424 SCRA 42 – Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Disbarment Case is Sui Generis – Immoral

and Deceitful Conduct

In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a
lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza
was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo.
Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that
Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then Macarrubo
subsequently married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently
abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbo’s marriages as
well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially declared in default for
failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself.
In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to save
her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to
pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that the
ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed
to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is
currently being annulled due to similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void,
recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for grave
misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is
still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second
marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second
and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One
incident of a “shotgun marriage” is believable, but two such in succession would tax one’s
credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and
family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution
of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in
a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit
of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the annulment of
Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for
disbarment.