Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and
AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for Central Bay
Reclamation, etc.
Zaldy V. Trespeses for intervenor Prime Orion Phil. Inc.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Sugay Law Office for movants R.S. Atienza, et al.
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for movants Foreign Investors
Italian-Thai Dev't & Centasia, etc.
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court denied with finality respondents' motions for reconsideration
seeking to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation without public bidding 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila, ruling that any
sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are property of
the public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man
under Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The ruling of the Court in the Ponce cases cannot serve as an authority for a
private corporation like Amari to acquire submerged lands or reclaimed
submerged lands within Manila Bay under an amended joint venture. In said
Ponce cases, the Cebu City ordinance merely granted Essel, Inc. an "irrevocable
option" to purchase foreshore lands after the reclamation. The option to purchase
referred to reclaimed lands, and not to foreshore lands which are inalienable.
Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or submerged lands, and thus may
qualify as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain provided the
requirements of public land laws are met.
In the instant case, public respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA) immediately
transferred its rights and ownership over the subject area, 78% of which is still
submerged, to the joint venture which is 70% owned by Amari. These still
submerged lands are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. The
Supreme Court also ruled that under theGovernment Auditing Code, government
land should not be sold without public bidding; and that under the present
Constitution, a private corporation like Amari is prohibited from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain.
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J :p
TOTAL P1,754,707,150.00
==============
Mr. Luis Benitez of SGV, the external auditors of AMARI, testified that
said Letter-Agreement was approved by the AMARI Board. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)
The private entity that purchased the reclaimed lands for P1.894 billion expressly
admitted before the Senate Committees that it spent P1.754 billion in
commissions to pay various individuals for "professional efforts and services in
successfully negotiating and securing" the contract. By any legal or moral
yardstick, the P1.754 billion in commissions obviously constitutes bribe money.
Nonetheless, there are those who insist that the billions in investments of the
private entity deserve protection by this Court. Should this Court establish a new
doctrine by elevating grease money to the status of legitimate investments
deserving of protection by the law? Should this Court reward the patently illegal
and grossly unethical business practice of the private entity in securing the
contract? Should we allow those with hands dripping with dirty money equitable
relief from this Court?
Despite these revolting anomalies unearthed by the Senate Committees, the fatal
flaw of this contract is that it glaringly violates provisions of the
Constitution expressly prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain.
Thus, we now come to the resolution of the second Motions for
Reconsideration 7 filed by public respondent Public Estates Authority ("PEA") and
private respondent Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation ("Amari"). As
correctly pointed out by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez in his Consolidated
Comment, 8 the second Motions for Reconsideration raise no new issues.
However, the Supplement to "Separate Opinion, Concurring and Dissenting" of
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo brings to the Court's attention the Resolutions of this
Court on 3 February 1965 and 24 June 1966 in L-21870 entitled "Manuel
O. Ponce, et al. v. Hon. Amador Gomez, et al." and No. L-22669 entitled "Manuel
O. Ponce, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al." ("Ponce Cases"). In effect, the
Supplement to the Dissenting Opinion claims that these two Resolutions serve
as authority that a single private corporation like Amari may acquire hundreds of
hectares of submerged lands, as well as reclaimed submerged lands, within
Manila Bay under the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA").
We find the cited Ponce Cases inapplicable to the instant case.
First, as Justice Bellosillo himself states in his supplement to his dissent, the
Ponce Cases admit that "submerged lands still belong to the National
Government." 9 The correct formulation, however, is that submerged lands are
owned by the State and are inalienable. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State's
inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion,
absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 10 This is also true with
respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void
being contrary to the Constitution. 11
This is why the Cebu City ordinance merely granted Essel, Inc. an "irrevocable
option" to purchase the foreshore lands after the reclamation and did not actually
sell to Essel, Inc. the still to be reclaimed foreshore lands. Clearly, in the Ponce
Cases the option to purchase referred to reclaimed lands, and not to foreshore
lands which are inalienable. Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or
submerged lands, and thus may qualify as alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain provided the requirements of public land laws are met.
In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are
still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside
the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15
hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the
waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the
submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the
documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title
would be made only after actual reclamation.
The Amended JVA states that the PEA "hereby contributes to the Joint Venture
its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal
Development as well asown the Reclamation Area." 12 The Amended JVA further
states that "the sharing of the Joint Venture Proceeds shall be based on the ratio
of thirty percent (30%) for PEA and seventy percent (70%) for AMARI." 13 The
Amended JVA also provides that the PEA "hereby designates AMARI to perform
PEA's rights and privileges to reclaim, own and develop the Reclamation
Area." 14 In short, under the Amended JVA the PEA contributed its rights,
privileges and ownership over the Reclamation Area to the Joint Venture which is
70% owned by Amari. Moreover, the PEA delegated to Amari the right and
privilege to reclaim the submerged lands.
The Amended JVA mandates that the PEA had "the duty to execute without
delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to
AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan." 15 The Amended JVA
also provides that "PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause
the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land
Share in the name of AMARI, . . ." 16
In the Ponce Cases, the City of Cebu retained ownership of the reclaimed
foreshore lands and Essel, Inc. only had an "irrevocable option" to purchase
portions of the foreshore lands once actually reclaimed. In sharp contrast, in the
instant case ownership of the reclamation area, including the submerged lands,
was immediately transferred to the joint venture. Amari immediately acquired the
absolute right to own 70% percent of the reclamation area, with the deeds of
transfer to be documented and the certificates of title to be issued upon actual
reclamation. Amari's right to own the submerged lands is immediately effective
upon the approval of the Amended JVA and not merely an option to be exercised
in the future if and when the reclamation is actually realized. The submerged
lands, being inalienable and outside the commerce of man, could not be the
subject of the commercial transactions specified in the Amended JVA.
Second, in the Ponce Cases the Cebu City ordinance granted Essel, Inc. an
"irrevocable option" to purchase from Cebu City not more than 70% of the
reclaimed lands. The ownership of the reclaimed lands remained with Cebu City
until Essel, Inc. exercised its option to purchase. With the subsequent enactment
of the Government Auditing Code(Presidential Decree No. 1445) on 11 June
1978, any sale of government land must be made only
through public bidding. Thus, such an "irrevocable option" to purchase
government land would now be void being contrary to the requirement
of public bidding expressly required in Section 79 17 of PD No. 1445. This
requirement of public bidding is reiterated in Section 379 18 of the 1991 Local
Government Code. 19 Obviously, the ingenious reclamation scheme adopted in
the Cebu City ordinance can no longer be followed in view of the requirement
of public bidding in the sale of government lands. In the instant case, the
Amended JVA is a negotiated contract which clearly contravenes Section 79
ofPD No. 1445.
