that private respondent
never took possession of the property. Under the
law, possession is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.
Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." If
what petitioners meant was that private
respondent never lived in the building
constructed on said land, it was because her
family had settled in Iloilo.
There is no document showing the establishment
of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po
as trustor and private respondent as trustee.
Not even Exhibit "B" can be considered as such
a document because private respondent, the
registered owner of the property subject of said
"deed of sale," was not a party thereto. The
oral testimony to prove the existence of the
express trust will not suffice. Under Article
1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No
express trust concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proved by parole
evidence."
Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot
prove an express trust in writing, they can
prove an implied trust orally. While an implied
trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with
extreme caution, because such kind of evidence
may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70
SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be made to rest on
vague and uncertain evidence or on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf. De
Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267
[1962]). Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee
was not in a financial position to acquire the
land and to introduce the improvements thereon.
On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of
petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her
testimony in court that Ong Yee was a
stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was
engaged in business.
The Court of Appeals did not give any credence
to Exhibit "B" and its translation, Exhibit "C",
because these documents had not been properly
authenticated.
Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or
destroyed. When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and lost or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document.
The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This
order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218
SCRA 602 [1993]).
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the
genuineness and due execution of the deed of
sale, Exhibit "B".
The due execution of the document may be
established by the person or persons who
executed it; by the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged; or by any person who
was present and saw it executed or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures;
or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).
Page 3 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was
present when said document was executed, but the
trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she
not sign said document, even merely as a
witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct
or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only
on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching
Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided,
or after the deed of sale was executed. The
Court does not believe that she was present
during the execution and signing of the deed of
sale involved therein, notwithstanding her
pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6,
Records p. 414).
As to the contention of petitioners that all the
tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts,
deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate
of title were in their possession, private
respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners
when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true,
are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as
even a mere administrator or manager may
lawfully perform them pursuant to his
appointment or employment (Rollo,
p. 10).
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were
in the name of private respondent and her
husband. The rental receipts were also in the
name of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003]
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, vs. EDERLINA
P. CATITO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 53485 which affirmed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
14, in Civil Case No. 17,817 dismissing the
petitioners complaint, and the resolution of the
Court of Appeals denying his motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents[3]
As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner,
the case at bar stemmed from the following
factual backdrop:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian
citizen of German descent. He is an electrical
engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot
with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the
Philippines in 1974, started engaging in
business in the country two years thereafter,
and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen.
In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed
and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in
Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to
Kings Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a
massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina
and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to
Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and
was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney,
Australia, where she found employment as a
masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub. She was
fluent in German, and Alfred enjoyed talking
with her. The two saw each other again; this
time Ederlina ended up staying in Alfreds hotel
for three days. Alfred gave Ederlina sums of
money for her services.[4]
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he
persuaded her to stop working at Kings Cross,
return to the Philippines, and engage in a
wholesome business of her own. He also proposed
that they meet in Manila, to which she assented.
Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to the
Philippines. Within two weeks of Ederlinas
arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred
reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in
the Philippines and engage in business, even
offering to finance her business venture.
Ederlina was delighted at the idea and proposed
Page 4 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily
agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but
that he was eager to divorce his wife in
Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to
Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait
a little bit longer.
Ederlina found a building at No. 444 M.H. del
Pilar corner Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila,
owned by one Atty. Jose Hidalgo who offered to
convey his rights over the property for
P18,000.00. Alfred and Ederlina accepted the
offer. Ederlina put up a beauty parlor on the
property under the business name Edorial Beauty
Salon, and had it registered with the Department
of Trade and Industry under her name. Alfred
paid Atty. Hidalgo P20,000.00 for his right over
the property and gave P300,000.00 to Ederlina
for the purchase of equipment and furnitures for
the parlor. As Ederlina was going to Germany,
she executed a special power of attorney on
December 13, 1983[5] appointing her brother,
Aser Catito, as her attorney-in-fact in managing
the beauty parlor business. She stated in the
said deed that she was married to Klaus Muller.
Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume
his work as a pilot.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he
visited Ederlina in her Manila residence and
found it unsuitable for her. He decided to
purchase a house and lot owned by Victoria
Binuya Steckel in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218429 for US$20,000.00. Since Alfred
knew that as an alien he was disqualified from
owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that
only Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of
sale as the buyer of the property, as well as
in the title covering the same. After all, he
was planning to marry Ederlina and he believed
that after their marriage, the two of them would
jointly own the property. On January 23, 1984,
a Contract to Sell was entered into between
Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and
Ederlina as the sole vendee. Alfred signed
therein as a witness.[6] Victoria received from
Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the
amount of US$10,000.00 as partial payment, for
which Victoria issued a receipt.[7] When
Victoria executed the deed of absolute sale over
the property on March 6, 1984,[8] she received
from Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the
amount of US$10,000.00 as final and full
payment. Victoria likewise issued a receipt for
the said amount.[9] After Victoria had vacated
the property, Ederlina moved into her new house.
When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she
had her father Narciso Catito and her two
sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for
good and live with Ederlina. He returned to
Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat
to John Reid for $7,500.00 on May 4, 1984.[10]
He also sold his television and video business
in Papua New Guinea for K135,000.00 to Tekeraoi
Pty. Ltd.[11] He had his personal properties
shipped to the Philippines and stored at No. 14
Fernandez Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. The proceeds of the sale were
deposited in Alfreds account with the Hong Kong
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon
Branch under Bank Account No. 018-2-807016.[12]
When Alfred was in Papua New Guinea selling his
other properties, the bank sent telegraphic
letters updating him of his account.[13] Several
checks were credited to his HSBC bank account
from Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation,
Westpac Bank of Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Limited and Westpac BankPNG-
Limited. Alfred also had a peso savings account
with HSBC, Manila, under Savings Account No. 01-
725-183-01.[14]
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong
Kong, they opened another account with HSBC,
Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina,
under Savings Account No. 018-0-807950.[15]
Alfred transferred his deposits in Savings
Account No. 018-2-807016 with the said bank to
this new account. Ederlina also opened a savings
account with the Bank of America Kowloon Main
Office under Account No. 30069016.[16]
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New
Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7,
1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing in
Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he
and Ederlina had been married on October 16,
1978 and had a blissful married life until
Alfred intruded therein. Klaus stated that he
knew of Alfred and Ederlinas amorous
relationship, and discovered the same sometime
in November 1983 when he arrived in Manila. He
also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and
to return her to him, saying that Alfred could
not possibly build his future on his (Klaus)
misfortune.[17]
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron,
a close friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there
was any truth to Klaus statements and Sally
confirmed that Klaus was married to Ederlina.
When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted
that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But
she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus.
Page 5 of 36
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Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the
amorous relationship and wait for the outcome
of Ederlinas petition for divorce. After all,
he intended to marry her. He retained the
services of Rechtsanwltin Banzhaf with offices
in Berlin, as her counsel who informed her of
the progress of the proceedings.[18] Alfred paid
for the services of the lawyer.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase
another house and lot, owned by Rodolfo Morelos
covered by TCT No. 92456 located in Pea Street,
Bajada, Davao City.[19] Alfred again agreed to
have the deed of sale made out in the name of
Ederlina. On September 7, 1984, Rodolfo Morelos
executed a deed of absolute sale over the said
property in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee
for the amount of P80,000.00.[20] Alfred paid
US$12,500.00 for the property.
Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one
Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo, located in
Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT No. 35251.
Alfred once more agreed for the name of Ederlina
to appear as the sole vendee in the deed of
sale. On December 31, 1984, Atty. Camporedondo
executed a deed of sale over the property for
P65,000.00 in favor of Ederlina as the sole
vendee.[21] Alfred, through Ederlina, paid the
lot at the cost of P33,682.00 and US$7,000.00,
respectively, for which the vendor signed
receipts.[22] On August 14, 1985, TCT No. 47246
was issued to Ederlina as the sole owner of the
said property.[23]
Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27,
1985, the total amount of US$250,000 with the
HSBC Kowloon under Joint Deposit Account No.
018-462341-145.[24]
The couple decided to put up a beach resort on
a four-hectare land in Camudmud, Babak, Davao,
owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela Serrano.
Alfred purchased the property from the spouses
for P90,000.00, and the latter issued a receipt
therefor.[25] A draftsman commissioned by the
couple submitted a sketch of the beach
resort.[26] Beach houses were forthwith
constructed on a portion of the property and
were eventually rented out by Ederlinas father,
Narciso Catito. The rentals were collected by
Narciso, while Ederlina kept the proceeds of the
sale of copra from the coconut trees in the
property. By this time, Alfred had already spent
P200,000.00 for the purchase, construction and
upkeep of the property.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family
informing them of her life with Alfred. In a
Letter dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about
how Alfred had financed the purchases of some
real properties, the establishment of her beauty
parlor business, and her petition to divorce
Klaus.[27]
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her
business in Manila, she executed on July 8,
1985, two special powers of attorney[28]
appointing Alfred as attorney-in-fact to
receive in her behalf the title and the deed of
sale over the property sold by the spouses
Enrique Serrano.
In the meantime, Ederlinas petition for divorce
was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A
second petition filed by her met the same fate.
Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned
by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would
agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to
file a bigamy case against Ederlina.[29]
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership
to Ederlina, or as an alternative, the
establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina
owning 30% of the equity thereof. She initially
agreed to put up a corporation and contacted
Atty. Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary
documents. Ederlina changed her mind at the last
minute when she was advised to insist on
claiming ownership over the properties acquired
by them during their coverture.
Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started
deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to
secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could
charge her for bigamy and could even involve
Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid
complications, Alfred decided to live
separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her. In one of her letters to
Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined
her life. She admitted that the money used for
the purchase of the properties in Davao were
his. She offered to convey the properties deeded
to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and
Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to prepare her
affidavit for the said purpose and send it to
her for her signature.[30] The last straw for
Alfred came on September 2, 1985, when someone
smashed the front and rear windshields of
Alfreds car and damaged the windows. Alfred
thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint
charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with
malicious mischief.[31]
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at
father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all P342,000.00;
his life savings and because of this, he was
virtually penniless. He further accused the
Catito family of acquiring for themselves the
b. TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house)
properties he had purchased with his own money.
located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of
He demanded the return of all the amounts that
600 square meters, registered in the name of
Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over
Ederlina Catito, with the Register of Deeds of
all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina
Tagum, Davao del Norte valued at P144,000.00;
during their coverture.[32]

