Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Title Facts Issue/s
Association of Small GR No. 79777: PD 27, EOs 228
Landowners v. DAR Secretary & 229 – Nicolas Manaay and his
GR Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, wife own a 9-hectare riceland;
and 79777 while Agustin Hermano, Jr.
14 July 1989 owned 5. They both have four
Cruz, J. tenants each on their respective
landholdings, who were declared
full owners of the said lands by
EO 228 as qualified farmers
under PD 27.
The Manaays and Hermano
question the constitutionality of
PD 27 and EOs 228 and 229.
GR No. 79310: PP 131, EO
229 – Landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill
District in Negros, as well as
Planters’ Committee, Inc. seek to
prohibit the implementation of
PP 131 and EO 229 for being
violative of the constitutional
provisions on just compensation,
due process, and equal
protection.
Subsequently, the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters
(NASP), Manuel Barcelona, and
Prudencio Serrano filed their
own petitions, which also
assailed the constitutionality of
the abovementioned statutes.
GR No. 79744: EOs 228 &
229 – Inocentes Pabico alleges
that the then DAR Secretary
placed his landholding under the
coverage of OLT, in violation of
Ruling
W/N PD 27, PP 131, and EOs YES. The promulgation of PD
228 and 229 were validly 27 by Pres. Marcos in the
enacted. exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been
sustained and there is no reason
to modify or reverse it on that
issue. As for the power of Pres.
Aquino to promulgate PP 131
and EOs 228 & 229, the same
was authorized by Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution. Significantly,
the Congress she is alleged to
have undercut has not rejected
but in fact substantially affirmed
the challenged measures and has
specifically provided that they
shall be suppletory to RA 6657
whenever not inconsistent with
its provisions.
W/N the CARP fund provision in NO. PP 131 is not an
PP131 conforms to the appropriation measure even if it
requirements of a valid does provide for the creation of
appropriation. the said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An
appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release
of public funds from the
treasury. The creation of the fund
is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation,
which is agrarian reform.
W/N PP 131 and EO 229 should NO. This argument is no longer
be invalidated because they do tenable because RA 6657 does
not provide for retention limits. provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law. As such,
landowners who were unable to
Doctrine
To the extent that the measures
under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of
private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive
such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for
which payment of just
compensation is imperative.
Title to all expropriated
properties shall be transferred to
the State only upon full payment
of compensation to their
respective owners.
Obiter: One of the basic
principles of the democratic
system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means.
There is no question that not
even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse
the bypassing of an individual’s
rights. It is no exaggeration to
say that a person invoking a
right guaranteed under Art III of
the Constitution is a majority of
one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
due process and the requirement
for just compensation.
Certificates of Land Transfer
were subsequently issued to
tenants, who then refused to pay
lease rentals to him. He then
protested the erroneous inclusion
of his small landholding under
OLT and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the said CLTs,
which was denied without
hearing. Although he filed an
MR, EOs 228 and 229 were
issued, rendering his MR moot
and academic because the said
EOs directly effected the transfer
of his land to his farmers-tenants.
GR No. 78742: PD 316 – The
Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines
invokes the right of retention
granted by PD 27 to owners of
rice and corn lands not exceeding
7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands
do not exceed the statutory limit
but are occupied by tenants who
are actually cultivating such
lands.
Because PD 316 provides that no
tenant-farmer in agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farmholding
until such time as the respective
rights of the tenant-farmers and
the landowner shall have been
determined, they petitioned the
Court for a writ of mandamus to
W/N the assailed statutes violate
the equal protection clause.
W/N the assailed statutes are
valid exercises of police power.
exercise their rights of retention that right.
under PD 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by RA
6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
NO. The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The
argument that not only
landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to
share the burden of
implementing land reform must
be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will
not see.
YES. The subject and purpose of
agrarian reform have been laid
down by the Constitution itself,
which satisfies the first
requirement of a lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to
the manner of fixing the just
compensation, which it is
claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in
violation of judicial prerogatives.
However, there is no
arbitrariness in the provision, as
the determination of just
compensation by the DAR is not
by any means final and
conclusive upon the landowner
or any other interested party,
because the law provides that the
determination made by the DAR
is only preliminary unless
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
compel the DAR Secretary to
issue the IRR, as they could not
eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of
retention.
W/N the content and manner of
just compensation provided for
in the CARP Law is violative of
the Constitution.
W/N the CARP and EO 228
contravene a well-accepted
principle of eminent domain by
divesting the landowner of his
property even before actual
payment to him in full of just
compensation.
accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts
will still have the right to review
with finality the said
determination.
NO. Although the traditional
medium for payment of just
compensation is money and no
other, what is being dealt with
here is not the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is a revolutionary
kind of expropriation, which
involves not mere millions of
pesos. The initially intended
amount of P50B may not be
enough, and is in fact not even
fully available at this time. The
invalidation of the said section
will result in the nullification of
the entire program.
NO. EO 228 categorically stated
that all qualified farmer-
beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired
under PD 27, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the
farmers’ cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation.
The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the
land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with
the landowner.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Sigre v. CA Matias Yusay owned a parcel of
GR Nos. 109568 and 113454 irrigated rice land in Iloilo, in
8 August 2002 which Ernesto Sigre was a
Austria-Martinez, J. tenant. Sigre previously had been
paying Yusay a lease rental of 16
cavans per crop, but stopped
paying in 1991-92. Instead, he
remitted the payments to the
LBP pursuant to DAR’s
Memorandum Circular No. 6
(MC 6), which set the guidelines
in the payment of lease
rental/partial payment by farmer-
beneficiaries under the land
transfer program of PD 27.
Lilia Gonzales, co-administratrix
of Yusay’s estate, filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus
with the CA, seeking to prohibit
the LBP from accepting Sigre’s
leasehold rentals. According to
Gonzales, she had no notice that
DAR had already fixed the value
of the land. Her petition also
assails the validity of MC 6 and
PD 27.
The CA then declared MC 6 null
and void, and directed the LBP
to return to Gonzales the lease
rentals paid by Sigre, and Sigre
to pay the rentals directly to
Gonzales.
W/N PD 27 sanctions MC 6.
W/N an irreconcilable conflict
exists between PD 816 and MC
6, such that PD 816 must prevail
over MC 6.
W/N PD 27 is unconstitutional
for setting limitations on the
judicial prerogative of
determining just compensation.
YES. It was pursuant to PD 27 The power of subordinate
that MC 6 was issued by the legislation allows administrative
DAR. The Circular was meant to bodies to implement the broad
remedy the situation where the policies laid down in a statute by
tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to “filling in” the details. All that is
the landowner were not credited required is that the regulation
in his favor against the should be germane to the objects
determined purchase price of the and purposes of the law; that the
land, thus making him a regulation be not in contradiction
perpetual obligor for said to but in conformity with the
purchase price. Since the assailed standards prescribed by law.
Circular essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of
PD 27, it is therefore valid.
NO. PD 816 provides that the
tenant-farmer shall pay lease
rentals to the landowner until the
value of the property has been
determined or agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR. On
the other hand, MC 6 mandates
that the tenant-farmer shall pay
to the LBP the lease rental after
the value of the land has been
determined. Thus, there is no
incompatibility between these
two. On the contrary, the two
supplement each other as they set
the guidelines for the payments
of lease rentals on the
agricultural property.
NO. Jurisprudence has upheld
the constitutionality of the said
decree. Moreover, the
determination of just
compensation under PD 27 is not
final or conclusive, because
unless both the landowner and
the tenant-farmer accept the
valuation by DAR, the parties
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Office of the President v. CA and Aurora Tinio-Reyes owned 24
Heirs of Jose Reyes hectares of land in Nueva Ecija,
GR No. 131216 which she bequeathed to her 9
19 July 2001 children upon her death, one of
Pardo, J. which was Jose.
When Jose tried to get a TCT
over his lot, he was told that he
first needed a clearance from the
DAR attesting to the non-
inclusion of his land in the OLT.
However, the PARO ruled that
his land was covered under the
OLT.
The DAR then issued 12 TCTs
in his favor after he appealed the
PARO Decision. However,
subsequently, the Secretary of
the Office of the President
affirmed the PARO as Aurora’s
will was not registered prior to
PD 27’s effectivity, and thus
could not bind third persons.
When Jose appealed, the CA
W/N RA 6657 superseded or
repealed PD 27.
W/N Jose’s land should be
covered by the OLT under RA
6657 or PD 27.
may bring the dispute to court in
order to determine the
appropriate amount of
compensation.
NO. According to EO 229, PD
27 as amended shall continue to
operate with respect to rice and
corn lands, covered thereunder.
Whatever provisions of PD 27
that are not inconsistent with RA
6657 shall be suppletory to the
latter, and all rights acquired by
the tenant-farmer under PD 27
are retained even with the
passage of RA 6657.
NO. There is no doubt that the Seizure only takes effect on the
original landholding of Aurora, payment of just compensation.
consisting of 24 hectares of
Riceland tenanted by farmers
was covered by PD 27. However,
the expropriation of the
landholding did not take place on
the effectivity of PD 27, as the
seizure only takes effect on the
payment of just compensation;
and the DAR had not even
determined the just
compensation for the taking of
the landholding when it decreed
that the land was under the
coverage of RA 6657. Moreover,
when Aurora died and her
children inherited the land, they
only acquired 2.5 hectares each,
which is decidedly within the
retention area of 7 hectares under
PD 27, or 5 hectares under RA
6657.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
reversed the Secretary’s Order.
Corpuz v. Grospe Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-
GR No. 135297 beneficiary under the OLT
8 June 2000 Program of the DAR. Pursuant to
Panganiban, J. PD 27, he was issued a
certificate of land transfer over 2
parcels of agricultural land.
Corpuz then mortgaged the land
to the Grospes. In their mortgage
contract, Corpuz allowed the
spouses Grospe to use or
cultivate the land during the
duration of the mortgage.
Corpuz subsequently instituted a
complaint which alleged that the
Grospes had entered the disputed
land by force and destroyed the
palay that he had planted on it.
However, according to the
Grospes, Corpuz had already
executed a “Waiver of Rights”
over the landholding in favor of
the spouses in consideration of
P54k.
Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled
that Corpuz abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to
the Samahang Nayon of Nueva
Ecija. Said Samahang Nayon
even passed Resolution Nos. 16
and 27 recommending the
reallocation of said lots to the
Grospes, who were the “most
qualified farmers-beneficiaries.”
The DARAB and the CA both
affirmed the Decision.
Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary In 1988, RA 6657 was approved
W/N the waiver of rights is
contrary to agrarian law.
W/N Corpuz had abandoned his
landholding.
W/N Corpuz had voluntarily
surrendered his landholding.
W/N the CARL should include
YES. The sale or transfer of Voluntary surrender, as a mode
rights over a property covered by of extinguishment of tenancy
a Certificate of Land Transfer is relations, does not require court
void except when the alienation approval as long as it is
is made in favor of the convincingly and sufficiently
government or through proved by competent evidence.
hereditary succession. This
ruling is intended to prevent a Obiter:
reversion to the old feudal The farmers’ cooperatives were
system in which the landowners established to provide a strong
reacquire vast tracts of land, thus social and economic
negating the government’s organization to ensure that the
program of freeing the tenant tenant-farmers will enjoy on a
from the bondage of the soil. lasting basis the benefits of
agrarian reform.
NO. Corpuz’ surrender of
possession did not amount to an
abandonment because there was
an obligation on the part of the
Grospes to return possession of
the landholding upon full
payment of the loan. There was
no clear, absolute, or irrevocable
intent to abandon.
YES. Corpuz’ intention to
surrender the landholding was
clear and unequivocal. He signed
his concurrence to the Samahang
Nayon Resolutions. His
voluntary surrender to the
Samahang Nayon qualifies as a
surrender or transfer to the
government because such action
forms part of the mechanism for
the disposition and the
reallocation of farmholdings of
tenant-farmers who refuse to
become beneficiaries of PD 27.
NO. It was never the intention of Raising of livestock, poultry, and
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
GR No. 86889 by the President of the
4 December 1990 Philippines. It includes the
Paras, J. raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine in its coverage.
In 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated
the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39
of the said law.
Luz Farms, a corporation
engaged in the livestock and
poultry business, allegedly
stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of certain
sections of RA 6657, of the
Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing under RA 6657,
and of the IRR of Section 11. It
prays that the aforesaid statutes
be declared unconstitutional.
the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage.
W/N the requirement in Sections
13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing
“corporate farms” to execute and
implement “production-sharing
plans” is unreasonable for being
confiscatory and violative of due
process, with respect to livestock
and poultry raisers.
Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.
W/N the assailed provisions
violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
the framers of the Constitution to swine are excluded from the
include the livestock and poultry coverage of the CARL.
industry in the coverage of the
agrarian reform program of the
government. The intention of the
Committee was to limit the
application of the word
“agriculture”. Thus, Section II of
RA 6657 which includes “private
agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry,
and swine raising” in the
definition of “commercial farms”
is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered
by the agrarian reform program
of the State.
YES. As there is no reason to
include livestock and poultry
lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform, there is no need to call
upon them to distribute from 3%
of their gross sales and 10% of
their net profits to their workers
as additional compensation.
NO. Substantial distinctions exist
between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of
fruits or crops and land
exclusively used for livestock,
poultry and swine raising that
make real differences:
1. There are no tenants
nor landlords in
livestock and poultry
businesses;
2. Livestock and poultry
do not sprout from
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Natalia Realty v. DAR PP 1637 set aside several
GR No. 103302 hectares of land in Antipolo, San
12 August 1993 Mateo, and Montalban as
Bellosillo, J. townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the
metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite, where
Natalia Realty’s properties were
situated. Estate Developers and
Investors Corporation (EDIC),
the developer of the Natalia
properties, was granted approval
to develop the said properties
into low-cost housing
subdivisions. The Natalia
properties then became the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
When the CARL came into
effect, the DAR issued a Notice
of Coverage on the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. Natalia immediately
registered its objection to the
said Notice and requested the
DAR Secretary to cancel the
same. However, members of the
Samahan ng Magsasaka sa
Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA)
W/N the Natalia properties were
validly converted from
agricultural to residential land.
W/N the Natalia properties are
covered by the CARL.
land;
3. Land is not a primary
resource;
4. Livestock and poultry
production are
industrial activities;
5. Livestock and poultry
farmworkers are
covered by minimum
wage law rather than
by tenancy law.
YES. Natalia and EDIC Lands not devoted to agricultural
complied with all the activity are outside the coverage
requirements of law, even of CARL.
securing prior approval from
DAR. As a matter of fact, there “Agricultural land” refers to
was no need for Natalia and “land devoted to agricultural
EDIC to do so because the activity, and not classified as
Natalia properties were within mineral, forest, residential,
the areas set aside for the commercial, or industrial land.”
Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Since PP 1637 created the
townsite reservation for the
purpose of providing additional
housing to the burgeoning
population of Metro Manila, it in
effect converted for residential
use what were erstwhile
agricultural lands provided all
requisites were met.
NO. The undeveloped portions
of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot be considered as
“agricultural lands.” These lots
were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural
lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
filed a complaint against Natalia
and EDIC before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator to restrain
them from developing areas
under their cultivation. The RA
issued a writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Natalia and EDIC
appealed to the DARAB but the
latter merely remanded the case
to the RA. Natalia then requested
the DAR Secretary to set aside
the Notice of Coverage. Neither
the DAR Secretary nor the DAR
Director concerned took action
on the protest letters.
Morta v. Occidental Jaime Morta and Purificacion
GR No. 123417 Padilla filed a suit against Jaime
10 June 1999 Occidental, Atty. Mariano
Pardo, J. Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for
allegedly gathering pili nuts,
anahaw leaves, and coconuts
from their respective land and
destroying their banana and
pineapple plants. Occidental
claimed that he was a tenant of
the actual owner of the land,
Josefina Baraclan, and that
Morta and Padilla were not
actually the owners of the land in
question.
The trial court ruled in favor of
Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et
al. appealed, contending that the
case was cognizable by the DAR
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB).
Thus, the RTC reversed the
lower court and ruled in favor of
Occidental, stating that the case
is a tenancy-related problem
which falls under the exclusive
W/N the cases are properly
cognizable by the DARAB.
NO. Since there is a dispute as to
who is the rightful owner of the
land, the issue is clearly outside
DARAB’s jurisdiction. Whatever
findings made by the DARAB
regarding the ownership of the
land are not conclusive to settle
the matter. At any rate, whoever
is declared to be the rightful
owner of the land, the case
cannot be considered tenancy-
related for it still fails to comply
with the other requirements.
Assuming arguendo that Josefina
is the owner, then the case is not
between the landowner and
tenant. If, however, Morta is the
landowner, Occidental cannot
claim that there is consent to a
landowner-tenant relationship
between him and Morta. Thus,
for failure to comply with the
requisites, the issue involved is
not tenancy-related cognizable
by the DARAB.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction
over a case, there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit:
1. That the parties are the
landowner and the
tenant or agricultural
lessee;
2. The subject matter of
the relationship is an
agricultural land;
3. That there is consent
between the parties to
the relationship;
4. That the purpose of the
relationship is to bring
about agricultural
production;
5. That there is personal
cultivation on the part
of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA Dissent: Davide, CJ. 6. That the harvest is

affirmed the RTC. It is a tenancy-related issue shared between the
because whether it is Josefina or landowner and the
Morta who is the owner of the tenant or agricultural
land is no moment. It does not lessee.
affect Occidental’s tenancy.
Tenancy attaches to the land. The Limited jurisdiction of DAR:
cases filed by Morta and Padilla 1. Adjudication of all
were a clever way to defeat the matters involving
agrarian law. While the cases implementation of
were ostensibly for damages, agrarian reform;
they were, at bottom, a fight on 2. Resolution of agrarian
issues incident to or arising from conflicts and land-
an agrarian relationship. tenure related
problems; and
3. Approval and
disapproval of the
conversion,
restructuring, or
readjustment of
agricultural lands into
residential,
commercial, industrial,
and other non-
agricultural uses.
Monsanto v. Zerna Leonarda Monsanto owned a W/N an agrarian dispute existed YES. The resolution of an agrarian
GR No. 142591 parcel of land, wherein Jesus and between the parties. 1. The subject of the dispute is a matter beyond the
7 December 2001 Teresita Zerna were overseers. In dispute between them legal competence of regular
Panganiban, J. 1995, the Zernas harvested was the taking of courts. The DARAB exercises
coconuts from the plantation coconuts from the primary jurisdiction—both
without Monsanto’s consent, and property owned by original and appellate—to
processed them into copra for the Monsanto; determine and adjudicate all
purpose of confirming their 2. The Zernas were the agrarian disputes, cases,
claim that they are tenants of the overseers of the controversies, and matters or
land. It was alleged that the total property at the time of incidents involving the
amount that they actually made the taking of the implementation of agrarian laws
was P6,262.50; they deposited coconuts, as can be and their implementing rules and
P5,162.50 with the Barangay gleaned from their regulations.
Secretary of the locality, keeping Kasabutan;
the balance of P1,100.00 for their 3. Monsanto allowed the An agrarian dispute refers to any
labor. Zernas to plant controversy relating to tenurial

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Monsanto instituted a criminal
case of qualified theft against the
Zernas, but the Zernas were
acquitted for lack of criminal
intent. The barangay captain of
the locality was ordered to return
to Monsanto the money that the
Zernas deposited. Monsanto filed
an MR for the return of the
P1,100.00.
The court then ruled that since
the harvesting of the coconuts
and processing of the same into
copra were not with the consent
of Monsanto, then they could not
be entitled to compensation for
their labor.
On appeal, the CA ruled that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to
order the Zernas to pay
Monsanto the P1,100.00.
Because the dispute involved an
agricultural tenancy relationship,
the matter fell within the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB. It then annulled the
RTC order requiring the return of
the P1,100.00.
Sanchez v. Marin David Felix owned a fishpond.
GR No. 171346 Jaime Sanchez was instituted as
19 October 2007 a tenant on the said fishpond,
Chico-Nazario, J. with a 50/50 sharing agreement.
After a few years, Felix sold and
transferred ownership of the
subject fishpond to the Marins.
As new owners of the fishpond,
they entered into a civil law
agreement with their mother,
Zemaida, which was renewable
W/N the RTC was stripped of its
criminal jurisdiction when the
CA annulled the Order regarding
the remaining P1,100.00.
W/N a fishpond is an agricultural
land.
W/N a tenurial arrangement
exists between Sanchez and
Zenaida Marin.
coconut, coffee, arrangements—whether
jackfruit, and cacao as leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
shown by the or otherwise—over lands
Kasabutan; devoted to agriculture, including
4. A tenurial arrangement (1) disputes concerning farm
exists among herein workers’ associations; or (2)
parties as regards the representation of persons in
harvesting of the negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
agricultural products, changing, or seeking to arrange
as shown by the terms or conditions of such
several remittances tenurial arrangement.
made by the Zernas to
Monsanto, A tenancy relationship may be
substantiated by established either verbally or in
receipts. writing, expressly or impliedly.
NO. There is no question that the
RTC had criminal jurisdiction to
try the Zernas for the crime of
qualified theft. However, the
resolution of the issue of who is
entitled to the P1,100.00 falls
squarely within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB, as it is an
agrarian dispute.
NO. By virtue of Sec. 2, RA Fishponds are no longer
7881, the operation of fishponds considered agricultural lands.
is no longer considered an
agricultural activity, and a parcel
of land devoted to fishpond
operation is no longer an
agricultural land.
YES. Although the fishpond is
not covered by the CARL, it
bears emphasis that Sanchez’
11
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
yearly.
Zenaida then made an
arrangement with Sanchez
wherein Sanchez would receive a
regular salary and a 20% share in
the net profit of the fishpond.
When her lease agreement with
her children expired, Zenaida
ordered Sanchez to vacate the
premises. Sanchez refused,
asserting that he was a tenant of
the fishpond and not a mere
contractual worker; hence, he
had the right to its peaceful
possession and security of
tenure. He then asked the court
to declare him as a tenant of the
subject fishpond, which
subsequently did.
As Sanchez was already declared
as an agricultural tenant of the
fishpond, he filed a petition to
the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for the
fixing of leasehold rentals for his
use of the fishpond. However,
Zenaida countered this
application by filing a case with
the PARAD to eject Sanchez for
failure to pay the rent and for
failure to render an accounting.
The PARAD consolidated the 2
cases and ruled in favor of
Sanchez.
Zenaida appealed to the
DARAB, which affirmed the
PARAD decision. The CA
reversed the ruling, stating that
the DARAB lacked jurisdiction
status as a tenant in the subject
fishpond and his right to security
of tenure were already previously
settled. Having been declared as
a tenant with the right to security
of tenure as provided by the law
enforced at the time of the filing
of the complaint, Sanchez has
acquired a vested right over the
subject fishpond. Therefore, even
if fishponds were later
excluded/exempted from CARL
coverage, and despite the fact
that no CLOA has been issued to
Sanchez, the same cannot defeat
the aforesaid vested right already
granted and acquired by Sanchez
long before the passage of RA
7881.
W/N the DARAB has YES. The present case was
jurisdiction over the case. instituted as early as 1991 when
the law applicable was still RA
6657, and fishponds and prawn
farms were not yet
exempted/excluded from the
CARL coverage. At that time,
there was an agrarian dispute
between the parties. Prior to the
enactment of RA 7881 in 1995,
the case was already pending
appeal before the DARAB.
Hence, the aforesaid
amendments cannot be made to
apply to divest the DARAB of its
jurisdiction of the case. Once
jurisdiction is acquired by the
court, it remains with it until the
full termination of the case.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
over the case. It stated that Sec. 2
of RA 7881, which amended
Sec. 10 of RA 6657, excluded
private lands actually, directly,
and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds from the
coverage of the CARL, so that
the operation of a fishpond is no
longer considered an agricultural
activity. Since the cases are not
agrarian disputes, then the
DARAB could not have validly
acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
Nuesa v. CA When Verdillo was issued an
GR No. 132048 “Order of Award” by the DAR
6 March 2002 Secretary over 2 parcels of land,
Quisumbing, J. it had a condition that Verdillo
should personally cultivate the
land, and pay at least the first
installment, within a period of 6
months.
21 years later, Verdillo filed an
application with the DAR for the
purchase of the said lots claiming
that he had complied with the
conditions set forth in the Order
of Award. Restituto Rivera
protested this application,
claiming that it was he who had
been in possession of the land
and had been cultivating the
same. He also filed his own
application for the said parcels in
opposition to that of Verdillo.
After the DAR’s investigation of
the conflicting claims, it found
that Verdillo violated the terms
of the Order of Award, and
W/N the DARAB has NO. Verdillo and Rivera had no
jurisdiction over the case. tenurial, leasehold, or any
agrarian relations whatsoever
that could have brought this
controversy between them within
the ambit of an “agrarian
dispute.” Consequently, the
DARAB had no jurisdiction over
the controversy and should not
have taken cognizance of
Verdillo’s petition in the first
place.
W/N the DARAB acted in grave YES. The revocation by the
abuse of discretion. Regional Director of DAR of the
earlier Order of Award by the
DAR Secretary falls under the
administrative functions of the
DAR. The DARAB and its
provincial adjudicator or board
of adjudicators acted erroneously
and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance
of the case, then overturning the
decision of the DAR Regional
Director and deciding the case on
the merits without giving Rivera
While it bears emphasizing that
findings of administrative
agencies, which have acquired
expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are accorded not
only respect but even finality by
the courts, care should be taken
that administrative actions are
not done without due regard to
the jurisdictional boundaries set
by the enabling law for each
agency.
The DAR is vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian
reform program. The DARAN
has primary original and
appellate jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or
13
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
cancelled the said Order. Hence,
Verdillo filed with the Provincial
Adjudication Board a petition for
the annulment of the said order.
Instead of filing an Answer to
the Petition, Rivera filed a
Motion to Dismiss. However, the
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator
chose to resolve the case on the
merits, and ruled in favor of
Verdillo. The DARAB and the
CA affirmed this decision.
Almuete v. Andres Since the National Resettlement
GR No. 122276 and Rehabilitation
20 November 2001 Administration (NARRA)
Ynares-Santiago, J. awarded a parcel of land to
Rodrigo Almuete in 1957, he and
his family exercised exclusive
possession over it, cultivating it
and planting narra, fruit trees,
rice, corn, and legumes thereon.
However, in 1979, an Agrarian
Reform Technologist represented
that Almuete could not be found
W/N the case is an agrarian
dispute and, as such, falls under
the DARAB’s jurisdiction.
the opportunity to present his
case.
NO. The action filed by Almuete
before the trial court was for
recovery of possession and
reconveyance of title. The issue
to be resolved was who between
Almuete and Andres has a better
right to the subject property
considering that both of them are
awardees of the same property. It
was thus a controversy relating
to ownership of the farmland,
which is beyond the ambit of the
phrase “agrarian dispute.” No
incidents involving the
implementation of the CARP and
other agrarian laws and their
IRRs.
An “agrarian dispute” is defined
to include “any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise over
lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning
farmworkers’ associations or
representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes
any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired
under RA 6657 and other terms
and conditions of transfer and
other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB
is limited to cases involving a
tenancy relationship between the
parties.
Elements of a tenancy
relationship:
1. The parties are the
landowner and the
tenant or agricultural
lessee;
2. The subject matter of
the relationship is an
14
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

and that he had waived all his juridical tie of landowner and agricultural land;
rights as a NARRA settler. It was tenant was alleged between the 3. There is consent
also stated in the report that the parties, let alone that which between the parties to
actual owner of the land was would so characterize the the relationship;
Marcelo Andres, who was then relationship as an agrarian 4. The purpose of the
allowed to file his homestead dispute. Consequently, the RTC relationship is to bring
application. was competent to try and decide about agricultural
the case. Its decision was, thus, production;
After the issuance of an original valid and can no longer be 5. There is personal
certificate of title in favor of disturbed, after having attained cultivation on the part
Andres pursuant to his finality. Nothing more can be of the tenant or
homestead patent, he and 10 done with the decision except to agricultural lessee;
other armed persons entered the enforce it. 6. The harvest is shared
subject property and took between the landowner
possession of approximately half and the tenant or
of it. agricultural lessee.

Almuete quickly brought the

matter the DAR’s attention, and
learned of the cancellation of his
award and its subsequent titling
in favor of Andres. Almuete then
filed an action for reconveyance
and recovery of possession
against Andres, which was
granted by the court.

Andres then filed a petition for

certiorari with the CA, assailing
the trial court’s jurisdiction over
the nature as well as the subject
matter of the case. He argued
that since the subject property
was agricultural land covered by
a homestead patent, exclusive
jurisdiction was with the
DARAB, and not with the
regular courts. The CA ruled in
Andres’ favor, and declared the
ruling of the RTC as null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Chico v. CA Pedro Chico claims to be the
GR No. 122704 lawful owner of a parcel of land,
5 January 1998 which the Mananghayas were
Vitug, J. occupying. He averred that he
needed the lots for his personal
use but because the
Mananghayas refused to vacate,
he was constrained to initiate the
case.
The Mananghayas assert that the
true owners of the property in
question, Don Rafael and Doña
Salud Chico, were succeeded
upon their death by their son
Delfin Chico. They also claim
that they had long been in lawful
possession of the subject parcel
of land as tenants of the deceased
spouses and their son to whom
rentals had been paid.
W/N the dispute between the
parties is agrarian in nature.
NO. The records of the case fail
to show any juridical tie binding
between the parties or their
predecessors-in-interest, let alone
that which would so characterize
the relationship as an agrarian
dispute. Worse, the land subject
matter of the controversy was not
shown to be an agricultural land;
to the contrary, the land appears
to be located within a residential
area. Compounding the matter,
no receipt, or any other evidence,
was presented by the
Mananghayas to prove their
claim that the harvest was shared
between the parties.
In order for a tenancy relation to
take serious hold over the
dispute, it would e essential to
first establish all its
indispensable elements. It is not
enough that these requisites are
alleged; these requisites must be
shown in order to divest the
regular court of its jurisdiction in
proceedings lawfully began
before it.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pedro

and ordered the Mananghayas to
surrender its possession. The
Mananghayas then initiated a
petition for certiorari with the
CA to annul the RTC decision
for being void. They contend that
their tenancy relationship with
the original owners was an
agrarian dispute cognizable
exclusively by the DARAB. The
CA set aside the RTC decision
on the ground that the dispute
between the parties was an
agrarian reform matter.
Isidro v. CA Natividad Gutierrez owns a W/N the parties have a tenurial NO. Based on the statutory Tenancy is not a purely factual
GR No. L-105586 parcel of land, over which her arrangement. definitions of a tenant or lessee, relationship dependent on what
15 December 1993 sister Aniceta was an overseer. it is clear that there is no tenancy the alleged tenant does upon the
Padilla, J. Aniceta allowed Remigio Isidro or agricultural/leasehold land. It is also a legal

16
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
to occupy the swampy portion of
the land, so that he would have
enough income to meet his
family’s needs, with the
condition that he vacate the
property upon demand. Remigio
occupied the land without paying
any rental and converted the
same into a fishpond.
When Natividad demanded
Remigio to return the land, the
latter refused to vacate, claiming
that he had spent effort and
invested capital in converting the
same into a fishpond. Thus, a
complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed by Natividad.
However, it was dismissed by
the trial court, stating that the
land is agricultural and is thus an
agrarian dispute under the
original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of
agrarian relations. The RTC
affirmed the decision.
The CA then reversed the lower
courts, and ruled that there was
no tenurial arrangement between
the parties, and that Remigio
only possessed the property by
mere tolerance.
Sintos v. CA From 1963 to 1983, Teofilo
GR No. 96489 Magarin, Aguido Ebasco,
14 July 1995 Guillermo and Manuel Casinillo,
Quiason, J. Sergio Corpus, Severino
Magarin, Rufina Mendoza,
Victoria Orilan, and Fausta
Salidaga had been cultivating
W/N the case falls under the
DARAB’s jurisdiction.
W/N the tenants have a right to
disturbance compensation.
relationship existing between the
parties. There was no contract or
agreement entered into by
Remigio with Natividad nor with
the overseer of the property, for
Remigio to cultivate the land for
a price certain or to share his
harvests. Remigio failed to
substantiate his claim that he was
paying rent for the use of the
land.
NO. A case involving an
agricultural land does not
automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the
DARAB has jurisdiction. The
law provides for conditions or
requisites before the possessor of
the land can qualify as an
agricultural lessee or tenant, and
the land being agricultural is
only one of them. The law states
that an agrarian dispute must be
a controversy relating to a
tenurial arrangement over lands
devoted to agriculture. In the
absence of a tenancy
relationship, the complaint for
unlawful detainer is properly
within the jurisdiction of the
MTC.
YES. There existed a landlord
and tenant relationship between
the parties. He allowed them to
cultivate the land and, in return,
received a share of the harvest.
Being tenants, they are entitled
to disturbance compensation.
relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when
the farmer is installed, and their
written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are
not contrary to law, are even
more important.
Unless a person establishes his
status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the
government under existing
tenancy laws.
An agricultural lessee is a person
who, by himself and with the aid
available from within his
immediate farm household,
cultivates the land belonging to,
or possessed by, another with the
latter’s consent for the purposes
of production, for a price certain
in money or in produce or both.
An agricultural lessor, on the
other hand, is a natural or
juridical person who, either as
owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor
lets or grants to another the
cultivation and use of his land for
a price certain.
Where persons cultivated the
land and did not receive salaries
but a share in the produce or the
cash equivalent thereof, the
relationship created between
them and the landowner is one of
tenancy and not employment.
17
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

portions of a parcel of land

owned by Nicolas Sintos. They
agreed to pay him one-fourth of
their harvest as their shares.
Subsequently, Nicolas amended
the sharing agreement by
requiring them to give him 10
sacks of 50 kilos per sack, per
hectare, per harvest. Thereafter,
the said tenants paid him on the
basis of the new sharing scheme.

When the subject parcel of land

was identified by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform as covered
under Operation Land Transfer,
Certificates of Land Transfer
were issued to the tenants.

Nicolas then asked for the

exclusion of his landholding
from the land reform program,
contending that the portions
occupied by his tenants were part
of his land development project,
the Sintos Subdivision. After
investigation, the MAR
recommended the cancellation of
the CLTs in favor of the tenants
and instead recommended the
award to them of disturbance
compensation.

Although no agreement was

reached by the parties with
respect to the amount of
disturbance compensation, the
tenants were ejected from their
landholding when Nicolas started
dumping sand and gravel on the
portions they were cultivating.
They then filed a case against
18
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Nicolas for the payment of

disturbance compensation.

The trial court ruled in favor of

the tenants, and ordered Nicolas
to pay them disturbance
compensation. The CA affirmed
the trial court. Nicolas appealed,
contending that the respondents
do not have a right to the
compensation because they were
not his tenants.
Philbancor v. CA Vicente Hizon, Jr. is the owner W/N the tenants could still NO. Section 12 of RA 3844 The right of tenancy attaches to
GR No. 129572 of agricultural lands which were exercise their right of provides that the right of the landholding by operation of
26 June 2000 tenanted by Alfredo Pare, Pablo redemption, five years after the redemption may be exercised law. The leasehold relation is not
Pardo, J. Galang, and Amado Vie. Hizon registration of the certificate of within 2 years from the extinguished by the alienation or
mortgaged the subject property sale with the Register of Deeds. registration of the sale. The transfer of the legal possession of
to Philbancor without his redemption period had already the landholding.
tenants’ knowledge, and when he expired when the tenants filed
failed to pay his obligations, the complaint for redemption.
Philbancor was able to acquire Nevertheless, the tenants may
the property at a public auction. continue in possession and
enjoyment of the land in question
The tenants allegedly only found as legitimate tenants because the
out about the mortgage seven right of tenancy attaches to the
years after the public auction, landholding by operation of law.
when they were notified by The leasehold relation is not
Philbancor to vacate the lots. extinguished by the alienation or
Thus, they filed a complaint for transfer of the legal possession of
maintenance of possession with the landholding.
redemption and tenancy right of
pre-emption against Philbancor
and Hizon with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB).

The PARAB ruled in favor of the

tenants and ordered Philbancor
to execute the necessary Deed of
Redemption in favor of the
tenants.

19

Heirs of Roman Soriano v. CA
GR No. 128177
15 August 2001
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
The DARAB and the CA
affirmed the decision.
A parcel of land originally
owned by Adriano Soriano
passed on to his heirs who leased
the same to the spouses de Vera
for 15 years beginning 1967
(until 1982). Roman, one
Adriano’s children, was to act as
caretaker of the property during
the period of the lease. However,
in 1968, the de Vera spouses
ousted him from the property and
appointed Isidro and Vidal
Versoza as his substitutes.
Because of this, Roman filed a
case for reinstatement and
reliquidation against the de Vera
spouses. On appeal to the CA, he
won. Prior to the execution of the
CA’s decision in 1972, the de
Vera spouses and Roman entered
into a post-decisional agreement
wherein the spouses allowed
Roman to sub-lease the property
as an agricultural tenant until the
termination of the lease in 1982.
The said agreement was
approved by the agrarian court.
After executing an extrajudicial
settlement among themselves,
Adriano’s heirs divided the
property into 2 lots. The first was
assigned to Lourdes, Candido,
and the heirs of Dionisia; the
other was assigned to Francisca,
Librada, Elocadio, and Roman.
In 1971, the first lot was sold by
its owners to the spouses Abalos,
while the ¾ of the second lot was
W/N the ruling in the land
registration case in favor of the
spouses Abalos becomes res
judicata with respect to the
security of tenure rights of the
heirs of Roman Soriano.
W/N the winning party in a land
registration case can effectively
eject the possessor thereof,
whose security of tenure rights
are still pending determination
before the DARAB.
NO. What is in issue in the land
registration case was ownership.
The security of tenure case
before the DARAB involved the
issue of possession. It is
important to note that although
the spouses Abalos have been
declared titled owners of the
subject land, the exercise of their
rights of ownership are subject to
limitations that may be imposed
by law. The Tenancy Act
provides one such limitation.
Agricultural lessees are entitled
to security of tenure and they
have the right to work on their
respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is
established.
NO. Roman’s status as tenant is
yet to be declared by DARAB.
The prevailing party in a land
registration case cannot be
placed in possession of the area
while it is being occupied by
once claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a
declaration that the latter’s
occupancy was unlawful. This is
because if Roman’s claim of
possession as a tenant of the said
property is proven, it will entitle
him and his heirs to protection
against dispossession.
Security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings
is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood.
The exercise of ownership yields
to the exercise of the rights of an
agricultural tenant (as provided
for in The Tenancy Act).
Obiter:
Possession and ownership are
distinct legal concepts. There is
ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will
in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the
rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the
owner, among which are the
right to enjoy the thing owned
and the right to exclude other
persons from possession thereof.
On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right.
Literally, to possess means to
actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in two
ways: possession in the concept
of owner and possession of a
holder.
A judgment for ownership does
not necessarily include
20
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

sold to the same spouses by possession as a necessary

Elocadio, Francisca, and incident.
Librada.

In 1976, the spouses Abalos filed

with the RTC of Pangasinan an
application for registration of
title over the lots they bought
from the heirs of Adriano (the
first one and the ¾ pro-indiviso
share of the second lot sold to
them). The application was
granted by the RTC, and
affirmed both by the CA and SC.

In 1983, Roman, along with

Elocadio and Librada, filed a
case against the Abalos spouses
for annulment of document
and/or redemption, ownership,
and damages. It was denied by
the trial court.

In 1984, or 11 years after the

approval of the post-decisional
agreement between Roman and
the spouses de Vera, the Abalos
spouses filed with the agrarian
court a motion for execution of
the said post-decisional
agreement which allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the
property. The motion prayed that
the spouses Abalos be placed in
possession of the subject
property, jointly with Roman
Soriano, and to levy so much of
Roman’s property to answer for
the use and occupation of Roman
of 6/7 share of the property.
When Roman died in 1985, he
was substituted by his heirs.
21
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

It appears that in 1988, the land

registration court’s decision was
partially executed by partitioning
the second lot into two—one part
in favor of Roman and the other
in favor of the spouses Abalos.
Roman’s heirs appealed to the
CA, which affirmed the partition
but reversed the order of the land
registration court directing the
issuance of a writ of possession
because of the pendency of the
case instituted by Roman against
the Abalos spouses.

In 1993, the SC ultimately

dismissed Roman’s case of
annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership, and
damages against the Abalos
spouses; as well as the motion
for execution instituted by the
Abalos spouses. Roman’s heirs
then filed with the DARAB a
complaint against the Abalos
spouses for “Security of Tenure
with prayer for Status Quo Order
and Preliminary Injunction.” The
Abalos spouses, on the other
hand, in view of the SC’s
disposition of the case, moved
for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution and/or writ of
possession to place them in
possession of the first and ¾ of
the second lot. The trial court
held this case in abeyance until
after DARAB resolves the
complaint filed by Roman’s
heirs. The Abalos spouses’ MR
was denied by the trial court, and
on appeal, the CA reversed the
22
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
RTC, ordering the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of
the Abalos spouses.
Hernandez v. IAC The spouses Tolentino owned a
GR No. 74323 parcel of coconut land. They had
21 September 1990 persons living on the said land,
Medialdea, J. who cleaned and cleared certain
portions of the plantation for the
purpose of improving the
harvest, were identified as
“bantay” or watchers over the
property and entitled to 1/6 share
in the harvest. Their houses were
built in a cluster inside the
property.
Subsequently, SALES, Inc. was
able to acquire the land. Its
possession was relinquished to
Wenceslao Hernandez under a
civil law lease. The watchers’
pay was reduced to 1/7 of the
harvest. However, from 1980 to
1983, they were not paid their
shares.
SALES, Inc. averred that the
watchers had been ejected from
the land even before it acquired
the same; thus, they did not have
a right to a share of the harvests,
since they were not tenants. It
also claimed that under the lease
agreement, Hernandez was
forbidden to take any tenants,
and that these watchers were
only subsequently hired as wage
laborers to do the picking,
gathering, and hauling of
cocounuts. The court ruled in
favor of the watchers, and
W/N the watchers could be YES. The watchers have been in
considered as agricultural continuous, uninterrupted
tenants. physical possession of their
respective areas in the
landholding, which they have
cleaned and cleared for the
purpose of improving the
harvests; they have lived in the
landholding and constructed their
houses thereon; they were paid in
an amount equivalent to 1/6 of
the harvest during the ownership
of the Tolentino spouses, and
then later, 1/7 during the period
of Wenceslao’s lease. Their
status as tenants based on the
foregoing cannot be gainsaid.
Where they cultivated the land
and did not receive salaries but a
share in the produce or the cash
equivalent of his share in lump,
the relationship is one of tenancy
and not employment. The fact
that they have huts erected on the
landholdings shows they are
tenants.
Where a person cultivates the
land and does not receive salaries
but a share in the produce or the
cash equivalent of his share in
lump, the relationship is one of
tenancy and not employment.
An important criterion in
determining whether the
relationship is one of share
tenancy is cultivation.
The definition of cultivation is
not limited merely to the tilling,
plowing or harrowing of the
land. It includes the promotion of
growth and the care of the plants,
or husbanding the ground to
forward the products of the earth
by general industry.
It may be said that the caretaker
of an agricultural land can also
be considered the cultivator of
the land.
RA 3844 abolished and outlawed
share tenancy and put in its stead
the agricultural leasehold system.
RA 6389 subsequently declared
that share tenancy was contrary
to public policy. Although share
tenancy was statutorily
abolished, leasehold tenancy for
coconut and sugar lands has not
yet been implemented. The
policy makers of government are
still studying the feasibility of its
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
declared them as tenants of
SALES, Inc. and Wenceslao
Hernandez. The latter were also
ordered to pay the former their
unpaid shares in the harvest. The
CA affirmed.
Valencia v. CA When Victor Valencia acquired
GR No. 122363 two parcels of land, he entered
29 April 2003 into civil law leases with
Bellosillo, J. Glicerio Henson and Fr. Andres
Flores. Henson instituted
Crescenciano and Marciano Frias
to work on the property; while
Fr. Flores appointed the Friases,
plus some others, as farmhands.
However, in Fr. Flores’ lease
contract, there was a stipulation
that he was prohibited from
installing a leasehold tenant
thereon. No such prohibition
existed in Henson’s contract.
When Fr. Flores’ lease period
expired, Valencia ordered his
farmhands to vacate the lot. The
farmhands refused to do so, and
actually even secured CLTs over
the land in their names. Catalino
Mantac, one of the farmhands,
subsequently entered into a
leasehold contract undertaking to
have a profit-sharing agreement
with Valencia.
After 12 years, DAR investigated
the matter and found that the
right of the farmhands to the land
ceased upon the termination of
Can a contract of civil law lease
prohibit a civil law lessee from
employing a tenant on the land
subject matter of the lease
agreement?
YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not
automatically authorize a civil
law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the
landowner. The lessee must be
so specifically authorized. A
different interpretation would be
most unfair to the hapless and
unsuspecting landowner who
entered into a civil law lease
agreement in good faith only to
realize later on that he can no
longer regain possession of his
property due to the installation of
a tenant by the civil law lessee.
On the other hand, under the
express provision of Art. 1649 of
the Civil Code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the
consent of the lessor, unless
there is a stipulation to the
contrary. In the case before us,
not only is there no stipulation to
the contrary; the lessee is
expressly prohibited from
subleasing or encumbering the
land, which includes installing a
leasehold tenant thereon since
the right to do so is an attribute
of ownership.
application and the consequences
of its implementation.
Nonetheless, this did not end the
rights of share tenants in these
types of lands. The eventual goal
of legislation of having strong
and independent farmers
working on lands which they
own remains.
The right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be
provided by law. Inherent in the
right of landholders to install a
tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such
authority, civil law lessees as
landholders cannot install a
tenant on the landholding.
Tenancy relationship has been
held to be of a personal
character.
Deforciants cannot install lawful
tenants who are entitled to
security of tenure.
A contract of civil law lease can
prohibit a civil law lessee from
employing a tenant on the land
subject matter of the lease
agreement.
Essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship:
(1) The parties are the
landowner and the
tenant;
(2) The subject is
agricultural land;
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

the lease contracts, except as (3) There is consent;

regards to Mantac, with whom (4) The purpose is
Valencia entered into a tenancy agricultural
agreement. As such, it was production;
recommended that the CLTs (5) There is personal
given to the other farmhands be cultivation; and
cancelled. However, the (6) There is sharing of
Regional Office disregarded the harvests between the
investigation report and ruled parties.
that the farmhands had a right to
continue on the land until An allegation that an agricultural
otherwise ordered by the court. tenant tilled the land in question
On appeal to the Office of the does not make the case an
President, then Exec. Sec. agrarian dispute. Claims that one
Teofisto Guingona upheld the is a tenant do not automatically
ruling of the DAR, with the give rise to security of tenure.
modification that the area The elements of tenancy must
acquired by Valencia as first be proved in order to entitle
homestead be excluded from the the claimant to security of tenure.
coverage of PD 27.
The principal factor in
Valencia then appealed to the determining whether a tenancy
CA contending that the Exec. relationship exists is intent.
Sec. erred in recognizing the Tenancy is not a purely factual
farmhands as tenants, and relationship dependent on what
disallowing him and his 7 the alleged tenant does upon the
compulsory heirs from land. It is also a legal
exercising their right of retention relationship.
under RA 6657. However, the
CA dismissed the case. The security of tenure guaranteed
by our tenancy laws may be
invoked only by tenants de jure,
not by those who are not true and
lawful tenants.

The act of subletting to third

persons extinguishes the
agricultural leasehold relations,
as this constitutes an
abandonment of the landholding
due to absence of personal
cultivation.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Caballes v. DAR Andrea Millenes allowed
GR No. 78214 Bienvenido Abajon to construct
5 December 1988 a house on a portion of her
Sarmiento, J. landholding, paying a monthly
rental of P2.00. Millenes
likewise allowed Abajon to plant
a portion of the land, agreeing
that the produce thereof would
be shared by both on a 50-50
basis.
When Millenes sold her land to
the spouses Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, the spouses told
Abajon that they intended to
build a poultry close to his house
and persuaded him to transfer his
dwelling to another portion of
the landholding. Abajon refused
to leave, even after confrontation
before the Barangay Captain of
the locality.
W/N Abajon is an agricultural
tenant.
NO. To invest Abajon with the
status of a tenant is preposterous.
He only occupied a miniscule
portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot,
which cannot by any stretch of
imagination be considered as an
economic family-sized farm.
Planting camote, bananas, and
corn on such a size of land
cannot produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the
farm family’s basic needs. Thus,
the order sought to be reviewed
is patently contrary to the
declared policy of RA 3844.
Moreover, there exists no
tenancy relationship between the
parties because Abajon’s status
is more of a caretaker who was
allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to
Obiter:
Social justice is for the
deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is never
justified to give preference to the
poor simply because they are
poor, or reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice
must always be served for the
poor and the rich alike
according to the mandate of law.
Interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus. – Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is
the best method of interpretation.
Essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship:
(7) The parties are the
landowner and the
tenant;
(8) The subject is
agricultural land;
(9) There is consent;
(10) The purpose is
agricultural
production;
(11) There is personal
cultivation; and
(12) There is sharing of
harvests.
Unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he
is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing laws.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

live in the premises and to have a

Subsequently, Yolanda filed a garden of some sort. Agricultural Tenancy status arises only if an
criminal case against Abajon for production as the primary occupant of a parcel of land has
malicious mischief for harvesting purpose being absent in the been given its possession for the
bananas and jackfruit from their arrangement, it is clear that primary purpose of agricultural
property without her knowledge. Abajon was never a tenant of production.
All the planting on the property Millenes.
however, had been done by Obiter:
Abajon. The trial court ordered If justice can be meted out now,
the referral of the case to the why wait for it to drop gently
Ministry of Agrarian Reform for from heaven?
a preliminary determination of
the relationship between the
parties. The Ministry ruled that a
tenancy relationship existed
between the parties, and, as such,
the case is not proper for hearing.

On appeal, the DAR (the new

MAR) reversed the findings and
declared that the case was proper
for trial as the land involved was
residential. The new minister of
the DAR, however, set aside the
said order and declared that the
criminal case was not proper for
trial, as there was an existing
tenancy relationship between the
parties.

National Housing Authority v Allarde

Facts:

Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working
on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. On

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate
including the lots in question, warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to the crops planted
on the said lots. In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to
them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In January 1992, petitioner caused the
bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18, 1992, the
respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before the
respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from
bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy. Petitioner contended that the said lots which were
previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes are not covered by the CARP as they are not
agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657. The RTC issued the writ.

Issue:

Whether or not the disputed land is covered by CARP

Held:

Lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the Department of Agrarian
Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the
ambit of said law. Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia under Presidential Proclamation No.
843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the
agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL.

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Isidro v CA

Facts:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private
respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The
occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner
occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer
demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he
had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private
respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case
because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC which
affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts

Held:

No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB
has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The
law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law
states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important.

Suplico v CA

Facts:

Isabel Tupas leased her landholding for the amount of P10, 000.00 to petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a
contract that was set to expire on 31 May 1982. Some time in 1979, respondent Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meter
of the farmland under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Petitioner was to receive from the respondent 62 cavans from the palay
harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private
respondent resided with his family in a farmhouse on the land. When, years later, petitioner threatened to eject respondent from the
property, the respondent initiated an action for damages and injunction against petitioner in the Court of Agrarian Relations.The
complaint averred that respondent was the tenant-farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas having been instituted
as such tenant in 1979 by her administrator, herein petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed rental of 62
cavans of palay per crop yield. On 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision declaring private respondent a bona fide
agricultural lessee. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is a tenant of the subject land

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Held:

Tenancy did exist between the parties. Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there resided,
with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly, private respondent and his wife were
personally doing the farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring of persons
outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the
status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses.
Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans
of palay per crop yield.

Bejasa v CA

Facts:

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of
administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria
Dinglasan, Jaime’s wife with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15, 000.00 in
consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of one year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite
Victoria’s demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in
the form of rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime
Dinglasan, amd the trial court ruled in favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas

Held:

The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
Candelaria and the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent. Even
assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that
they did.

Almuete v Andres

32
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Facts:

The subject property was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to
petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. He and his family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively for some twenty-two years. On
August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the whereabouts of
Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control
and financial hardship. The technologist also stated therein that the actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to
date. Thereafter, a homestead patent was issued in favour of Andres. Marcelo Andres gained control, and took possession, of
approximately half of the subject property. Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which rendered a
decision in favour of Almuete. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the decision of the trial court NULL and VOID because the
case is an agrarian dispute, hence it falls within the jurisdiction of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are
indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between
petitioners and respondent since there is no tenancy relationship between them. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the
regular courts.

Monzanto v Zerna

Facts:

Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna were charged with qualified theft for stealing the coconut harvests from the plantation of
petitioner Monzanto. The spouses were the overseer of the land owned by the petitioner. After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted
them of the charge. The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information were P6, 262.50. However, the awarded amount
was only P5, 162.50 which was deposited by private respondents with the barangay secretary on March 2, 1995, after deducting P340
for harvesting cost and P760 for labor cost. Thus, petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying that the remaining sum
of P1, 100 be returned to her. In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the Motion and ordered private respondents to
return the amount of P1, 100.10. On appeal, CA ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay
petitioner the amount of P1, 100 because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship; the matter fell within the
jurisdiction of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the award of the civil liability in this case is agrarian in nature

Held:
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

An agrarian dispute existed between the parties. First, the subject of the dispute between them was the taking of coconuts from
the property owned by petitioner. Second, private respondents were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the
coconuts. A tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting of the agricultural products, as shown by the
several remittances made by private respondents to petitioner. These are substantiated by receipts. In any event, their being overseers
does not foreclose their being also tenants.

Alita v CA

Facts:

Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands through homestead patent under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents instituted a
complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection
therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained through homestead law. The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for
reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the RTC was
sustained.

Issue:
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP

Held:

Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring
to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice
precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights
over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Daez v CA

Facts:

Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being
cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-
36
 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter
of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but
hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as
for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685
riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR Secretary
reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision of the Office of the President.

Issue:

Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application for retention under RA 6657

Held:

The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for
the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an
application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the
retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that
became final and executory.

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Paris v Alfeche

Facts:

Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully
tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer
under P.D. 27. Petitioner alleged that she owns one of the subject property as original homestead grantee who still owned the same
when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. The Adjudicator a
quo rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner but that decision was reversed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court
rejected the claim of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act are automatically exempted from the operation of land reform

Held:

Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they
continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands from land reform coverage.

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v Secretary of DAR

Facts:

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention
Archie’s Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They
assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as
unconstitutional. they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including
fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and is, therefore void. During the debates of the Constitutional Commission, it shows that the intent of the
constitutional framers is to exclude industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.

Issue:

Whether or not fishponds and prawn ponds are included in the coverage of CARL
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Held:

On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress amending some provisions of RA 6657. The
provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the
foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of
R.A. No. 7881.

Republic v CA

Facts:

Private respondent is the owner of the five parcels of land in issue which have a combined area of approximately 112.0577
hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Rizal. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On
June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to
Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657. On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for
exemption of the land from agrarian reform. Private respondent alleged that the property should be exempted since it is within the
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

residential and forest conservation zones of the town zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued
an Order denying the application for exemption of private respondent. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DAR was reversed.
Petitioner DAR maintains that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax declarations.

Issue:

Whether or not the land classification on tax declarations are conclusive

Held:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in a tax declaration is conclusive and final, nor
would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In
fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for
exemption from CARP.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Facts:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6
hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community.
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December
1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile.
By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases,
respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.
The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the
property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and
above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against
the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area
prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Held:

Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an

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adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v DAR Secretary

Facts:

Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land,
249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985,
Archbishop several petitions for exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986,
issued by the Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena. Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director
contending, inter alia, that they are used for charitable and religious purposes. The appeal was denied by the DAR Secretary. On
appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject lands are exempt from the coverage of CARP

Held:

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Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as the lands are clearly not exempt under the
law. The laws simply speak of the landowner without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the
landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds naked title only or can exercise all the rights of
ownership. Archbishop would have the Court read deeper into the law, to create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657,
and to do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of
landless farmers and farmworkers.

Luz Farms v DAR Secretary

Facts:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11
thereof. Petitioner prayed that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. It argued that Congress in enacting the

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said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.

Issue:

Whether or not lands devoted to livestock and poultry business are included in the coverage of CARL

Held:

From the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated
in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.

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Land Bank v CA

Facts:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to
qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to
expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the
Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise
of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of
Deposit by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

Issue:

Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just compensation

Held:

It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among
the valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can
be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term deposit.
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Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway but the sane was denied. Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use
but the petition was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process

Held:

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to
a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

Sigre v CA

Facts:

Private respondent Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto
Sigre, and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre. It appears that Ernesto Sigre was
private respondent’s tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private
respondent a lease rental of sixteen cavans per crop or thirty-two cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992,
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Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian
Reform’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by
farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. CA declared that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the
formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation.

Issue:

Whether or not PD 27 is unconstitutional

Held:

The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation
is bereft of merit. The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is
not final or conclusive. Clearly from the provisions of the two laws, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the
valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in
order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.

Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary

Facts:
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Program. The contention of the
petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of RA 6657 regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment of just compensation by means of LBP Bonds,
Shares of Stocks in government-owned or controlled corporations, and tax credits.

Issue:

Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is allowed

Held:

It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. However, we do
not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we
deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Agrarian Reform program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost
will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of
billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it
is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. It is assumed that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part
of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation
would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method.

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Land Bank v CA and Jose Pascual

Facts:

Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three parcels of land located in Guttaran, Cagayan. Pursuant to the Land Reform
Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform placed these lands under its Operation
Land Transfer. After receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD regarding the value of just compensation, private respondent
accepted the valuation. However, when the judgment became final and executory, petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation
of PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay thus forcing private respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the PARAD which the latter
issued on 24 December 1992. Still, petitioner LBP declined to comply with the order. Private respondent filed an action for
Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD which the appellate court
granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the LBP can refuse to pay the landowner of the value of just compensation

Held:

Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which bears the approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal
duty to finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD

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through its counsel, Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which became final and executory. As a matter of
fact, petitioner even stated in its Petition that it is willing to pay the value determined by the PARAD provided that the farmer
beneficiaries concur thereto. These facts sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the land. The only thing
that hindered it from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the farmer-beneficiary. But as we have already stated, there is no
need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle, petitioner can now be compelled to perform its legal duty through the issuance of a
writ of mandamus.

Santos v Land Bank

Facts:

The lands of petitioner were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. Regional Trial Court, sitting as an Agrarian Court
rendered judgment fixing the amount of P49, 241,876.00 to be the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands of the
petitioner. A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3, 543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and
bond; thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged, the balance unpaid amounted to P45, 698,805.34 which was ordered by the
Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with RA 6657. Petitioner claimed that the payment of P41, 128,024.81 in Land Bank
Bonds was not acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash or certified check. Initially, the RTC ruled in favour

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of the petitioner but on motion for reconsideration it ruled otherwise and declared that the unpaid balance should be paid in
accordance with RA 6657. On appeal to the CA, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can refuse the LBP Bonds as payment of just compensation

Held:

RA 6657 is clear and leaves no doubt as to its interpretation regarding the manner of payment of just compensation. The
provision allows the landowner to choose the manner of payment from the list provided therein, but since plaintiff had obviously
wanted payment to be made in cash, then the trial court had only to apply Section 18 of R.A. 6657 which provides for the payment of
a percentage thereon in cash and the balance in bond.

Estribillo v DAR

Facts:
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Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings
so that the same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and
approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice
or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the
TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal
to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their
registration.

Issue:

Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance

Held:

After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers
who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection
accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the

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date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.

Vda. De Tangub v CA

Facts:

Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988 an agrarian
case for damages by reason of their unlawful dispossession, as tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and
Eugenia Martil. On August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint declaring that the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform by virtue of Executive Order
No. 229. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court agreed with the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was correct in dismissing the case. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs
as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly
came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

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Quismundo v CA

Facts:

On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial court praying that their
relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended. On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should
allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No.
3844, as amended. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the denial order, invoking as an additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority and by
reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private
respondents filed another motion dated November 9, 1988, for the supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the trial court
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granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA upheld the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

With the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, the regional trial courts were divested
of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft of authority to
act on the same. The allegation of private respondents that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on February 13,
1988 is immaterial since as of either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

Machete v CA

Facts:

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the
RTC against petitioners. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's
landholdings. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter.
They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations; hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell
squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal to the
CA, the ruling of the RTC was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners
to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence
of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

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DARAB v CA

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint with the PARAD, praying that they be maintained in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of a portion of the land in question. Private respondents alleged that they are farmworkers and occupant-tillers of the land
in question and that the portion of the land they were cultivating had been bulldozed at the instance of Federico Balanon and other
individuals acting in behalf of the petitioner BSB Construction. On March 10, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator issued an order
enjoining the BSB Construction and all persons representing it “to cease and desist from undertaking any further bulldozing and
development activities on the property under litigation or from committing such other acts tending to disturb the status quo.” On
March 12, 1993 petitioners filed a complaint with the DARAB in which they sought the nullification of the restraining order issued by
the PARAD. On May 6, 1993, the DARAB issued a status quo order. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court declared that the
DARAB has no jurisdiction to issue SQO.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB can take cognizance of a pending case under PARAD

Held:

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All actions pursued under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR, in accordance with Section 50 of RA 6657, must be
commenced in the PARAD of the province where the property is located and that the DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to
review the PARAD’s orders, decisions and other dispositions. Consequently, the DARAB was not possessed of jurisdiction to take
cognizance, in the first instance, of the BEA Case. Neither may the DARAB now claim that it issued the SQO in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, since it recognized, as an original complaint, the BEA Case.