Third, Republic Act No. 1899 authorized municipalities and chartered cities to
reclaim foreshore lands. The two Resolutions in the Ponce Cases upheld the
Cebu City ordinance only with respect to foreshore areas, and nullified the same
with respect to submerged areas. Thus, the 27 June 1965 Resolution made the
injunction of the trial court against the City of Cebu "permanent insofar . . . as the
area outside or beyond the foreshore land proper is concerned."
As we held in the 1998 case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 20 citing the Ponce Cases, RA No. 1899 applies only to foreshore lands,
not to submergedlands. In his concurring opinion in Republic Real Estate
Corporation, Justice Reynato S. Puno stated that under Commonwealth Act No.
141, "foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties," and that such lands "remained property of the State." Justice
Puno emphasized that "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at
present." The instant case involves principally submerged lands within Manila
Bay. On this score, the Ponce Cases, which were decided based on RA No.
1899, are not applicable to the instant case.
Fourth, the Ponce Cases involve the authority of the City of Cebu to reclaim
foreshore areas pursuant to a general law, RA No. 1899. The City of Cebu is
a public corporation and is qualified, under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions, to hold alienable or even inalienable lands of the public domain.
There is no dispute that a public corporation is not covered by the constitutional
ban on acquisition of alienable public lands. Both the 9 July 2002 Decision and
the 6 May 2003 Resolution of this Court in the instant case expressly recognize
this.
Cebu City is an end user government agency, just like the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority or the Department of Foreign Affairs. 21 Thus, Congress
may by law transfer public lands to the City of Cebu to be used for municipal
purposes, which may be public or patrimonial. Lands thus acquired by the City of
Cebu for a public purpose may not be sold to private parties. However, lands so
acquired by the City of Cebu for a patrimonial purpose may be sold to private
parties, including private corporations.
However, in the instant case the PEA is not an end user agency with respect to
the reclaimed lands under the Amended JVA. As we explained in the 6
May 2003 Resolution:
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. PEA took the place of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling all reclaimed lands of
the public domain. In the hands of PEA, which took over the leasing and
selling functions of DENR, reclaimed foreshore (or submerged lands)
lands are public lands in the same manner that these same lands would
have been public lands in the hands of DENR. (Emphasis supplied)
Our 9 July 2002 Decision explained the rationale for treating the PEA in the same
manner as the DENR with respect to reclaimed foreshore or submerged lands in
this wise:
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA
has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds
of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single
private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively
nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering
over 80 million strong. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution which
allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, and the 1987
Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce Cases cannot serve
as authority for a private corporation to acquire alienable public lands, much less
submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a private corporation like
Amari is barred from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the facts in the Ponce Cases are different from the facts in the instant
case. Moreover, the governing constitutional and statutory provisions have
changed since the Ponce Cases were disposed of in 1965 and 1966 through
minute Resolutions of a divided (6 to 5) Court.
This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the
reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has
sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed
lands remains with the PEA. As we stated in our 9 July 2002 Decision:
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are
those in the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or
certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking
the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In
fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title
should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates,
being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a
private corporation.
As we held in our 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution." In our 6
May 2003 Resolution, we DENIED with FINALITY respondents' Motions for
Reconsideration. Litigations must end some time. It is now time to write finis to
this "Grandmother of All Scams."
WHEREFORE, the second Motions for Reconsideration filed
by Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
DENIED for being prohibited pleadings. In any event, these Motions for
Reconsideration have no merit. No further pleadings shall be allowed from any of
the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr ., C .J ., Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales and Callejo,
Sr., concur.
Bellosillo, J ., I vote to grant reconsideration.
Puno, J ., I maintain my previous qualified opinion.
Quisumbing, J ., I vote to allow reconsideration.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., I maintain my previous dissent.
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., we maintain our dissent.
Azcuna, J ., took no part.
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250 (Resolution), [November
|||
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public
Estates Authority (PEA for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from
signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works
in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according
to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be
agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and
conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to
cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred
or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473)
square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and
approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying
elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center
Area and the First Neighborhood Unit. [3]
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters. Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and
7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom
Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque
City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841
hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the
Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding.[4] On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in
its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. [5] On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. [6]
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all
scams. As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. [7] Among
the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is
illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the
Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,[8] the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel,[9] and the Government Corporate Counsel.[10] The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. [11]
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports
that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director
Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz
composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The
Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without
prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court.[12]
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain
to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,[13] PEA and AMARI filed their Comments
on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28,
1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order;
and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion
for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution
dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA, for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended
JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner
now prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be
declared null and void.[14]
The Issues
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and
academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms and conditions of the on-
going negotiations for a new agreement. The petition also prays that the Court enjoin
PEA from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with
AMARI.
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the
terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied
petitioners prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioners
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI
have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the
President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court
could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or
remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval
by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its
jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to
enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes
preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in
violation of the Constitution. Petitioners principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of
the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the
Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes
more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does
not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still
prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the
name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot,
the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.[17]
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the
Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution,[18] covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the
private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles[19] under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 (CA No. 141 for brevity). In
the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation,
reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes
by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain
undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the
purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because
the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty
years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987. [20]
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this
petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and
ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latters seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI
to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation
project.[21]
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the
principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases
involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public.[22] The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition
for mandamus which falls under the originaljurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the
instant case.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioners direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera[23] where the Court granted
the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the
Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that
in Taada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2
of the Civil Code[24] and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638[25] to publish the
presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make
an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has
no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of
the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to
demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,[26]2 the
disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was
under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for
the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even
without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of
a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative
statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty,
petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.[27] The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI
to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation
of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public
right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is
sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution
of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce
their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized
in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule
that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of
natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the
requisite locus standi.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains
the right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional
stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the
following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke
the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-
decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government
agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during
deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting
them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires
PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires
PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its
own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property.These include the size, location, technical description and
nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the
parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all
these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long
before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code
requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand
from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the
right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official
acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of
the government. From this moment, the publics right to information attaches, and any
citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite
proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,[33] the Court ruled as follows:
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI
of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and
did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such
as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until
granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific
public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but
also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class
of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for some
economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of
public dominion into private property, to wit:
Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or
to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of
the State.
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use
or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to
private parties.[45]
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated
the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as
follows:
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or
public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or
otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and
alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to
be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall
give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or
reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest
and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General may by executive order prescribe. (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and
disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654
mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654
made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which
the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only
for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private
parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public
Land Act.[46] The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or
other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-
six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that
the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be
disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to classify lands of the
public domain into x x x alienable or disposable[47] lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered
the Governor-General to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession.
Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been officially delimited and classified.
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands disposable under this title [48] shall be
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other
lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial
or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the
Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into
disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-
General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into government
reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-
agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the
public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands shall
be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. The Governor-
General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally
declare that the lands were not necessary for the public service. Act No. 2874 reiterated
the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No.
1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as
the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could
not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as
areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only
allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56
(d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes
the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government
could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private
parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.[49]
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the
sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in
Section 1, Article XIII, that
Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus,
foreshore lands, considered part of the States natural resources, became inalienable by
constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25
years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were
reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither
timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural
lands.[50] However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold
to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and
the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not
prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public
land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section
58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long
established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands
of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
other than timber and mineral lands.[51]
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable[52] lands of the public domain, which prior to such
classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No.
141 authorizes the President to declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession. Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for
disposition or concession only lands that are officially delimited and classified. Sections
6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain,
the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and
then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving
these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes
or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed
of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or
other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as
the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-
nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for
the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section
61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to
private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for
non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to
qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes
other than agricultural shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and
not otherwise. Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term disposition includes lease of
the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable
lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No.
141,[54] unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[55] Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly
the law on this matter, as follows:
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too
are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore
and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed
only the leasing of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936
also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were
to be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. Before
leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the
land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must
have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the
foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by
lease. The land remained property of the State. (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present.
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907
was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The
prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under
the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the
State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the
public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government
reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to
private parties.[56]These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the
President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-
agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the
only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government
could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority
before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to
government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141
declares that
Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is
requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares:
Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or
transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public
interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting
its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that
could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or
statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to
government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on
ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner,
such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on
the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private
parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands. [57]
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63
and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not
needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director
of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in
the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales
of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.[58]
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the
sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private
land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to
disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public
dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950
state that
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is
no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified
as patrimonial property of the State.[59] In the case of government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the
manner of their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public
dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public
service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public
dominion.
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the
Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception
of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain. In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands. However, the term public agricultural lands in
the 1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement
lands of the public domain.[60] If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral
land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain
to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly
owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the
public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution declared that
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable
lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban
extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban
under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain.
Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by
dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates
and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for
the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying
out the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and
functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any
stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary
for the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified. (Emphasis
supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the
public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow
of the tide.[61] Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the
ebb and flow of the tide.[62] Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the
public domain[63] and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open
to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully
owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies
now, only to private corporations and associations. PD No. 1084 expressly empowers
PEA to hold lands of the public domain even in excess of the area permitted to
private corporations by statute. Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as
title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these
lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which
states
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit
private individuals.
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted
the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution state that
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may
be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to
hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except
through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the
rationale behind this ban, thus:
FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3,
line 5 which says:
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this
was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private
corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very
clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases
decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it
would be in violation of this. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,[64] the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in
this way:
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause,
consists of three properties, namely:
1. [T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of
1,578,441 square meters;
2. [A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands; and
3. [A]t AMARIs option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area.[65]
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves the development of the Freedom Islands
and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x, plus an option granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x.[66]
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest
of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00
for PEAs actual cost in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also
complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will
further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares,
still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30
percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as
the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARIs
share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of
AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that
x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARIs Land share based on
the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall
then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title
covering AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if
more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains
to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles
pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area
of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of
367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI
joint venture PEAs statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the
Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive
right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan.
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25,
1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own
under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
state that:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x.(Emphasis
supplied)
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
Memorandum,[67] PEA admits that
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
D. Conclusion
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other
natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and
submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as agricultural lands
of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.[71]
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified.[72] The
President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No.
141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,[73] the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi
property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as
the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.Although the Chancery had transferred to
another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 [74] of the
Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally
declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on
the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed
Freedom Islands.Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA
pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name
of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085
and President Aquinos issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the
Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are
thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or
concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on
some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these
islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the
land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Being
neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under
the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are waters x x x owned by the State forming part
of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a
private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973
with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866, argues that if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the
party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the
public domain which the State may not alienate. [75] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters reads as follows:
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim
from the sea only with proper permission from the State. Private parties could own the
reclaimed land only if not otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority. This
clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant
or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea
from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from
the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed
land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. [76] Article 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land
ownership that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain.[77]
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141
requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved
for public or quasi-public purposes.[78]Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the
government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National
Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
x x x.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National
Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may
reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer
by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the
government, which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract
executed by it with any person or entity. Under such contract, a private party
receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the
contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land,
subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the
reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and
then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no
legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that
these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea,
these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x x owned by the State,
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.Only when actually
reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural
lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government
may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition.Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEAs reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its
charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following:
[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x;
[T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be
necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary. PEA is empowered to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities,
buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their
use. Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would
actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on
PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects
for and on behalf of the National Government. The same section also states that [A]ll
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the
PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity; x x x. Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and
PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No.
525 recognized PEA as the government entity to undertake the reclamation of lands
and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests.[79] Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed
for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no
longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong
to or be owned by the PEA, could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once
reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or
EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for
brevity) the following powers and functions:
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the
countrys marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic
resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and
police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges
upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all
other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources
and supportive of the national interest;
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands. DENR
also exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA
needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in
Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the
public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be
classified as alienable under Sections 6[81] and 7[82] of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides
that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President
the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under
water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of
areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop,
sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable
and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public
service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only
such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the
Constitution, Title I and Title III[83] of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.[84]
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141,
the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands
transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x.[85] (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,[86] the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x
x x.
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to
the Government. The Court declared that -
It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
provides that
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume
the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public
Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public
Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including
appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides
that -
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to
sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred ownership and administration
of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by PEA. EO No. 525 expressly states
that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x
owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government. [87] (Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEAs patrimonial
lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory
prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the contractor or his assignees (Emphasis supplied) would not
apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional
ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case
the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. [90] The Commission on Audit
implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-
296[91] dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must
be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to
only in case of failure of public auction.
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEAs
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private
corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10,
1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250
hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a
60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.[92] No one,
however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel
advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of
another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10,
1991.[93]
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to
AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract,
enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.[94] The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, [95] is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the
failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before
the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country
had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar
to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically
apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the
reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed
land, not exceeding 12 hectares[96] of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in
ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only
way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a
direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, PEA theorizes that the act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed
lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private
lands. This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the issuance of the special
patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land
of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private property. In short,
PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the
corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands
have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the
following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,[97] where the Court held
Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over
which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,[98] where the Court declared -
After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,[99] where the Court ruled -
While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do
so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be
under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title
is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[100] where the Court held
When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said
lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same.