c. A parcel of agricultural land located at

Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a
Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte,
Complaint[33] dated October 28, 1985, against
consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from
Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of
Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already
Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal
paid in full by plaintiff. Valued at
properties located in Quezon City and Manila.
P228,608.32;
In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia,
that Ederlina, without his knowledge and
consent, managed to transfer funds from their
joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own II. Personal Properties:
account with the same bank. Using the said
funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the
properties subject of the complaints. He also a. Furniture valued at P10,000.00.
alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was
established with his own funds, and that the
Quezon City property was likewise acquired by
him with his personal funds.[34] . . .

5. That defendant made no contribution at all

to the acquisition of the above-mentioned
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was properties as all the monies (sic) used in
declared in default. Alfred adduced his evidence acquiring said properties belonged solely to
ex-parte. plaintiff;[36]

In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be
also filed a complaint[35] against Ederlina with rendered in his favor:
the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for
specific performance, declaration of ownership
of real and personal properties, sum of money,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
and damages. He alleged, inter alia, in his
it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
complaint:
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant:

4. That during the period of their common-law

relationship, plaintiff solely through his own
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the
efforts and resources acquired in the
corresponding deeds of transfer and/or
Philippines real and personal properties valued
conveyances in favor of plaintiff over those
more or less at P724,000.00; The defendants
real and personal properties enumerated in
common-law wife or live-in partner did not
Paragraph 4 of this complaint;
contribute anything financially to the
acquisition of the said real and personal
properties. These properties are as follows:
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the
plaintiff all the above real and personal
properties or their money value, which are in
I. Real Properties
defendants name and custody because these were
acquired solely with plaintiffs money and
resources during the duration of the common-law
a. TCT No. T-92456 located at Bajada, Davao relationship between plaintiff and defendant,
City, consisting of 286 square meters, (with the description of which are as follows:
residential house) registered in the name of the
original title owner Rodolfo M. Morelos but