Celendro v CA

Facts:

Private respondent is the surviving spouse of the late Florencio Guevarra, an awardee under the Homestead Law. Petitioner
occupied and tilled two hectares of private respondent’s property through the latter’s tolerance, with the express condition that if and
when that portion of the land should be needed by private respondent, the latter needed only to demand its return. When the private
respondent started to demand, the petitioner requested for extension until finally the former wrote a formal letter of demand. When
said demand remained unheeded, a case for unlawful detainer was commenced by private respondent before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Wao, Lanao del Sur against petitioner. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the private respondent. On appeal
to the RTC, the decision was affirmed. Upon learning of the issuance of a writ of execution, petitioner filed a Petition to Quiet Title

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before the Provincial Adjudication Board which office rendered a decision granting the petition. Private respondent appealed to the
DARAB but the decision was affirmed. When private respondent went to the CA, the decision of DARAB was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court can be reversed by the DARAB

Held:

Petitioner cannot question before an administrative body the final decision of the MCTC or the RTC. A final judgment can no
longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any
other official, branch or department of Government. This particular injunction against administrative bodies is based on the principle
of separation of powers, which presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. The DARAB,
which is under the Department of Agrarian Reform in the executive branch, must accord due respect to the MCTC and the RTC,
which are both instrumentalities of the judiciary.

Centeno v Centeno

Facts:

The parcels of land owned by private respondent were the subject of an earlier case filed by respondent against petitioners
before the DAR for cancellation of certificates of land transfer. In said case, it was established that petitioners, through fraud and
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misrepresentation, obtained CLTs in their names. The DAR issued an order directing the recall and cancellation of petitioners' CLTs.
The aforesaid order was affirmed by the Office of the President in its decision dated July 8, 1987, which had become final and
executory. Despite the decision of DAR, petitioners have interfered with and prevented respondent from exercising acts of possession
over the landholdings earlier adjudicated to her. This prompted the private respondent to file a complaint with the DARAB for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and Damages. A decision
was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator in favour of the respondent which was affirmed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the
same was affirmed. Petitioners are contending that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-
shoot of the suit for cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners before
the DARAB. That previous case culminated in a decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of the subject landholdings
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Since the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case
for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favour of herein respondent, the Court believes and so hold that the DAR continues to
have jurisdiction over the same.

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Ocho v Calos

Facts:

Respondents, all surnamed Calos, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudicator entitled
“Annulment of Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery of Possession
and Ownership” against petitioner Ocho and other farmer-beneficiaries on the ground that the original farmer-beneficiaries unlawfully
conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them to third persons. The Caloses also posited that the subject land was
beyond the coverage of the agrarian reform law as the same was covered by a homestead patent. The Provincial Adjudicator rendered
a decision in favour of the respondents. When the case was elevated to the DARAB, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was
reversed. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DARAB was substantially affirmed except that the appellate court declared that
petitioner and Vicente Polinar are not qualified beneficiaries as they are already owners of other agricultural lands. Petitioner
contended that the claim of the Caloses that he is owner of three parcels of land which matter was already determined and decided
with finality in the Resolution of DAR cannot be subject to review by any court.

Issue:

Whether or not the findings of DAR regarding qualification of petitioner constitute res judicata

Held:

Yes. There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands had already been passed
upon by the proper quasi-judicial authority. Said decision became final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof

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after their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is
the owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.

Gonzales v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform directing her
to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said
bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55, 690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land. On December
20, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to
restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction,
alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans
and the valuation of her land. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and dismissing
the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies

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Held:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. The proper procedure which the petitioner
should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its
executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not
only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings
will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has
yet another forum available, the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or
determination of just compensation. Moreover, the petitioner has not obtained any exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.

Cabral v CA

Facts:

On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the BARC for the cancellation of the Emancipation
Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favour of private respondents. The patents and titles covered portions of the property owned and
registered in the name of petitioner. On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an order dismissing the petition for
cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated July 11,

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1990. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director and claiming denial of due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to decide on the petition

Held:

The DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case. It is amply clear from the provisions of CARL and other
pertinent rules that the function of the Regional Office concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the
enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. Thus, the
Regional Director is primarily tasked with implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of the agency,
as well as the agency program in the region. The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the determination of rights and
obligations of the parties.

Tirona v Alejo
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Facts:

On March 25, 1996, petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuñez before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela for
ejectment. Petitioners claimed to be owners of various fishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela. They alleged, among others that
on January 20, 1996, private respondent Nuñez, “by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfully entered the said fishpond lots and
occupied the same” against their will, thereby depriving them of possession of said fishponds. Private respondent raised the defense
that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners’ failure to allege prior physical possession in their complaint. The
MeTC rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner but in the case of Ignacio the MeTC, the trial court declared otherwise. The two
cases were decided jointly in the RTC where the MeTC’s declaration regarding the prejudicial question was affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule is no different in actions for ejectment.
All that is alleged in the complaint was unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to
petitioners’ actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire
jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no
jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.

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Calvo v Vergara

Facts:

On October 21, 1972, the lots of Milagros Lebumfacil were placed under the Operation Land Transfer program of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Presidential Decree No. 27, which deemed the tenant-farmers as owners of the land they till. Due to
poor health and senility of the prospective farmer-beneficiaries Baguio and Apan, they waived their rights over the said lots.
Consequently, the DAR awarded the lots to the Vergara spouses and to the Basalo spouses. Despite the coverage under the OLT
program of the parcels of land, Lebumfacil still sold them on to petitioner spouses Benny and Jovita Calvo. Subsequently, on October
2, 1991, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Toledo City a complaint for illegal detainer against private respondents
praying for their eviction from their homelots. As the dispute was agrarian in nature, the MTC forwarded the case to the PARAD
which declared that the coverage of the subject land under Operation Land Transfer as valid and legal. Petitioners appealed to the
DARAB which affirmed the above decision with modification. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DARAB was affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are tenant-farmers and are thus qualified as reallocates

Held:

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Being a question of fact, it is beyond the office of this court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, where only questions of law may be raised. Petitioners, in raising the above issue, is in effect questioning the factual findings of
the DARAB, contrary to the doctrine that findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

Nuesa v CA

Facts:

On May 25, 1972, an Order of Award was issued in favour of Jose Verdillo over two parcels of agricultural land of the
Buenavista Estate with the conditions that within a period of six months from receipt of a copy, the awardee shall personally cultivate
or otherwise develop at least one-fourth of the area or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the
first installment. On August 26, 1993 private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions. Petitioner filed a letter of protest against
private respondent claiming it is him who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. On January 24, 1994,
petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order cancelling the award to private respondent.
Respondent sought relief to the Provincial Adjudicator which reversed the decision of the Regional Director. On appeal to the

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DARAB, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was affirmed. The Petition for Review filed by herein petitioners with the Court
of Appeals was denied due course and ordered dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB can take cognizance of the case

Held:

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the
administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the case. In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the definition of agrarian dispute.
Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s
petition in the first place.

Sarne v Maquiling

Facts:

On February 17, 1998, private respondents filed a complaint for redemption and damages against petitioners before the Office
of the Provincial Adjudicator, Dumaguete City. In their complaint, they alleged that as tenants of the subject parcel of land, they have
the right of pre-emption and redemption pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 3844 otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian

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Reform. The Adjudicator ruled in favour of the respondents. Petitioners alleged that the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction because the
land in question was not under the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the
Philippines. On appeal to the CA, the jurisdiction of DARAB was upheld.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

It is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in this case is anchored on Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule II of the DARAB New
Rules of Procedure covering agrarian disputes involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. There is nothing in the provision from which it can be
inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of DAR and
LBP. We should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.

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DAR v Abdulwahid

Facts:

On December 28, 2000, Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844 as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for
the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc., the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines. DAR filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that Yupangco’s causes of action were not within the jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA,
the appellate court sustained the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The complaint in the petition at bar seeks for the RTC to cancel Certificates of Land Ownership Awards issued to the
beneficiaries and the Transfer Certificates of Title issued pursuant thereto. These are reliefs which the RTC cannot grant, since the
complaint essentially prays for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed property within the CARP, which is but an incident
involving the implementation of the CARP. These are matters relating to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord
to agrarian reform beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties

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are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and
resolved by the DARAB.

Philippine Veterans Bank v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The lands were taken by the DAR for
distribution to landless farmers pursuant to R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank
of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property with the
RTC which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can still appeal after the 15-day period for filing appeals

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Held:

Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that “the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.” The petition
in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial
court correctly dismissed the case.

Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula Inc. v CA

Facts:

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

The members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants on the two parcels of land formerly
owned by Macario Aro. When Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., the members of petitioner were
evicted. The parcels of land were later leased to the spouses, Ruben Rodriguez and Gloria Bugagao and were then developed into a
sugarcane plantation, with private respondents as the regular farmworkers. The same property was acquired by the Philippine National
Bank at a Sheriff’s auction sale. The ownership of subject parcels of land was later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust which
conveyed the same to the Republic of the Philippines. On March 26, 1991, in furtherance of its objective of instituting agrarian reform
in the country, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership for the said parcels of land in favour of the petitioner. Private
respondents filed a petition for certiorari on CA which ordered the respondent DAR to conduct a hearing, with due notice to the herein
petitioners, to determine the rightful beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land in accordance with R.A. No. 6657.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals

Held:

Time and again, the Court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
unnecessary. Records show that the letter which was supposed to be the notice to the private respondents regarding the inclusion of
subject properties in the CARP was ineffective. There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subject
parcels of land. In such hearings, the private respondents, who were deprived of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should
participate.

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Greenfield Realty Corporation v Cardama

Facts:

Private respondents filed with the Provincial Adjudicator of Sta. Cruz, Laguna against Independent Realty Corporation, among
others. Respondents claimed to have already been issued their respective Certificates of Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27 which took effect on October 21, 1972, thus subject landholdings can no longer be covered by the CARP law. Respondents
also claimed to have succeeded their father who died on January 9, 1989 in the latter’s tenancy rights, and should be declared now as
leasehold tenants and actual tillers of the subject irrigated riceland. Judgment was rendered in favour of the private respondents by the
Provincial Adjudicator. On appeal to the DARAB, it was declared that the respondents are not bona fide tenant of the subject property.
When the case was brought to the CA, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was reinstated.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the DARAB is based on substantial evidence and thus should become final and conclusive upon the
court

Held:

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Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Even if
we consider that the evidence presented is relevant, they are not adequate to support the conclusion reached by the DARAB. On the
other hand, the records of the case are replete with relevant evidences which are adequate to support the conclusion that Hermogenes
Cardama is the bona fide tenant of the subject property. Thus, the evidences on which DARAB based its decision are not relevant and
adequate to support its conclusion.

Bernarte v CA

Facts:

On October 5, 1989, Estrella Arastia filed a complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of RA 6657 before the RTC in its
capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. The complaint alleged that petitioners illegally intruded into the land of Arastia, burned the
existing sugarcane plants and started to cultivate small portions thereof. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction as it was the DARAB, pursuant to Section 50 of RA 6657, which had jurisdiction over
the case. The motion was dismissed by the RTC. Meanwhile a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Arastia from preventing their
re-entry and re-occupation of the landholdings pending the resolution of the case was also obtained by petitioners from DARAB.
When the petitioners were arrested by the police officers for their refusal to leave the property, and was thereafter criminally charged,
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they asserted that the preliminary injunction obtained by them in the DARAB was the one valid since the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint. Petitioner’s raising the issue of
jurisdiction in their answer to the complaint did not automatically divest the lower court of jurisdiction over agrarian case filed by
Arastia. The court had to continue exercising authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case. It should be pointed out that in filing the case, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting petitioners from the land
on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between them. However, her invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657
which considers as a prohibited act “forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to
avail themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program,” obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian
Case No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court.

Land Bank v De Leon

Facts:

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Respondent spouses Arlene and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just compensation of a parcel of land before the
RTC of Tarlac acting as a Special Agrarian Court. On December 19, 1997, the agrarian court rendered summary judgment fixing the
compensation of the subject property. The DAR and LBP both filed separate appeals using different modes. DAR filed a petition for
review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal. The appeal by the DAR was given due course, while that
of the LBP was dismissed on the ground that LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not an ordinary appeal was the proper mode to appeal the decision of the RTC regarding just compensation

Held:

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for
availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on a ruling of the CA regarding the same issue, LBP acted on
the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. While the
Court holds that petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, and such is a rule of
procedure which affects substantive rights, it should not be applied to the case of LBP since this case was still pending when said
doctrine was decreed.

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Laurel vs. Garcia

Facts:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,
1990 or the Roppongi property acquired by the Government from Japan. Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one
of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. He states that being one of public dominion, no
ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State. Hence, it cannot be appropriated, as it is outside the commerce of man.
The respondents refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property has ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over
thirteen years now and because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts, one of which is the enactment by the Congress RA 6657 which contains a provision stating that funds may
be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries

Issue:

Whether or not the Roponggi property can be alienated and sold for funding purposes of the CARP in accordance with Section 63[C]
of RA6657?

Held:
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No. Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of
the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified
as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and
not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the
Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.

Rovillos v CA

Facts:

Sometime in 1971, petitioner's predecessor started tilling and cultivating a portion of private respondent's land under a share-
crop agreement. On December 30, 1979, petitioner and the private respondent entered into a contract which stipulated that the former
was to be contracted as a farm laborer or helper responsible for the cultivation of two hectares of the four hectare land. When
petitioner no longer cultivated the land in question in his capacity as a farm laborer but as a tenant, with the corresponding right to
exclude the private respondent from the land, private respondent demanded from the petitioner to desist from further cultivation of the
said land. These demands proved futile. Private respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner for Recovery of Possession
with Damages with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On February 20, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision
finding that petitioner was not a tenant but a mere farm helper or laborer of the private respondent. The decision of the RTC was
affirmed by CA.

Issue:

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Whether or not RA 6657 has repealed the provisions of PD 27

Held:

The Supreme Court pointed out that the land in question is covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, which, incidentally has not
yet been repealed by Republic Act No. 6657. The provisions of PD 27 shall have a suppletory effect.

Reyes v Reyes

Facts:

On April 22, 1991, Dionisia Reyes filed a complaint for reinstatement with DARAB against private respondents, her four
younger brothers. She alleged that her father, the late Felizardo Reyes, was the tenant of a two-hectare agricultural lot owned by
Marciano Castro. After her father’s death, she and Marciano Castro executed a leasehold contract naming her as the agricultural lessee
of the property. However, sometime before the start of the planting of the dry season crop in 1989, respondents forcibly entered the
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area and occupied a one-hectare portion of the property. They claimed to be the tenants thereof. Respondents then paid rent to the
Castros’ overseer and continued to occupy half of the property to petitioner’s damage and prejudice. Respondents denied Dionisia’s
claim that she was the bona fide leasehold tenant. They claimed that they inherited the lease rights to the property from their deceased
father. They likewise averred that they were the ones actually cultivating the portion occupied by them. Hence, petitioner’s claim to be
the lawful agricultural lessee had no basis, either in fact or in law.

Issues:

Whether or not the RA 6657 has suppletory character with that of RA 3844 insofar as the determination of leasehold agreement is
concern?

Held:

The present dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No. 3844, which, except for Section 35
thereof, was not specifically repealed by the passage of the R.A. No. 6657, but was intended to have suppletory effect to the latter law.
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in
accordance with Section 4 of the said act or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply
means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The
other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. In the instant case, it is not disputed that an
agricultural leasehold contract was entered into between petitioner and Ramon Castro.

RAFAEL GELOS
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-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162
SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER RELATIONSHIP, DISTINGUISHED

1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services
and the farm employer as the lessee thereof;

2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land;

3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a salary or wage regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit; and

4. the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.

The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;

2. the subject is agricultural land;

3. the purpose is agricultural production; and

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4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.

In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as
a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247).

YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214

CONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained

R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and
capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm
family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and
reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.

The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of
land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-
size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to
provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.

TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept
some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of

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sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements,
provided there are complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; All requisites must concur

The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept
some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500 square meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Not shown by sharing of harvest

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationships. Certainly it is not unusual for landowner to
accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait
of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specifically when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, sq. meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:

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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;

2. the subject is agricultural land;

3. the purpose is agricultural production; and

4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.

In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as
a de jure tenant.

HILARIO
-versus-
IAC
148 SCRA 573

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites

Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:

1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. the subject is agricultural land;

3. the purpose is agricultural production; and

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4. there is consideration. It is also understood that

5. there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that

6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvests.

Fact that respondent was giving the landowners 20 cavans of palay every harvest not sufficient basis for formation of landlord tenant
relationship where the landowners never intended to devote part of their metropolitan property to agriculture.

The land in question was purchased at a foreclosure proceeding as "residential" and tax assessments show that it is "residential", not
agricultural.

A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession of the subject property.

Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land.

SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009

Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a
housing complex for PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per square
meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution
authorizing the purchase of the subject property at P4.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a
Petition seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of disturbance compensation. The voluntary
surrender was approved and the tenancy relation was extinguished on the date they entered into the agreement. A Deed of Sale with
Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of the land to
residential purposes were prepared. TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered. However, due to financial distress,
PASUDECO did not complete the construction. For the meantime, though, it did not authorize any person to occupy the landholding.

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Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect
lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, C. Almario remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that
petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with the LBP.

The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the property into a housing project for its
employees in the latter part of April 1990. In May 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before
the PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings. Petitioners together with armed
men, entered the property and destroyed some of their crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses
the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property.

1. TENANCY — ESTABLISHMENT
Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481-482:

Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law
in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied.

By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy
relations into leasehold relations. The other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing.

2. IMPLIED TENANCY
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without opposition, does not mean that
PASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will
not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant,because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is
intent.

3. ELEMENT OF TENANCY — CONSENT

Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51, 63 and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829,
February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA 234, citing Lastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the
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property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true
and lawful landholder. cCaSHA

4. ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION — NOT DETERMINATIVE OF TENANCY

Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon, G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August
28, 2008:

Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING — SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 690-691:

Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must
be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any
other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.

6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS — NOT BINDING UPON JUDICIARY

Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571-572:

The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the certification
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC, concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or
provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.

SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL.

-versus-

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COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI

Promulgated: October 23, 1992
G.R. No. 88113

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Requires consent

It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true and lawful owner is absent. But
this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her
will or permission to work on the farm land.

This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals where this court further held that the agricultural lessee's rights are
enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor-in-interest.

Whatever was the true nature of his designation, Benigno, was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and the law expressly
grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally
possessed.

VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Facts:

 Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City,
Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397 hectares
under Homestead Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease agreement with a certain Glicerio

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Henson. And later, into a five-year civil law lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to a prohibition
against subleasing or encumbering and against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent.
 Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others together with the
Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve became recipients of CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements,
Valencia demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to gain possession of his
landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to be his overseer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the
property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the
respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail.
 However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profit sharing agreement. No other
respondent entered into any kind of agreement with the petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of the
protest, an administrative investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to 1983, it was only Bautista
who received the shares in the produce. Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista refused to issue a receipt for such.
Valencia did not receive a single cavan for the said years. to aggravate matters, some of the respondents have even subleased
their properties despite the pending protest of Valencia. While all this was transpiring, Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into
a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279 hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137.
 Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maintained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to appeal to the
Office of the President. However, the Order was affirmed with the modification that the Homestead be excluded from the
coverage of P.D. No. 27.
 Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

 Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to do so under
Article 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case?

Held:

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 A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is
provided by the minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119).
 When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes
that there is already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The
epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a
leasehold tenant on the land; not until then.

xxx xxx xxx

 From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the
property under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee,
although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition
exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees whose rights
terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement.

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition

Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of
the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is
automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil
law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself.
This tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to
the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he
can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
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RETENTION; Homestead Grantees

With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct descendants," the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law allows landowners whose lands have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them
provided the original homestead grantees who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the homestead. [50] The right to choose the area to be retained, which
shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule. [51] However, the factual determination of whether
Valencia and his "direct descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit provided by
Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise of the administrative agency concerned.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations
could not establish the claimed relationship. [43] The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in
order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element
of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. [46]

In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson, and subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores,
partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a
finding of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on
file which contained in clear and precise terms the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without
the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating for the record that such stipulation barring the
subletting of the property was violated by Fr. Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.

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TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites

The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: [36] (a) the parties being landowner and
tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural
tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically
give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. [38]

A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. Hence, a perusal of the records and
documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does
exist between petitioner and private respondents.

The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important.

TANPINGCO VS IAC

SYLLABUS

Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-in-interest or against a party which may be bound
by the judgment to be reversed therein. — Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real-
party-interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co.,
Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-interest is one who
stands to be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals,
170 SCRA 800 [1989] citing Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, 165
SCRA 598 [1988]). If the suit is not brought against the real-party-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the

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complaint states no cause of action (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA
652).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party
defendant. — We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals
(198 SCRA 300 [1991], a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law. — Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to
the land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. — As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439
[1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law
explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of
the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However,
the donation itself is valid (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the
petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance
compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. — Considering that the tenant in the case at bar
is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in question, the
real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner
cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the

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disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for
payment of disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. — In view of the foregoing,
we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having arrived at this conclusion, we do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the other errors assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals
(190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his
disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to for it (ESPIRIDION
TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).

POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425

GRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing Agricultural Leasehold

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations,
must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be
presumed, much less determined by mere implication.

Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security
of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844.

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TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites

Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:

1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. the subject is agricultural land;

3. the purpose is agricultural production; and

4. there is consideration. It is also understood that

5. there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that

6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvests.

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing Agricultural Leasehold

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations,
must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be
presumed, much less determined by mere implication.

Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security
of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844.

ANICETO M. QUIÑO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599

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RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Full Amount of the Redemption Price

It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the
buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an
offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase
immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary
prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic
uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's
ability to pay at the proper time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by
him falls short of the requirement of the law and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against him.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Redemption Price

An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court
coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed however that in making a
repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention
must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to
repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held
ineffectual. As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent
Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Purpose of Written Notice

The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quite
any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying he redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for
redemption will start running. The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the
terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of
the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic document
on 02 March 1987. the amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180)
days.
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Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997
278 SCRA 820

The policy of social justice, we reiterate, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as we said in Galay et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. "is an imperative of every
humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege."
It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary.

Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express
terms.

A mere member of a tenant's immediate farm household is not entitled to a home lot.

RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO
-versus-
ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
Promulgated: February 2, 2000
Adm. Case No. 3808

LEGAL ETHICS; Remission of duty as a lawyer

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Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to
allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB), thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciated of facts.

Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses
only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership. Yet respondents dares raised the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any
lawyer would know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the fact of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same
parcel of land.

Facts:

 Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Respondent was one of the squatters
living in one of the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the
squatters, the latter refused and instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
claiming to be tenants therein.
 Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for
the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time, claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land.
They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.
 Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a case against respondent
accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be
imposed against the latter.

Held:

 After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the former are as follows:

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". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total inconsistency, nay, total opposition
with each other which raises doubts about the respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how
Respondent can, in good faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.

Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He
failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus
deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts.

Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence
of land ownership. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of
title. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title
over the same parcel of land."

 The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by evidence on record.
 Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all
probability, he knew not to be his.
 As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is
a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the
court will not tolerate.

BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versus-
PATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
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CERTIFICATIONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above,
DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In
Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant
are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.

The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Facts:

 In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land owned by Gregorio
Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta,
successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments
against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance
of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
 Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged to Consuelo A. de
Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and
ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The
land also does not fall under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the
presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises.

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However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint
for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
filed by the plaintiff.
 The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed
the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal.
 Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio Araneta II whom he has known
and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino
Tocio. Petitioner, likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding

Held:

 The Appeal lacks merit.

 "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove that the landowner made him his
tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do
not disclose how and why he became a tenant."
 In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and
Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of
the true and lawful landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act
No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. . . . To rule
otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful
landholder."
 Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed
above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed
landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings
specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.
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Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:

 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
 Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine
raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the
end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently
receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:
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 Said provisions are unconstitutional.

 The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
 Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa
kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no
reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Association Of Small Landowners Vs. Secretary Of DAR Case Digest

Asso. Of Small Landowners Vs. Sec. Of DAR 175 SCRA 343

G.R. No. L-78742

July 14, 1989

Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:

a.

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A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare
Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.

b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental aga

inst Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the
physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

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Vinzons-Magana vs. Minister of Agrarian Reform (1991)

FACTS
MAGANA owned a parcel of riceland in Talisay, Camarines Norte, which was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan (PAITAN). On
Oct 20, 1977, MAGANA filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2)
inability and failure of PAITAN to till and cultivate the riceland due to illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties.
This petition was referred by the presiding judge of the Court of Agrarian Reform to the DAR, which failed to act upon the request for
more than 3 years. Instead, on July 10, 1980, the property was placed under the Land Transfer Program by Memorandum Circular 11
(1978) which implement LOI 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners
who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas, as being covered under the Land Transfer Program. A
Certificate of Land Transfer was awarded to PAITAN, who no longer paid Magana the rentals and instead deposited them with the
Land Bank, which were credited as amortization payments for the riceland. MAGANA now assails the constitutionality of MC11 and
LOI 474, claiming that

the issuance of CLT to PAITAN without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof
before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due
process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON the said issuances are UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD NO.
The validity of LOI 474 has already been recognized by the court in previous cases. LOI 474 is neither class legislation, nor does it
deprive a person of property without due process of law or just compensation As to MC11, it is an elementary rule in administrative
law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect. As previously held by the court, the taking of private property under
the CARP Law is constitutional. The government merely exercises its police power in prescribing retention limits and, the taking
under the power of eminent domain just requires the payment of just compensation. The determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the COURTS. NOTE: Mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee
ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the
party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under PD27.
This recognition is neither permanent nor irrevocable. The failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to
pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor
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is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. It is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles the
farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding
—
a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to
compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding. The landowner
and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. Such
determination of just compensation by the DAR is NOT final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party for
Section 16 (f) clearly provides: "Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation." Magana is not without protection. Should she fail to agree on the price of her land as fixed
by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his
lease

rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer.

GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CAFACTS:
Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito
Asiatic,Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into twoparcels

LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into aresidential and industrial estate

CAI embarked on the development of the housing project intothree phases and secured a locational clearance for the projectfrom the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC

CAI decided to continue with the development of its HakoneHousing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction

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The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements withthe respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their
farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendantordered the bulldozing of the property

In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffsto possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals
Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into acompromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs
entering into an agreement with CAI

CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverageunder Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as theComprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed beforethe DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they arefarmers who have
occupied a parcel of public agricultural landadjacent to Pasong Bayabas River

According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activitieswould convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural
land,thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancyrights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayedthat a
temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop thebulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or astatus quo
order be later issued to enjoin the same

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTSUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-
2010)Marianne Cabacungan8

1.
Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. ActNo. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
2.
whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the privaterespondent;
3.
whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession andcultivation of
the property in suit;
4.
whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil CaseNo. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-members
of the PBFAI; and
5.
whether the appellate court committed a reversible error indismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
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HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit.

Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But longbefore the law took effect, the property subject of the suit hadalready
been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.

With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classifiedas residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original
andappellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of thepetitioner PBFAI and its members.

Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenantsof the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its membershad no
cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof andfor damages.

When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separatedeeds
of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over theportions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from
the private respondent CAI varied sums of money.In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAIthereby waived
their respective claims over the property. Hence,they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of thesame.

Petition denied.

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Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR

FACTS:

 Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
 On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of
Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.
 EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the
requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
 On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
 DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which
consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
 Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
 Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC
before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.
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 DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.
 Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further
proceedings
 Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither
respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
 Hence, this petition.
 Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved
by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.
 OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed
with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP

HELD:

 NO.
 Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are
"arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

THIRD DIVISION

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[G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]

JOSE, JULIO and FEDERICO, All Surnamed JUNIO, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, in His Capacity as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 -- the date of effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) -- are outside the coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion
clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 24, 2000
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-GR SP No. 37217. The Decision denied petitioners Petition for Certiorari[3] for its
failure to show that the DAR had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its
Exemption Order dated September 13, 1994. The Order, issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, had excluded Lot 835-B
from the coverage of Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

In its Resolution dated April 4, 2001, this Court (through the Second Division) immediately denied the Petition for failure of
petitioners (1) to attach the duplicate original/certified true copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision; and (2) to state the dates of their receipt and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision.

In their Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the April 4, 2001 Resolution, petitioners alleged that they had received the assailed CA
Decision on March 8, 2000 and filed their Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2000. They likewise submitted a duplicate
original of the February 2, 2001 CA Resolution,[5] which had denied that Motion.

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On January 22, 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation.[6] It stated that in a clarificatory letter dated July 30, 1997,[7] Salvador S.
Malibong, the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City, completely reversed the false Certification he had issued earlier. That
Certification had been the basis of the DAR secretarys assailed Exemption Order.

On February 18, 2002, public respondent submitted its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. They in turn
submitted their Reply to the Comment on June 14, 2002, in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated April 10, 2002. In its
Resolution dated August 13, 2003, the Court (Second Division) resolved to grant their Motion for Reconsideration and to require the
solicitor general to comment on the Petition within ten days from notice.

On October 9, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG stated that its
Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on February 18, 2002, had fully addressed the issues presented in
their Petition for Review. On November 12, 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within thirty days from notice. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the First Division, and
finally to the Third, which will now resolve the controversy.

The Facts

The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:

In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] by
complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners), identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC [Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991 x x x, it is prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against
the registered owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of
Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622. Petitioners claim that x x x
Sta. Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling the
subject property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision; that as prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in
question, being former laborers, actual occupants and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their rights will be prejudiced by
the illegal conversion of the land into a residential subdivision x x x.

On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to [Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for appropriate action x x x. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary
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of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September 13, 1994 in RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM
CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by Atty. Angel
Lobaton, Jr., Petitioners, portions of which read as follows:

After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the parties, this Office finds the petition for exemption to
be well founded. Under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that lands which has already been classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from CARP coverage. To this, it is an
[i]nescapable conclusion that the subject property is exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the same was classified
as residential as evidenced by the Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as per Certification dated
June 22, 1994 issued by the said Commission. The Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9, 1994
stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the service area of the irrigation system in the locality. In effect the said
application had conformed to the requirements of the law on exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr. Espanola that the portion,
which he planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by CARP[,] is beyond recognition as the program does not
apply to those which are already classified as residential lands prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it is
confined only to agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated definition, it is
beyond reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and factual basis.[8]

As earlier said, the Exemption Order was challenged before the appellate court via a Petition for Certiorari.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. It found that prior to June 15, 1988, Lot 835-B had
been reclassified from agricultural to residential land. It relied on the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of
Agrarian Reform[9] that lands were outside the coverage of the CARL if they had been converted to non-agricultural uses by
government agencies, other than the DAR, prior to the effectivity of that law.

Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991 had nullified the reclassification of Lot 835-B.
The appellate court noted that the land had been validly reclassified from agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the effective date

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of both laws. It added that neither of those two laws could be applied retroactively, since they contained no provision authorizing their
retroactivity.

Hence, this Petition.[10]

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this lone issue for our consideration:

Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to exclude or exempt at will from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) the subject agricultural land which was already automatically covered by the
CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity on June 15, 1988 without affording due process to herein petitioners and without the necessity
of Congress having first to amend Section 4 of the said law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from CARP coverage.[11]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue:
Coverage

Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

xxxxxxxxx

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(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1990,[12] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses,
issued pursuant to Section 49 of CARL, which we quote:

x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis supplied)

Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was addressed to then DAR Secretary
Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of
lands was not exclusively done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies; namely, the Department
of Local Governments and Community Development, the Human Settlements Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary
Franklin M. Drilon explained the coordination in this wise:

x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 6389,[16] an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed
of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes.[17]

Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued to give teeth to the implementation of
the agrarian reform program decreed in P.D. No. 27, the DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands,
specifically those planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or to non-agricultural uses, subject to studies on zoning of the
Human Settlements Commissions (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was, x x x recognized and
reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) and
the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two agencies on

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May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to any
particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.

It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority to review and ratify land use
plans and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI
No. 729 [1978]). This was followed by [E.O.] No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(the predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use
control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments, subdivision or estate
development projects of both the public and private sector and urban renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review,
evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and
infrastructure projects, of national, regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects
including industrial estates.

Hence, the justice secretary opined that the authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
could be exercised only from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988.

Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994,[18]
stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of
Republic Act 6657. Designed to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the AO provided
guidelines and procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances.

Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12,[19] Series of 1994, entitled Consolidated and Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses. It provided that the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO
No. 6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs);
and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had
the ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose lands were covered by
DOJ Opinion No. 44.

Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reform,[20] which had earlier held
that lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL
were outside the coverage of that law. Our ruling in Natalia was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite
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reservations, but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL,[21] provided the
conversion was made by government agencies other than the DAR -- like the HLURB and its predecessor, the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC).[22]

The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of Appeals,[23] which affirmed the
authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to reclassify the property in question from
agricultural to residential, as approved by the HSRC (now the HLURB). The Court held that Section 3 of RA 2264,[24] amending the
Local Government Code, specifically empowered municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the National Planning
Commission, to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Hence, the power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural was not subject to the approval of the DAR.[25]

It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like those approved by the
HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, the DARs clearance is no longer necessary for conversion.

The next question before us is whether the subject landholding was in fact reclassified as residential before June 15, 1988, the date of
effectivity of the CARL. The Exemption Order of the DAR secretary pointed out that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as
residential under Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod. This reclassification was later affirmed by the HSRC.

The courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.[26] It must be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies the
power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL.

According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP must be accompanied by a certification
from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to June 15, 1988 (the date of effectivity of
the CARL). In the instant case, the landowner did file an accompanying Certification from the HLURB.

The Certification issued by the Board expressly mentioned that the property x x x, Lot 835-B located at Brgy. Tangub, Bacolod City,
covered by TCT T-79622, x x x was identified for residential use under the 1976 Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod prepared
pursuant to the Program of the then Ministry of Local Government and approved by the City Council in its Resolution No. 5153-A,
Series of 1976.[27] It also certified that the area where the aforecited property is located was likewise identified for residential use

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under the Town Planning, Housing Zoning Program of the National Coordinating Council of the then Ministry of Human Settlements
as approved under the City Council Resolution No. 5792, Series of 1977. x x x.[28]

These Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance. Petitioners did not present any evidence to overcome that
presumption.[29] The letter of the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City -- cited by petitioners to contradict the
Certifications -- did not touch on, much less corroborate, their claim that the subject landholding remained classified as agricultural. It
merely restated what was already provided in the law -- that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands.

Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the subject property was declared by its owners as agricultural land since time
immemorial until at least 1994.[30] It is settled, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for
zoning purposes.[31] It may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes, but it may well be within
a commercial zone.[32] In the determination of the nature of a piece of property, a discrepancy would thus exist between its
classification for real estate taxation purposes vis--vis that for zoning purposes.

Under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor to identify a property for assessment levels,[33]
not to bind a provincial/city assessor. Under Section 220 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual
use, regardless of any previous assessment or taxpayers valuation thereon which, in turn, is based on a taxpayer's declaration.

Republic v. Court of Appeals[34] ruled thus:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor
would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In
fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for
exemption from CARP. In Halili v. Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the
Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.

Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation purposes, once a local government has
reclassified it as residential, that determination must prevail for zoning purposes.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

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SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990

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CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE PACITA, MATTHEW and ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA,
respondents.

Emilio G. Garcia for petitioners.

CORTES, J.:

On January 17, 1978, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for
expropriation of a parcel of land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by private respondents herein as evidenced by
TCT No. 24006, issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10]. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 5257-M and entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Turandot Aldaba, et al."

On March 2, 1978, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of the land, upon its
deposit of the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P7,200.00) as provisional value of the land. On June 8, 1978,
petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that
petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order
payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance
compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per hectare.

On December 8, 1978, respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an order denying the petitioners' supplemental motion, holding that
to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the
claim for disturbance compensation is a claim against the State. On January 12, 1979, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied by respondent judge in an order dated February 13, 1979.

On July 23, 1980. the instant petition was filed and was docketed as G.R. No. 54281. On January 14, 1981, this Court issued a
resolution denying the instant petition for lack of merit. On March 10, 1981, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, limiting the
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discussion on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation case. On August 19, 1981, this Court issued a
resolution granting the motion for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition.

Meanwhile on December 22, 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of
appeal, as well as a first motion for extension of thirty (30) days from January 12, 1979 within which to file record on appeal which
was granted by respondent court. The Solicitor General was appealing from that portion of the December 8, 1978 decision of the
Court of First Instance which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter. Counsel for
private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period. On August 13, 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal interposed by the Republic. The Office of
the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, public respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders
of the Court of First Instance. On April 29, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing public respondent's petition. On
October 24, 1980, public respondent filed with this Court a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886, asking this Court to annul the
decision of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate
the same to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to
approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals.

I.

The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of petitioners to intervene in the expropriation proceedings
instituted by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject property.

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements
of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual,
direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer's Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson v. Revilla, supra].

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In the present case, petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest in the matter in litigation for he, not private
respondents herein, is the party entitled to just compensation for the subject property sought to be expropriated or, in the alternative,
disturbance compensation as a bona fide tenant based on Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389.

Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on Certificate of Land Transfer No. NS-054560 issued to them, where the tenant
farmer/grantee is "deemed owner" of the agricultural land identified therein. * Petitioners contend that the certificate is a muniment of
title evidencing their legal ownership of a portion of the subject property. Thus, they conclude that they are entitled to a portion of the
proceeds from the expropriation proceedings instituted over the subject property.

There is no merit to the above contention.

The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But
the import of such phrase must be construed within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with the other
stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree.

Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the fundamental objective of
addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the countryside. More
importantly, it recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive agricultural base of the country's economy. To achieve this
end, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands
they were tilling. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the
minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the government, their lands to qualified farmers at
liberal terms and conditions. However, a careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer
issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the
compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.

A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, declare

that _________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his cultivation and having complied with the
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implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby deemed to be the owner of the
agricultural land described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the tenant farmer as fixed by the authorities
concerned, including the interest rate at the rate of six percentum (6%) per annum shall be paid by the tenant farmer in
fifteen (15) equal annual amortization, that the tenant framer must be a member of a Barrio Association upon
organization of such association in his locality, and that the title to the land herein shall not be transferred except by
hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree Number 27, the
Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 26, Emphasis supplied].

And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27,
full compliance by the grantee with the abovementioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation
Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is
the emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer
Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.

Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein.
The certificate simply evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms
for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent
nor irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization
payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his
certificate of land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].

Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he
acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer
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open to doubt or controversy [See definition of vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic
of the Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with
these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.

In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property
for public use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand,
petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they
have not complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent [See Private
Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 34. And also Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact, petitioners do
not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization
payment for the purchase of the subject property.

Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the
proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.

Anent petitioners' claim for disturbance compensation, the Court finds that the law cited by petitioners, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No.
3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389, cannot be invoked to hold the State liable for disturbance compensation [See Campos v. CA,
G.R. No. 51904, October 1, 1980] where this Court by resolution denied for lack of merit therein petitioner's claim that, as agricultural
lessee or tenant, he was entitled to disturbance compensation against the State. It refers to situations where the peaceful enjoyment and
possession by the agricultural tenants or lessees of the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor thereof. Paragraphs 1 to 7 of
the said section enumerate the instances when the lessees may be evicted by the owner/lessor, and paragraph 1 thereof provides that
lessees shall be entitled to disturbance compensation from the owner/lessor, if the land will be converted by the latter into a residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, deals with the liability of an owner/lessor to
his agricultural tenant/lessee and cannot be invoked to make the State liable to petitioners herein for disturbance compensation.

Nor may petitioners invoke this section as basis to hold private respondents liable for disturbance compensation. Section 36 (1) of Rep.
Act No. 3844, as amended, is applicable only when it is the owner/lessor who voluntarily opts for the conversion of his land into non-
agricultural land. In the present case, it is the State, not the private respondents, who disturbed petitioners' possession of the subject
property. The conversion of the property into a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and
Highways was undertaken by the government independent of the will of private respondents herein.

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Parenthetically, it should be noted that the government has already paid petitioner Celso Pagtalunan approximately FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to compensate the latter for improvements introduced on the property, and expenses for relocating
his home [Petitioners' Reply to the Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2; Rollo, p. 98. And also Private Respondents'
Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 93].

Considering, therefore, that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the expropriation of the subject property, nor to
disturbance compensation under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, the Court finds that the trial court committed no reversible error in
denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene in the expropriation proceedings below.

II.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that since their motion to intervene alleges as justification therefor that petitioner
Celso Pagtalunan is the bona fide tenant of the subject property, the case should have been referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted properties.

The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings in this
case has been rendered moot and academic by B.P. Blg. 129. Under Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, all civil actions and
special proceedings which were then under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly the Courts of First Instance].

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

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DAR vs Delia Sutton

FACTS:

 The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and
calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
 On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
 In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to
the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 DAR ignored their request
 DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of
land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.
 DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of
CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.
 Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being
contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the
government.
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ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD:

 Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
 In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all
lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. UY

G.R. No. 169277 February 9, 2007
FACTS: Dr. Vicente K. Uy, Wellington K. Ong, Jaime Chua, and Daniel Sy, among others, are owners
of a 349.9996-ha parcel of land located in Barangay Camaflora, Barrio of San Andres, Municipality
of San Narciso, Province of Quezon. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 160988.
Sometime in 1993, some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property filed petitions in the

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DAR, seeking to be declared as owners- beneficiaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under
the CARP over the property. For his part, respondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an
Application for Exclusion in the form of a letter, through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
Durante L. Ubeda. To substantiate his request to exclude their landholding from CARP coverage
under the Luz Farms ruling, respondent declared that their property had been exclusively used for
livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15, 1988. The Provincial Task Force on Exclusion
led by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Belen T. Babalcon conducted an ocular
inspection of the property and an actual “headcount” was conducted.
PARO Durante L. Ubeda recommended the exclusion from CARP coverage a total of 219.50 has: 134
has. for cattle-grazing, 28 has. for horse and carabao grazing, 12.5 has. for infrastructure and 45 has.
for retention of nine landowners.
The applicants, through Uy, wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug
requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO Ubeda. Dir. Daludug affirmed the findings of
Ubeda. The applicants then appealed the order to the DAR Secretary. The DAR partially granted the
appeal only with respect with the 219.50 hectares.
The applicants appealed the order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of
Execution. The President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona rendered a
decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit, saying that private agricultural lands or portions
thereof exclusively, directly and actually used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of 15 June
1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of CARP. Corona said By simple reading, it is obvious that
the livestock, poultry and swine, in order to be included in the computation of the area to be
exempted from CARP coverage, should have been existing in the area sought to be exempted at the
time of the effectivity of RA 6657, which is June 15, 1988.
However, on October 5, 1998, then Chief Presidential Legal Adviser Harriet Demetriou submitted
the following Memorandum to the President, advising the latter to exclude the land in question
completely. A second motion for reconsideration was filed and the OP acted upon the said MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OP is empowered to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed
before it.
HELD:
Yes. It is settled that rules of procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in
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proceedings before administrative bodies. Thus, technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial
proceedings are unavailing in cases before administrative bodies. Administrative bodies are not
bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law.
Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only
to help secure and not to override substantial justice.
The SC ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review
any determination or disposition of a department head. In fact, the doctrine requires an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
priorly exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked.

Daez v. CA

Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by the respondent farmers
Soriente et al. The problem arose when the land was subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474. Thus, the land
was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.

On May 31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under duress stating they are not tenants but hired workers. Hence,
Daez apllied for exemption of OLT claiming her land is untenanted and the cancellation of the CLT’s. (not majorly related to the topic)

In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of
agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10)
hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.

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DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:

Denying Eudosia Daez’s application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner
being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.

DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong

Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Disregarded the
affidavit of the farmers under duress.

Court of Appeals

Sustained the decision of both DAR secretaries

Supreme Court

Denied their prayers and sustained the decisions

Main Issue Related to our topic

Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application
for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

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DAR Regional Director

March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied
the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct
management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

DAR Secretary

Affirmed the decision of the regional director. Appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

Office of the President

Ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectare of land. Still denied
the application of the children. Hence the appeal in CA.

Court of Appeals

Reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.

Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land

Held:

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Petitioner Daez has the right to retain the 4.1685 hectare land pursuant to her right of retention under 6657. The decision of the Office
of the President is reinstated.

Ratio:

Read Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657

Paez was denied the right to choose what she wants to retain.

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THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL
SISON, respondents.

Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an order of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had issued certificates of land transfer to
the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of
their shares if they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.

Certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for
their respective areas of cultivation. the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who
ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."

Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case which revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang,
Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently,

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the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had
been issued to the petitioners-tenants. However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the
landholdings be included in the Operation Land Transfer.

Petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer was denied. Motion for reconsideration was denied as well.

After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was issued on September 7, 1988 by Secretary
Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from
the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain
not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and
that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer
because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has the authority to cancel certificates issues?

RULING:

Petitioners’ contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land
Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of
land transfer fall within the Secretary’s administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison
were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary
Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.

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LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. TERESITA V. SALVADOR, RESPONDENT.

Facts: Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140
issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador that
petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest and that despite several verbal
and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.

In their Answer petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband,
Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana
Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce

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with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.

The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court remanded the case to the MTC for
preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties' submission of their respective position papers and other
supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10,
2003. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the
parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship.

ISSUE: WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LAND

RULING:

Agricultural tenancy relationship

does not exist in the instant case.

Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the
affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to
prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was
submitted to show that respondent's predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary.

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Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners' neighbors declaring that
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented
receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between
them and the landowners.

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Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6
hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in
December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the
ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property
under the CARP.

The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the
property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18%
and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled
against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a
watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Ruling:

Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures
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an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of
lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

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Roxas and Co., Inc. v. CA

Facts: Petitioner Roxas and Co. Is a corporation that owns 3 haciendas in Batangas, which the government wishes to acquire under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Law (CARL). Before the effectivity of the law, the petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to EO 229, which served as guidelines to the comprehensive
agrarian program.

The two other haciendas—Banilad and Palico—were placed under compulsory acquisition by the DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Hacienda Banilad and Palico

DAR sent invitations to Roxas and Co in order to discuss the results of the DAR investigation, finding both Banilad and Palico qualified
under the CARP. For Hacienda Palico, DAR sent a letter of acquisition to Roxas and Co at their offices in Manila, while for Hacienda
Banilad, DAR addressed the notices to Jaime Pimintel, caretaker of the said hacienda. It was petitioner Pimintel who attended all the
proceedings regarding the two haciendas. Hence, during trial, Roxas and Co claimed that they were not informed of the acquisition
proceedings on their two haciendas.

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DAR then opened a trust account in favor of petitioner Roxas and Co. These trust accounts were replaced by DAR with cash and
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds. Meanwhile, petitioner Roxas applied for the conversion of the haciendas from agricultural to
non-agricultural. Despite this, DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two haciendas. It then issued and distributed certificate of
land ownership awards (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries.

Hacianda Caylaway

Although Hacienda Caylaway was initially offered for sale to the government, Roxas and Co sent a letter to DAR secretary
withdrawing its offer. According to Roxas, the reclassification of Caylaway from agricultural to non agricultural was authorized by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. Also, the municipality of Nasugbu where the haciendas are located had been declared a tourist
zone. Roxas also argued that the land is not suitable for agricultural purposes.

DAR secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of his VOS. According to the secretary, the withdrawal can only be based on specific
grounds such as unsuitability of soil for agriculture, slope of the lad is over 180 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.

Despite the denial of the withdrawal of the VOS, petitioner still filed an application for conversion with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), which submitted the case to the Secretary of DAR for resolution. The DAR secretary dismissed the case.

Roxas and Co went to the CA on app

eal. CA dismissed appeal claiming that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issues:

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1. WON the court can take cognizance of petitioner’s petition despite failure to exhaust administrative remedies

2. WON acquisition proceedings against the petitioners were valid

3. WON the court can rule on whether the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non agricultural

Ruling:

1. Yes. Petitioner’s action falls under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies sine there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for the petitioners at this point. The CLOAs were already issued despite the fact that
there was no just compensation.

2. Acquisition proceedings against petitioners violated their right to due process. First, there was an improper service of the
Notice of Acquisition. Notices to corporations should be served through their president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors or partners. Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was served, was neither of those. Second, there was no
notice of coverage, meaning, the parcels of land were not properly identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the
law, the land owner has the right to choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving the Notice of Acquisition,
petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisiton. Third, The CLOAs were
issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP
bonds. DAR’s opening of a trust account in petitioner’s name does not constitute payment. Even if later, DAR substituted the
trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the lack of notice, which still amounts to a violation of the
petitioner’s right to due process.

3. Despite all this, the court has not jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non agricultural. DAR’s
failure to observe due process does not give the court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for land
conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of approving applications for land conversion. They have the tools and

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experience needed to evaluate such applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which applications for land use
conversion are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to correct their defects with regard to petitioner’s right to due process.

Petitioner dismissed.

Note: Pertinent section although not mentioned in the case is Sec. 20 of the LGC on power of LGU to reclassify land. However, the
code also provides that the CARL prevails over LGC provisions.

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Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines

Facts:

The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land
located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another
woman.

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When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose
Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.

On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorio’s brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject
property. The decision stated that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that
the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the
intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.

Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the
said program.

However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners.
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform
program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated

Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were
tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by the ascendant of the
petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heir’s due process.

RULING:

YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, implying that there
was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program

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cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of
law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the
extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions,
especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case,
no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation.
Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for
expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

In addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of
sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to
the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the
reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.

Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, they are nonetheless “good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession”.

Petitioners’ right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

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Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM
with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that
occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to
choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
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and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA
6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?

(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP?

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita
were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed
to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders
of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

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[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted
to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of
the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have
produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to
acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed
that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because
not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been
rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its
July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no
apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

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3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to
agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly
covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that
there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these
may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves
to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.
In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is
the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been
validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded
from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale
of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

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[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita.
To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the
approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of
the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that
none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian
court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the
qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the
EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not
entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.
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[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided
by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101
shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

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Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao

Facts:

The DUMLAOS were co-owners of a 32 hectare ricelands in Nueva Vizcaya which was placed under OLT by virtue of PD27
(note that actual date of taking was not stated.)

The DAR made a preliminary valuation on 16 hectares (2 lots) and payments were made to the DUMLAOs by Landbank. The
DUMLAOs filed a complaint before the RTC to determine just compensation, and requested the appointment of 3 commissioners to
make the determination.

The DAR moved to dismiss claiming that the RTC does not have jurisdiction. The RTC eventually recognized the case and
ordered payment at 6,912.50 per hectare for one lot & to follow the amount provided for in the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers
Undertaking for the other lot. The DUMLAOs was claiming market value of 109,000 per hectare.

The DUMLAOs appealed to the CA which ruled in their favor, which noted that the time of taking was not certain. The CA held
that after the passage of RA No. 6657, the formula relative to valuation under PD No. 27 no longer applies.

Under PD 27 and EO No. 228, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands
is: 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.

Under the CARL, it is provide:

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Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,
the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.

ISSUE:

Which law should be followed to determine just compensation

Ruling:

(1) The just compensation due to respondents should be determined under the provisions of RA No. 6657.

The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be
computed in accordance with said law, although the property was acquired under PD No. 27. The latter law, being the latest law in
agrarian reform, should control, as held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo.

Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the
Act also provides

Sec. 7. Priorities. – The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all
agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

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Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners
for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired
and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not more
than four (4) years.

This demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
landless.

DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time makes it inequitable to follow the
guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228. Hence, RA No. 6657 should apply.

NOTE HOWEVER that the CA’s act of setting just compensation in the amount of P109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise
of this judicial function, had it followed the mandatory formula prescribed by RA No. 6657. However, the appellate court merely
chose the lower of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as basis for determining just compensation, namely: (a) P109,000.00
per hectare as the market value of first class unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)P60.00 per square meter as
the zonal value of the land in other barangays in Villaverde.

This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the formula provided by RA No. 6657 under Section 17, as
implemented through DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) - LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1),

where: LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

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MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

(2) The “taking” of the properties for the purpose of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of
emancipation patents.

The nature of the land at that time determines the just compensation to be paid.

(3) The DUMLAOs are entitled to payment of just compensation on their entire landholdings covered by Operation Land Transfer,
except for the five hectares of retention area each of them are entitled to (RIGHT OF RETENTION).

The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. The DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. In the exercise of its functions, the courts still have the
final say on what the amount of just compensation will be.

A reading of Section 18 of RA No. 6657 shows that it is the courts, not the DAR, which make the final determination of just
compensation.

Also, to wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay in processing the four properties’ claimfolders is
to violate the elementary rule that payment of just compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of property.

While the DAR is vested with primary

jurisdiction to determine in a preliminary manner the amount of just compensation, the circumstances of this case militate
against the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO AND MAGIN SORIANO, NAMELY: MARIVEL S.
CARANDANG AND JOSEPH SORIANO, Respondents.

Facts: Marivel Carandang and Joseph Soriano are the children of the late Sps. Jorja Rigor- Soriano and Magin Soriano, the owners of
the two parcels of land located in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
and were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending that such
valuation was too low compared to existing valuations of agricultural lands, the heirs commenced an action for just compensation.
They asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992
and R.A. No. 6657.

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The RTC ordered Land Bank to pay the heirs the amount P1,227,571.10 as just compensation.

Land Bank appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition.

Hence, Land Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the appeal, both parties entered into an agreement re-evaluating the cost of the parcels of land. Thus, Land
Bank submitted a manifestation informing the High Court that the parties have already filed their Joint Motion to Approve submitting
their Agreement dated November 29, 2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present appeal to the Supreme Court should be dismissed?

Ruling:

The appeal should be closed and terminated.

CIVIL LAW: compromise; contract

The Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in
this case. Under Art. 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to
a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation.

As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between
the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. A review of the terms

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of the Agreement, indicates that it is a judicial compromise because the parties intended it to terminate their pending litigation by
fully settling their dispute.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PLACIDO ORILLA and CLARA DY ORILLA, respondents.

Facts:

Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of Lot No. 1, 11-12706, situated in Bohol, containing an area of
23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18401. In the latter part of November 1996, the Department of
Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition
dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for P371,154.99 as compensation based on the valuation made by the
Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).

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Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial
DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation
made by the petitioner.

After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision which rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of petitioner subject
matter of the instant action at P7.00 per square meter. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify
the petitioners their expenses for attorney’s fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real
estate appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court.

After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision dated November 20, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads –

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant
action at P7.00 per square meter, as only prayed for, which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the
same shall have been fully paid. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners
their expenses for attorney’s fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate
appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court.

On March 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action18 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It questioned the propriety of the
SAC Order granting the execution pending appeal. Respondents and the presiding judge of the SAC, as nominal party, filed their
respective comments on the petition.

In its Decision dated July 29, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the assailed SAC Order dated
December 21, 2000 granting execution pending appeal was consistent with justice, fairness, and equity, as respondents had been
deprived of the use and possession of their property pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be immediately compensated with the
amount as determined by the SAC under the principle of "prompt payment" of just compensation.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
February 5, 2003. Hence, this appeal
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ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF
THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, EVEN THOUGH THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT IS SATISFIED BY THE PAYMENT AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE PROVISIONAL COMPENSATION UNDER
SECTION 16(E) OF RA 6657, UPON SUBMISSION OF THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF "LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, ET AL.," G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6,
1995 AND JULY 5, 1996, AND NOT BY EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC.

RULING:

In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is a
resounding YES.

The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social justice by
distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it
puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only
consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As
expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation."
Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just
compensation.

In light of these circumstances, the SAC found that the valuation made by petitioner, and affirmed by the DAR, was unjustly way
below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of
respondents at the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation, deemed it proper to grant their
motion for execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt payment" of just compensation.

Contrary to the view of petitioner, "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible
bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance
with the legal requirements set by RA 6657.

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by
the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
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between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to modify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative

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Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to
deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents,
and to allow them to withdraw the same.

Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA
6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the Landbank was a substantial compliance
with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

Issue: Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just compensation

Ruling: It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account
among the valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term deposit.

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Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and
related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This
law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

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The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A.
6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They
invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform
program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can
determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

Ruling:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under
the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

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Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just
compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be
the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

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HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO TANTOTCO, MARGARITA R. TANTOCO and PACITA R.
TANTOCO, petitioners, vs. HON. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, GEN. TRIAS, CAVITE, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE and THE DAR
REGION IV DIRECTOR,

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Facts:

Petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. who died and was substituted by his heirs while this case was still pending before the DARAB
Adjudication Board for Region IV, and his co-petitioners, namely, Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco and Pacita
R. Tantoco, were the former owners of a vast track of land with an area of 106.5128 hectares, situated at San Francisco, General Trias,
Cavite and previously registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33404 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

At about that time, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was already considering the land in question for compulsory acquisition
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Francisco Tantoco, Sr., for and in his own behalf and in behalves of his co-petitioners,
declared the productive nature and agricultural suitability of the land in dispute and at the same time offered the same to the DAR
for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer To Sell (VOS) scheme of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Obviously welcomed by the DAR, the offer was immediately acted upon. Hence, after processing the acquisition of the same 100
hectares under the VOS scheme of Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR issued on August 30, 1993 a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) in favor of private respondent Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) of San Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and its
53 members. In turn, on the basis of the same CLOA, the respondent Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. CLOA-1424 in the
name of ARBA and its 53 members and accordingly cancelled the Tantocos' TCT No. T-402203.The Tantocos filed their petition for
cancellation of TCT N. CLOA-1424 and the reinstatement of their TCT No. T-402203. Impleaded in the same petition as additional
respondents are the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite and the DAR Region IV Director.

The land in question is within the on-going industrial estate development site per land use plan of the Municipality of General Trias,
Cavite; that it has been planted to sugar and declared as such for taxation purposes. In an Order dated September 1, 1986 of the
then Minister of Agrarian Reform Heherson Alvarez, the same land was declared outside of the purview or ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 27; that the property is within that portion of Cavite that has been declared as an industrial zone in the CALABARZON
area, reason for which the price of real properties thereat has greatly appreciated, "so much so that almost all persons, including
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owners, investors and farmers became interested, and even pseudo-claimants are speculating to make a windfall profit on whatever
real property they could lay their hands on"; that the approval of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law on June 10, 1988, coupled
with the knowledge that the area has been declared part of the industrial zone of Cavite, persons unknown to petitioners begun to
claim to be tenants or farmholders on said land, when in truth and in fact, petitioners never had any tenant/farmworker thereon, and
neither did the petitioners give their consent for anyone to farm the same "which is suitable for sugarcane, residential or industrial
purposes and not for rice or corn or other industrial products"

Coupled with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and eventually a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents,
particularly ARBA, "from negotiating, selling or otherwise disposing of said land, or any part or portion thereof", the petition prays for a
judgment: (a) declaring TCT No. CLOA-1424 as null and void from the beginning and ordering its cancellation; (b) reinstating the
petitioners' TCT No. T-402203, or issuing a new title to them; and (c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect said mandate,
plus damages and attorney's fees.

In its Answer, respondents ARBA denied the material allegations of the petition, and averred, among other things, that the subject
land is planted to several crops such as rice, corn, bananas, vegetable, etc.; that the farmer-beneficiaries listed in TCT No. T-CLOA-
1424 are qualified beneficiaries as provided for in Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657; that due process the coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the land in dispute.

Both the petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) at Quezon City, where their
respective recourses were consolidated and docketed as DARAB Case No. 6385.

In time, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and a Submission, to
which a corresponding Opposition was interposed by respondent ARBA.

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Eventually, in its Resolution of September 6, 1999, the DARAB denied petitioners' motions "for lack of merit", saying that "no new
matters are adduced by the movants which will warrant a reversal of the board's decision

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DARAB ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED JULY 1, 1998, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS BY
THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR IN HER DECISION DATED JUNE 17, 1997.

RULING:

NO.

The Court made a thorough review of the evidence on record and found nothing therein to substantiate petitioners' posture. It may
well happen, as it normally does, that a piece of evidence may be viewed differently by different fora. Certainly, however, if an
appellate agency, like the DARAB, did not adopt in toto the finding of facts made by a subordinate office, and even disagrees with
them, more so when, as here, the disagreement is well-explained, We are at loss to understand how grave abuse of discretion, as
understood in law and jurisprudence, may be imputed to the latter.

Finally, petitioners presently question the legal competence and authority of the four (4) DARAB members who signed and
promulgated the assailed decision. It is petitioners' thesis that all four (4) of them are political appointees of former President Fidel V.
Ramos. As such, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, allegedly issued by the incumbent President soon after assuming office on
June 30, 1998, whereunder all political appointees of the former President were deemed terminated from office, said members had
ceased to be such effective July 1, 1998. Prescinding therefrom, petitioners contend that the decision under review which was
promulgated on July 1, 1998, "is null and void" for lack of legal authority on the part of the same four (4) DARAB members who signed
and promulgated the decision.

As indicated below their respective names, DARAB members Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano are all
Assistant Secretary in the Department of Agrarian Reform, the first being at the same time Vice Chairman of DARAB, while the last two
(2) are members of the same Board, while member Artemio A. Adaza, Jr., was then the DAR Undersecretary.
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In the absence of a showing by the petitioners, and none has been made by them, that the four (4) DARAB members are non-
career officials, the challenge on their legal authority to sign and promulgate the assailed decision must simply fall.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DARAB, et.al., respondents

Facts:

The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon
province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in
Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an
agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing from sale or settlement
and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land
area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to
cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some
of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080
hectares.

In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which
the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract.
The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical
training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group
pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied

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research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the
same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment
their salaries.

Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio
Pelayo and other complainants (respondents). Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the
lowland rice project.

In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training
Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income
Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-
economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. The
one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served
with notices to vacate.

The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or
separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the
complaint.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage
of land under the CARP.

2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.
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Ruling:

DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP. — Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A.
6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More
specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such
purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers,
etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's
titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found
by the school to be necessary for its purposes.

SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. —
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an
erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The
order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and
on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL. — As to the determination of when and what
lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass
upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB
nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest
as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.

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The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication
Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as null and void and hereby orders that they be set
aside, with costs against the private respondents.

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Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

Facts: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.

DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop
year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year
1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.