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,[101] where the Court stated
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a fee simple title or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands,
provides that Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration
Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that
upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens
System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a
12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical
Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National Government
transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings
and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The
Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao
Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a
public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a
property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as
proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private
party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEAs patent or certificates of
title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of
the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the
recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a
better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. [102] The registration of
lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public
lands into private lands.[103]
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate
of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land
cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom
Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in
Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized
by Congress, the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to
government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of
PD No. 1529, a statutory lien affecting title of the registered land even if not annotated
on the certificate of title.[104] Alienable lands of the public domain held by government
entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their
disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only
individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60
of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into
private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise,
the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public
domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly
public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO
No. 525 declares that
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas
shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach
in the reclamation of lands;
xxx.
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x
x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands.
PD No. 1529
Based on its legislative history, the phrase conveyed to any person in Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government, as provided in Section 60 of
CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of
PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress. This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered
unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents
the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be
disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public
domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of
the Code states
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public
wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations
in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of
an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer
the airport.Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public
school site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. [106] All these properties
become properties of the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or
PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any
existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of
PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National
Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD
No. 1529 states
Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of
title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new
certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province,
city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such
right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of
registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of
the authority taking the land or interest therein. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively
private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered
pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the
Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila
Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA is not a sale but a joint venture with a
stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier
reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract
with the Republic. Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to cause the issuance and delivery of the
certificates of title conveying AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI. [107]
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations shall not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease. The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means
that AMARI will hold the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and
ownership is a disposition of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or
alienation under CA No. 141,[108] the Government Auditing Code,[109] and Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed
from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also
inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not
available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands
retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of
the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed
equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable
natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation
of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose
is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and
void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue
involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL
and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947.]
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MORAN, C.J : p
Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from
the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which
was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then
brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether
or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary,
there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted
outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another
case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if
its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a
confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional
question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our
judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we
have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the
motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the
constitutional issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted,
is a question involving different considerations not to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary
upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been
presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not
only had the briefs been presented, but the case had already been voted and
the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal
stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular ofthe
Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-
appellee was naturally oneof the registers of deeds to obey the new circular,
as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial
court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander
A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision
or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending
before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal ofhis appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that
withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is
whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete
exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after
having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our
conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or
misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon
the national patrimony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full
advantage ofby many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional
question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors
and the vendees will have nointerest but to uphold the validity of their
transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the
orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its
conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our
indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All these circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighed by
this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a
denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this
state of the proceedings, with our duty to decide the case upon the merits,
and by so doing, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall
then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitution is as follows:
"Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippine belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water 'power' in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and
its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose
being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation
and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain are classified into said
three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time ofthe adoption of the
Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and
judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands"
under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-
known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly
members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.,
175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined
in the Act ofCongress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands." This
definition has been followed in a long line of decisions of this Court.
(See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Santiago vs. Insular
Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13
Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs.
Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential
lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is
susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or
forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes ofagriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may
again become so under other circumstances; besides, the
Act of Congress contains only three classifications, and
makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands
that have ceased to be agricultural land."
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a
parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the
Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our
laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term
"public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were
not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be
presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention
had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
"Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are
obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the
adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people
who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning." (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3
Dall. [U. S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264;
152 P., 1039.)
"It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms
employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon
them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and
adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical
meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have
been employed in that sense in a written Constitution." (McKinney vs.
Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S. W., 303; L. R. A., 1918E, 581.)
"Where words have been long used in a technical sense and
have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires
that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the
sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense
may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section
1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential
lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature
has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is
to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised
conforms to the Constitution." (59 C. J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution
was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and
passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof
permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or
corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn
declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under
the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable
or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agricultural lands"
under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad
or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section
9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are
residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that
these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No.
141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as
public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection, that prior to the Constitution,
under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to
the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land ofthe
public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or
leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not
sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used
for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is
another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes
land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation
given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939,
Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or
not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now
XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial,
and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following
short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
"Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies
lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and
mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a
technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.,
175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many
subsequent cases. . . ."
"Residential, commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes.
Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they
must be classified as agricultural.
"Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining
whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test
(Odell vs. Durant, 62 N. W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co.,
123 p. 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation
for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
"Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen
why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to
agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his
home."
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a
Secretary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also
because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President
Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision
under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the
Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly
maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government —
judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it
reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile
to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they
may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in
the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both
sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose
and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who
under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same,
namely, the non transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical
meaning should be attached to "agricultural land" under section 5. It is a
rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will
bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference
between "agricultural land" under section 1, and "agricultural land" under
section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference
refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in
both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is
important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is
owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by
the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential
lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason
can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that
the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is
this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public
residential lots would become superfluous if the same prohibition is not
equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private
residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come
when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private
individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall
have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words
"no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into
"no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word
"agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit
the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes.
The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended
for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The
words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be
mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this
kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would
be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony
with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only
lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words
"no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning
than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely
one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to
avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first
draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that
"they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a
host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article
XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the
Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests,
and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino
nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign
authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee
on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said:
"The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural
lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land
Laws of the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Italics ours.) And, of the same tenor
was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .
Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared
to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may
cause instant death or the shortening of life. . . . If we do not completely
nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the
time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our
independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we
going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those offoreigners?" (Italics ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the
opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating
objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural
resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are
now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones,
and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the
Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a
piece of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly
implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the
Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No.
141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private lands
only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
"SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine
Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the
laws of which grant to citizensof the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or
permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their
own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws,
and while the same are in force, but not thereafter.
"SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance,
royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force
in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other
form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act;
to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters
may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant
to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or permanent improvements
thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are
in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall
not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the
lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,
corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or
associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period offive years, under the
penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary
case." (Public Land Act, No, 2874.)
It is to be observed that the phase "no land" used in these section refers
to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there
being practicallyno private land which had not been acquired by any of the
means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to
aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted
the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, section 122 and
123 of which read as follows:
"SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the
Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
"SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or
any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard
to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain,
or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement
on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to
persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts:Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and
in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire
the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or
associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government."
