Amendments & Revisions
barangay law, resolution or ordinance
1. GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the
Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the
petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991. They solicited the
required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon,
and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan
ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny
the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for
local initiative because its subject is “merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.”
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993
is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny
the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the
Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the
people regarding legislation because of the event in
February 1986. The new Constitution became “less
trusting of public officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the power
to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which
provides “amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3%
of the registered voter therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No.
6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor.”
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3
systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend
the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a
national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing
to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on
local initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.”
3. Lambino v. Comelec - 2006
Fact:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution and then filed a petition with Comelec to
hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and
(c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735.
The proposed changes under the petition will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
Comelec did not give it due course for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec
ruling.
Issue:
w/n the proposed changes constitute an amendment
or revision
w/n the initiative petition is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal
by the people
Held:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art.
XVII on direct proposal by people
Sec. 2, Art. XVII…is the governing provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. While this provision does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of
the framers of our Constitution clearly show that:
a. the framers intended to adopt relevant American
jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and
b. in particular, the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and
that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present:
a. the people must author sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf
b. as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the
proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached,
the petition must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before – not after –
signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at
the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive
and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s
not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
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proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does
the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode
is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through
a people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and
second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This
distinction was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A
people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a
revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not
a mere amendment.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution just
like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-
part test:
Quantitative test—asks whether the proposed change
is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the substantial entirety of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions. The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree
of the change.
Qualitative test—inquires whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision. Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, a change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that
jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles –
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive – affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision
of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution
are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the
President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of
one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-
and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference
between amendment and revision is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called revisions because members of the
deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The
same substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called amendments because the changes
are made by ordinary people who do not make an
occupation, profession, or vocation out of such
endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express
intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the language of
the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
By Congress as Constituent Assembly
4. Almario v. Alba, G.R. No. L-66088 January 25,
1984
CASE DIGEST
Facts: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643,
the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January
27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to
the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied
in four (4) separate questions to be answered by
simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek
to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of
Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of
acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and
4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform
program and a socialreform program), which cover
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there has
been no fair and proper submission following the
doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The
petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the
plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to
study the meaning and implications of Resolution
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Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the
proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be
presented to the people on a later date.
HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the
proposed amendments are beyond the power of the
courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not “grant”
of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise or
improvident or whether or not theproposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only
the people can decide. The questions are presented for
their determination. Assuming that a member or some
members of this Court may find undesirable any
additional mode of disposing of public land or an
urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote
“NO” in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to
the millions of voters an opportunity to express their
own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing
to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments,
their desirability, or the danger of the power being
abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are
aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers
of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a
case that the average voter does not know the
meaning of “grant” of public land or of “urban land
reform.
5. Mabanag vs. Vito Case Digest (Consti-1)
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed
separate opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on
23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by
the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part
in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in
the House of Representatives, but that resolution had
not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence
these three senators and eight representatives did not
take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto,"
nor was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to
prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of
Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need
citation of authorities that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also
too well known to require elucidation or citation of
authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of
the political departments of the government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified
law or resolution also binds the judges under the
"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification
of an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to
be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by the Congress
in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to
its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even in dependent of any intervention
by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of ratification.
7. OCCENA VS. COMELEC
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against
the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing
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a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in
a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122
to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on
the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in proposing
amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are
unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit,
the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to
propose its amendments and how it may be exercised
was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of
the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments similar
with the interim and regular national assembly. 15
When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it
acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so
extensive in character as to amount to a revision
rather than amendments. To dispose this contention,
the court held that whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment, because the
same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The
fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the
validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution.
At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would
become immaterial the moment the same is ratified
by the sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary
to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only
a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes
required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through
which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned. Further, the period required by the
constitution was complied as follows: "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or
revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In
the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
90-day period provided by the Constitution.
7. Gonzales vs COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the
Constitution – Political Question vs Justiciable
Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This
law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It
was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall
be held on the same day that the general national
elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This
was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other
concerned groups as they argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of
the proposals to the people who would be more
interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the
plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the
procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA
4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of
Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it
is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing
amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held
simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be
noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally
granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in
a republican state. That being, when Congress makes
amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting
as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a
legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional
limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a
plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC
held that there is nothing in this provision of the
[1935] Constitution to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a general election.
The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for
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ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes
dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a
special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be
able to compare the original proposition with the
amended proposition.
b. By Constitutional Convention
Tan vs Macapagal
C. By People’s Initiative
10. Santiago vs Comelec
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s
Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its
approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the
necessary publication of the said petition in papers of
general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD
Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on
people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and
no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA
6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and
on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative
were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III
thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law –
as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to
include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2
of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
there per centum of the registered voters therein. . .
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously
not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of inititative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. The
people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever
reason does not provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on
November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their
position, as shown by their various opinions already
given when the Decision herein was promulgated,
that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate
to amend the Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
d. By President during emergency
11. SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of
the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable
to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976.
Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec
4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976,
Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to
he submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in
its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;
to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power
to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
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consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence
the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose
amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the amending
process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution,
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions).
After that period, and the regular National Assembly
in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2
of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course
has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words
in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises
a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . .
..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form
a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as
the legislature.
e. Submission of Proposals
Doctrine of Proper Submission
Doctrine of Proper Submission
Amendments cannot be submitted to the people in a
piecemeal fashion wherein the other amendments are
to follow. The people should have a frame of
reference from which to read the amendments being
proposed. (Tolentino vs COMELEC)
12. TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
41 SCRA 702 – Political Law – Amendment to the
Constitution – Doctrine of Proper Submission
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an
advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even
before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino
then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be
allowed, there will be an improper submission to the
people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for
ratification. Election here is singular which meant
that the entire constitution must be submitted for
ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the
people were not given a proper “frame of reference”
in arriving at their decision because they had at the
time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised
Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would
be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the
light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of
Submission” which means that all the proposed
amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
the people for the ratification or rejection at the same
time, NOT piecemeal.
13. Planas v Comelec
(49 SCRA 105)
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
On 1 June 1971, a Constitutional Convention was
held to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines. While the Convention is in session on 21
September 1972, the entire Philippines were placed
under martial law by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081.
On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its
proposed Constitution. The next day the President
issued PD No. 73 “submitting to the Filipino people
for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor”, as well as setting the Plebiscite for said
ratification. On 7 December 1972, Charito Planas
petitioned the Court to enjoin respondents from
implementing PD No. 73 on the grounds that the
calling of plebiscite and appropriation of public funds
are lodged exclusively in the Congress and that there
being no freedom of speech, press and assembly and
no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof, there is no proper submission to the people of
said proposed Constitution. On 17 December 1972,
the President temporarily suspended the effects of PD
1080 for purpose of free and open debate on the
proposed Constitution. On 23 December 1972, the
Plebiscite was postponed until further notice by the
President. Thereby the Court refrained from ruling on
the cases. On 12 January 1973, petitioners filed an
“urgent motion” praying for the resolution of the
cases “as soon as possible”.
Page 6 of 70

Issues:
WON the validity of PD 73 is justiciable on the
ground that the question at hand is political in nature.
WON PD 73 is valid.
WON the Constitutional Convention have the
authority to pass the proposed Constitution.
WON martial law affected the proper submission of
the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite.
Held:
Yes. The Court finds that the issue aforementioned is
a justiciable one since the assailed decree purports to
have the force and effect of legislation, not only
because of the long list decided by the Court on the
acts of the Executive, but also of Subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution.
The validity of PD 73 was declared moot and
academic by the Court because the plebiscite
ordained in said Decree has been postponed.
Yes. The Court held that the Constitutional
Convention was legally free to postulate any
amendment it may deem fit to propose for as long as
they adhere to Section 1 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution.
The issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that martial law per se does not
necessarily bar the factual possibility of adequate
freedom.
14. UNIDO vs COMELEC
Equal Protection” – Access to Media
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973
Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a
plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES vote
was being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While
the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To
ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued
Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that
there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal
space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On
12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote
via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same
was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio
stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the
COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity
as Marcos has pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69.
COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the
denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal
protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their
request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied
due process nor were they not afforded equal
protection. It is the considered view of the SC that
when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or
consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he
did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of
the Philippines and not as the head of any political
party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister
and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the
program of government and shall determine the
guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the
head of state is at the same time the president of the
political party that is in power, it does not necessarily
follow that he speaks with two voices when he
dialogues with the governed. The president is
accorded certain privileges that the opposition may
not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations
and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they
are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought
contract with these TV stations and radio stations at
their own expense.
II – RATIFICATION
15. JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines
passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17,
1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented
by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election
of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,
1971.
While the Convention was in session on September
21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution
on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer
of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin
said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until
further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter
alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and
effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite,
the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same,
the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by
the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,”
Page 7 of 70
and “there is no proper submission to the people of
said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof.”
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an
order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal
action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing
“that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January
15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said
General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the
meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972,
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the
proposed Constitution.”
Because of these events relative to the postponement
of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it
fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held
were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution,
scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22,
1973, and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have
the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the
formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among
others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission
on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to
defer its final action on these cases.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners
in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent
motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon
as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973.”
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a
Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than
Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on
January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners
in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental
motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion
of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining
respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the
Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian
Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the
National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its
Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,
subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials
and persons who may be assigned such task, from
collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting
to the President or other officials concerned, the so-
called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have
met during the period comprised between January 10
and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in
paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed
a resolution requiring the respondents in said case
G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said
motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,
1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January
17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being
heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the
Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this
opinion and said that, upon instructions of the
President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering
to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102,
which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and
announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-
35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection
therewith was still going on and the public there
present that the President had, according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that
morning.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the
Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in
the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed
by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and
registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority
to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify
the proposed constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification
of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
Issues:
Whether or not the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been
acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the
1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
Page 8 of 70

Rulings:
It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
To determine whether or not the new constitution is
in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well
settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment
to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of
the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has
been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by
six (6) members of the court.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody
else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render
the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which
the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can
be separated or segregated from those of the qualified
voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies
must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the
constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast”
choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising
hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This
is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of
the American regime, we had adopted the Australian
Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the
Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is
void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies
as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of
those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure
therein mostly followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the
returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article
X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the
fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935
Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly,
and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this,
the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution
No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be
no free expression, and there has even been no
expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice
Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the
mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of
debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of
knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions
through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they)
have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether the people have accepted the
Constitution.”
The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the
officers and offices of the Executive Department, in
line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition
of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize”
its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of
Congress do not constitute congressional recognition,
unless the members have performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established
principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of
Public Officers. The compliance by the people with
the orders of martial law government does not
constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the
people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102,
and their compliance with a number of Presidential
orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of
which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience
of the people, under these conditions, is not
necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the
“enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the President
for his action under the Constitution by the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and
attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by
said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an
act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the
executive department of the Government.
Page 9 of 70
In all other respects and with regard to the other
respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that
said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental
Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission
of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance
with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution
and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in
force at the time of such plebiscite.
Being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it
is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance
thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no
vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on
the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or
not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the
Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with
the result, there are not enough votes to declare that
the new Constitution is not in force.
D. SELF – EXECUTING AND NON SELF
EXECUTING
SELF-EXECUTING and NON-SELF-EXECUTING
provisions of the Constitution
- Are provisions of the Constitution self-executory?
Or is there a need for legislation to implement these
provisions?
A constitutional provision is self-executing when it
can be given effect without the aid of legislation, and
there is nothing to indicate that legislation is intended
to make it operative. For example, a constitutional
provision that any municipality by vote of four-
sevenths of its qualified electors may issue and sell
revenue bonds in order to pay for the cost of
purchasing a municipally owned public utility is self-
executing and effective without a legislative
enactment.
Constitutional provisions are not self-executing if
they merely set forth a line of policy or principles
without supplying the means by which they are to be
effectuated, or if the language of the constitution is
directed to the legislature. As a result, a constitutional
provision that the legislature shall direct by law in
what manner and in what court suits may be brought
against the state is not self-executing.
Just as with constitutional provisions, statutes and
court judgments can be self-executing.
16. Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28,
2011
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock
of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-
Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific
Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First
Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong
Kong-based investment management and holding
company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that
it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares
(or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common
shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent
to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%, thus:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage
equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital,
and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
II. THE ISSUE
Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refer to the total common shares
only, or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and non-voting preferred
shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that
the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e.,
to the total common shares in PLDT.]
Considering that common shares have voting rights
which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
Page 10 of 70
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
election of directors, then the term “capital” shall
include such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in
the election of directors. In short, the term “capital”
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.
To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total
outstanding capital stock, including both common
and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes
the intent and letter of the Constitution that the “State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” A
broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns
the all-important voting stock, which necessarily
equates to control of the public utility.
Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly
denied of the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation expressly state that
“the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be
entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for
the election of directors or for any other purpose or
otherwise participate in any action taken by the
corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of
any meeting of stockholders.” On the other hand,
holders of common shares are granted the exclusive
right to vote in the election of directors. PLDT’s
Articles of Incorporation state that “each holder of
Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect
of each share of such stock held by him on all matters
voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of
Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right
to vote for the election of directors and for all other
purposes.”
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute,
that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares
of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General
Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document
required to be submitted annually to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold
120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas
Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In
other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total
number of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos
hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the
common shares equates to control, it is clear that
foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount
of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40
percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities
expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
As shown in PLDT’s 2010 GIS, as submitted to the
SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00
per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares
is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares
have twice the par value of common shares but cannot
elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of
common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred
shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own
only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred
shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of
the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common
shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably
shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the
non-voting preferred shares but with the common
shares, blatantly violating the constitutional
requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and
Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the
voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the
dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the
express command in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution that “[n]o franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to x x x
corporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens x x x.”
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common
shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises
the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and
thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own
only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting
a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not
exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4)
preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that
common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice
the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital
stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%.
This kind of ownership and control of a public utility
is a mockery of the Constitution.
[Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the Securities
and Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by the
Court to apply the foregoing definition of the term
“capital” in determining the extent of allowable
foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a
violation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions
under the law.]
E. GEN. PROVISIONS
17. ROQUE R. MARTINEZ, A.M. No. P-04-1795
vs LIM
March 25, 2009
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This complaint involves two interrelated
administrative charges against respondent Norvell R.
Lim, Sheriff III of the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81.
On March 11, 2002, respondent sent a letter to
Arsenio
R.M. Almaddin, officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Romblon stating:
Page 11 of 70
I wish to inform you that today, Monday, March 11,
2002, at 8 a.m., and for the month of March 2002, [it]
is the turn of the [OPP] to lead the flag ceremony.
However, this morning, this was not done because
none of the personnel of your office was present.
