G.R. Nos.
172532 172544-45 November 20,
2013
PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS,
CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I.
MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the decision2 dated November 22 2005 and the
resolution3dated April 21 2006 of the Court of Appeals
CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149 83150 and 83576.
The CA decision reversed and set aside the joint
decision4 dated January 9 2004 of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas (Deputy Ombudsman),
Primo C. Miro in OMB-V-A-02-0414-H finding
respondents Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de Erederos Catalina
Alingasa and Porferio I Mendoza guilty of the
administrative charge of Grave Misconduct. The Deputy
Ombudsman also found Oscar Peque guilty of Simple
Misconduct.
The Factual Antecedents
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present
case are as follows:
Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land
Transportation Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos,
Mendoza's niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and
Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO
Cebu, were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private
complainants, namely: Maricar G Huete (Liaison Officer
of GCY Parts), Ernesto R Cantillas (Liaison Officer of
Isuzu Cebu, Inc.), Leonardo Villaraso (General Manager
of TBS Trading), and Romeo C. Climaco (Corporate
Secretary of Penta Star).5 They were likewise charged
with criminal complaints for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act."
The administrative and criminal charges arose from the
alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of
confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in
the processing of documents for the registration of motor
vehicle with the LTO.
Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa
of selling the confirmation certificates, supposed to be
issued by the LTO free of charge. This scheme allegedly
existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional
Director of LTO Cebu. They observed that:
(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the
amount of ₱2,500.00 per pad without official
receipt;
(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to
Erederos who would, in turn, remit all the
collections to Mendoza;6
(3) The official receipt for the processing of the
confirmation certificates issued to the private
complainants acknowledged only the amount of
₱40.00 which they paid for each engine, chassis
or new vehicle, as MR. (Miscellaneous Receipt-
LTO Form 67);
(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from
the ₱2,500.00 required to be paid for each pad;
(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for
the individual stock/sales reports evaluation of
Erederos;7and
(6) The confirmation certificates processed
during the previous administration were no longer
honored; thus, the private complainants were
constrained to reprocess the same by purchasing
new ones.
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila
also revealed that the confirmation certificates were given
to the representatives of car dealers, who were authorized
to supply the needed data therein. In the Requisition and
Issue Voucher, it was Roque who received the forms. On
August 19, 2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desi
stance on the ground that he was no longer interested in
prosecuting the case.
On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman
ordered the respondents to file their respective counter-
affidavits. The respondents complied with the order and
made the required submission.
On December 12, 2002, the case was called for
preliminary conference. At the conference, the
respondents, thru their counsels, manifested their
intention to submit the case for decision on the basis of
the evidence on record after the submission of their
memoranda/position papers.
In the interim, additional administrative and criminal
complaints for the same charges were filed by Rova
Carmelotes (Liaison Officer of ZC Trading Center),
Mildred Regidor (Liaison Officer of Grand Ace
Commercial), Estrella dela Cerna (Liaison Officer of JRK
Automotive Supply), and Vevencia Pedroza (Liaison
Officer of Winstar Motor Sales) against the respondents.
These new complaints were consolidated with the
complaints already then pending.
In their complaints, the new complainants commonly
alleged that they had to pay ₱2,500.00 per pad to
Alingasa before they could be issued confirmation
certificates by the LTO Cebu. Alingasa would give her
collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. When they
protested, Erederos and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as
the source of the instructions. They were also told that the
confirmation certificates processed during the previous
administration would no longer be honored under
Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to buy new
sets of confirmation certificates to process the registration
of their motor vehicles with the LTO.
In his counter-affidavit, Mendoza vehemently denied the
accusations. He alleged that the confirmation certificates
actual distribution and processing were assigned to
Alingasa; the processing entails the payment of ₱40.00
per confirmation certificate, as administrative fee;
payment is only made when the confirmation certificates
are filled up and submitted for processing with the LTO,
not upon issuance; and he did not give any instructions to
impose additional fees for their distribution.
He also alleged that the case against him was instigated
by Assistant Secretary Roberto T. Lastimosa of the LTO
Head Office so that a certain Atty. Manuel I way could
replace him as Regional Director of the L TO Cebu.8
Mendoza additionally submitted the affidavits of
desistance of Carmelotes and Dela Cerna. Carmelotes
testified that she has no evidence to support her
allegations against Mendoza. Dela Cerna, on the other
hand, stated that she was merely told to sign a document
which turned out to be an affidavit-complaint against the
respondents. Subsequently, however, Dela Cerna
executed a second affidavit, retracting her previous
statements and narrating how she was threatened by
Peque to sign an affidavit of desistance (1st affidavit).