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(1) TCT No. T-92456 (with residential house)
located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286
square meters, registered in the name of the
original title owner Rodolfo Morelos but already
fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
(2) TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house)
located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of
600 square meters, registered in the name of
Ederlina Catito, with the Register of Deeds of
Tagum, Davao del Norte, valued at P144,000.00;
(3) A parcel of agricultural land located at
Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte,
consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from
Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already
fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
c) Declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and
absolute owner of the above-mentioned real and
personal properties;
d) Awarding moral damages to plaintiff in an
amount deemed reasonable by the trial court;
e) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00
as attorneys fees for having compelled the
plaintiff to litigate;
f) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00
incurred as litigation expenses also for having
compelled the plaintiff to litigate; and
g) To pay the costs of this suit;
Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and
equitable in the premises.[37]
In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material
allegations in the complaint, insisting that she
acquired the said properties with her personal
funds, and as such, Alfred had no right to the
same. She alleged that the deeds of sale, the
receipts, and certificates of titles of the
subject properties were all made out in her
name.[38] By way of special and affirmative
defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause
of action against her. She interposed
counterclaims against the petitioner.[39]
In the meantime, the petitioner filed a
Complaint dated August 25, 1987, against the
HSBC in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City[40] for recovery of bank deposits and
damages.[41] He prayed that after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor,
thus:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that
the Honorable Court adjudge defendant bank, upon
hearing the evidence that the parties might
present, to pay plaintiff:
1. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
AND THIRTY U.S. DOLLARS AND NINETY EIGHT CENTS
(US$126,230.98) plus legal interests, either of
Hong Kong or of the Philippines, from 20
December 1984 up to the date of execution or
satisfaction of judgment, as actual damages or
in restoration of plaintiffs lost dollar
savings;
2.The same amount in (1) above as moral damages;
3. Attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to
TWENTY FIVE PER CENT (25%) of (1) and (2) above;
4. Litigation expenses in the amount equivalent
to TEN PER CENT (10%) of the amount in (1) above;
and
5. For such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the circumstances.[42]
On April 28, 1986, the RTC of Quezon City
rendered its decision in Civil Case No. Q-46350,
in favor of Alfred, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the defendant to
perform the following:
(1) To execute a document waiving her claim to
the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City in favor of
plaintiff or to return to the plaintiff the
acquisition cost of the same in the amount of
$20,000.00, or to sell the said property and
turn over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff;
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
(2) To deliver to the plaintiff the rights of
ownership and management of the beauty parlor
located at 444 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila,
including the equipment and fixtures therein;
(3) To account for the earnings of rental of the
house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, as well as the
earnings in the beauty parlor at 444 Arquiza
St., Ermita, Manila and turn over one-half of
the net earnings of both properties to the
plaintiff;
(4) To surrender or return to the plaintiff the
personal properties of the latter left in the
house at San Francisco Del Monte, to wit:
(1) Mamya automatic camera
(1) 12 inch Sonny T.V. set, colored with remote
control.
(1) Micro oven
(1) Electric fan (tall, adjustable stand)
(1) Office safe with (2) drawers and safe
(1) Electric Washing Machine
(1) Office desk and chair
(1) Double bed suits
(1) Mirror/dresser
(1) Heavy duty voice/working mechanic
(1) Sony Beta-Movie camera
(1) Suitcase with personal belongings
(1) Cardboard box with belongings
(1) Guitar Amplifier
(1) Hanger with mens suit (white).
To return to the plaintiff, (1) Hi-Fi Stereo
equipment left at 444 Arquiza Street, Ermita,
Manila, as well as the Fronte Suzuki car.
(4) To account for the monies (sic) deposited
with the joint account of the plaintiff and
defendant (Account No. 018-0-807950); and to
restore to the plaintiff all the monies (sic)
spent by the defendant without proper authority;
(5) To pay the amount of P5,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[43]
However, after due proceedings in the RTC of
Davao City, in Civil Case No. 17,817, the trial
court rendered judgment on September 28, 1995
in favor of Ederlina, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court cannot give due course to
the complaint and hereby orders its dismissal.
The counterclaims of the defendant are likewise
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[44]
The trial court ruled that based on documentary
evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of
land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The
court further stated that even if Alfred was the
buyer of the properties, he had no cause of
action against Ederlina for the recovery of the
same because as an alien, he was disqualified
from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of
land to the petitioner was null and void ab
initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the
petitioner was precluded from recovering the
properties from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals[45] in which the petitioner posited the
view that although he prayed in his complaint
in the court a quo that he be declared the owner
of the three parcels of land, he had no
intention of owning the same permanently. His
principal intention therein was to be declared
the transient owner for the purpose of selling
the properties at public auction, ultimately
enabling him to recover the money he had spent
for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The
appellate court ruled that the petitioner
knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was
barred from recovering the money used in the
purchase of the three parcels of land. It held
that to allow the petitioner to recover the
money used for the purchase of the properties
would embolden aliens to violate the
Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance,
the public policy.[46]
Hence, the petition at bar.
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
The petitioner assails the decision of the court respondent to enrich herself at the expense of
contending that: the petitioner in violation of Article 22 of the
New Civil Code.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING

THE RULE OF IN PARI DELICTO IN THE INSTANT CASE The petition is bereft of merit.
BECAUSE BY THE FACTS AS NARRATED IN THE DECISION
IT IS APPARENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT EQUALLY
GUILTY BUT RATHER IT WAS THE RESPONDENT WHO
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
EMPLOYED FRAUD AS WHEN SHE DID NOT INFORM
provides, as follows:
PETITIONER THAT SHE WAS ALREADY MARRIED TO
ANOTHER GERMAN NATIONAL AND WITHOUT SUCH
FRAUDULENT DESIGN PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE
PARTED WITH HIS MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
PROPERTIES.[47] private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
and associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
in the public domain.[50]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE INTENTION OF THE PETITIONER IS
NOT TO OWN REAL PROPERTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
BUT TO SELL THEM AT PUBLIC AUCTION TO BE ABLE Lands of the public domain, which include
TO RECOVER HIS MONEY USED IN PURCHASING private lands, may be transferred or conveyed
THEM.[48] only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire or hold private lands or lands of the
public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from
Since the assignment of errors are intertwined
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence,
with each other, the Court shall resolve the
they have also been disqualified from acquiring
same simultaneously.
private lands.[51]

The petitioner contends that he purchased the

Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales
three parcels of land subject of his complaint
in question were entered into by him as the real
because of his desire to marry the respondent,
vendee, the said transactions are in violation
and not to violate the Philippine Constitution.
of the Constitution; hence, are null and void
He was, however, deceived by the respondent when
ab initio.[52] A contract that violates the
the latter failed to disclose her previous
Constitution and the law, is null and void and
marriage to Klaus Muller. It cannot, thus, be
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
said that he and the respondent are equally
produces no legal effect at all.[53] The
guilty; as such, the pari delicto doctrine is
petitioner, being a party to an illegal
not applicable to him. He acted in good faith,
contract, cannot come into a court of law and
on the advice of the respondents uncle, Atty.
ask to have his illegal objective carried out.
Mardoecheo Camporedondo. There is no evidence
One who loses his money or property by knowingly
on record that he was aware of the
engaging in a contract or transaction which
constitutional prohibition against aliens
involves his own moral turpitude may not
acquiring real property in the Philippines when
maintain an action for his losses. To him who
he purchased the real properties subject of his
moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law
complaint with his own funds. The transactions
is unyielding.[54] The law will not aid either
were not illegal per se but merely prohibited,
party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
and under Article 1416 of the New Civil Code,
leaves the parties where it finds them.[55]
he is entitled to recover the money used for the
Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the
purchase of the properties. At any rate, the
petitioner cannot have the subject properties
petitioner avers, he filed his complaint in the
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money
court a quo merely for the purpose of having him
he had spent for the purchase thereof.[56]
declared as the owner of the properties, to
Equity as a rule will follow the law and will
enable him to sell the same at public auction.
not permit that to be done indirectly which,
Applying by analogy Republic Act No. 133[49] as
because of public policy, cannot be done
amended by Rep. Act No. 4381 and Rep. Act No.
directly.[57] Where the wrong of one party
4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted
equals that of the other, the defendant is in
to him, by way of refund for the money he used
the stronger position ... it signifies that in
to purchase the said properties. To bar the
such a situation, neither a court of equity nor
petitioner from recovering the subject
a court of law will administer a remedy.[58] The
properties, or at the very least, the money used
rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO MALO
for the purchase thereof, is to allow the