We hope that we would be able to look forward to
seeing all the personnel of [the OPP] in the Hall of
Justice, Romblon, Romblon, participate in [the flag
ceremony] every Monday morning and Friday
afternoon.[1]
On May 16, 2002 complainants Roque R. Martinez,
Maria Elena M. Felipe, Robert R. Miano, Rosalinda
G. Macasa and Ciriaco D. Mariveles, Jr., all
employees of the OPP, filed an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct against respondent in
the Office of the Ombudsman.[2] They asserted that
respondents March 11, 2002 letter portrayed them as
unpatriotic Filipinos, tarnished their reputation as
public officers and cast dishonor, disrepute and
contempt on their persons.
Respondent explained that, in the absence of the
presiding judge, he was the administrative officer-in-
charge of the Hall of Justice. As such, it was his duty
to require complainants to attend the flag ceremony.
Thus, he wrote Almaddin to remind him that the OPP
had been assigned to lead the flag ceremony for the
month of March 2002 and to inform him that no one
from his office attended the ceremony that morning.
Respondent denied ill-will against complainants.
Subsequently, complainants filed another complaint
against respondent charging him of violation of
PD[3] 26[4] which provides:
(1) Judges of the Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Court
of Industrial Relations, Military Tribunals and City
and Municipal Courts, may transmit in the mail, free
of charge, all official communications and papers
directly connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings.
(2) The envelope or wrapper of the
privileged mail matter shall bear on the left upper
corner the name, official designation and station of
the official sending such mail matter and on the right
upper corner, the words: "Private or unauthorized use
to avoid payment of postage is penalized by fine or
imprisonment or both." (emphasis supplied)
Complainants stated that respondent did not pay for
postage stamps when he mailed copies of his counter-
affidavit to them. Since the mailed matter neither
involved a court process nor was in any way
connected to the conduct of judicial proceedings, he
was guilty of violating the said decree.
Respondent asserted that the allegations against him
were baseless. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed for
lack of probable cause the complaint for violation of
PD 26.[5]
But the Ombudsman referred the administrative
aspect of the complaints against respondent to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).[6]
With regard to the complaint for grave misconduct,
the OCA found that respondent bore no malice when
he sent the March 11, 2002 letter. It noted:
There is nothing in the letter that is suggestive of
complainants lack of patriotism as to impute bad faith
on the part of respondent. Respondent was merely
expressing his concern so that any similar incident
may not happen again mindful of everyones bounden
duty to express and manifest their patriotism and love
of country and respect for the flag.
Thus, it recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit.
With regard to the complaint for violation of PD 26,
the OCA found that respondent mailed his counter-
affidavit in the previous complaint (for grave
misconduct) using envelopes intended for free
postage. Inasmuch as the mailed matter was not an
official communication related to the conduct of
judicial proceedings, respondent was guilty of
violating the law. Hence, it recommended that
complainant be fined P1,000.
We adopt the findings of the OCA with a
modification of the penalty.
Misconduct implies wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment; an act that is corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[7]
Flag ceremonies inspire patriotism and evoke the
finest sentiments of love of country and
people.[8] Section 18 of RA[9] 8491 provides:
Section 18. All government offices and educational
institutions shall henceforth observe the flag-raising
ceremony every Monday morning and the flag
lowering ceremony every Friday afternoon. The
ceremony shall be simple and dignified and shall
include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National Anthem.
Pursuant to this mandate, Supreme Court Circular No.
62-2001 (dated September 21, 2001) provides:
All Executive Judges shall supervise the holding of
the flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies in their
respective Hall of Justice buildings or courthouses
and shall ensure the attendance of all judges and court
personnel in the rites.
In deference to these mandates, the Chief State
Prosecutor directed the personnel of the OPP to attend
the flag ceremony.[10]
Page 12 of 70
Consequently, as administrative officer-in-charge of
the Hall of Justice of Romblon, respondent was duty-
bound to remind the employees to attend the flag
ceremony. Furthermore, the March 11, 2002 letter
(quoted above) was courteously written. Respondent
neither used offensive language nor insinuated that
complainants were unpatriotic. Thus, there was no
misconduct on the part of respondent.
Nonetheless, we agree that respondent violated PD
26. In Bernadez v. Montejar,[11] we held that the
franking privilege granted by PD 26 extended only to
judges and referred to official communications and
papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings.[12] Respondent was not a judge nor was
the mailed matter related to the discharge of judicial
functions. Thus, respondent violated PD 26 for which
a fine of P500 should be imposed on him.
Considering that respondent compulsorily retired on
September 7, 2003, the fine of P500 shall be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for grave misconduct
against Sheriff Norvell R. Lim is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit. But he is found guilty of violating
Presidential Decree No. 26 and is hereby fined P500
which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
18. Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793,
June 19, 2012
TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications
of Members, and Term of Office
DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties
does not involve administrative liability as it is
only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for
registration.
FACTS:
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago
(MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the
NCR for participation in the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was
represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco
Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC denied the
Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance
with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is
common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, and some members participated in the
take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage.
This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at
the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to
achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in
which it stated that its membership includes former
members of the AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates,
Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended
Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the
instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti
(sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only
and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration that is still pending. It is
not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of
pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List
System of Representation in the eventuality that their
Petition is approved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. In the instant Petition, MAGDALO
argues that the findings of the assailed resolutions on
the basis of which the Petition was denied are based
on pure speculation. The assailed Resolutions
effectively preempted the court trying the case. The
subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion
that the founders of the Magdalo committed mutiny,
held innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed
violence and used unlawful means and in the process
defied the laws of organized society purportedly
during the Oakwood incident when even the court
trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided
the case against them; and the Resolution violates the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to
due process of law.
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had
the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO
for registration and accreditation as a political party.
It contends that this determination, as well as that of
assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of
force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which
cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for
certiorari.
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it
concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to
assess whether parties applying for registration
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter
nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in
basing its determination on pure conjectures instead
of on the evidence on record.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
HELD: NO
This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice
to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for
Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and
Page 13 of 70
statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties
and organizations to participate in electoral contests.
The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
xxxxxxxxx
ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition
to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
are supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration. x x x.
RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, reads in part:
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or
organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained
in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the privileged participation that our election laws
grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered
political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a
request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the
next natural step to follow.
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority
of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties
or organizations seeking registration and
accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether
its exercise of this discretion was so capricious or
whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In
view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the
time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules
that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in taking judicial notice of the
Oakwood incident.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of
discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the
Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or
evidence on record, but on mere speculation and
conjectures. This argument cannot be given any
merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may
be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further,
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers
administrative agencies to admit and give probative
value to evidence commonly acceptable by
reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of
judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v.
American Express,this Court explained as follows:
The concept of facts of common knowledge in the
context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are so commonly known in the community
as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable
among reasonable men.
The Oakwood incident was widely known and
extensively covered by the media made it a proper
subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated
these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance
thereof without requiring the introduction and
reception of evidence thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses
violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did
not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood
because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was
held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated
the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single
shot was fired during the incident.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that
seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881,
which provides that no political party which seeks to
achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation.
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of
force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which
is employed against common right, against the laws,
and against public liberty. The Oakwood incident
was one that was attended with violence. As publicly
announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their
dissatisfaction with the administration of former
President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged
Page 14 of 70
corruption in the military and the supposed sale of
arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted
the President, her cabinet members, and the top
officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve
these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel
occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full
battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in
the building. These brash methods by which
MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its
members and withdraw its support from the
government constituted clear acts of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held
hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use
of impelling force to take over and sustain the
occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other
unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government obscure the actual
circumstances surrounding the encounter. The
deliberate brandishing of military power, which
included the show of force, use of full battle gear,
display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices,
engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At
the very least, the totality of these brazen acts
fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not,
therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of
the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its
objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve
its goals through violence or unlawful means did
not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case
No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the
COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through
violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an
unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which
in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of
innocence. This argument cannot be sustained.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain
the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections
is purely administrative in character. In exercising
this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful,
and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although
this process does not entail any determination of
administrative liability, as it is only limited to the
evaluation of qualifications for registration, the
ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is
nonetheless analogously applicable:
An administrative case is altogether different from a
criminal case, such that the disposition in the former
does not necessarily result in the same disposition for
the latter, although both may arise from the same set
of facts. The most that we can read from the
finding of liability is that the respondents have
been found to be administratively guilty by
substantial evidence the quantum of proof
required in an administrative proceeding. The
requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure that the proposed witness should not
appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with
the character and purpose of a criminal proceeding,
and the much stricter standards observed in these
cases. They are standards entirely different from
those applicable in administrative proceedings.
Further, there is a well-established distinction
between the quantum of proof required for
administrative proceedings and that for criminal
actions, to wit:
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar
against which the evidence at hand is measured is not
the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, requiring moral certainty to support
affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, applies.
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC
Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative
power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the
elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary
threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In
finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or
unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives,
the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of petitioner committed crimes,
as respondent was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was
limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of
disqualifications for registration as a political party.
In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only
had to assess whether there was substantial evidence
adequate to support this conclusion.
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a
criminal action charging members of MAGDALO
with coup dtat following the events that took place
during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary.
Therefore, although the registration case before the
COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial
court may find bases in the same factual
circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely
separate and distinct issues requiring different
evidentiary thresholds.
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view
of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired
during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifications from party registration.
*Issue on Mootness
Page 15 of 70
whether this case has been rendered moot and
academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for
the elections on even date, it specifically asked for
accreditation as a regional political party for purposes
of subsequent elections.
xxxxxx
The moot and academic principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present
in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the fore
matters of public concern, as it challenges the very
notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a
ground for disqualification from party registration.
Moreover, considering the expressed intention of
MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as
the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the
case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues
raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and
for all.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.
The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of
a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.
18 – NA
19. Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24
July 2012
31JUL
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series
of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion
in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to
privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of
a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of
habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs
made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that
the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege
of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
21. Animos vs. PVAO
G.R. No. 79156, June 22, 1989
FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran,
having been a member of the USAFFE and the
guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a
suit for mandamus by the petitioners against PVAO,
for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to
1947, under Republic Act No. 65, as amended.
However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the
basis that Animos’ disability was only considered
partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on
Disability Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum
payment of his pension benefits. The petitioner
submits that the rating system adopted by PVAO is
null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO
can be considered a suit against the state.
HELD: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit
will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. When
officers and agents of the government are sued in their
individual capacity, the cloak of protection from the
government is removed. According to the doctrine in
Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We hold that under the facts and
circumstances alleged in the amended complaint,
which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not
one against the Government, or a claim against it, but
one against the officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights to be established by the
contending architects, or to prevent them from
Page 16 of 70
making payment and recognition until the contending
architects have established their respective rights and
interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the
work done”. Hence, the complaint cannot be
considered a suit against the state because it is a well-
settled principle of law that we may consider a public
official liable in his personal private capacity for the
damage caused by his acts when done with malice and
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and
jurisdiction.
22. Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and
NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of
copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation
between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ
Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who
had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody.
Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go
after media organizations “found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of
a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and
radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be
a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to
the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez
filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as
the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the
Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and
of the press. A governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in
or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for
and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act
into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
AZCUNA CONCURRING OPINION
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
I vote to GRANT the petition on the ground that the
challenged NTC and DOJ warnings violate Sec. 10,
Art. XVI of the Constitution which states:
Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy
environment for the full development of Filipino
capability and the emergency of communication
structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the
nation and the balanced flow of information into, out
of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy
that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.
This provision was precisely crafted to meet the needs
and opportunities of the emerging new pathways of
communications, from radio and tv broadcast to the
flow of digital information via cables, satellites and
the internet.
The purpose of this new statement of directed State
policy is to hold the State responsible for a policy
environment that provides for (1) the full
development of Filipino capability, (2) the emergence
of communication structures suitable to the needs and
aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of
information, and (3) respect for the freedom of speech
and of the press.
The regulatory warnings involved in this case work
against a balanced flow of information in our
communication structures and do so without
respecting freedom of speech by casting a chilling
effect on the media. This is definitely not the policy
environment contemplated by the Constitution.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
23. Executive Order No. 185, s. 2015
Page 17 of 70
23. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 185
MODIFYING THE NOMENCLATURE AND
RATES OF DUTY ON CERTAIN IMPORTED
ARTICLES AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE
TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THE PHILIPPINE TARIFF
COMMITMENTS ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS
INCLUDED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
LIST UNDER THE ASIA-PACIFIC
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
WHEREAS, under the 2007 Sydney and 2011
Honolulu Declarations, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders made a commitment to
address issues on climate change, review the progress
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha
Development Agenda negotiations on the
liberalization of trade in environmental goods and
services, and take concrete steps to achieve past
ambitions and make green growth a reality, consistent
with their WTO obligations;
WHEREAS, in its 2009 Annual Report, the APEC
Committee on Trade and Investment endorsed the
APEC Environmental Goods and Services (EGS)
Work Program to help in reaching an agreement on
actions to support sustainable growth in the region,
advance work to increase utilization and
dissemination of EGS, reduce existing barriers and
refrain from introducing new barriers to trade and
investment in EGS, and enhance the capabilities of
economies to develop their EGS sectors;
WHEREAS, under the 2012 Vladivostok
Declaration, the APEC leaders endorsed the APEC
List of Environmental Goods enumerating 54
environmental goods that “directly and positively
contribute to green growth and sustainable
development objectives,” with a commitment to
reduce applied rates to 5% or less on these
environmental goods by the end of 2015, taking into
account “economies’ economic circumstances,
without prejudice to their position in the WTO;”
WHEREAS, on 19 May 2015, the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
Board recommended the reduction of the Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) rates of duty on certain tariff
lines under the APEC List of Environmental Goods
by 2015; and
WHEREAS, Section 401 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1464, or the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (TCCP), as amended, empowers the
President, upon the recommendation of NEDA, to
increase, reduce or remove existing rates of import
duty, as well as to modify the tariff nomenclature.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO
III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
power vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Rates of Import Duty. The articles
specifically listed in Annex A hereof, as classified
under Section 104 of the TCCP, as amended, shall be
subject to the MFN rate of duty in accordance with
the schedule indicated opposite each article. The rates
of import duty on tariff headings and subheadings
which are not enumerated and those which are listed
but represented by the symbol “xxx” shall remain in
force and effect.
SECTION 2. Levy on Articles. Upon the effectivity
of this Order, all articles which are specifically listed
in the aforesaid Annex and are entered into, or
withdrawn from warehouses in the Philippines for
consumption shall be levied the MFN rates of duty as
therein prescribed.
SECTION 3. Repeal. All issuances, orders, rules,
and regulations, or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 4. Separability. Should any provision of
this Order be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
other provisions unaffected thereby shall remain valid
and subsisting.
SECTION 5. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect
immediately following its complete publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 26th day of June,
in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Fifteen.
II – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SUPREMACY
24. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GSIS (1997)
267 SCRA 408 – Political Law – Constitutional Law
– Supremacy of the Constitution – Filipino First
Policy
Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution – Par.
2, Sec. 10, Art. XII
Pursuant to the privatization program of the
government, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, Manila
Prince Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong
Berhad (RB). MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share
while RB’s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the
highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the
winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending
declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid and invoked the
Filipino First Policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities.
But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH
filed a petition for TRO against GSIS to avoid the
Page 18 of 70
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was
granted.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH
arguing among others that:
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
needs an implementing law because it is merely a
statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the
highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit
buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale
pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light
of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self
executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony.
Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains
to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the
mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for
more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated
with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos
which not only pertains to individuals but to
corporations as well and other juridical
entities/personalities. The term “qualified Filipinos”
simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference
would be counter productive and inimical to the
common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
“qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the
latter shall be chosen over the former.”
2. INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
25. Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. vs Nagmamalasakit na
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino
MARCH 31, 2018 BY LAWISKOOL
GR No. 160261
10 November 2003
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which
is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court
to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
Page 19 of 70
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. ─ In cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official
are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and or
resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be,
by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment with the
Secretary General. (emphasis, underscoring and
italics supplied)
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation of Impeachment
Proceedings. −Within a period of one (1) year
from the date impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official. (emphasis,
underscoring and italics supplied)
3. PREAMBLE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
27. AGLIPAY vs RUIZ – 1937
64 Phil. 201 – Political Law – Appropriation –
Religious Sect – Religious Freedom
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place
sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then
Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production
of certain stamps the design of which would have in
their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat
as border design. Eventually, the stamps were
produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No.
4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine
Independent Church, assailed the production and sale
of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of
said stamps commemorative to a particular religious
event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the
Philippine Constitution which prohibits the
appropriation or usage of public money for the use or
benefit of any church or denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said
stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of
the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the
stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the
City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act
No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any
public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052
appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government”.
The fact that the fund is being used for such is only
incidental to the function of Director of Posts and
under his discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating
influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere.
Evidence would be our preamble where we implored
the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal
government. If should also be further noted that
Page 20 of 70
religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
III – STATE
CONCEPT OF THE STATE
ARTICLE I
ARTICLE 1 – CONSTI
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including
its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046
(as amended by RA 5446)
AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines
describes the national territory as comprising all the
territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
Paris concluded between the United States and Spain
on December 10, 1898, the limits of which are set
forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the
islands embraced in the treaty concluded at
Washington, between the United States and Spain on
November 7, 1900, and in the treaty concluded
between the United States and Great Britain on
January 2, 1930, and all the territory over which the
Government of the Philippine Islands exercised
jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth
in the above-mentioned treaties have always been
regarded as part of the territory of the Philippine
Islands;
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and
connecting the various islands of the Philippines
archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension,
have always been considered as necessary
appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of
the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost
islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the
boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties
comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial
sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight
lines joining appropriate points of the outermost
islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified
and specifically defined and described for the
information of all concerned; Now, therefor,
Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the
Philippines are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:
Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided
for in Section one hereof are considered inland or
internal waters of the Philippines.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved: June 17, 1961.
Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED
BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE
THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046,
entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines
archipelago are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:
28. MAGALLONA vs ERMITA
655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory –
RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining
the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law.
This law was meant to comply with the terms of the
third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the
validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some
of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the
Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the
Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona
et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA
9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or
lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
Page 21 of 70
when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our
territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with
the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The
area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent
of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na.
mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is
evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the
territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic
waters” and that we may term it as our “internal
waters”, but the bottom line is that our country
exercises sovereignty over these waters and
UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our
observance of international law, we allow the
exercise of others of their right of innocent
passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures
from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as
well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of
islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in
short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines
of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine
Island group). This is because if we do that, then we
will be enclosing a larger area which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the
demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three
levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the
baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the
baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from
the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is
the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of
the UNCLOS.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
29. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law;
Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit
for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
Page 22 of 70

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
30. COLLADO VS CA (N/A)
31. SEC vs DENR VS YAP
NOTE: This case is consolidated with G.R. No.
167707 (Secretary of DENR vs Yap). This case is
more popularly referred to as “Boracay
Landowners vs DENR”
568 SCRA 164 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds
– Land Classifications – Boracay Cases – Positive
Act by the Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory
relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty
taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified landof the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,”
which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or
the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG
appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May
2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay
landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court
(SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They
alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG
argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et
al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and
Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. All lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions
of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
Page 23 of 70
submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act
No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession
under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. It is plain error for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates
the legal presumption that the lands are alienable
and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants
are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested
right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of
pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They
say their continued possession and investments give
them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable
investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible
to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
32. G.R. No. 152570 September 27, 2006
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x
PEDRO URGELLO, intervenor-appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July
2001 and 18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097,
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, Cebu City
in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.
The antecedents follow.
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed
her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of
Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477
hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu.
Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent
No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said
lot.1 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold2 to SAAD
Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's
heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint3 for
annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by
Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and
reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass
of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance
of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was
irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that
the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest
reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made
after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the
Regional Executive Director of the Forest
Management Sector, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City,
about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and
construction of dikes within the area covered by
Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.4 On 14 July
1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention
against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations
of respondent.5 However, the heirs failed to file their
answer to the complaint and were thus declared in
default.6
In its Decision7 dated 15 May 1999, the trial court
dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent
failed to show that the subject lot is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or that it has been
classified as such before the issuance of the free
patent and the original title. According to the trial
court, the issuance of the free patent and title was
regular and in order, and must be accorded full faith.
Considering the validity of the free patent and the
OCT, petitioner's purchase of the property was also
declared legal and valid. The trial court also denied
the complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its
Decision8 reversed and set aside the trial court's
judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which
the subject lot belongs, are not subject to private
ownership, unless these are first classified as
agricultural lands. Thus, absent any declassification
of the subject lot from forest to alienable and
disposable land for agricultural purposes,9 the
officers erred in approving Orcullo's free patent
application and in issuing the OCT; hence, title to the
lot must be cancelled.10 Consequently, the Court of
Appeals invalidated the sale of the lot to petitioner.
However, it declared that Urgello's Fishpond Lease
Page 24 of 70
Agreement may continue until its expiration because
lease does not pass title to the lessee; but thereafter,
the lease should not be renewed. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one
issued declaring Free Patent No. 473408 and the
corresponding OCT [No.] 0-6667 as NULL and
VOID ab initio.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender
the owner's duplicate copy of OCT [No.] 0-6667 to
the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered
to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer
certificates of title that may have been subsequently
issued.
Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay
Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu, subject matter of this case,
is hereby REVERTED as part of [the] public domain
and to be classified as timberland.11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, claiming
insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider
pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals categorically
stated that there was a preponderance of evidence
showing that the subject lot is within the timberland
area.12
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred
in relying on the DENR officer's testimony. It claims
that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect
that if there was no classification yet of an area, such
area should be considered as a public forest. Such
opinion was premised on the officer's construction of
a provision of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,13 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Those still to be classified under the present system
shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.14
Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on
19 May 1975, or long after the issuance of the free
patent and title in question. Thus, the provision
stating that all public lands should be considered
as "part of the public forests" until a land
classification team has declassified them is applicable
only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot
be made retroactive to cover and prejudice vested
rights acquired prior to the effectivity of said law,
petitioner concludes.15 It adds that if the subject lot
was encompassed by the term "public forest," the
same should have been designated as a "Timberland
Block," not as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF-315-D,
Sibonga Cadastre which was the designation made by
the Republic prior to 1972.16
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals'
reliance on the land classification map (L.C. Map)
presented by respondent. The trial court had
previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961 as
inadmissible, finding that "the plaintiff has not duly
proved the authenticity and contents." According to
petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither
a certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy
by any DENR official having legal custody of the
original thereof, and thus should not have been made
the basis of the cancellation of the free patent and
title.17
Petitioner further contends that the projection survey
conducted by the DENR to determine if the subject
lot falls within the forest area "is not clear, precise and
conclusive," since the foresters who conducted the
survey used a magnetic box compass, an unreliable
and inaccurate instrument, whose results are easily
affected by high tension wires and stones with iron
minerals.18
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to
overcome the presumption of regularity of the
issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Socorro
Orcullo.
In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to
show that the subject lot is inside the timberland
block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the
survey conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and the
opinions of DENR officers. Since respondent is the
original plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is
on it to prove that the subject lot is part of the
timberland block, petitioner adds.
There is merit in the petition.
Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, and the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.19 Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.20 In instances where
a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of
the public domain is found under private ownership,
the Government is allowed by law to file an action for
reversion,21 which is an action where the ultimate
relief sought is to revert the land to the government
under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land
subject of the action originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.22
It has been held that a complaint for reversion
involves a serious controversy, involving a question
of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
government and it is aimed at the return of the
disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to
cancel the original certificate of registration, and
nullify the original certificate of title, including the
transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.23 Thus, the State, as the party
alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended
the application of the free patent, bears that burden of
proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should
never be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of
evidence not even being adequate.24
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an
action for reversion, to show the details attending the
issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and
explain why such issuance has deprived the State of
the claimed property.
In the instant case, the Solicitor General claimed that
"Free Patent No. 473408 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-6667 were erroneously and irregularly
obtained as the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
Management Bureau) did not acquire jurisdiction
over the land subject thereof, nor has it the power and
authority to dispose of the same through [a] free
Page 25 of 70
patent grant, hence, said patent and title are null and
void ab initio."25 It was incumbent upon respondent
to prove that the free patent and original title were
truly erroneously and irregularly obtained.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.
The Court finds that the findings of the trial court
rather than those of the appellate court are more in
accord with the law and jurisprudence.
In concluding that the subject parcel of land falls
within the timberland or forest reserve, the Court of
Appeals relied on the testimony of Isabelo R. Montejo
that as it had remained unclassified until 1980 and
consequently became an unclassified forest zone, it
was incapable of private appropriation. The pertinent
portions of Montejo's testimony read:
Q: And in that particular [R]evised Forestry Code,
there is that statement that unless classified by a land
classification team, an area can never be released.
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Prior to 1980, there was no classification was [sic]
ever of the lands of the public domain in the town of
Sibonga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, nobody knew in the whole DNR
before and now DENR what areas were timberland
and what areas are not timberland in the town of
Sibonga prior to 1980?
A: Yes, sir, that is why the law states that if there is
no classification should be [sic] considered as the
public forest in order to protect the resources.26
Obviously, respondent's counsel and witness were
referring to P.D. No. 705 particularly Section 13
thereof which reads:
CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION AND SURVEY
SEC. 13. System of Land Classification.—The
Department Head shall study, devise, determine and
prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the
proper and accurate classification and survey of all
lands of the public domain into agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, settlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing lands, and into such
other classes as now or may hereafter be provided by
law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify
through inter-bureau action the present system of
determining which of the unclassified lands of the
public domain are needed for forest purposes and
declare them as permanent forest to form part of the
forest reserves. He shall declare those classified and
determined not to be needed for forest purposes as
alienable and disposable lands, the administrative
jurisdiction and management of which shall be
transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided, That
mangrove and other swamps not needed for shore
protection and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be
released to, and be placed under the administrative
jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be
classified under the Present system shall continue
to remain as part of the public forest. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Reliance on this provision is highly misplaced. P.D.
No. 705 was promulgated only on 19 May 1975, or
four (4) years after the free patent and title were
awarded to Orcullo. Thus, it finds no application in
the instant case. Prior forestry laws, including P.D.
No. 389,27 which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does
not contain a similar provision. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." The Court
does not infer any intention on the part of then
President Marcos to ordain the retroactive application
of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, even assuming for
the nonce that subject parcel was unclassified at the
time Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact
remains that when the free patent and title were issued
thereon in 1971, respondent in essence segregated
said parcel from the mass of public domain. Thus, it
can no longer be considered unclassified and forming
part of the public forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject
lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve is a
purported L.C. Map No. 2961.28 However, at the
hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial court denied
admission of the map for the purpose of showing that
the subject lot falls within a timberland reserve after
respondent had failed to submit either a certified true
copy or an official publication thereof.29 The Court
observes that the document adverted to is a mere
photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue
print as insisted by respondent.30 A mere photocopy
does not qualify as competent evidence of the
existence of the L.C. Map. Under the best evidence
rule, the original document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the general result of
the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.31
In this case, respondent claims that the presentation
of the original L.C. Map is unnecessary since it is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the
public office.32 Evidence, indeed, is admissible when
the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. However, to
prove its contents, there is a need to present a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.33 In addition, while the L.C. Map may be
considered a public document and prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein,34 the map,
to be admissible for any purpose, must be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record.35
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly.
The same rule holds true when the Government is one
of the parties. The Government, when it comes to
court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit
to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges
at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in
every respect the same as those of its citizens; it
cannot have a superior advantage. This is so because
Page 26 of 70
when a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court and participates therein, its claims and
rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule
applicable to the claims and rights of the private
parties under similar circumstances.36 Failure to abide
by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map
submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to
show that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve.
Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao,
Cebu testified that they personally saw the subject lot
and that it falls within the timberland or forest reserve.
Ultimately, however, the basis of their declaration is
the L.C. Map which respondent failed to present in
accordance with the rules on admissibility. Two
foresters in fact testified that the subject lot was a
mangrove area.37 The foresters who conducted the
survey may have been competent and their techniques
reliable; nevertheless, the observation that mangroves
grow in the subject lot is not conclusive as to the
nature of the land at present or at the time the free
patent and title were issued. Assuming that the area is
covered by mangroves when they surveyed it, there is
no proof that it was not planted with trees and crops
at the time Orcullo applied for free patent.
Respondent was also unable to establish that the
subject lot has "very deep and muddy soil" or are
"mudflats," such that it is unsuitable for fruit and non-
fruit bearing trees.38 Yet these are factual matters
which the Court does not generally delve into. As it
is, a mere declaration from the said officers, without
any other supporting evidence, is not sufficient to
establish that the area in question is part of the forest
reserve.
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by
respondent is admissible in evidence, still the land in
question can hardly be considered part of the
timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961,
which purports to be the "correct map of the areas
demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the
provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended"39 was made
only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was
made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the
free patent over the subject lot.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court, finding
that the disputed land was classified as timberland 25
years after private individuals had commenced their
continuous possession and cultivation thereof in good
faith, declared that they have the better right. The
Court held:
It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land
Classification Project No. 3, classifying the 22-
hectare area as timberland, was certified by the
Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924,
whereas the possession thereof by private
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest
commenced as early as 1909. While the
Government has the right to classify portions of
public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land
in good faith much prior to such classification
must be recognized and should not be prejudiced
by after-events which could not have been
anticipated. Thus, We have held that the
Government, in the first instance may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made.41 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Obviously, private interests have intervened before
classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not
only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the
subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded
to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971.