June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.

After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by
CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-
PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.

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August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to
facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.

DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.

Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998 (CARL)—NO

2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES

The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out
the coverage of CARP. The program shall: “… cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.”

Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification
of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.

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Section 3(c): “agricultural land- “land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.”

“agriculture” or “agricultural activity”- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government. There is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the
public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.

-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo
Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as
school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is
the land per se, not the income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Ruling:

I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the
purposes of their exemption:

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
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In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes.”
The importance of the phrase “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary” cannot be understated. The
words of the law are clear and unambiguous. The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis is applicable. Where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, wherein we declared the land subject exempt from CARP coverage. However, DECS’ reliance is misplaced because the
factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.
1st, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by
the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU). In this case,
however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
2nd, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and
campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a
“Management and Development Agreement”, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing
Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students. The retention of the land was
found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs. On the other hand, the lands in this case were
not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses. They were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational but business purposes. Also, it was the income and not the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of
the schools.

II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that they were not qualified beneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section
15, R.A. No. 6657:

SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the
CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;
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(c) location and area of the land they work;

(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other
public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further,
on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was
none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism
designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. The
objective of the State is that: “landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to
move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the
subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.

Milestone Farms, Petitioner v. Office of the President, Respondent

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Facts:

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to
breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle,
pigs, and other livestock

On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect. In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property
pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of
agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO. DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC)
conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and recommended the exemption of petitioner’s 316.0422-hectare property
from the coverage of CARP.

DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCEC’s recommendation

The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by
Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary. Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
against Balajadia and company before the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

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RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted
by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration,
Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier,
without the knowledge of the CA – as the parties did not inform the appellate court – then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion
order granting petitioner’s application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf
courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property
subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villa’s Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that
the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states
that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is
hereby declared covered by the CARP.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

Ruling:

No.

When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said
that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full
force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

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LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

Facts:

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they
are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
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On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider
the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of
the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.

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NAPOLEON MAGNO, Petitioner v. GONZALO FRANCISCO and

REGINA VDA. DE LAZARO, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale executed by Talens on 28 July 1972, but the sale was only registered on 3
September 1986. At the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage
were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares, respectively.

Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel Lazaro on 5 October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco
on 7 August 1980. In the leasehold contract, Manuel Lazaro was obliged to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season,
and 20 cavans during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand, was required to pay a lease rental of
35 cavans during the regular season and 25 cavans during the cropping season.

On 19 May 1993, petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and collection of lease rentals against
respondents. At the time of filing of the complaint, respondent Francisco and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of
155 cavans and 145 cavans, respectively.

Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint invoking the following arguments:

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1. The leasehold contracts are without force and effect since the lot was under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The sale executed by Talens was merely designed to exclude the land from
OLT coverage.

2. Since the lot value, as determined and approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), has been paid, the
collection of lease rentals is now moot.

3. Respondents are now considered owners-cultivators of their respective landholdings and cannot be ejected.

On 22 December 1993, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the case for lack of merit.

On appeal, the DARAB rendered a Decision dated 8 January 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a NEW
DECISION is hereby rendered:

1. Finding and declaring the Deed of Absolute sale binding upon respondents Gonzalo Francisco and
Regina vda. De Lazaro;

2. Maintaining the agricultural leasehold relationship between landowner-petitioner Napoleon Magno and
respondents-lessees Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro; accordingly, declaring the Contracts

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of Agricultural Leasehold respectively entered into by and between the said parties still subsisting and in full
force and effect;

3. Ordering respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro to pay severally their lease rentals in
arrears covering the period from the regular season of (April) 1991 up to and until the final restoration or
proper reinstatement of the lease contracts in question.

Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the DARABs decision.

The CA set aside the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards (DARAB) Decision dated 8 January 2004 and reinstated the
Decision dated 22 December 1993 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cabanatuan City. The PARAD dismissed
petitioners action for collection of lease rentals and ejectment againstGonzalo Francisco and Regina Vda. De Lazaro (respondents).’

Issue: Whether unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular on their face can defeat the land owners
rights to agricultural leasehold rentals.

Ruling:

Petition Granted. CA set aside.

It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy relationship, such that the complaint for collection of
back rentals and ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.
However, in view of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized that the lot is
subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program. Since the classification and
identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian Law Implementation cases, the DAR
Secretary should first resolve this issue. In Sta. Ana v. Carpo, we held:

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Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this case. An action
for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the
PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners
and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by
the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) Cases. (Boldfacing supplied)

Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when
the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October
2002, the DARAB suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative determination of the lot and
thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted in their Memorandum that the DAR has not
submitted the result of its administrative determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should
first resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final determination of this case can be had.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and petitioners right of retention should be introduced in the proper
forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve these issues being the agency lodged with such authority since
it has the necessary expertise on the matter.

We sustain the DARABs ruling declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold entered into by petitioner and respondents still
subsisting and in full force and effect. We modify the DARABs ruling ordering respondents to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears
covering the period from the regular season of April 1991 until the final determination on the OLT coverage of the lot.

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ALANGILAN REALTY & DVT CORP vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner
filed an Application and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from CARP Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with MARO-DAR. It
averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject landholding as reserved for residential under a
zoning ordinance, which was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994,
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use
Ordinance, reclassifying the landholding as residential. Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the
CARP.

On May 6, 1997, then DAR denied petitioner’s application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that the Alangilan landholding
remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at the time of the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657. The qualifying phrase reserved for residential means that the property is still classified as agricultural, and is
covered by the CARP.

On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for
review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision but CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan landholding was devoted to agricultural
activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988 and even thereafter. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s Alangilan landholding is subject to the coverage of CARP, notwithstanding that the property has been
converted to non-agricultural uses by the zoning ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law.

Ruling:

It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the
land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the
intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for
residential is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding
was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994,
reclassifying the landholding as residentia. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as
petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject landholding had already been converted into residential use prior
to June 15, 1988. The court noted that the subject landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of
the application for exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO and RARO, disclosed that the
landholding was planted with mangoes and coconuts.

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Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court,
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position,
has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be
altered, modified, or reversed. In this case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the reversal of the decision of
the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and the CA.

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Romanita Concha et, al. vs. Paulino Rubio et, al.

G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010

Facts:

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The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), named as beneficiaries the herein petitioners.
Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the
petitioners to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have not
relinquished their rights over the same, as they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners. Meanwhile, The Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved the landowners’ application for conversion, subject to the following conditions: The farmer-
beneficiary, if any, shall be paid disturbance compensation pursuant to R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389; the remaining 18.5006
hectares shall be covered by CARP under compulsory acquisition and the same be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the coverage of the remaining 18.5006. The petitioners herein were
identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries where three Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued in their favor.
Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance compensation. They now, however, question the validity and legality
of the institution of the petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject landholding. The PARAD ruled that respondents had waived their
rights as tenants and as farmer-beneficiaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform program, as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay. In addition, the PARAD ruled that it had no authority to rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was a
purely administrative matter under the jurisdiction of the DAR. However, the DARAB set aside said decision and ordered to issue new
Certificates of Land Ownership Award in favor of respondents. CA affirms said decision. Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not
clothed with the power or authority to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries
since the same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issue
involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).

Ruling:

This Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to
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identify who between the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative
function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. As earlier stated
no other agency of government is empowered or authorized by law in the selection and designation of farmer beneficiaries except
the DAR being purely an administrative function. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power and authority to rule on the
selection of farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra vires act of said Board, being administrative in character. Thus, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer’s (MARO) decision not to include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded respect in
the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it is the MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who,
together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible agrarian beneficiaries.

The Adjudicator found DAR to have legal and valid reasons in the exclusion of plaintiffs as farmer-beneficiaries based on their
sworn statement which waived and renounced their rights as tenants and farmer- beneficiaries of the program. This was based on the
fact that plaintiffs were awarded individual “homelots” and paid disturbance compensation by the landowner. In any case, it must
be stressed that a tenant of a parcel of land, which is later declared to be under the coverage of CARP, is not automatically chosen
nor does he have absolute entitlement to be identified as the farmer-beneficiary. The finding of the MARO declaring petitioners as
beneficiaries of the land in dispute must, therefore, be accorded respect. It should also be equally binding on the DARAB for the
simple reason that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction over the former. The DARAB cannot review, much less reverse, the
administrative findings of DAR. In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the
controversy between petitioners and respondents in deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in
dispute.

1. CORPUZ vs. GROSPE (CRUZ)

G.R. No. 135297

June 8, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform. He was
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issued a Certificate of Land Transfer over two parcels of agricultural land. In order to pay for the hospitalization of his wife, he mortgaged the
subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract expired, he again mortgaged it to respondent Hilaria Grospe for a period of four
years. The parties executed a contract, which allowed the respondents to cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage or until
December 05, 1990.

Corpuz subsequently instituted a complaint which alleged that the Grospe's had entered the disputed land by force and destroyed the palay that
he had planted on it. However according to the Grospes, Corpuz had already executed a "waiver of rights' over the landholding in favor of the
spouses in consideration of 54k.

PARAB adjudicator Ernesto Tabar ruled that Corpuz abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija. Said
Samahang Nayon even passed Resolution No. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of said lots to the Grospes, who were the most
qualified farmers-beneficiaries. DARAB and CA affirmed the decision

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the 'waiver of rights' is contrary to agrarian law

2. Whether or not Corpuz had abandoned his landholding

3. Whether or not Corpuz had voluntarily surrendered his landholding

HELD:

1. Yes. The sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a certificate of land transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor

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of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the
landowners reacquire vast tract of land thus, negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.

2. No. Corpuz’ surrendered of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of the Grospe's to
return the possession of the landholding upon full payment of the loan. There was no clear, absolute or irrevocable intention to abandon.

3. Yes. Corpuz' intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions.
His voluntary surrender to the samahang nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the
mechanism for the disposition and reallocation of of farmholdings of tenant farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of pd 27.

2. ESTOLAS vs. MABALOT (DAVID)

G.R. No. 133706
May 7, 2002

FACTS:
On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot located
in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent
passed on the subject land to the petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent,
there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer, the DAR
officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the
subject land and the case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On July 8, 1988, the DAR’s District Office submitted an investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject
land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent
and that the money loan be returned to petitioner.

Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional
Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of
petitioner as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land.
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CA ruled: The transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned to respondent. Respondent had not
effectively abandoned the property, because he tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby making it available to other qualified farmer-grantees?

HELD:
There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be transferred to anyone other than the Government. PD 27
specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the
government shall not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by
other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or
claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There
must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus,
susceptible of being appropriated by another. Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines abandonment or
neglect as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his
land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar
years.” In the present case, no such “willful failure” has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to
claim dominion over the land.
Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was
abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and
that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
3. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (DELOS SANTOS)
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

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FACTS:

The government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. A
few years after, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into
through negotiation without public bidding.

The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands,
the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.

On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner
prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domains as a violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own the lands under the amended joint venture agreement having 367.5
hectares s. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the Constitution.

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HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. Since the Amended Joint Venture Agreement seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer
to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

The Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution which allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, and the 1987 Constitution
reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce Cases cannot serve as authority for a private corporation to acquire alienable public lands,
much less submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a private corporation like Amari is barred from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain.

4. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (GATACELO)
G.R. No. 86889

December 4, 1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, prayed that Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A. No. 6657,
including the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, be declared unconstitutional for being repugnant to the

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due process clause. Sections 13 and 32 directed "corporate farms", which included livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement
"production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) that would distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation. Luz Farms also argued that livestock or poultry raising
was not similar to crop or tree farming; it was not the primary resource in this undertaking and represented no more than five percent (5%) of
the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Thus, they must not be covered by the law. On the other hand, DAR
commented that livestock and poultry raising were embraced in the term "agriculture" based on Webster's International Dictionary’s definition.
The Court, then, took cognizance of the case, as it assailed the constitutionality of the law.

ISSUE:

WON the contested provisions and implementing rules, which covered livestock and poultry industry under agrarian reform, were
unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly showed that
it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. Moreover, the Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land.
Simply, the said provisions and rules were violative of the Constitution.

6. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE (LAZARO)

G.R. No. L-29381
September 30, 1969

FACTS:
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PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30 meters
adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to Legazpi. These
strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center thereof is a track measuring
ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running locomotives. On both sides
of the track, or about two (2) to five (5) meters away from the embankment of the track, are telegraph and telephone posts
fifty (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR
draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them
as depository of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges during washouts. or other damaged parts
of the line occasioned by derailments or other calamities.

The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People occupied them;
they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the face of all these that, with
adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the track,
after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years. A civil law lease contract
in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly stipulates
that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the property . . . temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing, however, failed to take
possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of
previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways (PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and
are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code, such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

2. WON CAR has jurisdiction over the present case.

HELD:
The answer to both issues is no.
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According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of
the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." The term
"agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the
constitutional sense. The phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor
timber lands and embraces within its wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by Section 166(1)
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code," '[a]gricultural Land means land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively."

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot
devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.

The entire width of 30 meters is important to PNR's railroad operations which should not be hampered. And, communication
lines must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to prevent
people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along the track itself
which might cause derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary precautions on
time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.

The use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities. The
contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its materials on the land.
It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water during rainy days. What if PNR
should decide to construct another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR
from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.

In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had no
jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the parties, as the third person was, in reality, an
unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no power to sublet. There is also
thus ho legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the parties.
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We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus null and void.

7. KRIVENKO vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS (MEDINA)

G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

FACTS:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was
interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.

ISSUE:

WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

HELD:

No. "Public agricultural lands"‖ mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the
Court stated: Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,‘ and with respect to public agricultural
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino
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citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Thus Section 5,
Article XIII provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

8. ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA (MONZON)

G.R. No. 127876
December 17, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. The events of this case occurred during the
incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino who issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution.
Before the law’s effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the
provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR
in accordance with the Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988(CARL).

In a letter, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian
reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) on the ground that
withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is
over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, petitioner
filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas,
reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway

Petitioner instituted Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued
by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the haciendas had been declared a tourist zone, is
not suitable for agricultural production. DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property
was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for
determination. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and
the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.

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Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAR observes due process of the proceedings over the three haciendas

HELD:
The acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process
therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for
conversion. failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not
give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-
circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to
correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic
precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.

9. MORTA VS. OCCIDENTAL (ROMANO)

G.R. No. 123417

June 10, 1999

FACTS:

Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili
nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental claimed that he was

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a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners of the land in question. The
trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory
Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related problem which
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.

HELD:

NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly outside DARAB’s jurisdiction. Whatever findings made
by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful
owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo
that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim
that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue
involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:

7. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

8. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

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9. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

10. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

11. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

12. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

10. VDA DE TANGUB vs. CA (TIBURCIO)

UDK NO. 9864
December 3, 1990

FACTS:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte, an agrarian case for damages by reason of their
unlawful dispossession in which they were tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons
were also impleaded as defendants which has interests over the land. The judge dismissed the complaint. He ruled that based on EO No. 229,
EO No. 129-A in relation to RA No. 6657, agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the
jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case.

HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction. DAR has jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction thus conferred on the DAR based on EO No. 229 and EO No. 129 - A, are:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

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(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and
other non-agricultural uses.

The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department.

Further, RA 6657 states:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

The RTCs have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand,
confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1)
branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same
law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and

2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."

The RTC City was therefore correct in dismissing the case. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land,
not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield
the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

11. THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE ET. AL vs. CA (CRUZ)

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G.R. No. 138016.

January 30, 2002

FACTS:

The spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural land in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates,
the Romeros sold separate portions thereof to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson. Claiming to be the agricultural tenants of the land
in question, Jose Juanite (now deceased) and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a complaint with the Provincial Agricultural Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against the spouses Edilberto and Felisa Mercado and their vendees above-named for the
cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to exercise their right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12 of which
reads:

‘Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be
redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.’

Edilberto Romero, et al., as defendants, filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses. They alleged that the Romeros, being the
owners of the property, had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person. They strongly denied the allegation of the Juanites that
the latter were their tenants.

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On October 28, 1993, the PARAB (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) rendered his decision declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants;
directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to prepare the leasehold contract in their favor; declaring the deeds of sale executed by
the Romero spouses in favor of Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonsonnull and void; and directing the latter to vacate the premises.

On appeal, the DARAB reversed. In its decision dated April 21, 1998 , it declared that the Juanites were not tenants on the subject landholding;
and hence, had no right of redemption.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were tenants of the Romero spouses (respondents) as to entitle them to the right of redemption.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of PARAB. The PARAB declared the petitioners to be tenants on the basis of the following evidence:

a) certification of 28 persons to the effect that spouses Juanite had been working on the land as tenants;

b) in the deed of absolute sale signed by Edilberto Romero as vendor, he stated that spouses Juanite were his tenants;

c) the spouses Juanite had been in possession and cultivating the land since 1969.

Without any evidence to support its finding, the DARAB reversed the finding of the PARAB and found that petitioner Juanites were not tenants
because they failed to submit evidence that they were sharing the harvests of the with the landowners, respondent Romero spouses. SC agreed
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with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation; and

(6) there is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant
of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a dejure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

But note that from the time of the landowners’ admission that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of “sharing
harvest” is assumed as a factual element in that admission.

12. HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA vs. CA (DAVID)

G.R. No. 132048
March 6, 2002
FACTS:
On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an “Order of Award” in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels
of agricultural land in Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively,
under the following conditions:
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- Within 6 months, he shall personally cultivate at least ¼ of the area; or

- Occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment

In no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale be issued in favor of the covering the lots without a certification issued by
the Land Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted
to some productive enterprise at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their house therein in case of
residential land.

After twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein
petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of private respondent,
it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his own
application for said parcels in opposition to that of private respondent.

On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation and
found that the subject lots were previously tenanted by other persons and it is clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the
terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor.

On January 24, 1994, petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order, cancelling Order of
Award issued in favor of Jose Verdillo and giving Restituto Rivera the opportunity to purchase said lots.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ claim that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction

HELD:
Yes the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The case involves the strict administrative implementation and award of lots. The
matter falls under the exclusive jurisdiction and administrative competence of the DAR (Regional Director and Department
Secretary) and not of the DARAB (including the Provincial Adjudicator and the Provincial Adjudication Board itself).

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Centeno vs. Centeno, “the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.” The
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction “to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O.
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations.”

Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), “agrarian dispute” is defined to include “(d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants
and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

13. ALMUETE vs. CA (DELOS SANTOS)

G.R. No. 122276
November 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the subject property
peacefully and exclusively. However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin on August 17,
1979 filed false reports making it appear that Almuete has waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo Andres was the
actual occupant of the land from 1967 to date.

Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos,
immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no
time in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela. The Trial Court
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rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a petition for
certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of execution which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not this case is considered an agrarian dispute.

Whether or not regular courts have jurisdiction.

HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and said thatit gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by
petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts. The Supreme Court held that this case is not of an agrarian dispute. An agrarian dispute is
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

In this case no juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize
the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title: there is no "agrarian dispute"
involving tenancy relationship between the parties that the issue should fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

14. SPOUSES ATUEL ET AL vs. SPOUSES VALDEZ (GATACELO)

G.R. No. 139561

June 10, 2003

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FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. They assailed the decision of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which ordered the segregation of the subject
lot from the land of respondents and awarding the same to petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB which reversed
the decision of the MARO. After a review of the issues raised, the question is whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to resolve the controversy.

ISSUE:

WON DARAB has jurisdiction to try and hear this case.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the respondents' complaint for recovery of possession of
the subject lot. Though the parties did not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.
The court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. In the case at bar, the respondents did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any,
between them and the petitioners. The allegations in the complaint indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for
recovery of possession or accion publiciana. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between
the parties. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

15. OCA vs. CA (ISMAEL)

G.R. No. 144817
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March 7, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in the locality as the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan,
Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of another called the "Salayog" property. Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole and
exclusive owner of two fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties. Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be
the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that he had been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid
fishponds from the time he received the same from the petitioners Oca brothers until the first week of May 1992 when he requested from them
the share of the harvest and instead of acceding, petitioners demanded that he vacate the lands.

A complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory Order was filed by the respondent
against the petitioner with the PARAD. Petitioners in their answer denied that the respondent is a caretaker/tenant of the land. They
acknowledged that the respondent is merely an industrial partner who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of
P140,000.00. After due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the
subject fishponds.

The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but the Board affirmed in toto the Decision of the PARAD. Petitioners sought
relief with the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the Decision ruling that the private
respondent cannot be a tenant of the "Salayog" property, he having sold his share and interest and had consequently, waived any interests he
had thereon. Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new argument the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the PARAD over the subject fishponds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners be permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case?

HELD:
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or
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omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is understandable as
this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and exceptional
circumstances, estoppel or waiver may operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this form of defense. Thus, we have
held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We defined laches
as "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it."In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they
never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or
the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's
exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its
jurisdiction during the eight years this case was under litigation.

The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant's right by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean rendering
useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time, effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the litigants and of
the State. This is especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted litigation.

16. REMIGIO ISIDRO vs CA (LAZARO)

G.R. No. 105586
December 15, 1993

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FACTS:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment
his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same
into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to
vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a
fishpond.

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond and, thus, in a
decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the
dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided
in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land involved in this case is an agricultural land.

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
As to the first issue, the answer is yes. As to the second issue, the answer is no.

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore
the question at issue is agrarian. In this

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connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, provides that the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner
into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB
has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or
tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of
them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant: (2) the subject matter
is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
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planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with
the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the
other hand, is a natural or juridical person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants
to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain.

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold
relationship existing between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by
the petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a
price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the
land.

18. ONQUIT vs. BINAMIRA-PARCIA (MONZON)

A.M. MTJ-96-1085
October 8, 1998

FACTS:
The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry case with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
with damages. Said case was assigned to her sala. The complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised the
issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because
it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion
for Disqualification, Request for Disqualification and Request for Resolution. Basically, these motions were founded on the trial court’s alleged
lack of jurisdiction. In a single Order, respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge , the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar
would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.

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Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay
from the land in question.

ISSUES:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case.

WON that the plaintiff’s injunction bond was approved by respondent Judge without first serving a copy to the complainant and the motion of
issuance of seizure order was not served resulting in a violation of due process.

WON the complainants were ordered to leave the land because they will certainly lose the case

WON the sheriff seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the plaintiff.

HELD:
The case was dismissed. The court held that it is a basic rule that the material averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment,
determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the
simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.” It is the duty of the
court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was
ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted.

The records belie the claim of complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to the defendants. Records show that said writ
was served to the defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefore, nevertheless the
executing Sheriff left each a copy to the defendants.

As to the allegation that the judge was persuaded with money and told the complainants to leave the land were not supported by evidence
apart from the self-serving statements made by complainant. The court is not persuaded by said accusations hurled by complainant simply
because there is no evidence thereon to implicate the respondent Judge.

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Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in his duty to issue a receipt for the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not issue
the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier for issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next day. From
the record, complainant made no averment that respondent Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving complainant a
receipt. It was reasonable to briefly wait until measurement could be made as to the volume of the palay after being cleaned and threshed
before issuance of the receipt. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff has regularly performed his official
duty.
1. CORPUZ vs. GROSPE (CRUZ)
G.R. No. 135297

June 8, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform. He was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer over two parcels of agricultural land. In order to pay for the hospitalization of his wife, he mortgaged the
subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract expired, he again mortgaged it to respondent Hilaria Grospe for a period of four
years. The parties executed a contract, which allowed the respondents to cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage or until
December 05, 1990.

Corpuz subsequently instituted a complaint which alleged that the Grospe's had entered the disputed land by force and destroyed the palay that
he had planted on it. However according to the Grospes, Corpuz had already executed a "waiver of rights' over the landholding in favor of the
spouses in consideration of 54k.

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PARAB adjudicator Ernesto Tabar ruled that Corpuz abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija. Said
Samahang Nayon even passed Resolution No. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of said lots to the Grospes, who were the most
qualified farmers-beneficiaries. DARAB and CA affirmed the decision

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the 'waiver of rights' is contrary to agrarian law

2. Whether or not Corpuz had abandoned his landholding

3. Whether or not Corpuz had voluntarily surrendered his landholding

HELD:

1. Yes. The sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a certificate of land transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor
of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the
landowners reacquire vast tract of land thus, negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.

2. No. Corpuz’ surrendered of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of the Grospe's to
return the possession of the landholding upon full payment of the loan. There was no clear, absolute or irrevocable intention to abandon.

3. Yes. Corpuz' intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions.
His voluntary surrender to the samahang nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the
mechanism for the disposition and reallocation of of farmholdings of tenant farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of pd 27.

2. ESTOLAS vs. MABALOT (DAVID)

G.R. No. 133706
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May 7, 2002

FACTS:
On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot located
in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent
passed on the subject land to the petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent,
there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer, the DAR
officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the
subject land and the case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On July 8, 1988, the DAR’s District Office submitted an investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject
land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent
and that the money loan be returned to petitioner.

Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional
Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of
petitioner as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land.

CA ruled: The transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned to respondent. Respondent had not
effectively abandoned the property, because he tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby making it available to other qualified farmer-grantees?

HELD:
There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be transferred to anyone other than the Government. PD 27
specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the
government shall not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by
other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.

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For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or
claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There
must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus,
susceptible of being appropriated by another. Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines abandonment or
neglect as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his
land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar
years.” In the present case, no such “willful failure” has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to
claim dominion over the land.
Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was
abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and
that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
3. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (DELOS SANTOS)
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

FACTS:

The government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. A
few years after, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into
through negotiation without public bidding.

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The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands,
the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.

On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner
prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domains as a violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own the lands under the amended joint venture agreement having 367.5
hectares s. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the Constitution.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. Since the Amended Joint Venture Agreement seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer
to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
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The Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution which allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, and the 1987 Constitution
reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce Cases cannot serve as authority for a private corporation to acquire alienable public lands,
much less submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a private corporation like Amari is barred from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain.

4. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (GATACELO)
G.R. No. 86889

December 4, 1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, prayed that Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A. No. 6657,
including the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, be declared unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
due process clause. Sections 13 and 32 directed "corporate farms", which included livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement
"production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) that would distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation. Luz Farms also argued that livestock or poultry raising
was not similar to crop or tree farming; it was not the primary resource in this undertaking and represented no more than five percent (5%) of
the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Thus, they must not be covered by the law. On the other hand, DAR
commented that livestock and poultry raising were embraced in the term "agriculture" based on Webster's International Dictionary’s definition.
The Court, then, took cognizance of the case, as it assailed the constitutionality of the law.

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ISSUE:

WON the contested provisions and implementing rules, which covered livestock and poultry industry under agrarian reform, were
unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly showed that
it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. Moreover, the Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land.
Simply, the said provisions and rules were violative of the Constitution.

6. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE (LAZARO)

G.R. No. L-29381
September 30, 1969

FACTS:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30 meters
adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to Legazpi. These
strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center thereof is a track measuring
ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running locomotives. On both sides
of the track, or about two (2) to five (5) meters away from the embankment of the track, are telegraph and telephone posts
fifty (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR
draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them
as depository of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges during washouts. or other damaged parts
of the line occasioned by derailments or other calamities.

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The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People occupied them;
they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the face of all these that, with
adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the track,
after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years. A civil law lease contract
in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly stipulates
that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the property . . . temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing, however, failed to take
possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of
previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways (PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and
are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code, such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

2. WON CAR has jurisdiction over the present case.

HELD:
The answer to both issues is no.

According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of
the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." The term
"agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the
constitutional sense. The phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor
timber lands and embraces within its wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by Section 166(1)

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of the Agricultural Land Reform Code," '[a]gricultural Land means land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively."

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot
devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.

The entire width of 30 meters is important to PNR's railroad operations which should not be hampered. And, communication
lines must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to prevent
people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along the track itself
which might cause derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary precautions on
time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.

The use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities. The
contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its materials on the land.
It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water during rainy days. What if PNR
should decide to construct another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR
from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.

In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had no
jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the parties, as the third person was, in reality, an
unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no power to sublet. There is also
thus ho legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the parties.

We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus null and void.

7. KRIVENKO vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS (MEDINA)

G.R. No. L-630

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November 15, 1947

FACTS:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was
interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.

ISSUE:

WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

HELD:

No. "Public agricultural lands"‖ mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the
Court stated: Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,‘ and with respect to public agricultural
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino
citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Thus Section 5,
Article XIII provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

8. ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA (MONZON)

G.R. No. 127876

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December 17, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. The events of this case occurred during the
incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino who issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution.
Before the law’s effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the
provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR
in accordance with the Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988(CARL).

In a letter, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian
reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) on the ground that
withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is
over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, petitioner
filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas,
reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway

Petitioner instituted Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued
by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the haciendas had been declared a tourist zone, is
not suitable for agricultural production. DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property
was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for
determination. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and
the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.

Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAR observes due process of the proceedings over the three haciendas

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HELD:
The acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process
therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for
conversion. failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not
give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-
circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to
correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic
precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.

9. MORTA VS. OCCIDENTAL (ROMANO)

G.R. No. 123417

June 10, 1999

FACTS:

Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili
nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental claimed that he was
a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners of the land in question. The
trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory
Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related problem which
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.

HELD:

NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly outside DARAB’s jurisdiction. Whatever findings made
by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful
owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo
that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim
that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue
involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:

13. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

14. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

15. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

16. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

17. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

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18. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

10. VDA DE TANGUB vs. CA (TIBURCIO)

UDK NO. 9864
December 3, 1990

FACTS:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte, an agrarian case for damages by reason of their
unlawful dispossession in which they were tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons
were also impleaded as defendants which has interests over the land. The judge dismissed the complaint. He ruled that based on EO No. 229,
EO No. 129-A in relation to RA No. 6657, agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the
jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case.

HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction. DAR has jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction thus conferred on the DAR based on EO No. 229 and EO No. 129 - A, are:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and
other non-agricultural uses.

The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department.
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Further, RA 6657 states:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

The RTCs have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand,
confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1)
branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same
law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and

2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."

The RTC City was therefore correct in dismissing the case. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land,
not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield
the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

11. THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE ET. AL vs. CA (CRUZ)

G.R. No. 138016.

January 30, 2002

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FACTS:

The spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural land in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates,
the Romeros sold separate portions thereof to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson. Claiming to be the agricultural tenants of the land
in question, Jose Juanite (now deceased) and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a complaint with the Provincial Agricultural Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against the spouses Edilberto and Felisa Mercado and their vendees above-named for the
cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to exercise their right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12 of which
reads:

‘Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be
redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.’

Edilberto Romero, et al., as defendants, filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses. They alleged that the Romeros, being the
owners of the property, had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person. They strongly denied the allegation of the Juanites that
the latter were their tenants.

On October 28, 1993, the PARAB (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) rendered his decision declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants;
directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to prepare the leasehold contract in their favor; declaring the deeds of sale executed by
the Romero spouses in favor of Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonsonnull and void; and directing the latter to vacate the premises.

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On appeal, the DARAB reversed. In its decision dated April 21, 1998 , it declared that the Juanites were not tenants on the subject landholding;
and hence, had no right of redemption.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were tenants of the Romero spouses (respondents) as to entitle them to the right of redemption.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of PARAB. The PARAB declared the petitioners to be tenants on the basis of the following evidence:

a) certification of 28 persons to the effect that spouses Juanite had been working on the land as tenants;

b) in the deed of absolute sale signed by Edilberto Romero as vendor, he stated that spouses Juanite were his tenants;

c) the spouses Juanite had been in possession and cultivating the land since 1969.

Without any evidence to support its finding, the DARAB reversed the finding of the PARAB and found that petitioner Juanites were not tenants
because they failed to submit evidence that they were sharing the harvests of the with the landowners, respondent Romero spouses. SC agreed
with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

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(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation; and

(6) there is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant
of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a dejure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

But note that from the time of the landowners’ admission that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of “sharing
harvest” is assumed as a factual element in that admission.

12. HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA vs. CA (DAVID)

G.R. No. 132048
March 6, 2002
FACTS:
On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an “Order of Award” in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels
of agricultural land in Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively,
under the following conditions:
- Within 6 months, he shall personally cultivate at least ¼ of the area; or
- Occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment

In no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale be issued in favor of the covering the lots without a certification issued by
the Land Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted
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to some productive enterprise at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their house therein in case of
residential land.

After twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein
petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of private respondent,
it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his own
application for said parcels in opposition to that of private respondent.

On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation and
found that the subject lots were previously tenanted by other persons and it is clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the
terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor.

On January 24, 1994, petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order, cancelling Order of
Award issued in favor of Jose Verdillo and giving Restituto Rivera the opportunity to purchase said lots.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ claim that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction

HELD:
Yes the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The case involves the strict administrative implementation and award of lots. The
matter falls under the exclusive jurisdiction and administrative competence of the DAR (Regional Director and Department
Secretary) and not of the DARAB (including the Provincial Adjudicator and the Provincial Adjudication Board itself).

Centeno vs. Centeno, “the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.” The
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction “to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O.

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Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations.”

Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), “agrarian dispute” is defined to include “(d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants
and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

13. ALMUETE vs. CA (DELOS SANTOS)

G.R. No. 122276
November 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the subject property
peacefully and exclusively. However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin on August 17,
1979 filed false reports making it appear that Almuete has waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo Andres was the
actual occupant of the land from 1967 to date.

Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos,
immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no
time in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela. The Trial Court
rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a petition for
certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of execution which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not this case is considered an agrarian dispute.

Whether or not regular courts have jurisdiction.

HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and said thatit gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by
petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts. The Supreme Court held that this case is not of an agrarian dispute. An agrarian dispute is
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

In this case no juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize
the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title: there is no "agrarian dispute"
involving tenancy relationship between the parties that the issue should fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

14. SPOUSES ATUEL ET AL vs. SPOUSES VALDEZ (GATACELO)

G.R. No. 139561

June 10, 2003

FACTS:

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Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. They assailed the decision of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which ordered the segregation of the subject
lot from the land of respondents and awarding the same to petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB which reversed
the decision of the MARO. After a review of the issues raised, the question is whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to resolve the controversy.

ISSUE:

WON DARAB has jurisdiction to try and hear this case.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the respondents' complaint for recovery of possession of
the subject lot. Though the parties did not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.
The court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. In the case at bar, the respondents did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any,
between them and the petitioners. The allegations in the complaint indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for
recovery of possession or accion publiciana. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between
the parties. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

15. OCA vs. CA (ISMAEL)

G.R. No. 144817
March 7, 2002

FACTS:
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Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in the locality as the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan,
Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of another called the "Salayog" property. Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole and
exclusive owner of two fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties. Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be
the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that he had been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid
fishponds from the time he received the same from the petitioners Oca brothers until the first week of May 1992 when he requested from them
the share of the harvest and instead of acceding, petitioners demanded that he vacate the lands.

A complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory Order was filed by the respondent
against the petitioner with the PARAD. Petitioners in their answer denied that the respondent is a caretaker/tenant of the land. They
acknowledged that the respondent is merely an industrial partner who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of
P140,000.00. After due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the
subject fishponds.

The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but the Board affirmed in toto the Decision of the PARAD. Petitioners sought
relief with the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the Decision ruling that the private
respondent cannot be a tenant of the "Salayog" property, he having sold his share and interest and had consequently, waived any interests he
had thereon. Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new argument the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the PARAD over the subject fishponds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners be permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case?

HELD:
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or
omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
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cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is understandable as
this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and exceptional
circumstances, estoppel or waiver may operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this form of defense. Thus, we have
held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We defined laches
as "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it."In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they
never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or
the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's
exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its
jurisdiction during the eight years this case was under litigation.

The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant's right by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean rendering
useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time, effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the litigants and of
the State. This is especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted litigation.

16. REMIGIO ISIDRO vs CA (LAZARO)

G.R. No. 105586
December 15, 1993

FACTS:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment
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his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same
into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to
vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a
fishpond.

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond and, thus, in a
decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the
dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided
in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land involved in this case is an agricultural land.

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
As to the first issue, the answer is yes. As to the second issue, the answer is no.

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore
the question at issue is agrarian. In this

connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, provides that the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

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An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner
into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB
has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or
tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of
them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant: (2) the subject matter
is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with
the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the
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other hand, is a natural or juridical person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants
to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain.

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold
relationship existing between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by
the petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a
price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the
land.

18. ONQUIT vs. BINAMIRA-PARCIA (MONZON)

A.M. MTJ-96-1085
October 8, 1998

FACTS:
The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry case with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
with damages. Said case was assigned to her sala. The complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised the
issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because
it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion
for Disqualification, Request for Disqualification and Request for Resolution. Basically, these motions were founded on the trial court’s alleged
lack of jurisdiction. In a single Order, respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge , the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar
would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.

Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay
from the land in question.

ISSUES:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case.
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WON that the plaintiff’s injunction bond was approved by respondent Judge without first serving a copy to the complainant and the motion of
issuance of seizure order was not served resulting in a violation of due process.

WON the complainants were ordered to leave the land because they will certainly lose the case

WON the sheriff seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the plaintiff.

HELD:
The case was dismissed. The court held that it is a basic rule that the material averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment,
determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the
simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.” It is the duty of the
court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was
ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted.

The records belie the claim of complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to the defendants. Records show that said writ
was served to the defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefore, nevertheless the
executing Sheriff left each a copy to the defendants.

As to the allegation that the judge was persuaded with money and told the complainants to leave the land were not supported by evidence
apart from the self-serving statements made by complainant. The court is not persuaded by said accusations hurled by complainant simply
because there is no evidence thereon to implicate the respondent Judge.

Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in his duty to issue a receipt for the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not issue
the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier for issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next day. From
the record, complainant made no averment that respondent Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving complainant a
receipt. It was reasonable to briefly wait until measurement could be made as to the volume of the palay after being cleaned and threshed
before issuance of the receipt. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff has regularly performed his official
duty.
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DIGEST OF AGRARIAN-RELATED SUPREME COURT RULINGS

(2000-2007)

JURISDICTION, THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES REMAINS
WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WHILE ONLY THE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION THEREOF IS VESTED
WITH THE DARAB; RESORT TO THE COURTS CANNOT BE FORECLOSED ON THE THEORY THAT THE COURTS ARE
THE GUARANTORS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, The Secretary of DAR, DARAB, Davao City and Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132767 (January 18, 2000)

Facts:

 Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao which were taken by the Department of Agrarian
Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for determination of the just compensation for its
property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao onJanuary 26, 1994. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
it was filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. The Decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just compensation

Held:

 No.
 To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
provides:

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"Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. — The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation
and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be
entitled to only one motion for reconsideration."

 As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the
original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been
transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid
for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
 The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the
decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
 Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.

ADMINISTRATOR/OVERSEER AT THE SAME TIME A TENANT, UNDER COMMON USAGE IN THE LOCALITY, THE
TERM ADMINISTRATOR IS USED INTERCHANGEABLY WITH TENANCY

Gerardo Rupa Sr. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Magin Salipot
G.R. No. 80129 (January 25, 2000)

Facts:

 The case at bar involves an action for redemption with damages filed by Gerardo Rupa Sr. against Magin Salipot. Rupa claimed that he
had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now,
sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also, that he is the overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses.
However, without any prior written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in January 1981.

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Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he sought assistance with the local office of Agrarian
Reform for the redemption of the questioned property and even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court.
 However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of
the subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finds, in substance, that
there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound by his
admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Mariano Luzong filed six months after the instant case
wherein he admitted that he was the overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses. Thus, negating his
claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land or a mere overseer thereof.

Held:

 In the case at bar, we find that there are compelling reasons for this Court to apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts on the ground that the "findings of fact of both courts is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is in actuality contradicted by evidence on record." A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, both the trial
court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa and instead relied mainly on the
statements made in the decision in another case.
 A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;

3. There is consent;

4. The purpose is agricultural production;

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5. There is personal cultivation; and

6. There is sharing of harvests.

 Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, Rupa could avail of the benefits afforded by R.A. No. 3844, as amended,
particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads:

"SECTION 12. Lessee's right of redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire
landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said
right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption."

 As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the
redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior
written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Section 11, RA 3844, as amended; c) only the area
cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e)
there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed.
 The statements made in the decision that "[Rupa] claimed that he was made administrator by the Lim spouses of their five (5) parcels of
land in Armenia, Uson, Masbate" and that the "prosecution witnesses in that case, namely, Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan
admitted that they were hired laborers of Rupa in tilling the land in question" should not have been relied upon by the CA to conclusively
disprove the tenancy relationship.
 First of all, we must look at the context in which these statements were made. The admission made by Rupa as stated in the decision was
made, as mentioned earlier, in a criminal case for malicious mischief which Rupa filed against one Mariano Luzong, son-in-law of Salipot,
on the ground that the latter destroyed the banana and cassava plants growing in Rupa's farm. Said statement was apparently made to
prove Rupa's standing to file the complaint and to prove how he could have witnessed the destruction made by said person.
 Second, in claiming that he was administrator of the property, Rupa, a farmer of limited education must have used the word
"administrator" in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. As aptly
pointed out by counsel for Rupa during the trial, with no objection from the counsel of Salipot, "under common usage in the locality, the
term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy.
 Third, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the "inherent incompatibility" between being a tenant-farmer and an administrator or
overseer. According to Rupa, he was tenant of one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other
four parcels of land owned by the said spouses. Salipot and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed Rupa to be an overseer and a copra
agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have been receiving a fixed salary. As tenant under our legal definition, he may have been
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sharing the harvests with the landowner. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility between the two. However, one could in
fact be overseer of a parcel of land, supervising the laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for one's services, and at the same time,
act as tenant farmer in another landholding.
 Fourth, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were "hired laborers" should not have been given significant weight by the
CA. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a person cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or omission of another, except as
provided by the Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-partner, agent, conspirator and privies. The said witnesses do not come under
any of these exceptions.
 As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that Rupa was a copra buyer from May 19, 1978 to October 10,
1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule out Rupa's claim that he was a tenant-farmer since 1962. Rupa has satisfactorily explained
that "pursuing two or three lines of work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come far and in between, and the tenant can
always engage in the business of copra-buying in the interim." Moreover, the dates indicated therein cover only a short period of time as
against Rupa's claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981.
 We are therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the records do not establish Rupa's status as an
agricultural tenant. Indeed, the testimony of Rupa and his witnesses in open court, in our view, had not been convincingly rebutted and we
have no reason to doubt the veracity of the testimonies of his witnesses. Certainly, the passing statements contained in the decision in the
criminal case for malicious mischief cannot overcome the evidentiary value of the testimonies of said witnesses. A meticulous review of
the record would have found overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa. A scrutiny of the entire evidence on hand would be in line with the
State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.

DECEIT/SQUATTING, RESPONDENT CANNOT IN GOOD FAITH ALLEGE TO BE A LAWFUL TENANT ONE MOMENT
AND BE AN OWNER THE NEXT
Raymundo T. Magdaluyo vs. Atty. Enrique L. Nace
Adm. Case No. 3808 (February 2, 2000)

Facts:

 Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Respondent was one of the squatters living in one of
the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the squatters, the latter
refused and instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants therein.

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 Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the
annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time, claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land. They traced their
alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.
 Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a case against respondent accusing him of
having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter.

Held:

 After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the former are as follows:

". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each
other which raises doubts about the respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can, in good
faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.

Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege
in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus deceiving the court and giving it
an inaccurate appreciation of facts.

Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet
respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer should know that a
Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land."

 The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by evidence on record.
 Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he
knew not to be his.
 As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the court will not tolerate.

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RETENTION/EXEMPTION, AN APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION AND AN APPLICATION FOR RETENTION ARE

DISTINCT REMEDIES IN LAW. FINALITY OF JUDGMENT IN ONE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE SUBSEQUENT
INSTITUTION OF THE OTHER

Eudosia Daez and/or Her heirs, Represented by Adriano D. Daez vs. Court of Appeals, Macario Sorientes, Apolonia Mediana, Rogelio Macatulad
and Manuel Umali
G.R. No. 133507 (February 17, 2000)

Facts:

 Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein
respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered
under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law.
 The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an
Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely
issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents.
 Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio
B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure
to prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on
appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous
Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the fact that a previous decision denying
the petition for exemption had long become final and executory

Held:

 It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct
remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment
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to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the
same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.
 The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social
justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed
to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the
landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
 The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY BE CREATED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE TRUE AND LAWFUL LANDHOLDER
WHO IS EITHER THE OWNER, LESSEE, USUFRUCTUARY OR LEGAL POSSESSOR OF THE LAND

Bayani Bautista vs. Patricia Araneta

G.R. No. 135829 (February 22, 2000)

Facts:

 In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since
1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio
Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments against his person, for the issuance of
a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right
as tenant of the land.
 Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum
Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the
establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall
under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. The
former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and

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refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff.
 The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said
Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal.
 Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio Araneta II whom he has known and believed as
the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner,
likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding

Held:

 The Appeal lacks merit.

 "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As
the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and
why he became a tenant."
 In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In
the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the
acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for
fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder."
 Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above,
DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde
vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions
that are not supported by substantial evidence.

JURISDICTION/AGRARIAN DISPUTE/LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP, NO AGRARIAN DISPUTE EXISTS IN THE CASE AT

BAR. THE DARAB HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE MAIN ISSUE. CLEARLY, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE DARAB ALSO
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ANCILLARY MATTERS INCIDENT THERETO

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Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos represented by his widow, Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 109992 (March 7, 2000)

Facts:

 The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel,
Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by
his heirs and represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.
 Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. On April 1, 1992, respondent
filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from
preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless".
 The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that
the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for
Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. The petition was dismissed.
 Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his
rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season".
 On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and
Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
 The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue. On July
8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and
intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with intervenor Antonio being recognized as the
duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review
on Certiorari.

Issue:

 Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question of ownership is pending
resolution with the Regional Trial Courts?

Held:

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 Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229,
228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

 "Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

 Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property.
 In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian
conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural
lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

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 Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not
have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place.
 The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As
such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties,
necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which
has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already
been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership.

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER/WAIVER OF RIGHTS/ABANDONMENT, THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS NULL AND VOID FOR
BEING CONTRARY TO OUR AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS. HOWEVER, VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF THE
LANDHOLDING IN FAVOR OF THE SAMAHANG NAYON CONSTITUTES AS A VALID GROUND FOR THE
ABANDONMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER PD 27

Gavino Corpuz vs. Spouses Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria Grospe

G.R. No. 135297 (June 8, 2000)

Facts:

 Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of
agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly
owned by a certain Florentino Chioco.
 Petitioner mortgaged the subject land to pay for his wife's hospitalization on January 20, 1982 in favor of Virginia de Leon. Upon the
expiration of the contract, he again mortgaged the property to respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four
years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa
Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage.
Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB in Cabanatuan City(Region III) against the respondents
averring that the latter entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed the palay planted on
the land.

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 Respondents in their answer, claimed that the petitioner himself allowed them to take over the possession and cultivation of the property
until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of
Rights" over the landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and claimed that his and
his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.
 The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who
were the "most qualified farmer(s)-beneficiaries".
 The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise,
petitioner's appeal and subsequent reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

 Whether or not the appellate court was correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his sons on the waiver were not forged?
 Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the waiver were genuine, was it (the waiver) null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws?
 Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27?
 Did he (petitioner), by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?

Held:

 As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB — an administrative body which has acquired
expertise on the matter — such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The presence or the absence of forgery
was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that
the appellate court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported by the evidence.
 We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the
alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old
feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from
the bondage of the soil. In Torres v. Ventura, the Court clearly held:

". . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors.

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. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular [No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:

"'Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights,
and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null and void."'

 Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act
by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never
returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
 The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy relationship; and (b) his failure to
work on the landholding for no valid reason. The CA also deemed the following as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the tenancy
relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private
respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding. We disagree.
 As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the private respondents were obligated
to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable
intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private
respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
 However, the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of
his rights under the agrarian laws.
 PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable except through hereditary
succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 also
provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee . . . ."
 To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private person. It was the government, through the DAR,
which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently
proved by competent evidence.
 Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms
part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD
27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrarian
reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or
surrendering tenant-farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that
the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
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JURISDICTION/AGRARIAN DISPUTE/TENANCY RELATIONSHIP, FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER OR

NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE
EXISTENCE OF AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISREGARDED THE DEFENDANT'S
ANSWER FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME

Jaime P. Corpin vs. Amor S. Vivar and the Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137350 (June 19, 2000)

Facts:

 Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure
to timely file his Answer with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision ordering
private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court and submitted documents
to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals. The latter upheld the Regional Trial
Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition.

Issues:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of Section 7, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court as it considered all the
documents submitted by the Private Respondent for the first time together with the memorandum
 Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties

Held:

 In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan circuit trial court, which dismissed
defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have
disregarded defendant's Answer and should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case.

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 What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel
Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
 Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may present evidence which may shed
light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
 Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between petitioner and respondent, which
was based on the documents attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not
previously presented to the municipal trial court in the original case, must be set aside.
 The records of the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court and hear the issue of jurisdiction.

INTERVENTION/PARTIES-IN-INTEREST, ASSUMING THAT THE LANDS ARE "CARPABLE", IT IS NOT THE

PETITIONER BUT THE MEMBERS THEREOF WHO ARE THE PROPER PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
CONTROVERSY

Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMP) vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al.
G.R. No. 139051 (June 26, 2000)

Facts:

 The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella granting the request for conversion of
1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu, Batangas into residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In
essence, the Order stated that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any tenant-tillers,
disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law.
 Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a forty-four (44) hectare portion filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to such, former President Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on
November 27, 1975 declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones more
suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and urban uses.
 In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-
Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their objections
to these Santiago notices.
 Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned
Order issued on May 27, 1975 and denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520,
Maragondon, Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones.

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 Meanwhile, on May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition with the DARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the
purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was
contrary to the Leong Order of January 22, 1991.
 Petitioner KSMP (Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc.) filed a complaint-in-intervention on the aforementioned case.
This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No.
47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB. The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition.

Held:

 We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that the Conversion Orders have long become final
and executory. There was, therefore, no more case to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly
dismissed pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the
private respondents is untenable. A perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the
purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final disturbance compensation to the legitimate farmer-
occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the
DARAB does not have any jurisdiction.
 Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition to intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest
are the members thereof who were not even recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR,
"members of petitioner are merely holding on to an expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still
CARPable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already been excluded from the purview of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had long become final and executory.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP/LEASEHOLD, BASICALLY, UNLESS THE PETITIONERS CAN SHOW PROOF THAT THEY
SHARED THE HARVESTS WITH THE LANDOWNER, NO TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CAN EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 108941 (July 6, 2000)

Facts:

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 Isabel Candelaria is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191 and TCT No. T-59172 measuring 16 hectares and 6
hectares, more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naiyan, Oriental Mindoro.
 On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement on the land with Pio Malabanan. The contract stipulated that
Malabanan will clear, clean and cultivate the land, purchase and plant calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds and make the necessary
harvests of fruits. Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear it.
 On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first agreement. Malabanan was under no
obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.
 In 1983, Malabanan died.
 On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact having powers of administration over
the disputed property.
 On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife, for a period of one
year. Meanwhile, the Bejasas agreed to pay rent to Victoria of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "Aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" also
for a term of one year. The Bejasas were unable to pay the full amount of the consideration. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use.
 On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasan again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land. The special power of
attorney in favor of Jaime Dinglasan was also renewed by Candelaria on the same date. Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking the ejectment of the Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the
case.
 Sometime on June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro against the Bejasas for
"Recovery of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages". The case was however referred to the DAR who in turn
certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. The trial court dismissed the complaint including the Bejasas'
counterclaim for leasehold and damages.
 The Bejasas then filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and homelot with recovery of damages"
against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bejasas reasoning that a tenancy relationship was
created between the parties and that as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.
 Respondents appealed the aforementioned decision. On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial
court's ruling. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue:

 Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship created in favor of the Bejasas?

Held:

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 The elements of a tenancy relationship are the following:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation; and

(6) there is sharing of harvests.

 After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
 Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
 There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
 In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests since "no receipt, or any other
evidence was presented." We added that "Self serving statements . . . are inadequate; proof must be adduced."
 Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent.
 The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not
know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's
lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for
P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of
harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a
tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
 Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy
agreement, there is no proof that they did.
 Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain
terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.

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COMPENSATION, RESPONDENT BANK WAS MANDATED TO PAY THE PETITIONER IN THE MANNER SET FORTH IN
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657. ITS COMPLIANCE WAS NOT AN UNDERTAKING TO PAY IN CASH BECAUSE SUCH ACT
WOULD HAVE BEEN A DEVIATION FROM THE DICTUM OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT, TO WHICH THE EXECUTION
MUST CONFORM. PAYING IN CASH, AS PETITIONER DEMANDS, IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH SUCH JUDGMENT

Edgardo Santos represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Romeo L. Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, Jesus Diaz, Roberto Ong and Augusto
Aquino
G.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)

Facts:

 Petitioners Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206. On August 12, 1997, the Regional Trial Court sitting as
an Agrarian Court fixed the amount of P49,241,876.00 as the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands owned by the
petitioner with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares, respectively. The properties were taken by the government pursuant to the Land
Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27. A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 has been previously
released by the Land Bank to the petitioner in cash and bonds. Hence, the balance of P45,698,805.34 was ordered by the Regional Trial
Court to be paid in accordance with R.A. No. 6657.
 The Land Bank released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash, Land Bank No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P4,128,024.81 to the
petitioner and P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as commission fees. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution before the Regional Trial Court praying that payment of the compensation be in the proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and
P32,499,745 in cash. Before the motion could be resolved, petitioner moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion for the
release of the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check, claiming that payment of the P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank
bonds was not acceptable. Land Bank opposed the motion contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied.
 The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the
garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank moved for reconsideration. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion to
hold the Land Bank in contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check.
 Respondent Regional Court was presided over by a new judge who resolved the two motions in an Order dated April 24, 1998. To
summarize, the new judge ruled that the payment of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18,
Republic Act No. 6657 as follows:

Total land value per judgment P49,241,876.00

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Amount payable in bonds:

70% (50 has) P22,323,932.75
75% (excess) 13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16

Amount payable in cash:

30% (50 has) P9,567,399.75
35% (excess) 4,337,635.81 13,905,035.56

Less:
Preliminary valuation: P3,543,070.66
Commissioner's Fee: 948,857.52
Payment to plaintiff on
12-24-97 3,621,023.01 P8,112,951.19

————————

P5,792,084.37

 The new judge further ruled that by implication, both the Order dated March 20, 1997 and the Order dated December 22, 1997 should be
deemed reconsidered.
 The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the Trial Court. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

 Basis of the determination of how much should be paid in cash and how much should be paid in bonds. And in relation thereto, whether
the April 24, 1998Order of Judge Villegas-Llaguno was proper?

Held:

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 The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had become final and executory. The
reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final
judgment.
 It is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid in the manner provided by RA 6657." Pursuant to
Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds, as indicated below:

"Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions

(a) For lands above fifty (50) Twenty-five percent (25%)

hectares, insofar as the
excess hectarage is
concerned.
(b) For lands above twenty-
Four (24) hectares and
up to Fifty (50) hectares
cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial
instruments negotiable
at any time
Thirty-percent (30%) cash,
the balance to be paid in
government financial
instruments negotiable at
anytime."

 Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No.
6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment.
 Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and
bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the
entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.

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EXEMPTION, SECTION 10 OF THE CARL IS CLEAR ON THIS POINT WHEN IT PROVIDES THAT "ALL LANDS WITH
EIGHTEEN PERCENT (18%) SLOPE AND OVER, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY DEVELOPED SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
THE COVERAGE OF THIS ACT"

Republic of the Philippines Rep. by the Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Green City Estate Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 139592 (October 5, 2000)

Facts:

 The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-
Jala, Province of Rizal were acquired by private respondent through purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. de Torres. The
tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject
parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law
of 1988 (CARL). Private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian reform
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director
recommended a denial of the said petition on the ground that private respondent "ailed to substantiate their (sic) allegation that the
properties are indeed in the Municipality's residential and forest conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor
irrigable".
 Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage, this time alleging that the property is within
the residential and forest conservation zones and offering a portion of about 15 hectares of land (irrigated riceland) to sell to farmer
beneficiaries or to DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. The latter in turn
created a commission to conduct ocular inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to conduct an inspection and
thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission.
 On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the Assailed DAR Orders and declaring the mountainous and
residential portions of the petitioner's land to be exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Hence, this petition
for review.

Issue:

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 Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are exempt from CARL coverage?

Held:

 There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would
proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for
exemption from CARP. In Halili vs. Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land
Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. The classification of the Board in said
case was more recent than that of the tax declaration and was based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat.
 The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly agricultural. In
essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree
slope containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area
of 8 hectares. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees
provides another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point
when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act."
 Petitioner DAR and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) contest the finding of the Court of Appeals that the subject parcels of land
have a mountainous slope on the ground that this conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not in accord with established surveying
procedures. They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the "slope" issue since this matter was allegedly never
raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner DAR and the OSG thus claim that laches had already set in.
 As pointed out earlier, the crux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue are exempt from the coverage of the
CARL. The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore material in the disposition of this case, for
which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the
creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the
determination of the slope of the subject parcels of land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of
commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed of persons who were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence
of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full
faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.

CONVERSION/DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, IN THE EVENT THAT TENANTED LAND IS CONVERTED PURSUANT

TO SECTION 36 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844, THE ONLY RELIEF AVAILABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS IS THE
PAYMENT OF A DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO FIVE TIMES THE AVERAGE OF THE GROSS
HARVESTS OF THE LANDHOLDING DURING THE LAST FIVE PRECEDING CALENDAR-YEARS. IN THIS CASE, THE
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AWARD OF A 75 SQUARE METER HOMELOT WAS MERELY MADE IN LIEU OF THE AFOREMENTIONED
DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION

Ernesto Bunye vs. Lourdes Aquino, et al.

G.R. No. 138979 (October 9, 2000)

Facts:

 Respondents Lourdes, Cita and Roberto, all surnamed Aquino are the children of the late Bartolome Aquino who was instituted in 1967 as
a tenant over a 16,974.50 square meter lot located at Ilaya Street, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila belonging to Zoilo Bunye, the
father of petitioner Ernesto Bunye. Sometime in 1970, Zoilo Bunye told Bartolome Aquino to stop cultivating 14,474.50 square meters of
the land since the former was going to devote the same to commercial uses. No disturbance compensation was paid to Bartolome Aquino,
but Zoilo Bunye permitted Bartolome Aquino to continue cultivating the remaining 2,500 square meters and promised him a homelot
within the said area. Considering himself aggrieved, Bartolome Aquino repaired to the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in order to seek
judicial recognition of his tenancy status over the remaining 2,500 square meters. The CAR rendered judgment recognizing Bartolome
Aquino as a tenant over 2,500 square meters of the subject property with a fixed annual rental of P140.00. On November 5, 1976, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the CAR's decision. Thus, Bartolome Aquino continued in the possession and cultivation of 2,500 square
meters of Zoilo Bunye's land and he constructed his family home on a 500 square meter area thereon.
 The controversy arose when Ernesto Bunye's petition for conversion of the remaining 2,500 square meters was approved by the Minister
of Agrarian Reform (MAR). Petitioner was able to eject the respondents from the 2,000 square meters but not from the 500 square meters
they occupied. Respondents filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator insisting that they are entitled
to the possession of the 500 square meters of land they occupied as homelot, it being part of the compensation for the deprivation of the
16,974.50 square meters of land originally tenanted by Bartolome Aquino.
 The Regional Adjudicator held that no tenurial relations could exist between the parties as the land ceased to be agricultural by virtue of its
conversion in 1986. However, petitioner was ordered to pay respondents disturbance compensation for the latter's dispossession from the
2,500 square meters homelot to respondents but only as an alternative relief in the event that the disturbance compensation could not be
computed. This Decision was affirmed by the DARAB and the Court of Appeals. However, acting upon a motion for reconsideration filed
by respondents, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by increasing the size of the homelot to 500 square meters. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue:

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 The sole issue is with respect to the legality of the appellate court's decision to increase the size of the homelot awarded to respondents to
500 square meters?

Held:

 SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land,
an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized
by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.

 Neither petitioner nor respondents questioned the conversion decreed in 1986, which was a factual finding of both the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Court of Appeals; therefore, it should be presumed that the conversion was validly and legally done. Thus, even
before Bartolome Aquino died in 1988, tenurial relations had already been extinguished, leaving respondents without any claim upon the
homelot allegedly promised by Zoilo Bunye to their father.
 In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, the only relief available to respondents is the
payment of disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years. The award of 75 square meters of land originally granted by the Regional Adjudicator and subsequently
affirmed by the DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance compensation for the dispossession of respondents of 2,500 square meters of
land. Although the Court of Appeals in its November 26, 1998 Decision affirmed the grant of 75 square meters of land as reasonable, it
simultaneously declared that respondents are entitled to disturbance compensation for the entire 16,974.50 square meters of land originally
tenanted by Bartolome Aquino.
 From 1976 until 1995, respondents never sought the payment of disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under
section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, an action to enforce any cause of action under such law shall be barred if not commenced within
three years after such cause of action accrued. Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square
meters of land of which their father was dispossessed in 1970 has prescribed. Thus, respondents are only entitled to disturbance
compensation for their dispossession of 2,500 square meters of land and we find that, in the absence of adequate data on the land's
harvests, the award of 75 square meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief.