Page 10 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST
CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.[59]
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
constitutional proscription, nor claim that he
acted in good faith, let alone assert that he
is less guilty than the respondent. The
petitioner is charged with knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition.[60] As can be
gleaned from the decision of the trial court,
the petitioner was fully aware that he was
disqualified from acquiring and owning lands
under Philippine law even before he purchased
the properties in question; and, to skirt the
constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had
the deed of sale placed under the respondents
name as the sole vendee thereof:
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject
to the constitutional restrictions governing
the acquisition of real properties in the
Philippines by aliens.
From the plaintiffs complaint before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 84, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-46350 he alleged:
xxx That on account that foreigners are not
allowed by the Philippine laws to acquire real
properties in their name as in the case of my
vendor Miss Victoria Vinuya (sic) although
married to a foreigner, we agreed and I
consented in having the title to subject
property placed in defendants name alone
although I paid for the whole price out of my
own exclusive funds. (paragraph IV, Exhibit W.)
and his testimony before this Court which is
hereby quoted:
ATTY. ABARQUEZ:
Q. In whose name the said house and lot placed,
by the way, where is his house and lot located?
A. In 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco, del
Monte, Manila.
Q. In whose name was the house placed?
A. Ederlina Catito because I was informed being
not a Filipino, I cannot own the property. (tsn,
p. 11, August 27, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q. So you understand that you are a foreigner
that you cannot buy land in the Philippines?
A. That is correct but as she would eventually
be my wife that would be owned by us later on.
(tsn, p. 5, September 3, 1986)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What happened after that?
A. She said you foreigner you are using
Filipinos to buy property.
Q. And what did you answer?
A. I said thank you very much for the property
I bought because I gave you a lot of money (tsn.,
p. 14, ibid).
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware
that as a non-citizen of the Philippines, he was
disqualified from validly purchasing any land
within the country.[61]
The petitioners claim that he acquired the
subject properties because of his desire to
marry the respondent, believing that both of
them would thereafter jointly own the said
properties, is belied by his own evidence. It
is merely an afterthought to salvage a lost
cause. The petitioner admitted on cross-
examination that he was all along legally
married to Teresita Santos Frenzel, while he was
having an amorous relationship with the
respondent:
ATTY. YAP:
Q When you were asked to identify yourself on
direct examination you claimed before this
Honorable Court that your status is that of
being married, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q To whom are you married?
A To a Filipina, since 1976.
Q Would you tell us who is that particular
person you are married since 1976?
A Teresita Santos Frenzel.
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Q Where is she now?
A In Australia.
Q Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who
became an Australian citizen?
A I am not sure, since 1981 we were separated.
Q You were only separated, in fact, but not
legally separated?
A Thru my counsel in Australia I filed
separation case.
Q As of the present you are not legally
divorce[d]?
A I am still legally married.[62]
The respondent was herself married to Klaus
Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner
and the respondent could not lawfully join in
wedlock. The evidence on record shows that the
petitioner in fact knew of the respondents
marriage to another man, but nonetheless
purchased the subject properties under the name
of the respondent and paid the purchase prices
therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi
that the respondent and the petitioner were
capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still
disqualified to own the properties in tandem
with the respondent.[63]
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article
1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per
se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition
by the law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby
enhanced, recover what he has paid or
delivered.[64]
The provision applies only to those contracts
which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit
private interests. It does not apply to
contracts void ab initio. The sales of three
parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who
is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they
were entered into in violation of the
Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to
recover the properties or the money used in the
purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy.
Neither may the petitioner find solace in Rep.
Act No. 133, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4882,
which reads:
SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, private real property may be
mortgaged in favor of any individual,
corporation, or association, but the mortgagee
or his successor-in- interest, if disqualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines, shall not take possession
of the mortgaged property during the existence
of the mortgage and shall not take possession
a of mortgaged property except after default and
for the sole purpose of foreclosure,
receivership, enforcement or other proceedings
and in no case for a period of more than five
years from actual possession and shall not bid
or take part in any sale of such real property
in case of foreclosure: Provided, That said
mortgagee or successor-in-interest may take
possession of said property after default in
accordance with the prescribed judicial
procedures for foreclosure and receivership and
in no case exceeding five years from actual
possession.[65]
From the evidence on record, the three parcels
of land subject of the complaint were not
mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners
thereof but were sold to the respondent as the
vendee, albeit with the use of the petitioners
personal funds.
Futile, too, is petitioners reliance on Article
22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.[66]
The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO
CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated
as an accion in rem verso.[67] This provision
does not apply if, as in this case, the action
is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.[68]
It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso
over the subject properties, or from recovering
the money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman vs. Johnson:[69] The objection that a
contract is immoral or illegal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
not for his sake, however, that the objection
is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has
the advantage of, contrary to the real justice,
as between him and the plaintiff.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails
the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming
with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision
3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which
terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between petitioner and respondent, as
well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The
couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
By this time, respondent had inherited the house
in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel
of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo
property was registered in the name of
petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s
alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment,
the spouses eventually separated. On September
26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for
separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within
the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of
the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus –
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family
Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title
by either spouse during the marriage shall be
excluded from the community property. The real
property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in
Germany is excluded from the absolute community
of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily,
the proceeds of the sale of said real property
as well as the personal properties purchased
thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner.
However, the part of that inheritance used by
the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot
in this country cannot be recovered by the
petitioner, its acquisition being a violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution
which provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The
law will leave the parties in the situation
where they are in without prejudice to a
voluntary partition by the parties of the said
real property. x x x
x x x x
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
As regards the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry
of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in
Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon,
the Court shall not make any pronouncement on
constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed decision modifying
the trial court’s Decision. It held that
respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for
the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It
also considered petitioner’s ownership over the
property in trust for the respondent. As regards
the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there
is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits
respondent from acquiring the same. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision of the lower court dated August 12,
1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena
Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and
the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction
of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal,
deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent
for the preservation, maintenance and
development of the aforesaid real property
including the depreciation cost of the house or
in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in
the event respondent does not have the means to
reimburse the petitioner out of her own money
and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the
petitioner of the cost of the land and the house
deducting the expenses for its maintenance and
preservation spent by the respondent. Should
there be profit, the same shall be divided in
proportion to the equity each has over the
property. The case is REMANDED to the lower
court for reception of evidence as to the amount
claimed by the respondents for the preservation
and maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising
the following issues:
I except
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED
TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE
THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT
INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE
COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING
VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION
THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING
RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY
A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE
LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF
CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an
alien, is disqualified to own private lands in
the Philippines; that respondent was aware of
the constitutional prohibition but circumvented
the same; and that respondent’s purpose for
filing an action for separation of property is
to obtain exclusive possession, control and
disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for
transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property
but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid
by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner;
that the funds were given to petitioner in
trust; and that equity demands that respondent
should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent
is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations,
are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary
purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony. In the
case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the
Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution, "natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated," and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited
to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who
may alienate their agricultural lands in favor
of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and
it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only
remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after
all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands
of Filipino citizens. x x x
x x x x
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to
be construed as not including residential lots
or lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole
towns and cities," and that "they may validly
buy and hold in their names lands of any area
for building homes, factories, industrial
plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health
and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s
Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is
beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared
that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said
property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an
implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner’s
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent’s disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where
the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who
is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise
would allow circumvention of the constitutional
prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only
a court of law but also a court of equity, is
likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity
as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.
The latter is a frequently stated maxim which
is also expressed in the principle that he who
has done inequity shall not have equity. It
signifies that a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer
of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent
to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is
not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman
v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Page 15 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale
to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains
that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas
Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge
of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was
his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no
right whatever over the property by virtue of
that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a
right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and
void. In any event, he had and has no capacity
or personality to question the subsequent sale
of the same property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband
a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as
to its transfer or disposition. This is a right
that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife
had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even
if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out to militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering
and holding the property so acquired, or any
part thereof. And whether in such an event, he
may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of
conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that
would be, in the premises, a purely academic
exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena
Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent
Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in
Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August
13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862
terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent,
decreeing a separation of property between them
and ordering the partition of the personal
properties located in the Philippines equally,
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001]
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE
D. ALOVERA,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS,* respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional
Trial Court, Roxas City, in Reconstitution Case
No. R-1928,[2] pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz
Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen,
Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes,
Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel,
Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land
with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters,
designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the
corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas
City.[3]
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with
the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action
against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of
sale and recovery of land.[4] The plaintiffs
assailed the validity of the sale because of the
constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring ownership of private agricultural
Page 16 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
land, including residential, commercial or succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun
industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial
the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the settlement.[13]
Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme
Court ruled thus:
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register
of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz, issued a
granting the sale to be null and void and can certification that a transfer certificate of
not give title to the vendee, it does not title over the property was issued in the name
necessarily follow therefrom that the title of Lee Liong.[14] However, the records of the
remained in the vendor, who had also violated Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during
the constitutional prohibition, or that he the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on
(vendor) has the right to recover the title of September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition
which he has divested himself by his act in for reconstitution of title.
ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency
another principle of law sets in to bar the
equally guilty vendor from recovering the title
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court,
which he had voluntarily conveyed for a
Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the
consideration, that of pari delicto.[5]
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong
on the basis of an approved plan and technical
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael description.[15] The dispositive portion of the
A. Dinglasan, together with Francisco, Carmen, trial courts decision reads thus:
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano,
Jose, Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan
filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz
WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds
an action for recovery of the same parcel of
for the City of Roxas is ordered to reconstitute
land.[6] Citing the case of Philippine Banking
the lost or destroyed certificate of title in
Corporation v. Lui She,[7] they submitted that
the name of Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City,
the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for
with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2
being violative of the Constitution. On
of this decision. This decision shall become
September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong filed
final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the
case on the ground of res judicata.[8] On
Commissioner of LRA of a notice of such judgment
October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the
without any appeal having been filed by any of
trial court denied the motion.[9] The heirs of
such officials.
Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court
by petition for certiorari. On April 22, 1977,
the Supreme Court annulled the orders of the
trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, SO ORDERED.
holding that the suit was barred by res
judicata.[10]
Given at Roxas City, Philippines,