In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent
and certificate of title was regular and in order.
Orcullo complied with the requisites for the
acquisition of free patent provided under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as
certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.42
Besides, the records do not show that respondent has
considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior
to the issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT
No. 0-6667. To declare the land now as forest land on
the authority of L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only in
1980, and opinions based on the said map, would
unduly deprive petitioner of their registered property.
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in
the present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized
and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic
foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not
lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right by the
Government against one of its citizens, the paramount
considerations of fairness and due process must be
observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that
the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of
Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid
and regular issuances, respondent's insistence on the
classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve
must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 July 2001
and the Resolution dated 18 March 2002 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated 15 May 1999 dismissing
the complaint for reversion and the complaint-in-
intervention is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
2. PEOPLE
CITIZENSHIP
Republic Act 8171
Files:
Republic Act 8171
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO
HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS
AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship
Page 27 of 70
through repatriation in the manner provided in
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon
for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral
turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or
incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent
alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or
affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried
child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage
must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not affected
thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.
i. DEFINITION OF CITIZENSHIP
33. TECSON vs COMELEC
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and
Page 28 of 70
to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino
citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the "enmasse Filipinization" that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code.
ii. Elements of Citizenship
34. G.R. No. L-47616 October 15, 1941
JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor-General from
the decision of the Court of Jose Tan Chong for a writ
of habeas corpus to secure his release from the
custody of the Secretary of Labor.
It appears that the petitioner was born in San Pablo,
Laguna, in the month of July, 1915, of a Chinese
father named Tan Chong Hong and a Filipino mother
named Antonia Mangahis; that his parents were
legally married; that sometime in 1925 when the
petitioner was about ten years old he was taken by his
parents to China; that on January 25, 1940, he arrived
at the port of Manila and sought entry as a native born
citizen. The board of Special Inquiry assigned to hear
his case, denied him admission on the alleged ground
that he is a Chinese citizen, and on appeal, the
Secretary of labor affirmed the decision of the Board
and ordered the deportation of the petitioner to the
port from whence he came. The petitioner sued for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of
Manila which was granted. Hence, the present appeal
by the Solicitor-General.
The petitioner, having been born in the Philippines
before the approval of our Constitution, of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen. This
conclusion is in harmony with the policy embodied in
the Constitution (par. 4 sec. 1, Art. IV; Torres vs. Tan
Chim, G. R. No. 46593, promulgated Feb. 3, 1940;
Gallofin vs. Ordoñez, G.R. No. 46782, promulgated
June 27, 1940). His sojourn in China did not
adversely affect his Philippine citizenship, it
appearing that ever since he was twelve years old he
wanted to return to the Philippines but his father
would not allow him to come, and he did not have
means to pay for his transportation back to the
Philippines until the date of his return. Animus
revertendi existed here. (Lim Teco vs. Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil., 84; Muñoz vs. Collector of
Customs, 20 Phil., 494; Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15 Phil.,
559.)lawphil.net
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly
affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
iii. IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENSHIP
Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance
JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and
private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates
for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before
the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of
material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his
Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then
Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to
spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta
Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Page 29 of 70
 Ty eventually migrated to the United States of
America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had
been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When
Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a
resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided
in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election as required under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA,
the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign
citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the
latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed,
however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
on 28 March 2007, he already performed the
following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA;
(3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in
his application that his residence in the Philippines
was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was
approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty
personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General
Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was
at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty
was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4
January 2007 again stating therein his address
as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19
March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.
He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had been
a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14
May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the
dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was
declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty
complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5
of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement
for holding an elective public office, and the purpose
of the citizenship qualification is none other than to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof.
Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March
19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225.
Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as commissioned
or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in
the country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in
stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before
the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:
Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines
when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year
before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in
favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to
file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion
and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside
the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September
2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc,
respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due
course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy;
and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition.
According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very
same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Page 30 of 70
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet
the one-year residency requirement set by law to
qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in
the Petition at bar.
. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely
his Philippine citizenship.
The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders
of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and
annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal
Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that
respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. Being a green card
holder, which was proof that he was a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the
absence of any waiver of his status as such before he
ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was
held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the
residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency
requirements for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino
may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides
for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances.
A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it
does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the
natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to
stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-
year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections
so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To
the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his
trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months
preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if
length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's
avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this
Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to
comply with the one-year residency requirement, so
Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May
2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court
did not find anything wrong in an individual changing
residences so he could run for an elective post, for as
long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty
that he has effected a change of residence for election
law purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has
proven by substantial evidence that he had established
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little
over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections,
in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the
Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.
To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification,
Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws
so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon
failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to
be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismiss.
iv. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS
34. LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship;
Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about
the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for,
be elected to, and assume and discharge the position
as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her
disqualification is that she is not a natural-born
citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement
in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the
highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the
winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.
Page 31 of 70

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification
stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because
her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for
the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never
attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's
parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period
under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification
based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the
naturalization certificate of one person should be in
accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly
under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through the Solicitor General or the representative
designated by statute, that may question in the
appropriate denaturalization proceeding.
2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her
oath of office, and she was allowed to officially
assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no
longer the COMELEC, should now assume the
jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section
2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998
HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based
on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure.
v. Naturalized Citizens
37. TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen
having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3
of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an
unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her
bid. She again sought elective office during the May
10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V.
Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters
of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective
post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that
she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath"
as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred
that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of
her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring
Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of
vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her
proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec,
but the appeal was dismissed y the second division
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for
elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2)
of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition
of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and
Page 32 of 70
political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially
sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her
Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not
oath before any public officer authorized to
administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on
Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
vi. STATELESS PERSONS AND FOUNDLINGS
38 . POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to day
before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn
infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US.
Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines
due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She
then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving
mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or
cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural
born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME
COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born
Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos
may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that
she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos.
Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a
class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention,
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with
the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the
UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the
10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines,
Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under
RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
vii – Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
39. Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No.
135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano
were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
Page 33 of 70
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained
the age of majority and registered himself as a voter
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold
public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of
the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other country
of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the
point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the
ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
40. [ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
PETITIONER
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention
for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
Page 34 of 70
medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned
to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
This is because “all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship
if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
“(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.
41. Jacot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming
his disqualification from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship
requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S
citizen. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after,
petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
Respondent Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification before the COMELEC against
petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his
US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing
laws. When the local and national elections were held
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC
finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of
merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the
citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.
Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens
of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to
reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It
specifically provides that public office in the
Philippines should meet the Constitutional
requirements and existing laws. At the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run
for elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in
Philippine elections must only have one citizenship,
that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails
to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election
requirements applicable to dual citizens and received
the highest number of votes for an elective position
does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the
citizenship requirement. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed
that the candidate was qualified. The rules on
citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be
strictly applied. The application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED.
Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and petitioner
was DISQUALIFIED.
viii- Natural Born citizen and Public Office
42. Arnado vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164 – Political Law – Election Law –
Republic Act No. 9225 – Qualifications of Local
Elective Candidates – Citizenship Requirements –
Dual Allegiance
Remedial Law – Formal Offer of Evidence – Evidence
not Offered
Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later,
however, he became an American citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing
his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of
candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a
disqualification case against Arnado on the ground
Page 35 of 70
that Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such
act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance
and that is a ground for disqualification under the
Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that
Arnado remained a US citizen.
In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to
run for public office because he complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which
provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for
elective public office if (1) they meet the
qualifications for the elective office they desire, and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships – which must be done
before the filing of the COC.
Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after
April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not
know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine
passport; that when he received said Philippine
passport, he used it since then; that at any rate,
Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an
Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance
before a notary public.
Balua however presented proof that Arnado again
used his US passport in January 2010 and in March
2010.
Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified
Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared
another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This
was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
195649).
Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for
mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival
candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No.
195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won
the 2013 elections as he even acquired 84% of the
votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.
Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado
from running in the May 2013 Elections and his
declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided.
Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He
averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his
disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the
Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by
Arnado are tenable.
HELD: No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory
does not override the requirements set by law. The
fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in
Kauswagan cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225.
Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines
and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his
COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed
recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US
passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that
he used his US passport in January 2010 and March
2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is
therefore disqualified to run for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of
running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again
(for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never
did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the
2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his
US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is
still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior
to November 2009 was cured when he again made a
second renunciation of his US citizenship on
November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of
Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a
mere photocopy of the original. Under the Best
Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court), the original must be presented unless the same
is lost. In this case, the original was never alleged to
have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being
used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never
formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.”
B. MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP
i. JUS SOLI AND JUS SANGUINES
44. G.R. No. 210164 – Political Law – Election Law
– Republic Act No. 9225 – Qualifications of Local
Elective Candidates – Citizenship Requirements –
Dual Allegiance
Remedial Law – Formal Offer of Evidence – Evidence
not Offered
Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later,
however, he became an American citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing
his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of
candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a
disqualification case against Arnado on the ground
that Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such
act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance
and that is a ground for disqualification under the
Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that
Arnado remained a US citizen.
In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to
run for public office because he complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which
provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for
elective public office if (1) they meet the
qualifications for the elective office they desire, and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships – which must be done
before the filing of the COC.
Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after
April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not
Page 36 of 70
know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine
passport; that when he received said Philippine
passport, he used it since then; that at any rate,
Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an
Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance
before a notary public.
Balua however presented proof that Arnado again
used his US passport in January 2010 and in March
2010.
Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified
Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared
another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This
was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
195649).
Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for
mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival
candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No.
195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won
the 2013 elections as he even acquired 84% of the
votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.
Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado
from running in the May 2013 Elections and his
declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided.
Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He
averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his
disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the
Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by
Arnado are tenable.
HELD: No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory
does not override the requirements set by law. The
fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in
Kauswagan cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225.
Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines
and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his
COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed
recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US
passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that
he used his US passport in January 2010 and March
2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is
therefore disqualified to run for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of
running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again
(for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never
did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the
2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his
US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is
still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior
to November 2009 was cured when he again made a
second renunciation of his US citizenship on
November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of
Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a
mere photocopy of the original. Under the Best
Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court), the original must be presented unless the same
is lost. In this case, the original was never alleged to
have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being
used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never
formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.”
ii- Judicial Declaration of Phil Citizenship
45. REPUBLIC V. SAGUN (G.R. NO. 187567;
FEBRUARY 15, 2012)
FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of
Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August
8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar
of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for
a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due
to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected
Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a
judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino
and she is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of
Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had
voted in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her
positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her
record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered
the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the
petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to
annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial
declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant
recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before
us. Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public,
there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine
citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance
which was not registered with the nearest local civil
registry was executed when she was already 33 years
old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.
ISSUES:
Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration
Page 37 of 70
of Philippine citizenship procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
Is an election of Philippine citizenship, made
twelve (12) years after reaching the age of
majority, considered to have been made within a
reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence?
HELD: Under our laws, there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a
given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an
act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights
of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass
upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a
specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the
court's competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a
judicial declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship, it is imperative that we determine
whether respondent is required under the law to make
an election and if so, whether she has complied with
the procedural requirements in the election of
Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the
governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution
reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
x x x x
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states
that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent
clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of
Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that
the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines,
and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now
be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to
confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly
she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to
comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents
petition before the trial court must be denied. (Re:
Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar.
Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1,
1999, 316 SCRA 1, 7-8.)
GRANTED
iii- Philippine Citizenship by Naturalization
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL
ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND
THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-
EIGHT.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and
may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of
this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his
Page 38 of 70
relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or
Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of
continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be
understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:
Having honorably held office under the Government
of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political
subdivisions thereof;
Having established a new industry or introduced a
useful invention in the Philippines;
Being married to a Filipino woman;
Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines
in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of
persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of
the branches of education or industry for a period of
not less than two years;
Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following
cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
Persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas;
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;
Persons who, during the period of their residence in
the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals
of the Filipinos;
Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United
States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the
United States 3whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior
to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship
shall file with the Bureau of Justice4 a declaration
under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become
a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set
forth name, age, occupation, personal description,
place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance,
the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft,
if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the
place of residence in the Philippines at the time of
making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid
until lawful entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place,
and manner of his arrival has been issued. The
declarant must also state that he has enrolled his
minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education5 of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government, and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant
must furnish two photographs of himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make
a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to
any race or nationality, and those who have
resided continuously in the Philippines for a
period of thirty years or more before filing their
application, may be naturalized without having to
make a declaration of intention upon complying with
the other requirements of this Act. To such
requirements shall be added that which
establishes that the applicant has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in the
public schools or in private schools recognized by
the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality. The same shall be understood
applicable with respect to the widow and minor
children of an alien who has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before
he is actually naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file
with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname; his present and
former places of residence; his occupation; the place
and date of his birth; whether single or married and
the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and
residence of the wife and of each of the children; the
approximate date of his or her arrival in the
Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and,
if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he
came; a declaration that he has the qualifications
required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he
is not disqualified for naturalization under the
provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the
requirements of section five of this Act; and that he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must
be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and
be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible
Page 39 of 70
persons, stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be
a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in
their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The
petition shall also set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may
desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The
certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention
must be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First
Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the
filing of the petition shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—
Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be
the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same
at petitioner's expense, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one
of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides, and to have
copies of said petition and a general notice of the
hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in
his office or in the building where said office is
located, setting forth in such notice the name,
birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and
place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of
the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to
introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the
hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be
held within ninety days from the date of the last
publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as
possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence,
the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data
to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of
Justice,8 the Provincial Inspector9 of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province and the justice of the
peace10 of the municipality wherein the petitioner
resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition
shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any
election. The hearing shall be public, and the
Solicitor-General, either himself or through his
delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall
appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the
Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing.
If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view of the
evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in this Act and has
complied with all requisites herein established, it
shall order the proper naturalization certificate to be
issued and the registration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as required in
section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand seven
hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the
instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the
Supreme Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from
and after the date on which the parties were notified
of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon
appeal, the decision of the court has been confirmed
by the Supreme Court,14 and the said decision has
become final, the clerk of the court which heard the
petition shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization
certificate which shall, among other things, state the
following: The file number of the petition, the number
of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the
person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk
of the court, the personal circumstances of the person
naturalized, the dates on which his declaration of
intention and petition were filed, the date of the
decision granting the petition, and the name of the
judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the
petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court
which granted the petition, must be affixed to the
certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the
petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath:
"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this time I am a
subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth15of
the Philippines; [and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the United States
of America in the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto;16 and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court
shall keep two books; one in which the petition and
declarations of intention shall be recorded in
chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof
from the filing of the petition to the final issuance of
the naturalization certificate; and another, which shall
be a record of naturalization certificates each page of
which shall have a duplicate which shall be duly
attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the
petitioner.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as
"The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall
control and regulate the admission and integration of
aliens into its territory and body politic including the
grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens
born and residing in the Philippines may be granted
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings
subject to certain requirements dictated by national
security and interest.