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JURISDICTION, THE DAR IS VESTED WITH PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDICATE AGRARIAN
REFORM MATTERS AND SHALL HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ALL MATTERS INVOLVING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
ALSO, PARTICIPATION BY CERTAIN PARTIES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT RAISING ANY
OBJECTION THERETO, BARS THEM FROM ANY JURISDICTIONAL INFIRMITY AFTER AN ADVERSE DECISION IS
RENDERED AGAINST THEM

Cipriano Centeno, et al. vs. Ignacia Centeno

G.R. No. 140825 (October 13, 2000)

Facts:

 The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of the
suit for cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners before the DARAB. That
previous case culminated in a decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of the subject landholdings under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The case at bar is for the maintenance of her peaceful possession of the premises and to prevent the
petitioners from further harassing her and disturbing her possession and enjoyment thereof. The PARAD, the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals all rendered a decision in favor of the respondent adverting to the Decision of the DAR recalling and canceling the CLTs issued
in favor of the petitioners.
 The petitioners filed a Petition for Review assailing the jurisdiction of the DARAB over the case for maintenance of peaceful possession
averring that there is no tenancy relationship nor any agrarian dispute present in the case at bar which would place the case under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.

Issue:

 Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case for recovery of possession?

Held:

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 Under Section 50 of R.A 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
 Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides:

Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,and matters or incidents involving the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No.
3844 as amended by Republic Act No 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:

xxx xxx xxx

f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation
Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof; (Emphasis added.)

 Furthermore, petitioners are barred by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the DARAB. A perusal of the records will show
that petitioners participated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking for affirmative relief in their answer. This
Court has ruled that participation by certain parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from
any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.

RES JUDICATA, RES JUDICATA EXISTS IN THE CASE AT BAR. "AT THE RISK OF OCCASIONAL ERRORS, JUDGMENTS
OF COURTS SHOULD BECOME FINAL AT SOME DEFINITE DATE FIXED BY LAW"

Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, et al.

G.R. No. 137908 (November 22, 2000)

Facts:

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 The Caloses averred that their parents, Efipanio and Valentina were the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 23,7109
hectares located in Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukidnon covered by OCT No. P-2066 and issued by virtue of Homestead Patent No. V-42876.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land was placed under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently distributed to
qualified farmer beneficiaries. The original farmer-beneficiaries, however, allegedly unlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the
lands granted to them to third persons. The amended complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipation Patents and Transfer
Certificates of Title issued to these third persons. The PARAD rendered his decision ordering the revocation/cancellation of all EPs, CLTs,
TCTs and other titles involving OCT No. P-2066 for being null and void ab initio. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and
upheld the validity of the EPs and TCTs issued. This Decision was substantially affirmed by the Court of Appeals except on the part of
petitioner Ramon Ocho and Vicente Polinar who were directed "to restore and surrender to the government their landholdings". Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the basis of the
resolution in a previous case docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. 006-90 which the respondents have purportedly allowed to lapse
into finality.

Issue:

 Whether or not res judicata exists in the case at bar?

Held:

 There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the
proper quasi-judicial authority (the hearing officer of the DAR) in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision became final and executory when
the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof after their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
 As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:

. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by
its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question
litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more
even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of
every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.

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 The findings of the Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long attained finality, averring that petitioner is not the owner of
any other agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the same parties and property. The CA thus erred in still
making a finding that petitioner is not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns other agricultural lands.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT EXIST ON THE MERE BASIS OF AN "INSIDIOUS SALE" OR TRANSFER OF
TENANCY RIGHTS MADE BY THE FORMER LESSEE

Angel Chico vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 134735 (December 5, 2000)

Issue:

 Whether or not a tenancy relationship can exist on the mere basis of an "insidious" sale or transfer of tenancy right by the former lessee
(Eugenia Esguerra) to the petitioner (Angel Chico)?

Held:

 No.
 Jurisprudence has established pre-requisite conditions in order that an agricultural leasehold relationship can be said to be extant; to wit:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;

(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

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 The matter of whether or not such an agreement exists between petitioner and private respondents (the owners) over the parcel of land in
question is a factual question.
 Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy relationship between the parties. This de
jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not
brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial.

RETENTION/DUE PROCESS, THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS SIMPLY AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD OR, AS
APPLIED IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACTION
OR RULING COMPLAINED OF
ALSO, THE ISSUANCE OF AN EMANCIPATION PATENT DOES NOT BAR THE LANDOWNER FROM RETAINING THE
AREA COVERED THEREBY
Lucia Mapa vda. de dela Cruz, et al. vs. Adjuto Abille
G.R. No. 130196 (February 26, 2001)

Facts:

 To cut a long story short, Herminio Abille filed a Petition for Exemption under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings
alleging that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to due process since DAR did not notify him or his representatives of the
OLT coverage of his lot.
 On April 19, 1989, DAR Regional Director Antonio Nuesa, Region I, San Fernando, La Union issued an Order denying the petition for
exemption and instead merely granted Herminio Abille a right of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares. On July 24, 1989,
Herminio Abille selected the seven-hectare retention area which included the area covered by CLT No. 0-064711, hence, said CLT was
automatically cancelled. Even the Tax Declaration issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz was cancelled and re-issued in favor of
Herminio Abille.
 Meanwhile, petitioners who are the compulsory heirs of Balbino dela Cruz filed with the DAR a petition for issuance of Emancipation
Patent. In his comment, respondent Adjuto Abille representing Herminio Abille prayed for the dismissal of the petition by reason of the
DAR Order dated April 19, 1989. On the basis of such, on October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis issued an Order denying
the petition for issuance of Emancipation Patent. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issued
declaring as null and void the Order dated April 19, 1989 on the basis of absence of due process of law. They sought the reinstatement of
CLT No. 0-064711 and the issuance of an emancipation patent in their favor as compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz.
 The motion for reconsideration was treated as an Appeal and elevated to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform who
rendered a Decision dismissing the instant motion for lack of merit and instead ordered the preparation of Certificates of Agricultural
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Leasehold (CALs) to the tenants as lessees thereat. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. They filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals which was also dismissed by the CA in a Decision promulgated on December 5, 1996. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for issuance of emancipation patent filed by the heirs of Balbino dela
Cruz?

Held:

 We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director
Antonio Nuesa in his Order dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained
area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent, petitioners were given such opportunity as they raised in issue
the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October
21, 1992, and also in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied).
 In the case of Daez v. Court of Appeals, where the Certificates of Land Transfer of farmer beneficiaries over some four (4) hectares of
riceland were issued without the landowner having been accorded her right to choose what to retain among her landholdings, we held that
the Transfer Certificate of Title issued on the basis of Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the farmer-beneficiaries cannot operate to
defeat the right of the heirs of the deceased landowner to retain the said riceland. Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar
the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:

"Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for
violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from P.D. No.
27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area." (emphasis supplied.)

 The earlier cases of Locsin, et al. v. Valenzuela, et al. and Quiban v. Butalid, which were cited by the petitioners, did not involve any issue
of retention rights of the landowner, hence, the said cases are not applicable to the case at bar.
 Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part
of a department head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with.

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APPEAL, CERTIORARI CANNOT BE RESORTED TO AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY OF APPEAL. AN
APPEAL IS A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE AND IT MAY ONLY BE EXERCISED IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW

Roberto Mito vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 126099 (March 12, 2001)

Facts:

 In an Administrative transfer action in May 1985, the Gapan-Penaranda Agrarian Reform Team Office No. 077, with station at Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, cancelled a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of Leonardo Flores, now deceased. Subsequently, it was re-
issued in the name of petitioner, Roberto G. Mito. Private respondent Victorino Flores, brother of Leonardo Flores, filed a letter-complaint
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region III, alleging that the transferred lot was actually his and that its transfer to
petitioner was unlawful.
 DAR dismissed the claim of private respondent Flores, declared petitioner Mito as a tenant-beneficiary of the land and directed the MARO
to issue a CLT or an Emancipation Patent in favor of Mito.
 Private respondent appealed to the DARAB, which promulgated a decision reversing the order of the Regional Director. It ordered the
DAR Provincial Office to issue an Emancipation Patent in favor of private respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to petitioner's failure to
utilize the correct remedy, specifically a petition for review without necessarily impleading the agency a quo and for violation of SC
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 on the filing of certified true copies of the material portions of the record referred to be
submitted. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Order dated January 4, 1990 of the Regional Director of DAR is supported by substantial evidence?

Held:

 We note that at the time of the promulgation of the DARAB decision on June 1, 1995, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR
were governed by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91). As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the
remedy should have been a petition for review, filed by petitioner in seven legible copies, without impleading the DARAB, the agency a
quo, as required by Circular No. 1-95. As found by the respondent court, not only did petitioner implead the DARAB, all his annexes
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other than the assailed resolutions of the DARAB were not certified true copies. In addition, it did not state the date petitioner received a
copy of each resolution, such that it could not be determined if the appeal was filed on time. Petitioner's failure to comply with the
requirements for perfecting an appeal merited the dismissal of his petition before the Court of Appeals.
 Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is a statutory privilege and it may only be
exercised in the manner provided by law.

CIVIL LAW LEASE, ALL THE REQUISITES OF A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MUST BE PRESENT, OTHERWISE, THERE
IS NO AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD EXISTING BETWEEN THE PARTIES BUT A MERE CIVIL LAW LEASE

Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez
G.R. No. 110012 (March 28, 2001)

Facts:

 Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and
private respondent Dominador Fernandez, respectively entered into a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon,
Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10
years until 1987 but adopting the terms and conditions of the original contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent
repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for ejectment was filed by
respondent against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is a civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner
to vacate the fishpond in question and surrender peaceful possession thereof.
 Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. However, the
Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds that the
agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease and not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly
termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in
question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over the subject premises ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease?

Held:
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 The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also
Sintos vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).
 Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and private respondent's father wherein petitioner's
father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the
spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or
implicitly. One of the essential requisites for existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and
no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for the petitioner to
pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy
relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time.

CERTIORARI/APPEAL/EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, IN THE CASE AT BAR, CERTIORARI WILL LIE

IF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OR THE APPEAL TO THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM WILL NOT PROVE TO BE A SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY

Heirs of Pedro Atega, represented by Veronica Atega-Nable vs. Ernesto Garilao, et al.
G.R. No. 133806 (April 20, 2001)

Facts:

 The land owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega with an area of 129.4615 hectares was made the subject of compulsory acquisition and
distribution pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Heirs protested to the MARO
who ignored the same considering that the PARO had already sent a Notice of Land Acquisition and Valuation. Petitioners then filed an
application for exemption with the Regional Director who denied the application on the basis of the lack of approval by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required by DAR Administrative Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90.
 Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed for
prematurity on the ground that the former failed to first exhaust all available administrative remedies. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

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 Whether or not the dismissal of the petition on the ground of prematurity (for failure to first file a motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of respondent Regional Director or an Appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform) was proper?

Held:

 In sum, we rule that certiorari will lie because a motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director or an appeal to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform will not prove to be a speedy or adequate remedy. However, we find that the Regional Director did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' application for Exemption of their property from the CARP.
 According to DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, an Application for Exemption from the coverage
of CARP filed before the Regional Director must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance
has been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect. In the instant case, no such accompanying
certification from the HLURB was filed by petitioners.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, THE PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER FINDS
NO JUSTIFICATION BOTH IN LAW AND IN JURISPRUDENCE

Lilia Gonzalez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 106028 (May 09, 2001)

Facts:

 Petitioner received two (2) orders from the DAR Regional Director directing her to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other
requirements of Land Bank for her to be paid the aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for two parcels of land owned by her.
 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the
enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction. The former
alleged that she never filed a land transfer claim and that she was not notified, nor heard of in the execution of the final survey plans and
the valuation of her land.
 After requiring the respondents to file a comment, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for failure of the
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals held that Certiorari cannot be used to substitute for Appeal. Hence,
this Petition.

Issues:

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 Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in dismissing the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies
 Whether or not respondents DAR Director and LBP acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the availed Orders
dated November 27, 1990 andApril 22, 1991

Held:

 The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an
administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the
petitioner.
 After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applicable in this case.
 It may be reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and tenant emancipation
program of the government is within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional Director. However, questions as to the propriety
of the issuance could have still been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of going directly to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari, the petitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have been given an opportunity to
review the matter and resolve the controversy.
 The petitioner raises the following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as applicable to the case at bar: (1)
where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process; and (3)
where the question involved is a purely legal one. We are not convinced that any of the exceptions obtains here. As above stated, the
Orders issued by the Regional Director pursuant to law are not patent nullities, and the alleged denial of the petitioner's right to due
process is intertwined with the question of notice upon the petitioner which raises basically a factual matter, i.e., whether three notices
were properly served upon petitioner. This issue is not to be resolved by the Court of Appeals in the first instance on certiorari. We do not
see how the controversy raises a purely legal question.
 The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to
go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort
to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove
advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available — the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of
cases involving land valuation or determination of just compensation.

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 Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered
fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.

OLT COVERAGE OF A LAND SUBJECT OF UNREGISTERED DEED OF DONATION, AN UNREGISTERED DEED OF

DONATION CANNOT OPERATE TO EXCLUDE THE SUBJECT LAND FROM THE COVERAGE OF
THE OPERATION LAND TRANSFER PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT

Ignacio Gonzales, et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 110335 (June 18, 2001)

Facts:

 The deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 551-C and
558-A containing 46.97 hectares and 37.5735 hectares, respectively. Marina Gonzales died intestate. On the other hand, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972conveying his share of the property, specifically Lot No. 551-C in favor of his 14
grandchildren. However, the said donation was not registered. Thus, when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the
landholdings of the spouses were placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and private respondents were accordingly issued EPs and
CLTs. On March 5, 1974, the administratix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of OLT. The application was initially denied but was finally granted by DAR
Secretary Benjamin Leong. Aggrieved, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the action of the DAR and
upheld the issuance of the certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same wad
denied by the CA. Hence, this Appeal.

Issues:

 Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect should be excluded from
the Operation LandTransfer Program?

Held:

 Article 749 of the Civil code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of
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the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons."
 It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides:

SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner — . . . But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

 The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned.
 Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates constructive notice to the whole world
(Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994]). Thus, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529,
provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration — Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

 The ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of
the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights
and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so because in the case at bar,
they have been cultivating the land even before World War II.

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB, IN ORDER "TO ACHIEVE A JUST, EXPEDITIOUS AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION
OF EVERY ACTION OR PROCEEDING BEFORE IT", THE DAR IS MANDATED "TO ADOPT A UNIFORM RULE OF
PROCEDURE" (SECOND PARAGRAPH, SECTION 50, R.A. NO. 6657), WHICH IS, AT PRESENT, THE DARAB REVISED
RULES
THERE IS A DISTINCT DELINEATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DARAB/RARAD/PARAD AND THE DAR REGIONAL
OFFICE, THUS, THE THEORY OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION MUST BE REJECTED

Victoria P. Cabral vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 101974 (July 12, 2001)

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Facts:

 Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of several parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan among which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390. As early as July 1973,
petitioner had already purportedly applied for the reclassification or conversion of the land for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The application for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April
25, 1988, Emancipation Patents and thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor of private respondents.
 Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs with the BARC on January 16, 1990 and on January 19, 1990, filed another petition for the
cancellation of the said Emancipation Patents and Torrens Title.
 The said petition was dismissed in an Order dated February 11, 1990 by then Regional Director Eligio Pacis. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of due process. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied prompting the petitioner to turn to the Supreme Court for relief. Also, on April 21, 1993,
petitioner filed with the Court an urgent Motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order alleging that respondent Gregoria Adolfo
had already conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand Development Corporation and the Sta. Rita Steel Resources Corporation
for the conversion of the land from agricultural to commercial and industrial purposes. In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.

Issue:

 Who has jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as contended by the
Petitioner or the Regional Director?

Held:

 Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have had over the cancellation of emancipation patents is lost with
the passage of subsequent laws.
 Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the Mechanism for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program) granted DAR quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters, to wit:

"SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian

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reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)."

 Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform
and for other purposes) subsequently provided for the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting it the powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases:

"SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. — There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the
Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by the
Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions
may be delegated to the regional office of the Department in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board."

 Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Law of 1988 (CARL). Section 50 thereof states:

"SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

 CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two newspapers of general circulation.
 In order "to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it," the DAR is mandated "to
adopt a uniform rule of procedure" (Second par., Section 50, RA. No. 6657), which is, at present, the DARAB Revised Rules. The Rules
were promulgated on December 26, 1988.
 The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes the DARAB to delegate its powers and
functions to the regional office in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board. The authority purportedly provides
additional justification for the Regional Office's jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the DARAB, through its Revised Rules,
has delegated such powers and functions to the RARADs and the PARADs, which, under Section 3 of the Rules, "are deemed to form part
of the DAR Regional Office where they are stationed."
 It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is granted with a fusion of governmental powers, in this
case, a commingling of the quasi-judicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of

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governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward
such delegation.
 In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication results in
confusion between the various agencies upon whom these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are supposed to serve. It
divides the agencies' resources and prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very
situation is evident in the various laws' distinct delineation of the functions of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional
Office. Accordingly, the Court must reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold that the DAR
Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.

INTERVENTION, FOR SUCH A MOTION FOR INTERVENTION TO BE ENTERTAINED, TWO (2) REQUISITES MUST
CONCUR: FIRST, THE WOULD BE INTERVENOR MUST SHOW THAT HE HAS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OR INTEREST IN
THE CASE AND THAT, SECOND, IT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY PURSUED AND PROTECTED IN ANOTHER
PROCEEDING

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al. vs. Tropical Homes Inc.

G.R. No. 136827 and 136799 (July 31, 2001)

Facts:

 Carlos Iñigo was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land located in Bago Iñigo, Toril, Davao City with an aggregate area of more
or less one million five hundred thirty two thousand four hundred fifteen (1,532,415) square meters. On July 17, 1971, Iñigo and
respondent Tropical Homes Inc. (Tropical for brevity) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for the development of the property into a
residential area which was later known as the "Better Living Subdivision". Tropical even filed with the City Council of Davao an
application for reclassification of the area from agricultural to residential. On October 2, 1972, the City Council of Davao, through
Resolution No. 558 declared the site of the Better Living Subdivision as a residential area.
 Carlos Iñigo died. On February 14, 1975, the aforementioned properties were divided among his heirs through a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition. The old titles were cancelled and new ones issued in the name of the heirs. When the Joint Venture Agreement initiated by the
late Carlos Iñigo and respondent Tropical pushed through with the Notice and Manifestation of conformity of the Heirs, the new titles
were again cancelled and replaced by new titles all registered in the name of Tropical.
 However, the DAR through its Davao Office subjected the aforementioned properties under CARP coverage. DAR issued three (3)
Notices of Acquisition to Tropical covering one million thirty seven thousand two hundred seventy two (1,037,272) square meters of the
land. Thereafter, TCT No. T-184249 was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, DAR through Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 301148 distributed the landholding to the identified farmer beneficiaries.

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 Tropical filed a petition with the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) for the cancellation of the CLOA on the ground that the landholding
was outside the coverage of the CARP. While the petition was pending, a Motion for Intervention was filed by Rolando B. Bersamin, et al.,
alleging that they are the bona fide residents of the landholding but were excluded in the CLOA. The PARAD ruled in favor of Tropical
and denied the Motion for Intervention ruling that the issue in intervention can be threshed out in a separate proceeding. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD. On December 11, 1997, Tropical
filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals and an urgent Motion for the issuance of a TRO. The TRO was granted
and later replaced by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of Tropical. Both
Petitioners and Petitioners-Appellants moved for reconsideration. The first motion was denied for having been filed beyond the fifteen (15)
day reglementary period while the second motion was ordered expunged from the rollo on the ground that they were not parties to the case
and that at no point in the legal process from the PARAD to the CA were they allowed to intervene. Hence, the present petitions.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners/appellants?

Held:

 Not having perfected their appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law, the decision of the Court of Appeals had become final
and executory. Such a failure carries with it the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. However, it is
true that we have recognized certain exceptions to this rule. In Ramos v. Bagasao, we excused the delay of four (4) days in the filing of a
notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant at a time when her counsel of record was
already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four (4) days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six (6) days to prevent a gross miscarriage
of justice since it stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for educational
purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had
theretofore been judicially settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant
being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. Unfortunately, we find no reason to make this case an exception. Our
ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson has been in force for fifteen (15) years. It is hard to believe that petitioners were not aware
of this ruling, or assuming that they were, their utter disregard of it is simply unacceptable.
 The petitioners-appellants in G.R. No. 136799 likewise committed a procedural error fatal to their cause of action. When they filed their
Motion for Intervention on November 25, 1996, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure was already in effect. Rule IX, Sec. 3 thereof
states —

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"SECTION 3. Intervention. — The filing of a motion for intervention shall be discouraged. Such motion shall be entertained only
upon a clear showing by the would-be intervenor that he has a substantial right or interest in the case that cannot be adequately pursued and
protected in another proceeding."

 Thus, for such a motion for intervention to be entertained, two (2) requisites must concur. First, the would-be intervenor must show that he
has a substantial right or interest in the case and that, second, it cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. The
absence of even one requisite will warrant its denial. Acting on this provision, the PARAD in fact denied the motion for intervention,
ruling that "their (petitioners-intervenors) rights over the property . . . can be properly threshed out in a separate proceeding duly instituted
for the purpose". In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we held that the discretion of a court (in this case a quasi-judicial agency) to allow
intervention, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has
been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Petitioners-appellants have not shown that the exercise of this discretion was made in
the manner above-described. Hence, it behooves this Court to leave the denial of the motion for intervention to the wisdom of the PARAD.
Besides, the theory of petitioners-appellants that as bona fide occupants of the landholding, they automatically acquire a substantial right
or interest in the case is unmeritorious. The right or interest here referred to is generally required to be direct and not consequential, and
one properly determinable in the action in which intervention is sought. The issue of whether or not they were improperly excluded from
the CLOA is an issue totally different from that in G.R. No. 136827, which is whether the City Council of Davao, through Resolution No.
558, validly reclassified the landholding from agricultural area to residential area, hence, rendering it outside the coverage of the CARP. If
indeed it was validly reclassified, then there would be no CLOA to speak of. Petitioners-appellants would have had no cause of action.
Conversely, if the reclassification was invalid, then the CLOA's legality would merely be affirmed. It must be borne in mind that the
alleged substantial right or interest of petitioners-appellants is based not on the legality or illegality of the CLOA brought about by the
supposed questionable reclassification done by the City Council of Davao through Resolution No. 558, rather, it is based on their claim
that they were improperly excluded from it. Thus, their interest is not one properly determinable in the action in which intervention is
sought. To further complicate the case by adding parties who have totally separate interests which can be the proper subject of a separate
proceeding, will simply delay the expeditious resolution thereof. It has been settled that the right to intervene is not an absolute right, for
the statutory rules or conditions for the right to apply must be shown. As the two (2) requisites were not met, petitioners-appellants have
no standing to intervene. At this point, the proper course of action was simply to have filed a separate proceeding altogether.
 It is indeed lamentable that the two (2) instant petitions must be denied for failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in
the Rules of Court. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

VESTED RIGHT, A PARTY CANNOT CLAIM THAT HE HAS A VESTED RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WHEN
THERE IS CLEARLY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW

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Graciano Palele vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) and Tomas Sobreviñas
G.R. No. 138289 (July 31, 2001)

Facts:

 The properties involved in this case form part of a larger tract of land referred to as Lot No. 707 consisting of 9,939 meters in Dinalupihan,
Bataan. The original holder-cultivator of the lot was respondent Tomas Sobreviñas' father, Daniel who had worked on the lot as a tenant
since the 1920s. Tomas succeeded to the possession of the said lot.
 On May 2, 1962, private respondent filed an application with the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of Lot No. 707. He paid
the purchase price of P810.66 in five installments and completed full payment on September 7, 1973, however, no deed of sale was issued
to him and the lot remained the property of the government. In 1981, the lot was subdivided into four (4) parcels of lands. On September
23, 1990, petitioner Graciano Palele applied for the purchase of two of the lots. Subsequently, DAR issued two (2) CLOAs covering the
two lots applied for. Private respondent being unaware of these incidents continued paying the real estate taxes on Lot No. 707 and upon
learning of the issuance of the CLOAs in favor of the petitioner, filed a petition for cancellation of the certificates on August 18, 1992. On
September 23, 1993, the PARAD rendered judgment for the petitioner. This Decision was affirmed by the DARAB. However, on appeal,
the said Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The CLOAs were ordered recalled and cancelled. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

Issue:

 Whether or not private respondent has acquired a vested right on the subject landholdings

Held:

 At the time private respondent applied to purchase Lot No. 707 on May 2, 1962, the law in effect was R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, which took effect on August 30, 1954. Pursuant to the said law, the then Land Tenure
Administration, the implementing agency of the government, issued Administrative Order No. 2, which was approved on May 10, 1956.
So far as pertinent to this case, Sections 14 and 16 of the Order provided:

SECTION 14. Persons Qualified to Purchase; Number of Lots Granted. — Subject to the provisions of Section 16 hereof, any private
individual who is qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines and who will personally cultivate and/or occupy the lot or lots which
may be sold to him, may be allowed to purchase not more than one (1) home lot and/or farm lot except that in case of farm lots with areas

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less than six (6) hectares, more than one (1) lot may be purchased provided, however, that the total area of the lots which may be sold to one
person shall not exceed six (6) hectares.

The cultivation of a farm lot by the husband or wife of the purchaser thereof, and by the members of the family of said purchaser who are
dependent upon him or her for support shall be considered as his or her cultivation for the purpose of this section and of Sections 24 and 25
hereof.

Section 16. Right of Preference to Purchase of Bona-fide Tenant, Bona-fide Occupant and Other Persons. — The bona-fide tenant and in
his absence or if he fails to qualify under Section 14 hereof, the bona-fide occupant of a subdivision lot in a private agricultural land
acquired by the government shall have the right of preference to purchase said lot. In the absence of the bona-fide tenant and/or bona-fide
occupant or in case said tenant and occupant fail to qualify under Section 14 hereof and subject to the provision of said section, the
following persons shall be preferred in the purchase of a farm lot and/or home lot, in the order in which they are named:

(1) A person who is the purchaser of a farm lot or lots in an agricultural land acquired by the government, the production of which yields
a net profit insufficient to maintain a decent standard of living provided, however, that he will be preferred only as to the portion of the farm
lot applied for in the same agricultural land which if added to the area of the lot or lots already sold to him will not exceed six (6) hectares;

(2) A person who is a resident of the municipality where the lot applied for is located.

These provisions clearly require that the applicant should personally cultivate and/or occupy the land subject of the purchase. This
requirement is reiterated in Sections 23 and 24 of the same order.

 It cannot be denied that private respondent had ceased to personally occupy and cultivate Lot No. 707 at least on August 8, 1963. Only a
year after his application and before he had fully paid the purchase price of the land, private respondent had already instituted tenants on
the said lot. This is clearly indicative of his circumvention of applicable agrarian reform laws. The fact that in 1992 he was surprised to
know that the lot had already been subdivided into smaller parcels since 1981, and that two of which had already been awarded to
petitioner, indicates quite clearly that he was not personally cultivating Lot No. 707. Thus, the Land Tenure Administration, and later the
Land Authority, was justified in refusing to issue a deed of sale in favor of respondent even though he paid in full the purchase price of the
lot.
 While it is true that due process protects vested rights, and this Court would be the first to stress this basic principle, it is no less true that
the guarantee cannot be invoked when, as in the case at bar, no right has been acquired at all because of non-compliance with the
requirements of the law.

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SECURITY OF TENURE, THE PREVAILING PARTY IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE CANNOT DISPOSSESS ONE
CLAIMING TO BE AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT THEREIN AND WHOSE SECURITY RIGHTS ARE STILL PENDING
DETERMINATION BEFORE THE DARAB

Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 128177 (August 15, 2001)

Issue:

 May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending
determination before the DARAB?

Held:

 A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land whose security of tenure rights are still
pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in
possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's
occupancy was unlawful.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MAY BE ESTABLISHED EITHER VERBALLY OR IN WRITING, EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY

Pevet Adalid Felizardo, et al. vs. Siegfredo Fernandez

G.R. No. 137509 (August 15, 2001)

Facts:

 To summarize, the petitioners in the case at bar are the registered owners of a parcel of land originally tilled by the father of the
respondent. Even during the lifetime of his father, respondent was already the one doing the duties of a tenant until the latter's death in
1995. However, petitioners would like to institute the elder sister of respondent as tenant of the land despite the allegation of respondent
that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he was already the declared tenant of the land.

Issue:

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 Whether Siegfredo has acquired the status of agricultural tenant which would preclude petitioners from exercising their right to choose
Asuncion (elder sister of respondent) as Policarpio's successor after the latter's death?

Held:

 The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is that respondent worked on the land since 1981 because his father could no longer do so.
Respondent did not merely aid his father in the latter's farm work, but completely took over that work since Policarpo was already very old
and incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p) of R.A. No. 1199 defines "incapacity" as any cause or circumstance which prevents the
tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations. Respondent fully assumed his father's leasehold obligations for 15 years precisely
because Policarpo could no longer perform his duties as petitioners' tenant and respondent is the only member remaining of the original
tenant's immediate farm household.
 The Regional Adjudicator correctly took judicial notice of the fact that at the age of 74, Policarpo was not able and could not reasonably
be expected to till the land anymore. Petitioners were not unaware of this circumstance since they already dealt with and received the
land's proceeds from respondent. The incapacity of Policarpo to attend to farm work had been evident to petitioners. The prevailing
situation in the farm and the length of time which had lapsed from the time respondent assumed the tenancy work until his father's death
amply support that conclusion.
 A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No.
1199. As aptly held by the Regional Adjudicator:

. . . the transfer and/or delegation of such tenancy obligations to herein complainant [respondent] was in conformity to the general practice
among farmers, especially so in the case of complainant who had been assisting his father in the farmworks (sic). When defendants failed to
intervene or object to this development, and continued to accept their shares as proffered by the new cultivator, they have thereby impliedly
consented to it giving rise to the new tenancy relationship with the complainant.

 Although petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the
tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from him the landowner's share
of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
 While it is true that Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landowner the right to choose a tenant successor in case of death or
incapacity of the original tenant, in this case we agree that said right could no longer be exercised by petitioners. Not only have they
allowed the lapse of a long period of time before attempting to exercise said right, it was also found that the successor they had allegedly
chosen, Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, was not qualified to succeed Policarpo because (a) she was no longer a member of the latter's
immediate farm household; and (b) she could not and did not, at any time, personally cultivate the land as shown by her unexplained
absence during the harvests subsequent to respondent's dispossession. Note also that in 1995, she was already 65 years old.

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CARP COVERAGE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS, TWO NOTICES ARE REQUIRED: FIRST, THE NOTICE OF
COVERAGE AND LETTER OF INVITATION TO A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND, SECOND, THE NOTICE OF
ACQUISITION TO BE SENT TO THE LANDOWNER
EXEMPTION, MORE THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND AS PARK IS THAT SAID LAND FORMS A
VITAL PART OF A WATERSHED AREA AND HAS SLOPES OF 18% AND OVER WHICH ARE EXEMPT UNDER SECTION
10 OF R.A. NO. 6657

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 112526 (October 12, 2001)

Facts:

 Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81949 and 84891 with a total area of 254.6
hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang Community and
ninety (90) light industries located in the area.
 Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Respondents filed a civil case
with the RTC of Laguna seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. Petitioner countered by seeking the
ejectment of the respondents and filed separate complaints for forcible entry against the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court,
Cabuyao, Laguna. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the DAR for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC
property under CARP.
 Eventually, after a long and arduous process, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition to petitioner and placed the properties under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program despite the protest made by
SRRDC that the property was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area being rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% or over and
that the occupants of the land were squatters not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. SRRDC further averred that the properties were
exempt from CARP coverage because it had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land
conversion. Later, the case was referred to the DARAB for summary land valuation.
 In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a Decision finding that the private respondents illegally
entered the SRRDC property and ordered them evicted.
 On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a Memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust
account in favor of SRRDC for P5,637,965.55 as valuation for the SRRDC property.
 On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated its Decision which, among others, dismissed the petitioner's protest against compulsory
coverage for lack of merit, ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay SRRDC the amount of P7,841,997.64 for the landholdings
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covered by the two titles and ordered the DAR through the MARO to take immediate possession of the landholding after transfer of the
titles in the name of the Republic of the Philippines for the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to farmer-beneficiaries.
 On January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 ruling that private respondents were
builders in bad faith.
 On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review of the DARAB decision. The CA promulgated a
decision affirming the Decision of the DARAB. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP considering that it forms part of a watershed area and has slopes of 18% and
over

Held:

 First, under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land, Compulsory and Voluntary.
 In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
 Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR
of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
 If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title.
Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase
price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of
its decision and the amount of just compensation.
 The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land,
the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on
July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such
lands.
 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of
all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a
Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of
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Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions,
objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
 For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a
preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-beneficiaries and other interested parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
 The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot
be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL
is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under
the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
 In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in
accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust accounts as was done by DAR.
 In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either."
 Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of
SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had not declared the
property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the
municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued Resolution 26 voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring
that the land was now classified as agricultural land.
 The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of
eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs."
 In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the
CARL, may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
 However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels
of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.
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 The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of
the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational
responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
 Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property
has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R.A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:

"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research
and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."

 Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory
acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
 To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-
evaluation of the issue.

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB IS LIMITED TO CASES INVOLVING TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PARTIES

Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete vs. Marcelo Andres and The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122276 (November 20, 2001)

Facts:

 Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the
subject property peacefully and exclusively.
 However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin on August 17, 1979 filed false reports
making it appear that Almuete has waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo Andres was the actual occupant of the

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land from 1967 to date. Said Gragasin further recommended that the award in favor of petitioner Almuete be cancelled and the land be
awarded to respondent Marcelo.
 Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos,
immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and
wasted no time in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela,
Br. 20 docketed as Civil Case No. Br-20-530. The Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and executory
upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a petition for certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of execution
which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

 Who between the petitioner and the respondent has a better right to the subject property considering that both of them are awardees of the
same property?

Held:

 No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the
relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
 Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

"Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.

 "Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No 6657, as:

"(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

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It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

 From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

 The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular
courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530. Its decision
was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing more can be done with the decision except to
enforce it.

LEASEHOLD TENANCY, THE QUESTION REGARDING RESPONDENT'S TENANCY STATUS IS FACTUAL IN NATURE
AND NORMALLY IS NOT PROPER IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW WHERE ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE
ENTERTAINED. HOWEVER, IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, WHEN THERE APPEARS TO BE COMPELLING REASONS TO
MODIFY SUCH, THE SAID FACTUAL FINDINGS MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF REVIEW
Felix Pascual vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Victor Solis
G.R. No. 138781 (December 3, 2001)

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Facts:

 On March 5, 1992, petitioner brought an action for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction" against respondent Victor Solis before the DARAB Region III in Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner alleged that respondent tried to
enter into possession and cultivation of the above described agricultural lots thus disrupting petitioner's peaceful possession and personal
cultivation of the same.
 Respondent in his answer averred that he is a lawful tenant of the lots and insisted that as a legitimate tenant, he enjoyed security of tenure
and cannot be ejected from the land except upon authority of the court. To substantiate his assertion, respondent presented two (2)
agricultural leasehold contracts as well as two (2) Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CALs).
 Petitioner countered by averring that respondent abandoned the first lot and voluntarily surrendered the second lot upon payment of a
disturbance compensation of P18,000.00. Furthermore, as a consequence of the voluntary surrender made by the respondent, petitioner
was able to sell the second lot to the spouses Jose Bernardo and Rosa Payumo as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" (Venta
Absoluta) dated December 11, 1985. Thus, the issue of respondent's status as lessee should be properly addressed to the new owners.
 In due course, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and against defendant (respondent) Victor
Solis, ruling that respondent was not a tenant of the disputed lots.
 On appeal, the DARAB reversed the findings of the PARAD and declared Victor Solis as a legitimate tenant and entitled to security of
tenure. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent was a tenant of the lands belonging to petitioner and consequently entitled to security of tenure?

Held:

 Initially, the question regarding respondent's tenancy status is factual in nature which is not proper in a petition for review, where only
questions of law may be entertained. However, after a careful examination of the evidence on record, there appears a compelling reason to
modify the factual findings below, since it appears that the appellate court and the DARAB failed to take into account certain important
considerations extant in the records.
 The appellate court and the DARAB erred in rendering judgment on the assumption that these lots are one and the same. To repeat, the
second contract and CAL 022 do not pertain to Lot No. 2025. Hence, respondent cannot be declared a tenant of Lot No. 2025. No lease
agreement or certificate was adduced to prove that Lot No. 2025 is the same lot described in the second contract and CAL 022.

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 Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties over Lot No.
2025. For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3)
there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental.
 The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that respondent did not personally cultivate the riceland
portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its harvest proceeds with petitioner. Petitioner did not consent to a leasehold agreement with respondent
over Lot No. 2025, as shown by petitioner's filing of complaint below to enjoin respondent from encroaching and planting thereon.
Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he is not entitled to security of tenure relative to this lot.
 As to the 1.3-hectare land subject of the second contract and CAL No. 022, petitioner contends that this lot was already sold to the spouses
Payumo in 1985. Therefore, the issue of respondent's tenancy status over the 1.3 hectare agricultural lot covered by the second contract
and CAL 022 is not proper for disposition in this case. Petitioner is no longer the owner of this lot and will not, thus, be benefited or
prejudiced by any declaration made herein, recognizing respondent as its bona fide tenant. The claim of tenancy over this lot should be
directed against the new owners/vendees, who are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the agricultural lessor/vendor.

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT ADJUDGE CIVIL MATTERS THAT RELATE TO THE
AGRARIAN RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. THESE ARE MATTERS BEYOND ITS COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION
AND ARE EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE DARAB

Leonarda L. Monsanto vs. Jesus and Teresita Zerna and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142501 (December 7, 2001)

Held:

 The filing of a criminal case carries with it the civil liability arising from the offense. However, the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters
that are beyond its competence and powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability of the accused, it
cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction.
 In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the criminal case against private respondents; however, it acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it effectively ruled on the agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. Private respondents had raised before it
the issue of tenancy by way of defense, and apparently interwoven with the agrarian dispute, were the acts complained of by petitioner: the
harvesting of the coconuts, their conversion into copra and, later, the sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should have confined itself to the
determination of whether private respondents were guilty of qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the proceeds of the copra
sale to petitioner. Such matter, being an offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties, is cognizable exclusively by the DARAB.

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PETITION FOR REVIEW, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN ARE ENTITLED TO BE
FARMER-BENEFICIARIES/TENANTS OF THE LAND IS A QUESTION OF FACT AND IS NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT OF A
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45

Spouses Benny Calvo and Jovita S. Calvo vs. Spouses Bernardito and Angelina Vergara, et al.
G.R. No. 134741 (December 19, 2001)

Facts:

 Milagros Lebumfacil was the owner of several lots located in Matab-ang Toledo City which were placed under the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program of the DAR. Two of the tenant farmers therein, Egmidio Baguio and Josefa Apan, due to poor health and senility
waived their rights over the said lots. This prompted the DAR to reallocate the same to other beneficiaries including the herein
respondents who were given a 750 square meter portion as their homelot.
 Despite the coverage under OLT program, Lebumfacil still sold the land to the herein petitioners who in turn filed a complaint for illegal
detainer praying for the eviction of the respondents from their homelots.
 The MTC forwarded the case to the PARAD who upheld the validity of the OLT program but declared the CLT Transfer Action No.
CEB-VII-184-91 involving the reallocated lots as null and void. On appeal, the DARAB modified the decision and upheld the validity and
legality of the coverage of the subject 750 square meters. The CA likewise affirmed the said Decision of the DARAB. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

 Whether private respondents are tenant-farmers and are thus qualified as reallocatees of OLT areas under Memorandum Circular No. 8-
80, series of 1980 and are entitled to a homelot under Letter of Instruction No. 705

Held:

 In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110207, 258 SCRA 651, 658 (1996), we distinguished between the two types of questions: there
is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. Being a question of fact, it is beyond the office of this court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, where only questions of law may be raised. Although there are exceptions,
petitioners did not show that this is one of them.

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LEASEHOLD TENANCY, ORDINARILY, TENANCY IS A FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH MAY NOT BE REVIEWED ON
CERTIORARI, BUT BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE DARAB UPHELD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,
AND THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (PARAB) ON THE ISSUE OF TENANCY, THE
SUPREME COURT IS OBLIGED TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Heirs of Jose Juanite, et al. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 138016 (January 30, 2002)

Facts:

 The Spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural land in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates, the
Romeros sold separate portions thereof to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson.
 Claiming to be the agricultural tenants of the land in question, Jose Juanite (now deceased) and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a
complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against the
spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero and their vendees above-named for the cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to
exercise their right of redemption pursuant to R.A. No. 3844.
 Edilberto Romero, et al. as defendants, in their answer alleged that the Romeros, being the owners of the property, had the perfect right to
sell any portion thereof to any person. They also strongly denied the allegation of the Juanites that the latter were their tenants.
 The PARAD rendered a decision declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants, directing the MARO to prepare the leasehold contract in their
favor, declaring the aforementioned Deed of Sale executed by the parties null and void and directing the latter to vacate the premises.
 On Appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and declared that the Juanites were not tenants of the land, hence, had no right of
redemption.
 Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, dismissed the petition. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioners are tenants of the Romero spouses (respondents) as to entitle them to the right of redemption

Held:

 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following:

(2) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

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(3) the subject is agricultural land;

(4) there is consent;

(5) the purpose is agricultural production;

(6) there is personal cultivation; and

(7) there is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy
laws.

 However, we agree with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the
element of "sharing harvest" is assumed as a factual element in that admission.
 We note that petitioners alleged in the complaint filed with the PARAB that:

"6. That in the year 1971, the herein defendants, informed plaintiffs that the land which, Hermogena Mercado-Mondonedo and which is
hereto described, as follows, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

and that the land was sold to her and husband, Edilberto Romero by Hermogena Mercado-Mondonedo and that since then,
plaintiffs continued in possession and cultivation of the land above described, as tenant and sharing the fruits and products of the land to
defendants, spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero."

 In their answer to the complaint, respondents denied the tenant and landlord relationship, but failed to rebut the evidence adduced by
petitioners that they were tenants.

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BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP, THE IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF CARP BENEFICIARIES ARE MATTERS
INVOLVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARP, A MATTER EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB

Lolihala Saberon Lercana vs. Porferio Jalandoni, et al.

G.R. No. 132286 (February 1, 2002)

Facts:

 Gregorio Pajuelas, grandfather of petitioner Lolihala S. Lercana, was the owner of an agricultural land with an estimated area of nineteen
(19) hectares, located in Barangay Salug, Siaton, Negros Oriental. It was mortgaged by Lolihala's mother, Bruna Saberon, and was
redeemed by Rodolfo Aspilla, who planted sugarcane and hired respondent Porferio Jalandoni, among other laborers, to work on the land.
In 1976, Aspilla's sugarcane production failed. Aspilla then appointed Jalandoni as overseer and authorized him to install the other
respondents as tenant-tillers who devoted the property to corn production. Respondents gave Aspilla, through Jalandoni, the owner's
shares of the corn products in "tercio" basis, in favor of the tenants. Jalandoni also gave to Aspilla the owner's share from the copra
produce on the same "tercio" basis. Aside from corn, respondents planted auxiliary crops like cassava and other vegetables.
 On August 21, 1972, Aspilla mortgaged the subject property to the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as security for a loan. Because
Aspilla failed to redeem the mortgage, it was foreclosed on October 25, 1978. On June 26, 1980, the title covering the property was
consolidated under TCT No. HT-1906 in the name of PVB.
 Not knowing about the ownership transfer, respondents continued to give to Aspilla his share of the harvest until 1984, when Aspilla led
for Kuwait. Thereafter, the share was given to Aspilla's children, who visited the property every harvest rime.
 In August 1989, petitioner appeared, claimed ownership of the land for allegedly having bought it from PVB and demanded from each of
the respondents the owner's share of the land produce. Not satisfied, petitioner and her relatives eventually took over and cultivated the
land.
 Respondents as plaintiffs below were constrained to file a complaint for reinstatement and damages against petitioner before the PARAD,
Negros Oriental. However, the case was dismissed.
 Respondents appealed to the DARAB which reversed and set aside the decision of the PARAD. The gist of the Decision by the Board is
that the disputed property has been offered to the DAR through CARP through the VOS scheme. As such, it was not true that petitioner
acquired ownership thereof. Further, that application papers for potential CARP beneficiaries have been processed since September 19,
1989.

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 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court resolved the issue in favor of the
respondents. It rendered a modified decision affirming the decision of the DARAB but deleting the award of P20,000 as exemplary
damages. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

 The issues concern (1) the occupation and tillage over the eastern portion of the land by petitioner and her relatives; and (2) their
qualification as beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Held:

 On the first issue, regarding respondents' tenancy, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB's finding that respondents were the actual
occupants and tillers of the entire subject landholding. This finding, according to petitioner, is in complete variance with the PARAD's
finding that respondents were not tenants nor agricultural lessees on the disputed property. Petitioner asserts that she and her relatives have
always remained on the one-half eastern portion of the land, cultivating the same peacefully, openly and uninterruptedly, before and after
the western portion was mortgaged. This, according to petitioner, is supported by Jalandoni's testimony that in 1976, when Aspilla gave
Jalandoni the authority to install tenants, Jalandoni occupied three (3) hectares while Mahinay, Mayorga and Ege, the other installed
tenants, occupied one hectare each. This means that Aspilla occupied a total area of only 6 hectares, confirming petitioner's contention that
only one-half of the entire subject landholding was mortgaged. Petitioner adds that respondents' submissive acceptance, when told by
petitioner that she had become the owner of the land, was a manifestation of respondents' own doubt on their status. Lastly, DARAB
Sheriff Edwin L. Badon, who also actually conducted an ocular inspection of the property, declared that an estimated area of 8 hectares,
which formed part of the entire 19 hectare-landholding, was under the tillage of Lolihala and relatives. All these substantially prove, said
petitioner, that she and her relatives had remained on the eastern portion of the property.
 Coming now to the present controversy, in our view, the finding of the appellate court, affirming the DARAB's own findings, that
respondents are the tenants of the entire property in question, is supported by the evidence on record. The testimony of Galoy Ezoy,
petitioner's own witness and a neighbor of the Pajuelas, shows that the disputed property was originally owned by Gregorio Pajuelas and
later on by Dodong Aspilla. Aspilla then appointed Porferio Jalandoni and company to work on the land. Ezoy further testified that
petitioner and her relatives started to work on the land only when the case was filed. His testimony was not refuted by petitioner.
Furthermore, the certifications of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Barangay Salag, Siaton, Negros Oriental, state that petitioner and her relatives were not the actual occupants and tillers on the subject
landholding, and that they only took over the property in 1990 when they entered and occupied it by force and threats. These certifications
carry the presumption of regularity in their issuance, but petitioner did not show any evidence to overcome that presumption. Also, the
certification of DARAB Sheriff Edwin L. Badon cited by petitioner to contradict the abovecited two certifications, merely attest to the
actual cultivation and occupation of petitioner and her relatives at the time of the pendency of the case at the DARAB, but not of the time
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when they actually started cultivating the land. Said certification did not concern, much less corroborate, petitioner's allegation that she
and her relatives have always remained in the eastern portion of the property, even after the mortgage. Thus, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals' finding, adopting that of the DARAB, was sufficiently supported by evidence on record.
 On the second issue tendered by the petition, it appears to us that the proper administrative official must resolve first the question of
beneficiaries under CARP. The Court of Appeals, in adopting the findings of the DARAB, did not declare respondents as beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in relation to the disputed landholding. The DARAB, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, left to the concerned DAR Offices the determination of who are or should be the CARP beneficiaries. At this
juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS, P.D. NO. 946 PROVIDES
THAT MATTERS INVOLVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSFER OF THE LAND TO THE
TENANT-FARMER UNDER P.D. NO. 27 AND AMENDATORY AND RELATED DECREES, ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS, RULES
AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa in his capacity as the Regional Director of DAR Region III and Restituto Rivera vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132048 (March 6, 2002)

Facts:

 On May 25, 1972, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an "Order of Award" in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of
agricultural land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buena Vista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters on
condition which substantially states that within a period of six (6) months the awardee shall personally cultivate or otherwise develop at
least one fourth of the area, occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment xxxx failure
on his/her part to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient cause for cancellation of this Order.
 On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private respondent (Jose Verdillo) filed with the Regional Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions of the said Order. Restituto Rivera, herein
petitioner, filed a letter protest against private respondent claiming that he is the one in possession of the land and cultivating the same.
 A representative of the DAR Regional Office undertook an investigation on the conflicting claims and found that the subject landholdings
were in the possession/cultivation of other persons other than Jose Verdillo and that it was crystal clear that Jose Verdillo had culpably
violated the terms and conditions of the Order of Award. On the basis of such, DAR Regional Director Antonio Nuesa promulgated an
Order canceling the Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo, declaring the lots vacant and open for disposition and allowing the
processing of Restituto Rivera's application to purchase the said lots.
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 Aggrieved, private respondent then filed a Petition with the PARAD. Petitioners countered by filing a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
instead of an Answer on the ground that the proper remedy in the case at bar is to file an Appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
under DAR Memorandum Circular No. 5-87 and not by a petition with the DARAB.
 The PARAD chose to render a decision on the merits, denied the Motion to Dismiss the Petition and reversed the Order of the Regional
Director.
 Petitioner Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He then interposed an appeal with the DARAB but the Board
affirmed the Decision of the PARAD.
 Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals but it was denied due course and was ordered dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' claims that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

Held:

 We agree with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case.
 P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No.
27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No.
816.
 The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the
administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the
case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.
 As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, "the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program."
The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228
and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations."

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 Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
 In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over
the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition in the first place.
 While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, due care should be taken that administrative actions are not
done without regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and
boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera
and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court
erred in sustaining DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION (BELATED INVOCATION THEREOF), THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT
PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DEFEAT THE TENANT'S RIGHT BY BELATEDLY RAISING THE ISSUE
OF JURISDICTION

Jose Oca, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Sergio O. Abalos

G.R. No. 144817 (March 7, 2002)

Facts:

 Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in the locality as the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan,
Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of another called the "Salayog" property. Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole
and exclusive owner of two fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties.
 Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that he had been in peaceful
possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid fishponds from the time he received the same from the petitioners Oca brothers until the

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first week of May 1992 when he requested from them the share of the harvest and instead of acceding, petitioners demanded that he vacate
the lands.
 A complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory Order was filed by the
respondent against the petitioner with the PARAD.
 Petitioners in their answer denied that the respondent is a caretaker/tenant of the land. They acknowledged that the respondent is merely an
industrial partner who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of P140,000.00.
 After due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the subject
fishponds. The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but the Board affirmed in toto the Decision of the PARAD.
 Petitioners sought relief with the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the
Decision ruling that the private respondent cannot be a tenant of the "Salayog" property, he having sold his share and interest and had
consequently, waived any interests he had thereon.
 Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new argument the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the PARAD over the subject fishponds.

Issue:

 Can they (petitioners) be permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case?

Held:

 The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act
or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
 An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is
understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.
 This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, estoppel or waiver may operate as a
shield to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this form of defense. Thus, we have held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We defined laches as "failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or has declined to assert it."

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 In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they never disputed the jurisdiction of the
Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's exercise of
jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction
during the eight years this case was under litigation.
 The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant's right by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean
rendering useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time, effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the
litigants and of the State. This is especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted
litigation.

BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP/SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, THE APPELLATE COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT

PETITIONERS ARE NOT QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP IS JUST AN OBITER DICTUM AND NOT
NECESSARY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES

Deogracias Musa, Romeo and Andro Musa as represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Marilyn Musa vs. Sylvia Amor
G.R. No. 141396 (April 9, 2002)

Facts:

 This case involves an agricultural landholding with a total area of 9.9611 hectares located at Dancalan, Donsol, Sorsogon formerly owned
by one Antonio Dasig, two hectares of which are ricelands and the rest are devoted to coconuts. When Antonio Dasig migrated to the
United States, his mother, Rosario Dasig, acted as administratrix of the said property.
 On March 5, 1993, Rosario, representing her son, sold the subject property to herein respondent Sylvia Amor for the total amount of
P300,000.00. This prompted petitioners, claiming to be tenants of the landholding, to file a case for redemption against respondent and
Rosario Dasig with the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudicator. Later on, respondent tried to eject petitioners from the
property so the latter withdrew the case for redemption and filed against respondent a complaint for annulment of sale, reinstatement and
damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. 05-154-S.
 The RARAD ruled in favor of petitioners declaring them as tenants of the landholding and nullifying the deed of absolute sale between
Rosario Dasig and respondent.
 On Appeal, the DARAB modified the ruling and declared the petitioners as bonafide tenants entitled to security of tenure. Not satisfied,
respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which in turn rendered a decision modifying the DARAB's ruling only
insofar as petitioners' status is concerned and holding that they "should not be considered tenants of the subject landholding". The decision
of the DARAB was affirmed in all other respects. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
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Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the petitioners not tenants of the land and not qualified beneficiaries under the
provision of the CARP?
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing respondents petition before the forum for failure to cite an explanation as to the
modes of service?

Held:

 It should be pointed out that identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the DAR Secretary.
Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989 provides:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10

Series of 1989

SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REGISTRATION OF BENEFICIARIES

I. PREFATORY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to R.A. 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides the Implementing
Rules and Procedures for the said registration.

II. OBJECTIVES.

A. General

1. Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of the CARP for the effective implementation of the program.

B. Specific

1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP. (Emphasis ours.)
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xxx xxx xxx

 It is significant to note that on September 3, 1993, the DAR Secretary through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a
Notice of Coverage placing the entire agricultural landholding, including the subject property, under CARP. Such being the case, the
appellate court's pronouncement that petitioners are not qualified beneficiaries under CARP is just an obiter dictum and not necessary in
the resolution of the issues.
 Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals should not have given due course to the petition because the respondent failed to attach
thereto a written explanation why personal service was not done, thereby violating Section 11, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court. The Court
of Appeals found the service of petition by registered mail sufficient notwithstanding the absence of an explanation why service by mail
was resorted to. Citing the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, it declared that "the Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases
even in suppletory character."
 The issue of sufficiency of service of pleadings pertains to the proceedings of the Court of Appeals which are governed by the Rules of
Court. Section 11, Rule 13 of said Rules provides:

"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be
done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."

 As the above-quoted provision requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The Court notes
that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol,
Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, the service by registered mail was sufficient notwithstanding the absence of an
explanation why service by mail was resorted to. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous.
In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may," signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.

CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VALIDITY OF P.D. NO. 27 AND DAR MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6, SERIES OF 1978

Rolando Sigre vs. Court of Appeals and Lilia Y. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay
G.R. No. 109568 (August 8, 2002)

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Lilia Y. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay
G.R. No. 113454 (August 8, 2002)

Facts:

 Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales as administratrix of the Estate of the late Matias Yusay filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
docketed as CA-GR SP No. 28906 seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals from
Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando Sigre) and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted to it
by Sigre.
 Ernesto Sigre is a tenant of the private respondent's irrigated riceland located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying
a lease rental of sixteen (16) cavans per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year 1991-1992, Sigre
stopped paying his rentals and instead remitted the same to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform's Memorandum
Circular No. 6, Series of 1978 on the guidelines of the payment of lease rentals by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of
P.D. No. 27.
 According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an
average of 119.32 cavans per hectare and pegged the value of the land at thirteen thousand four hundred five pesos and sixty-seven
centavos (P13,405.67). Thus, the petition filed with the Court of Appeals assailing not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6
but also the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27.
 The appellate court in its decision dated March 22, 1993 declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void and directed LBP to return to
private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre. The latter was also directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent. The
Appellate Court ruled that the said Circular is in conflict with PD 816 and that PD 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for
determining the cost of the land. It sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation.
 Hence, this present recourse, which is a consolidation of the separate petitions for review filed by Rolando Sigre and by LBP.

Issue:

 Validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and Constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27.

Held:

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 The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the
details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they are tilling.
 The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that "(T)he main purpose of the
circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
land x x x x . The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer's lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his
favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus, making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price." Since the assailed
Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the force of law and
is entitled to great respect.
 The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D.
No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has
been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in
1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.
 In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between
these two.
 That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of
cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and
parcel of the law of the land, viz.:

"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the
law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to
set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so
because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would
run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope
associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by
the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that
tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision
then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals."

 Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private respondent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court
emphatically declared that"Presidential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality."
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 Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of Rice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc.
v. The National Land Reform Council, to wit:

". . . If as pointed out in the opening paragraph, the validity of Presidential Decree No. 27 was assumed as early as 1974, on the first
anniversary of the present constitution, in De Chavez v. Zobel and specifically upheld in Gonzales v. Estrella five years later, there cannot
be any justification for holding that it is unconstitutional on its face without any factual foundation."

 Lastly, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D.
27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimately foreclosed when it was declared
therein that "R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petition."

SUCCESSION IN AGRARIAN CASES/FINDINGS OF FACTS/LEASEHOLD TENANCY

FIRST, THE APPELLATE COURT CANNOT MAKE ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND SUBSTITUTE THE SAME FOR THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DARAB
SECOND, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT CONFUSE THE LAW ON SUCCESSION PROVIDED FOR IN THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH SUCCESSION IN AGRARIAN CASES X X X X X IN AGRARIAN LAWS, THE
SECURITY OF TENURE OF THE DECEASED TENANT SHALL PASS ON TO ONLY ONE (1) HEIR

Dionisia L. Reyes vs. Ricardo L. Reyes, et al.

G.R. No. 140164 (September 6, 2002)

Facts:

 The instant case stemmed from a complaint for reinstatement with damages filed with the DARAB Region III Office by Dionisia Reyes on
April 22, 1991 against her four younger brothers, herein respondents. She alleged that her father, the late Felizardo Reyes, was the tenant
of a two-hectare agricultural lot in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan, owned by Marciano Castro. After her father's death on February 17, 1989,
she and Marciano Castro, through the latter's son and attorney-in-fact, Ramon R. Castro, executed a leasehold contract naming her as the
agricultural lessee of the property. However, sometime before the start of the planting of the dry season crop in 1989, herein respondents
forcibly entered the area and occupied a one-hectare portion of the property. They claimed to be the tenants thereof. Respondents then paid
rent to Castro's overseer, Armando Duran, and continued to occupy half of the property to petitioner's damage and prejudice.

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 Respondents in their answer averred that they inherited the lease rights from their father and that petitioner was a woman who could not
possibly work or till the land by herself. Hence, petitioner's claim to be the lawful agricultural lessee has no basis in fact and in law.
 The PARAD rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondents seasonably appealed the decision to the DARAB Central Office.
In turn, the DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Respondents elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which in turn, reversed the decision of the DARAB ruling that an "implied tenancy" existed between the respondents and
the landowner. The Appellate Court then went on to rule that by virtue of this "implied tenancy", the leasehold contract between the
Castros and the petitioner could only be made effective on the one-hectare portion of the disputed property. Hence, the instant petition.

Issued:

 Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding the substantial evidence rule with respect to the DARAB findings?
 Did the appellate court commit a reversible error of law in finding that respondents has satisfactorily met the requirements of a tenancy
relationship?

Held:

 In Malate vs. Court of Appeals, we held that:

In appeals in agrarian cases, the only function required of the Court of Appeals is to determine whether the findings of fact of the
Court of Agrarian Relations are supported by substantial evidence. And substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, and where the findings of fact of the agrarian court are supported by substantial evidence, such
findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court.

 Stated differently, the appellate court cannot make its own findings of fact and substitute the same for the findings of fact of the DARAB.
 A perusal of the assailed decision clearly shows that nowhere did the Court of Appeals rule that the findings of fact of the DARAB Region
III Provincial Adjudicator or the DARAB-Central Office were unsupported by substantial evidence. Nor did the appellate court hold that
said findings were made with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the agrarian quasi-judicial agencies. An examination of the record
categorically shows that the findings of fact of the DARAB were supported by substantial evidence. Perforce, the Malate ruling must
apply to the instant case. The finding of the DARAB that petitioner, by virtue of the contract of agricultural leasehold entered into between
her and the Castros, is the substitute tenant of the latter in lieu of her deceased father, is binding upon the appellate court and this Court.
Equally conclusive upon the court a quo and this Court is the finding by the DARAB that respondents were mere usurpers who failed to
present any proof as to the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and the Castro family.

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 On the second issue, we find respondents contentions far from persuasive.

 The present dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No. 3844, which, except for Section 35 thereof, was not
specifically repealed by the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657), but was intended to have
suppletory effect to the latter law. Under R.A. No. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold
relations: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or
implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy
relations into leasehold relations. The other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. In the
instant case, it is not disputed that an agricultural leasehold contract was entered into between petitioner and Ramon Castro. Respondents,
however, insist that an agricultural leasehold contract over a one-hectare portion of the landholding arose as a result of the actions of
Ramon's overseer, who must be viewed as the latter's agent. They conclude that because of his implied leasehold, the application of the
contract between petitioner and the landowner should be limited to the remaining portion of the property.
 Respondents' reasoning is flawed. While undoubtedly Duran was an agent of Ramon, he was not a general agent of the latter with respect
to the landholding. The record shows that as overseer, Duran's duties and responsibilities were limited to issuing receipt(s), selling
mangoes and bamboo trees and all other things saleable. Thus, by his own admission, Duran was a special agent under Article 1876 of the
Civil Code. Duran's duties and responsibilities as a special agent do not include the acceptance of rentals from persons other than the
tenant so designated by the landowner. Duran's authority as a special agent likewise excludes the power to appoint tenants or successor-
tenants. Clearly, Duran acted beyond the limits of his authority as an agent. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that since Duran
had been the overseer of the Castros for 16 years, he had thereby made respondents believe he had full authority from the Castro family
relative to the administration of the subject property. Regardless of the number of years that Duran had been the overseer of the Castros,
there is absolutely no showing that he was ever authorized to appoint tenants or successor-tenants for the Castros, nor to accept rentals
from the persons he would appoint. Absent substantial evidence to show Duran's authority from the Castros to give consent to the creation
of a tenancy relationship, his actions could not give rise to an implied tenancy. In fact, Duran admitted that he was aware of the existence
of the leasehold contract between petitioner and the Castros, naming the former as the successor-tenant to the property. Since an implied
tenancy between the same landowners and respondents is incompatible with this express and written leasehold contract and given the
absolute lack of substantial evidence to support the existence of an implied tenancy, the express tenancy contract must be maintained.
 One final note. Respondents original stance before the DARAB that they had inherited or succeeded to the tenancy rights of their late
father is likewise erroneous. As correctly found by the DARAB:

Defendants-Appellants should not confuse the law on succession provided for in the Civil Code of the Philippines with succession
in agrarian cases. In the former, (the) statute spreads the estate of the deceased throughout his heirs; while in agrarian laws, the security of
tenure of the deceased tenant shall pass on to only one (1) heir in the manner provided for in Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844.