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and June 10, 1994.

Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial JOSE O. ALOVERA
Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution
of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre,
formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of Roxas Judge[16]
City.[11] Petitioners alleged that they were the
widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun
Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional
of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an
1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee Liongs widow, Ang Entry of Judgment.[17]
Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee
Bing Ho, executed an extra-judicial settlement
of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to
themselves the subject parcel of land.[12] On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed
Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in with the Court of Appeals a petition for
Lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case No.
and donation executed in her favor by her 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court,
deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the
Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by case.[18] The Solicitor General contended that

Page 17 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
the petitioners were not the proper parties in
the reconstitution of title, since their
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not
acquire title to the lot because he was a
Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not
qualified to own the subject land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision declaring the judgment
of reconstitution void.[19]
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita
Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for reconsideration of the decision.[20] On
February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.[21]
Hence, this petition.[22]
Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor
General was estopped from seeking annulment of
the judgment of reconstitution after failing to
object during the reconstitution proceedings
before the trial court, despite due notice.
Petitioners alleged that the Solicitor General
merely acted on the request of private and
politically powerful individuals who wished to
capitalize on the prime location of the subject
land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the
land had been settled in two previous cases of
the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in
favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee
Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they
acquired ownership of the land through actual
possession of the lot and their consistent
payment of taxes over the land for more than
sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General
submitted that the decision in the
reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it
would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring ownership of private or public
agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land.[23] The purpose of the reconstitution of
title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in
exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred.[24]
In this case, petitioners sought a
reconstitution of title in the name of Lee
Liong, alleging that the transfer certificate
of title issued to him was lost or destroyed
during World War II. All the documents recorded
and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz,
which include the transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all
destroyed during the war. The fact that the
original of the transfer certificate of title
was not in the files of the Office of the
Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer
certificate of title had not been issued.[25]
In the trial court proceedings, petitioners
presented evidence proving the sale of the land
from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latters
subsequent possession of the property in the
concept of owner. Thus, the trial court, after
examining all the evidence before it, ordered
the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee
Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee
Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated
sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,[26] aliens could not acquire
private agricultural lands, save in cases of
hereditary succession.[27] Thus, Lee Liong, a
Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the
land in question.[28]
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale
of the land to an alien did not validate the
transaction, for it was still contrary to the
constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain.
However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the
parties to the transaction.[29] In sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title
thereto by virtue of the provisions of the
Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are
deemed to have committed the constitutional
violation and being thus in pari delicto the
courts will not afford protection to either
party.[30] The proper party to assail the sale
is the Solicitor General. This was what was done
in this case when the Solicitor General
initiated an action for annulment of judgment
of reconstitution of title. While it took the
Page 18 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Republic more than sixty years to assert itself,
it is not barred from initiating such action.
Prescription never lies against the State.[31]
separate suit.[41] Thus, although petitioners
are in possession of the land, a separate
proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue
of ownership of the land.

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to

the original sellers, because of the doctrine
of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may
initiate an action for reversion or escheat of
the land to the State, subject to other
defenses, as hereafter set forth.[32]
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate
against escheat proceedings because the land is
now in the hands of Filipinos. The original
vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land
has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently
their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners
are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor
General does not dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside
the order of reconstitution of title in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition,
without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., on official leave.

The constitutional proscription on alien
ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this SECOND DIVISION
case, however, there would be no more public
policy violated since the land is in the hands G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA
land. If land is invalidly transferred to an LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or appellee,
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the vs.
title of the transferee is rendered valid.[33]
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors,
to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
on the basis of the invalidity of the initial oppositors- appellants.
transfer.[34] The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that
reconstitution of the original certificate of
title must be based on an owners duplicate, The main issue in this appeal is the manner of
secondary evidence thereof, or other valid partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
sources of the title to be reconstituted.[35] Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries,
In this case, reconstitution was based on the namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez;
plan and technical description approved by the his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez;
Land Registration Authority.[36] This renders and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
the order of reconstitution void for lack of
factual support.[37] A judgment with absolutely
nothing to support it is void.[38]
The task is not trouble-free because the widow
Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while
the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for
is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title substitutions.
lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition.[39] It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died
destroyed title.[40] Any change in the ownership
in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
of the property must be the subject of a

Page 19 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted
to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa TOTAL.........................................
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the ..................... P512,976.97
estate. In due time she submitted an inventory
of the estate as follows:
MENOS:

INVENTARIO
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te

tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota
......... P 5,000,00
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones,
situadoen
VALOR
LIQUIDO.......................................
la Escolta, .... P507,976.97
Manila........................................
..................... P500,000.00
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos

parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo,
Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge
Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en
Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate,
hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con
sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion
vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la

de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00 participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz
Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los
legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha
por accion propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del
.............................................. otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del
............8,347.00 apellido Ramirez,

Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —

de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de
en la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez,
domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General
Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion
vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina
.............................................. Avenida de los Reyes 13,
1,620.90

b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de
Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
fideicomisaria a saber:—
Co............................................
..............................................
.... 2,350.73