Page 40 of 70
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions
of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail
of the benefits of this Act must meet the following
qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and
residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18)
years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and
believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which
he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary
and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution dully recognized by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught
and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and
where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor
children of school age, he/she must have enrolled
them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she
derives income sufficient for his/her support and if
he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of
his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not
apply to applicants who are college degree holders but
are unable to practice their profession because they
are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak
Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the
Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not
qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under
this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association of group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or
propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in
the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals
of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is
at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall file with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a
petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed,
thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the
latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each
copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other
name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of
residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names
and citizenship of his/her parents and their residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or
occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or
his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner
shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and
the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and
residence of his/her spouse; and if his marriage is
annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage
and the court which granted the same;
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and
birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under
this Act;
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a
public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and
honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and
to renounce absolutely and forever any prince,
potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the
country of which the applicant is a citizen or subject.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's birth certificate;
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native
born certificate of residence;
(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death
certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court
decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;
(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth
certificates, alien certificate of registration or native
born certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's
minor children, wherever applicable;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner,
and sworn statements on the good moral character of
the petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of
good reputation in his/her place of residence stating
that they have personally known the petitioner for at
least a period of ten (10) years and that said petitioner
has in their own opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and
is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of
prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and
that he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS);
Page 41 of 70
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the
petitioner in the schools he attended in the
Philippines. Should the petitioner have minor
children, a certification that his children are enrolled
in a school where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught and are part of the curriculum; and
(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for
the past three (3) years.
Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. -
There shall be constituted a Special Committee on
Naturalization herein referred to as the "Committee",
with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, or his representative, and the
National Security Adviser, as members, with the
power to approve, deny or reject applications for
naturalization as provided in this Act.
The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to
consider applications for naturalization. For this
purpose, the chairman and members shall receive an
honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and
One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00),
respectively, per meeting attended.
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special
Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who
believes that he has all the qualifications, and none of
the disqualifications, may file an application for
naturalization with the secretariat of the Special
Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of
Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the
petition shall be stamped to indicate the date of filing
and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the petition, the
Committee shall determine whether the petition is
complete in substance and in form. If such petition is
complete, the Committee shall immediately publish
pertinent portions of the petition indicating the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of the
applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, and have
copies of the petition posted in any public or
conspicuous area. The Committee shall immediately
furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the
petitioner's place of residence and tile National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition
and its supporting documents. These agencies shall
have copies of the petition posted in any public or
conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and
premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a
report stating whether or not petitioner has any
derogatory record on file or any such relevant and
material information which might be adverse to
petitioner's application for citizenship.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be
wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. -
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of
the agencies which were furnished a copy of the
petition or the date of the last publication of the
petition, whichever comes in later, the Committee
shall consider and review all relevant and material
information it has received pertaining to the petition,
and may, for the purpose call the petitioner for
interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity
of the petition and its annexes, and to determine the
truthfulness of the statements and declarations made
in the petition and its annexes.
If the Committee shall have received any information
adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the
petitioner to answer, explain or refute the
information.
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the
facts before it, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it
shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify the
petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the
Committee shall disapprove the same.
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and
Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the notice of the approval of
his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the
Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows:
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval
of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of
naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days
from the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner
shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum
upon proof of payment of the required naturalization
processing fee and certificate of naturalization.
Should the applicant fail to take the abovementioned
oath of allegiance within said period of time, the
approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.
Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. -
Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his
oath of allegiance as required in the preceding
section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's
oath to the proper local civil registrar. Thereafter, the
BI shall cancel the alien certificates of registration of
the applicant.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor
Children. - After the approval of the petition for
administrative naturalization in cancellation of
applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's
alien lawful wife and minor children may file a
petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration with the Committee subject to the
payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows: Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the
petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor
Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the
approval of her petition for administrative
naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but
her minor children may file a petition for cancellation
of their alien certificates of registration with the BI
subject to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of
Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel
certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in
the following cases:
(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly
authorized representative made any false statement or
Page 42 of 70
misrepresentation or committed any violation of law,
rules and regulations in connection with the petition
for naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains
Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the
certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his
minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship by
virtue of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years
next following the grant of Philippine citizenship,
establish permanent residence in a foreign country,
that individual's certificate of naturalization or
acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's
remaining for more than one (1) year in his country
of origin, or two (2) years in any foreign country, shall
be considered prima facie evidence of intent to
permanently reside therein;
(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with
acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be
used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or
legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a
condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege, the certificate of naturalization
or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked;
and
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with
acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to
national security, the certificate of naturalization or
acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary
title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make
an express renunciation of his title or membership in
this order of nobility before the Special Committee or
its duly authorized representative, and such
renunciation shall be included in the records of his
application for citizenship.
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall
fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or
cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall
purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging,
falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization
certificate issued under this proceeding for the
purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the
same may be used by another person or persons, and
any person who shall purposely aid and assist another
in obtaining a naturalization certificate in violation of
this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and
by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and
in the case that the person convicted is a naturalized
citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not
earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be
ordered cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her
birth with the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar may, within two (2) years from the
effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the
acquisition of the Philippine
citizenship: Provided, That the applicant possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under this Act and subject to the requirements of
existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. -
An amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%)
of the filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant
to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of
the Philippines Law Center and another twenty-five
percent (25%) shall be allotted for the publication of
the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said
amount shall be treated as receipts automatically
appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -
The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be needed for the proper implementation of
the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of
existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section
or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not
affected thereby shall continue to be in force and
effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd)
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
46.
Rep vs ONG - 2012
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the
governments favor and against the applicant.[1] The
applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance
with the requirements of law.[2]
Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate
courts Decision[3] dated May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
74794, which affirmed the trial courts grant of citizenship
to respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals
(CA) held:
With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse
the decision of the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23, 2001, is
AFFIRMED in toto and the instant appeal is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years
old,[5] filed a Petition for Naturalization.[6] The case was
docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9 of
the RegionalTrial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act
No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law,[7] the
petition was published in the Official Gazette[8] and a
newspaper of general circulation,[9] and posted in a public
place for three consecutive weeks,[10] six months before the
initial hearing.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General
Page 43 of 70
entered its appearance and authorized[12] the city prosecutor
to appear on its behalf.[13] Accordingly, Fiscals Ester
Veloso and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings
below.
Respondent Ong was born at
the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4,
1958.[14] He is registered as a resident alien and possesses
an alien certificate of registration[15] and a native-born
certificate of residence[16] from the Bureau of Immigration.
He has been continuously and permanently residing[17] in
the Philippines from birth up to the present.[18] Ong can
speak[19] and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano,
and Amoy.[20] He took his elementary[21] and high
school[22] studies at the SacredHeart School for Boys
in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and
the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a
degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the
Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.[23]
On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a
Chinese citizen.[24] They have four children,[25] namely,
Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),[26] Kimberley Grace
(born on May 15, 1984),[27] Kyle Gervin (born on
November 4, 1986),[28] and Kevin Griffith (born on August
21, 1993),[29] who were all born and
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were
enrolled[30] at the Sacred Heart School for
Boys and Sacred Heart School for Girls.[32] At the time
[31]
of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children
were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village,
Banilad, Cebu City.
Ong has lived at the following addresses:[33]
1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in
Grade 2)[34]
2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until
1970)[35]
3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until
1992)[36]
4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village,
Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998);[37] and
5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes,
Nasipit, Talamban, Cebu City (present).[38]
Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an
average annual income of P150,000.00.[39] When he
testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman
since he graduated from college in 1978.[40] Moreover,
Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his
business. [41]
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for
the years 1994 to 1997.[42] Based on these returns, Ongs
gross annual income was P60,000.00 for
1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996;
and P128,000.00 for 1997.
Respondent further testified that he socializes[43] with
Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and
Christmas.[44] He is a member of the Alert/ React VII
Communications Group and the Masonic organization.[45]
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to
prove[46] that he is of sound physical and mental
health.[47] As shown by the clearances from the National
Bureau of Investigation,[48] the Philippine National
Police,[49] the trial courts,[50] and the barangay,[51] he has no
criminal record or pending criminal charges.[52]
Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and
Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as his character
witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of
Borbon, Cebu.[53] He has known Ong since 1970 because
Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas brother.[54] He
testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and
adopts the Filipino culture.[55] Meanwhile, Carvajal
testified that he has known Ong since the 1970s because
they were high school classmates.[56] He testified that Ong
is morally irreproachable and possesses all the
qualifications to be a good citizen of
the Philippines.[57] Carvajal is a businessman engaged in
leasing office spaces.[58]
On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs
petition. Among other things, the trial court held that:
xxxx
By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by
the [respondent], the following facts had been
established.[59]
xxxx
x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager
engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989 from
which he derives an average annual income of more than
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and
X with sub-markings); x x x[60]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court
believes and so holds that [respondent] possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [respondent] KERRY
LAO ONG is hereby admitted as citizen of the Republic
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[61]
Republics Appeal
On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor
General, appealed
to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting
Ongs petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses
a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as
required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.[62]
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts
finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that
he is a businessman/business manager earning an average
Page 44 of 70
income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns
belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to
present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade,
which is the source of his income. Considering that he has
four minor children (all attending exclusive private
schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank
deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home,
his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under
the circumstances, the Republic maintained that
respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.[63]
Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has
adopted a higher standard of income for applicants for
naturalization.[64] He likewise conceded that the legal
definition of lucrative income is the existence of an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses.[65] It is
his position that his income, together with that of his wife,
created an appreciable margin over their
expenses.[66] Moreover, the steady increase in his income,
as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully
employed.[67]
The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It
explained:
In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces
of evidence] which relates [sic] to his lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation. Judging from the present
standard of living and the personal circumstances of the
[respondent] using the present time as the index for the
income stated by the [respondent], it may appear that the
[respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We
must be mindful that the petition for naturalization was
filed in 1996, which is already ten years ago. It is of judicial
notice that the value of the peso has taken a considerable
plunge in value since that time up to the
present.Nonetheless, if We consider the income earned at
that time, the ages of the children of the [respondent], the
employment of his wife, We can say that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to
be able to provide for an adequate support.[68]
The appellate court denied the Republics motion for
reconsideration[69] in its Resolution dated November 7,
2006.[70]
Issue
Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in
accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that
there is an appreciable margin of (respondents) income
over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support.[71] The Republic contends that the CAs conclusion
is not supported by the evidence on record and by the
prevailing law.[72]
The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that
he qualifies under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the
years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong earns
from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared
income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative
income. It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of a
family of six, with four children of school age.[73]
Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of
Ongs income, much less can they describe the lawful
nature thereof.[74] The Republic also noted that Ong did not
even attempt to describe what business he is engaged
in. Thus, the trial and appellate courts shared conclusion
that Ong is a businessman is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures.[75]
The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate
courts Decision and the denial of Ongs petition for
naturalization.[76]
Respondents Arguments
Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a
review of factual findings, which review is improper in a
Rule 45 petition.[77] He further submits that his tax returns
support the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative
trade.[78]
Our Ruling
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest.[79] Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the
applicant.[80] The burden of proof rests upon the applicant
to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.[81]
In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around
respondent Ongs compliance with the qualification found
in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law, which provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this
Act, any person having the following qualifications may
become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
xxxx
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth
not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency,
or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
x x x x[82]
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means
not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown
that the employment gives one an income such that there
is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support
in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity
or a public charge.[83] His income should permit him and
the members of his family to live with reasonable
Page 45 of 70
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization.[84]
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the
existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants
income; his or her spouses income should not be included
in the assessment. The spouses additional income is
immaterial for under the law the petitioner should be the
one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.[85] Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the
applicants qualifications must be determined as of the time
of the filing of his petition.[86]
Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court
finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been
observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses
testified that Ong is a businessman but none of them
identified Ongs business or described its nature. The Court
finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature
of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with
respect to his own (leasing of office space). A comparison
of their respective testimonies is reproduced below:
Carvajals testimony
Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.
Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?
A: I am into leasing of office spaces.[87]
Kerry Lao Ongs testimony
Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?
A: Businessman.
Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?
A: After graduation from college.[88]
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the
inadequacy of the testimonial evidence. The applicant
provided no documentary evidence, like business permits,
registration, official receipts, or other business records to
demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a
business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to
prove his possession of some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation. Bare, general assertions
cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an
applicant for naturalization.
The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of
the trial courts decision. The trial court held that respondent
Ong is a businessman engaged in lawful trade and business
since 1989[89] but did not cite the evidence, which supports
such finding. After poring over the records, the Court finds
that the reason for the lack of citation is the absence of
evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts
conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is
only an assertion found in Ongs petition for
naturalization.[90] But, on the witness stand, Ong
did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he
had been a businessman since he graduated from college,
which was in 1978.[91]
Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X
(which are Ongs tax returns), mistakenly found that Ong
derives an average annual income of more than One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos.[92] This conclusion is not
supported by the evidence. The cited tax returns show that
Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to 1997
were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00,
and P128,000.00, respectively. The average annual
income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only,
not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that the
trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in
Ongs petition,[93] but not from the evidence.
As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether
Ong has a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the
issue whether Ongs income, as evidenced by his tax
returns, can be considered lucrative in 1996. In
determining this issue, the CA considered the ages of Ongs
children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the fact
that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then
concluded that there is an appreciable margin of Ongs
income over his expenses.[94]
The Court finds the appellate courts decision
erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses
income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative
income.[95] Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis-
-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property;
(b) that his proven average gross annual income around the
time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had
to provide for the education of his four minor children; and
(c) that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private
schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it
arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an
appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his
familys basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof
that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of
income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of
his income over his familys expenses, his income cannot
be expected to provide him and his family with adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work.[96]
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he
possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade
provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.[97]
The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a
Rule 45 petition precludes a review of the factual findings
of the courts below.[98] In the first place, the trial court and
appellate courts decisions contain conclusions that
are bereft of evidentiary support or factual basis, which is
a known exception[99] to the general rule that only questions
of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for
naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual existence of the applicants
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire
records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court.[100] Indeed, [a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest
Page 46 of 70
that it has been differently categorized and given special
treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the
granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude
the reopening of that case and giving the government
another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or
order granting citizenship will not even constitute res
judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent
judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization
already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or
fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if
not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal.