APPEAL/PETITION FOR REVIEW, THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FOR THE DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURTS (SACs) IS BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW AND NOT BY AN ORDINARY NOTICE OF
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APPEAL

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon
G.R. No. 143275 (September 10, 2002)

Facts:

 Petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin,
Concepcion, Tarlac covered by TCT No. 163051 with a total area of 50.1171 hectares. The property was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 at P50,000.00 per hectare. However, the DAR only made a counter-offer of P17,656.20 per
hectare/total of P884,877.54 and later, P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appellees' failure to respond to the new offer made by
DAR, the DARAB took cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 16 (d) of R.A. No. 6657. Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order
directing respondent-appellant LBP to recompute the value of the subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992. An aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65 was arrived at but this was again rejected by the petitioners-appellees.
 In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, petitioners asked the Regional Trial Court, Br. 63, Tarlac (the designated special agrarian court in the
area) to fix the just compensation of the property. The court rendered a summary judgment on December 19, 1997, fixing the
compensation of the subject property at P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of
sugarland. Respondent-appellant moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the court. DAR filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also filed a notice of appeal of the said decision. The Third Division of the Appellate Court gave due
course to the petition for review. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, dismissed petitioner LBP's ordinary
appeal for lack of merit reasoning that the mode of appeal followed by petitioner LBP was erroneous. Considering that Sec. 60 of R.A. No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law mandates that Appeals from Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition
for review. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition questioning the resolution of the Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

 What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, in the
determination of just compensation — an appeal by way of a petition for review or an ordinary appeal?

Held:

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 Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three modes of appeal, to wit:

"Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for Review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by Certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review oncertiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

 A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of
R.A. No. 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.
 The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant
procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering
that R.A. No. 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the mode by which the
appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for
petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.
 As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the adoption of the procedure for petitions for
review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized
and can co-exist.
 Moreover, the same Section 5(5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by the petitioner states that "(r)ules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." Section 60 is
obviously a special procedure. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, it cannot be otherwise merely because it was formulated by the
legislature and not by any special body. As long as the said section provides for a particular process for the governance of the special court
concerned, the provision is accurately classified as a special procedure. Subject to constitutional limitations, the statutory enactment of a

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special procedure cannot be said to encroach on the power of this Court to formulate rules of procedure for the reason that we have not yet
provided for a particular process specifically governing agrarian courts.
 Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before
any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for review before the
Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th)
Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.
 Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for review,
the time to appeal the decision of the Special Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.

SECURITY OF TENURE/LEASEHOLD TENANCY/RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION, THE SALE EXECUTED BY THE BANK IN

FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 27 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES AND MUST, THUS, BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID

The Heirs of Guillermo A. Batongbacal vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 125063 (September 24, 2002)

Facts:

 Juana Luciano was the registered owner of an agricultural land planted to rice and corn measuring 16,555 square meters, situated in Brgy.
Bolakan, Bocaue, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1338.
 Luciano mortgaged the parcel of land to the Philippine Banking Corporation and subsequently failed to redeem the same. Thus, the bank
became the absolute owner of the land and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-123404. The bank sold the property to petitioner
Guillermo Batongbacal. It also executed an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy to enable the petitioner to register the land under his name.
However, when the petitioner tried to register the Deed of Absolute Sale, he discovered that Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-025760
was already issued in the name of private respondent Catalino Santos also covering the same property.
 Petitioner filed a complaint with the DAR Team Office in Sta. Maria, Bulacan which endorsed the case to the Adjudicator of Bulacan.
After due proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Catalino Santos (now represented by his son Severino Santos).
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration but both were denied by the RARAD in an
Order dated August 17, 1989. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. Petitioner passed away and was substituted by his heirs,
Rosario Batongbacal, et al. The said heirs filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court rendered
judgment denying the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

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Issue:

 Who between the parties are lawfully entitled to the ownership and possession of the subject landholding?

Held:

 Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 states that once the agricultural leasehold relation is established, the same shall confer upon the lessee the right
to continue working on the landholding until such relation is extinguished, and the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure
on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court and for causes provided by law. It is worthy to note that
the sale or alienation of tenanted land is not among the causes of extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation provided under the
law.
 In Endaya v. Court of Appeals, we held that, "Transactions involving agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists
resulting in change of ownership will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee." In Tanpingco v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, we stated that, "Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of
their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their means of livelihood."
 When P.D. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the land was already owned by Philbanking, but the tenancy relations remained in force.
By virtue of this law, "tenant farmers are deemed owners of the land they till, subject to the rules and regulations to be hereafter
promulgated. Pursuant to the mandate of P.D. 27, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued to private respondent Catalino Santos on
January 22, 1981, and was registered on February 1, 1981 with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
 During all this time, private respondent continued tilling the land and paying rentals to Juana Luciano, and after her death, to her
representatives. The sale between Philbanking and petitioner took place on January 11, 1985. At about this time, Juana Luciano's
representatives began to refuse accepting the rentals from private respondent. Thus, private respondent deposited the rentals with a certain
Crispin Santiago, a rice mill owner in nearby Tuvo, Bocaue, through the mediation of the Barangay Captain. Under the circumstances, we
find that private respondent complied in good faith with the obligations incumbent upon him as an agricultural lessee.
 Philbanking, on the other hand, was remiss in its duties as an agricultural lessor when it sold the subject land to a third person, without
giving notice to private respondent and giving him the opportunity to exercise his right of preemption as an agricultural lessee.
 Section 11 of R.A. 3844 provides:

"Section 11. Lessee's Right of Preemption. — In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee
shall have thepreferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That the entire landholding offered for
sale must be preempted by the Department of Agrarian Reform upon petition of the lessee or of any of them: Provided, further, That where
there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by
him. The right of preemption under this section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be
served by the owner on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform." (Emphasis provided)
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 Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed a breach of obligation as an agricultural lessor. As the records show, private respondent was not
informed about the sale between Philbanking and petitioner, and neither was he privy to the transfer of ownership from Juana Luciano to
Philbanking. As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters affecting the land he tills, without need for
him to inquire about it.
 Department Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1974, implementing P.D. 27, provides:

4. No act shall be done to undermine or subvert the intent and provisions of Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instruction, Memoranda and
Directives, such as the following and/or similar acts:

xxx xxx xxx

f.) Transferring ownership of tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972, except to the actual tenant-farmers or tillers
but in strict conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 and the requirements of the Department of Agrarian
Reform . . . .

 In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual
tenant-tillers thereon. Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was in violation of the
aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and void.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF BOTH PARTIES

Rodolfo Arzaga and Francis Arzaga vs. Salvacion Copias and Prudencio Calandria
G.R. No. 152404 (March 28, 2003)

Facts:

 The case involves a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by the petitioners as co-owners and purchasers of Lot No.
5198 in a tax delinquency sale and against the respondents who assert that they are amortizing owners of the same, having been issued
Emancipation Patents as tenant beneficiaries of one Caridad Fuentebella who was purported to be the previous owner of the land. The case
was filed in the RTC and dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the court ruling that the case was cognizable by the DARAB
because it involved possession and ownership of agricultural lands as well as issuance of emancipation patents. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the said resolution.
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Issue: Jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) over a dispute involving a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 5198 located at Inabasan, San Jose, Antique.

Held:

 In Monsanto vs. Zerna (G.R. No. 142501, 07 December 2001), it was held that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must
exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee and (6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee", on which all other requisites
of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both parties.
Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198 by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private
respondents assert ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate
of Title. Neither do the records show any judicial tie or tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest. The questioned
lot is allegedly declared for taxation purposes in the name of petitioners' father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to have any
connection with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Caridad Fuentebella.

xxx xxx xxx

 The basic rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is clear that the petitioners'
action does not involve an agrarian dispute but one for recovery of possession which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (CARP COVERAGE), IN SOME EXCEPTIONAL CASES OF

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS, THE LANDOWNER NEED NOT EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF BEFORE THE COURTS

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Apex Investment and Financing Corporation

G.R. No. 149422 (April 10, 2003)

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Facts:

 Respondent Apex Investment and Financing Corporation (now SM Investments Corp.) owns several lots located at Barangay Paliparan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-72491, T-90474, T-90475, T-90476 and T-90477. The MARO
initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings over these lots but respondent denied having received any such notice (because it was no
longer holding office at the address where the notice was sent). Respondent only learned of the compulsory acquisition proceedings over
TCT No. T-90476 in the December 11, 1997 issue of BALITA. Respondent filed a Protest with the PARO rejecting DAR's offered
compensation of P229,014.33 for the 23,614 square meter property, asserting that the subject landholding had already been classified as
residential even prior to the effectivity of the law. In support of the protest, respondent attached copies of its land titles, tax declarations,
location map and other supporting documents. It was only after more than one year before the PARO forwarded to petitioner DAR the said
protest together with the records of the compulsory acquisition proceedings. However, despite the pendency of the protest, the Register of
Deeds still cancelled one of its titles and issued a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and thereafter TCT No. CLOA-
2473 was issued in the name of one Angel Umali who is a farmer-beneficiary allegedly occupying the land. Respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari and prohibition praying that the compulsory acquisition proceedings be declared null and void and for TCT No. CLOA-
2473 issued to Angel Umali to be cancelled. Petitioner opposed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence,
this Appeal.

Issues:

a) That respondent Apex violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies; and

c) That the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the subject parcels of land are residential and not covered by R.A. No. 6657

Held:

 On the first assigned error. This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and
is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded
where, as in this case: (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and (b) the administrative action is
patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

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xxx xxx xxx

 In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993, 225 SCRA 278), we held that the aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted in their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before
resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners
had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved
their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking
judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondent's lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition.
 On the second assigned error. Respondent vehemently insists that its lots have been classified as residential prior to June 15, 1988, the
date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. As earlier mentioned, Engineer Gregorio Bermejo, Municipal Engineer and Deputized Zoning
Administrator of Dasmariñas, Cavite, certified that respondent's lands are within the residential zone of Dasmariñas, based on the Land
Use Plan of that municipality duly approved by the HLURB in its Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981. We observe,
however, that this factual issue was never determined below. Thus, we cannot conclude that respondent's parcels of land are residential.

CIVIL LAW LEASE, THE CIVIL LAW LESSEE, ALTHOUGH A LEGAL POSSESSOR, MAY NOT INSTALL TENANTS ON
THE PROPERTY UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE LESSOR ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS A SPECIFIC
PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT OF LEASE PROVIDING FOR SUCH

Victor G. Valencia vs. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 122363 (April 29, 2003)

Facts:

 Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City, Negros Oriental.
One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397 hectares under Homestead
Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease agreement with a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a
five-year civil law lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering
and against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent.
 Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others together with the Friases to
cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve became recipients of CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia
demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to gain possession of his landholdings and had in fact

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designated Bernie Bautista to be his overseer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the property was placed under the
Operation Land Transfer Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the respondents. Valencia again protested but to no
avail.
 However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profit sharing agreement. No other respondent entered
into any kind of agreement with the petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of the protest, an administrative
investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to 1983, it was only Bautista who received the shares in the
produce. Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista refused to issue a receipt for such. Valencia did not receive a single cavan for
the said years. to aggravate matters, some of the respondents have even subleased their properties despite the pending protest of Valencia.
While all this was transpiring, Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279
hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137.
 Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maintained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to appeal to the Office of the
President. However, the Order was affirmed with the modification that the Homestead be excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27.
 Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

 Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to do so under Article 1649
of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case?

Held:

 A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An
extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority
view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119).
 When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6
merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land;
not until then.

xxx xxx xxx

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 From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the property
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee, although a legal possessor,
may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract
of lease, the occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease
agreement.

TENDER OF PAYMENT, "CERTIFICATION TO FINANCE REDEMPTION OF ESTATE UNDER RA NO. 3844, AS

AMENDED" ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP) DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A
VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT AS REQUIRED BY OUR AGRARIAN LAWS

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al.

G.R. No. 106615 (January 15, 2004)

Ignacio Arcega, et al. vs. Hon. Norberto Ponce, RTC, et al.

G.R. No. 108591 (January 15, 2004)

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al.

G.R. No. 109452 (January 15, 2004)

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al.

G.R. No. 109978 (January 15, 2004)

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al.

G.R. No. 139379 (January 15, 2004)

Facts:

 The instant consolidated petitions involve a parcel of agricultural land over which 14 tenants vigorously assert their right of redemption.
Arcega, et al. are agricultural lessees of landholdings planted to sugarcane described as Lot 3364 of the San Fernando Cadastre. The lot
was originally owned by the spouses Roberto and Asuncion Wijangco under TCT No. 27507-R and mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan.
Eventually, for their failure to pay their loan, the PNB foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale that followed, PNB was the highest

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bidder. On July 10, 1980, the spouses Eligio and Marcelina Mallari purchased the two lots from PNB without any indication that the same
was tenanted. The agreed purchase price was P2,365,000.00 with P473,000.00 as 20% down-payment and the balance payable in three
installments.
 On July 22, 1981, Arcega, et al., who were occupying portions of the land, filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, San Fernando,
Pampanga a Petition for Redemption against the spouses Wijangco, PNB and the spouses Mallari. With the abolition of the CAR, the case
was automatically absorbed by the RTC, Br. 46 of San Fernando, Pampanga. Eligio Mallari informed the tenants that they bought the lot
from PNB. The tenants tried to redeem their respective landholdings at P5,000.00 per hectare but the spouses rejected the offer
considering that they purchased the lot from PNB at P18,000.00 per hectare.
 To summarize, RTC ordered Arcega, et al. to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for the tenants' failure to make a tender
of payment and/or consignation of the redemption price. Instead of tendering payment, Arcega, et al. presented a certification
entitled "Certification to Finance Redemption of Estate under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended". The RTC dismissed the Petition ruling that: 1)
Arcega, et al., failed to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed 180-day period; and 2) The Land Bank certification does
not constitute a valid tender of payment and/or consignation of the redemption price. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved, the spouses Mallari filed a Petition for Review.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the right of the tenants to redeem the property has "not yet prescribed because no notice in writing of the
sale was ever given by the vendee upon (them) as agricultural lessees of the land, as required by law". The only issue left to be resolved is
as regards the intrinsic or inherent validity of the Land Bank Certification.

Issue: Whether or not the tenants have validly tendered or consigned payment of the redemption price for the purpose of exercising their right of
redemption under Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended through their presentation of a document entitled, "Certification to Finance
Redemption of Estate Under R.A. No. 3844, as Amended" issued by the President of the Land Bank of the Philippines.

Held:

 First and foremost, paragraph 2 of Land Bank Circular No. 3 (Rules and Regulations on the Financing by Land Bank of Acquisition of
Landholdings by Agricultural Lessees Through Pre-emption or Redemption under RA No. 3844, as Amended) has made it a mandatory
requirement that "all proposals for Land Bank financing of land acquisition through pre-emption or redemption must carry the favorable
indorsement of the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform". It is likewise required that the prescribed form must indicate that the
certification has been "issued pursuant to a letter-request from the (DAR Secretary) to the Land Bank of the Philippines".
 Secondly, the questioned certification itself declares that the Land Bank's undertaking to finance the redemption is conditional. The
financing will push through"if found in consonance with the provisions of Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended and with the
relevant policies and procedures laid down by the Land Bank Board of Directors". Certainly, this is contrary to the certification prescribed
by Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3 dated February 25, 1980. Moreover, the challenged certification does not set aside the specific

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compensation for the redemption of the landholding. Hence, the Mallari spouses were not assured of the corresponding amount and its
payment by Arcega, et al.
 The right of redemption under RA No. 3844, as amended is an essential mandate of the agrarian reform legislation to implement the
State's policy of owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, self-reliant existence for small farmers. Unfortunately, such laudable
policy could not be effected in favor of Ignacio Arcega, et al. since they failed to tender or consign payment of the redemption price. Thus,
spouses Mallari should be allowed to continue enjoying their right over the subject property as purchasers thereof, for the State's
commendable agrarian reform policy is never intended to unduly transgress the rights of innocent purchasers of lands.

MERITS OF THE CASE, CASES SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS RATHER THAN ON MERE TECHNICALITIES OR
PROCEDURAL IMPERFECTIONS

Paulina Diaz, Godelito Lapinid, Elecito Lapinid, Violeta Zamora, Anastacia Lapinid, Evelyn Lapinid, Marivel Lapinid and Carin Lapinid vs.
Carlos Mesias, Jr.
G.R. No. 156345 (March 4, 2004)

Facts:

 Petitioners are the owners of a 1.2 hectare riceland tilled by the father of respondent. Respondent requested that he be granted a homelot.
The matter was brought to the BARC then to the MARO. The latter concluded that the respondent was not a de jure tenant of the land, he
being a mere member of the immediate farm household of his father, Carlos Mesias. A Petition was filed with the PARAD who dismissed
the case. Appeal was made to the DARAB who reversed the decision of the Adjudicator a quo. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed
but to no avail. The matter was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the latter dismissed the Petition on the ground of defective
certification of forum shopping and failure to attach legible copies of the records and supporting documents under Rule 43. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but the Court of Appeals only reconsidered insofar as the defective certification of forum shopping. Hence, the
instant petition for review on whether or not the petitioners complied with the requirements set in Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

 We agree with the petitioners contention that the dismissal of the petition on purely technical grounds was unwarranted. In denying due
course to the petition, the appellate court gave premium to form and failed to consider the substantial rights of the parties
 "Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses rather
than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. Rules of Procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather

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than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court state that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

APPEAL, RULES OF PROCEDURE: A PARTY CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF THE CASE OR HIS CAUSE OF ACTION
ON APPEAL

Henry L. Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., DARAB and Spouses Larry and Jovita Velasco
G.R. No. 118292 (April 14, 2004)

Facts:

 Petitioner averred that he is the owner-administrator of a parcel of land planted to rice and tobacco in Sitio Torite, Brgy. San Cristobal,
Bangar, La Union. The spouses Velasco who cultivated the land allegedly stole one sack of palay from the land's harvest and subleased the
land to a certain Boy or Ensong Maala during the last tobacco season.
 In the ensuing proceedings, the Regional Office found that Larry Velasco subleased the land to a certain Francisco Maala which is a
ground for ejectment but on the other charge, there was no convincing evidence to support this accusation. The respondent-spouses
Velasco appealed and the DARAB reversed the Order of the Regional Office. Petitioner appealed to the CA who affirmed the decision of
the DARAB, hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not a party is entitled to a change of theory of his case (i.e., dispute between an agricultural landlord and tenant).

Held:

 The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously
held that "Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." A judgment that goes outside the issues and
purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid. The
rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present case, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the
Court of Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the spouses Velasco from the land under R.A. No. 3844.

EXEMPTION, PROPERTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) LEASED AND
USED NOT FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM CARP COVERAGE

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DAR as represented by its Secretary, Roberto M. Pagdanganan vs. DECS

G.R. No. 158228 (April 27, 2004)

Facts:

 The subject of this controversy are Lot Nos. 2509 and 871-D of Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental with an area of 189.2462
hectares. The lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS on October 21, 1921 and consequently transferred to
DECS under TCT No. 167175.
 DECS in turn, leased the subject landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years or from 1984-1985 to
1993-1994. Subsequently, the lease was renewed for another 10 years from 1995-1996 until 2004-2005.
 On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farmworkers therein filed a petition for
Compulsory Coverage. A "Notice of Coverage" was issued with the approval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed to the Secretary of
DAR who in turn affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
 DECS filed a petition for review with the CA to set aside the Decision of the DAR Secretary. However, the CA affirmed the
aforementioned Decision. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the properties (owned by DECS) are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

Held:

 Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their
exemption, viz.:

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, x x x x x x shall be exempt from the coverage of
this Act

 Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary" and 2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."
 The importance of the phrase "actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what
respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and
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unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
 The ruling in Central Mindanao University vs. DAR Adjudication Board is inapplicable in the case at bar. First, in the CMU case, the land
involved is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was specifically reserved by the late President Carlos P.
Garcia for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (CMU) under Proclamation No. 476. Second, x x x x x

"The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs of CMU. On the other hand, the
lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income
from the contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality."

APPEAL, THE PERFECTION THEREOF WITHIN THE STATUTORY OR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD IS NOT ONLY
MANDATORY BUT ALSO JURISDICTIONAL

Florentino Zaragoza vs. Pedro Nobleza

G.R. No. 144560 (May 13, 2004)

Facts:

 On November 15, 1983, petitioner and respondent entered an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a 1.18 hectare parcel of land situated
in Brgy. Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo. However, on February 6, 1991, petitioner instituted a complaint for termination of leasehold
relationship with damages for violations purportedly committed by the respondent. The PARAD dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Petitioner appealed the case up to the Court of Appeals. In a Motion for Extension, the CA gave the former an "absolutely non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from March 15, 2000 or until March 30, 2000 within which to file a petition for review". Petitioner appears to
have filed via registered mail his petition for review only on April 12, 2000.
 The Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 31, 2000 dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed. First, the petition was
mailed thirteen (13) days beyond the extended period to appeal and second, two of the annexes to the petition (i.e., two informations)
were "mere plain copies" in violation of Section 6 (c) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner manifesting that as per June 14, 2000 certification issued by Registry Clerk E.P.
Villaruel of the Pasig Capital Office, Registry No. 7439 allegedly covering the petition for review addressed to the CA, it was mailed on
March 30, 2000. In the same breath, petitioner pleaded for a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure given the "overriding importance
of the factual and legal issues" raised in his petition. CA denied the motion.

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 Respondent filed a comment pointing out that like the CA, the petition addressed to his counsel indicated that it was only mailed on April
12, 2000. Respondent also impugned the reliability of the certification of the postal registry clerk, it not having been made under oath.
Hence, this Appeal.

Held:

 The two informations attached to the petition filed before the CA need not, as correctly argued by the petitioner, be certified true copies.
Section 6 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should not be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers
accompanying the petition for review be certified true copies.
 In accordance then with the established rule and practice, in view of the absence of any of the recognized exceptions that would warrant a
review of the findings of facts of the appellate court, the issue raised by petitioner as regards the date of the filing of the petition for review
will not be considered by this Court, the resolution thereon by the CA being final.
 Since the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of
petitioner to so perfect his appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the
right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law.

RETENTION RIGHTS OF REDEMPTIONER-GRANDCHILDREN

Samahan ng Magsasaka sa San Josep represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et al.
G.R. No. 158314 (June 3, 2004)

Facts:

 Dr. Nicolas Valisno, Sr. is the registered owner of a 57-hectare property situated in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-38406. Before the enactment of P.D. No. 27, the land was the subject of an ejectment suit in 1971,
wherein the Valisnos' tenants (herein petitioners) were ejected from the property.
 On October 20 and 21, 1972, Dr. Valisno mortgaged 12 hectares of his property to Renato and Angelito Banting. Thereafter, the property
was subdivided into ten lots and on November 8, 1972, individual titles were issued in the name of the eight children of Dr. Valisno to
Angelito Banting and to Renato Banting.
 The mortgage on the 12 hectare portion was foreclosed and the property sold at public auction. Four grandchildren of Dr. Valisno
redeemed the property namely Maria Cristina Valisno, Leonora Valisno Yujuico, Benedicto Valisno Yujuico and Gregorio Valisno

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Yujuico. At the time of the redemption, only Benedicto was of legal age, the others were only minors. Redemption was made on October
25, 1973 but the titles were only transferred to the redemptioners on November 26, 1998.
 In 1994, Dominador Malalang in behalf of SMSP filed a petition for coverage of the subject property. Originally, the petition was
dismissed but Secretary Garilao ultimately held that the property was covered by CARP subject to the retention rights of the heirs of
Nicolas, Sr. The Valisno heirs specifically the 7 children and the 10 grandchildren including the 4 redemptioners filed a consolidated
Application for Retention and Award under R.A. No. 6657. The Regional Director approved the retention of the Valisno children covering
35 hectares but placed the excess 19 hectares under Compulsory Acquisition for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. The request for the
award to the grandchildren was denied for utter lack of merit. The Secretary affirmed the Order. However, on review with the Court of
Appeals, the CA reversed the Order of the DAR Secretary and granted the award of one hectare for each of the grandchildren and affirmed
the retention rights of three hectares for each of the redemptioner-grandchildren or for a total of 12 hectares. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that the 12 hectares be placed under CARP coverage. It was denied. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the grandchildren of the landowner are still entitled to retention rights?

Held:

 The relevant laws governing the minors' redemption in 1973 are the general Civil Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into
contractual relations. Article 1327 of the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract. Article 1390
provides that a contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent is voidable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by
the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable and was not void ab initio, as petitioners argue.
 Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered into by the minors would require that: 1) the plaintiff must have an interest in
the contract; and 2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the party responsible for the defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil
Code provides in part that "(t)he action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted". The action to annul the
minors' redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that could only have been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the
aggrieved parties in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never initiated by the minors.
 As owners in their own right, the redemptioner-grandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all the landowners. This right of
retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant
and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its
name denotes, is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of
taking land only to return it to the landowners afterwards, which would be a pointless process.

COVERAGE; ONLY AGRICULTURAL LANDS ARE COVERED BY CARP

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Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc., et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 142359 (May 25, 2004)

Facts:

 Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49363, which set aside and reversed the
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and reinstated the decision of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Trece Martirez City, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for
Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI).
 Sometime in 1964, Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC, for brevity) bought a parcel of land with an area of 753,610 square meters
(75.3610 hectares) located at Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) No. T- 91584
and T-91585. On September 20, 1977, the aforesaid titles were cancelled by TCT No. T-62972 issued to and in the name of the LDC's
successor, the Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI). The property was subsequently subdivided into two parcels of land, one of which was
covered by TCT No. 116658, with an area of 365,753 square meters, and the other covered by TCT No. 116659 with an area of 387,853
square meters.
 The LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate, where industrial sites and a low cost
housing project inceptually called the Tamanli Housing Project would be established.
 The property was subdivided into 728 residential lots per the consolidation subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Lands, each with
an average area of 240 square meters.
 Considering the parcel of land to be not covered by P.D. 27, it being untenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn as
reported by the Agrarian Reform Team Leader concerned and favorably recommended for conversion by him and further, by the Regional
Director for Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, and considering further, that the parcel of land subject hereof was found to be suitable for
conversion to residential subdivision by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and considering finally, that the
herein petitioner was issued a locational clearance by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, the instant request of the petitioner
is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 3844, as amended, and P.D. 815.
 On March 14, 1980, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Cavite (Provincial Board of Cavite) passed Resolution No. 40 declaring the
midland areas composed of Carmona, Dasmariñas, parts of Silang and Trece Martirez (where the subject property is situated) and parts of
Imus, as industrial areas.
 In 1987, the CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project and contracted with E.M. Aragon Enterprises
for the bulldozing of the property. However, the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction filed on May 22, 1987 against the CAI in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.

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 The civil case notwithstanding, the CAI decided to proceed with the third phase of its project. It developed its eleven-hectare property into
a residential property called the Mandarin Homes. The CAI applied for and was granted a separate Order of Conversion on January 2,
1990 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1991, the CAI started selling the houses in its Mandarin Homes Project.
 On October 27, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Barbara P. Tan issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the defendant landowner
and any/all persons acting for and in its behalf or under its authority to cease and desist from further bulldozing the premises in question
and committing acts of dispossession or tending to disturb the peaceful possession and cultivation of the complainants of the landholdings
in question.
 On July 15, 1996, the DAR Region IV issued a Cease and Desist Order against the respondents. The defendants, in a Letter dated July 16,
1996, informed the DAR, Region IV Office, that the land subject of the cease and desist order was also subject of DARAB Case No.
0285-95 and, as such, was under the jurisdiction of PARAD Barbara Tan. The defendants, likewise, raised the issue of forum shopping,
per our ruling in Crisostomo v. SEC.
 After due hearings, PARAD Barbara P. Tan rendered a Decision on August 8, 1996 in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 in favor of the
defendants. The PARAD held that the plaintiffs were bound by the order of dismissal of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13. It
declared that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 were the kins, siblings or spouses of the complainants in the case before it.
Moreover, the complainants had executed deeds of quitclaim or waiver covering the portions of the property which they purportedly
occupied. Thus, the complainants had already waived their rights of possession and cultivation over the portions of the property which
they claimed to be occupying.
 On March 15, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the DARAB and reinstating the decision of the PARAD. The
CA ruled that under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657, all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act.
 Aggrieved, the PBFAI filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on April 11, 2000 before this Court. For its part,
DARAB filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for the reversal of the decision in CA-GR SP No. 49363. The same was
docketed as G.R. No. 142980. On May 11, 2000, the DARAB manifested that it was adopting as its own the petition for review filed by
PBFAI. In our Resolution dated June 28, 2000, we granted the motion of the DARAB and ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 142980
and 142359.

Issues:

 Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)?
 Whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent?
 Whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession and cultivation of the
property in suit?
 Whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-members of
the PBFAI?
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 Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

Held:

 The contention of the petitioners has no merit.

 Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not
classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988.
 When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona
to non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80
hectares of the property covered by TCT No. 62972 into non-agricultural land, he did so pursuant to his authority under Rep. Act No. 3844,
as amended, by P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 946.
 It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the property was not tenanted and not devoted to the
production of palay and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the Minister was
not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that
the property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister
Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved
twenty-one (21) years earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local
Government and the National Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
 With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and
appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members. Consequently, the DARAB should
have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
 The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject matter is determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and
the law extant at the time of the commencement of the suit/complaint/petition. All proceedings before a tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are null and void.
 Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no
cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages. Besides,
when the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty-seven (37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of
quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the
private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their
respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same.

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JURISDICTION; DAR HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca

G.R. No. 154112 (September 23, 2004)

Facts:

 Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No.
1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar
cane.
 On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF
COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
 On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against
Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for 'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No.
405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.'
 Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14
June 1990 be declared unconstitutional.
 MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.
 The respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice
of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
on January 17 and 18, 2000.
 In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of
Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

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Issue:

 The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the
private respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.
 The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial
court, which is a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.

Held:

 The Petition has merit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)
 All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should
be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters
 Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was
devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity
is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002
and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:

"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. — No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."

JURISDICTION; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT NOT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION ON ISSUE OF UNLAWFUL
DETAINER AND FORCIBLE ENTRY OVER RESIDENTIAL LANDHOLDING

Anicia U. Tecson, et al. vs. Dante Gutierrez

G.R. No. 152978 (March 4, 2005)

Facts:

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 The case at bar involved an actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 2287 filed by petitioner against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) on 21 August 1997. Petitioners alleged that they were the owners of a residential lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-62466 and TCT No. T-62465, which they leased to respondent for and in
consideration of four cavans of palay yearly under an oral lease agreement. The lots was to be used by the respondent as the site of his
dwelling. They declared that starting the year 1995, respondent failed to pay the yearly rental. Thus, they considered the lease terminated
and made oral and written demands on him to vacate the property. Respondent, however, stubbornly refused to leave.
 Petitioner charged him of occupying, since January 1997, a portion of their residential lot under TCT No. T-62465, without their consent,
this lot is adjacent to the subject lot of Civil Case of Unlawful detainer. Respondent averred that he was a farmer beneficiary of a homelot
composed of the subject parcels of land.
 On August 21, 1998, the MTC decided the Forcible Entry in favor of petitioners. It ruled that respondent cannot claim entitlement to
acquire the subject lot as his homelot for the following reasons: (1) respondent was not a tenant-farmer of the petitioners; (2) the land was
residential and not agricultural, and the respondent was using it for purposes other than agricultural; (3) the subject lot was far from
respondent's farm; and (4) no certification was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform that the land was respondent's homelot.
 On August 24, 1998, the MTC likewise decided the Unlawful detainer case in favor of petitioners based on the same reasons. The MTC
ordered the respondent to vacate the parcel of land and to pay petitioners four cavans of palay or its equivalent per annum beginning 1995
and every year thereafter until he vacates the subject land.
 Respondent appealed the decisions to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but latter rendered decision affirming in toto the MTC decisions.
 Respondent elevated the cases to the Court of Appeals in a consolidated petition for review. The latter reversed the rulings of the RTC and
dismissed the complaint of Unlawful detainer and Forcible Entry. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case involved agrarian reform
matters which should be resolved by the DARAB and not by the MTC. The Court of Appeals also declared that the application of agrarian
reform laws does not depend on the existence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties and that an agrarian reform
beneficiary is entitled to a homelot even when the property where the homelot is located belongs to a person other than his landlord.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction in cases of Unlawful Detainer and
Forcible Entry.

Held:

 We must point out that this appeal stemmed from ejectment suits wherein the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In their complaint for unlawful detainer, petitioners alleged that the respondent
unlawfully withheld possession of the land despite several demands on him to vacate the premises, and that these demands were made
after the latter failed to pay the rent. Likewise, in their complaint for forcible entry, petitioners averred that respondent deprived them of
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physical possession of the land by means of stealth and strategy. Based on the averments in the complaint, the Municipal Trial Court
indeed properly acquired jurisdiction over the cases below between herein petitioners and the respondent.
 Although respondent impugned the validity of petitioners' title over the property and claimed it to be his homelot, this assertion could not
divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases. The court could not be divested of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases on the
mere allegation that the defendant asserts ownership over the litigated property. Moreover, a pending action involving ownership of the
same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. The ejectment cases can proceed
independently of the DARAB case. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature
of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.
 It is settled that the only issue for resolution in ejectment suits is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
MTC, nonetheless, has the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession.
 Going to the issue of rightful possession now, our view, petitioners are entitled to possess the parcels of land. For respondent failed to
show that the land had been awarded to him by the Department of Agrarian Reform as his homelot. There is , instead, preponderance of
evidence shown before the trial court in favor of petitioners' claim. They were able to show Transfer Certificate of Titles in their names,
whereas the respondent had none but bare assertions.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; EMANCIPATION PATENT BEYOND ATTACK AND SCRUTINY; FORFEITURE OF

AMORTIZATIONS IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT

Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato

G.R. No. 155181 (April 15, 2005)

Facts:

 The case involves private agricultural land devoted to rice with an area of 1.787 hectares, owned by Dr. Victoria Marave-Tiu and located
at Brgy. San Pedro, Alangalang, Leyte.
 The subject property was covered by Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27, and was eventually awarded to Estanislao Ayo,
who was also administrator of the property. However, as the latter was already old and sickly at that time, he requested that it be instead
registered in the name of petitioner (Liberty Ayo-Alburo). Accordingly, CLT No. D-038564 covering the property was issues in
petitioner's name on April 23, 1984. And E.P. No. A-025173 with the corresponding TCT No. TE-775 covering the property was
subsequently issued in petitioners' favor on March 5, 1987.

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 Later, respondent (Uldarico Matobato) together with DAR, Region VIII filed Petition dated April 2, 1996 before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Tanghas, Tolosa, Leyte for cancellation of the CLT and EP issued in petitioner's favor and for the
issuance of a new certificate and patent in respondent's name. Respondent alleged that since 1966 until the filing of the petition before the
PARAD, he had been cultivating the property and giving shares of the harvest as rentals to petitioner.
 PARAD rendered a Decision dated Sept. 25, 1996 in favor of respondents ordering cancellation of TCT No. TE-775 with EP No. A-
025173, the process of the reallocation in favor of Uldarico Matobato, the issuance of new title, and the forfeiture of the land amortization
payment paid in the name of Liberty Ayo in favor of the reallocatee Uldarico Matobato. DARAB affirmed in toto the PARAD Decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:

 Whether or not private respondent was a bona fide tenant of the property.
 Whether or not the issuance of an emancipation patent put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
 Whether or not the amortization payments the petitioner (Liberty Ayo) make to the land should be forfeited in favor of respondent
(Matobato).

Held:

 By admittedly allowing respondent to cultivate the property and viewing the owner's share of the produce, petitioner implicitly recognized
respondent as tenant. There thus between them an implied contract of tenancy.
 A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. Although petitioners did not expressly give
their consent to a leasehold relation with respondent, in our view petitioners converted to the tenancy impliedly by allowing respondent to
cultivate the landholding in question and by reviewing from him the landowners share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
 The mere issuances of an emancipation does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
Emancipation Patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June
17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents
issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure.
 While the DARAB has jurisdiction to order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary, forfeiture should be made
in favor of the government and not to the reallocatee of the landholding.

CERTIORARI; CERTIORARI LIES WHERE THERE IS NO APPEAL NOR PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pepito Planta, et al.

G.R. No. 152324 (April 29, 2005)

Facts:

 Respondent Faustino B. Tobia is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24310
situated in Viga, Angadanan, Isabela, with an area of approximately 10.9044 hectares (subject property). He voluntarily offered to sell the
subject property to the Government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Pursuant to its
mandate under Executive Order No. 405, petitioner LBP determined the valuation of the subject property at P107,962.83 per hectare or a
total of P1,145,075.41. Accordingly, the Government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) offered to buy the subject
property at the purchase price of P1,145,075.41 in accordance with petitioner LBP's valuation. As he found the valuation too low,
respondent Tobia rejected the offer.
 In view of respondent Tobia's rejection of the offer, summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the
subject property were conducted before respondent Pepito Planta, in his capacity as the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). After due proceedings, respondent Provincial Adjudicator rendered the Decision dated
November 14, 2000 setting aside petitioner LBP's valuation of the subject property and fixing the same at P250,000.00 per hectare.
 Petitioner LBP sought reconsideration of the said decision but respondent Provincial Adjudicator, in the Order dated January 25, 2001,
denied its motion.
 Subsequently, respondent Tobia filed a Manifestation and Motion dated April 16, 2001 praying for the issuance of a writ of execution for
failure of petitioner LBP to appeal the Decision dated November 14, 2000. Petitioner LBP opposed the same contending that the said
decision has not attained finality in view of its seasonable filing of a petition for judicial determination of just compensation for the subject
property.
 Despite the pendency of A.C. No. 0634, respondent Provincial Adjudicator issued the Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2001 which was
addressed to the DARAB Sheriff directing him to implement the Decision dated November 14, 2000. Petitioner LBP received a copy of
the writ of execution on July 6, 2001 and forthwith filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Respondent Provincial Adjudicator, in
the Order dated August 8, 2001, denied the said motion.
 On August 30, 2001, petitioner LBP filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari to assail the Writ of
Execution dated June 27, 2001 issued by respondent Provincial Adjudicator. In the said motion, petitioner LBP averred, among others,
that it received the Order dated August 8, 2001 denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2001.
 Without acting directly on petitioner LBP's motion for extension of time to file its petition for certiorari by either granting or denying it,
the CA denied due course to the petition for the reason that it was the wrong remedy.
 Petitioner LBP filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated October 12, 2001 but
the same was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated February 12, 2002.

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Issue:

 Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner LBP?

Held:

 Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because the
same is not a "final order" within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recently explained, "a writ of execution is not a
final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or a judgment. It is a judicial
process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party." As such, an order of execution is generally not appealable.
 On the other hand, certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11,
Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part, that "the decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof." In
relation to this provision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribes that any party who does not agree with the decision (in the summary
administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the court for final determination of just compensation.
 Thus, at the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA, the remedy of appeal was not available to petitioner LBP either to
question the decision of respondent Provincial Adjudicator concerning the land valuation of the subject property or to assail the writ
directing the execution of the said decision. Even granting arguendo that the remedy of appeal was then available to petitioner LBP, the
same would not have been a speedy and adequate remedy against the execution of respondent Provincial Adjudicator's decision.
 Petitioner LBP, thus, properly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2001 issued by respondent
Provincial Adjudicator and the appellate court committed reversible error in dismissing it outright.
 Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No.
6657 (within fifteen days from receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or resolution). The Court holds that Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 prevails since
it is a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of agrarian reform laws. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is extendible, but such extension shall not extend
the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 In this case, petitioner LBP filed its motion for extension to file petition for certiorari with the CA on August 30, 2001. To recall,
petitioner LBP received a copy of the writ of execution on July 6, 2001 and forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. It
received on August 21, 2001 respondent Provincial Adjudicator's order denying reconsideration of the writ of execution. Under Section 54
of R.A. No. 6657, respondent LBP had fifteen days from the receipt of the order within which to file the petition for certiorari with the CA.
Petitioner LBP, thus, seasonably filed its motion for extension of time to file a petition forcertiorari.

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 However, instead of either granting or denying petitioner LBP's motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari, the CA
dismissed outright the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. The CA committed reversible error in so doing
not only because, as already discussed petitioner LBP properly availed of the remedy of certiorari, but also because the outright dismissal
of the petition was precipitately made.

JURISDICTION IN DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad

G.R. No. 127198 (May 16, 2005)

Facts:

 On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural
lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition
named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered
tenants of the land.
 After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation
due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.

 DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order dated July 30, 1996 for
being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land
Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.
 Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to
the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing
was due to accident and/or mistake. The affidavit of Land Bank's counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the
Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it
had no notice of hearing" due to his heavy workload.
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 The trial court, in its Order of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own
negligence.
 In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work
constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious
defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.
 According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their properties. Private
respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly
with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are
mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the valuation of the
properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.

Issue:

 Whether or not the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to
the Court of Justice?

Held:

 In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
second refers to judicial proceedings.
 In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner
the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the
courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
 Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts
of justice.
 It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
 In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as
irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced
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that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA
6657 and existing jurisprudence.

CONVERSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM RECLASSIFICATION; AUTHORITY OF DAR TO APPROVE CONVERSION OF

AGRICULTURAL LANDS COVERED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES HAS NOT BEEN
PIERCED BY THE PASSAGE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Jose Luis Ros, Andoni F. Aboitiz, Xavier Aboitiz, Roberto E. Aboitiz, Enrique Aboitiz, Matthias G. Mendezona, Cebu Industrial Park Developers,
Inc. and FBM Aboitiz Marine, Inc. vs. DAR, Hon. Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as DAR Secretary, and Dir. Jose Llames, in his capacity as
Director of DAR-Regional 7
G.R. No. 132477 (August 31, 2005)

Facts:

 The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of DAR Region 7 disallowing the application
for conversion filed by petitioners, owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was
based on Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands.
Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995. Because of such disapproval, Petitioners filed with the
RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR which has jurisdiction citing Section 20 of the Local Government Code.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court denied the same. Hence, Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Supreme Court referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals thru a Resolution dated 11 November 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said
Resolution but the same was denied thru Resolution dated 27 January 1997.
 The Court of Appeals ordered the Public Respondents to file their comments on the Petition. Two sets of comments from Public
respondents, one from DAR Provincial Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were submitted, to which petitioners
filed their Consolidated Reply. Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 30 January 1998.
 Petitioners claim that local grants have the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 20 of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has
already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be

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confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective, that if
the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation from DAR is necessary.

Issues:

 Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority
under Section 20 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out
of coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR?
 Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
 Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining development works on the
subject lands?
 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against the DAR?

Held:

 The petition lacks merit.

 After the passage of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands, through reclassification, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction
over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 are exempted
from conversion.
 Reclassification of lands does not suffice. In Alarcon vs. CA (405 SCRA 440) it was ruled that conversion is different from
reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR.
Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized, for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
 R.A. No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988 and Municipal Ordinance No. 101, which reclassified the subject land, was passed on 25
March 1992, and the Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101 was
passed on 03 April 1995, long after R.A. No. 6657 has taken effect. To further clarify any doubt on its authority, DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 12 dated October 1994 which provides for the consolidated and revised rules and procedures governing
conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses.
 The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not
been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
 It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the
trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa vda. de Villena, found occasion to
reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
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 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
 Injunction is not the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitions in developing the subject land. Section 68 of R.A.
No. 6657 provides:

"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. — No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DAR),
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the
program."

JURISDICTION; PARAD ADJUDICATOR HAS PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN CASES
INVOLVING THE ISSUANCE, CORRECTION AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF CLOAS

Esperanza vda. de Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 146035 (September 9, 2005)

Facts:

 The case at bar involved a petition for review filed by petitioner to nullify and set aside the decision of Court of Appeals. Subject of this
litigation are two parcels of agricultural land located at Sampaloc (Paligui) Apalit, Pampanga, namely: Lot 847 and Lot 845, with the area
of 1.0876 and 1.0632 hectares, respectively. Presently, these lots are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 4304 and 4305,
registered in the name of respondent Reynald M. Romero, who is the holder of Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) Nos. 70690
and 70691 issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
 Formerly, the subject parcels of agricultural land were covered by a CLOA in favor of farmer-beneficiary Leonardo Briones. In A.R. Case
No. 0029 '94 of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office at Region III, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga herein
petitioners challenged the award of subject lots to Briones.
 During the pendency of A.R. Case No. 0029 '94, Briones filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) at
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a petition for the cancellation of his CLOA because he executed a "Waiver of Rights" in favor of one
Erlinda Quintos. Before this petition for cancellation could be resolved by the PARAB, Briones executed another "Waiver of Rights" in
favor of herein respondent to facilitate the transfer of the two (2) parcels in question to respondent who bought said lots from Briones for
P2M, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Briones in favor of respondent.

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 The PARAB Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. granted Briones' petition for cancellation of his CLOA. Pursuant thereto, the DAR Secretary
issued CLOA Nos. 70690 and 70691 in favor of respondent Romero on the basis of which TCT Nos. 4304 and 4305 were issued in the
latter's name. Meanwhile, in A.R. Case No. 0029 '94, the DAR Regional Office at Region III issued an Order dated March 7, 1994.
 However, considering that the subject parcels of land were already sold and transferred, and titles thereto already issued in favor of
respondent Romero, the aforesaid Order of March 7, 1994 in A.R. Case No. 0029'94 was not enforced. Nevertheless, the DAR Regional
Office at Region III continued with its investigation. Then, on December 13, 1995, DAR Region III Director Eugenio B. Bernardo, issued
an Order dispositively reading, as follows:

REWARDING Lot No. 847 with an area of 1.0376 hectares and a portion of 1.0632 hectares of Lot No. 845 all at Sampaloc
(Paligui), Apalit, Pampanga in favor of Esperanza vda. de Lopez and Modesta vda. de Asuncion, and the due issuance of CLOAs in their
favor;

DIRECTING Esperanza vda. de Lopez and Modesta vda. de Asuncion to institute appropriate action before the proper forum for the
cancellation of the CLOAs issued in the name of Reynald Marcelino Romero; and

 Upon knowledge of said Order, respondent Romero filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a petition for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Annulment/Cancellation of Order dated
December 13, 1995 with Injunction".
 Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the PARAB has no jurisdiction to entertain Romero's aforementioned petition because
the questioned Order dated December 13, 1995 of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo is administrative in nature and, therefore,
should have been appealed by Romero to the DAR Secretary. On appeal, Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's recourse as well as the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
 PARAB Adjudicator Ilao, Jr., denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court Appeals via a petition
for certiorari.
 Hence, this instant petition for review.

Issue:

 Whether or not PARAB Adjudicator has jurisdiction over a case involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAS)

Held:

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 The pertinent and applicable Rule II, Section 1(a) clearly states that the DARAB has "primary and exclusive original and appellate
jurisdiction" to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving: (1) the implementation of the CARP under RA 6657, E.O. No.
228, and 129-A, RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No. 6389, PD No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules; and (2)
the rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical where such person is engaged in the management, cultivation and use
of all agricultural lands covered by CARP and other agrarian laws. Thus, inasmuch as the peaceful possession of respondent Romero
which is being disturbed by the assailed December 13, 1995 Order of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo pertains to an agrarian
dispute, involving, as they do, the rights of respondent Romero as an awardee of a CLOA over the subject parcels of agricultural land,
which are now registered in his name under TCT Nos. 4304 and 4305, we rule and so hold that the PARAD has the primary and exclusive
original and appellate jurisdiction over said order assailed in DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96.
 Simply put, we find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the PARAD's denial of petitioners' motion to
dismiss. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PARAB Adjudicator Ilao, Jr. has jurisdiction over DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96 under
the afore-quoted Rule II, Section 1(a) of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Undoubtedly, DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96 is an agrarian
dispute involving rights of respondent Romero over the subject agricultural lands, which rights were disturbed by the Order dated
December 13, 1995 of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo by disqualifying Romero as farmer-beneficiary of the subject lots and
directing petitioners to institute appropriate action before the proper forum for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued in the name of
respondent Romero. With respect to petitioners' contention that the aforesaid DAR orders had become final and executory on account of
respondent Romero's failure to appeal the same to the DAR Secretary, suffice it to say that should the PARAD ultimately find said orders
to have been issued without jurisdiction, the PARAD is sufficiently clothed with authority and definitely has the jurisdiction to declare the
same null and void under the time-honored principle that void judgments never become final and executory and cannot be the source of
any right whatsoever.

COVERAGE; CARP COVERED PROPERTY DONATED FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION FOR CHARITABLE
PURPOSE
REPEALING LAW; P.D. NO. 27 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW REPEALED SPECIAL LAW SECTION 4 OF ACT NO. 3239
POLICE POWER; EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER PREVAILS OVER OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY PRIVATE CONTRACT

Hospicio De San Jose de Barili, Cebu City vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 140847 (September 23, 2005)

Facts:

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 Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239.
The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support,
free of charge, of indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by
the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No.
3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latter's general repealing clause.
 The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order held that P.D. No. 27 was a special law, as it applied only to
particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn
lands, provides no exemptions based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. The Order of the DAR Secretary was
assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals which the latter, the Court of Appeals and hereby, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It sustained the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section
4 of Act No. 3239 was expressly repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands to qualified
beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6657. The appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it did "the need to distribute and create an
economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land, most especially those with less privilege in life, our peasant farmer."
 Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner filed Petition for Review.

Issues:

 Whether or not provision in Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that
was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties?
 Whether or not Act No. 3239 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657?
 Whether or not P.D. No. 1808 impairs the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligation contract?

Held:

 Under Section 4 of the CARL, place under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed in Section 10 thereof. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No.
27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ultimately, the
result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless, both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to
appreciate what to this Court is indeed the decisive legal dimension of the case.
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 Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of
eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
 This characterization is warranted whether the expropriation is operative under the CARL or P.D. No. 27, as both laws are keyed into the
same governmental objective. Moreover, under both laws, the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the properties taken. The twin
process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been
aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which
is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc."
 Thus, we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the subject properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale, within
the contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. 3239. The transfer arises from compulsion of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the
Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the resulting transaction would not be considered as a
conventional sale, since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of the law. Regrettably, the DAR
Secretary and the Court of Appeals failed to apply that sound principle, preferring to rely instead on the conclusion that Section 4 was
repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL.
 Nonetheless, even assuming for the nonce that Section 4 contemplates even forced sales such as those through expropriation, we would
agree with the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals that Section 4 is deemed repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL.
 The other arguments raised by the Hospicio are similarly bereft of merit. It wants us to hold that P.D. No. 27 and the CARL, both enacted
to implement the urgently needed policy of agrarian reform, violate the non-impairment of contracts clause under the Bill of Rights. Yet
the broad sweep of this argument ignores the nuances adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 10 of Article III. We have held that the
State's exercise of police powers may prevail over obligations imposed by private contracts.
 The rationale for holding that the properties of the Hospicio are covered by P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657 is so well-grounded in law
that it obviates any resort to the sordid game of choosing which of the two competing aspirations is nobler. The body which would have
unquestionable discretion in assigning hierarchical values on the modalities by which social justice may be implemented is the legislature.
Land reform affords the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of
others. By refusing to exempt properties owned by charitable institutions or maintained for charitable purposes from agrarian reform, the
legislature has indicated a policy choice which the Court is bound to implement.

COVERAGE; PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 2052 JURISDICTION; DAR NOT THE COURT HAS
THE JURISDICTION ON ISSUE OF TENANCY

Department of Agrarian Reform, et al. vs. Paulino Franco

G.R. No. 147479 (September 26, 2005)

Facts:
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 In the case at bar it involved a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ("DARAB") with modification by deleting the disturbance compensation.
 The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Patrocinia G. Mercado ("MARO Mercado" of the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") sent
a letter to Paulino Franco ("Franco") through Franco's attorney-in-fact, Plaridel Seno ("Seno") requesting Franco to attend a conference to
discuss the terms and conditions of bringing under the agricultural leasehold system Franco's land located in Babag, Cebu City with an
aggregate area of 36.8 hectares. Franco failed to attend the meeting and merely sent a letter-reply to MARO Mercado, objecting to the
placement of his land under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 ("RA 6657") or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
 MARO Mercado prepared the documentation folders for Provisional Lease Rentals in favor of the private petitioners herein. Acting
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Buenaventura Pomida ("PARO Pomida") approved the Provisional Lease Rentals recommended by
MARO Mercado. Franco filed with the DARAB, Region VII, Cebu City a petition to nullify the orders of MARO Mercado and PARO
Pomida. Franco alleged that the land could not be placed under the agricultural leasehold system because Proclamation No. 2052 dated 30
January 1981 and Letter of Instruction No. 1256 ("LOI No. 1256") dated 14 July 1982 had already classified the land as non-agricultural.
 The Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ("Adjudicator") ruled in favor of Franco, declaring the assailed orders void. Citing Proclamation No.
2052, LOI No. 1256, and the Order dated 16 September 1992 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, the Adjudicator held that Franco's
land is excluded from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law under RA 6657.
 On appeal, the DARAB rendered its Decision dated 23 July 1996 affirming the decision of the Adjudicator. The DARAB held that
Franco's land was not agricultural land at the time the questioned orders were issued. The DARAB cited two reasons: (1) Franco's land is
within the tourism zone pursuant to Proclamation No. 2052, promulgated on 30 January 1981, and which preceded the enactment of RA
6657 which became effective on 15 June 1988; and (2) the purpose of Proclamation No. 2052 is manifested in the issuance of LOI No.
1256 which directed the DAR Secretary to exempt the areas situated within the declared Tourist Zone from the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer, and to suspend or cancel all processing for coverage of these areas under the land reform program.
 In the Decision, one of the members of the DARAB, Lorenzo R. Reyes ("Reyes"), made a handwritten note under his signature
stating: "Petitioner-appellee [Franco] will still have to apply for conversion and if granted appellants will be entitled to disturbance
compensation."
 Franco filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, said Motion was denied by DARAB for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered decision affirming the DARAB decision with the modification that private petitioners have no right to disturbance
compensation.

Issues:

 Whether or not the handwritten note made by one of the members of DARAB under his signature form part of DARAB decision?
 Whether or not the findings of Non-Tenancy as ruled by the Court of Appeals is proper inspite of the fact the same has not been factually
determined in the Court a quo?
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Held:

 Obviously, the handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes does not form part of the decision and cannot be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, it was proper for the DARAB to dismiss the motion for reconsideration, albeit the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration failed to mention the impropriety of the issue raised in such motion.
 Again, Franco sought for review not the DARAB decision but the one-sentence handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes, which is a
mere opinion of a lone member of the DARAB and has no binding effect. The view expressed in the note is not the opinion of the
DARAB and does not form part of the DARAB decision. Certainly, the note does not form part of the dispositive portion of the DARAB
decision which could be subject to an appeal. The Court reiterated that "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is
the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in
one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment.
 Indeed, the ruling of the appellate court that private petitioners have no right to disturbance compensation because they have not proven
that they are tenants of Franco's land went beyond the DARAB decision being appealed. The determination of entitlement to disturbance
compensation is still premature at this stage since this case originally involved only the issue of nullity of the Provisional Lease Rental
Orders. Further, it is the DAR that can best determine and identify the legitimate tenants who have a right to disturbance compensation.

TENANCY; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; AGRICULTURAL TENANCY AS DEFINED UNDER

THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES; TENANCY RELATIONS CANNOT BE BARGAINED AWAY
EXCEPT FOR THE STRONG REASONS PROVIDED BY LAW; CHANGE OF LANDOWNERSHIP DOES NOT TERMINATE
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

LUDO & LUYM Development Corporation and/or CPC Development Corporation vs. Vicente C. Barreto as substituted by his heirs namely:
Maxima L. Barreto, Peregrina B. Uy, Rogelio L. Barreto, Violeta L. Barreto, Florenda B. Templanza, Eduardo L. Barreto, Evelyn B. Bersamin,
Cecilia B. Aquino and Nelson Nilo L. Barreto
G.R. No. 147266 (September 30, 2005)

Facts:

 The present petition stemmed from a complaint for "Opposition Against the Application for Renewal of the Conversion Order/Claim for
Payment of Disturbance Compensation Plus Damages" filed on 30 April 1991 by Vicente C. Barreto against herein petitioners LUDO and

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CPC before the DARAB Regional Office in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, involving a thirty-six-hectare land covered by TCT No. 18822-
25, six hectares of which were devoted for the planting of coconuts, while the remaining thirty hectares had been planted with sugarcane.
 In 1938, Vicente C. Barreto, as tenant of landowner Antonio Bartolome, worked on and cultivated two hectares of land devoted to
sugarcane plantation. In 1956, Antonio Bartolome sold the entire estate to LUDO with the latter absorbing all the farmworkers of the
former. Vicente C. Barreto was designated as a co-overseer with Bartolome on the six-hectare coco land portion of the estate, pending the
development of the entire estate into a residential-commercial complex.
 Pursuant to City Ordinance No. 1313, the subject landholding fell within the Commercial-Residential Zone of the city. On 30 March 1978,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a conversion permit to petitioner LUDO authorizing the conversion of the entire estate
into a residential/commercial lot. On 24 November 1988, petitioner CPC, the developer of the subject property, requested for the renewal
of the conversion permit earlier issued to the LUDO. Vicente C. Barreto opposed by filing a letter-complaint on 30 April 1991 before the
DARAB Regional Office in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, on the ground that such act was one of the prohibited acts enjoined by Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6657. The DARAB rendered a decision, in favor of petitioners LUDO and CPC, finding that there was no tenancy
relationship existing between LUDO and Vicente C. Barreto, thus, no disturbance compensation was due the latter for having been
dispossessed of the six-hectare landholding he had been tilling. The DARAB Regional Office gave ample credence to the affidavit of
Antonio Bartolome, complainant's co-overseer and former owner of the thirty-six-hectare landholding.
 On appeal to DARAB Central Office, the latter affirmed the PARAD's Decision which CA annulled and set aside through a resolution
dated 12 August 1997, hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

 Whether or not there existed a tenancy relationship between petitioner LUDO and Vicente C. Barreto?
 Is the Statute of Limitation under R.A. No. 3844 applicable to bar payment of disturbance compensation to a tenant?
 Is deceased Vicente C. Barreto entitled to disturbance compensation for his dispossession?

Held:

 The findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance. The Court found that
there was a compelling reason for it to apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of their factual findings on the ground that the findings
of facts of both courts contradict each other. An overwhelming evidence in favor of the late Vicente C. Barreto was overlooked and
disregarded.
 In the case at bar, it bears emphasizing that no one has denied the existence of the tenancy status of deceased Vicente C. Barreto over the
subject thirty-six-hectare landholding with respect to its former owner, Antonio Bartolome. There being no waiver executed by Barreto, no
less than the law clarifies that the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship is not terminated by mere changes of ownership, in
cases of sale or transfer of legal possession as in lease. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation
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shall not be extinguished by the sale, of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, the purchaser shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
 For this reason, when petitioner LUDO became the owner of the subject landholding, it became subrogated to the rights and obligations of
its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Bartolome, his obligation under the law to Barreto, continues and subsists until terminated as provided
for by law.
 A tenant has been defined under Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his
immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold system. Applying the preceding to the case at bar, what became apparent from the
records is that though the late Vicente C. Barreto was designated as a co-overseer of the subject landholding, he was also tilling the land
and had a sharing arrangement with petitioner LUDO and Antonio Bartolome. What is glittering, therefore, is that the deceased also took
on the added duty of being the overseer of the petitioners. Nothing in law and in the facts of the case at bar excludes one from the other.
 Reclassification is very much different from conversion. The latter is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. Reclassification, in contrast, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. Parties can still continue with their tenurial relationship even after such
reclassification. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
 In the case at bar, though there appears to be no court proceeding which took cognizance of the reclassification/application for conversion
of the subject landholding from agricultural to residential/commercial, the permit issued by the DAR on 30 March 1978 was never assailed
and thus, attained finality. In the case of Bunye v. Aquino, the Court allowed the payment of disturbance compensation because there was
an order of conversion issued by the DAR of the landholding from agricultural to residential. The decree was never questioned and thus
became final. Consequently, the tenants were ejected from the land and were thus awarded disturbance compensation. Hence, Barreto,
who used to be a tenant of petitioner LUDO at the time of the conversion of the subject landholding, is entitled to disturbance
compensation for his dispossession.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 09, SERIES OF 1993 WHICH PRESCRIBES A MAXIMUM
RETENTION LIMIT FOR OWNERS OF LAND DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK RAISING; RULE MAKING POWER OF DAR
UNDER SECTION 49 OF THE CARL

Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC) vs. Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T.
Sutton
G.R. No. 162070 (October 19, 2005)

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Facts:

 This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993,
null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
 The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On
October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell
(VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
 On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
 On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of
the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents filed with petitioner
DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL.
 On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was
devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers
they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.
 On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area
of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
 On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their
VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
 On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares
of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
 Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-
raising. Said motion was denied. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and
validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for
exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-

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raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appeal to CA, the CA ruled in
favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.

Issue:

 Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional?