Page 20 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras
partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de
Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la
mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace
V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St.
Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias
precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias
nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo
propietarios, podran en cualquier memento
vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares
fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted
a project of partition as follows: the property
of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno
dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion
is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of
partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of
Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's
usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b)
that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first
heirs are not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree, as provided
in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the
grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is
an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest
in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the
testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the
project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto
have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of
giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
ownership. They admit that the testator's
dispositions impaired his widow's legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the
only survivor is the widow or widower, she or
he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone
survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-
half of his estate over which he could impose
no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904,
par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free
portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo
approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct
in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled
to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as
her legitime and which is more than what she is
given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle
more than her legitime will run counter to the
testator's intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution
is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that
he may enter into the inheritance in default of
the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857,
Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief
or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary
(Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino,
"Although the Code enumerates four classes,
there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the
fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p.
185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art.
859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die
before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of
the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the
Page 21 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
three mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described
in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by
virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further
that the fiduciary or first heir and the second
heir are living at time of the death of the
testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for
a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies
of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants,
thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con
substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of
the substitution so provided. The appellants
question the sustitucion vulgar y From this, it follows that the fideicommissary
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third
usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot
because as We have ruled above, the widow is not
entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion
vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v.
Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar
aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did
not predecease the testator. But dying before
the testator is not the only case for vulgar
substitution for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided
in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the
vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its
fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are
correct in their claim that it is void for the
following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the
Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first
heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree"
as designation, substitution, or transmission.
The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted
this construction. From this point of view,
there can be only one tranmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be
related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and
Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and be
one generation from the first heir.
can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are
one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op.
cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on
Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of
the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits
"that the testator contradicts the
establishment of a fideicommissary substitution
when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief,
p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real
properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
Page 22 of 36
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The 1935 Constitution which is controlling
provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the
usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the
Constitutional provision which enables aliens
to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the
usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting
of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed
as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her
legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion
to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership
and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that
of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro,
Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.
LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for
private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration
of title over a parcel of land which he acquired
by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with
the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative
and asks this Court to nullify the decision of
the appellate court which affirmed the judgment
of the court a quo in granting the application
of respondent spouses for registration over the
lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots
347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with
a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San
Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo,
p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent
spouses where then natural-born Filipino
citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an
application for registration of title of the two
(2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens
and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and
after the parties have presented their
respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision confirming private respondents' title
to the lots in question, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
Page 23 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
hereby approves the said application and
confirms the title and possession of herein
applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755
in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor
de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by
birth but now Canadian citizens by
naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini
Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124
Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
In the certificate of title to be issued, there
shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters
road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the
decision of the trial court based on the
following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both
applicants were still Filipino citizens when
they bought the land in controversy from its
former owner. For this reason, the prohibition
against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity,
they are the rightful owners of the subject
realty considering also that they had paid for
it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in
initiating the instant action is merely to
confirm their title over the land, for, as has
been passed upon, they had been the owners of
the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out
that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may
already have (Municipality of Victorias vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31,
1987). With particular reference to the main
issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that
title and ownership over lands within the
meaning and for the purposes of the
constitutional prohibition dates back to the
time of their purchase, not later. The fact that
the applicants-appellees are not Filipino
citizens now cannot be taken against them for
they were not disqualified from acquiring the
land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R.
No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-
28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did
not merit petitioner's approval, hence this
present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied
outright for having been filed out of time had
it not been for the constitutional issue
presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private
respondents have not acquired proprietary
rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration
thereof in their favor. It maintains that even
privately owned unregistered lands are presumed
to be public lands under the principle that
lands of whatever classification belong to the
State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before
the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. Petitioner further argued that it is only
when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the
land become privately owned land, for in the
same proceeding, the court may declare it public
land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that
applicants, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the two
adjacent parcels of land applied for
registration of title under a bona-fide claim
of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such
being the case, it is conclusively presumed that
all the conditions essential to the confirmation
of their title over the two adjacent parcels of
land are sought to be registered have been
complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's
observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been
declared to be within the alienable and
disposable zone established by the Bureau of
Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands,
Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that
the disputed realty had been occupied by the
applicants "whose house of strong materials
stands thereon"; that it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-
spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same
by means of a public instrument entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed
by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17,
1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants
and their predecessors in interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years
prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance
in the instant case is the circumstance that at
the time the applicants purchased the subject
lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens
such that when they filed their application for
registration in 1987, ownership over the land
in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo,
p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate
court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land
was declared for taxation purposes in the name
of respondent spouses only since 1979. However,
tax declarations or reality tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found
that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration."
This is not, however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession "since June
12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b],
CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So
there is a void in respondents' possession. They
fall short of the required possession since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they
needed only to prove thirty (30) years
possession prior to the filing of their
application (on February 5, 1987), they would
still be short of the required possession if the
starting point is 1979 when, according to the
Court of Appeals, the land was declared for
taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-
15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least.
Following the logic of petitioner, any
transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor,
or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
notorious and exclusive possession thereof for
thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however,
what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the
Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)
and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself
or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus,
it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has
Page 25 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
been in possession of the subject property for
only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest,
the said period is tacked to his possession. In
the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the
disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny
this except that respondent spouses, in its
perception, were in possession of the land
sought to be registered only in 1978 and
therefore short of the required length of time.
As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were
acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have
been in open and continued possession thereof
since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the
shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be
deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in
Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982])
deserves scant consideration. There, it was held
that before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic
v. Villanueva (supra), has already been
abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands
v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509;
and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia
ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic
Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and
by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the
Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
x x x x x x x x x
As interpreted in several cases, when the
conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application
for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by the statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State
than the dictum of the statute itself (Section
48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..."
No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claims is of the required
character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so
well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
pronouncement such that open, continuous and
Page 26 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of
alienable public land ipso jure converts the
same to private property (Director of Lands v.
IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA
602 [1990]). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest,
vest title on such applicant so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public and (National
Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216
SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law
are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued (National
Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the
land ceases to be a part of the public domain
and goes beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not
established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land (Municipality of Victorias
v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms,
but does not confer ownership. As could be
gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature
of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. Evidence was offered to prove that
their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes
on the subject land and introduced improvements
thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true
copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo
and her sister Simplicia was also formally
offered to prove that the subject parcels of
land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from
her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her
only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise,
a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented
in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no
forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953,
Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat
respondents' application for registration of
title on the ground of foreign nationality.
Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v.
Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise
foreign nationals but were natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed
acquisition of the property. But this is where
the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco
sought to register a large tract of land under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and
in the alternative, under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. The land registration court
decided in favor of the applicants and was
affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The
Director of Lands brought the matter before us
on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide,
Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced,
the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under Section 19
of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they
or their predecessors-in-interest derived title
from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the
"titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession
especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment
title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by
purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria"
or possessory information title, which could
become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their
predecessors have been in possession since time
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that if had been a
private property even before the Spanish
conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil
935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
Page 27 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under the Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the
applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession,
in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño
and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court,
in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178
SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by
the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice
Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant
for registration under Section 48 of the Public
Land Act must secure a certification from the
Government that the lands which he claims to
have possessed as owner for more than thirty
(30) years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its
positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered
no evidence at all to prove that the property
subject of the application is an alienable and
disposable land. On the contrary, the entire
property . . . was pasture land (and therefore
inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably
failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, . . ., is
patently baseless. . . . When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial
possession," it means possession of which no man
living has seen the beginning, and the existence
of which he has learned from his elders (Susi
v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never
present in the case of private respondents. . .
. interest under the Public Land Act. In addition,
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable
basis for the finding that the private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land for more than eighty (80)
years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed
to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest)
had possessed the property allegedly covered by
Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject
of both his last will and testament and the
project of partition of his estate among his
heirs — in such manner as to remove the same
from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi
doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-
interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted
no right whatsoever, with respect to the said
property, to his heirs. This being the case, his
possession cannot be tacked to that of the
private respondents for the latter's benefit
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became
American citizens before such filing, it goes
without saying that they had acquired no vested
right, consisting of an imperfect title, over
the property before they lost their Philippine
citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied
registration of title not merely because they
were American citizens at the time of their
application therefor. Respondents therein
failed to prove possession of their predecessor-
in-interest since time immemorial or possession
in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the
time of their application, as American citizens,
they have acquired no vested rights over the
parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were
undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of the acquisition of the properties
and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession
in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-
private respondents have constructed a house of
strong materials on the contested property, now
occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition
of this case is the fact that the Constitution
Page 28 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
itself allows private respondents to register
the contested parcels of land in their favor.
Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent
provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article
XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship may be a transferee of private land,
for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was
passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to
enter into a contract under Philippine laws may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of one thousand square meters, in the case
of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence.
In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided,
That if both shall avail of the same, the total
area acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or
rural lands for residential purposes, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of an
additional urban or rural lands for residential
purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas
herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up
to the present, no other law has been passed by
the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what
governs the disposition of private lands in
favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has
lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be
BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already
Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof
by respondents in view of what the Constitution
ordains. The parcels of land sought to be
registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession and occupation thereof
under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945
or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of 1,000
sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as
vendees of a private land, were natural-born
citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of
transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What
is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private
land, they could apply for registration in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of
their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the
requirements in BP 185, must also be complied
with by private respondents. Specifically, it
refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements
provided for in other laws for the registration
Page 29 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
of titles to lands, no private land shall be
transferred under this Act, unless the
transferee shall submit to the register of deeds
of the province or city where the property is
located a sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and addresses of
his parents, of his spouse and children, if any;
the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside
permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost
his Philippine citizenship and the country of
which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8
of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements
in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant
case since said requirements are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere
in the provision is it stated, much less
implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for
registration of title before a land registration
court should not be confused with the issuance
of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application
for registration has become final that a decree
of registration is issued. And that is the time
when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with
by the applicants. This decree of registration
is the one that is submitted to the office of
the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant.
Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no
participation in the approval of the application
for registration of title as the decree of
registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration
of title over a parcel of land which he acquired
by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with
the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is
private land and thus subject to registration
by qualified persons. It was really needless to
elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling
case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this
petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The
finding that the respondent spouses were
natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired
the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent
spouses are no longer citizens of the
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does
not follow that because they were citizens of
the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if
they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is
irrelevant because it is not disputed that the
respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the
land in question when it was transferred to
them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable
either because it speaks of a transfer of
private land to a former natural-born citizen
of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
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NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided
by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is
applicable, it does not appear that the private
respondents have observed "the limitations
provided by law."
even at the subsequent time when the respondent
spouses would come before the Register of Deeds.
B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof,
imposes certain requirements, including a
specific limitation on the quantity of land (not
more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which
must not be exceeded both by the land of which
such foreign national becomes transferee and by
such land taken together with other land
previously acquired by such foreign national.
(2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for