As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x
involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings,
the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the
purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of
said decision, in the light of the law and extant
jurisprudence.[101] In the case at bar, there is even no need
to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant
records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven
his possession of a known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation to qualify for naturalization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision
dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong
is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth
paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
iv- Effect of Naturalization on the Wife,
Naturalization, Citizenship
49. Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena
Saavedra Batu(i)gas (DIGEST)
GR No. 183110
7 October 2013
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization,
Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the
CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that
granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent
Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
She stated that she intends in good faith to become a
citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed
under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly
in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed
Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because
aliens are precluded from owning lands in the
country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG
to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September
28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can
speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano.
Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were
taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in
education, she then practiced her teaching profession
in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen.
They have five children, all of whom studied in
Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband,
as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of
and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and
copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted
their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from
2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital
union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in
Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the
citizenship requirement as required by law to become
a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found
under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married
to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary
for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980,
Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration
by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The
CID granted her application. However, the Ministry
of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found
no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a
Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship. As the records
before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under
judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents
are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration,
Page 47 of 70
land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of
which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that
of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition
for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to
compliance with the period and the requirements
under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
v- Naturalization by Presidential Decree / Legislative
Naturalization
49. [G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]
HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN
CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF
MANILA and any person having or claiming an
interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review
on certiorari filed by Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan
Co seeking to reverse and set aside the Order[1] dated
September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26, dismissing their petition for
correction of entries in the Civil Register. Likewise
sought to be reversed and set aside is the Order dated
April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said
order.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His
sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In
their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that
their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K.
Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 270.His application was
granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The
Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15,
1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his
favor. Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng
took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime,
Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned
their respective degrees in architecture and
accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court for correction of entries in their
certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp.
Proc. Case No. 98-90470. They alleged, inter alia, in
their petition that:
(3) They were born in the Philippines and the
legitimate children of CO BOON PENG;
(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China,
was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 15th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;
(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father
CO BOON PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is
why entry in their respective birth certificates as to
their fathers citizenship was Chinese;
(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by
naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the]
petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still
minors at that time became Filipino citizens through
the derivative mode of naturalization. Our
Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law
who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof;
(7) The naturalization of petitioners father in 1977
was an act or event affecting and concerning their
civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register,
Article 407 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the Civil
Register.[2]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the
trial court render judgment correcting and changing
the entries in their respective birth certificates as to
the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from
Chinese to Filipino.[3]
On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an
order dismissing the petition outright on the ground
that the petition was insufficient, solely because the
petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for
naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No.
1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
473. [4]
The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the
assailed order arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No.
473 were designed to grant citizenship to deserving
aliens; hence, should be construed together. They
averred that the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473
should also be granted to the petitioners whose father
was granted naturalization under LOI No.
270.However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27,
1999, denying their motion for reconsideration for the
following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act
No. 473 and Letter of Instructions No. 270 are statutes
relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the
minor children of the applicant. Section 15 of CA No.
473 expressly provides for the effect of the
Page 48 of 70
naturalization on the wife and children of the
applicant while LOI No. 270 does not have any
proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers
to qualified individuals only. The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Committee
established pursuant to LOI No. 270 and the
amendments issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of
qualified individuals only; no proviso therein referred
to its effect on the wife and children of the individual;
(c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemed
and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and,
(d) the application of the so-called pari materia rule
of construction made by the petitioners is misplaced,
as what should be applied in the instant case is the rule
on strict construction of legislative grants or
franchise. The court a quo stressed that legislative
grants, whether they be of property, rights or
privileges, whether granted to corporations or
individuals, must be strictly construed against the
grantee and in favor of the grantor.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court
assailing the court a quos Order dismissing their
petition outright and its Order denying their motion
for the reconsideration of the same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in
holding that their petition was insufficient. They
assert that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they
are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA
No. 473, which provides that minor children of
persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the
Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens
thereof. They contend that although LOI No. 270,
under which the petitioners father was naturalized
does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of
CA No. 473, the latter provision should be deemed
incorporated therein. They point out that both laws
have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant
Philippine citizenship to qualified aliens permanently
residing in the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the
rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read
together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No.
270 should be harmonized and reconciled since all
statutes relating to the same subject, or having the
same general purpose, should be read in connection
with it, and should be construed together as they
constitute one law.[6]
The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of
LOI No. 270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine
citizenship not only to qualified aliens but also to their
minor children who were born in the country. They
assert that this is apparent from paragraph 4-A
thereof, which extends the option to adopt Filipino
names not only to qualified applicants for
naturalization but also to their wives and minor
children. They submit that when then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must
be presumed to have been acquainted with the
provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to
abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of
Section 15 thereof; otherwise, Pres. Marcos would
have expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No. 473 in
relation to LOI No. 270. Thus, according to the
petitioners, the naturalization of their father during
their minority is an act or event affecting their civil
status that must be recorded in the Civil Register
pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that
the court a quo did not err in issuing the assailed
orders. Contrary to the petitioners theory, LOI No.
270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws;
therefore, are not in pari materia. He points out that
although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both govern
the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the
requirements and procedure for naturalization by
judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the other hand, deals
with the requirements and procedure for
naturalization by presidential decree.
The Solicitor General further asserts that the
petitioners contention that the naturalization of their
father is an event affecting and concerning their civil
status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has
no legal basis. The correction sought and allowed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must be one that
reflects a fact existing before or at the time of birth. In
the petitioners case, the naturalization of their father
in 1977 took place long after they were
born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General,
under LOI No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the
naturalization of a father did not ipso facto render his
children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot
invoke Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the
naturalization laws.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule on statutory construction provides that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed
together because enactments of the same legislature
on the same subject are supposed to form part of one
uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in
the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to
have in mind the existing legislations on the subject
and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto.[7]
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together
to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy,
thus:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature
enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, it is held that in
the absence of any express repeal or amendment
therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with
the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes,
and they all should be construed together. Provisions
in an act which are omitted in another act relating to
the same subject matter will be applied in a
proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent
with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same
subject matter are to be compared with the new
provisions; and if possible by reasonable
construction, both are to be construed that effect is
given to every provision of each. Statutes
in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so
far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony
with each other.[8]
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the
naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the
Philippines. While they provide for different
procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by
judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs
Page 49 of 70
naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes
have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens
permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to
the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture,
tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and
contributed to the economic, social and cultural
development of our country, to be integrated into the
national fabric by being granted Filipino
citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the
acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more
expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are
naturalized, the faster they are able to integrate
themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able
to contribute to the cultural, social and political well-
being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the
petitioners correctly posit, statutes
in pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section
15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision
should be read into the latter law as an integral part
thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus,
Section 15 of CA No. 473,[9] which extends the grant
of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of
those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly
applied to the minor children of those naturalized
under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in
evidence the certificate of naturalization of their
father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to
Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to
prove the following material allegations in their
petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co
Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines;
and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon
Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412
of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order. The law does not provide for a specific
procedure of law to be followed. But the Court
approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide
for a procedure to implement the law.[10] The entries
envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include
not only status but also nationality.[11] The acts,
events or factual errors envisaged in Article 407 of the
New Civil Code include even those that occur after
the birth of the petitioner. However, in such cases, the
entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected
or changed. The decision of the court granting the
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth
and shall form part of the civil register in the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar.[12]
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from. To change means to
replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a
substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does
not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect
that the correction or change may be.[13] Such entries
include not only those clerical in nature but also
substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain
the truths about the facts recorded therein.[14]
The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
summary if the entries in the civil register sought to
be corrected are clerical or innocuous in
nature. However, where such entries sought to be
corrected or changed are substantial: i.e., the status
and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of
their parents,[15] the proceedings are adversarial in
nature as defined by this Court
in Republic v. Valencia, thus:
One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.[16]
In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as
respective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar;
and, (b) all persons who have claims any interest
which would be affected thereby.[17]
In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition
that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng,
who was naturalized as a Filipino citizen, but that
their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a
Chinese national. In view of their fathers
naturalization, they pray that the entries in their
certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their
father be changed from Chinese to Filipino.
The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate,
it behooved the trial court to do its duty under Section
4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:
Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
After hearing, the court shall issue an order either
dismissing the petition or issue an order granting the
same. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in the certificates of birth of
the petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form
part of the records of the local civil register.[18]
Page 50 of 70
In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition
outright in violation of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Patently, then, the trial court erred in so doing.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are SET
ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special
Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and
ORDERED to continue with the proceedings in the
said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
SO ORDERED.
v—Judicial Declaration
50. G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014 - DENNIS L. GO,
Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law. Aside from his
presentation of all other requirements, petitioner
presented, as witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas,
Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and Juan Go.
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric
examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no
psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr.
Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that
petitioner’s medical examination results were normal.
Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, said that he had
known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration.
Teresita described him as a peace-loving person who
participated in activities sponsored by his school and
the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner
personally.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for
naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the
qualifications set forth by law. But the CA reversed
and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Go’s petition for naturalization
should be granted.
Ruling: No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial
naturalization, the application must show substantial
and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other
words, an applicant must comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her
possession of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications enumerated under the law, and
present at least two (2) character witnesses to support
his allegations.
In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed
the requirements for character witnesses, namely:
That they are citizens of the Philippines; 
 once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
That they are “credible persons”; 
 Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
That they personally know the petitioner; 
 circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise
That they personally know him to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by law; 
 posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila
That they personally know him to be a person of good
repute; 
 During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa,
That they personally know him to be morally
irreproachable; 

That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and


That he “is not in any way disqualified under the
provisions” of the Naturalization Law. 

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits
executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish
their own qualification to stand as such in a
naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not
present evidence proving that the persons he
presented were credible. In the words of the CA, “he
did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in
the community, known to be honest and upright,
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their
word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty
of the worthiness of petitioner.”
Furthermore, the background checks done on
petitioner yielded negative results due to the
uncooperative behavior of the members of his
household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when
asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court,
this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino
customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to
state his former residence in the petition was fatal to
his application for naturalization. Indeed, this
omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case.
Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed
without prejudice.
vii- Administrative Philippine Citizenship
Supra – Rep vs Batuigas
viii- OSG Special Committee on Citizenship
52. EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a
Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares
St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he
derives an average annual income of
around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the
filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting
the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12
and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned
were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted. The entire petition and its
annexes, including the order, were ordered published
ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
City Hall Building.9
Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in
Page 51 of 70
1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So
family’s business. He would usually attend parties
and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s
family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral character,
including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo,
testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He
and petitioner were classmates at the University of
Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some school
organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA on the following grounds:
Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a
citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are
three ways by which an alien may become a citizen
by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted
by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate
and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born
aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives,
who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate,
the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No.
9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging which is administrative rather than
judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature
believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No.
9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born
aliens. The only implication is that, a native born
alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the
applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her
witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the
purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person"
is not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character
and has no police record; who has not perjured in the
past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible.
What must be credible is not the declaration made but
the person making it. This implies that such person
must have a good standing in the community; that he
is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may
be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the
applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that
respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition.
A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary
proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does
not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon grounds or
conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final
grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal
the decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition before
the lower court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.
c. LOSS OF PHIL CITIZENSHIP AND
DENATURALIZATION
53. LABO VS COMELEC
176 SCRA 1
– Law on Public Officers – Election Laws –
Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship –
Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of
Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition
for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts
that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage
with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and
Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s
considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is
just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the
will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by
a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the
second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace
Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity
of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his
marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of
Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in
1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It
Page 52 of 70
cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino.
To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office.
His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The
people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government
Code and the Constitution simply by electing a
foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for
Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines
have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through
the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s
disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the
second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates
that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election.
Ramon Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC [211 SCRA 297;
GR 105111, July 3, 1992]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification,
2nd Highest Number of Votes)
Facts: For the second time around, believing that he
is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for
mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May
11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other
hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March
25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a
disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino
citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the
assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an
Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent
(Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that
the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall
become final and executory only after five (5) days
from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13,
Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to
be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio
City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of
this case in the event the issue is elevated to the
Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec
resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation
of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the
City Mayor of Baguio.
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant
petition for review with prayer, among others, for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside
the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to
render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen;
and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his
proclamation in the event he wins in the contested
elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused
to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Labo has already become final and
executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not
issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May
9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling
Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has
already become final and executory. Ortega further
posits the view that as a result of such finality, the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof
by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of
votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the
candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number
of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for
mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on
May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s)
certificate of candidacy had already become final and
executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said
resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on
the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992
and in the interim no restraining order was issued by
this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992
constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as
Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino
Page 53 of 70
citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of
the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not
necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate
with the next highest number of votes to proclamation
as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest
number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by
the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that
he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio
City and his subsequent disqualification does not
make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111)
originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny
due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the
same did not deter the people of Baguio City from
voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed
by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the
resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain
the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election
Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
d. REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
54. TECSON CASE – SUPRA CASE NO.33
55. BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPINE BAR,
Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship
Requirement
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the
Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to
show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born
in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as
a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served
as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by
saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that
under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the
age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after
reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935
Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so
when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years
after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be
relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to
take the lawyer’s oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected
Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree
with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.
Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the
allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even
noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was
extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any
further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be
considered. It is not enough that he considered all his
life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and
a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules
for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give
any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect
Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because
he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to
take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector
is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
i. Procedure for Reacquisition via Repatriation –
RA 8171
56. TABASA vs CA
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization;
Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa
acquired American citizenship when his father
became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he
arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as
"balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained
by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US
embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that
his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a
standing warrant for several federal charges against
him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the RA
No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of
repatriation under RA 8171. The only person entitled
to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino
Page 54 of 70
woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by
marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino,
including his minor children who lost Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for
repatriation. The act cannot be applied in his case
because he is no longer a minor at the time of his
repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171
only belongs to children who are of minor age at the
time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
57. ALTAJEROS vs CA
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization;
Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to
disqualify and deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on
the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he
made a false representation in his COC that he was
not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered
that he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s
repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation
with the proper local civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation. Petitioner completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but
before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation
retroacted to the date he filed his application and was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in
the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
ii – RA no. 9225 CITIZENSHIP
REACQUISITION ACT
58. David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18,
2015 Retroactivity of laws, Citizenship, R.A. 9225
AUGUST 4, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and
purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However,
the portion where they built their house is public land
and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application
(MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which
was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document
was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed before
he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the
MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in
his Public Land Application despite his subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING:
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a
Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225,
he belongs to the first category of natural- born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who
lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of
petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of
his category as having already lost Philippine
citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that
such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA,
a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he
was then still a Canadian citizen.
Page 55 of 70

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status
is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
59. THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee
Vs
FRED L DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants
May 19, 1903
G.R. No. 1051
FACTS OF THE CASE
The defendants were charged of scurrilous libel
against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
because of an editorial it published in the issue of
“Manila Freedom”. The defendants were convicted
for said offense basing upon Section 8 of Act. No.