Erederos and Alingasa commonly contended that they did
not collect, demand and receive any money from the
complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.
Erederos stated that the case against her was initiated by
Huete because she found several discrepancies in the
documents she had processed. According to her, the
present case was Huete s ploy to avoid any liability.
For their part, Alingasa stressed that her act of
maintaining a control book for the releases of the
confirmation certificate pads negates her liability, while
Peque denied any participation in the distribution and sale
of the confirmation certificates.
On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a
joint decision on the administrative aspect of the cases
filed against the respondents, and a joint resolution on the
criminal aspect of the cases.
The Deputy Ombudsman s Ruling
In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found
Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Peque, on the other hand, was only found guilty
of simple misconduct and was meted the penalty of
reprimand.
The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants
allegations that Alingasa collected ₱2,500.00 for the
issuance of confirmation certificates and, thereafter,
remitted the collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He
relied largely on the affidavits supporting the respondents
guilt. He found the affidavits and the NBI/Progress report
strong enough to establish the respondents guilt. The
Deputy Ombudsman also explained that while the
distribution of confirmation certificates to authorized car
dealers is not prohibited, the demand and the collection
of payment during their distribution are anomalous.
The respondents separately moved for reconsideration,
but the Deputy Ombudsman denied their motions on
March 5, 2004.9
The respondents separately appealed to the CA to
challenge the rulings against them.
The CA’s Ruling
On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents
petition and reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s joint
decision in the administrative aspect. The CA ruled that
the Deputy Ombudsman s finding of grave misconduct
was not supported by substantial evidence because the
affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored,
were not corroborated by any other documentary
evidence. Additionally, the affiants did not appear during
the scheduled hearings. The CA also found that the
affiants failed to categorically specify that the respondents
personally demanded from them the payment of
₱2,500.00 -an allegation that the appellate court deemed
material in establishing their personal knowledge. Without
this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA held that the
statements in the affidavits were hearsay and, thus,
should not be given any evidentiary weight. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the
consolidated petitions are GRANTED and accordingly the
assailed Joint Decision dated January 9, 2004
(administrative aspect of the cases filed by the private
respondents) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the administrative charges against
petitioners are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated
January 9, 2004 (criminal aspect) issued by the public
respondent, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the
same.10
The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration
of the decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
resolution of April 21, 2006. The denial led to the filing of
the present petition.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
The Deputy Ombudsman posits that the evidence
adduced by the complainants satisfied the requisite
quantum of proof. He argues that the complainants
personal knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of
their narration; hence, their affidavits could not have been
hearsay. Their affidavits read:
3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the
following anomalies concerning the processing of vehicle
registration, x x x, as follows:
a. That in order to secure the forms of
Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy the
same at the present price of ₱2,500.00 per pad
from Catalina Alingasa, an L TO personnel, who
will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn
Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, a niece and the
Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio
Mendoza;
b. That Confirmation Certificates processed
during previous administration would not be
honored and under such situations, they would
require that the same be reprocessed which
means that we have to buy and use the new
forms supplied by the present administration.11
The Deputy Ombudsman also argues that his joint
decision was not solely based on the complainants
affidavits since he also took into account the
NBI/Progress report, which uncovered the alleged
anomalies. He posits that these pieces of evidence, taken
together, more than satisfy the required quantum of proof
to hold the respondents administratively liable for grave
misconduct.
The Case for the Respondents
In their respective comments, the respondents separately
argue that the complainants statements in their affidavits
lack material details and particulars, particularly on the
time, the date, and the specific transactions.
They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which
contained general averments, and the NBI/Progress
report that was based on the same affidavits, failed to
meet the quantum of proof required to hold them
administratively liable.
For his part, Mendoza argues that since the affidavits
failed to categorically state that the complainants
personally witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa
to Erederos and eventually to him, his participation in the
anomalous scheme has not been sufficiently shown;
hence, he should not have been found liable.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in dismissing the
administrative charge against the respondents.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. The CA committed no reversible
error in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the
Deputy Ombudsman on the ground that they were not
supported by substantial evidence.