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections
120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the
new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is
completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the
absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent
members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had
been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot in question does not come within the
purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there
being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means
provided in said provisions. We are not, however, deciding the instant case
under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to lands that
had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may
be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land
including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic
Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in
favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens
to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes nodistinction between private lands that are
strictly agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial. The
prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens,
which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative
measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which
would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly
it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the
Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure
intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we
have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may
desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens,
admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate ofthe Constitution, we will not
attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are
satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution
from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the
Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire
to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not
acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado and Briones, JJ., concur.
(Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. L-630, [November 15, 1947], 79 PHIL
|||
461-568)
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi,
Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are
as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William
Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park
purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of
Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine
Commission.[1]
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United
States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916; [2] December 28,
1916;[3] and January 17, 1917.[4] Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting
of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173[5] to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen
Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.[6]
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.[7] The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. [8]
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon[9] and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses
Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First
Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J.
Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does
who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land
covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally
leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land
registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded
with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi
Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan
of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the
parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs,
dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14,
1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, 169, 173 and 176 and
[10]
Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the
Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the
lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1,
21, 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;
[11]
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged
Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
So Ordered." [12]
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos
have established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of
Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court
further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay
were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the Properties because
these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point,
we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as
one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his
reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only
1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area,[13] the RTC ordered TCT 3913
covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings
of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law
and jurisprudence on the matter.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original
certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-
1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution
are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War
at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino
citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of
private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They
allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917.
Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of
law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions
of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of
America which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father Diego
Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50
years at the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the
16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether
agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal
Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under
the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest
derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the
declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January
17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916;
Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No.
8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of
Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro
Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.[14] The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court
of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified
copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were
in open , adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to
their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the
very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10
months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already
surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the
petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly
known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these
properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles
without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the
validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents. [15]
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the
lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry
show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. [16] Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,[17] unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of
the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.[18]
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding
the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were
surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands
were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the
lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number
21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique
Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the
Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948[19] contains the following note, "in conflict
with provincial reservation."[20] In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and
the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no
justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the
lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT
3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the
aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of
Civil Case T-143,[21] were within the perimeter of the national park,[22] no pronouncement
as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area
falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 163766. June 22, 2006.]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CANDY MAKER, INC., as
represented by its President, ONG YEE SEE, * respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the May 21, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73287, which affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision 2 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 99-
0031 declaring respondent the owner of the parcels of land designated as Lots
3138-A and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad.
688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the
Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway,
and on the southeast by a legal easement.
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and
signed a Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was
subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square meters,
and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters. 3 The technical description of
Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the Regional Technical Director of the
Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998. 4
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. 5 The buyer declared
Lot No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-
18929, 004-18930 and 004-18931. 6
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with the
MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A
and Lot No. 3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order 7 on June 18, 1999 directing the
applicant to cause the publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the
Deputy Sheriff to post the same. The Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) and
Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their
respective reports on the status of the parcels of land before the initial hearing
scheduled on October 29, 1999. cHDaEI
On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application for
registration over the lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY
SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529. 57
Petitioner asserts that the Engineer's Survey Report 58 and the Laguna de Bay
Shoreland Survey 59 both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the
reglementary lake elevation, hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists
that the property belongs to the public domain as classified under Article 502 of
the Civil Code. 60 Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v.
Tiamson, 61 petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of private
appropriation since it is a public land owned by the State under the Regalian
doctrine. On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null
and void.
Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence to
warrant the registration of the property in its name as owner. The testimonies of
the two witnesses only proved that the possession of the land may be
characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to prove that its
predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously
and adversely in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineer's Survey Report and the
Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they were
neither offered nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It points out that petitioner
failed to invoke these reports in the appellate court. It was only when the petition
was filed with this Court that the respondent learned of its existence. Petitioner's
reliance on the reports/survey is merely an afterthought. The case of Bernardo v.
Tiamson is irrelevant because the factual issues are different from those of this
case.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation 62 with this Court, appending
thereto the report 63 conducted by the survey team of the LLDA Engineering and
Construction Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the 10,971 sq m property
subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and that the profile distance of
the property from the actual lake waters is about 900 m. to 1 km.
The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction
over the amended application; (2) whether the property subject of the amended
application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so, (3)
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its
ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over
respondent's application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing the
notice of hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit "E-1." The
representative of the OSG was present during the hearing and interposed his
objection thereto.
On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject of
this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July
18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title
over the property.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942,
reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, nay apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. EATCcI
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the
phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945;" thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII,
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession, and occupation by the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 64
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State. 65 Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title. 66 The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation
of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. 67
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State. 68 The rationale for the period "since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest
thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious
possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through acquisitive
prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, 69 the Court declared that:
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that '(o)wnership and
other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years,' this provision of law must
be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article
states that '. . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law.' Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years
unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with
color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes
of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right. 70
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or
a legislative act or statute. 71 Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable
and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of the application. 72
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land. 73 Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. 74 A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership; such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. 75
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable
agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per
L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927." 76 However,
under R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and
below the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public
lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated as
lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate
incompatible element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying
and defining development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake with an
approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form a strip of the lakebed along its
shores alternately submerged or exposed by the annual rising and lowering of
the lake water. They have environmental ecological significance and actual
potential economic benefits. HEaCcD
Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and
the surrounding provinces, cities and towns within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out
the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality
of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore town
of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created deep
concern on the part of the Government and the general public over the
environmental impact of such development, on the water quality and ecology of
the lake and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water from the Pasig
River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around
the lake and the increasing urbanization have induced the deterioration of the
lake, and that water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate
further if steps are not taken to check the same. The floods in the Metropolitan
Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the hydraulic system
of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily
involve the lake and its river systems.
This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17,
1978 P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the
LLDA is empowered to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the policies and programs therein provided including the
policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority.
In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series of
1996 relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the Work
and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin. Section
5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to maintain all
shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in
consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the improvement of the
water quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the
Laguna de Bay.
As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of the
LLDA based on the ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the
Memorandum of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located below
the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay,
and, as such, is public land. Although the Report and Memorandum were not
offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent admitted in its Manifestation in
this Court that the property is situated below the 12.50 elevation based on the
survey of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla, the same survey team who
conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12, 2005, which thus
confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a judicial admission in
the course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it. 77
Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by
occupants before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the
respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:
First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property,
and even failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed to
present his father's death certificate to support his claim that the latter died in
1980. There is likewise no evidence when his mother died. cITCAa
Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was
"74 years old." 82 He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10
years old in 1937. It is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the
property with his father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how
many cavans of palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent of such
cultivation, in order to support the claim of possession with a bona fide claim of
ownership.
Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker "upahan" to help him cultivate the
property. He, however, failed to state the name of the worker or to even present
him as witness for the respondent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal
Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the application for
registration of respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. 99-
0031. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
(Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, [June 22, 2006], 525 PHIL
|||
358-381)
[G.R. No. 120066. September 9, 1999.]
Ramon N. Casanova and Florentino & Esmaquel Law Office for petitioners.
Virgilio S. Patricio and Ariel B. Gepty for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent Jose Lachica filed an application for title to land on April 28,
1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife,
Adela Raz from one Eulalio Raz. Petitioners filed an opposition to the application
for title contending that they have been in peaceful, continuous and open
possession, under claim of ownership,of the substantial portion of the land
applied for titling. On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the applicant and the oppositors, the court a quo rendered
judgment declaring the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the
improvements thereon be brought under the operation of the Property
Registration Decree and the title thereto be registered in the name of Jose
Lachica. The opposition filed by petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal, but the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal. The primordial issue to be
resolved is whether or not the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the
confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4,845 square meter
parcel of land he applied for.
HSTCcD
The Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled that both the trial and
appellate courts erred in awarding the questioned land totally to private
respondent. A circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record revealed
that with the exception of 620 square meters, there had been no satisfactory
showing of how private respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the
subject land. Particularly, respondent did not produce the alleged
deeds of conveyance evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz
and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied on secondary evidence to prove
the existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and the appellate
courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar facts
prevailing in this case rest on infirm legal bases much more so in the fact of the
overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it. Moreover,
there were glaring variances in the identities and technical descriptions of the
land applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land purportedly
purchased from Eufrocino Alba. Furthermore both trial and appellate courts
placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there
was no satisfactory explanation on how the area of land covered by said Tax
Declaration geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a
huge parcel measuring 4,845 square meters. In sum, the Court had reservation
on the propriety of adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the
subject land, in viewof their failure to present the technical descriptions of these
areas. Furthermore, there was no sufficient evidence showing that petitioners
have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, in the concept of owner, considering that the testimony of petitioner
Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record. The decision of the
trial court was modified.
SYLLABUS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
"Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28,
1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and
his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached
to the application are: technical description, surveyor's certificate,
certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue
printof Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the
certificate of publication in the Official Gazette was issued on September
23, 1958. The certification of posting ofthe notice of initial hearing was
issued on October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga,
Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast
by the property of the Municipalityof Banga (Sketch, Exh. "F").
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An
order of general default was issued but those who presented their
opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana
Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the
Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga represented by the
Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written
opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on
October 31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the southeastern
portion of the 240 square meters of the land applied for alleging that they
are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the
improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their
predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original
owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute
owners of the disputed portionof the same in their names. cdphil
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his
consolidated opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of default
stating that there is no reason to do so under the Rules of Court, and
that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as
well as the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are
without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was
granted and the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition ofOctabela Alba Vda. de Raz
were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits
'A' to 'I' and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago
(Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972).
The Court admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles
Relor to act as Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the
three sets of oppositors and submit an amended approved plan together
with the technical description for each portion.
The Commissioner's report and sketch was submitted on December 4,
1974. The applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioner's report on
December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of December 13, 1974
required the Commissioner to submit an amended report and amended
sketch.llcd
The Commissioner's corrected report and sketch was submitted on
February 24, 1975 which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there
being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the
testimony of oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the
record for her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing on March 15,
1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the
testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off record because
the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for cross-
examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a
formal offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments
thereto on August 29, 1988. TheCourt admitted said exhibits and the
testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four
oppositions were filed by the following:
1.Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2.Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3.Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and
4.Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago
manifested that he would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and
Jose Rago himself declared his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5).
Although no formal motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago
has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be
disregarded. LLpr
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the
original writing is not available for one reason or another which is the
best or primary evidence, to prove its contents is the testimony of some
one who has read or known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73
SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is
introduced, that the due execution, delivery and reason for non-
production of the original writing must first be
produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not
necessary to prove the loss of the original document beyond all
possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and
this may be shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly
made, for it in places where it is likely to be found. After proving the due
execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the
same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among
others, by the recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala.
126; and Bogardasvs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639,
are of the view that that where the lost documents are more than thirty
(30) years old and would thus prove themselves if produced, secondary
evidenceof their contents is admissible without proof of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He
presented the Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez.
While he failed to present the other deeds of sale covering the other
portions of the property, he has sufficiently established that they were
notarized documents and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in
1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a
case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent
search of those documents from the notary public but in vain. He
presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga, who
testified having seen those deeds as they were presented to him by the
applicant and which were used as basis for the preparation and
issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant.
Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that
the land was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant and
his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax covering the
property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application for
registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal
Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose
Lachica is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his
application for its original registration in his name. The land contains an
area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and
"Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia
Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National road; on the SW.,
along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga
(Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a
point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from
B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, . . . All points referred to are indicated on the plan and
are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings
true date of the survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the
approval, October 3, 1957." cdphil
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a
function that this Court normally undertakes 16 unless the appellate court's
findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 17 A thorough
review of the record convinces this Court that thegeneral rule with regard to the
conclusiveness of the trial court's and appellate tribunal's factual findings should
not be applied because there are material circumstances which, when properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that with
the exception of 620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory
showing of how private respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the
subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as the
arguments proffered by private respondent, he acquired the land in question from
three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly
executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b.] 300 square
meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-law Eulalio Raz,
and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from
Eufrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was not
questioned by petitioners as its technical description delineated in the Escritura
De Venta Absolutadated August 13, 1941, 18 to wit:
"Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco
central del municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una
extension superficial de ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840
mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por otros veinte y
unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad de
Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la
carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera
provincial y con terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con
al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y con propiedad de
Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en todos sus
cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de linderia mas que
dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja
declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador
Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos
(P20.00) . . ."