Held:

 The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the
definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is
an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such
as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.
 Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
 Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an
implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an
earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of
the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping
from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress
clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock
farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
 It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend
the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative
order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

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TENANCY; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE PRESUMED; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MUST EXIST BETWEEN
THE LITIGANTS BEFORE DARAB MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE; INDISPENSABLE REQUISITES OF TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP

Domingo C. Suarez vs. Leo B. Saul, Roger S. Brillo, Efrain S. Brillo, Eleno S. Brillo and Ignacio G. Pelaez
G.R. No. 166664 (October 20, 2005)

Facts:

 The case arose from a complaint for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory injunction, recovery of possession and damages filed by
respondents against petitioner and T'boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Respondents claimed that they were agricultural tenants in petitioner's
land on a 25-75 sharing agreement; petitioner voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
that they signed the documents for the transfer of the land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as farmer-
beneficiaries; that while the VOS was being processed, they were summarily ejected from the property by TADI after the latter entered
into a Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with petitioner thereby depriving them of their landholdings.
 Petitioner contended that respondents were installed as tenants, not by him, but by Wennie Gonzaga of the DAR in Koronadal, South
Cotabato. He denied the existence of a grower's contract between him and TADI over the subject land. The latter claimed that its grower's
contract with petitioner covered parcels of land different from those being claimed by respondents.
 The Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint for lack of merit finding that respondents failed to prove their alleged tenancy over
petitioner's land, and while they were identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries of the land subject of the VOS, they only have an
"inchoate right" to the land since its coverage under the CARP has yet to be completed.
 On appeal, the DARAB Central Office rendered a Decision reversing the Regional Adjudicator declaring the respondents as bona-fide
tenants; it ordered the reinstatement of respondents in their respective original landholdings after harvest, and ordered the MARO and
other concerned DAR officers to determine the disturbance compensation from the time of actual ejectment to actual reinstatement. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the said DARAB Decision. Hence, the instant petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision.

Issues:

 Whether or not the respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants under the law?
 Whether or not the petitioner illegally ejected respondents from their landholdings?

Held:

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 The petitioner's admission that respondents were tenants in the land, was qualified in paragraph 2 of petitioner's answer that it was Wennie
Gonzaga of DAR who installed them as such. Clearly, it was the DAR who placed respondents in actual possession of the land upon
petitioner's offer to transfer the same to the government. Other than this supposed admission, there is no evidence on record to prove the
tenancy relations. Respondents did not substantiate their claim with evidence to show that they were agricultural tenants in petitioner's
land. They did not allege actual cultivation or specify the crop produced thereby. Neither did they mention how much of the produce was
delivered to petitioner or submit receipts to prove the purported 25-75 sharing of harvests. They did not state, much less prove, the
circumstances of their agreement with petitioner as to the alleged tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that they are
agricultural tenants on the property.
 In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There
must be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de factotenant.
 In this case, there is no showing that there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents. Likewise, respondents have no
tenancy relationship with TADI, against whom they principally have a cause of action. The controversy is civil in nature since it involves
the issue of material possession, independent of any question pertaining to agricultural tenancy. Hence, the case falls outside the
jurisdiction of DARAB, it is cognizable by the regular courts.

AUTHORITY TO APPEAR; IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER; WHO HAS AUTHORITY TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan Development Co., represented by Mariano Pamintuan, Jr.
G.R. No. 167886 (October 25, 2005)

Facts:

 This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the April 15, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, which
dismissed Land Bank of the Philippines' (LANDBANK's) petition and sustained the August 2, 2004 Order of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which denied due course to the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance filed by
LANDBANK's counsels.
 In DARAB case for Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation, DARAB rendered a Decision dated April 27, 2004, fixing the just
compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Company's 274.9037 hectare lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4972

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and located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato, at P58,237,301.68. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. On June 4, 2004,
Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal,
or on June 15, 2004, said counsels also filed a Notice of Appeal via registered mail. Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the
notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show that
their appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new counsels, on the other hand, asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to
their Comment the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing Loreto
B. Corotan to represent, and designating Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsels for LANDBANK.
 On August 2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are without authority to represent petitioner because
the latter failed to effect a valid substitution of their former counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004 decision had become final
and executory because the notice of appeal filed by its purported new counsels is a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of
the reglementary period to appeal.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration appending two memoranda signed by Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, petitioner's Department
Manager and Head, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Legal Services Department, confirming the authority of Atty.
Montarde to file a notice of appeal.
 The DARAB, however, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the
Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the petition. It sustained the DARAB's finding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa were not clothed
with authority to file the notice of appeal.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
 In a resolution dated June 6, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the April 27, 2004 decision of
the DARAB.

Issue:

 Who has the authority to file a Notice of Appeal on behalf of a petitioner?

Held:

 We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice of
appeal in behalf of petitioner. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to

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produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions."

 The presumption in favor of the counsel's authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present
a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed
by the counsel in his client's name. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party require a lawyer to adduce
authorization from the client.
 In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of entry of appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, gave rise to the presumption that they have
the authority to file the notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the SPA executed by
Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of LANDBANK authorizing them to represent petitioner; and the two memoranda of Atty. Danilo
B. Beramo, Department Manager and Head, CARP Legal Services Department, requesting Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal. These
documents are sufficient proof of their authority to represent petitioner's cause. The doubt entertained by the DARAB as to when the SPA
and memoranda were executed is of no consequence in view of petitioner's vigorous assertion that it authorized said lawyers to file a
notice of appeal. Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly.
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first appearance and validates the action taken by him.
 The DARAB's assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly represent petitioner because there was no proper substitution of
counsels, lacks merit. Petitioner never intended to replace its counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates. Though not
specified in the notice, Attys. Montarde and Mesa entered their appearance as collaborating counsels.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ELEMENTS

Alejandro Danan, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Estrella Arrastia
G.R. No. 132759 (October 25, 2005)

The Court of Appeals and the DARAB vs. Estrella Arrastia

G.R. No. 132866 (October 25, 2005)

Facts:

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 Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property for a period of twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to
1988. Then, persons claiming to be farmers and residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a joint resolution as
members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura ("AMA") to enter and lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs.
They entered the disputed land and planted various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent confrontation on May 21, 1988 that led to
the filing of criminal charges against AMA members.
 On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petitioner DARAB, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented from destroying
standing crops on the disputed property and from fencing said property and that petitioners be allowed to continue with their farming
thereon. On August 15, 1988, the DARAB ordered the DAR Regional Director to conduct an ocular inspection on the disputed property.
The inspection team submitted an Ocular/Investigation Report stating that there were no substantially significant plantings on the disputed
property. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer ("MARO") of Lubao, Pampanga also submitted a report recommending the
disqualification of private petitioners from availing of the benefits under the CARP.
 On October 5, 1988, the DARAB issued an order denying AMA's motion for authority to cultivate and the order became final and
executory on July 29, 1989.
 Arrastia instituted an action against private petitioners for violation of Section 73(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 on October 9, 1989
and the trial court, sitting as a special agrarian court ("SAC"), issued a temporary restraining order. Subsequently a preliminary injunction,
both enjoining private petitioners from entering and cultivating the disputed property was issued to the latter.
 On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board ("PARAD") against Arrastia, alleging that they were actual tillers of the disputed property who were forcibly evicted
by Arrastia from their tenanted lots through the use of armed men. The matter was referred to BARC but the dispute could not be settled
amicably per recommendation of BARC Officials.
 On the basis of the reports submitted by BARC officials and private petitioners' affidavits, the hearing officer issued on December 9, 1990
an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of petitioners and the PARAD also directed the MARO to act on the petition for the
coverage of the disputed property under the CARP.
 On January 30, 1991, Arrastia filed an omnibus motion in DARAB Case No. 0001, questioning the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to
issue an order of injunction. The DARAB denied said motion and subsequently issued the writ of injunction on September 22, 1992.
 Arrastia filed an answer in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P' 89, interposing the defense that the disputed land was not devoted to
agriculture and that private petitioners were not tenants thereof.
 After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P' 89 on May 13, 1993, declaring that the subject
property is covered by the CARP and that private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries of the program. The adjudicator also issued an
injunction prohibiting Arrastia from disturbing private petitioners' occupation of the property.
 Arrastia appealed the aforementioned decision to petitioner DARAB. The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1551. On March 28,
1994, the DARAB rendered its decision modifying the appealed judgment.
 Aggrieved, Arrastia elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB.

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Issue:

 Whether or not private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries under the CARP?

Held:

 The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
 The appellate court's conclusion that private petitioners committed particular violations warranting their disqualification from the CARP is
based on the MARO report which has not been disputed by all the private petitioners. The MARO who prepared the report enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her functions. Absent any showing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving evidentiary weight to said report, said factual findings are generally deemed conclusive on this Court, which is not a
trier of facts.
 Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In the case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitioners' occupation and cultivation of the disputed
property was with the consent of the landowners.
 As borne by the case records, respondent Arrastia owns only 4.4630 hectares of the subject property, which is below the retention limit
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of retention of up to a maximum of five (5) hectares of agricultural land in favor of a
landowner whose property may be acquired for distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently, a landowner may keep his
entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land will not be covered at all
by the operation land transfer program although all requisites for coverage are present.
 The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it
to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does
not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must prevail. Moreover, Administrative
Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the
prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Therefore, there is no
legal and practical basis to order the commencement of the administrative proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastia's land
under the CARP since her property's land area falls below the retention limit of five (5) hectares.

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TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES

Ester Deloso vs. Sps. Alfonso Marapao and Herminia P. Marapao

G.R. No. 144244 (November 11, 2005)

Facts:

 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48503 which reversed the decision
of the DARAB and declared that petitioners is not a tenant of respondents.
 Petitioner filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the province of Agusan del Norte against
respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from interfering with her tenurial rights, and that an order be issued fixing the sharing of the
net produce of the landholding between the parties and directing respondents to account for the November 1994 harvest. Respondents, on
the other hand, maintained that Primitivo was not a tenant of the landholding but merely an overseer paid for the work he rendered. After
Primitivo's death, his son, Alberto, was installed as overseer and paid as farmworker. On the basis of the report of the ocular inspection
and investigation, the MARO found Alberto Temple to be the tenant of the landholding. The PARAD, however, reversed the finding of
the MARO and declared the petitioner as tenant of the landholding. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the findings of the PARAD and
ruled that the requisites of agricultural tenancy are present.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner is indeed a tenant of the subject landholding?

Held:

 In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following essential requisites must concur: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 Petitioner's evidence fails to establish the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship.

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 We, therefore, concur with the Court of Appeals that the DARAB relied far too much on the pesadas and vales and overlooked compelling
evidence indicating the absence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. In particular, the DARAB ignored the findings of the legal
officer who investigated the case and concluded that Alberto Temple, petitioners son, is the tenant of the landholding.

LEASEHOLD/GROUNDS FOR EXTINGUISHMENT

Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr., namely, Norma Tan, Jeanette Tan, Julieta Tan, Rommel Tan, and Enrique Tan, Jr., All represented by Rommel Tan vs.
Reynalda Pollescas
G.R. No. 145568 (November 17, 2005)

Facts:

 Petitioners are co-owners of a coconut farmland ("Land"). Esteban Pollescas ("Esteban") was the original tenant of the Land. Upon
Esteban's death in 1991, his son Enrique Pollescas ("Enrique") succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique Tan
("Tan"). Respondent Reynalda Pollescas ("Reynalda"), Esteban's surviving second spouse, demanded that Tan recognized her as Esteban's
successor. Tan did not accede. Thus, Reynalda filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Ozamis City
("DARAB-Ozamis") a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and damages.
 The DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the land in its Decision dated 28 April 1993. However, Reynalda failed to
deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting to P3,656.70. Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against
Reynalda with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Ozamis City, Branch 2. The trial court found Reynalda guilty of Estafa. For Reynalda's
continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the DARAB, Misamis Occidental ("DARAB-Misamis Occidental") an
ejectment case. On 18 September 1996, the DARAB-Misamis Occidental ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs. Reynalda appealed to the
DARAB, Diliman, Quezon City which reversed the DARAB-Misamis Occidental. The Tan heirs appealed the decision of the DARAB to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB ordering the Tan Heirs to respect Reynalda's possession
and cultivation of the Land. Hence, this petition.
 A petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals was filed which affirmed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board ordering petitioners to respect respondent's possession and cultivation of the land.

Issues:

 Whether or not there is a ground for extinguishment of leasehold?

 Whether or not the petitioners can validly dispossess respondent of the landholding for non-payment of rental?

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Held:

 Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the landowner cannot eject
the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law. RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes
and protects an agricultural leasehold tenant's right to security of tenure.
 Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for dispossession of the tenant's landholding. . . .
 Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that "not . . . more than" 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair
rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the
25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-
payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
 Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental
payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. Until the DAR has fixed
the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined. There
can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is
not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-payment of
rental.

JURISDICTION OVER THE CANCELLATION OF REGISTERED EP/CLOAS

Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro, as represented by Maximino dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, as represented by Benedicto U.
Cruz
G.R. No. 162890 (November 22, 2005)

Facts:

 The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate in Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and landless farmers,
conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended by Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the
Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in
favor of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon.
 By virtue of an Agreement to Sell, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in his favor as the qualified allocatee of the
landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property
and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela

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Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz. Mario administered the landholding, until their mother executed a
private document declaring that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz.
 Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children.
He then filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended that
the landholding be declared vacant and disposable to a qualified applicant and the approval of Alberto's application to purchase the
property.
 On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation of the MARO.
He directed the cancellation of Julian's CLT and declared that his rights be forfeited in favor of the government under the agreement.
 The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regional Director. The
DAR Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and evaluated the records and recommended that the PARO's
recommendation be affirmed. On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz,
and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
 Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been registered in
the name of Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance,
filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the order of the PARO, CLOA and TCT
issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The petitioners declared, inter alia, that they were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz and had no
knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they were not
bound by the private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of the CLOA and the title over the property in favor
of Alberto, was null and void, inasmuch as they violated agrarian reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980.
They insisted that they were deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary without due process of law.
 After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision declaring the petitioners as the rightful allocatees of the property,
and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The
PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the
petitioners.
 Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD.

Issues:

 Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered CLOAs.
 Whether the petitioners were denied of their right to substantive and procedural due process.

Held:

 The petition is denied for lack of merit.

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 It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of
whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the
defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,
including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.
 However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the
November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in
nature.
 The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and
Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her
son Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. The
sole tenant-beneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela Cruz. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of
transfer/sale, Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless.
 The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section 2 (f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were "registered" with the LRA. However,
for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom
CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR
in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees
are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.
 In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and
in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of
the PARO and the recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over whom the DAR
Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is
contrary to law and DAR orders, circulars and memoranda.
 On the second issue, the DAR Secretary took into account, inter alia, Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990.

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As the Court ruled in Nuesa v. Court of Appeals:

P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D.
No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the
purview of P.D. No. 816.

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the
administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding
the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.

DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION OF THE REGULAR COURTS AND THE DARAB

Norberto Rimasug, et al. vs. Melencio Martin, et al.

G.R. No. 160118 (November 22, 2005)

Facts:

 The case at bar involves a petition for review on the implied tenancy relationship. Petitioners were "either employees or relatives of some
employees" who were members of the San Miguel Cooperative Credit Union (SMCCU) organized by the San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
labor force.
 SMCCU acquired several parcels of land located at Pritil, Guiguinto, Bulacan which it subdivided for residential purposes and sold to
petitioners, to which they were issued separate titles. Due to financial constraints, petitioners were unable to construct houses on their
respective lots. They later came to know, however, that respondents had, without their knowledge and consent, entered the lots on which
they planted various agricultural crops.
 Petitioners thereupon put respondents on notice of their ownership, brought the matter before barangay authorities but respondents were
"uncooperative . . ." In the meantime, petitioners who could not "come up with the money to start a leg al battle with [respondents]"
tolerated the continued occupation of their lots until, by letter dated May 31, 1999, they advised respondents of their intention to build
their houses thereon and accordingly asked them to vacate within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. Respondents refused to heed

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the demand, however, prompting petitioners to file on June 28, 1999 a complaint for unlawful detainer against them before the MTC of
Guiguinto.
 By their "Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counterclaim," respondents claimed
that they are the recognized and registered tenants of agricultural lands owned by the SMC to which they paid corresponding lease rentals;
petitioners failed to comply with Sections 409(c) and 412 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) requiring
mandatory conciliation proceedings before the lupon; and the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case, it falling within the primary
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in accordance with Sections 4 and 50 of Republic Act
No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).
 On the merits, by Decision of March 12, 2002, the MTC held that respondents failed to prove the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship with petitioners who are the owners of the lots in question. Both parties appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan before which petitioners assailed the MTC's failure to grant attorney's fees and damages in the form of reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of their lots. Respondents, on the other hand,again raised the issue of jurisdiction and, in any
event, assailed the MTC decision as not in accordance with the facts and the evidence.
 Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the RTC by Order of January 27, 2003, they filed an
"Urgent Verified Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction and Petition for Review" before the
Court of Appeals.
 The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It held that
respondents had satisfactorily proven that they are duly recognized agricultural tenants of SMCCU on the subject lots. And it belied
petitioners' claim of having tolerated respondents' occupation of the lots, it charging petitioners "as former employees or workers of the
previous landowner company" with actual knowledge of respondents' tenancy.

Issue:

 Whether or not there is an implied tenancy relationship over which the DARAB has jurisdiction.

Held:

 Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act. No. 7691, vests Metropolitan Trial Courts, MTCs, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts with exclusive original jurisdiction cases for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. On the other hand,
Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 vests the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with primary
jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the
action is commenced, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot

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be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon a motion to dismiss, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant.
 A scrutiny of the following material allegations in petitioners' complaint showed that it involves possession de facto, the only issue
involved in ejectment proceedings.
 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides:

SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under
this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Underscoring
supplied)

 By their own admission, respondents were "informed" that the lots they are tilling are "allegedly" owned by SMC because the one
collecting the payments was working at SMC, although the official receipts issued to them were under the name of SMCCU. On that score
alone, the claim of the existence of a tenancy relationship fails, requirements No. 1 — that the parties are the landowner and the tenant is
agricultural lessee, — and No. 3 — that there is consent between the parties — not being present, for how could respondents have
contracted with a landowner whose identity they are not even certain of? Such uncertainty becomes more pronounced when note is taken
that before the trial and appellate courts they maintained that the lots are owned by SMC. Before this Court, however, they now adopt the
observation of the appellate court that the lots were owned by SMCCU.
 Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure. In fine, respondents' occupancy and
continued possession of the subject lots, upon their "honest belief and impression" that they are tenants of SMC or SMCCU, does not
make them de jure tenants.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; WHAT CONSTITUTES

Juan Padin, Juana Padin, Purita Padin and Gloria Padin vs. Heirs of Vivencio Obias, namely: Heirs of Isidro Obias, Santos Dolores, and Atty.
Francisco Obias
G.R. No. 137337 (December 9, 2005)

Facts:

 A complaint against the heirs of the late Vivencio Obias, herein respondents, who are the owners of 36 hectares of agricultural land
situated in Barangays Minoro and Kinalasan, San Jose, Camarines Sur; that in 1960, Cecilio Obias, then respondents' representative,

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designated petitioner Juan Padin as tenant and farm administrator over the whole property from 1960 until 1991; that after the death of
Vivencio Obias in 1991, Atty. Francisco Obias, one of herein respondents, took over the management of the property; that in August 1991,
petitioners attempted to register themselves with the DAR as agricultural tenants but respondents interposed their opposition; and that
respondents sold 204 cows without giving Juan Padin his share. Petitioners thus prayed that they be declared agricultural tenants; that Juan
Padin be retained as administrator of the entire property and as caretaker of the herd of cattle; and that his share from the proceeds of the
sale of the 204 cows be turned over to him. Respondents, in their Answer, admitted that they allowed petitioners to occupy and cultivate a
portion of the subject agricultural land. However, they denied any tenancy relationship with petitioners.
 On April 19, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint, holding that there was no tenancy relationship
between the parties. Juan Padin was only an administrator or overseer of the Obias estate. On appeal by petitioners, the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), reversed the PARAD Decision. Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review. On January 12, 1999, it rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification the DARAB Decision.

Issue:

 Whether or not there was a tenancy relationship between the parties?

Held:

 The issue of whether there was tenancy relationship between the parties can no longer be raised by respondents before this Court since
they did not interpose an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, this issue is factual and is building upon this Court,
the same being supported by substantial evidence.
 The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the DARAB is without authority to compel respondents to retain petitioner Juan Padin as farm
administrator of their property and as caretaker of their cattle. His services ended in 1991.
 As to the claim of petitioner Juan Padin that he is entitled to one-half of the amount realized from the sale of the cows, again, this is a
factual issue. This Court has no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals' finding that there is no evidence to support such assertion.

TENANCY; ELEMENTS

Monico San Diego vs. Eufrocinio Evangelista

G.R. No. 163680 (January 24, 2006)

Facts:

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 Petitioner Monico San Diego has been an agricultural tenant in a parcel of land located in barangay San Vicente, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
covered by TCT Number 98.728 (M) in the name of Andres Evangelista. After Andres Evangelista died in 1994, his son respondent
Eufrocinio Evangelista inherited the property which has a total area of three hectares, 21,000 square meters of which are planted with rice
and the remaining 11,200 square meters with bamboo.
 On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region III Office,
Malolos, Bulacan against respondent for maintenance of peaceful possession, enjoyment, and damages with respect to the bambooland
portion of the property. He complained that respondent and some unidentified companions forcibly entered the bamboo-planted portion of
the property and without authority of law and by means of force and intimidation cut down some of the bamboo trees which he had
planted thereon, without giving him his lawful share, and they threatened to continue cutting down the remaining bamboo trees and tried
to dispossess him as agricultural tenant thereof.
 Respondent countered that petitioner is a tenant only with respect to the riceland portion of the property, the bambooland portion not being
tenanted. And he denied petitioner's claim of having planted the bamboo trees, he claiming that they have been existing since 1937.
 The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissed petitioner's complaint by decision of October 6, 1997, holding, inter alia, that only the
riceland portion of the landholding is actually covered by the contract of lease and that the 33 cavans amount of rental per year during the
wet seasons refers to the riceland portion of the landholding.
 On appeal, the DARAB, by decision of February 16, 2000, reversed that of the Provincial Adjudicator holding the agricultural leasehold
contract executed between Plaintiff-Appellant and the late Andres Evangelista covers the lot consisting of three (3) hectares as evidenced
by an Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed by herein parties on 4 September 1984. Apparently, Plaintiff-Appellant is a tenant on the
3-hectare land and not on the 21,000 square meter area. Clearly, the bamboo land is part and parcel of the 3-hectare land.
 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by DARAB resolution of January 12, 2001, respondent elevated the case via petition
for review to the Court of Appeals which reversed the DARAB decision and reinstated that of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, by
decision of December 18, 2003.
 In reversing the DARAB decision, the Court of Appeals observed:

In the case of Monsanto v. Zerna, the Supreme Court laid down the elements of a tenancy relationship, which are:

"(1) the parties are landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) and subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee."

Following the guidelines set forth in Monsanto case, the Agricultural Leasehold Contract of private respondent with the late Andres
Evangelista excluded the bamboo land area, for the simple reason that requisites 5 and 6 are wanting in the instant case.

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Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner is a tenant of the entire landholding including that portion planted with bamboo.

Held:

 Private respondent is not a tenant in the subject bamboo land.

 The wordings of the agricultural leasehold contract itself which pertains only to the produce of rice belies private respondent's claim in
paragraph 4 of his Complaint that ". . . the subject bamboo trees were planted by herein plaintiff (now private respondent) when the
latter started working as agricultural tenant on the subject landholding." Thus, no evidence of personal cultivation of bamboo trees was
presented by private respondent other than his bare allegations to this effect.
 It was established in the Affidavits or "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of several neighbors of petitioner, one of whom is a Barangay Chairman,
that as early as 1957, Andres Evangelista during his lifetime was the one in possession of the bamboo land and actively administered the
cutting of the bamboo trees thereon, which upon the death of Andres Evangelista was carried on by petitioner when he inherited the
bamboo land in question.

"It is quite intriguing to one's conscience if there is any truth to the claim of plaintiff that he was the one who planted the bamboo trees
existing in the landholding in question for it must be taken judicial notice of the fact that during the recent years, specially so at the age of
the plaintiff, that it is no longer usual for a person of his age to claim that he was the one who planted the bamboo trees on the bamboo land
portion of the landholding in question."

 Moreover, Exhibit 6-A which is the annual payment of lease made by private respondent, listed merely in a piece of paper, as kept by the
late Andres Evangelista during his lifetime, clearly showed that the said payments corresponds only to the yield of rice over the portion of
riceland and not on the disputed bamboo land. Again, no mention was made about the yield of the bamboo land as to how much per year
was the harvest. Absent the essential elements of consent and sharing between the parties no tenancy relationship can exist between them.
 Acts contemporaneous and subsequent to the execution of the contract show that the parties intended to establish a tenancy relationship
only as regards the rice-planted portion of the property.
 Petitioner has been paying rentals in palay, not in bamboo. Annex "1" of respondent's position paper submitted to the Provincial
Adjudicator, which is a handwritten list ("Listahan ng Ani [of petitioner]") made by respondent's father-predecessor-in-interest, shows
under the column "Bigay" that petitioner was from 1981 up to 1994 paying annual rentals ranging from "28" to "33," which figures are
consistent with the earlier-quoted stipulation in the contract for petitioner to pay rental of 33 cavans of palay per annum.
 The evidence proffered by respondent on the other hand abundantly shows that the bambooland portion of the property has always been
untenanted, which evidence has not been controverted by petitioner.

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 In fine, the contract, as well as the acts of both petitioner and respondent contemporaneous and subsequent to the execution thereof, shows
that the parties established a tenancy relationship only with respect to the riceland portion of the property.

AGRARIAN DISPUTE, OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF MTC; REQUISITES OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY

RELATIONSHIP

Valeriano Cano vs. Spouses Vicente and Susan Jumawan

G.R. No. 153860 (February 6, 2006)

Facts:

 Respondents Vicente Jumawan and Susan Jumawan, are owners of agricultural land with an area of about 24,025 square meters at
Barangay Malagos, Baguio District, Davao City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 185776 of Davao
City Registry of Deeds.
 On February 24, 1999, petitioner and respondents entered into a notarized document entitled "Agreement," whereunder, for "humanitarian
consideration," the spouses, designated in said document as "OWNERS," allowed petitioner, therein referred to as "BUILDER," to
construct a house of light materials in an area of about twenty (20) square meters at the eastern portion of their property. Good for a term
of two (2) years starting March 1, 1997 and terminating on March 1, 1999.
 Following the expiration of the aforementioned "Agreement," respondents demanded the petitioner to vacate the area occupied by him and
to pay a rent of not less than P300.00 a month until he shall have vacated the same. Petitioner refused. After conciliation proceedings
before the local barangay lupon proved futile, respondents filed against petitioner a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Davao City on September 20, 1999.
 On July 26, 2000, MCTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
 An appeal to RTC, a decision was rendered reversing the appealed judgment for lack of jurisdiction saying that MCTC should have
dismissed the case and allowed the DAR to resolve the agrarian case. CA reversed and set aside that of the RTC and reinstated the
judgment of MCTC.
 With the CA's denial of his motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of June 6, 2002, petitioner is now with this Court via the present
recourse on the lone issue of his own formulation.

Issue:

 Whether or not the instant case involves agrarian dispute which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court?

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Held:

 The basic rule is that the material averments in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of a court. And jurisprudence dictates that a court
does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 Here, the allegation in respondent's complaint before the MCTC clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Petitioner was allowed to
construct his house/shanty on a portion of respondents' property without paying rental therefore but merely for "humanitarian
consideration", pursuant to a notarized agreement which explicitly imposes on the petitioner the obligation to remorse his construction
thereon and vacate the premises upon the expiration of said agreement. The agreement had undoubtedly expired but despite respondent'
demand to vacate, petitioner refused. To the MCTC, the agreement which petitioner admitted having signed clearly negates the claim of
tenancy relationship between the petitioner and the respondents. For sure, the very pieces of evidence submitted by the parties before the
MCTC, consisting of annexes to their respective positive papers, indubitably belie petitioner's claim of being a tenant of respondents.
 Case law teaches that the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur for a tenancy relationship to exist. The absence of one does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by the land reform program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

TENANCY; ITS ESSENTIAL REQUISITES

Hilaria Ramos vda. de Brigino vs. Dominador Ramos and Filomena Ramos
G.R. No. 130260 (February 6, 2006)

Facts:

 On 10 July 1992, petitioner and her spouse filed a petition for Annulment and/or Cancellation of Agricultural Leasehold Contract against
herein respondents Dominador Ramos and Filomena Ramos before the Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner and her
spouse alleged that they are the registered owners of the subject landholding with an area of 11,451 square meters located at Malibong
Bata, Pandi, Bulacan. The petition further stated that petitioner is the sister of respondent Dominador Ramos while respondent Filomena
Ramos is the surviving spouse of another brother named Pedro Ramos. The petition likewise averred that in the early months of 1991,
petitioner and her spouse discovered that respondent Dominador and Pedro Ramos were able to register with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) two documents both entitled, "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan" dated 29 June 1973, without the knowledge and consent of

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the petitioner and her spouse as the signature of petitioner in those documents were forged. Hence, petitioner and her spouse prayed that
said documents be declared void and the subject land as untenanted.
 On 31 August 1993, after attempts to amicably solve the dispute failed, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator ruled for respondents. Despite
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) finding that the signatures of petitioner in the "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan" were forgeries,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (PARAD) opined that the forgery does not suffice to render said documents null and void
inasmuch as petitioner and her spouse are estopped from denying the existence of said documents in view of the fact that petitioner's
spouse had issued rental receipts to respondents, which receipts strongly prove that they are occupying the subject land in the concept of
tenants and that implied tenancy was, accordingly, perfectly established. The PARAD further disposed that such being the case, security of
tenure must be accorded respondents in tune with Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844.
 Petitioner and her spouse appealed the PARAD's Decision with the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 1968 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the PARAD.
 Petitioner and her spouse elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which on 25 January 1996, affirmed the ruling of the DARAB.

Issue:

 Whether or not the respondents are bonafide tenants of the subject landholding?

Held:

 Republic Act No. 1199, also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines "agricultural tenancy" as:

[T]he physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.

 The essential requisites of tenancy relationship based on the foregoing definition, as cited in cases of recent vintage, are:

1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

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 In the present case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the foregoing elements, but the conflict lies in the elements
of consent and sharing. To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented.
 In fine, there exists substantial evidence on record to boost the findings of the Boards and the Court of Appeals that petitioner and her
husband consented to respondents' cultivation of the land in the concept of tenants and that the element of "sharing" is present, as shown
by the receipts for the period of 1991-1992. Indeed, tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. Here, all the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are obtaining.

EXEMPTION; EFFECT; FAILURE TO OBSERVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE APPLICATION FOR
EXEMPTION

Nicanor T. Santos Development Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, DAR Adjudication Board & Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (Andrea F. Dalmacio), Tuba, Benguet
G.R. No. 159654 (February 28, 2006)

Facts:

 The case at bar involves a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner against respondent officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Petitioner is a domestic corporation which owns a large tract of land known as the Santos Farm situated in Tabaan Valley, Tuba,
Benguet. Santos Farm with an area of 103.8 hectares and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19305 in the name of
petitioner.
 The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tuba, Benguet informed petitioner through its counsel that a portion measuring 14
hectares of the Santos Farm would be placed under the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) for acquisition
and distribution to prospective beneficiaries.
 Petitioner sent letter to BLAD requesting exemption of the Santos Farm from CARP coverage. The latter endorsed the matter to DAR
Regional Director for investigation and report. Petitioner also sent a letter to the DAR Secretary reiterating its position that the Santos
Farm should be excluded from the CARP coverage.
 Thereafter, respondent MARO Andrea F. Dalmacio sent petitioner a Notice of Coverage and Field Investigation Report, to confirm that
the Santos Farm had been placed under the CARP. Petitioner sent a letter to MARO Dalmacio expressing its position that the Santos Farm
should be exempt from CARP coverage. Petitioner also wrote the DAR Secretary insisting that the Santos Farm is exempted from the
coverage of the CARP.
 DAR Regional Director Wilfredo B. Leano advised petitioner to pursue the exemption of the Santos Farm in accordance with the
mandates of DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 09, series of 1994 and DAR A.O. No. 06, series of 2000. Instead, petitioner filed a
Protest with the DAR arguing that the Santos Farm is exempted from the CARP coverage. Petitioner also filed a Complaint before the
DARAB importuning the Board to rule on the protest. The DARAB ruled that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue on petitioner's
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exemption. Thus, the DARAB referred the Complaint to the DAR Regional Director. In a Memorandum, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) Deogracias F. Almora dismissed the Complaint for being time-barred and for failure to observe proper formalities.
 Hence, the petitioner instituted a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals to compel the DAR, DARAB, and MARO to act on its
petition for exemption of the Santos Farm from the CARP coverage. The Court of Appeals rendered Decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit and for being the improper remedy denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioner has complied with the administrative procedure for the application for exemption?
 Whether or not the petition for mandamus filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals is proper in view of the appellate court's
conclusion that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies?

Held:

 The records of the case, however, do not indicate that petitioner complied with the administrative procedure for the application for
exemption. Under Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1990, the application must be initiated before the MARO by submitting
ownership documents and other muniments of title and other evidence to support the application. The endorsement letters from the DAR
Secretary and the BLAD Director only indicate that petitioner's application for exemption was channeled to the wrong offices. Hence, the
application was referred to the DAR Regional Director. The records do not show, however, that after the endorsement letters came out,
petitioner pursued its application with the proper DAR office. Besides, the endorsement to the appropriate DAR office did not relieve
petitioner of its duty to initiate the proper formal application for exemption.
 As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all
means of administrative redress. In the instant case, it is beyond dispute that petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative recourse in
resisting the Notice of Coverage issued by respondent MARO. Unsuccessful in its attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage when it
lodged its protest with the incorrect administrative offices, petitioner resorted to a judicial remedy. The petition for mandamus, which it
filed, however, was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals. Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner.
 It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. The writ will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.

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 Suffice it to say that a petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy to assail the Notice of Coverage. The administrative rules of the
DAR also provide for the appellate procedure to contest decisions and issuances of the MARO. The mandatory recourse to the
administrative appeals process before any judicial remedy is invoked likewise falls within the ambit of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

EJECTMENT; LANDOWNER RETAIN ITS RIGHT TO EJECT UNLAWFUL POSSESSORS OF HIS LAND INSPITE OF THE
ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF COVERAGE OVER HIS LAND
POTENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARY MAY BE EJECTED BY LANDOWNER OVER HIS PROPERTY

Sps. Jesus and Evangeline Pasco vs. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 165501 (March 28, 2006)

Facts:

 The case at bar involved an action for unlawful detainer filed by respondent herein against petitioner spouses Jesus and Evangeline Pasco.
 Respondent, Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel of land containing more than 100
hectares. Constructed on respondent's parcel of land are houses which are occupied by its workers. Petitioners, among other workers, used
to work for respondent until 1987. They having ceased to be employed by respondent, petitioners were asked to vacate the house they
were occupying but they refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them before the MTCC in Talisay City.
Petitioners claimed that, inter alia, they built the house occupied by them at their own expense and their stay on the land was upon the
tolerance of respondent. However, the MTCC of Talisay rendered judgment in favor of respondent upon the findings that respondent
provided housing facilities to every worker in its hacienda without a requiring payment of rentals, however, with an implied promise that
the same be vacated upon their cessation from work. . . .
 After the promulgation of the MTCC decision, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Talisay City sent a Notice of Coverage
and Field Investigation (Notice of Coverage) advising respondent that its parcel of land is now covered under Republic Act 6657.
 The petitioners appealed the MTCC decision in the Unlawful Detainer Case to the RTC, contending that respondent's hacienda is covered
by the CARL and they are qualified beneficiaries thereunder that the MTCC has no jurisdiction yet to order their ejectment. The RTC of
Bacolod City affirmed the decision of MTCC Talisay, with modification. Petitioners moved to reconsider the RTC decision, contending
that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer in view of the agrarian dispute between them and respondent;
and by Order petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime,
the MARO of Talisay City issued a Certification that herein petitioner Jesus Pasco is registered as potential Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) beneficiary in the land owned by respondent.

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 On appeal, the Court of Appeal finds that the only issue in ejectment cases is the physical possession of the premises, independent of any
claim of ownership by the parties, and this must be so because the issue of ownership cannot be definitely decided in an ejectment case.
Considering that the petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.

Issues:

 Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may
be ejected from the land where he is identified as such, by the landowner, who has already been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his
land by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government?
 Whether or not the issuance of Notice of Coverage to respondent during the pendency of the ejectment case will automatically considered
as an agrarian dispute?
 Whether or not the issuance of Notice of Coverage to respondent will prevents its right to eject unlawful possessors of his land?

Held:

 In the case at bar, we find that the theory of petitioner before the MTCC is different from that proffered before the RTC. Thus, before the
MTCC, they claimed that the house they are occupying was built at their own expense. Before the RTC, they raised for the first time that,
they being qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. And, for the first time too, they assailed the MTCC's lack of jurisdiction over the action
due to prematurity, they contending that respondent's right to eject them would accrue only after they are reimbursed of their expenses in
the repair of the house.
 As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be
permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule. The aforecited rule is not without exception, however. The issuance during the pendency
of the case of a Notice of Coverage to respondent does not, however, automatically make the ejectment case an agrarian dispute over
which the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction. The issuance of a Notice of Coverage is merely
a preliminary step for the State's acquisition of the land for agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the
ownership of the land to the government. The purpose of a Notice of Coverage is explained by this Court. The Notice of Coverage shall
also invite the landowner to attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field investigation is for the
purpose of identifying the landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. . . . The date of the field
investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to representatives of the L[and] B[ank] [of the] P[hilippines], BARC, DENR
and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of the landowner and
the various representatives. . . . Should there be a variance between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed
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under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture, the degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a
composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation.
 Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law.
They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A.O.
No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his
property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A.O. No.
9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to
discuss the results of the field investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the
Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and the other
representatives may be present.
 As for the registration of petitioners as potential CARP beneficiaries, the same does not help their cause. As "potential" CARP
beneficiaries, they are included in the list of those who may be awarded land under the CARP. Nothing in the records of the case shows
that the DAR has made an award in favor of petitioners, hence, no rights over the land they occupy can be considered to have vested in
their favor in accordance with Section 24 of the CARL which reads:
 Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries. — The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an
award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes actual
possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain
the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the
Certificate of Title.

JURISDICTION; LAND CLASSIFICATION

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; REQUISITES

Nolito D. Solmayor, et al. vs. Antonio L. Arroyo

G.R. No. 153817 (March 31, 2006)

Facts:

 The case at bar involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President reversing the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) which dismissed herein respondent's appeal from the order of the Regional Director of DAR Region XI dismissing the petition
filed by Antonio Arroyo for the cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) issued to herein petitioners.

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 Respondent Arroyo received a letter from the legal officer of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) informing him that his
land with an aggregate area of 9.8038 hectares situated at Matina, Davao City, was the subject of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Likewise, he was advised that he could apply for the conversion of the land to residential or other urban
purposes in accordance with applicable laws. Team Leader I of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform notified respondent that based on the
parcellary map sketching conducted by the Agrarian Reform and the Bureau of Lands, the subject property was covered by the OLT
program since the area thereof, which was tenanted at that time, was more than seven hectares.
 Based on an Indorsement issued by the City Zoning and Development Officer it certifies that the property is "partly zonified as Residential
Class 'A' and 'B,' Commercial and Open Space . . . as per existing Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," respondent applied for the
conversion of the land to residential subdivision. Series of conferences were conducted between petitioners and respondent by DAR local
officials for relocation and disturbance compensation, however, no final agreement was reached.
 Later, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued CLTs in favor of petitioners. Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of said
CLTs on the ground that the subject land was, and still is, residential property and thus, beyond the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.
Furthermore, respondent denies the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and petitioners.
 Respondent, through his attorney-in-fact, made a Voluntary Offer to Sell his entire landholding, including the subject property, to the
government in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 6657. As a consequence thereof, the Regional Director of DAR Region XI
issued an Order dismissing respondent's petition for cancellation of CLTs. Respondent appealed said Order to the Office of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform praying that it be set aside and that the CLTs be cancelled. Meanwhile, DAR issued Emancipation Patents to
petitioners as the identified farmer-beneficiaries on the land.
 Thereafter, in an Order, DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an order dismissing respondent's appeal and upheld the validity of the
Emancipation Patents awarded to petitioners which states that this Office so holds that the landholding in question are agricultural as of
October 21, 1972 despite the fact that the same have been declared for tax purposes as residential. The Memorandum dated May 17, 1993
which contains the investigation report of the DAR personnel who conducted the ocular inspection and investigation explicitly shows that
when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect the actual use of the land is agricultural. This fact is further buttressed when petitioner, in his
letter dated August 8, 1988 manifested his desire to voluntarily offer to sell the properties in question to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, declaring that the subject landholdings are productive and suitable to agricultural production.
 Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in an Order prompting respondent to file an appeal before the Office of
the President. The Office of the President reversed the order of the DAR Secretary and declared the 9.8 hectares outside the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27, which states that exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops
even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops. That it is essential to determine whether
or not tenancy relationship exists between Mr. Arroyo and the appellees.
 Aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President, petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, maintaining
that the Office of the President erred in finding that the subject landholding has been classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity
of Presidential Decree No. 27 and not primarily devoted to rice or corn crops, and that the farmer-beneficiaries are not tenants of

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respondent. Thereafter, the appellate court denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the decision of the Office of the President. Hence, this
petitioner seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of appeal.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent property is an agricultural land devoted primarily to rice and/or corn?
 Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent?

Held:

 In contrast, respondent offers for consideration several documents to bolster its position that subject land is residential, namely: 1) copies
of the Declaration of Real Property (tax declaration) filed by respondent as early as 1968 indicating therein that the subject property is
residential; 2) a Certification dated 3 July 1979 by the Bureau of Soils stating that the land is suitable for urban use and for housing
projects; 3) a copy of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance granted by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
dated 12 January 1982 indicating therein that the land is primarily coco land and residential and suitable for the proposed residential
subdivision; 4) a Certification from the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Davao City dated 10 December 1981 to the effect that the
property per Zonification Ordinance of Davao City is within a Residential Zone Class "B"; 5) a Zoning Certification issued by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) dated 4 March 1991 certifying that the land is within the Residential/Commercial
Zones under zoning ordinance of Davao City adopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and ratified by the HLURB, through
Board Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980, dated 31 July 1980; 6) a Certification from the Office of the City Planning and Development
Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator, dated 26 March 1991 to the effect that the subject land was classified as Major
Commercial Zone (C-2) and High Density Residential Zone (R-2) in the City Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982, or better known as Expanded
Zoning Ordinance of Davao City; 7) a Certification from the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator of Davao City
dated 16 February 1996 that per Official Zoning Map of the City of Davao adopted under Resolution No. 711, Ordinance No. 281, Series
of 1972, the subject property is within two zones classification namely: Commercial Zone and Residential Zone Class B; and 8) the Report
of the DAR Provincial Task Force on Illegal Conversion dated 2 June 2000, ruling out any act of illegal conversion as the subject land is
classified as commercial and residential zones.
 Although this Court will not disregard the evidence presented by petitioners that the land is devoted to rice and corn crops in 1993, when
the ocular inspection by the DAR personnel was conducted, it must be noted that around the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No.
27 up to 1978, when the subject property was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the available evidence issued and
certified by the different government agencies, closer in time to the mentioned time frame will show that respondent's property has, indeed,
been classified as within the residential and commercial zones of Davao City. It cannot escape the notice of this Court that more than a
decade before the issuance of the said ocular investigation report stating that the land is devoted to agricultural production, government
agencies equipped with the technical expertise to determine the proper classification of the subject land have already determined that the
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land is part of the residential and commercial zones of Davao City making it suitable for other urban use. Therefore, it is only reasonable
to conclude, based on the certification of various executive agencies issued when this controversy arose, that at the time of the passage of
Presidential Decree No. 27, respondent's property was not agricultural.
 . . . As to the issue of whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents, we sustain the findings of
both the Court of Appeals and the Office of the President that petitioners are not de jure tenants of respondent. The essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship which must all concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between parties, to wit:
 The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
 The subject is agricultural land;
 There is consent;
 The purpose is agricultural production;
 There is personal cultivation; and
 There is sharing of harvests.
 The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The subject land not being agricultural, the requirements for the creation
of a tenancy relationship is thus lacking. Moreover, the Court has had the occasion to state that the key factor in ascertaining whether or
not there is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed property. Accordingly, having earlier concluded that
the subject landholding is not agricultural, we must conclude that petitioners are not de jure tenants of respondent and are, therefore, not
entitled to the benefits of Presidential Decree No. 27.

JURISDICTION; DARAB'S JURISDICTION ON JOINT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT; A TYPE OF JOINT ECONOMIC

ENTERPRISE; AGRARIAN DISPUTE; DEFINITION

Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 159089 (May 3, 2006)

Facts:

 This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the June 30, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498.
 On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for petitioner (Islanders CARP-Farmers
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.) with respondent (Lapanday Agricultural and Development Croporation). On April 2, 1996,
petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus,
Damages, with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent, the alleged . . . officers of petitioner who entered into the agreement,
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and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO), represented by Saturnino D. Sibbaluca. Petitioner subsequently
filed an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract were not authorized by it.
 Respondent's filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary,
exclusive, and original jurisdiction; that petitioner failed to comply with the compulsory mediation and conciliation proceedings at the
barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution of the complaint in behalf of petitioner. Respondent also averred that petitioner was
engaged in forum shopping because it also filed a petition before the DAR praying for the disapproval of the Joint Production Agreement.
The PARO also filed a motion to dismiss on May 16, 1996.
 On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with
Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees. On February 25, 1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of respondent declaring
the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding and ordering petitioner to account for the proceeds of the produce and to comply with
the terms of the contract.
 The RTC then issued its decision on October 18, 1999.

Issue:

 Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the suit.
 Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the ‘Joint Production Agreement' is valid instead of declaring it
as null and void ab initio, its provisions, terms and condition, cause and purposes being violative of the express mandatory provision of
R.A. 6657.
 Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the 'Joint Production Agreement' is a leasehold contract and
therefore valid.
 Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence
delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on the matter of agricultural land and tenancy relationship.

Held:

 Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order 229 vests in the DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through Executive Order
129-A, the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to
the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
 The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question are the rights and
obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of agricultural land acquired through the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
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 To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to establish the following elements: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
 In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship
between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within
the sphere of agrarian disputes.
 An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements — whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise — over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disputes include those concerning farm workers' associations or representations of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Also
included is any controversy relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries — whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
 The assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement
agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.
 Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly dismissed the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial court and the Court of Appeals for that matter to have ruled further on the issue of the validity
of the agreement.

JUST COMPENSATION; CANNOT BE PRESUMED, EXPROPRIATION OF LANDHOLDING COVERED BY R.A. NO. 6657
TAKE PLACE, NOT ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE ACT ON JUNE 15, 1988 BUT ON THE PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION
JURISDICTION; RTC AS SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS DISTINGUISHED FROM AGRARIAN ADJUDICATORS;
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. DARAB, ARB Associations of San Francisco, Gen. Trias, Cavite, Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite Heirs
of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr., Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco, and Pacita R. Tantoco vs The DAR Region IV Director
G.R. No. 149621 (May 5, 2006)

Facts:

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 The case involves an action for cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-402203 with prayer for issuance
of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners before the DARAB Region IV on November 11, 1994. Subject land was offered by Petitioner
for sale under the VOS scheme for 5M/hectare, title was cancelled and TCT CLOA 1424 was issued by the ROD in favor of ARBA.
DARAB Region IV rendered a decision declaring the subject property as covered under the CARP without prejudice to the exercise of
petitioners of their respective right of retention upon proper application; voiding and annulling TCT CLOA 1424; directing ROD of Cavite
to effect the cancellation of TCT No. CLOA 1424 and reinstatement of TCT No. T-402203 in the joint names of Petitoners/Co-owners
subject to its eventual coverage under CARP; and directing the MARO to re-screen ARBs and generate individual CLOAs.
 Both petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the DARAB in Quezon City. Said appeal was consolidated. In resolving the
controversy, DARAB condensed the issue posed by respective parties by addressing the question: Can a Collective Certificate of Land
Ownership Award validly issued pursuant to a Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) be cancelled on the petition of the former owner on the mere suspicion that some of the names listed therein are not
really qualified farmer-beneficiaries?
 DARAB rendered its Decision modifying the appealed decision of the Regional Adjudicator by approving the validity and efficacy of
TCT-CLOA No. 1424. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was denied by DARAB for
lack of merit. On appeal to Court of Appeals. Petitioners appeal dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration but
was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CLOA that had been issued by DAR to ARBA may be cancelled on the following grounds:

 The land in question is exempt from the coverage of CARP by reason of its inclusion in the industrial zone of CALABARZON;
 The DAR failed to conform strictly to the procedure for the acquisition of private agricultural lands laid down in RA 6657, hence,
violating due process and consequently denying petitioners just compensation; and
 ARBA and all its members have not paid the amortizations for the landholdings awarded to them as required under RA 6657 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1993.

2. Whether or not DAR's failure to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in the acquisition proceeding gives the courts the power to
nullify the CLOA issued to ARBA?

Held:

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 The Court accords respect to the findings of the Regional Adjudicator who has the primary jurisdiction and competence to establish the
agricultural character of the land in question which is properly within the coverage of CARP. It was not re-classified nor converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural use with the approval of the HLURB prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) on June 15, 1988.
 The DAR officials or its employees failed to comply strictly with the guidelines and operating procedures provided by law in acquiring the
property subject to CARP.
 Firstly, there were certain inconsistencies in the manner of selection by the DAR of the CARP beneficiaries who are members of ARBA.
 Secondly, the TCT No. CLOA-1424 was directly issued by the DAR in the name of ARBA without: (a) payment of just compensation;
and, (b) initial transfer of title to the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, in contravention to Section 16(e) of R.A. No.
6657.
 In the implementation of the CARP, the Special Agrarian Courts which are the Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners; and, (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the
question.
 The failure of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power
to nullify the CLOA that had been issued to ARBA. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to
run its regular course. DAR must be given a chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
 The resolution of this case by the DAR is to the best advantage of petitioners since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes,
being the administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter and vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform controversies. Further, the proceedings therein are summary and the department is not bound by technical rules
of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive action or proceeding.

JURISDICTION; NULLIFICATION OF CLOA; DARAB'S JURISDICTION CANNOT BE DEEMED TO DISAPPEAR THE

MOMENT A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS ISSUED; BENEFICIARIES; LANDOWNERS ARE WITHOUT PERSONALITY TO
QUESTION THE SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES

Rodolfo Hermoso, et al. vs. C.L. Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 140319 (May 05, 2006)

Facts:

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 The case involves a petition filed by C.L. Realty filed with the DARAB-Region III office a petition, docketed as DARAB Case No. 092-B-
93, praying for the cancellation of petitioners' CLOAs on the ground of irregular, premature and anomalous issuance. C.L. Realty alleged,
that the CLOA recipients do not meet the basic farmer-beneficiary qualification requirement and are not under the order of priority defined
in Section 22 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
 Respondent C.L. Realty Corp. is the registered owner of land with an area of 46.1476 has. located at Brgy. Alas-asin, Mariveles, Bataan
covered by TCT No. T-60221. On 28 August 1991, respondent received Notice of Acquisition of the said parcel of land followed by a
Notice of Valuation which the property in question was valued at 273,559.00 from the DAR Region III. Respondent challenged the
valuation.
 Respondent requested then DAR Region III Director Antonio Nuesa that the issuance of the CLOAs covering the property in question be
held in abeyance. Without requesting for the lifting of the land coverage, respondent applied for conversion. Unknown to respondent,
CLOAs were already issued to petitioners and corresponding certificates of title were thus issued. From then on, petitioners entered into
possession of said land and planted crops thereon.
 PARAD rendered decision ordering the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to petitioners finding that undue haste attended the processing
and issuance of the questioned CLOAs, and that they were not qualified as farmer beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657.
 On appeal to DARAB proper, the assailed PARAD decision was reversed and set aside and upheld the efficacy of the CLOAs predicating
its disposition on the premise that respondent failed to substantiate its allegations respecting the lack of qualification of petitioners as
farmer beneficiaries, and had not overturned the presumption that official duty had been duly performed.
 Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, C.L. Realty went to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of petition for review,
thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43795. Court of Appeals set aside the DARAB proper decision and reinstated the ruling of the
PARAD.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issues:

 Whether or not the DARAB provincial adjudicator has jurisdiction to nullify the CLOAs issued to petitioners, given that the corresponding
TCTs have been issued over the lands covered?
 Whether or not the petition filed by C.L. Realty before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator should have been dismissed for non-joinder
of indispensable parties?
 Whether or not the CA failed to take into account facts and circumstances supportive of herein petitioners' cause, and, on the other hand,
accorded undue weight to the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator?

Held:

 Petition is granted.
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 The DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial
functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws.
In Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, stated that the DARAB has primary,
original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of all the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP] under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 228, 229 and 129-
A, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The Court
made a similar pronouncement on the jurisdiction of DARAB in Bautista vs. Mag-isa vda. de Villa. Under Section 1 (f) of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure, such jurisdiction of the DARAB includes cases involving "the issuance, correction and cancellation of (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority." Surely, such jurisdiction cannot be deemed to
disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued. For, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of
such transfer. Needless to state, there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA on which it was grounded is void.
 The petitioners are in no position to question the jurisdiction of the DAR and its adjudicative arm at this late junction of the proceedings.
They are already estopped at this stage to challenge the competency of the DARAB and its provincial adjudicator to have taken
cognizance of the case. This disposition becomes all the more pressing considering the petitioners' active participation in the proceedings
below, and their having been the recipients of a favorable decision dated August 21, 1996 of the DARAB Proper. Decisional law frowns
upon a jurisdictional challenge cast against such a milieu.
 Petitioners' thesis, under the second ground, that the DAR officials who processed and approved the applications for issuance of CLOAs
and the Register of Deeds are indispensable parties cannot be given cogency. Surely, a final determination of the petition for cancellation
of CLOAs could be had even without joining in such petition any of the officials adverted to. And as a matter of long and recognized
practice, a public respondent need only to be impleaded incertiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but even then, the
adjudicating judge, officer or tribunal would only be considered a nominal party. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of
ordinary appeal under either Rule 43 or 45, only the private parties to the case are to be impleaded.
 The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court still rules for petitioners due to compelling reasons ostensibly overlooked by the appellate court.
Respondent's standing to question the qualification of the petitioners as CARP beneficiaries. As the DARAB Proper aptly observed: It is
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) together with the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC) who screen and select the possible agrarian beneficiaries. The landowner, however, does not have the right to
select who the beneficiaries should be. Hence, other farmers who were not selected and claimed they have a priority over those who have
been identified as such can file a written protest with the MARO or the PARO who is currently processing the claim folder.
 Section 22 of the CARP law provides merely for an order of priority in the distribution of the land to beneficiaries. In the case at bar, there
appears to be no applicants other than the petitioners.

EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE OF A LANDHOLDING DECLARED AS A SECURITY ZONE

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Department of Agrarian Reform rep. by Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp.
G.R. No. 152640 (June 15, 2006)

Facts:

 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and
March 7, 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled "Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR."
 The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which had been declared a
security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, entitled "Declaring the Area within a Radius of
Three Kilometers surrounding the Satellite Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone," which is subjected to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program of the government. Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised Rules and
Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In
view of this, the metes and bounds of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, were delineated.
 In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be
placed under CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme. On January 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the
subject property from CARP coverage, insisting that the land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations. Respondent's application
for exemption from CARP coverage was evaluated by DAR. During the pendency of the application, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao, in a letter dated March 21, 1994, suggested that respondent enter into a usufructuary agreement with the occupants of the subject
property until such time that it will have to use the property for its planned expansion. The occupants, however, refused to enter into such
an agreement.
 Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in its Resolution No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for the coverage of the
700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under CARP. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal
further opined that subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be detrimental to the
operations of PHILCOMSAT.
 An Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao rejecting PHILCOMSAT's application for exemption from CARP. Having been denied,
PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals to which the appellate court granted. Consequently, DAR moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied hence this petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845m as amended by P.D.
No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP.

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Held:

 P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The same was issued in 1982 pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the surrounding areas of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth
station in order to ensure its security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role of the earth station in the country's
telecommunications and national development. P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the security zone to the authority of the
Ministry of National Defense, consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and authority to determine who can
occupy the areas within the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized.
 The area, however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the
area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that the
government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT's operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its
operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
 Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to
whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which
this Court will not normally delve into considering that, subject to certain exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors of law. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously
be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for
purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE SOUGHT BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF FOR CERTIORARI

Inocencio Alimboboyog vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Paz Noble-Noblefranca

G.R. No. 163655 (June 16, 2006)

Facts:

 This case involves a Petition for Certiorari for the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2004, Inocencio Alimboboyog
(Alimboboyog) assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 73861 dated March 12, 2004 as it was allegedly
rendered without jurisdiction, there having been no prior valid service of pleadings and court orders upon him.

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 Private respondent Paz Noble-Noblefranca (Noblefranca) instituted an action before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) Office of the Provincial Adjudicator against Alimboboyog for collection of rentals and ejectment with damages. The
complaint was later amended to reflect the correct technical description of the property. Noblefranca prayed therein that Alimboboyog be
directed to pay back rentals representing her share as landowner amounting to 156 cavans of palay or its money equivalent covering the
period from 1988-1995. Alimboboyog filed an answer claiming that he was no longer obliged to remit the landowner's share because he
had already acquired the property by operation of law through the issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of his
father, Domingo Alimboboyog.
 The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, ordering respondent to vacate the landholding, turn over its peaceful
possession to Noblefranca, and pay the latter back rentals consisting of 156 cavans of palay or its monetary equivalent.
 Alimboboyog's Notice of Appeal was denied due course in an Order dated April 7, 1997 for having been filed out of time. Subsequently, a
writ of execution was implemented and Noblefranca was placed in possession of the land. Four (4) years later or on January 10, 2001, the
DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The resolution disposed of Noblefranca's motion for
reconsideration, despite the fact that Alimboboyog's Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, it opted to relax the
application of the rules and admit the appeal in order to achieve agrarian justice. This was questioned on a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. This decision is now the subject of the instant case.

Issue:

 Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper.

Held:

 It is not proper. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent. In this case, the plain and adequate remedy was a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Decision and the resolution thereof, which was not only expected to be but would actually have provided an
adequate and more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari.
 The filing of a motion for reconsideration would have afforded the Court of Appeals the opportunity to correct the errors attributed to it
and allowed Alimboboyog to ventilate his side. His failure to file such motion deprived the appellate court of its right and opportunity to
review and purge its decision of any oversight.
 In view of the fact that Alimboboyog failed to take advantage of the procedural remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration without any
concrete, compelling and valid explanation, we cannot allow him to now seek relief by certiorari. As a final note, we add that although the
merits of the case are not in issue in this petition, the same having been filed solely to question Noblefranca's failure to serve a copy of the
petition which she filed with the Court of Appeals on Alimboboyog's counsel, we nonetheless reviewed the substantive conclusions
reached by the appellate court and found them to be in accord with the facts of the case, law and pertinent jurisprudence.
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AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; JURISDICTION; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP NOT EXTINGUISHED BY CHANGES

BROUGHT ABOUT BY A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES

Sps. Proceso Amurao and Minerva Amurao vs. Sps. Jacinto Villalobos and Herminigilda Villalobos
G.R. No. 157491 (June 20, 2006)

Facts:

 Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas which they bought from a certain Ruperto Endozo, the landlord of herein
respondents.
 The parties then entered into a contract "Kasulatan Tungkol sa Lupang Pagtatayuan ng Bahay" (KASULATAN) before the barangay
officials wherein respondents promised to surrender the possession of the land to the petitioners should the latter need it for personal use
and in turn the petitioner will give 1,000 square meters upon surrender thereof. However, the respondents refused to vacate when it was
finally demanded. The matter was then brought to the Barangay but no compromise was reached. A complaint for ejectment was then filed
with the MTC. In turn, respondents filed an answer with motion to hear special and affirmative defenses claiming that they were already
occupying and working on the same as agricultural tenants prior to petitioners acquisition. The controversy being an agrarian dispute must
be lodged with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not the court which has jurisdiction over the case.
 The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Batangas disposed of the case, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case because
respondents spouses Jacinto Villalobos and Herminigilda ceased to be agricultural tenants after they executed the "Kasulatan Tungkol sa
Lupang Pagtatayuan ng Bahay" ("Kasunduan" or "Kasulatan") where they expressly waived their status as tenants after having been
given one thousand (1000) square meters of the land in question. It explained that the Kasulatan is the law between the parties.
 Via a Notice of Appeal, respondents appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), where it rendered a Decision modifying the
ruling of the MTC. The RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case and that respondents are bonafide tenants in petitioners' land. It
explained that the MCTC anchored its decision on the assumption that respondents were already occupying the 1,000 square meters of
land embodied in the Kasulatan. It found that it was unclear whether the terms and conditions contained in the Kasulatan have been
observed and complied with by petitioners because there was no documentary evidence showing that the 1,000 square meters of land have
been transferred to the respondents. It upheld the MCTC's finding that the Kasulatan is the law between the parties, and to be binding, the
parties should comply with its terms and conditions. Thus, for the Kasulatan's enforcement, it found it necessary that petitioners execute a
document transferring full and absolute ownership over the 1,000 square meters of land to the respondents.
 A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but was denied. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:

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 Whether or not the court a quo erred in ruling that the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are null and
void having been rendered without jurisdiction?
 Whether or not there is an agrarian dispute in the instant case?
 Whether or not tenancy relationship has been terminated by the KASULATAN.

Held:

 In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:

Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third
party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord
and tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said
relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation
is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . . .

 We rule that there is. As defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law," an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands
devoted to agriculture.
 The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay,
terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had ceased due to the Kasulutan, there still exists an
agrarian dispute because the action involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
 There being an agrarian dispute, the action is properly within the jurisdiction of the DAR, through the DARAB.