292 of the Commission. Defendants then appealed
for reversal of judgment made by the lower courts.
ISSUE (ADMINISTRATION)
Is the editorial published by the defendants directed
towards the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands?
RULING/HELD
No, the editorial was not directed towards the
government itself but towards the aggregate of
individuals who were administering the government
at that time.
“We understand, in modern political science, . . . by
the term government, that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are
unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority
of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of
authorities which rule a society. By "administration,
again, we understand in modern times, and
especially in more or less free countries, the
aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins
of government are for the time being (the chief
ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms
"government" and "administration" are not always
used in their strictness, and that "government" is
often used for "administration."”
In this case, the editorial published by defendants
where directed towards the personnel of the
Commission whom they described as "notoriously
corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal
character". This as being ruled out by the Supreme
Court was an attack not to the government system
but to the aggregate of individuals by whom the
government is being administered.
NOTES
The final judgment of the convictions of the
defendants was reversed by the Supreme Court
acquitting the defendants with costs against the
officials.
60. 100 Phil. 468 – Political Law – Two-fold
Function of the Government – Constituent vs
Ministrant Functions
Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court
stenographers assigned in a court in Manila. During
the pendency of a particular case in said court,
counsel for one of the parties, National Coconut
Corporation or NACOCO, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714
pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their
bills for the payment of their fees. The National
Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to
Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the
rate of P1 per page.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General
required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on
the strength of a circular of the Department of
Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment
of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that
NACOCO is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. NACOCO set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview
of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government
entity.
HELD: No. Government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of
being part of the government because they do not
come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While
it was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the
coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing
“Facilities for the better curing of copra products
and the proper utilization of coconut by-products“, a
function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry, it was,
however, given a corporate power separate and
distinct from our government, for it was made
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in
so far as its corporate existence and the powers that
it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518 – the law creating
NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the same
manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government.
The Supreme Court also noted the constituent
functions of the government. Constituent functions
are those which constitute the very bonds of society
and are compulsory in nature. According
to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as
follows:
Page 56 of 70
1. The keeping of order and providing for the
protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery.
2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and
wife and between parents and children.
3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and
interchange of property, and the determination of its
liabilities for debt or for crime.
4. The determination of contract rights between
individuals.
5. The definition and punishment of crime.
6. The administration of justice in civil cases.
7. The determination of the political duties,
privileges, and relations of citizens.
8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the
preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.
On the other hand, ministrant functions are those
that are undertaken only by way of advancing the
general interests of society, and are merely optional.
The most important of the ministrant functions are:
public works, public education, public charity,
health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles to
consider whether or not a government shall exercise
certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a
government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally
undertake and (2) that a government should do these
things which by its very nature it is better equipped
to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals.
61. G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
FACTS:
ACCFA was a government agency created under RA
No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery
was reorganized and its named changed to
Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land
Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors'
Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association
were referred to as Union in the ACCFA.
The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective
bargaining agreement effective for a period of one
year. Few months have passed, however,The
Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint
against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed
acts of unfair labor practices and non
implementation of said agreement. Court of
Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from
committing further acts tending to discourage the
Union members in the exercise of their right to self-
organizatoin, to comply with and implement the
provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good
faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to
reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution.
ACCFA appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental
functions.
RULING:
Yes. The implementation of the land reform program
of the government according to Republic Act No.
3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a
proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive
Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land
Reform Project Administration.
The law itself declares that the ACA is a government
office, with the formulation of policies, plans and
programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors,
as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization
with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of
doubt as to the governmental character of its
functions disappears.
62. Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh
de facto government
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH
G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September
17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P.
DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case
with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused
to continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the
ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes
of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the court of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the
government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.
Issues:
Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the
court made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States
and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other
Page 57 of 70
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts.
Whether or not those courts could continue hearing
the cases pending before them, if the said judicial
acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:
Political and international law recognizes that all
acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
under the Japanese occupation may be considered de
facto governments, supported by the military force
and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by
Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p.
444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and
govern the territory of the enemy while in its
military possession, is one of the incidents of war,
and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy
in his possession, during its military occupation, nor
for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the
laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and
decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered
territory, or the laws which regulate private rights,
continue in force during military occupation, excepts
so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts
of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the
powers of a de facto government, and can at his
pleasure either change the existing laws or make
new ones.”
General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944,
but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings
because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of
the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and conceived of
as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the
proceedings in cases then pending in said courts,
without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles “a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force,
resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that
which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and
subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
Rulings:
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were
good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of
justice of those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and valid. Those
not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is
broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as
well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that,
as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the
Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory
had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes
of any other government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said
principles of international law.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a matter
of course as soon as military occupation takes place,
in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An
Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice is,
so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says:
“From a theoretical point of view it may be said that
the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute
his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of
government, legislative, executive and judicial.
From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the
law of nations which compels the conqueror to
Page 58 of 70
continue local laws and institution so far as military
necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits
and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government
established by the occupant of transient character.
63. Estrada vs Desierto
353 SCRA 452 – Political Law – Constitutional Law
– De Jure vs De Facto President – Arroyo a de jure
president
Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of
Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly
but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent
from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a
longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused
the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January
19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said
day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had
defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s
surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking
her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him
in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de
jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a
co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
64. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Case Digest)
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July
15, 2003
Corrected Version
Topic: Prohibitions/Inhibitions of President of the
Philippines
FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino
Government in February 1986 was the recovery of
the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly
amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO)
issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It
created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of
assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises
and entities owned or controlled by them during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the
PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to
delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at
the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not
mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be
relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades
have passed since the government initiated its search
for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is
thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal
acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud
or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all
the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural
sidetracks.
Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos committed
prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during
his term of office
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Page 59 of 70
It is settled that judicial admissions may be
made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in
the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages
of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the
case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and
answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions
of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are
not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such
admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only
known lawful income of respondents since they did
not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL), as required by law, from which their net
worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President
could not receive any other emolument from the
Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President
could not receive during his tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other
source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses,
like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-
President shall not, during their tenure, hold any
other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the management
of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government or
any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government owned or
controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National
Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x
x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof including any government
owned or controlled corporation during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the government for his pecuniary
benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members
of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of
Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear
as counsel before any court or administrative body,
or manage any business, or practice any profession,
and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can
therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of
forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to
establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the
Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential
elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)
of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its
provisions are mandatory and should thus be
construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally
in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the
Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to
apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to
know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically stated
the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner
Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify
the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations
provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of
ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated
assets, properties and other material possessions of
those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful incom
e of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple
did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL) from which their net worth could be
determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in
itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting
their SAL would reward them for their violation of
the law.
65. Gov vs. Monte de Peidad 1916
35 Phil. 728 – Political Law – Parens Patriae
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in
the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it
was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was
then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the
Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the
amount. The government then filed a complaint. The
bank argued that the Philippine government is not an
affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was
not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is
competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is
competent to institute action against Monte de
Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine
of Parens Patriae. The government being the
protector of the rights of the people has the inherent
supreme power to enforce such laws that will
promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the
people the government has the right to take back the
money intended for the people.
65 A. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ V.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA
PHILIPPINES
Title:
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz, et al., etc., v. Ronald Paul
S. Gracia, etc.
Page 60 of 70
Court:
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Date:
31 July 2009
CRC Provisions:
Article 3: Best interests of the child
Domestic Provisions:
Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 - Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father: The illegitimate child shall
use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father. If admission of paternity is
made through a private handwritten instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided
the registration is supported by certain documents.
Article 176 of the Family Code: Illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognised by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. The
father has the right to institute an action before the
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
Case Summary:
Background:
The petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie)
cohabited with her partner Christian Dominique
Tomas Aquino (Dominique) for several months
leading up to Dominique's death. They were not
legally married. Two months after Dominique's
death, Jenie gave birth to their child, Christian.
Jenie applied to register Christian with Dominique's
surname and presented written evidence that
Dominique had acknowledged that Christian was his
child before his death. The application was denied
on the ground that the child was considered to be
born out of wedlock and Dominique has no capacity
to acknowledge paternity of Christian or provide the
documents required following his death.
Jenie filed a complaint against the decision and
argued that Dominique's written acknowledgement
of paternity prior to his death, was also supported
and verified by his brother, falls within the
documents required under the law. The trial court
dismissed Jenie's complaint as Dominique's written
acknowledgement was not signed and held that even
if it was signed, did not contain an express
acknowledgement and therefore did not meet the
legal requirements. Jenie appealed and argued that
the law did not require an acknowledgement to be
signed and that the trial court had erred in not
recognising a clear and unmistakable
acknowledgement of paternity.
Issue and resolution:
Paternity of child born out of wedlock. Whether or
not the unsigned handwritten statement of the
deceased father can be considered a recognition of
paternity in a "private handwritten instrument"
within the meaning of Article 176 of the Family
Code. The Court held that it did and ordered
Christian to be registered with Dominique's
surname.
Court reasoning:
Although there is no express requirement in the law
stating that a written instrument acknowledging
paternity needs to be signed, the requirement for due
execution is implied. In the present case, however,
special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique's
acknowledgement of paternity though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.
Since Dominique died two months prior to the
child's birth and is prevented from acknowledging
paternity in person. And also, the written
acknowledgement of paternity was handwritten and
its authenticity was supported by the facts and
evidence that Jenie presented. For example,
Dominique's brother's corroboration and
confirmation of the authenticity of the written
acknowledgement despite such testimony being
prejudicial to his own rights to inheritance.
Furthermore, the fact that Jenie and Dominique lived
together and Jenie continues to live with
Dominique's parents provide further factual
verification. There is therefore no doubt or dispute
that Dominique's written acknowledgement is
authentic and that paternity is established.
The law states that the welfare of the child shall be
the "paramount consideration". It is in Christian's
best interests to have legal certainty of his paternity
and to allow him to bear the surname of his now
deceased father and have a definitive name reflected
in his birth certificate and avoid the stigma of
illegitimacy.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human
rights instruments:
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall
be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:
Article 3(1): In all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus "the policy of the Family Code to liberalise
the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children." Too, "the State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown
father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner
minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the
surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it
in his birth certificate.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this decision is consistent with the
CRC. The best interests of the child must be a
primary consideration when determining all matters
affecting the child, including the determination of
the child’s paternity.
66. Rubi vs Provincial Board 1919
39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers
– Liberty and due process
Page 61 of 70
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in
the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped.
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation
made to that end and for purposes of cultivation
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-
Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very
low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped
from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and
other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by
virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the
validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.
Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived
of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of
necessity, who else was in a better position to
determine whether or not to execute the law but the
provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial
governor to execute the law as circumstances may
arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-
Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to
relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-
Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace
and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will
ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to
the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the
liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one
say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
67. Agustin vs Edu 88 s 772 (2001)
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
– Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car.
He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction
No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have
early warning devices particularly to equip them
with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning
devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to
the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with
blinking lights which is already enough to provide
warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to
compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early
warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4)
‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . .
. because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance
of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere
along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is
all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in
the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It
is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against
the due process and equal protection safeguards of
the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive
scope of the police power which was originally
Page 62 of 70
identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing
more or less than the powers of government inherent
in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence
being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by
this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of
legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending
as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great
public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In
the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in
the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by
Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare
occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its
being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu
v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
“To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction
on roads and streets designated as national roads . .
.” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted
by the imperative demands of public safety.
68. Product v. Fertiphil Corp.
G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.
Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit,
easier to file public suit, Apply real party in interest
test for private suit and direct injury test for public
suit, Validity test varies depending on which
inherent power
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his
legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which
provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in
having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the
Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust
Company who applies to the payment of corporate
debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped
the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI
refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection
and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on
the ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable
oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial
of due process of law.
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police
power of the state in ensuring the stability of the
fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil
did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed
fell on the ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an
exercise of the power of taxation ad is as such
because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a
private corporation.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the
power of taxation rather the police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a
litigant to be a "real party in interest" or party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the
ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed
from unlawful government intrusion and illegal
official action subject to the direct injury test or
where there must be personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural
technicality, it has also been held that locus standi
may be waived in the public interest such as cases of
transcendental importance or with far-reaching
implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil
has locus standi.
Page 63 of 70
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying
the levy which made its products more expensive
and harm its business. It is also of paramount public
importance since it involves the constitutionality of a
tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are
inherent powers of the state but distinct and have
different tests for validity. Police power is the
power of the state to enact the legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty on property in order to
promote general welfare. While, the power of
taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for
public purpose. The main purpose of police power
is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while
taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects
and lawful means tests are used to determine the
validity of a law enacted under the police
power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a
robbery for the State to tax the citizen and use the
funds generation for a private purpose. Public
purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose
which are traditionally viewed as essentially
governmental function such as building roads and
delivery of basic services, but also includes those
purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus,
public money may now be used for the relocation of
illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or
agrarian reform.
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
69. Merritt vs Gov
34 Phil 311 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages –
Liability of the State for acts of special agents
Political Law – Non-Suability of the State – Waiver
of Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E.
Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his
work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle
along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to have been negligent. Because of the
incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was
severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so
that he could never perform his job the way he used
to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what
he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to
sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to
bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for
the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a
special agent nor was a government officer acting as
a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. “The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of
the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest.”
70. Vigilar vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, Jan. 18,
2011 Immunity from Suit
DECEMBER 4, 2017
FACTS:
Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the
construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the
Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle,
Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently
awarded the “Contract of Agreement” by the said
government agency.
By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by
respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. However,
claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but
petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a
Complaint for the collection of sum of money with
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the
defense that the Complaint was a suit against the
state; that respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of
Agreement” covering the project was void for
violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the
proper appropriation and the Certificate of
Availability of Funds.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.
Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before
the CA which ruled in their favor, declaring the
contract null and void ab initio but ordered
compensation to Aquino for worked delivered,
subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied
with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then raised the
issue before the Supreme Court seeking complete
dismissal of the case without paying Aquino any
money.
Page 64 of 70
ISSUE:
Was the doctrine of sovereign immunity properly
invoked?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Citing their decision in EPG Construction (G.R. No.
131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566), the court
said that it would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable if the respondent is not duly
compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public
have received benefits from the project and reaped
the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. The
Court further said that the no government agency or
agent can conveniently hide under the State’s cloak
of invincibility against suit, because this principle
has limitations especially when that the ends of
justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in
this particular instance, the State’s immunity from
suit. The Court finally said that in this case, it can’t
be an instrument of injustice by upholding the
immunity from suit principle and affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
73. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY vs.
SANTAMARIA
G.R. No. 185572; February 7, 2012
FACTS:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG),
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation for the conduct
of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from
Manila to San Fernando, La Union.