the registration of the land in the private
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to
respondents' name have been complied with. I do
subsequent purchases of land by the respondent
not believe so for there is no showing that B.P.
spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
185 has also been enforced.
naturalized as Canadian nationals.

The view has been expressed that we should

confine ourselves to the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act. I
respectfully submit that the requirements in
B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should # Separate Opinions
also be applied.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Strict compliance is necessary because of the
special privilege granted to former Filipinos
who have become foreigners by their own choice.
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I
see no reason why we should be less so with
those who have renounced our country.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Feliciano, J.: concurring

Can a foreign national apply for registration
of title over a parcel of land which he acquired
by purchase while still a citizen of the
I agree with the great bulk of the majority
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with
opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the
the requirements for registration under the
result reached therein.
Public Land Act (CA 141)?

This separate statement is concerned only with

There is no question that the property is
the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the
private land and thus subject to registration
dispositive portion, of the majority opinion.
by qualified persons. It was really needless to
In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg.
elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly
185 which took effect on 16 March 1982, does not
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling
purport to cover the set of facts before the
case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses
Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this
became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land
petition.
here involved while they were natural-born
Philippine citizens who happened sometime later
to have been naturalized as citizens of another
country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can But I think the ponencia misses the point. The
determine, addresses itself only to a situation finding that the respondent spouses were
of persons who were already foreign nationals natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired
at the time they became transferees of private the land does not settle the question posed.
land in the Philippines, but who were previously
natural-born Philippine citizens. It is
difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185
can become applicable to the present situation