JUST COMPENSATION; JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT

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Ernestina L. Crisologo-Jose vs. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 167399 (June 22, 2006)

Facts:

 Petitioner is the owner of 34.6960 hectares of land which used to form part of a larger expanse situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-147218 of the land records of North Nueva Ecija. She is also the owner of several
parcels of land situated in the same municipality with a total area of 27.09 hectares and covered by twelve (12) separate titles, i.e., TCT
Nos. 155604 -09, 155611, 155615, 245112-15. According to the petitioner, respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) gave
these landholdings — which she inherited from her uncle, Alejandro T. Lim — a measly valuation of P9,000.00 per hectare.
 Excepting from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner filed on September 25, 1997, a PETITION for determination of just
compensation respecting her landholdings aforementioned. In said petition, docketed as AGR. CASE No. 962-G of the Regional Trial
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, petitioner prayed that "the sum of P100,000.00 at least per hectare, or the total sum of P6,178,600.00 be
fixed as just compensation of the total area of 61.7860 hectares," it being her allegation that her computation hewed with the guidelines
established under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and other related statutes.
 On September 8, 1999, the trial court, after due proceedings, rendered judgment fixing the fair market value of the 61.7860 hectares of the
land in question at P100,000.00 per hectare. But beyond value determination, the trial court ordered the respondent to pay petitioner the
total sum of P6,178,600.00, subject to the usual rules and regulation regarding payment.
 Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, respondent Land Bank went on appeal to the CA whereat its recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 69463.
 Eventually, the CA, in a decision dated October 15, 2004, reversed that of the trial court.
 In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion in its equally assailed resolution of January 24, 2005.
 Hence, petitioner's present recourse on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court is correct in rendering judgment fixing the just compensation of
the subject landholdings?

Held:

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 Just compensation, under the premises, presupposes the expropriation or taking of agricultural lands for eventual distribution to agrarian
reform beneficiaries. In the case at bench, respondent has averred and the CA has peremptorily determined that the tracts of land for which
petitioner is claiming just compensation have not actually been acquired by the government.
 With respect to the parcels of land with a total area of 27.09 hectares and covered by TCT Nos. 155604, 155605, 155606, 155607, 155608,
155609, 155611 155615, 245112, 245113, 245114 and 245115, the appellate court found that the claim folders therefor have not been
forwarded to the respondent bank for processing and eventual payment of the transfer claims. This reality could only mean, so the CA
correctly concludes, that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not yet expropriated the parcels in question for agrarian reform
purposes. In other words, ownership or at least control over the 27.09 hectares has not passed from the registered owner to the expropriator.
Petitioner could have had proven — but had not — the fact of actual or symbolic compulsory taking by presenting evidence to that effect,
such as the required Notice of Valuation which usually follows the Notice of Coverage, the letter of invitation to a preliminary conference
and the Notice of Acquisition that DAR sends, pursuant to DAR administrative issuances, to the landowner affected.
 Just like the matter of the 27.09 hectares of land immediately referred to above, petitioner has not discharged her burden of proving the
acquisition by the DAR of the other 34.6960 hectares of land once covered by TCT No. NT-147218. But even if perhaps she wanted to,
she could not have possibly done so, that portion being either a school site, a creek or residential area, ergo unsuitable for agricultural
activities and, hence, outside the scope of the agrarian reform program, be it under the CARL law or the more exacting P.D. No. 27. It
must be stressed, at this juncture, that respondent had all along — i.e., in its basic answer, its CA appeal brief and finally in its
Memorandum filed with the Court — stuck to its position that the 27.09-hectare area was never taken over by the DAR; and that no claim
for compensation therefor was ever processed, as is usual in agrarian compulsory acquisition scheme, under the summary administrative
proceedings prescribed by governing DAR circulars. Yet, the petitioner never attempted to prove the contrary. Significantly, save for
determining the fair market value of the landholdings in question, no reference is also made in the decision of the trial court regarding the
actual expropriation of the specific parcels of land subject of this case, albeit, quite strangely, it ordered payment of the value of the
property in question.

EJECTMENT; DISPOSSESSION UNDER RA 3844; FAILURE TO PAY AMORTIZATION NOT A GROUND FOR RECOVERY
OF POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP

Cynthia V. Omadle and Angelito Alisen vs. Spouses Wilfredo and Rogelia B. Casuno
G.R. No. 143362 (June 27, 2006)

Facts:

 Cynthia V. Omadle, petitioner, is the daughter of the late Francisco Villa owner of the lot 406, Pls-98 Ext., in Kalatugay, Base Camp,
Maramag, Bukidnon. Angelito Alisen, another petitioner, is Cynthia's farm worker. Spouses Wilfredo and Rogelia B. Casuno, respondents,

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were once tenants of Francisco Villa who were cultivating a portion of said lot which was later on awarded to them by the DAR and an
Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.
 It turned out that respondents mortgaged the property. Cynthia then redeemed the land and caused their eviction. Consequently,
respondents filed with the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Cagayan
de Oro City, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership (with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction) against petitioners.
 Petitioner Cynthia Omadle admitted that respondents were her father's tenants. However, the DAR declared the area exempt from the
coverage of the land reform program, being within the retention limits. She claimed that respondents paid their amortization only once.
They mortgaged the lot to several persons in violation of the terms of the Certificate of Land Transfer. Moreover, their cause of action has
prescribed because they filed their complaint only after four years from their eviction.
 In a Decision dated August 24, 1992, the DARAB Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint. On appeal by respondents, the DARAB
Central Office reversed the Decision, holding that petitioners and her siblings waived their right to retain seven (7) hectares, allowed under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, and being grantees of the Emancipation Patent, respondents could no longer be evicted. Petitioners then
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB judgment. Hence
this instant petition.

Issues:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents are owners of the subject land considering that they failed to pay
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) the required amortizations.
 Whether or not petitioners' cause of action was barred by prescription pursuant to Section 38 of R.A. 3844.
 Whether or not respondents are disqualified for violating the terms and conditions of their land title by not cultivating the area?

Held:

 On petitioners' contention that respondents failed to pay the Land Bank the required amortizations, SC agrees with the Court of Appeals
that at the time the patent and title were issued to respondents, petitioner Cynthia Omadle had already been paid her just compensation.
And granting that she has not yet been compensated, her proper recourse is against the Land Bank, not against respondents.
 As to petitioners' claim that respondents' cause of action has prescribed, let it be stressed that since respondents have been issued
Emancipation Patent No. A-042463 and TCT No. ET-5184 as early as December 18, 1987, they can no longer be considered tenants or
lessees, but owners of the subject landholding. Obviously, Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 on prescription finds no application to their case.
 An emancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee thereof shall have already complied with all the requirements prescribed
under P.D. No. 27, serves as a basis for the issuance of a TCT. It is the issuance of this emancipation patent that conclusively entitles the
farmer/grantee of the rights of absolute ownership. In Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, SC held:
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It is the emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority or the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer
Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee . . . .

Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitles a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.

EJECTMENT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP, ONCE ESTABLISHED,

ENTITLES THE TENANT TO A SECURITY OF TENURE

Purificacion Perez-Rosario, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Adjudication Board of Agrarian Reform, Mercedes Resultay, Basilio Cayabyab,
Federico Baniqued, And Miguel Resultay (deceased) Substituted by his heir, Arturo Resultay
G.R. No. 140796 (June 30, 2006)

Facts:

 The petition originated from an action for ejectment filed with the DARAB principally on the grounds of non-payment of lease rentals and
sub-leasing without the knowledge and consent of the owners of a parcel of agricultural land, consisting of 2.2277 hectares, more or less,
devoted to rice and mango production, located at Barangay Obong, Basista, Pangasinan and registered in the name of Nicolasa
Tamondong vda. de Perez, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31822.
 Respondents appealed to the DARAB. On June 10, 1994, the DARAB promulgated its decision, declaring Miguel and Mercedes Resultay
to be agricultural tenants on the land they till and to fix the lease rental on the land in accordance with pertinent agrarian laws, rules and
regulations.
 Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, the CA rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the DARAB ruling.
 Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the CA denied the motion through its Resolution dated November 8, 1999, a copy of which was
received by the petitioners on November 15, 1999.
 Twenty-two days later, or on December 7, 1999, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issues:

 Whether respondent Miguel and her wife Mercedes Resultay, is entitled to remain as agricultural lessee of the land in question with
respondent Federico Baniqued as their hired farm worker?

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 Whether respondent Basilio Cayabyab is entitled to remain as an agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare riceland portion of the
landholding in question?

Held:

 While it is conceded in all quarters that respondent Baniqued is a hired farm worker, from this fact alone, it cannot be inferred that
respondent Mercedes Resultay is not actually performing her obligations as an agricultural tenant or, stated otherwise, that she did not
cultivate the land in person or through other members of the immediate household. Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, and coupled with the fact that the petitioners are the complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a
lawful cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee rests upon them, since they are the agricultural lessors. This proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. She can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law. Section 36 of the same law enumerates the grounds for dispossession of the tenant's
landholding.
 In the recent past, the Court has held that the employment of farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the
existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in
the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land,
this Court nevertheless has declared that the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not
negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship.
 As correctly noted by the DARAB, it appears that the juridical relationship of the parties is still governed by agricultural share tenancy.
The relationship should be converted into a leasehold. Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 3844 provide for the automatic conversion of share
tenancy to agricultural leasehold. The lease rental should be determined in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657 in relation to
Section 34 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, and existing rules and regulations.
 The instant petition is DENIED.

RETENTION RIGHT

Heirs of Juan Griño, Sr. represented by Remedios C. Griño vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 165073 (June 30, 2006)

Facts:

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 Griños 9.35 hectares land in Brgy. Gua-an, Leganes, Iloilo was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 on account of which Certificates
of Land Transfer (CLTs) covering a portion thereof were issued in favor of his tenants. Griño later filed in the early 80's a letter-petition
for the cancellation of the above-said CLTs, contending that they were issued to the tenants without giving him an opportunity to be heard,
the area being a little over 6 hectares. In lieu of the land covered by the CLTs, Griño offered seven hectares for each of the tenants from
his 50-hectare land in Brgy. Tad-y, Sara, Iloilo (which is mortgaged to the DBP).
 Griño, however, later ordered to the DBP his 50-hectare land via dacion en pago to settle his obligation to it. On July 10, 1985, Griño died.
He was survived by his wife and seven children. On June 22, 1988, his wife also passed away. On June 15 RA 6657 or the CARL took
effect. DAR-RD Antonio S. Malaya dismissed the said petition by Order of September 25, 1989, citing letter of instructions No. 474. The
LBP later advised Griño heirs, herein petitioners, by letter of June 6, 1996, of the DAR's submission of Griños 9.35 hectare land transfer
claim for payment under PD 27, its approval on June 5, 1996, and the requirement for the parcels of the claim to be released. Petitioners
later filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for retention dated 14 March 1997 of the 9.35 hectare land. They likewise sought
the exemption of the 9.35 hectare land for the coverage of either PD 27 or the CARL. Emancipation Patents were issued in favor of Griños
5 tenant on June 5 and 25, 1997. DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres subsequently dismissed petitioners application for
retention, by Order dated April 27, 1998.
 Petitioners moved to reconsider the April 27, 1998 Order of the DAR RD but it was denied by Order of August 18, 1998. Petitioners
appealed to the DAR Secretary but it was denied by Order dated September 3, 2002 of then Secretary Hernani A. Braganza. Petitioners
elevated the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the September 3, 2002 Order of the
DAR Secretary.
 On challenge via petition for certiorari are the October 17, 2003 Decision and the June 21, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 73368,"Heirs of Juan Griño, Sr. represented by Remedios C. Griño v. Department of Agrarian Reform."

Issue:

 Whether the petitioners are entitled to right of retention?

Held:

 Petitioners fault the appellate court for ignoring the "evidence" they discovered when they had the opportunity to examine the records
forwarded by the DAR to the appellate court — "that Griño was misled into believing that [the] CLTs had been issued, when there were
none, or that the [September 25, 1989] Maraya Order denying Griño's petition for cancellation of [the] CLTs was without legal effect —
because the (1) CLTs were inexistent, (2) he was dead by the time the Order was rendered, and the property had long passed on to his
heirs, and (3) the heirs were never notified of said order, and there is no showing that it was sent even to Juan Griño, Sr.'s address of
record either."

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 As the appellate court ruled, however, petitioners are guilty of laches in their attempt to "resurrect the retention issue [seven and a half]
years after its denial was decreed and came to finality."
 As the appellate court ruled too, the DAR cannot be faulted if no substitution of parties took place when Griño died, it being the duty of
the heirs to attend to the estate of the deceased, which duty includes notification to adjudicating tribunals the fact of death of the litigant.
 At all events, these issues raised by petitioners, which substantially reiterate those raised in their motion for reconsideration before the
appellate court, were as the appellate court observed, never raised in the proceedings below nor in petitioners' petition for review before
said court.
 The petition is DISMISSED.

EMANCIPATION PATENTS; INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

Samuel Estribillo, et al. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Hacienda Maria, Inc.
G.R. No. 159674 (June 30, 2006)

Facts:

 The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located
at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The parcels of land, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested
area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with
other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof. HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent
No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of
527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
 The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by
the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the
RARAD Decision. After the DARAB denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the assailed Resolution:
 The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of
the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their
behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration
with Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel
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Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there
had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are
ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

Issues:

 Whether there was compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; the certification against forum shopping?
 Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings?

Held:

 Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-
94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation
where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues.
 Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or
principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio that the
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel.
In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.
 The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of the rules on the
certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in
their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance
with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that
would justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those which
we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
 Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as
certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
 The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the
possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative
proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the
Public Land Act.
 After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who
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have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded
to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."
 The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on
the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings.

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION ON CASES OF CONVERSION

Melencio Berboso and Concepcion Berboso vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. Nos. 141593-94 (July 12, 2006)

Facts:

 The case at bar is a petition for review of the Decision involving the confirmation of the order of conversion and the determination of the
amount of disturbance compensation filed with the DARAB by Belen and Corazon Carlos.
 On 29 November 1973, herein private respondents Belen and Corazon Carlos, together with Manuel, Alberto, Antonio and Rafaelito, all
surnamed Carlos, filed with the Bureau of Land Acquisition, Distribution and Development of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
a joint request for the conversion of their parcel of land consisting of 48.2789 hectares of unirrigated riceland situated at Calvario, Iba, and
Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and covered by TCTs No. 48182 and No. 48183 issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
 On 22 January 1975, DAR Secretary Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order declaring the said parcels of land suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial and other urban purposes.
 Pursuant to the 22 January 1975 Order, respondents Carloses effected the payment of the compensation due their agricultural tenants.
However, petitioners Melencio and Concepcion Berboso, successors-in-interest of one of their original tenants, Macario Berboso, refused
to vacate their landholdings.
 On 1 September 1989, private respondents Carloses filed with the DARAB Region III a Petition for Confirmation of the Order of
Conversion and for the Determination of the Amount of Disturbance Compensation. Private respondents Carloses and Emiliano Berboso,
brother of herein petitioners Berbosos and the named respondent in DARAB Case No. 101-Bul '89, filed with the DARAB a Joint Motion
to Determine the Amount of Disturbance Compensation due to the respondent/tenant agreeing to abide with the decision of the Board.
 On 16 October 1989, private respondent Corazon Carlos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of their co-
respondent herein JKM which involves one parcel of land consisting of 20,186 square meters covered by TCT No. T-225598 on even date,
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private respondent Belen Carlos executed another Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property also in favor of JKM which involves one parcel
of land consisting of 20,110 square meters covered by TCT No. T-58059.
 In its Decision dated 18 December 1989, the DARAB ordered private respondents Carloses to pay Emiliano Berboso the total amount of
P112,644.00 equivalent to five years disturbance compensation.
 On 15 January 1990, Emiliano Berboso filed with the DARAB a Motion to Set Aside the 18 December 1989 Decision of the DARAB
assailing therein the amount of disturbance compensation. He, together with the other petitioners Berbosos, asserted that he is entitled to
either the thirty percent (30%) physical portion of the lot, or the equivalent value thereof in cash, as disturbance compensation. He further
asserted that petitioners Berbosos, being tenants of the subject land, should have been included also as parties in the Joint Motion filed in
DARAB Case No. 101-Bul '89.
 On 5 March 1990, Emiliano Berboso filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of the 18 December 1989 Decision of the
DARAB docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20147.
 Meanwhile, on motion of private respondents Carloses, the DARAB issued a Writ of Possession dated 13 September 1990 against
Emiliano Berboso.
 On 26 December 1990, petitioners Berbosos filed an Action for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Damages, and Injunction against
private respondents Carloses before the DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. 217-Bul '90, alleging therein that the enforcement of the
said Writ of Possession would unjustly deprive them of possession of their land since the land being tilled and tenanted by their brother
Emiliano Berboso is separate and distinct from the land they are tenanting from private respondents Carloses, and that they have their own
tenanted areas of cultivation which are separate and distinct from that of their brother Emiliano Berboso.
 On 25 March 1992, petitioners Berbosos filed a Petition before the DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. 368-Bul '92, seeking to
exercise their right of redemption under Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. They similarly prayed for the reversion of the subject land to
its original agricultural use contending that private respondent JKM had already started utilizing the said land by bulldozing it. Finally,
they deposited with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARAD) the amount of P1,000,000.00 as redemption money. DARAB
Case No. 368-Bul '92 was consolidated with DARAB Case No. 217-Bul '90.
 On 26 March 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, denying Emiliano Berboso's Petition for Review.
 On 9 December 1992, petitioners Berbosos filed before the DAR Secretary a Petition for the Cancellation of the Conversion Order dated
22 January 1975 of previous DAR Secretary Estrella.
 On 9 February 1993, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) rendered a Decision dismissing the consolidated
DARAB Cases No. 217-Bul '90 and No. 368-Bul '92.
 Petitioners Berbosos appealed the aforesaid Decision to the DARAB Head Office at Quezon City, and on 5 January 1994, the DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order granting the Motion for Cancellation of the Conversion Order dated 22 January 1975.
 Private respondents Carloses moved for the reconsideration of the aforementioned Order of DAR Secretary Garilao but the same was
denied. Aggrieved, they filed an Appeal with the Office of the President which was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5994.
 On 24 October 1994, petitioners Berbosos filed before the DARAB Head Office, Quezon City, a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw
Complaint for Redemption in DARAB Case No. 368-Bul '92, since there was no more need for resolution of the said case in light of the
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Order of DAR Secretary Garilao dated 5 January 1994 finding the subject lands to be still agricultural in use and tenanted by petitioners
Berbosos.
 On 1 March 1996, the Office of the President rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of DAR Secretary Garilao dated 5
January 1994 and reinstating the Order of the former DAR Secretary Estrella dated 22 January 1975.
 On 25 June 1996, the DARAB Head Office, Quezon City, rendered a Decision on DARAB Case No. 1283, dismissing the Appeal of
petitioners Berbosos and affirming the Decision of the DARAB Region III dated 18 December 1989.
 On 21 August 1996, petitioners Berbosos filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of the Decision dated 1 March 1996 of
the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5994.
 On 29 December 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing both Petitions for Review, and affirming the Decisions of the
Office of the President dated 1 March 1996 and the DARAB dated 25 June 1996.
 Petitioners Berbosos invoked Presidential Decree No. 27. They argued that, upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on 21
October 1972, they are automatically deemed owners of the land in question; that TCTs No. EP-150-M and No. EP-149-M which cover
the subject lands, were issued in their favor by the DAR; and that said titles cannot be cancelled by the Court of Appeals in the absence of
a direct attack by private respondents Carloses and JKM.

Issues:

 The Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the Transfer Certificates of Titles of the Petitioner Berbosos in the absence of direct attack.
 The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the Conversion Order of DAR Secretary Estrella dated 22 January 1975.
 The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the private respondent Carlosses have complied with the requirements for conversion of their
land under Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
 The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was observance of due process in application and issuance of order of conversion.
 The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no violation of the security of tenure of petitioner Berbosos as farmer-beneficiaries.

Held:

 Petitioners Berbosos' arguments are without merit.

 As to the issue of whether or not there was a direct attack on the validity of the TCTs No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M of the petitioners
Berbosos by private respondents Carloses and JKM thus allowing for the cancellation of said titles, we rule in the affirmative.
 In the case of Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, we had an occasion to discuss the issue of direct attack on the validity of titles, to wit:

A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, Section 48, provides that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an

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attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which
the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

 It is well-settled that a judgment which had acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, thus, may no longer be modified in any
respect except to clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. Since the lawfulness
of the determination of the award of disturbance compensation was already settled in the 26 March 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, we hold that the legality and validity of the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order is also settled because
determination of disturbance compensation necessarily follows the Conversion Order. Simply put, there would be no determination of
disturbance compensation without a Conversion Order being first validly issued.
 Well-settled is the rule that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined only to
specific matters, is accorded not only respect but finality, particularly when affirmed by the appellate tribunal.
 Time and again, we ruled that what is repugnant to due process is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
 Lastly, petitioners Berbosos also posited that their security of tenure as farmers-beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 was
violated. According to them, the 18 December 1989 DARAB Decision fixing the amount of disturbance compensation is binding only
with respect to Emiliano Berboso, and since they were never made parties therein, their security of tenure cannot be affected.

TENANCY; ELEMENTS

Sps. Francisco G. Tuazon and Ruth A. Tuazon vs. Vicente G. Tuazon and John L. Tuazon
G.R. No. 168438 (August 28, 2006)

Facts:

 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73617 dated July 28, 2004
and April 26, 2005, respectively, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, in Civil Case No. RTC 2000-
0027. The trial court ruled that the case involves tenancy over which it lacks jurisdiction. The appellate court found that the issue is mere
possession and remanded the case for further proceedings.

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 The instant case arose from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages filed by respondents Vicente G. Tuazon and John L.
Tuazon against petitioner spouses Francisco G. Tuazon and Ruth A. Tuazon. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the
absolute owners of a 2.3119-hectare of land located at Gotob, San Agustin, Canaman, Camarines Sur covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. RP-298 (224241). They acquired the land by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1985 from its original owner, the
late Rosa G. Tuazon, who was Vicente's mother. They further alleged that after the sale, Francisco Tuazon (a brother of Vicente) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, a complaint for Reconveyance of Property docketed as Civil Case No. RTC '92-
2568 against Vicente on the ground that their mother Rosa ceded to him one hectare of the subject property. Rosa allegedly gave Francisco
the one hectare of land in exchange for the expenses which he and his wife incurred in redeeming the subject property from Atty. Ricardo
Gonzales and in paying the disturbance compensation to Federico Adriano, the former tenant of the subject property. They alleged that
Francisco's complaint was dismissed on February 28, 1994 and the validity of the Deed of Sale between Vicente and Rosa was upheld.
The decision became final on March 27, 1999. Respondents then averred that despite the finality of the decision and their repeated
demands to vacate the subject property, petitioners refused to turn over its possession.
 Petitioners pleaded tenancy as a special and affirmative defense. They alleged that in 1986, before respondents purchased the subject
property, Rosa instituted Ruth as legitimate tenant of the land. Ruth was instituted tenant after she redeemed the subject property from
Atty. Ricardo Gonzales with her own money and paid the disturbance compensation to the former tenants of the subject parcel.
 The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing to receive evidence on petitioners' defense of tenancy. During the hearing, Ruth presented
two certifications attesting that she is a tenant of the subject land. One was issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Canaman, Camarines Sur and the other by the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC). Alex Tuazon also testified that he regularly
received twenty-five percent (25%) of the produce of the land as landowner's share after his mother's death.
 The trial court then ruled that the case involves an agrarian dispute which is under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Thus, on October 24,
2001, it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit, hence, they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
 In a Decision dated July 28, 2004, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the appellate court in its assailed Resolution dated April 26, 2005.
 The appellate Court denied the petition.

Issues:

 Whether or not the lower court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondents against the petitioners?
 Whether or not petitioner is not a duly instituted tenant on the subject land and that no tenancy relationship exists between her and the
respondent?

Held:

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 To determine whether a case involves a tenancy dispute, the following essential requisites must be present: 1. the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; 2. the subject matter is agricultural land; 3. there is consent between the parties; 4. the purpose is agricultural production; 5.
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, 6. there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
 Not all of these requisites obtain in the case at bar.
 Petitioners' contention that their previous claims of ownership over the subject property are immaterial and do not negate the tenancy
relationship defies logic. Tenancy is established precisely when a landowner institutes a tenant to work on his property under the terms
and conditions of their tenurial arrangement. Petitioners cannot anomalously insist to be both tenants and owners of the subject land.
 Even the documentary evidence on record — the respective certifications issued by the MARO and BARC officers — do not constitute
proof that petitioner Ruth is a tenant of the subject land. It is settled that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional, not binding upon the courts, and could be overturned by a showing of
evidence to the contrary. The appellate court correctly observed, viz.:

. . . . In fact, we even entertain doubts about their competence as evidence of tenancy status in the absence of further evidence that the
MARO and BARC officers who made the certification investigated Ruth's status and saw for themselves or knew for a fact that Ruth
personally cultivated the land and undertook the activities required from a tenant.

 Petitioners also failed to prove that petitioner Ruth shared the produce of the subject land with Rosa from 1987-1991. The certification of
Alex that there is sharing of harvest leaves much to be desired. Alex himself admitted during his testimony that he was neither authorized
by his mother, Rosa, nor by his co-heirs, to act as administrator of the subject property.

ABANDONMENT; WHEN IS THERE ABANDONMENT OF A LANDHOLDING?

Jovendo del Castillo vs. Abundio Orciga, et al.

G.R. No. 153850 (August 31, 2006)

Facts:

 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner del Castillo seeking the nullification of the November 26, 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66122, ordering him to vacate the subject landholding and directing the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to restore possession of the farm lot to respondents.
 Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo is the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo, who previously owned a 1.3300-hectare riceland
located at Omabo, Polpog, Bula, Camarines Sur.

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 Eugenio Orciga was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-070176 over the said landholding on April 3, 1981.
 On August 1, 1988, Eugenio Orciga died. Prior to the final selection and determination of the successor of the deceased tenant, on July 1,
1991, the heirs agreed to rotate among themselves the cultivation of the riceland covered by said CLT. After cultivating and harvesting the
riceland from 1989 to 1991, Ronald Orciga abandoned the said farm on May 3, 1991 and left the town.
 On May 28, 1991, petitioner Del Castillo — a member of the CAFGU (Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit) — forcibly entered the
riceland of the late Eugenio Orciga. He started to cultivate the said land over the objection of the respondents, effectively ejecting them
from their possession and cultivation of the land.
 Respondents filed a Complaint on June 10, 1991, with the Office of Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB, Naga City. for Reinstatement with
Mandatory Injunction and Damages. Petitiner (Del Castillo), in his Answer, averred that Orciga failed to give lessor's share and was
advised by DAR Para-legal Officer to take over the cultivation of the land denying ejectment of respondents. He also claimed Orciga
mortgaged portions of the farm.
 PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondents, but the same was denied.
 Undaunted, Del Castillo, on July 18, 2001, interposed a petition for review before the CA, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 66122.
 On petition for review, the appellate court concluded that petitioner Del Castillo had no right to take possession of the farmland being
disputed even if the heirs had failed to deliver the agricultural lessor's share. It held that when the beneficiary abandons the tillage or
refuses to gain rights accruing to the farmer-beneficiary under the law, it will be reverted to the government and not to the farm lot owner.
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

 Who should be entitled to possess the disputed landholding under the DAR Land Transfer Program — the petitioner, as representative of
the former titled landowner, or the respondents, as successors of the deceased beneficiary?

Held:

 The Court holds respondents to be the rightful possessors of the disputed farmland and at the same time, rejects the instant petition.
 Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of respondents, was awarded Certificate of Land
Transfer No. 0070176 over the contested land pursuant to PD No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he is the acknowledged
owner of the contested land.
 A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issued to a tenant-farmer, which proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the
terms and conditions of ownership over said land and likewise describes the landholding — its area and its location. A CLT is the
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of the land's value or for as long as the
beneficiary is an "amortizing owner."
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 In the case at bar, the petitioner has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-payment of the land to the DAR and the Barangay
Committee on Land Production that will subsequently resolve said dispute pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and other issuances; and, second, to negotiate with the DAR and LBP for payment of the compensation
claim pursuant to Section 2 of EO No. 228. Eventually, the scheme under EO No. 228 will result to the full payment of the compensation
of the value of the land to Menardo del Castillo, petitioner's father and former landowner.
 From the foregoing options, it is indubitably clear that the reconveyance of the land to the former owner is not allowed. The policy is to
hold such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farmers. The objective is to prevent repetition of cases where the lands
distributed to the tenant-farmers reverted to the former lot owners or even conveyed to land speculators. Thus, possession of the land
cannot be restored to petitioner del Castillo although there was failure of the heirs to pay the landowner's share or compensation. The
transfer or conveyance of the riceland can only be made to an heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who shall in turn cultivate
the land. In the case in hand, even if Ronald Orciga has abandoned the land, the right to possess and cultivate the land legally belongs to
the other heirs of Eugenio Orciga. Undoubtedly, petitioner Del Castillo is not a beneficiary of Eugenio Orciga — the original beneficiary;
hence, petitioner has no legal right to the possession of the farmland.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; THE ISSUE ON REDEMPTION HAVING ATTAINED FINALITY, PETITIONER'S EFFORT TO
MODIFY THE SAME IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA

Alejandro Moraga vs. Sps. Julian and Felicidad Somo, et al.

G.R. No. 166781 (September 5, 2006)

Facts:

 The property in dispute is a parcel of agricultural land consisting of 1.7467 hectares which is located in Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
and covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5926 in the name of Victoriano Ipapo who died on 6 June 1976. This
property was tenanted by Alejandro Moraga, the deceased father of petitioner Enrique Moraga.
 On 7 March 1973, Victoriano Ipapo sold the landholding to his daughters Felicidad, Carmelita, and Herminigilda, and their respective
spouses, Julian Somo, Reynaldo Fernandez and Gil San Diego (respondents) for P10,000.00 per Bilihan Tuluyan of even date, with the
knowledge and consent of Alejandro Moraga as admitted in his affidavit.
 On 22 July 1981, a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-042737 was issued in favor of Alejandro Moraga for the same parcel of
agricultural land and eventually, TCT No. EP-108 (m) was issued in his favor.
 On 11 October 1993, respondents filed with the DARAB a complaint for Cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer and the
Emancipation Patent and for Ejectment against Enrique and Mercedes Moraga (Moragas), the surviving heirs of the late Alejandro Moraga
who died on 25 August 1993. Mercedes Moraga is the surviving spouse of the deceased Alejandro Moraga. The case was docketed as
DARAB Case No. 567-Bul '93.
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 Finding that the EP was issued not in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 27 and that the Moragas violated their obligations as
tenants of the subject landholding, the Provincial Adjudicator, in a decision dated 30 June 1994, rendered a judgment in favor of
respondents. The Moragas filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. The Moragas then appealed to the Court
of Appeals.
 In the meantime, respondents filed an application for retention with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which was opposed by
petitioner Enrique Moraga. In an Order dated 22 February 1994, the Regional Director of DAR Region III granted the application for
retention by respondents.
 Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who affirmed the decision of the Regional Director in an Order dated 14 October
1994.
 Unfazed, petitioner appealed the ruling of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to the Court of Appeals. Said appealed ruling of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform was consolidated by the Court of Appeals with the appealed decision of the DARAB in Case No. 567-Bul '93. The
consolidated cases were docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 38445.
 In a Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the two appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38445, thus affirming the
rulings of the DARAB and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The decision became final and executory since no either motion for
reconsideration nor appeal from the same were ever filed by any party.
 While the CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 was still pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner and Mercedes Moraga, on 6 April 1995, filed
before the Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan, a complaint for Redemption against respondents which was docketed as DARAB
Case No. 927-Bul '95.
 In a Decision dated 23 November 1995, the Provincial Adjudicator, opined that the case for redemption has been rendered moot and
academic inasmuch as respondents, by virtue of the said ruling of the Court of Appeals, had acquired vested rights over the subject
property.
 On appeal, the DARAB in Case No. 927-Bul '95 affirmed with modification the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB,
while sustaining the Provincial Adjudicator's ruling that the Moragas' right to redeem has prescribed, stated that the heirs of Alejandro
Moraga shall remain as tenants and are entitled to security of tenure. The Moragas filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision denying their claim for redemption. Respondents likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision insofar as it
decreed that Alejandro Moraga's heirs shall "remain tenants entitled to security of tenure." Both motions were denied by the DARAB.
 Hence, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
 In a decision dated 29 January 2003, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895
affirming in toto the decision of the DARAB. Since no appeal was filed by either party, this decision became final and executory.
 On the other hand, the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, in resolving the sole issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 on whether or not the
DARAB is correct in ordering that the heirs of Alejandro Moraga remain as tenants in the subject landholding, ruled for the respondents. It
ratiocinated that the DARAB committed palpable error in decreeing that Alejandro Moraga's heir "shall remain as tenants entitled to
security of tenure" considering that the said ruling alters the already final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 38445, enunciating that the Moragas are not entitled to security of tenure for violating their obligations as tenants.
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 Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. The Court of Appeals did not budge from its stand and
denied the motion in a Resolution dated 11 January 2005.

Issues:

 Whether or not petitioner shall remain as tenant of the landholding entitled to security of tenure?
 Whether or not the petitioner has a right of redemption over the landholding subject of the instant case?
 Whether or not petitioner is entitled to disturbance compensation?

Held:

 Contrary to what petitioner believed, the said portion of the body of the decision is merely an obiter dictum. In fact, the dispositive portion
of the decision categorically upholds the eviction of petitioner. If indeed, it was pronounced in the said decision that petitioner were to
remain as tenant, then the dispositive portion of the same would not have upheld petitioner's eviction. It should be remembered that while
the body of a decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the court's reasoning propenderates, it is the
dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties and obligations.
 Since CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 resolved the issue of security of tenure and ordered petitioner's eviction, this Court can no longer entertain
petitioner's attempt to re-litigate the same on the ground of res judicata. In a zealous attempt to salvage his case for redemption, petitioner
insisted that the late Victoriano Ipapo failed to inform petitioner's deceased father in writing and the DAR of the sale of the land in
question in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6389, amending Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 3844. By raising this
issue, petitioner is trying to resuscitate the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, dated 29 January 2003, which has
already attained finality. It must be recalled that said decision declared that petitioner lost his right to redeem the property on the grounds
of prescription and that petitioner's father has waived his right to redeem said property. Said issue on redemption having attained finality,
petitioner's effort to modify the same is barred by res judicata.
 Anent petitioner's claim of disturbance compensation, suffice it to state that since this matter is brought up for the first time in this Petition
for Review, this Court cannot take cognizance of the same. The settled rule is that matters or issues not raised below cannot be raised
before this Court for the first time.

CERTIORARI; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; 60 DAY PERIOD MUST BE OBSERVED

Land Bank of the Philippines, Represented by Margarito B. Teves, President and CEO, Leticia Lourdes Camara, Department Head-Landowners
Compensation Department II, and Romeo V. Cadanial, Acting LVD Head, AOC XI vs. The Honorable Bernardo V. Saludanes, in his capacity as

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Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Diosdado Cajes, in capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum City, Soriano Fruits Corporation et al.
G.R. No. 146581 (December 13, 2006)

Facts:

 Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated November 22, 2000 and January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(Seventeenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59492.
 The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6, 1999 by several landowners with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein
petitioner, and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land
forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the government.
 The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount
of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial, the Special Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the
Commissioners. On February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just
compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases.
 Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. The LBP filed with the same court a
Notice of Appeal. A few days after. The DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal. Both notices of appeal was denied by the SAC.
 The LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated but was denied.
 The joint Decision, having become final and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court.
 The LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
 In its Resolution the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed thirty-two (32) days beyond the sixty (60) day
reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the Appellate Court.

Issue:

 Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari be exempt from the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice
and equity.

Held:

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 We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.

 In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, we held that the period of 60 days to file a petition for certiorari is reasonable and sufficient. It provides
for ample time for a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court, tribunal, board, or
officer, It was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition
of their cases. Hence, the 60-day period must be considered non-extendible, except where a good and sufficient reason can be shown to
warrant an extension.

COMMERCIAL FARM; DEFERMENT ORDER SERVES AS NOTICE OF COVERAGE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE
DEFERMENT PERIOD

CONVERSION; REQUIREMENTS; DAR SHOULD REFER TO THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANS AND THE
ORDINANCES OF THE SANGGUNIAN IN ASSESSING LAND USE CONVERSION APPLICATIONS

DAR, as represented by its Secretary, Rene C. Villa vs. Sarangani Agricultural Co., Inc., Acil Corp, Nicasio Alcantara and Tomas Alcantara
G.R. No. 165547 (January 24, 2007)

Facts:

 Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of
a municipal zoning ordinance (MZO), and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel, approved by the
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Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani. A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARL
commercial farms deferment scheme.
 On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an application for land use conversion of various parcels
of land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares covering lot No. 1-C, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 2, 39, 53, 806 and 807. Meanwhile, members of
the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the
application for land use conversion filed by SACI. They alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights. Later, an
"Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI.
 The PLUTC, recommended the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares planted with bananas and coconuts. The committee noted that said
portion of the property was still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with opposition from
SARBAI.
 SACI contended among others that 1) the banana plantations will be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made
available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 2) at the time the application for land use conversion was
filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular because the same
may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion; and 3) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be
a legal barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.
 DAR Secretary denied SACI's application for land use conversion. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, elevated the case with the Court of Appeals on
petition for review raising substantially the same issues. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition, the assailed
Decision and Order of the Office of the President, as well as the Orders of the DAR Secretary were reversed and set aside insofar as the
DAR directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998
Notice of Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform was directed to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid
area under the terms and conditions as provided in pertinent guidelines of the department. As to the rest of the area applied for conversion,
action on which has been deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR Region No. XI) is hereby DIRECTED to expedite the processing and
evaluation of petitioners' land use conversion application in accordance with the provisions of DAR AO No. 7, Series of 1997, and DAR
AO No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of the latter issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its effectivity.
 It also enjoined the DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners'
lands under compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657. Actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice
of Coverage under CARP are also nullified for DAR's failure to observe due process therein.

Issues:

 Whether or not the notice of coverage was illegal for failure of the DAR to observe due process?

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 Whether or not DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and accompanying ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary
reference so as not to defeat the very purpose of the Local Government Unit (LGU) concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve
social and economic benefits in pursuance to its mandate towards the general welfare?
 Whether or not DAR failed to take into consideration the basic provisions and principles of law with special attention to the requirements
or preconditions for land classification/conversion and the basic mandate of the CARP?

Held:

 On due process issue, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial
farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the CARL or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998.
 The process of acquisition of commercial farms by DAR is specifically provided under Article III, Section 9 of A.O. 9, that in VOS and
CA, the Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon the expiration of the deferment period of the subject
commercial farm, as the Notice of Coverage. It is unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to respondents in order to place
the properties in question under CARP coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by
petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must be upheld.
 On the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion. In connection thereto, Sec 20 of R.A. 7160,
[the Local Government Code of 1991], empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands.
 Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify
agricultural lands into other uses.
 With regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is
correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use
conversion applications.
 The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions
prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR's scope of authority
in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in
view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local government has reclassified
certain portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993,
and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use
conversion application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses.

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 The creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to
supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
 Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed
as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657."
 The petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on due process is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to the 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the
deferment period of which has already expired, isAFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to
proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage, are REINSTATED.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; PERSONAL CULTIVATION AS ESSENTIAL REQUISITE

REDEMPTION RIGHT; ONLY BONAFIDE TENANTS MAY AVAIL OF THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

Gerardo Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, Nigaderio Pangilinan, Tranquilino Cua and Juliana Francisco Pajota
G.R. No. 161959 (February 2, 2007)

Facts:

 Juliana F. Pajota is the registered owner of an agricultural land situated at Gapan, Nueva Ecija. On August 28, 1993, Pajota appointed
Tranquilino Cua as her attorney-in-fact to negotiate with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for the cancellation of a real estate
mortgage on the land. On December 5, 1994, Pajota leased the land to petitioner as evidenced by a Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan.
 On December 8, 1995, a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 28, 1995, in favor of respondent
Nigaderio Pangilinan, were presented simultaneously before the ROD of Nueva Ecija. Thereafter, a new TCT was issued in Pangilinan's
name.
 Petitioner alleged that when he visited the land, he was driven away by Pangilinan and Cua and also discovered that the land was already
fenced with wooden posts and barbed wire. He reported the incident to the Philippine National Police Station in Gapan, Nueva Ecija and
also alleged that upon learning of the sale, he sent two letters to Pangilinan demanding to vacate the property, informing Pangilinan that he
was exercising his right of redemption. He also tendered a payment of P50,000 which he deposited with Security Bank, Gapan Branch.
The said money was consigned with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cabanatuan City.
 Petitioner filed before the PARAD a Petition for Redemption and Ejectment, who dismissed the case on the ground that Castillo had no
cause of action against Pangilinan since he was not the latter's tenant. On reconsideration and after the impleaded Pajota and Cua, the
PARAD reversed his decision. He ruled that Castillo was a tenant entitled to exercise the right of redemption under Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 3844.

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 The respondents appealed to the DARAB which reversed the ruling of the PARAD in a new judgment, declaring plaintiff-appellee not
a bona fide tenant over the property in suit and ineligible to avail of the right of redemption granted under Sec 12 of R.A. No. 3844; and
ordering the maintenance of respondents-appellants in peaceful possession of the landholding.
 The DARAB ruled that only a bona fide tenant who cultivates the land himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household may exercise the right of redemption granted by Sec 12 R.A. No. 3844. Based on the records, Castillo was gainfully employed
as a manager of Warner Lambert Philippines during the period when he should have been cultivating the land. Thus, he could not have
cultivated the land himself as his employment required him to report for office work regularly.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the DARAB denied the same. Then petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the decision and resolution of the DARAB. The appellate court dismissed
the petition, reiterating that only bona fide tenants may avail of the right of redemption.

Issue:

 Whether or not petitioner is a bona fide tenant of Respondent Pajota, and whether he can avail the right of redemption in a lease contract
he entered into?

Held:

 The element of personal cultivation by the petitioner was not proven. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the petitioner
personally cultivated the lands. Much less was it shown that he was assisted by his sons in his farm work. This is fatal to the petitioner's
cause as without the element of personal cultivation, a person cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written
agreement of the parties.
 The Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan entered into by Pajota and the petitioner can not by itself prove that the petitioner is a bona
fide tenant. To determine whether a tenancy relationship exists, the concurrence of all the following essential requisites must be
established by substantial evidence: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 The petition fails to show that the petitioner is a bona fide tenant. Hence, his petition cannot be granted.

JUST COMPENSATION; PAYMENT OF THE COMPENSATION MUST BE WITHIN THE REASONABLE TIME FROM ITS
TAKING

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APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164195 (February 6, 2007)

Facts:

 Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San
Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province.
 On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government. On 16 October 1996, AFC and
HPI received separately from PARO of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the
properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI's properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.
 AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and No. 113359, and applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT
No. 113359 from Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also rejected the valuation of
its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363.
 Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP's valuation, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their
valuations in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI
withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel
the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
 After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of the RP the ROD of Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued TCTs and
Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
 On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a
decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC and
HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently
consolidated.
 The SAC rendered a decision dated 25 September 2001 fixing the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its
improvements owned by the plaintiffs.
 LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on the value of residential
and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are agricultural. On December 5, 2001, the trial court modified its
decision ordering the DAR to pay interest.
 LBP filed a Notice of Appeal and was given due course in the Order of the RTC dated 15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside
its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting execution pending appeal.
 On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003
orders of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted said petition for being meritorious.
 AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004.
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 Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Review. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition of the DAR for failure to state the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court.
 The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 became final and executory and entry of
judgment was issued by the appellate court on 7 May 2003.
 On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

 Whether or not there is payment of Just Compensation?

Held:

 The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
 When the trial court arrived at the valuation of a landowner's property taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation is considered in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6657.
 Conspicuously, the trial court did not merely rely solely on the appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners. The trial court conducted
hearings for the purpose of receiving the parties' evidence.
 The SAC, correctly determined the amount of just compensation due to AFC and HPI.

JURISDICTION; RTC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DARAB DECISIONS;
DARAB IS A CO-EQUAL BODY WITH THE RTC AND ITS DECISIONS ARE BEYOND THE RTC's CONTROL

Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. and Heirs of Petra Capistrano Piit vs. Hon. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), et al.
G.R. No. 142628 (February 6, 2007)

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Facts:

 Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City which measured 123,408 sq. m. under TCT No. T-
62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 sq. m., and Lot No. 2291-
D with an area of 49,778 sq. m. Springfield developed these properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
 On May 4, 1990, the DAR, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage (NOC), placing the property
under the coverage of R.A. No. 6657. The heirs of Piit, opposed the NOC. On August 27, 1991, Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo,
Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The Regional Director filed a
notice of appeal, which the PARAD disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision became final and executory and
Springfield proceeded to develop the property.
 The DAR Regional Director filed a petition for relief from judgment of the PARAB Decision before the DARAB. In its Decision dated
October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the NOC. It also directed the MARO to proceed with the
documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.
 On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Br. 40, a petition for
annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its subsequent proceedings, contending that the DARAB decision was
rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing. The RTC issued an Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
 On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color;
that what they sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab
initio for having been rendered without due process of law.
 The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is
a co-equal body.

Issues:

 Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB?
 Whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA?

Held:

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 With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the
then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the RTC) the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs.
Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in paragraph 16 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the CA.
 The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers
and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial
review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards.
 Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and
its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment
of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
 Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those
rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies.
 Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-
judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.

EXEMPTION; DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL MATTERS; THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVING THE JURISDICTION ON
THE CONTROVERSY MUST RE-EVALUATE THE FACTUAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE

Paulino Reyes, et al. vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 148967 (February 9, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioners are the tenants of the disputed portion of Hacienda Looc which has been the subject of application for exclusion from CARP
coverage pursuant to Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1994.
 By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27, a portion of the hacienda with an aggregate area of 1,282.9767 hectares that were planted with
rice and corn were distributed to the farmers, and emancipation patents (EPs) were accordingly issued.
 The hacienda was acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. through a Deed of
Cession in Payment of Debt on May 19, 1971.

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 Pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 issued on February 3, 1987, certain assets and liabilities of DBP were transferred to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines. Among the properties that were transferred was Hacienda Looc.
 On February 27, 1987, DBP executed a Deed of Transfer of the properties in favor of the Government. On the same date, a Trust
Agreement was entered into by the Government and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) whereby the latter was constituted trustee of
Hacienda Looc.
 On June 28, 1990, APT entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Wherein APT
signified its intention to sell to DAR portions of the hacienda under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of R.A. No. 6657 on the
condition that DAR will return to APT non-CARPable portions of the property. Between 1991 and 1993, DAR generated 25 Certificates
of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) to the farmers of the hacienda.
 On December 10, 1993, APT conducted a public bidding involving the property in question. Bellevue Properties, Inc. tendered the highest
cash bid. It thereafter assigned the right to purchase the property to Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), subrogating to
the latter all its rights, claims and benefits under the DAR-APT MOA.
 On March 7, 1995, MSDC filed an adverse claim over Hacienda Looc before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas. In the same
year, MSDC was able to register the disputed ten parcels of land of the hacienda with an aggregate area of 1,219.0133 hectares.
 On April 10, 1995, MSDC filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, for the
cancellation of the notices of acquisition issued by DAR; the cancellation of the CLOAs; and the conversion of the property into non-
agricultural uses.
 On May 30, 1995, PARAD Antonio Cabili issued an Order stopping all joint venture agreements in Hacienda Looc.
 Between the months of January and June of 1996, the RARAD issued three Partial Summary Judgments canceling the fifteen (15) CLOAs
issued to the farmers, including those covering the ten parcels of land. The cancellation was grounded on the waiver allegedly executed by
the farmer-beneficiaries who declared that the lands they were tilling were not suitable for agriculture.
 On October 4, 1996, private respondent, by virtue of a Joint Venture Agreement with MSDC for the purpose of developing the area
covered by the ten cancelled CLOAs, filed a Petition for Exclusion of the subject lots from CARP coverage on the ground that they had an
average slope of more than eighteen percent (18%), and the area "has no semblance of agricultural development whatsoever."
 Meanwhile, petitioners, along with the other farmer-beneficiaries affected by the order, filed a complaint with the Office of the DAR
Secretary objecting to the cancellation of their respective CLOAs.
 On December 26, 1996, the DAR Regional Director for Region IV issued an Order granting the Petition for Exclusion filed by Fil-Estate
pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 10, Series of 1994. As a result, the subject ten parcels of land with an aggregate area of
1,219.0133 hectares were exempted from CARP coverage.
 On January 29, 1997, petitioners, aggrieved by the Order of Exclusion, filed their appeal with the Office of the DAR Secretary, on the
grounds that 1) there was no due process as they were not informed of the exemption case or the proceedings thereof; 2) the cancellation
of the CLOAs was based on the waivers allegedly executed by the farmer-beneficiaries; and 3) the property was agriculturally developed
and, therefore, covered by CARP.

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 On March 25, 1998, the DAR Secretary issued an Order, ordering the coverage of the agriculturally developed areas, re-documentation of
the same under CARP acquisition and awarded to individual beneficiaries found to be qualified under the CARL. Petitioners filed Motion
for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Office of the President but the same was denied. The
OP affirmed the Order of the Secretary.
 Petitioners filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the
Executive Secretary. The CA, in its resolution, dated September 4, 2000, denied the petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the disputed ten parcels of land are exempt from CARP coverage?

Held:

 One of the reasons why petitioners are objecting to the cancellation of their CLOAs and the exclusion of the ten parcels of land from
CARP coverage is because these lots are agricultural and developed. While it is true that the DAR officials have generally found the lots
to have an average slope of 18%, the contention that the same have been cultivated and are actually agriculturally developed so as to make
them subject to CARP is a factual matter that must be looked into.
 Upon a review of the records, the Court agreed with petitioners that there are factual matters that should be re-examined to properly
resolve the case. The Court is not a trier of facts. The CA, having the appellate jurisdiction to rule on the controversy, must re-evaluate the
factual aspects of the case in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
 While, generally, petitioners' failure to comply with the procedural requirements prescribed under the Rules of Court would warrant the
dismissal of the petition, fundamental considerations of substantial justice persuade the Court to have the present case decided on the
merits rather than dismissed on a technicality. It is settled that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very strict and technical
sense. These are used only to help secure rather than override substantial justice. The stringent application of the rules must yield to the
demands of substantial justice.
 The petition is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for it to render a decision on the merits with DISPATCH.

EXEMPTION; EXEMPTION OF LIVESTOCK FROM CARP; CONDITIONS THEREOF; RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE

BODIES MUST BE IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Vicente K. Uy

G.R. No. 169277 (February 9, 2007)

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Facts:

 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70541 and the Resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The CA reversed
and set aside the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) which had affirmed the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
exempting only a portion (219.50 hectares) of respondent Vicente K. Uy's 349.9996-ha landholding from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
 Some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property owned by the respondent filed petitions in the DAR, seeking to be declared as
owners- beneficiaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP over the property. Respondent, in behalf of the co-owners,
filed an Application for Exclusion, through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Durante L. Ubeda citing the Luz Farms ruling as
the property had been exclusively used for livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15, 1988.
 MARO Belen Babalcon made a Final Report, declaring that 346.000 ha, more or less, is devoted to coconut and livestock farming; The
MARO declared that while a total of 429 livestock heads are being raised in the property, "the total area for exclusion is undetermined
because there are portions occupied by tenants which should not be excluded from CARP coverage."
 Meanwhile, PARO Ubeda submitted a separate Report where he declared the following: that the total number of Certificate[s] of
Ownership is 434 which is more than the actual headcount of 401; that the number of cattle 7 years old and above totaled 134 heads with
13 males and 121 females as of date of certification; and that 300 cattles were of ages 6 years old and below with 76 males and 234
females.
 The applicants, through Uy, wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug, requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report
of PARO Ubeda. This request was reiterated in a letter where the applicants requested, for the first time, the exclusion of another parcel of
land — 22.2639 ha and covered by TCT No. T-11948 — which is contiguous to the 349.9996-ha lot covered by their earlier application.
 The Regional Director issued an Order affirming the findings and recommendation of PARO Ubeda. Respondent and his co-owners
appealed. Arguing that the properties have been devoted to livestock-raising even prior to 1977. Thus, the landholdings should be
excluded from CARP coverage. They further argued that for purposes of determining the area for exclusion under A.O. No. 9, the entire
number of livestock should be credited in applying the ratio of one head to one hectare and that the landholdings totaled only 370 ha and
there are 429 heads of livestock, they have more than complied with A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993.
 The DAR issued an Order suspending the processing and issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards to the farmers-beneficiaries
of the landholding covered by TCT No. 160988 pending the resolution of the appeal. On October 7, 1996, the DAR issued an Order
partially granting the application for exclusion.
 The applicants appealed the Order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of Execution. The President, through then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona (now a member of the Court), rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Respondent and his co-owners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for being devoid of substantial merit.
 The OP, issued a Memorandum for DAR Secretary Morales referring the case for the Secretary's final disposition, on the matter of
exemption from CARP coverage of the subject landholding.
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 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

 Respondent for himself and in behalf of other owners then filed a "Petition for Review with Application/Prayer for Status Quo and/or Stay
of Execution" before the CA, alleging that the OP committed errors. Judgment was rendered affirming the decision of the OP and,
consequently, the October 7, 1996 DAR Order.
 Respondent and his co-owners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, praying that the entire 349.9996 has. be exempted from
CARP coverage. On May 24, 2004, the CA rendered an Amended Decision reversing and setting aside its previous decision.

Issues:

 Whether or not the 349.9996-hectare landholding of Vicente K. Uy used in raising livestock, poultry and swine are exempted from the
coverage following the Luz Farms Doctrine?
 Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent tolled the reglementary period to appeal?
 Whether or not the application of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 on the respondent's landholding of more or less 472 ha.
is valid in light of the ruling of this Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, where DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1993 was declared unconstitutional?

Held:

 It must be shown that the entire landholding, and not just portions of it, should be devoted to livestock raising. The words "regardless of
age" in the order should be interpreted to mean only those heads of cattle existing as of June 15, 1988. Accordingly, the ratio of land to
livestock should be based on those livestock found existing in the landholding at the time R.A. No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988. This
is consistent with the intent of the law to prevent fraudulent declaration of areas actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock as
well as to protect the rights of agrarian beneficiaries therein.
 It is clear then that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to be filed from a decision, resolution or order of the OP. However, the
filing of a second motion for reconsideration is not absolutely prohibited. A second motion for reconsideration is allowed in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
 It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend
the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative
order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
 The instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the CA in CA-GR SP No. 70541 exempting the parcel of land
under TCT No. T-160988 with an area of 349.9996 hectares from coverage of the CARP is AFFIRMED. However, the Amended Decision
exempting the 22.2639-hectare landholding covered by TCT No. 11948 from the coverage of the CARP is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION AND PAYMENT OF COMPENSABLE AREAS

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Juan H. Imperial

G.R. No. 157753 (February 12, 2007)

Facts:

 Respondent Juan H. Imperial owned five parcels of land with a total area of 156.1000 hectares, located in Barangay Pawa, Manito, Albay.
Pursuant to the Land Reform Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). On October 21, 1972, the lands were distributed to deserving
farmer beneficiaries. On July 20, 1994, Imperial filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation in the Regional
Trial Court.
 During the course of the trial, the court created a commission to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute including
the lands' valuation. On June 21, 1996, the commission submitted a report containing the following findings: (1) the lands were not first-
class riceland; (2) the irrigation came from a creek which depended on rains; (3) the harvest was once a year; (4) about fifteen hectares
were devoted to non-fruit bearing coconut trees; (5) approximately five hectares were upland rice while the rest of the area was
uncultivated; and (6) the lands were rolling hills.
 Using the formula under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 for computing the land value, the commission fixed the just compensation at
P2,012.50/hectare, for a total of P314,151.25. Imperial vigorously objected to the valuation. Thus, the trial court referred the report back to
the commission for further reception of evidence.
 The commission submitted another report, with the following observations: (1) of the total land area of 156.1000 hectares, only 151.7168
hectares were compensable since 4.3832 hectares were either used by Imperial or devoted to right of way, barrio site, or feeder road; (2)
the irrigated area was only 1,000 square meters; and (3) the lands were generally devoted to upland rice.
 After due proceedings, the trial court issued on August 4, 2000, a judgment, fixing the compensable area of 151.7128 has. at
P2,185,241.50. It also declared as non-compensable 4.3832 hectares which were either used by Imperial or devoted to right of way, barrio
site, or feeder road. The trial court fixed the just compensation at P14,375/hectare for unirrigated area, and P57,500/hectare for irrigated
area, for a total of P2,185,241.50.
 The party appealed to the CA where on November 23, 2001, the CA set aside the trial court's decision, and remanded it to the court of
origin for re-evaluation of the correct compensation.

Issues:

 Whether a 6% annual interest should be included in computing the just compensation?

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 Whether the areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site should be considered as compensable?

Held:

 DAR A.O. No. 13 applies to all landowners: (1) whose lands are actually tenanted as of October 21, 1972, or thereafter, and covered by
the OLT; (2) who opted for government-financing through the petitioner as the mode of compensation; and (3) who have not yet been paid
the value of their land. It provides a formula for determining the land value and the additional interests it would have earned.
 The grant of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually shall be reckoned as Tenanted as of 21 October 1972 and covered
under OLT which is From 21 October 1972 up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006; and Tenanted after 21
October 1972 and covered under OLT: From the date when the land was actually tenanted (by virtue of Regional Order of Placement
issued prior to August 18, 1987) up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006 (Emphasis supplied.)
 The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. Just compensation in
expropriation proceedings represents the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
 The respondent should be compensated for what he actually lost and that should include not only the areas distributed directly to the tenant
beneficiaries but also those areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site, which were undoubtedly diverted to the use of the
public. The only area that ought to be excluded is the portion or portions retained by the respondent as owner-cultivator for his own use.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT; PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF FINAL PARAD DECISION IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER
THE RULES OF COURT

Valentin P. Fraginal, et al. vs. The Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal, represented by Pedro Parañal, et al.
G.R. No. 150207 (February 23, 2007)

Facts:

 The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Camarines Sur, a Complaint for Termination of Tenancy Relationship, Ejectment, and
Collection of Arrear Rentals and Damages, against Fraginal, et al.
 Fraginal, et al. filed an Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the PARAD on the ground that they are not tenants of the Heirs of Toribia
Parañal, for the land they are tilling is a 1.1408-hectare public agricultural land within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
 The PARAD issued a Decision on October 8, 1998 ordering the ejectment of Fraginal.

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 On April 5, 2001, two years from issuance of the PARAD Decision, Fraginal, et al. filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. They insisted that the PARAD Decision is void as
it was issued without jurisdiction. CA dismissed the Petition in its April 24, 2001 Resolution. Likewise, CA also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Fraginal, et al. in the assailed Resolution dated September 3, 2001.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court pertains only to judgment or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Court?

Held:

 The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Fraginal, et al. before the CA failed to meet the conditions.
 First, it sought the annulment of the PARAD Decision when Section 1 of Rule 47 clearly limits the subject matter of petitions for
annulment to final judgments and orders rendered by Regional Trial Courts in civil actions. Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial
tribunals or administrative bodies such, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible to petitions for annulment under Rule 47.
 Second, Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are
available, such as a petition for new trial, and a petition for relief from judgment or an appeal.
 The 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures, which was applicable at the time the PARAD Decision was issued, provided for the mode of
appeal: Under Rule XIII Section 1 (b), it does not allow for a petition for annulment of a final PARAD Decision. While the DARAB Rules
provide for an appeal to the DARAB from a decision of the PARAD, Fraginal, et al. did not avail of this remedy.
 Moreover, there is nothing in Rule XIII that allows a petition for annulment of a final PARAD Decision. As held in Macalalag, there must
be a law granting such right, in the absence of which, Fraginals' petition for annulment of judgment was correctly denied due course by the
CA.

JURISDICTION; BARC CERTIFICATION IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE PRESENTED TO ADJUDICATOR IF THE PARTIES

ARE RESIDING IN NON-ADJOINING BARANGAYS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS ARE NOT BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES
FOLLOWED IN COURTS OF LAW

Espinosa vs. Quiboloy

G.R. No. 147525 (February 26, 2007)

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Facts:

 A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria V. Quiboloy, as co-owner and administratrix of three
(3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant to
pay the rent and till the subject landholding. Petitioner filed his answer assailing Quiboloy's personality to bring suit. Petitioner also
offered unsubstantiated denials of Quiboloy's charges. As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the
land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently
convinced that Quiboloy's allegations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner. Instead of immediately
appealing from the adjudicator's decision, petitioner allowed the reglementary period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition, reiterating the well-settled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It stressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Provincial Adjudicator of Pampanga (PARAD) is correct in proceeding with the case without first complying with the
jurisdictional requirements on BARC certification under the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure?

Held:

 The PARAD did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of the BARC Certification. The 1989 DARAB Rules
exempted parties residing in non-adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC Certification. Since it is undisputed that Quiboloy
resided in San Nicolas 1st, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to
present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute.
 Under the law, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules. The adjudicator is given
enough latitude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the
agrarian dispute. The assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari.
Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to
dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and
appeal an adverse decision. The petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute the adjudicator's decision.
 The petition is DENIED.