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters as
well as its dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How
this parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters is explained by the fact
that the Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square meters
thereof for the Banga Public Market Road. prcd
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the other two
parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from
Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters owing to the questionable
circumstances surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia
Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802. 19 The records further reveal that
Dionisia Regado sold: [1.]1,850 square meters of the land to the
Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a
deed of sale dated April 29, 1914; 20 [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz
evidenced by a document entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated September
6, 1918, 21 and [3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a
deed ofconveyance dated September 6, 1918 written in Spanish. 22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz on
January 15, 1933. 23 Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and his wife
Octabela Albaconveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on
November 5, 1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the
heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased
by Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz. 25 The deed of conveyance was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June
17, 1969 26 and is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio
Raz, her husband. 27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are borne
out by the documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did not
produce the alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported transfers
made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on
secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was sustained by both
the trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-Ã -
vis the peculiar facts prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much
more so in the face of the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners
arrayed against it because —
". . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by
means of witnesses, but must necessarily be evidenced by a written
instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by
secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can
be received except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as
regards such contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they
are drawn up in writing in the manner aforesaid." 28 cdrep
It will be readily noted vis-Ã -vis the foregoing that: a.] the land applied for is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly purchased from
Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for
is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba is cocal
secano. Palay is unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term palayero refers to land devoted
to the planting of rice; cocal, on the other hand, means coconut tree
plantation 33 while secano denotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the
land applied for has an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land
supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land
applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by
Apolonia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW
by the Banga Public Market whereas the land allegedly obtained from
Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the
E by the Banga-Libacao Carretera Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and
on the W by Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a
person who claims that he has better right to real property must prove not only
his ownership of the same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof. 35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax
Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no satisfactory
explanation of how the area of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181
geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel
measuring 4,845 square meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by 1954
Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant and his
spouse which shows that the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers
an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953
Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private respondent's wife.
The land declared for taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square
meters. Tax Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528 in the name of private respondent's wife, Adela Raz. The land declared
therein for taxation purposes likewise measures 620 square meters. LLpr
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947 to 4,845
square meters in 1956 came about on account of an affidavit dated November
17, 1956 wherein private respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal
Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square
meters on the bare claim that "the area has been decreased" to only 620 square
meters. The timing of the revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the
application can not but engender serious doubts on the application more so
considering that prior thereto realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to
1956 covered an area measuring 620 square meters and private
respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to claim possession and
ownership over the same period for an infinitely larger area of 4,845 square
meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership. 37 Tax
declarations for a certain number of years, although constituting
proof of claim of title to land, 38 is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership
unless they are supported by other effective proof. 39 It was, thus, held in one
case 40 that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a
few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment does not constitute
sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona fide claim of ownership prior to the
filing of the application. Still in another case, 41 the claim that the applicant had
been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land was not
given credence because it was negated by the fact that he declared the land for
taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed his application for registration
although he could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land.
A belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no real
claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration 42 and where
there are serious discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case,
registration must be denied. 43 If at all, the foregoing facts only serves to
underscore private respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with judicial
color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels of land and to
enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the
peculiar facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding
consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is proved. 44 Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends on the
law existing at the time an action is filed 46 and a law continues to be in force with
regard to all rights which accrued prior to the amendment thereof. 47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant filed his
application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that: dctai
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.]
Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those
not susceptibleof private appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral
lands. 53 For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain classified as disposable' or 'alienable' are further sub-classified into a.]
Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive
purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes; and d.]
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as
those alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor
mineral lands. Thus the term includes residential, commercial and industrial
lands for the reason that these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands. 55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the
registration of private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple
which refer to:
1.]Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during
the Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the:
a.] Titulo real or royal grant; b.]Concession especial or special grant;
c.] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment title; d.] Titulo de
compra or title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or
possessory information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a
gratuitous title; 56
2.]Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion,
avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in
Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code; and
It can not be said that private respondent's possession was con justo titulo y
buena fe. On the contrary, private respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for
himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who
have been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted
acts of deprivation of the latter's rights which is tantamount to bad faith. Indeed
this Court has ruled that the —
". . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other
persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and
intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual
physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation ofactual
fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person." 64
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non
oritur actio — noman can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing. 65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not
similarly vest ownership over the property upon private respondent/applicant
because Article 1137 of the Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that —
"ARTICLE 1137.Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of good faith."
prcd
SO ORDERED.
(Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120066, [September 9, 1999], 372
|||
PHIL 710-742)
[G.R. No. 130906. February 11, 1999.]
SYNOPSIS
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First
Instance of Albay. OCTNo. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided
resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein
petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that
the subject land is foreshore land. Within the time for pleading, private
respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed
their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza
S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss.
They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in
rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the
proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss.
After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec.No.
88 and the Court's resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both
decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the
appellant's brief within the extended period granted to petitioner. Hence, the
present petition. Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely
technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged that it has raised meritorious grounds
which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will result to the
prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government would
lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the
public domain. aDHCEA
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of
what constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules
is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to relax or suspend the rules or
to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or
when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine
once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellant's
brief. Petitioner Republic's appeal presented an exceptional circumstance
impressed with public interest which in the Court's discretion must be given due
course.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
Petitioner maintains that our resolution of 8 May 1989 in G.R. No. 85770 entitled
"Spouses Espiritu v. Baritua" does not constitute res judicata to the instant case
because there isno identity of parties, causes of action, and subject matter
between the two cases. The Supreme Court case was instituted by Spouses
Jose and Maura Espiritu and others against Jose Baritua, while the instant case
was filed by no less than the Republic of the Philippines against herein
respondents. The former arose from a proceeding to quiet title, while the latter is
an action for reversion.
Anent the "unappealed letter-decision" of the Director of Lands, petitioner
contends that the same was a "reversible mistake" which did not bar the filing of
a reversion suit, as the government is never estopped by the mistakes of its
officials or agents.
Petitioner also argues that the 1953 reconstitution case only involved the
restoration of the title which was supposed to have been lost or destroyed. The
issue as to the nature of the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was never
delved into by the court. Petitioner insists that the parcels of land in question are
foreshore lands, and hence, inalienable and incapable of registration.
Consequently, the certificates of title covering said lands are void ab initio.
As regards the trial court's finding of forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the
same is without basis. It is the first time that petitioner instituted an action against
herein respondents concerning the lands in question.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the dismissal of the appeal for
failure to file brief on time was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner failed to present special circumstances or good reasons to
justify its motions for extension. Moreover, that the parcels of land involved are
foreshore was confirmed in the 1917 cadastral and 1953 reconstitution
proceedings. This finding attained finality through our resolution in the action for
quieting of title (G.R. No. 85770), and was further affirmed through the
administrative investigation conducted by the Director of Lands. Thus, the instant
case is now barred by res judicata.
We have long observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) regularly
presents motions for extension of time to file pleadings, taking for granted the
court's leniency in granting the same. Instead of contributing to the swift
administration of justice as an instrumentality of the State, the OSG contributes
to needless delays in litigation. Despite the numerous cases that need the OSG's
time and attention, equal importance should be allotted to each and every case.
Deadlines must be respected and court warnings not taken lightly.
However, after a thorough reexamination of this case, we are of the view that the
challenged resolutions should be reconsidered.