Page 31 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
The important point is that the respondent
spouses are no longer citizens of the
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does
not follow that because they were citizens of
the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if
they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is
irrelevant because it is not disputed that the
respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the
land in question when it was transferred to
them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable
either because it speaks of a transfer of
private land to a former natural-born citizen
of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided
by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is
applicable, it does not appear that the private
respondents have observed "the limitations
provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for
the registration of the land in the private
respondents' name have been complied with. I do
not believe so for there is no showing that B.P.
185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should
confine ourselves to the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act. I
respectfully submit that the requirements in
B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should
also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the
special privilege granted to former Filipinos
who have become foreigners by their own choice.
If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I
see no reason why we should be less so with
those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority
opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the
result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with
the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the
dispositive portion, of the majority opinion.
In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg.
185 which took effect on 16 March 1982, does not
purport to cover the set of facts before the
Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses
became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land
here involved while they were natural-born
Philippine citizens who happened sometime later
to have been naturalized as citizens of another
country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
determine, addresses itself only to a situation
of persons who were already foreign nationals
at the time they became transferees of private
land in the Philippines, but who were previously
natural-born Philippine citizens. It is
difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185
can become applicable to the present situation
even at the subsequent time when the respondent
spouses would come before the Register of Deeds.
B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof,
imposes certain requirements, including a
specific limitation on the quantity of land (not
more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which
must not be exceeded both by the land of which
such foreign national becomes transferee and by
such land taken together with other land
previously acquired by such foreign national.
(2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to
subsequent purchases of land by the respondent
spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
Page 32 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as
Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago
M. Kapunan and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for
petitioner.
Quitain Law Office for private respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition to review the order of the Court of
First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No.
1253, entitled "Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City,
Defendants", instituted by the plaintiff to
declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102
and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No.
P-2508 based thereon issued in the name of
defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the
aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's
duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and the defendant
Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree
the reversion of the land in question to the
mass of public domain, and granting such further
relief as may be just and equitable in the
premises.
The land covered by the free patent and title
in question was originally applied for by
Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966,
transferred her rights to the land and its
improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who
filed his application therefor on February 3,
1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102
was issued by the President of the Philippines
for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970,
after transmittal of the patent to the Register
of Deeds of General Santos City, Original
Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was
issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du
Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the
Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of
Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare
free patent No. V-466102 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of
defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab
initio and to order the reversion of the land
in question to the mass of public domain. The
action is based on the ground that the land
covered thereby is a forest or timber land which
is not disposable under the Public Land Act;
that in a reclassification of the public lands
in the vicinity where the land in question is
situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March
7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of
Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area
which was reverted to the category of public
forest, whereas the application for free patent
by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969,
or more than eleven years thereafter; that the
said patent and title were obtained fraudulently
as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never
occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301),
holding that a certificate of title fraudulently
secured is not null and void ab initio, unless
the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the
land covered by the application is part of the
public domain when it is not, the respondent
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Certificate of Title based on the patent had
became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the
one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act for review of a decree
of title on the ground of fraud. From this order
of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint,
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has
appealed to this Court for review.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants
the petition on the ground that the area covered
by the patent and title is not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and,
hence the patent and title thereto are null and
void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate
of title issued pursuant to a free patent does
not lie against the state in an action for
Page 33 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
reversion of the land covered thereby when such Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
land is a part of a public forest or of a forest 769)
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest
lands are not alienable or disposable under
either the Constitution of 1935 or the
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R.
Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of
No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied
Lands has jurisdiction over public lands
upon by respondent Court in dismissing this
classified as agricultural under the
case, is not controlling. In that case no forest
constitution, or alienable or disposable under
land was involved but agricultural public land
the Public Land Act, and is charged with the
which was first covered by a patent issued to
administration of all laws relative thereto,
one party and later registered under the Torrens
mineral and timber lands are beyond his
System by the other party. The litigation was
jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that
between private parties where the party who
has jurisdiction and authority over the
registered it under Act No. 496 sought the
demarcation, protection, management,
nullity of the title of the patentee under the
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public
Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party
forests and forest reservations and over the
seeking the nullity of the title and reversion
granting of licenses for the taking of products
of the land is the state itself which is
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section
specifically authorized under Section 101 of the
1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That
Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings as
the area in question is a forest or timber land
an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not
is clearly established by the certification made
available to a private individual.
by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is
within the portion of the area which was
reverted to the category of forest land,
approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that
the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in
application for free patent over the land in possession of the property prior to his filing
question on June 3, 1969, the area in question the application, contrary to the provisions of
was not a disposable or alienable public land law that the applicant must have been in
but a public forest. Titles issued to private possession or cultivation thereof for at least
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent
covered thereby is not disposable public land search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party,
but forest land are void ab initio. In Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could
Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. not be contacted because he is a resident of
31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512, this Court said: Davao City; that there are no existing signs of
improvements found in the area in question as
it is not under cultivation but covered with
grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had
being used as ranch for grazing cows by the
no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the
heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments
land involved was still inalienable forest land
were placed on the area surveyed which goes to
when granted, then it may be plausibly contended
show that there was no actual survey thereof;
that the patent title would be ab initio void,
that the property in question is inside the
subject to attack at any time by any party
ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under
adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et
Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore,
al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil
inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has
Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular
a fence around it to show that other persons
Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of
could not enter and cultivate the same, and that
Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).
the signature of then Acting District Land
Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has
been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs.
Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L
ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains
The above alleged circumstances are indicative
a title under the Public Land Act which
of fraud in the filing of the application and
includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which
obtaining title to the land, and if proven would
cannot be registered under the Torrens System,
override respondent Judge's order dismissing
or when the Director of Lands did not have
the case without hearing. The
jurisdiction over the same because it is a
misrepresentations of the applicant that he had
public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue
been occupying and cultivating the land and
of said certificate of title alone, become the
residing thereon are sufficient grounds to
owner of the land illegally included. (See
nullify the grant of the patent and title under

Page 34 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides 1961). Prescription does not lie against the
as follows: state in such cases for the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the state
(Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil
Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance
That statements made in the application shall
to the state is not barred prescription
be considered as essential conditions or parts
(Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz,
of any concession, title or permit issued on the
et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23
basis of such application, and any false
SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484,
statement thereon or omission of facts,
Jan. 31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the
changing, or modifying the consideration of the
Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. 728;
facts set forth in such statement, and any
751-753).
subsequent modification, alteration, or change
of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit Even granting that the title of private
granted. ... respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be
reopened under the Land Registration Act, the
land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the
state in an action for reconveyance under
A certificate of title that is void may be
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land
ordered cancelled. A title will be considered
Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is
void if it is procured through fraud, as when a
adequately covered by the prayer of the
person applies for registration of the land
complaint for the grant of such other relief as
under his name although the property belongs to
may be just and equitable in the premises.
another. In the case of disposable public lands,
failure on the part of the grantee to comply
with the conditions imposed by law is a ground
for holding such title void (Director of Lands FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, respondent court, dated June 22, 1973,
May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis dismissing the complaint, and that of September
supplied). The lapse of the one year period 29, 1973, denying the motion for its
within which a decree of title may be reopened reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No.
for fraud would not prevent the cancellation 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby
thereof, for to hold that a title may become annulled and set aside. The respondent court
indefeasible by registration, even if such title shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render
had been secured through fraud or in violation judgment thereon accordingly.
of the law, would be the height of absurdity.
Registration should not be a shield of fraud in
securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.
Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
938, page 38).

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Muñoz

Palma, JJ., concur.
Considering that it is the state is seeking the
cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani
Du Timbol, said title has not become
indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked Separate Opinions
against the state. A title founded on fraud may
be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one
year from the issuance thereof, through a
petition filed in court by the Solicitor
General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil.
946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G.
R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs.
I concur in the judgment setting aside
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-
respondent court's orders which erroneously
6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).
dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground
of purported indefeasibility of private
respondent's torrens certificate of title under
Public land fraudulently included in patents or section 38 of Act 496 and ordering the remand
certificates of title may be recovered or of the case for trial and disposition on the
reverted to the state in accordance with Section merits. Petitioner's complaint is not barred by
101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands the cited Act since it duly alleges that
vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, respondent's torrens title was issued pursuant

Page 35 of 36
NATURAL RESOURCES- Santoalla
to a free patent covering forest or timber land
which is not disposable under the Public Land
Act and if these factual allegations are duly
established at the trial, petitioner would be
entitled to a judgment that the patent and title
of respondent, being part of the forest zone,
are null and void.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the judgment setting aside

respondent court's orders which erroneously
dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground
of purported indefeasibility of private
respondent's torrens certificate of title under
section 38 of Act 496 and ordering the remand
of the case for trial and disposition on the
merits. Petitioner's complaint is not barred by
the cited Act since it duly alleges that
respondent's torrens title was issued pursuant
to a free patent covering forest or timber land
which is not disposable under the Public Land
Act and if these factual allegations are duly
established at the trial, petitioner would be
entitled to a judgment that the patent and title
of respondent, being part of the forest zone,
are null and void.

Page 36 of 36