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of
China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance
of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China
agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the
Philippine government to finance the Northrail
Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM
Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government
named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30
MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not
exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF,
payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and
at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines, Wang Chungui, wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho informing him of
CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for
the Northrail Project. On 30 December 2003,
Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract
Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I
of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan
to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract
Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail
Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government
and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement, the Buyer Credit Loan Agreement. In the
Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government
in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the
Northrail Project.
ISSUE:
Whether the Contract Agreement is an executive
agreement.
RULING:
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties defines a treaty as, “An international
agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular
designation.” The Court held that an executive
agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the
former (a) does not require legislative concurrence;
(b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a
narrower range of subject matters.
Despite these differences, to be considered an
executive agreement, the following three requisites
provided under the Vienna Convention must
nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be
between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must
governed by international law. The first and the third
requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
The Contract Agreement was not concluded between
the Philippines and China, but between Northrail
and CNMEG. By the terms of the Contract
Agreement, Northrail is a government-owned or -
controlled corporation, while CNMEG is a
corporation duly organized and created under the
laws of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, both
Northrail and CNMEG entered into the Contract
Agreement as entities with personalities distinct and
separate from the Philippine and Chinese
governments, respectively.
Neither can it be said that CNMEG acted as agent of
the Chinese government. As previously discussed,
the fact that Amb. Wang, in his letter dated 1
October 2003, described CNMEG as a "state
corporation" and declared its designation as the
Primary Contractor in the Northrail Project did not
mean it was to perform sovereign functions on
behalf of China. That label was only descriptive of
its nature as a state-owned corporation, and did not
preclude it from engaging in purely commercial or
proprietary ventures.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing reasons that
the Contract Agreement does not partake of the
nature of an executive agreement. It is merely an
ordinary commercial contract that can be questioned
before the local courts.
75. DOH v Phil Pharmawealth GR No. 182358
Department of Health, Secretary Alfredo
Romualdez, USec. Margarita Galon, petitioner;
Philippine Pharmawealth, Inc, respondent;
February 20, 2013
Second Division
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO)
No. 27 series of 1995 was issued by then
Department of Health Secretary Alfredo G.
Romualdez. AO 27 sets the guidelines and procedure
Page 65 of 70
for accreditation of government suppliers of
pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to
the public, such accreditation to be valid for three
years but subject to annual review.
On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued
AO 10 series of 2006 which amended AO 27. Under
Sec 7 of AO 10, accreditation period for government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to
2 years. Also, accreditation of Pharmaceutical
companies may be recalled, suspended or revoked
after due deliberation and proper notice by the DOH
Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
Sec 7 of AO 10 was later amended AO 66 series of
2008 which stated that the 2 year accreditation may
be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due
deliberation, hearing and notice by the DOH
Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum
No. 171-C9 which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government
suppliers. In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the
DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita
M. Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of
2000 inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug
companies, including herein respondent Phil
Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October
27, 2000.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed
them copies of a document entitled “Report on
Violative Products” issued by the Bureau of Food
and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or
adverse findings relative to these accredited drug
companies’ products. PPI’s products were included
as BFAD found that PPI’s products sold to the
public were unfit for human consumption.
The companies were directed to submit their
respective explanations on the findings within 10
days. PPI did not submit its reply on time. Instead, it
submitted a letter stating that it is referring the
matter to its lawyers for preparation of a reply but
with no indicated date of compliance, which DOH
Usec Galon found untenable, thus she informed PPI
thru letter that its accreditation had been suspended
for two years in accordance with AO 10 and
Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI thru letter, demanded
that Usec Galon cease and desist from enforcing the
suspension under pain of legal redress.
PPI then filed a complaint to declare certain DOH
issuances (Memorandum No. 171-C, AO 10, Series
2000, Usec Galon’s suspension order; and AO 14,
Series 2001) null and void for being in violation of
Section 26, Republic Act 3720, with prayer for
injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later
DOH Secretary Dayrit. It claimed that its
accreditation was suspended without due notice and
hearing. It prayed that it be awarded moral damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The respondent DOH officials filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that it gave PPI the opportunity to
explain but it did not do so in a timely manner. The
suspension was necessary to stop the distribution
and sale of substandard products. In a Manifestation
and Motion, the DOH officials further moved to
dismiss the case as it was a suit against the State; the
complaint was improperly verified; and the
corporate officer lacked the authority to file the suit.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case,
holding that the suit is against the State, thus the
principle of immunity form suit is applicable.
On appeal to the CA, however, the latter reversed
and set aside the RTC decision. According to the
CA, it was premature for the RTC to have dismissed
the case, as the cause of actions were sufficiently
alleged in the complaint. Further, by filing a
complaint, the DOH officials hypothetically
admitted the allegations in the complaint-that they
were being sued in their official and private
capacities. Thus the DOH officials, herein
petitioners, elevated the case to the Supreme Court,
arguing that PPI’s prayer for damages should be
considered a suit against the State for it would
require the needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s
claim for damages should it win. In issuing the
assailed DOH issuances, they acted within the scope
of their authority, hence should not be made to
account individually. Petition was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOH, in this circumstance, is under
the mantle of state immunity.
HELD:
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However,
if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it
may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent
when a law, either special or general, so provides.
On the other hand, there is implied consent when the
state “enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a
state enters into a contract, it does not automatically
mean that it has waived its nonsuability. The State
“will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity, x x x no such waiver may be implied.”
“Statutory provisions waiving state immunity are
construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
77. Landbank vs Rivera 2010
SUMMARY: LBP, performing govt function is not
liable for the cost of the suit.
PETITION: Petition for review on certiorari by
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering the payment by LBP of just compensation
and interest in favor of respondents Esther Anson
Rivera et al
FACTS:
Rivera are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural
land and later transferred in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title that was placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27.
After the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
directed payment, LBP approved the payment of
P265,494.20, exclusive of the advance payments
made in the form of lease rental amounting to
P75,415.88 but inclusive of 6% increment of
P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, series of 1994.
Page 66 of 70
Rivera instituted Civil Case No. 94-03 FOR
DETERMINATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (RTC), claiming that the
landholding involved was irrigated with two
cropping seasons a year with an average gross
production per season of 100 cavans of 50
kilos/hectare, equivalent of 200 cavans/year/hectare;
and that the fair market value of the property was not
less that P130,000.00/hectare, or P2,668,302.00 for
the entire landholding of 20.5254 hectares.
LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands
placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree
No. 27 were governed and valued in accordance
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 etc.
The RTC rendered its decision, holding: THE JUST
COMPENSATION OF THE LAND PARTLY
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-95690 IS FIXED AT
PHP1,297,710.63.
Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to
pay Esther Anson, Cesar Anson and Antonio Anson
the aforesaid value of the land, plus interest of 12%
per annum or Php194.36 per day effective October
7, 2004, until the value is fully paid, in cash or in
bond or in any other mode of payment at the option
of the landowners in accordance with Sec. 18, RA
6657.
LBP filed MR – DENIED
LBP next filed a petition for Review to the Court of
Appeals then the DECISION DATED OCTOBER 6,
2004 is MODIFIED, ordering petitioner LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES to pay to the
respondents just compensation (inclusive of interests
as of October 6, 2004) in the amount of
P823,957.23, plus interest of 12% per annum on the
amount of P515,777.57, or P61,893.30 per annum,
beginning October 7, 2004 until the just
compensation is fully paid in accordance with this
decision.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that:
Pursuant to AO 13, considering that the landholding
involved herein was tenanted prior to October 21,
1972, the rate of 6% per annum is imposed,
compounded annually from October 21, 1972 until
October 21, 1994, the date of the effectivity of AO
13.
Beyond October 21, 1994, only the simple rate of
6% per annum interest is imposable until October 6,
2004 (the date of the rendition of the decision of the
RTC) on the total value (that is, P164,059.26 plus
the compounded increments up to October 21, 1994)
but minus the lease rentals of P75,415.88.
Only the simple rate of 6% is applicable up to then
because the obligation to pay was not founded on a
written agreement that stipulated a different rate of
interest. From October 7, 2004 until the full
payment, the simple interest rate is raised to 12%
per annum.
The reason is that the amount thus determined had
by then acquired the character of a forbearance in
money.
LBP DISAGREED WITH THE IMPOSITION OF
12% INTEREST AND ITS LIABILITY TO PAY
THE COSTS OF SUIT. IT FILED A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS DENIED IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RESOLUTION
DATED 18 MARCH 2008.
Thus this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Is it valid or lawful to award 12% rate of interest
per annum in favor of respondents notwithstanding
the 6% rate of interest per annum compounded
annually prescribed under DAR A.O. No. 13, series
of 1994, DAR A.O. No. 02, series of 2004, and
DAR A.O. No. 06, series of 2008, "xxx from
November 1994 up to the time of actual payment?
(RELEVANT TO THE CASE)
II. IS IT VALID OR LAWFUL TO ADJUDGE
PETITIONER LBP, WHICH IS PERFORMING A
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION, LIABLE FOR
COSTS OF SUIT?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED. (LBP performing
GOV’T function IS EXEMPTED from cost of suit)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that LBP is
hereby held exempted from the payment of costs of
suit. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
At the outset, the Court notes that the parcels of land
subject matter of this case were acquired under In
the instant case, while the subject lands were
acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27, the
complaint for just compensation was only lodged
before the court on 23 November 2000 or long after
the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 in 1998.
Therefore, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657
should be the principal basis of the computation for
just compensation.
Conformably with the foregoing resolution, this
Court rules that a 12% interest per annum on just
compensation, due to the respondents, from the
finality of this decision until its satisfaction, is
proper.
SECOND ISSUE:IMPORTANT!
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY ADJUDGED LBP LIABLE TO PAY
THE COST OF SUIT.
LBP’s argument
According to LBP, it performs a governmental
function when it disburses the Agrarian Reform
Fund to satisfy awards of just compensation. Hence,
it cannot be made to pay costs in eminent domain
proceedings.
NHA’s argument
the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all
kinds of fees and charges, because it performs
governmental functions.
COURT’s DECISION
COURT AGREES – DO NOT NEED TO PAY
COST – PERFORMING GOVT FUNCTIONS
While it has not always been easy to distinguish
governmental from proprietary functions, the Court's
declaration in the Decision quoted above is not
without basis. Indeed, the characterization of
Page 67 of 70
governmental functions has veered away from the
traditional constituent-ministrant classification that
has become unrealistic, if not obsolete.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz avers: "[I]t is now obligatory
upon the State itself to promote social justice, to
provide adequate social services to promote a rising
standard of living, to afford protection to labor to
formulate and implement urban and agrarian reform
programs, and to adopt other measures intended to
ensure the dignity, welfare and security of its
citizens.....These functions, while traditionally
regarded as merely ministrant and optional, have
been made compulsory by the Constitution."
The relevant provision of the Rules of Court states:
RULE 142, “No costs shall be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise
provided by law.”
Based from jurisprudence, LBP is an agency created
primarily to provide financial support in all phases
of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 and Section 64 of RA
No. 6657.
It is vested with the primary responsibility and
authority in the valuation and compensation of
covered landholdings to carry out the full
implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program.
It is evident from the afore-quoted jurisprudence that
the role of LBP in the CARP is more than just the
ministerial duty of keeping and disbursing the
Agrarian Reform Funds.
As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is
primarily responsible for the valuation and
determination of compensation for all private lands.
It has the discretion to approve or reject the land
valuation and just compensation for a private
agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the
LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and
determination of just compensation by a party, the
DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the
right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if
appropriate.
IT IS CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE
DISCUSSIONS THAT SINCE LBP IS
PERFORMING A GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION IN AGRARIAN REFORM
PROCEEDING, IT IS EXEMPT FROM THE
PAYMENT OF COSTS OF SUIT AS PROVIDED
UNDER RULE 142, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
Thus, since LBP is performing a gov’t function, it is
thus exempted from paying the cost of suit.
In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land
and determination of just compensation by a party,
the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has
the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by
appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if
appropriate.
It is clear from the above discussions that since LBP
is performing a governmental function in agrarian
reform proceeding, it is exempt from the payment of
costs of suit as provided under Rule 142, Section 1
of the Rules of Court.
78. Lockheed vs. UP G.R. No. 18591 AprIL 18,
2012 Immunity from Suit
DECEMBER 4, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman
Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for
security services with respondent UP. In 1998,
several security guards assigned to UP filed separate
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of
underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay
for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials,
13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of
deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System
(MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31,
1998, and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued,
can UP funds be garnished?
RULING:
We agree with UP that there was no point for
Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state
immunity from suit as this was never an issue in this
case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it
participated in the proceedings below. What UP
questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its
PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly
applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the
government and has the capacity to sue and be
sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade
execution, and its funds may be subject to
garnishment or levy. However, before execution
may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment
award must first be filed with the COA.
79. UP vs Dizon 2012
CASE DIGEST: UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al. v. HON. AGUSTIN S.
DIZON, et al.
FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered
into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction and renovation of the
buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP
was able to pay its first and second billing. However,
the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due
to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect
the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its
decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB
Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the
UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
Page 68 of 70
On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders,
the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied
UPs petition. The denial became final and executory.
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion
for execution despite their previous motion having
already been granted and despite the writ of
execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003,
the RTC granted another motion for execution filed
on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already
issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the
RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The
CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?
II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed
out of time?
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not
subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the
UP remains to be a "chartered institution"
performing a legitimate government function.
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality,
performing the States constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education. As a
government instrumentality, the UP administers
special funds sourced from the fees and income
enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by
Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act
No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of
the UP, including any interest accruing from the
deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of
which should always be aligned with the UPs
mission and purpose, and should always be subject
to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are
government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for
the attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the
State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between
suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of
the monetary judgment against the UP was within
the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no
moment that a final and executory decision already
validated the claim against the UP.
HELD: The period of appeal did not start without
effective service of decision upon counsel of record.
(The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment;
service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation
of time)
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of
the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished
from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the
finality of the judgment based on the supposed
tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on
September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has
attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or
by this Court as the highest court of the land. But the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not
been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions,
among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no
prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision that render its execution unjust and
inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity
warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional
power to disregard the declaration of finality of the
judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of
the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB
Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he
was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP.
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the
OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that
where a party has appeared by counsel, service must
be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough
from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules
of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Where one counsel appears for several parties,
he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper
served upon him by the opposite side."
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon
Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the
remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal
would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be
correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became
final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of
Page 69 of 70
appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so
declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against
the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule
contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing
of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the
running of the period for filing the appeal; and that
the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA
and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly
adhering to the rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application

in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the
Court first announced in mid-September of 2005
through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration." The retroactive application of the
fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is
impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Consequently, even if the reckoning started from

May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the
denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice
of appeal was not tardy within the context of the
fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-
days counted from service of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration would end on June 1,
2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had
until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a
Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with
Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds
that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed,
falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in
the place where the court sits, the time shall not run
until the next working day.

GRANTED

80.

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