The rules of court governing practice and procedure were formulated in order to
promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding
without sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations. 7
The filing of appellant's brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on its own motion or on that of the appellee upon failure of the appellant to serve
and file the required number of copies of the brief within the time provided. 8
If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time may be allowed
provided (1) there is good and sufficient cause, and (2) the motion for extension
is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. 9 The court's
liberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers should never presume that their
motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course or for the length of
time sought; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised
in accordance with the attendant circumstances. 10
What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules
is discretionary upon the court. The court has the power to relax or suspend the
rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. 11 Among the reasons which the court
allowed in suspending application of the rules on filing an appeal brief were the following: (1) the cause for
the delay was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; 12(2) there was no objection from the State, 13 and the brief was filed within
the period requested; (3) no material injury was suffered by the appellee by
reason of the delay in filing the brief; 14 (4) the fake lawyer failed to file the
brief; 15 (5) appellant was represented by counsel de oficio; 16 (6) petitioner's
original counsel died; 17 and (7) the preparation of the consolidated brief involved
a comparative study of many exhibits. 18
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are
foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public
domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined
as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the
flux and reflux of the tides." 19 It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide." 20
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of
government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) 21 as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle
behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and
discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application,
however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict
with that of, the DENR Secretary. 22
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the
DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of
Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No. 18655, which stemmed
from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." 23 Petitioner,
on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V,
Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence
the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." 24 The contradictory
views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true
nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the
RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of
petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient
cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; the Resolutions of 30
July 1997 and 29 September 1997 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE;
petitioner's appeal is reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings.
ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
(Republic v. Imperial, Jr., G.R. No. 130906, [February 11, 1999], 362 PHIL 466-
|||
479)
[G.R. No. 83609. October 26, 1989.]
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent
Amelia Bisnar.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the
decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426,
entitled "IbarraBisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents'
application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land
in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256. cdll
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on
July 20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners
in fee simple ofLots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares
(345,385 sq.m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas,
Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those
parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40,
Rollo).
On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:
"1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots
applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various
types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real'
or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the
'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra' or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or
possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or
any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent applicable laws.
"2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
"3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation, (pp 17-19, Record on Appeal)." (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
"Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case,
they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years." (p. 16,
Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona
fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the
filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by
planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land
into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the
classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in
the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land
than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the
government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a
prerogative of the Executive Department ofthe government and
not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as
amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be
registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
"As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should
be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted
facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest
purposes." (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56
SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69;Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210
[1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). Cdpr
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, [October 26, 1989],
|||
SYLLABUS
TRACEY, J : p
All these lots, in their original state, whether near the sea or at a
distance from it inland, and whether bare or washed by the tides, were not
covered by waters practically navigable and were filled, whether naturally or
artificially, with vegetation sometimes cultivated and in common use for fuel
and for building purposes, and they were all adapted to fisheries or fish
hatcheries by the labor of man introducing or regulating the access of salt
water thereto. It is obvious that all five cases are of the samegeneral nature
and that one rule must be applied to them all.
In this discussion of the meaning which the Congress of the United
States attached to the phrase "public lands" in the Philippine Bill, we have
assumed that it was used in the same sense as in other laws enacted by that
body. If, however, it can be considered as employed with reference to the
peculiar conditions of the territory to which it was to be applied and to the local
law or usage prevailing therein, the result would not be different. In many of
its general features the Spanish law of public lands in the Philippines
resembled the American. Government property was of two kinds — first, that
of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that
having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340. ) Lands of
the first class, while they retain their public character are inalienable; those of
the second are not.
By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was enacted that all "the
land, soil, ground not under cultivation, and forests in the Philippine Islands
should be considered saleable crown lands," which were not included in four
exceptions stated, among which were "those which belonged to forest zones
which the State desires to hold for the Commonwealth." This corresponds in
the main to the American classification into Government property, public
lands, and forest reserve. Mineral lands are elsewhere defined. It is to be
noted, however, that in the two languages terms ordinarily equivalent are not
in this relation employed in the same sense and that lands de dominio
publico signify quite a different thing from the arbitrary English phrases "public
lands" or "public domain."
The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest Spanish Law of
Waters extended to these Islands, provides that private property can not be
acquired in lands preserving the character of public ownership ( title 1, art. 1,
par. 29), and among the lands declared of public ownership and use by
article 1 of chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:
"The seashore.—By shore is understood the land alternately
covered and uncovered by the sea in its tidal movement. Its interior, or
land limit, is the point reached by the highest and equinoctial tides. At
those places not affected by tides, the land limit is the highest point
reached by sea water in ordinary storms or hurricanes." (Par. 3.)
So that under this legislation the same question also presented itself as
to what constituted seashore, which was of public use and trust and therefore
not alienable. This question can not be said to have been settled by official
ruling at the time of the American occupation. From the official records it
appears that there were then pending for registration a great number of
possessory expedientes, twenty-two of which, made before April 17, 1895,
were from the Province of Pampanga alone, in which the land was described
as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894 such manglares appear at the
outset to have been registered and considered alienable and numbers of
them were conceded by adjustment, including considerable tracts in the town
of Sexmoan and Lubao in Pampanga. Claims having been made that on
account of the trees growing thereon they formed part of the forest reserve
and also because, being covered and uncovered by the tide, they were part of
the shore, and in either case were inalienable, the engineer in chief of the
forestry district of the center of Luzon addressed, on January 7, 1893, a
communication to the inspector general de montes (Forestry Department) in
which he expressed an opinion that as part of the shore they were not subject
to private ownership and asked for an early decision of the question. On
November 26, 1893, the acting inspector-general notified the chief of the
district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his excellency, the governor-general,
had that day ordered all action suspended on expedientes of manglar and
nipa lands and salt marshes until the questions involved in regard thereto
should be determined. In this condition the matter remained until the
expiration of the Spanish sovereignty.
By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore fishery was
declared public, but by article 23 authority might be granted individuals to
establish shore hatcheries for fish and shellfish, and by article 15 salt-water
ponds on private ground not communicating with the sea by water navigable
by boats were recognized as private property, while chapter 10 permitted and
regulated the draining of swamps and marshes, both of private and of public
ownership.
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law
the custom had grown up of converting manglares and nipa lands into
fisheries which became a common feature of settlements along the coast and
at the time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most
productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy
vested interests and prove a public disaster. In our opinion it was the object of
Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the
purposes of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property.
Therefore the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed, without
cost.
Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
(Montano y Marcial v. Insular Government, G.R. No. 3714, [January 26, 1909],
|||
12 PHIL 572-593)