APPEAL; THE MODE OF APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OR ORDERS OF DAR AS QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IS BY PETITION
FOR REVIEW TO THE CA

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Robert Padua vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, Atty. Delfin B. Samson, Department of Agrarian Reform, and Mr. Teofilo Inocencio
G.R. No. 153456 (March 2, 2007)

Facts:

 Private respondents Pepito dela Cruz, et al. were tenants of Lot Nos. 68 and 90 of the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In 1966,
upon the request of Anao Mayor Catalino Cruz (Mayor Cruz), Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said properties to the municipality on the
condition that these be used as school sites. The project did not materialize and, in 1977, Dela Cruz, et al. asked that the properties be
returned to them. However, they found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to
Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT).
 Upon Petition for Cancellation of CLT filed by Dela Cruz, et al., Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary Condrado Estrella issued an
Order dated April 19, 1982 (Estrella Order), cancelling the CLT issued to Labagnoy and Cruz. The latter filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment for lack of due process but the same was denied by Secretary Estrella in his Order dated September 19, 1984. Labagnoy and
Cruz appealed to the Office of the President (OP) which dismissed the same in an Order dated May 9, 1990. Said OP Order became final
and the same was partially executed with the restoration of Lot No. 68 in the possession of Dela Cruz, et al.
 During the pendency of the appeal before the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of
which DAR Regional Office III issued an Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot No. 90 open for
disposition. On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein
petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua) who had been occupying said property and paying the amortization thereon to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP).
 Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, et al., acting thru Anao Mayor Clemente Apuan, filed with the DAR Secretary a Letter-Petition for Cancellation
(Letter-Petition) of the December 7, 1987 DAR Regional Office III Order and the November 7, 1989 DAR Order, the same was granted in
an Order by Secretary Ernesto Garilao dated July 2, 1995.
 Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Nestor Acosta issued a Memorandum dated May 9, 2000, directing herein public respondent
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Teofilo Inocencio (PARO Inocencio) to implement the Garilao Order. In turn, PARO Inocencio
instructed Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Lino Mabborang (MARO Mabborang) to issue the necessary documents to award Lot No.
90 to Dela Cruz, et al.
 In justifying his recourse to a Petition for Annulment, Padua claims that the DAR under Sec. 50 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) cannot take cognizance of the petition for cancellation because the matter involved is a civil law issue relating to the validity of a
contract of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not an agrarian reform matter; that cancellation can only be ordered by a court of justice,
not by an administrative agency exercising only quasi-judicial powers.
 Padua also claimed lack of due process in that he was allegedly never impleaded as a party to the Petition for Cancellation of CLT nor
furnished a copy of the Letter-Petition but that he became aware of the Garilao Order only when it was about to be implemented.

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 Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Final and Executory Order of the DAR Secretary on December 18, 2001. The CA
issued Decision dismissing the Petition for Annulment. Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its May 7, 2002
Resolution.

Issue:

 Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not holding that the Department of Agrarian Reform acted without
jurisdiction?

Held:

 Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that a DAR Decision or Order be reviewable by the CA in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
turn, the Rules of Court, consistent with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and R.A. No. 7902, prescribes under Rule 43
that the mode of appeal from decisions or orders of DAR as a quasi-judicial agency is by petition for review to the CA. Padua's recourse to
a Petition for Annulment of the Garilao Order, rather than a petition for review, was therefore fatally infirm.
 The July 2, 1995 Order, then DAR Secretary Garilao Order was therefore issued by Sec. Garilao in the exercise of his power under
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 2 (b) of Administrative Order No. 06-00.
 As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of
a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative
Order No. 06-00, DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not
yet registered with the Register of Deeds.
 As to the claim of Padua that he was not accorded due process in the cancellation of the Santiago Order which awarded Lot No. 90 in his
favor, this is belied by his own Annex "A" in support of his Urgent Reiteration of Application for Restraining Order or for Observance of
Judicial Courtesy as Mandated by Eternal Gardens versus Court of Appeals.
 Thus, any defect in due process was cured by the fact that Padua had filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Appeal to the OP from the
Garilao Order.
 The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ALL REQUISITES MUST CONCUR IN ORDER TO CREATE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, et al. vs. Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, et al.

G.R. No. 170346 (March 12, 2007)

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Facts:

 On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on the latter's claim that he was the tenant of
the subject property located at Brgy. Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under TCT No. T-11543.
The property was originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966.
 On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis
Oriental a Complaint for cancellation of title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of Possession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot.
 On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered dismissing private respondents' complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation
Patent. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
 On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on the sole ground that private respondents' right to
contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot's title was barred by prescription.
 On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents' motion for reconsideration, hence they filed a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on the
following grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property
which was less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing: and (4) the classification of the subject property
as residential, which is outside the coverage of P.D. No. 27.

Issues:

 Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists?

 Whether or not the petitioners are de jure tenants of private respondents?

Held:

 The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under P.D. No. 27 due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish
a tenancy relationship between them.
 There is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that the petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that
there was sharing of harvests except for their self-serving statements. The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship.
 The taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The CA was correct in pointing out that Virginia A.
Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party.
 Likewise, the property under dispute is residential property and not agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-094 issued on
September 3, 1998 clearly shows that the subject property is located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b),

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Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and Development Office of Cagayan de
Oro City.

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST; CERTIFICATION ALONE THAT CLOAs WERE ALREADY GENERATED IN THE NAMES
OF FARMERS DOES NOT VEST ANY RIGHT AS AWARDEES THUS, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST

Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya, represented by Elvira M. Baladad vs. Wilfredo G. Mosquera, et al.
G.R. No. 152430 (March 22, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioner Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya (Samahan) is an association of farmer-beneficiaries duly recognized by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Petitioner alleged that its members had been cultivating the disputed land for many years prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 6657, (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Respondents are the registered owners of three parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-267409, T-267410, and T-267411, which have an aggregate area of 53.1164 hectares located in
Macabud, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal. The disputed land was previously owned by Philippine Suburban Development
Corporation which planned to develop it as a residential subdivision, and was sold to Vinebel Realties, Inc. in 1979 through an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Petitioner alleged that in 1994, the landholding was sold to respondents without any DAR clearance, in
violation of Section 6-D of CARL.
 On July 7, 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Rodriguez, Rizal issued a Notice of Coverage to the disputed land.
On February 21, 1995, respondents applied for exemption from the coverage of CARL based on Sec. 10, R.A. 6657.
 On March 31 and August 7, 1995, the Regional Director of DAR-Region IV denied respondents' application and Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively. Respondents appealed the two Orders of the Regional Director to the DAR Secretary, which on April 19
and July 9, 1996, Sec. Ernesto D. Garilao denied.
 In his April 19, 1996 order, Garilao stated that: as for the apparently conflicting certifications issued by the CENRO of Antipolo, Rizal, on
different dates, it is the view of this Office that there is actually no conflict between the two certifications. The certification issued by
Deputy Land Inspector Ruben A. Cabreira on October 21, 1994 refers only to one of the three lots subject of the instant petition while the
other certification issued pertains to all the lots subject of the instant petition, which were described to be "partly rolling and agricultural in
nature and planted to fruit-bearing trees. Even assuming arguendo that they are in conflict, it is submitted that between the two
certifications, the second one should prevail since it is not only the latest, [but] it is also more complete.
 On appeal, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres set aside the DAR Secretary's Orders and exempted the property from the CARL
coverage through his June 25, 1997 Resolution. Petitioner and the DAR subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

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 In the meantime, the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Soil and Water Management, sent two missions to conduct
fieldwork and validate the actual development in the disputed land.
 In a report transmitted by DA to Pres. Fidel V. Ramos, it was recommended that the disputed land be exempted from conversion since the
general area of the land, including areas with 18% slope, was physically occupied and actively used for intensive and diversified farming.
 On August 14, 1998, the OP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On September 23, 1998, petitioner, through Elvira M.
Baladad, and the DAR jointly filed a second Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the OP in its December 22, 2000
Resolution.
 Petitioner appealed the Resolutions of the OP to the CA through Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA rules that the
petitioner was not a real party in interest and had no legal standing to sue.
 On the exemption of the land from CARL, the CA found that the OP's Resolution was supported by substantial evidence; hence, the CA
did not substitute the OP's findings of fact.

Issues:

 Whether or not petitioners are real parties-in-interest in this case?

 Whether or not the subject landholding may be exempted from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?

Held:

 Petitioner is not a real party-in-interest in this case. According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. We stand by the ruling
in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-beneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest. In Fortich, the
farmers who intervened in the case were mererecommendees.
 The peculiar circumstances of this case should be noted. This petition originated from an application for exemption from CARP which
was filed by the respondents before the Regional Director of the DAR. Petitioner entered the picture when the DAR's Orders were
reversed by the OP. Petitioner's lack of capacity to intervene in the case may not have been an issue before the OP since in administrative
cases, technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. In fact, Sec. 50 of R.A. 6657 expressly allows farmer leaders to "represent
themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organization in any proceedings before the DAR." This right of representation generally
continues in appeals in congruence with the provisions of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan are mere qualified beneficiaries of CARP. The certification that CLOAs were already
generated in their names, but were not issued because of the present dispute, does not vest any right to the farmers since the fact remains
that they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded lands, or granted CLOAs. Respondents cannot be considered estopped
from questioning petitioner's legal standing since petitioner appeared before the OP after the latter decided in respondents' favor. When the
petitioner appealed the case to the CA, respondents duly questioned the petitioner's capacity to sue.
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 Thus, having resolved that the respondents have no legal standing to sue and are not the real parties-in-interest, we find no more necessity
to take up the other issues.

EXEMPTION; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ARE GENERALLY ACCORDED RESPECT AND
EVEN FINALITY BY THE SUPREME COURT

Department of Agrarian Reform, rep. by OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. Oroville Development Corp., rep. by Antonio H. Tiu and
Waldo G. Rebolos
G.R. No. 170823 (March 27, 2007)

Facts:

 On July 7, 1997, petitioner, Oroville applied with DAR Regional Office No. X for exclusion of the subject property from CARP coverage
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 06, s. of 1994. Petitioner alleged that the property was reclassified into residential use prior to
June 15, 1998, the date of effectivity of RA 6557, per Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance No. 880, s. of 1979 of Cagayan de Oro City, as
approved by the HLURB on September 24, 1980.
 On May 25, 1998, DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order denying petitioner's application, declaring it as agricultural and coverable under
CARP. Petitioners' MR was denied thru an Order issued by DAR Secretary Braganza on June 20, 2002, affirming Sec. Garilao's order.
 Petitioner elevated the DAR Orders to the Office of the President (OP). OP rendered a Decision on June 27, 2003, affirming the two
earlier decisions of the DAR Secretaries. Petitioner's MR was denied by the OP in its Resolution dated December 9, 2003.
 On petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether the subject property
is classified as agricultural as found by the DAR Secretary and affirmed by the OP, or residential as alleged by respondent Oroville.
 CA initially declared in its Decision dated March 16, 2005 that the subject property is agricultural on the basis of a later certification to
this effect dated February 10, 1997 issued by the City Development Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office which
superseded the Certification dated November 22, 1993 issued by the same authority.
 Upon Oroville's motion for reconsideration, however, the CA set aside its earlier Decision and ruled that the subject property has been
reclassified as residential and therefore beyond the coverage of CARP. This time, the appellate court gave credence to three (3) Zoning
Certifications dated July 23, 2004 issued by the Assistant City Development Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office to
the effect that the subject property is within the city's potential growth areas for urban expansion. According to the Court of Appeals, these
certifications were not considered by the court in the resolution of Oroville's petition because they were not yet in existence when the
petition was filed on February 24, 2004.
 In its Petition for Review dated January 9, 2006, the DAR seeks the reversal of the appellate court's Amended Decision, arguing that the
latter precipitately relied on the Zoning Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office and erroneously assumed that a
local government unit such as Cagayan de Oro City has unconditional authority to classify and reclassify lands within its territorial
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jurisdiction. The DAR points out that the Assistant City Development Coordinator herself clarified, in a letter dated December 2, 2005,
that the zoning classification of the subject property remains to be agricultural considering that the 1979 Zoning Code of Cagayan de Oro
City is still in force. Further, the Zoning Certifications do not qualify as newly discovered evidence because the supposed basis for these
certifications, City Ordinance No. 7959, was already in effect in 2001, years before the Court of Appeals rendered its original Decision in
2005.
 The DAR maintains that the Certification dated February 10, 1997 to the effect that the subject property is agricultural should be upheld
because it was based not only on a zoning ordinance but, more importantly, was approved prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in 1988. Oroville centers its comment on the argument that the subject property had been classified as
residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL and the Local Government Code (LGC). Moreover, it avers that the subject property has
been consistently declared as residential land as shown in previous tax declarations. The DAR asserts that tax declarations are not
conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.
 In the Orders dated May 25, 1998 and June 20, 2002, the DAR declared the property to be agricultural on the basis primarily of the
Certification dated February 10, 1997 prepared by the City Planning and Development Office stating that it is within AGRICULTURAL
DISTRICT per provision of Section 22-A of the 1994 Certified Ordinance of the City of Cagayan de Oro."

Issue:

 Whether or not Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office are conclusive in determining whether a landholding is
exempt from CARP coverage?

Held:

 In order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property must have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988.
In this case, the DAR's examination of the zoning ordinances and certifications pertaining to the subject property, as well as its field
investigation, disclosed that the same remains to be agricultural. The Zoning Certifications to the effect that the land is within the city's
potential growth area for urban expansion are inconsequential as they do not reflect the present classification of the land but merely its
intended land use.
 Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported
by substantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of
his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason,
ought not to be altered, modified or reversed. More so, because the DAR's findings have gone up the ladder of administrative process and
have been affirmed by the Office of the President.
 Petition is GRANTED.

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COVERAGE; COVERAGE AND ACQUISITION OF SUGARLANDS; VALIDITY OF SECTION 16, R.A. NO. 6657

Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc., (CONFED), et al. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Land Registration Authority (LRA)
G.R. No. 169514 (March 30, 2007)

Facts:

 A Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the Confederation of Sugar Producers
Association, Inc., et al. It seeks, inter alia, to enjoin the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Land
Registration Authority from "subjecting the sugarcane farms of Petitioner Planters to eminent domain or compulsory acquisition without
filing the necessary expropriation proceedings pursuant to the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and/or without the application or
conformity of a majority of the regular farmworkers on said farms."
 Petitioners CONFED, NFSP, UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their members own or administer private agricultural lands devoted to
sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been planting sugarcane on their lands allegedly since time immemorial. While
their petition is denominated as one for prohibition and mandamus, the petitioners likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of
Section 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In other words, their
arguments, which will be discussed shortly, are anchored on the proposition that these provisions are unconstitutional.

Issue:

 Whether or not DAR acted in excess of jurisdiction by exercising the Power of Eminent Domain to Deprive Thousands of Landowners,
including the Member-Planters of Petitioner-Federations of their Private Agricultural Lands, without Filing the Necessary Expropriation
Proceedings pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court in Gross Violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution?

Held:

 In Association of Small Landowners, the Court categorically passed upon and upheld the validity of Section 16 of RA 6657, including
paragraphs (d), (e) and (f), which sets forth the manner of acquisition of private agricultural lands and ascertainment of just compensation.
 The foregoing disquisition is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." Under the doctrine, when the Supreme
Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future

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cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment which results therefrom.
 Contrary to the petitioners' submission that the compulsory acquisition procedure adopted by the DAR is without legal basis, it is actually
based on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said law, there are two modes of acquisition of private agricultural lands: compulsory and
voluntary. The procedure for compulsory acquisition is that prescribed under Section 16 of RA 6657.
 The procedure prescribed in Section 16 of RA 6657 is a summary administrative proceeding. As outlined in Roxas, the said procedure,
taken together with the pertinent administrative issuances of the DAR, ensures compliance with the due process requirements of the law.
More importantly, this summary administrative proceeding does not preclude judicial determination of just compensation. In fact,
paragraph (e) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is categorical on this point as it provides that "[a]ny party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation."
 The petitioners' main objection to paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is that they are allegedly in complete disregard of
the expropriation proceedings prescribed under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners' argument does not persuade. As declared by
the Court in Association of Small Landowners, we are not dealing here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain, but
a revolutionary kind of expropriation:
 Indeed, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of the inclusion by Congress of the sugar lands in the
coverage of RA 6657. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of
the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority
not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
 Petition is dismissed.

SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL; WHAT IS REQUIRED IN SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Fernando Alsua, namely: Clotilde S. Alsua, Roberto S. Alsua, Ma. Elena S. Alsua and Ramon Alsua
G.R. No. 167361 (April 2, 2007)

Facts:

 Respondents are the heirs of the late Fernando Alsua, who was the registered owner of various parcels of agricultural land with an
aggregate area of approximately 50 hectares situated in Catomag, Guinobatan, Albay.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform initiated proceedings to acquire respondents' properties via the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner LBP valued the properties at P2,361,799.91, which respondents rejected. Thus,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the

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compensation for respondents' lands which eventually came out with a decision fixing the value of the properties at P4,806,109.05, to
which respondents opposed.
 On 11 April 2002, petitioner LBP filed a petition for the determination of just compensation before the RTC, Branch 3, Legazpi City
which issued an Order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute within reasonable length of time.
 Petitioner's counsel sought reconsideration of the order of dismissal, however, the trial court denied the same because it was filed one day
late and lacked merit.
 Petitioner elevated to the Court of Appeals the issue of the timeliness of the filing of its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insisted that
the copy of the order of dismissal should be deemed received upon delivery to petitioner's counsel and not upon receipt by petitioner's
guard on duty.
 On 17 September 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, dismissing the petition for review. The Court of Appeals
cited Rule 13, Section 8 and Section 10 of the Rules of Court in disregarding petitioner's proposition that the fifteen-day period for filing
the motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from its counsel's actual receipt of the order of dismissal. It explained that the purpose
of this rule on service by registered mail is "to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes beyond the power of the
party being served to determine at his pleasure."

Issue:

 What is required in service by registered mail?

Held:

 All that the rules of procedure require in regard to service by registered mail is to have the postmaster deliver the same to the addressee
himself or to a person of sufficient discretion to receive the same.
 Thus, in prior cases, a housemaid, or a bookkeeper of the company, or a clerk who was not even authorized to receive the papers on behalf
of its employer, was considered within the scope of "a person of sufficient discretion to receive the registered mail." The paramount
consideration is that the registered mail is delivered to the recipient's address and received by a person who would be able to appreciate the
importance of the papers delivered to him, even if that person is not a subordinate or employee of the recipient or authorized by a special
power of attorney.
 In the instant case, the receipt by the security guard of the order of dismissal should be deemed receipt by petitioner's counsel as well.
 The instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES; TENANCY IS NOT A PURELY FACTUAL RELATIONSHIP IT IS

ALSO A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP

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Loreto Reyes vs. Spouses Honorio and Josefina B. Joson, Dominador Masangkay, and Renato Robles
G.R. No. 143111 (June 7, 2007)

Facts:

 Sometime in 1963, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes, petitioner, as caretaker/watcher of a fishpond situated in Doña Francisca,
Balanga, Bataan. Caragay was then leasing the fishpond from its owner, Apolonio Aguirre. In 1973, Caragay's lease contract expired.
Tomas Aguirre, son of Apolonio Aguirre (deceased), leased the fishpond to Honorio Joson for the period from 1973 to 1982. Upon the
expiration of the lease in 1982, Tomas Aguirre appointed Joson administrator of the fishpond.
 As administrator of the fishpond, Joson, in June 1984, leased it to Felizardo Malibiran for five years. The lease contract bears the signature
of petitioner asbantay palaisdaan. Malibiran then retained petitioner as fishpond caretaker/watcher during the five-year lease period.
 Upon the expiration of Malibiran's lease, possession of the fishpond reverted to Joson who allowed petitioner to continue working as
caretaker/watcher. Sometime in November 1989, Caragay, the former lessee, re-entered the fishpond and proceeded to harvest bangus and
prawns therefrom with the assistance of petitioner.
 Caragay refused to vacate the premises, prompting Joson to file with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataan a complaint for
forcible entry. Eventually, the parties reached a compromise agreement which was approved by MTC in a decision dated March 4, 1990.
However, Caragay and his workers, including petitioner, failed to comply with the compromise agreement, hence, the MTC issued a writ
of execution.
 Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Balanga, Bataan a petition for injunction with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against spouses Honorio and Josefina Joson, et al. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for injunction for lack of jurisdiction.
 On October 1, 1990, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD), San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for a TRO.
 The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a Decision, declaring the plaintiff, Loreto Reyes, the lawful tenant over the subject landholding,
making the temporary restraining order permanent, and ordering the respondent to respect the peaceful possession and actual occupation
of the plaintiff Loreto Reyes. On appeal, the DARAB, affirmed the judgment of the PARAD.
 With the denial of their motion for reconsideration by the DARAB, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
alleging in that the DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural tenant.
 On March 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting respondents' petition and setting aside the DARAB's challenged
Decision.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural tenant?

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Held:

 The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
 The essential requisites to establish a tenancy relationship are: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 All the above elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of
land, a cultivator or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. It is only when an individual has established his status as a de jure tenant that he is
entitled to security of tenure and would thus come under the coverage of existing tenancy laws.
 Moreover, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural
tenant recognized under agrarian laws. Occupancy and continued possession do not make one a de jure tenant. Tenancy status only arises
if an occupant has been given possession of an agricultural landholding for the primary purpose of agricultural production which, in this
case, is significantly absent. Based on the records, petitioner was a mere fishpond watcher/caretaker.
 As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, there is no evidence to prove petitioner's claim he is a tenant on the subject fishpond. His bare
assertions are insufficient. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial, defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

LAND VALUATION; VALUATION OF LAND COVERED UNDER P.D. 27

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Vicente M. Estanislao and Luz B. Hermosa
G.R. No. 166777 (July 10, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioner challenges, via petition for review, the Court of Appeals' Decision affirming the valuation and determination of just
compensation by the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch I, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
 Spouses Vicente M. Estanislao and Luz B. Hermosa (respondents) are the registered owners of eight parcels of land situated in Hermosa,
Bataan with a total land area of 10.8203 hectares covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles.

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 Sometime in 1996, 1997 and 1999, 10.5321 hectares (subject lots) of respondents' lands were awarded to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to
the Operation Land Transfer Program (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Applying Executive Order (E.O.) 228, petitioner,
together with the Department of Agrarian Reform, valued the subject lots at P97,895 or P1.075 per square meter.
 The formula used by petitioner and the DAR to compute the amount payable to respondents: is LV (land value) = AGP (average gross
production) x 2.5 x GSP (government support price)
 Upon the request of the DAR, petitioner deposited the amount of P237,089.02, in cash and in bond, in favor of respondents. Respondents
subsequently filed a complaint before the SAC, against the DAR, the petitioner, and the OLT tenant-beneficiaries.
 The SAC, which named a panel of Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to
respondents, rendered a Decision on October 8, 2003, fixing the just compensation at P20 per square meter.
 Only petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the SAC, which motion was denied, hence, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the SAC decision, hence, this petition.

Issue:

 What is the land valuation formula that can be utilized in fixing the just compensation of landholding that is covered under P.D. 27?

Held:

 This Court held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad that seizure of landholdings or properties covered by P.D. No. 27 did not
take place on October 21, 1972, but upon the payment of just compensation. Taking into account the passage in 1988 of R.A. No. 6657
pending the settlement of just compensation, this Court concluded that it is R.A. No. 6657 which is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27
and E.O. 228 having only suppletory effect.
 Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of
PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is
likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did
not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.
 Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the
just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27
and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
 It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
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JURISDICTION; DARAB HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REVERSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF DAR ON

QUALIFICATION OF FB's

Sonny B. Manuel vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and Pedro Tejada
G.R. No. 149095 (July 24, 2007)

Facts:

 The estate of Juan C. Cojuangco at Bakal 1, Talavera, Nueva Ecija (Cojuangco estate) was placed under Operation Land Transfer pursuant
to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. A portion thereof was awarded to Pedro Tejada (Tejada) as shown by Emancipation Patent (EP),
issued in his name.
 Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Nueva Ecija, a Petition praying that the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be directed to cancel EP issued in
the name of Tejada and to generate and register a new emancipation patent in his name.
 PARAB rendered a Decision, on November 11, 1996 ordering the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and/or the PARO of DAR North,
Nueva Ecija to cancel the EP issued to respondent Pedro Tejada and generate a new EP in the name of petitioner Sonny Manuel and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel EP 22205 issued in the name of respondent Pedro Tejada and register the new EP
thus generated by the DAR in the name of Sonny Manuel.
 On appeal by Tejada, the DARAB issued a Decision affirming the cancellation of EP No. 22205 but, at the same time, denying petitioner's
application for EP.
 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA which affirmed in toto the DARAB Decision, adding that petitioner's employment as a
Municipal Engineer and his having established residence in a municipality different from where the subject property is located constitute
abandonment. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in CA Resolution.

Issues:

 Whether or not the DARAB has incidental jurisdiction to resolve an application for emancipation of patent in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction?
 Whether or not DARAB may inquire into and reverse the finding of DAR on the status of the applicants as an agrarian reform beneficiary?

Held:

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 Section 50 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, reiterating Section 17, Chapter IV of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229, vested in DAR both
quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate agrarian reform issues and administrative prerogative to determine matters involving implementation
of agrarian laws.
 Inherent in the power of DAR to undertake land distribution for agrarian reform purposes is its authority to identify qualified agrarian
reform beneficiaries. Corollary to it is also the authority of DAR to select a substitute to a previously designated beneficiary who may
have surrendered or abandoned his claim, and to reallocate the land awarded to the latter in favor of the former.
 Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,
it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the administrative agency.
 It should also be equally binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction over the former: the
DARAB cannot review much less reverse the administrative findings of DAR. Instead, the DARAB would do well to defer to DAR
expertise when it comes to the identification and selection of beneficiaries.
 In proceedings for issuance of registered emancipation patents to an applicant who has been appointed substitute beneficiary by DAR, the
authority of the DARAB is limited to the examination of the applicant's full-fledged membership in a recognized farmers' cooperative, as
evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the SN and a final reallocation order issued by DAR. In said proceedings, the DARAB
cannot review, much less overturn, the administrative assessment made by DAR on the qualifications of said applicant to be an agrarian
reform beneficiary. However, if the proceeding instituted is for cancellation of a registered emancipation patent, then the DARAB has the
authority to inquire into the qualifications of the holder of the emancipation patent to determine whether the latter committed
misrepresentation as to his basic qualifications, which is one of the grounds for cancellation of his emancipation patent.
 It is clear that the DARAB and the CA went overboard when they reversed the administrative finding of DAR on the qualifications of
petitioner. As the proceeding filed before the DARAB involved merely an application for issuance of emancipation patent, it should have
limited its adjudication to these questions: a) whether petitioner has been appointed a substitute beneficiary by virtue of a final reallocation
order issued by DAR; b) whether he is a full-fledged member of the SN; and c) whether he has paid in full the amount of just
compensation.

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; SECURITY OF TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LESSEE

Dolores Granada vs. Bormaheco, Inc., Represented by its Branch Manager, Hernane Lozanes
G.R. No. 154481 (July 27, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioner filed a petition for Status Quo with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction, before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in Bacolod City, wherein she sought to prevent respondent Border Machinery and Heavy Equipment Co., Inc.
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(BORMAHECO) from ejecting her from a parcel of land, with an area of 2.5 hectares and with 300 coconut trees growing on subject
property.
 Petitioner alleges that as early as 1950, her father, Alfredo Granada, was the agricultural lessee of the subject property, which was then
owned by Augusto Villarosa. When Augusto Villarosa sold the subject property to respondent in 1965, she claims that Alfredo Granada
continued to occupy the subject property as an agricultural lessee until his death in 1981. Thereafter, petitioner succeeded to her father's
rights as an agricultural lessee. Since then, she had cultivated the subject property and paid all rent due thereon.
 On 1984, petitioner and respondent executed a Contract of Lease which provided that the lease covered the coconut trees growing on the
subject property.
 Meanwhile, in a Decision, the PARAD decreed that no agricultural leasehold relationship existed between respondent and petitioner. It
also found that there was no showing that the purpose of the lease was for agricultural production since rent was paid in terms of money
and not crops, and that the contract of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the petitioner shall cultivate the subject property. It
further ruled that the subject property was not agricultural, but industrial or residential in nature.
 On appeal, the DARAB, in its Decision, reversed the PARAD Decision. It pronounced that the subject land was agricultural in nature as
evidenced by the Certification issued by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, stating that the same was officially classified as
"cocoland." It further declared that the written 1984 contract of lease, is not reflective of the true intent of the parties. Even though the
contract stipulated that only the coconut trees were covered, the DARAB resolved that petitioner was in actual possession of the land and
cultivated the same.
 Respondent then filed Petition for Certiorari at Court of Appeals where the CA rendered decision dated 12 April 2002 reversing the
DARAB and upholding PARAD decision.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure?

Held:

 The petition is meritorious.

 The essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship as follows: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and
the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a
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unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing or plowing. Holes are merely dug on
the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees
are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit
bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and
watering, thereby increasing the produce.
 It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements of agricultural leasehold tenancy are met in this case.

JUST COMPENSATION; BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF THE FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Luz Lim and Purita Lim Cabochan
G.R. No. 171941 (August 2, 2007)

Facts:

 Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the Department of Agrarian Reform compulsorily acquired 32.8363
hectares of agricultural land situated in Patag, Irosin, Sorsogon (the property) owned by respondents Luz Lim and Purita Lim Cabochan.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the property at P725,804.21.
 Respondents rejected petitioner's valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16 (d) of RA 6657, a summary administrative proceeding was
conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the property. The PARAD initially
valued it at P1,174,659.60 but later reduced the amount to P725,804.21 upon motion of petitioner.
 Dissatisfied with the PARAD's decision, respondents filed on January 26, 1998 a petition for determination of just compensation with the
RTC of Sorsogon where they prayed for a compensation of at least P150,000 per hectare, or an aggregate amount of P4,925,445. The case
proceeded to trial, with the RTC appointing each party's nominee as commissioner.
 On September 14, 2001, Branch 52 of the Sorsogon RTC renders decision adopting the valuation submitted by respondents' commissioner
(P1,548,000). Both parties moved for reconsideration. On December 21, 2001 Order, the RTC reconsidered its earlier decision and
increased the valuation to P2,232,868.40.

Issue:

 Whether the RTC erred in dispensing with the formula prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994?

Held:
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 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, this Court underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-
92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94. The amount of P2,232,868 adopted by the RTC in its December 21, 2001 Order was not based on any
of the mandatory formulas prescribed in DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94, the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the
valuation adopted by the RTC.
 The Court is thus compelled to remand the case for determination of the valuation of the property by the RTC which is mandated to
consider the factors provided under above quoted Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the formula prescribed in DAR
AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94.

EMANCIPATION PATENT; DARAB's JURISDICTION ON THE CANCELLATION OF EP

Heirs of Florencio Adolfo vs. Victoria P. Cabral, et al.

G.R. No. 164934 (August 14, 2007)

Facts:

 The controversy involves two parcels of land consisting of 29,759 square meters and 957 square meters, respectively, situated in Barangay
Iba (now Pantok), Meycauayan, Bulacan.
 Petitioners are the heirs of the late Florencio Adolfo, Sr. They alleged that the parcels were included in the Operation Land Transfer
program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Thus, their father applied with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now Department of
Agrarian Reform) for the purchase of these parcels.
 On April 25, 1988, he was issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) Nos. A-117858 and A-117859-H, which became the basis for the issuance
of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) Nos. EP-003(M) and EP-004(M) on October 24, 1989.
 Respondent Victoria P. Cabral alleged that she is the lawful and registered owner of the lands covered by petitioners' emancipation patents
and certificates of titles as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, issued on January
6, 1960. She also averred that petitioners' emancipation patents should be cancelled since (1) these covered non-agricultural lands outside
the coverage of P.D. No. 27; (2) these were issued without due notice and hearing; and (3) no Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) were
previously issued.
 On August 26, 2003, respondent Cabral filed with the DARAB, Region III, Branch II, Malolos City, Bulacan, a petition for the
cancellation of petitioners' emancipation patents and torrens titles and the revival of the respondent's previous title.
 Petitioner move to dismiss the petition due to (1) lack of jurisdiction (2) lack of legal personality to sue (3) prescription.
 On November 20, 2003, the PARAD denied the motion and upheld the DARAB's jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

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 Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On May 18, 2004, the appellate court dismissed
the petition due to petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies since the orders of the PARAD should have been elevated for
review to the DARAB.
 Meanwhile, the PARAD rendered a Decision on June 18, 2004, canceling petitioners' emancipation patents and ordering the Registry of
Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to revive respondent Cabral's OCT No. 0-1670 [now OCT No. 0-220(M)]. That decision is on appeal
with the DARAB.

Issue:

 Does the DARAB have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for the cancellation of emancipation patents and certificates of titles?

Held:

 Specific and general provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657 and its implementing rules and procedure address the issue of jurisdiction. Section
50 of Rep. Act No. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform
matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions
with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform matters.
 Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within its primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction. Subparagraph 1.6 provides that the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority (the Registry of Deeds). Incidentally, under DAR Memorandum Order No. 02, one of the
grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs is that the land is exempt or excluded from P.D. No. 27.
 In respondent Cabral's petition before the DARAB, she sought the cancellation of petitioners' emancipation patents and torrens titles. She
impugned the legality of the emancipation patents since (1) these covered non-agricultural lands outside the coverage of P.D. No. 27, (2)
these were issued without due notice and hearing, and (3) no CLTs were previously issued. Based on these material averments, it is
crystal-clear that the action was one for cancellation of emancipation patents on the ground of exemption or exclusion from the coverage
of P.D. No. 27. Indisputably, jurisdiction is properly vested with the DARAB.

LAND VALUATION; FINALITY OF DARAB DECISION ON LAND VALUATION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez

G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)

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Facts:

 After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare
land in BarangayAgpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
 On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBP to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA
MARTINEZ for her property covered with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50).
 A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional
Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
 Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for
reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004.
 LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash
was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue:

 Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for
fixing of just compensation with the SAC?

Held:

 In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under
Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a
singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation
with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to
be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.
 We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.

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 In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the
consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its
receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD
could very well issue the writ of execution.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE PRESUMED

Marino Escariz y de los Santos vs. Genaro D. Revilleza

G.R. No. 155544 (August 24, 2007)

Facts:

 This controversy involves a fruit orchard situated in San Isidro, Calauan, Laguna with an area of 6,967 square meters. Respondent Genaro
D. Revilleza, bought the orchard from Jose Velasco and had the property registered in his name under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
98856 and T-98857.
 On December 17, 1993, Marino Escariz, petitioner, filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Region IV a
complaint for "Recognition of Security of Tenure with Damages and Prayer for Accounting and Depositing of Tenant's Share Pending
Litigation" against respondent, docketed as DARAB Case No. LA-0336-93.
 In his answer, respondent denied any tenancy relationship with petitioner, claiming that the latter is actually a tenant of the owner of a
neighboring riceland. He would occasionally hire petitioner to work on his orchard on a piecework basis. Petitioner illegally entered the
property by erecting a shack where he lives. Respondent then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
 In a Decision dated October 11, 1994, the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner.
 On appeal by respondent, the DARAB, in its Decision, affirmed the assailed judgment with modification permanently prohibiting the
respondent landowner from disturbing the complainant's peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject premises as a legitimate
tenant/lessee thereon.
 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the DARAB denied the same.
 On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on October 21, 1999 finding that none of the elements of a tenancy relationship
exists.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner is a bona fide tenant?

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Held:

 Petitioner is not a bona fide tenant. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove that a tenancy
relationship exists. The following are the elements of tenancy relationship:

o Parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee

o Subject matter is an agricultural land

o Consent of the parties

o Purpose is agricultural production

o Personal cultivation

o Harvest is shared

 In Caballes v. DAR, all elements must concur for a tenancy relationship to exist. Absent such status as a de jure tenant, a person is not
entitled to security of tenure
 There is no evidence on record of the following elements:

o Consent of the parties

o Sharing of harvest

 Tenancy is a legal relationship. The principal factor in determining its existence is the intent of the parties. Other than the self-serving
statement of petitioner that he is a tenant, there is no concrete evidence to show that the parties agreed to establish such a relationship. To
prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other similar evidence must be presented, self-serving statements are inadequate.
 Petition denied.

JURISDICTION; DARAB HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ANNULMENT OF REGISTERED CLOA's

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Mariano Dao-Ayan vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

G.R. No. 172109 (August 29, 2007)

Facts:

 Assailed via petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the decision of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the DARAB, Region
X, Malaybalay City dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners-father and son Mariano Dao-ayan (Mariano) and Marjun Dao-ayan
(Marjun) against respondents Araneta Landless Agrarian Reform Farmers Association (ALARFA), the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer of Bukidnon, and the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon, for Annulment and Cancellation of Certificate of Title of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) No. 00371923 and TCT No. AT-9035.
 After Lot No. 209 (the lot), which is located at Kahaponan, Valencia City, Bukidnon belonging to the Agricultural Research Farm
Incorporated, was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Marjun filed an application before the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office No. 10 as a farmer-beneficiary thereof. It appears, however, that Marjun's name as applicant
was later delisted.
 It turned out that ALARFA had filed a Petition for Disqualification of Mariano as Farmer-Beneficiary under the CARP on the ground that
he already possessed substantial real properties to thus bar him from being a farmer-beneficiary, and that acting on the petition for
disqualification, DAR Regional Director Rogelio Tamin disqualified Mariano as farmer-beneficiary, he having been found to be, among
other things, already a beneficiary under Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27 of at least three parcels of land totaling 2.2938 hectares.
 The DAR Regional Director subsequently issued to ALARFA on October 20, 1997 the CLOA, on account of which the TCT was issued in
ALARFA's name, represented by Claudio A. Fuentes.
 Petitioners filed a motion to stay execution of the award of the CLOA to ALARFA, claiming that they were not given notice of the
Petition for Disqualification and of the Decision of the DAR Regional Director thereon.
 In the meantime, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), by installation order, directed the MARO of Valencia, Bukidnon to
install ALARFA on the lot and to order the occupants-non beneficiary including petitioner to vacate the same.
 Petitioner thus filed the complaint subject of the present petition, for annulment and cancellation of ALARFA's CLOA against ALARFA,
the PARO, the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon.
 The DARAB, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication dismissed petitioners complaint. The DARAB affirmed the dismissed as did the
Court of Appeals.
 The DARAB affirmed the dismissal as did the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

 Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the annulment of registered CLOAs
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 Whether or not the decision of the DAR RD disqualifying petitioners and the awarding of the CLOA to respondent ALARFA has already
become final and executory such that it may no longer be questioned in further proceedings

Ruling on the 1st Issue:

 DARAB has jurisdiction

 Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules enumerates the cases over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction:

o (f) those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority

o Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable
by the Secretary of the DAR

 Section 2 of DAR A.O. No. 06-00 (ALI Rules) enumerates the cases over which the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction:
 (d) issuance, recall or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the ROD
 Prior to registration with the ROD, cases involving the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLOAs or EPs are within the jurisdiction of the
DAR
 Since the complaint was for cancellation of a CLOA which had already been registered, the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction over it

Ruling on the 2nd Issue:

 The Regional Director's resolution has already become final and executory
 Section 15, Chapter 3 Book VII of Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

"Section 15. Finality of Order. — The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a
copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been
perfected."

 There is no proof that petitioners were given notice of the proceedings before the DAR RD. Thus, the counting of the 15-day prescriptive
period commenced upon the registration of the CLOA on October 28, 1997 which is considered constructive notice as against the whole
world, or on December 12, 1997, the date petitioners filed a motion to stay execution of the DAR RD's resolution granting the CLOA to
ALARFA
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 No appeal having been taken by petitioners within the 15-day prescriptive period counted from any of said two dates, the assailed DAR
Regional Director's resolution had become final and executory long before petitioners filed on June 22, 1998 the complaint for Annulment
and Cancellation of the CLOA.

RETENTION; LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO RETENTION ON LANDHOLDING COVERED UNDER P.D. 27

Josephine A. Taguinod and Vic A. Aguila vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 154654 (September 14, 2007)

Facts:

 Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-12368 and T-65348,
with an aggregate area of 10.4496 hectares, being 7.8262 hectares and 2.6234 hectares, respectively, both under the Registry of Deeds of
Isabela, Cagayan. TCT No. T-12368 emanated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. I-3423 which was issued on January 11, 1936
based on a homestead patent issued on December 18, 1935. On the other hand, TCT No. T-65348 was derived from TCT No. T-36200-A
which cancelled OCT No. I-2965. OCT No. I-2965 was issued on May 27, 1935 on the basis of a homestead patent issued on June 27,
1935.
 Subsequently, the 7.8262-hectare lot covered by TCT No. T-12368 was transferred to and registered in the name of petitioner Vic A.
Aguila (who was then 14 years old) under TCT No. T-90872 dated January 19, 1976; while the other 2.6234-hectare lot under TCT No. T-
65348 was transferred to petitioner Josephine A. Taguinod. Both disputed lots were placed under the coverage of the OLT pursuant to PD
27.
 Petitioner Vic A. Aguila, Salud Aguila, on behalf of then minor petitioner Aguila, filed a notarized application for retention on January 26,
1976.
 On October 24, 1984, when he was already of age, petitioner Aguila filed a letter-protest for exclusion or exemption from the OLT of his
landholding covered by TCT No. T-90872. Similarly, after acquiring the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-65384, petitioner Taguinod
filed her June 24, 1988 letter-protest with the Team Leader of the DAR, Santiago, Isabela, seeking exclusion or exemption from the OLT
of her landholding.
 On June 23, 1989, the DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of San Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela sent a letter to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), recommending approval of the applications of Salud A. Aguila/Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A.
Taguinod for retention of rights over the two subject lots.
 On August 3, 1990, taking into consideration the MARO's recommendation, the PARO issued a Resolution granting the application for
retention of petitioners and plac[ing] under OLT coverage the excess of seven (7) hectares.

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 Respondents-farmer-beneficiaries filed an Opposition to and Counter-Protest over Resolution dated August 3, 1990 of the PARO and a
Motion for Reconsideration to Set Aside Resolution dated August 3, 1990 at DAR Regional Director. On August 21, 1991, the Regional
Director of the DAR, Region 02, issued an Order, affirming the August 3, 1990 PARO Resolution.
 Private respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1991, where they contended, inter alia, that landowner Salud
Aguila was not entitled to a seven (7)-hectare retention over the subject lots, as she was the owner of several other landholdings,
specifically 11 parcels of land, at the time the subject lots were placed under the coverage of the OLT program pursuant to PD 27.
 Petitioner Taguinod filed her September 16, 1991 appeal from the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director with the DAR
Secretary. On September 28, 1992, the DAR Secretary issued an Order affirming the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director and
denying petitioner Taguinod's appeal.
 On January 6, 1993, the DAR Secretary issued an Order granting private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration finding that Salud
Aguila was disqualified to retain seven (7), as she owned several landholdings other than the subject lots.
 Petitioners appealed before the OP. OP rendered a Decision reversing the January 6, 1993 Order of the DAR Secretary and reinstating the
latter's September 28, 1992 Order with a modification that subject landholdings are not covered by the OLT program of the government
pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision, but same was denied
 Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43. CA sustained private respondents' position affirming the Order of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration where on August 7, 2007 resolution said motion
was rejected by the CA.

Issue:

 Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retention?

Held:

 Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed
by the Agrarian Reform Law.
 LOI No. 474 mandates the DAR Secretary to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the Government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven (7) hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families." Considering her other eleven (11)
landholdings and the application of LOI No. 474, we agree with the DAR Secretary and CA's holding that Salud Aguila is not entitled to
retention over the subject lots.
 Moreover, considering the seemingly simulated transfers made by Salud Aguila over the subject properties, we agree with the DAR
Secretary and CA that these were done to circumvent the intent and application of PD 27 and the OLT of the Government.
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 Premised on said grounds, the issue on petitioners' right to retention over the subject lots is answered in the negative as they are not the
owners, and consequently are not small landowners who are accorded the right of retention.

JUST COMPENSATION; ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF RTC; VALUATION OF PROPERTY IN

EMINENT DOMAIN IS ESSENTIALLY A JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Federico C. Suntay, Represented by his Assignee, Josefina Lubrica
G.R. No. 157903 (October 11, 2007)

Facts:

 Federico Suntay (married to Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay), herein respondent, represented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, covered by TCT
No. T-31 of the Registry of Deeds of Mamburao.
 Sometime in 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to the government's land reform program under PD No. 27,
expropriated 948.1911 hectares of respondent's property. The portion expropriated consisted mostly of lowland and non-irrigated riceland.
 The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), herein petitioner, and the DAR fixed the value of the expropriated land at P4,251,141.68
or P4,497.50 per hectare.
 Respondent rejected petitioner's valuation as being unconscionably low and tantamount to taking his property without due process. He
then filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), Region IV, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), a petition for the determination of just compensation against petitioner and the DAR.
 On January 24, 2001, the RARAD rendered a decision fixing the just compensation for the expropriated land at P157,541,941.30 and
directing petitioner to pay respondent the said amount.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RARAD in an Order dated March 14, 2001.
 On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, a Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation against respondent and the RARAD.
 On May 22, 2001, the RARAD, upon respondent's motion, issued an Order in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00 declaring that the
Decision of January 24, 2001 had become final and executory. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the RARAD denied the
same in an Order dated July 10, 2001.
 On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement the Decision.
 Before the RTC, Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan issued an Order dated August 6, 2001, dismissing the Land Bank's petition for
being late. Petitioner promptly filed a motion for reconsideration. However, in an Order dated August 31, 2001, the RTC denied the
motion.

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 On September 10, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. The court issued an Order dismissing the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. On July 19,
2002, the CA rendered its Decision (1) granting the petition for certiorari.
 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA finding merit in respondent's motion for reconsideration, rendered an Amended
Decision dated February 5, 2003 dismissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:

 Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the LBP's petition for the determination of just compensation?

Held:

 The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition.

The petition is not an appeal from the RARAD's final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation
over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

 Section 50 (Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR) must be construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred
upon the DAR.
 Valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
 It is clear from Section 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTC. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section
57 and therefore would be void.
 What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
 The petition is granted.

COVERAGE; COVERABILITY OF P.D. 27 LANDS THROUGH WAIVER, INTENTIONAL AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
OF RIGHT OF THE LANDOWNER
TRANSFERABILITY; TRANSFERABILITY OF P.D. 27 AWARDED LANDS

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Estate of the late Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio, represented by George Lizares vs. Gonzalo Dizon, et al.
G.R. No. 148777 (October 18, 2007)

Facts:

 Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio is the owner of a vast tract of land with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares located in Masamat, Mexico,
Pampanga. Sometime in 1973, Pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27, a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLTs) covering said
landholding, including the portion planted with sugarcane, were issued to the tenants of said land. On January 12,1977, landowner Panlilio
executed an Affidavit interposing no objection in placing portion dedicated to palay crop under P.D. 27 and that it is her desire that her
entire property which is referred as Hacienda Masamat be placed under said law. On February 28,1994, a complaint for the annulment of
coverage of said landholding under P.D. 27 was filed by Petitioner Jesus Lizares, Panlilio's Administrator of Hacienda Masamat. The
same was dismissed by the PARAD and on Appeal, the DARAB affirmed said dismissal. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of
the DARAB in its amended decision dated November 29, 2000. Likewise, an issue on the validity of the transfer by the tenant-farmers to
third person of the awarded land was raised in the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

 Whether or not the ownership of the lot may now be transferred to persons other than the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government

Ruling:

 The prohibition in PD 27, states that "[t]itle to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government
shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government"
 PD 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the heirs of the beneficiary
or the Government
 The prohibition stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate
and sustained agricultural production
 Sec. 6 of EO 228 provides, thus:

"Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of amortizations"

The CA construed said provision to mean that the farmer-beneficiary can sell the land even to a non-qualified person

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This is incorrect. Implied repeals are not favored

Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228 principally deals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under
PD 27

 The lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the heirs of the beneficiary or to the Government for eventual transfer to
qualified beneficiaries by the DAR
 Thus, transfers of lands acquired under PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void
 A contrary ruling would make the farmer an "easy prey to those who would like to tempt [him/her] with cash in exchange for inchoate title
over the same," and PD 27 could be easily circumvented and the title shall eventually be acquired by non-tillers of the soil
 The prohibition even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner.
 The sales or transfers are void ab initio, being contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code
 In this regard, DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures to annul the illegal transfers and recover the land unlawfully conveyed to
non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.

JURISDICTION; AGRARIAN DISPUTE

Active Realty and Development Corporation vs. Bienvenido Fernandez

G.R. No. 157186 (October 19, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioner filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City,
alleging that it had become the owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-85541 by virtue of the
Deed of Sale executed between petitioner and Philippine National Bank (PNB), the previous owner of the land; that respondent had been
occupying the subject land by reason of PNB's tolerance; that petitioner sent a letter of demand to respondent asking the latter to vacate the
subject property; and that despite the demand, respondent failed and refused to vacate the subject land, as a consequence of which,
petitioner had been unlawfully deprived of the possession of the lot and the rental value of P500.00 per month.
 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved the implementation of
Agrarian Reform and should fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). MTC issued
an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.

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 Respondent insisted that there was a pending case involving same parties at DARAB. An Injunction Order dated January 3, 1996 was
issued by the DARAB against the petitioner ordering the latter to cease, desist and refrain from harassing, molesting, disturbing,
threatening, ousting, and removing or ejecting from their respective landholdings the petitioners in DARAB Case No. R-0605-142-96.
 The DARAB case was resolved by the Provincial Agrarian Report Adjudication Board (PARAB) which directed the DAR-PARO to make
a factual finding on the "CARPability" or "non-CARPability" of the subject land. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner elevated the
matter to the DARAB. The DARAB rendered a Decision which held that the subject matter is not within its jurisdiction.
 Meanwhile, the MTC rendered a Decision, ordering the defendants (including herein private respondent), their heirs and successors-in-
interest, to vacate the premises covered by TCT No. T-85541 situated in Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City, to pay plaintiff (herein
petitioner) actual damages in the amount of P500.00 monthly computed from November 27, 1997 until the lot is actually vacated, to pay
plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of cost. Respondent appealed the MTC Decision to the RTC.
 The DARAB rendered a Decision which held that the subject matter is not within its jurisdiction.
 The RTC rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the MTC judgment. The motion for reconsideration of said decision was also
denied by the RTC. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
 The CA issued a Resolution requiring Teresita F. Mendoza to cause her appearance as party-respondent in behalf of the deceased
respondent. The CA issued a Resolution stating that pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the service to Teresita F. Mendoza,
although actually unserved, shall be considered completed.
 The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC judgment.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.

Issue:

 Whether or not this case presents an agrarian dispute. If it does, jurisdiction over it should be with the DARAB, otherwise, it should be
with the regular courts.

Held:

 Respondent sought the dismissal of the pending unlawful detainer case in the MTC by involving the defense of litis pendentia.
 For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the parties to the action are
the same; (2) that there is substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought; (3) that the result of the first action is determinative
of the second in any event and regardless of which party is successful.
 Contrary to the claim of respondent, the parties in the unlawful detainer case in the MTC and the DARAB case are different, as he is not
included as a petitioner in the DARAB case.
 Not being a party to the DARAB case, respondent has no personality to assert that the DAR has primary jurisdiction over the land subject
matter of the MTC case considering that he is not identified as one of the farmers-beneficiaries-petitioners in the DARAB case.
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 Further, the CA should not have relied on the Investigation Reports of MARO Officer Villa dated March 4, 1997 and March 26, 1997, as
the same were not executed pursuant or in relation to any pending case. Moreover, browsing through the Investigation Reports, it is clear
that its tenor is only recommendatory or directory in nature. Thus, the execution of the Investigation Reports does not automatically divest
the regular courts of their jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
 WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED.

EXEMPTION/EXCLUSION; EXEMPTION OF FISHPOND FROM COVERAGE OF CARL AND THE PASSAGE OF RA 7881
CANNOT DEFEAT VESTED RIGHT ALREADY GRANTED AND ACQUIRED BY THE TENANT

Jaime Sanchez, Jr. vs. Zenaida F. Marin, et al.

G.R. No. 171346 (October 19, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioner Jaime Sanchez, Jr. is an agricultural tenant of a 10-hectare fishpond situated at Barangay Talao-Talao, Lucena City, which was
previously owned by David Felix, the ascendant of herein respondents. Respondent Zenaida F. Marin is the civil law lessee of the subject
fishpond and the mother of respondents.
 In 1977, the petitioner was instituted as a tenant of the subject fishpond by its previous registered owner David Felix.
 A few years thereafter, David Felix sold and transferred ownership of the subject fishpond to respondents Jesus Nicasio, Jose David,
Maria Bernadette, Paul Peter and Philip Luis, all surnamed Marin, to whom a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43289, covering
the subject fishpond, was issued. The aforesaid respondents, as the new owners of the fishpond, entered into a civil law lease agreement
dated 24 June 1985 with their mother and co-respondent Zenaida F. Marin, which was renewable yearly.
 On 21 July 1986, the petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 53, in which he asked the
court to declare him as a tenant of the subject fishpond.
 On 20 July 1987, the RTC of Lucena City rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, declaring the [herein petitioner] as the
agricultural tenant, not a hired contractual worker on the [subject fishpond], and therefore, entitled to the security of tenure.
 The Decision was appealed by respondent Zenaida F. Marin to the appellate court, which on 11 September 1989, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC of Lucena City.
 Having been declared as an agricultural tenant on the subject fishpond, the petitioner, on 15 March 1991, filed before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Region IV a Petition for the fixing of the leasehold rentals for his use of the subject fishpond at
P30,000.00 per annum.
 On 17 April 1991, respondent Zenaida F. Marin filed a Complaint before the PARAD Region IV, primarily to eject the petitioner from the
fishpond because of the latter's failure to pay the rent and to make an accounting, in violation of Sections 17 and 50 of Republic Act No.
1199.
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 The PARAD on 2 March 1993, rendered a Decision. Ordering that the petitioner be maintained in the peaceful possession of subject farm-
holding.
 Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision but the same was denied in a Joint Order, dated 15 May 1995,
rendered by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD).
 Aggrieved respondents appealed the PARAD Decision dated 2 March 1993 to the DARAB, reiterating their position that the fishpond was
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
 On 25 September 2000, the DARAB rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator dated 2 March 1993.
 Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review where on 23 May 2005, the appellate court rendered its assailed
Decision granting in part the Petition of the respondents by annulling and setting aside the DARAB Decision dated 25 September 2000 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but it was denied in a Resolution dated 25 January 2006.

Issue:

 Whether the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?

Held:

 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually,
directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, now defines agricultural land as land devoted to agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. As to what constitutes an agricultural activity is defined by Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical. By virtue of the foregoing amendments, the operation of fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel
of land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land.
 Even as it is recognize that the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7881. The Court, nonetheless, does not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals that since the subject
fishpond is no longer an agricultural land, it follows then that there can be no tenurial arrangement affecting the parties in this case. And in
view of the fact that there is no agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB, then the DARAB had no jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's
case.
 It bears emphasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject fishpond and his right to security of tenure were already
previously settled in the Decision dated 20 July 1987 of the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case No. 86-8, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 11 September 1989. Having been declared as a tenant with the right to security of tenure as
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provided in Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844 in relation to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1199, the law enforced at the time of the
filing of the Complaint before the RTC of Lucena City, the petitioner has acquired a vested right over the subject fishpond, which right or
interest has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Therefore, even if fishponds, like the subject
matter of this case, were later excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL as expressly provided in Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to the petitioner, the same cannot defeat
the aforesaid vested right already granted and acquired by the petitioner long before the passage of Republic Act No. 7881.
 Indubitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, the petitioner's right to tenancy and security of tenure over
the subject fishpond must still be honored.
 The Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case, contrary to the declaration made by the appellate
court in its Decision.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS

Antonio Masaquel, et al. vs. Jaime Orial

G.R. No. 148044 (October 19, 2007)

Facts:

 Petitioners Antonio Masaquel (Antonio), Juliana Masaquel-Marero (Juliana), Apolonia Masaquel-Tolentino (Apolonia) and Maria
Masaquel-Oliveros (Maria) were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 66,703 sq. m. located in Barrio Biga, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. ON-724.
 On 21 June 1987, the co-owners executed a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Paghahati ng Lupa" whereby the subject lot was divided
into four parts.
 On 27 September 1993, Respondent Jaime Orial filed an amended complaint with the DARAB against petitioners alleging that he was a
tenant of a parcel of agricultural land owned by and registered in the name of Antonio.
 Petitioners denied the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and respondent claiming that respondent was a mere usurper and
trespasser, petitioners specifically denied the allegation that they harassed him and threatened him with physical harm.
 In a Decision dated 18 December 1994, the provincial adjudicator ruled that respondent was not a tenant of the subject land. On appeal,
the DARAB reversed the findings of the provincial adjudicator and declared respondent a tenant of the subject land. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but the DARAB denied it in a Resolution dated 22 November 1999.
 Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appellate court affirmed the DARAB decision on 9 May 2001.

Issue:

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 Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the parties?

Held:

 No tenancy relationship existed between the parties.

 In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All
these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant.
 The evidence presented by respondent failed to meet the test of substantiality, in line with the standard of proof required in administrative
cases.
 Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary
or legal possessor of the land, and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy.
 In view of the absence of a tenancy relationship, the case falls outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Thus, it is cognizable by the regular
courts. Consequently, the complaint filed by respondent was rightfully dismissed by the provincial adjudicator.

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; EJECTMENT; ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF A HOMELOT NOT

SUFFICIENT TO DIVEST MTC OF JURISDICTION

Juliana Sudaria vs. Maximilliano Quiambao

G.R. No. 164305 (November 20, 2007)

Facts:

 On 11 October 2001, respondent Maximilliano Quiambao filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Miguel, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 2557. Respondent stated that he was the owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 354 sq.m. situated in Barrio Sta. Rita, Bata, San Miguel, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-113925. He also averred that
in 1965, by virtue of a Kasunduan, his predecessor-in-interest, Alfonsa C. vda. de Viola, leased the said piece of land to petitioner's late
husband, Atanacio Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later increased to P873.00 per annum in 1985. According to
respondent, in the same year, petitioner, who took over the lease after her husband's death, stopped paying the rentals on the property. In
April 2001, respondent made a demand for petitioner to pay the overdue rentals and vacate the premises.

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 In her Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that the subject property was previously owned by Alfonsa C. vda. de Viola and
later inherited by Leticia and Asuncion Viola as evidenced by an agricultural leasehold contract. She claimed that she had not been remiss
in paying the lease rentals, as the payment for the years between 1980 and 1999 were evidenced by receipts except that the receipts for
1998 and 1999 were withheld by respondent. Petitioner also maintained that she refused to pay the lease rentals to respondent because he
was not the registered lessor, and that as bona fide tenant-successor of her deceased husband, she was entitled to security of tenure, as well
as to the homelot which formed part of the leasehold under agrarian laws. She further contended that the MTC could not have taken
cognizance of the case as there had been no prior recourse to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council as provided for in Section 53 of
Republic Act No. 6657. Finally, petitioner asserted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an agrarian dispute.
 In a Decision dated 10 May 2002, the MTC held that there existed a tenancy relationship between the parties and that since the subject lot
was petitioner's homelot, the instant controversy is an agrarian dispute over which the courts have no jurisdiction.
 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 reversed the decision of the MTC.
 Consequently, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure where the CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but the same was denied.
 Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Issue:

 Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto?

Held:

 Rightful possession belongs to respondent. Petitioner failed to show that the Department of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in
her favor as her homelot. Instead, the clear preponderance of evidence is on the side of respondent. He presented the Torrens title covering
the lot in his name.
 It must be stressed, however, that the Court has engaged in this initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute only for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession.
 The petition is DENIED.

JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BY THE RTC

APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164195 (December 19, 2007)

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Facts:

 The LBP filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration on the Decision of the SC dated 6 February 2007 partially granting the LBP's
petition and affirming the decision of the CA giving due course to LBP's appeal.
 The grounds for the LBPs motion for reconsideration are that special agrarian courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula devised to
implement Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657; the LBP complied with the constitutional requirement on prompt and full payment of
just compensation; the LBP ensured that the interests already earned on the bond portion of the revalued amounts were aligned with 91-
day treasury bill (T-Bill) rates and on the cash portion the normal banking interest rates; that petitioners are not entitled to an award of
Attorney's fees and commissioners' fees; and that LBP's counsel did not unnecessarily delay the proceedings.

Issue:

 Whether or not SACs are bound by the formula devised to implement Section 17 of R. A. No. 6657 on Determination of Just Compensation?

Held:

 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the SC declared that as the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian
reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely
"filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into
account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.
 The ruling in the Celada case is in conflict with the Apo Fruits which the SC ruled that the more acceptable practice has always been to
interpret and reconcile apparently conflicting jurisprudence to give effect to both by harmonizing the two (Celada Ruling vis-à-vis Apo
Fruits Ruling).
 The trial court, actually took into consideration all the factors in the determination of just compensation as articulated in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657.
 The trial court had substantially applied the formula by looking into all the factors included therein, i.e. net income, comparable sales and
market value per tax declaration, to arrive at the proper land value. The basic formula set forth in DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998 does not
and cannot strictly bind the courts.
 As established in earlier jurisprudence, the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the
regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies.
 The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation,
which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency.

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 The modification of the Decision dated 6 February 2007 pertaining to the award of interest on just compensation, commissioner's fees and
attorney's fees, is in order.
 In all other respects, the Decision dated 6 February 2007 is MAINTAINED.

COVERAGE; CONDITIONAL DONATION OF PROPERTIES UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ARCHBISHOP WILL

NOT SERVE TO REMOVE THE PROPERTY FROM COVERAGE OF CARL

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and DAR Regional Director (Region V)
G.R. No. 139285 (December 21, 2007)

Facts:

 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668
hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut
trees.
 Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office petitions for exemption from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied.
 Archbishop appealed and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name
of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.
 This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
 The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
 The petition was dismissed by the CA. Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied.

Issue:

 Whether or not as administrator of the Roman Catholic properties, these subject properties should have been exempt from the OLT?

Held:

 The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the
landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of
ownership. To do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit
of landless farmers and farmworkers.
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 The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation — there is only one right of retention per landowner,
and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.
 Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or
mortgage the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This
matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform. In that case,
wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court
found that the lands of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform.
 Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale
under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their lands from
coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA
6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and
the disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective.
 Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application
of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond
Archbishop's control. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land.
If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without limit under the protection of religious
organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream.
 Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the
coverage of agrarian reform. The lands in Archbishop's name are agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall
under the exemptions.
 Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does
not appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt
from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. does not create another
definition for the term "landowner."

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