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of
fact is not absolute
It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence.12 Their factual findings are
generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not
finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on
Audit-Region VII,13 where we held that: When the findings
of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial
evidence, it should be considered as conclusive. This
Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the
Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings
absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion. Hence,
being supported by substantial evidence, we find no
reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman
which are affirmed by the CA.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however,
is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to
administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual
issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record
and reverse the administrative agency s findings if not
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the
findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy
Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the
courts.14
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence
to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty
of the administrative charges against them. Mere
allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not
equivalent to proof.15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s
findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial
evidence, the same shall not bind this Court.
Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court
deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review
under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual
questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. As held in
Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac,16 a re-examination of factual
findings is outside the province of a petition for review on
certiorari to wit:
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings
cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier
stated, this Court is not a trier of facts. xxx The Supreme
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is
already outside the province of the instant Petition for
Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a
question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.17 Unless the case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review
of legal questions.18
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a
petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA, and
not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in
the first instance.19 It is imperative that we refrain from
conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by
trial courts, lest we convert this Court into a trier of facts.
As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda
and Maria Altamirano etc. et al.20 our review is limited only
to the errors of law committed by the appellate court, to
wit:
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is
generally limited to the review of errors of law committed
by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged
to review all over again the evidence which the parties
adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule
admits of exceptions, such as where the factual findings
of the CA and the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory.
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,21 this Court laid down the
guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers, as follows:
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing
administrative decisions of the executive branch of the
government, the findings of facts made therein are to be
respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency
of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-
examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an
administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and
do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence
that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned. [emphases ours]
The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety
of the CA s reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman s decision
that found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct.
While this issue may be one of law, its resolution also
requires us to resolve the underlying issue of whether or
not substantial evidence exists to hold the respondents
liable for the charge of grave misconduct. The latter
question is one of fact, but a review is warranted
considering the conflicting findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman and of the CA. Accordingly, we now focus
on and assess the findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman and of the CA for their merits.
The Deputy Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence
The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of
grave misconduct based on the affidavits submitted by the
complainants and the NBI/Progress report. In giving
credence to the affidavits, the Deputy Ombudsman ruled
that the complainants have amply established their
accusations by substantial evidence.
The CA’s appreciation of evidence
The CA, on the other hand, reversed the Deputy
Ombudsman s findings and ruled that no substantial
evidence exists to support the latter’s decision as the
affidavits upon which said decision was based are
hearsay evidence. It found that the affidavits lack the
important element of personal knowledge and were not
supported by corroborating evidence.
We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman are not supported by substantial evidence
on record.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative
cases
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence.22 The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to
believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is
required in an ordinary civil case,23 or evidence beyond
reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the
evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion.
Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 198924 provides
that:
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
(1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
[emphasis ours]
The only pieces of evidence presented by the
complainants to establish the respondents' guilt of the act
charged are: (1) their complaint-affidavits and the (2)
NBl/Progress report. As correctly found by the CA, these
pieces of evidence do not meet the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases.
The Evidence Against Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa
i. Private complainants affidavits
The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal
knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos
in the allegedly anomalous act. These affidavits indicate
that the complainants have commonly noticed and
witnessed the anomalous sale transaction concerning the
confirmation certificates. Without going into details, they
uniformly allege that to secure the confirmation
certificates, an amount of ₱2,500.00 would be paid to
Alingasa, an L TO personnel, "who will remit her
collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza vda. Erederos, a
niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio
Mendoza."25 While the payment to Alingasa might be
considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged
remittance to Erederos and Mendoza -on its face - is
hearsay.
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of he witness
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only
on the facts that he knows of his own Rersonal
knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own
perception.26 A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard.27 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the
witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from
others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements
but likewise applies to written statements, such as
affidavits.28
The records show that not one of the complainants
actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to
Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did
they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the
collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific
allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or
Mendoza receive money. That the complainants alleged
in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and
witnessed" the anomalous act complained of does not
take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay
evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard
from others."29 Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence. 30
The affidavits also show that the complainants did not
allege any specific act of the respondents. All that the
affidavits allege is a description of the allegedly
anomalous scheme and the arrangement whereby
payments were to be made to Alingasa. There is no
averment relating to any "personal demand" for the
amount of ₱2,500.00.
Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that
the complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos'
and Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At
most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts
of Alingasa who is the recipient of all payments for the
processing of confirmation certificates. This situation,
however, is affected by the complainants' failure to
specify Alingasa's act of personally demanding ₱2,500.00
-a crucial element in determining her guilt or innocence of
the grave misconduct charged.
With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit 31 that
Alingasa and Erederos categorically told them that it was
Mendoza who instructed them to collect the ₱2,500.00 for
the confirmation certificates, we once again draw a
distinction between utterances or testimonies that are
merely hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those
that are considered as legal hearsay.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
To the former belongs the fact that utterances or
statements were made; this class of extrajudicial
utterances or statements is offered not s an assertion to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only as to the
fact of the utterance made. The latter class, on the other
hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement; this kind pertains to extrajudicial utterances
and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth
of the fact asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances
lies in the applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay
evidence. The first class, i.e. the fact that the statement
was made, is not covered by the hearsay rule, while the
second class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's
allegation belongs to the first class; hence, it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement. The following discussion, made m Patula v.
People of the Philippines32 is particularly instructive:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a
human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis
of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received
s evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination. However, if an
extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to
prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not
to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely
to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind
of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal
hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact
that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule
does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. [citations
omitted]
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible
under the hearsay evidence rule
We additionally note that the affidavits were never
identified by the complainants. All the allegations
contained therein were likewise uncorroborated by
evidence, other than the NBI/Progress report.
In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,33 we had the
occasion to rule on the implications of the affiants' failure
to appear during the preliminary investigation and to
identify their respective sworn statements, to wit:
Notably, the instant administrative complaint was
resolved by the Ombudsman merely on the basis of the
evidence extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983.
The preliminary conference required under Republic Act
No. 6770 was dispensed with after the nominal
complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P.
Ledesma, manifested on July 29, 1996 that he was
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
documents on record while the petitioner agreed to simply
file his memorandum. Consequently, the only basis for the
questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the
petitioner from the government service was the unverified
complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his
alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that
the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even
identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding
investigation conducted by the BID Resident
Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did they
appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their
respective sworn statements despite prior notice before
the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the
criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge
against the petitioner "was not supported by any
evidence." Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and
inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman should have dismissed the administrative
complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.
(emphasis supplied)
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements,
and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their
affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should
be treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence
rule.
ii. NBI/Progress report
With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the
complainants as corroborating evidence, the same should
not be given any weight. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
assertions, the report cannot help its case under the
circumstances of this case as it is insufficient to serve as
substantial basis. The pertinent portion of this report
reads:
04. P/Sinsp. JESUS KABIGTING and Senior TRO
ALFONSO ALIANZA visited JAGNA District Office at
Jagna, Bohol wherein they were able to conduct interview
with MR. RODOLFO SANTOS, Officer-In-Charge who
has assumed his new post only in February 2002. During
the conduct of the interview, Mr. SANTOS revealed that
the anomalous Dos-por-Dos transactions have been
prevented and eliminated when the previous District
Manager in the person of Mr. LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR,
who was transferred to Tagbilaran District Office allegedly
on a floating status and under the direct control and
supervision of its District Manager, Mr. GA VINO PADEN,
Mr. SANTOS allegations of the existence of "Dos-por-
Dos" transactions were supported by the
records/documents gathered of which the signatures of
Mr. OLAIVAR affixed thereof. Copies are hereto attached
marked as Annexes D-D-6.
xxxx
06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. HUETE, a
resident of Lahug, Cebu City and liaison Officer of GCY
Parts, Kabancalan Mandaue City and Mr. ERNESTO R.
CARTILLAS a resident of Basak, Mandaue City and
liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in Jagobiao, Mandaue
City stated among others and both attested that: Annexes
"E-E-1."
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of
Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present cost
of ₱2,500.00 per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA, an
LTO Personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain
MARILYN MENDOZA V da De EREDEROS, a niece and
secretary of the Regional Director, PORFERIO
MENDOZA.34
This quoted portion shows that it was based on
complainant Huete's and Cantillas' affidavits. It
constitutes double hearsay because the material facts
recited were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. As held in
Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phil.) Inc., et al., 35 reports of
investigations made by law enforcement officers or other
public officials are hearsay unless they fall within the
scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: The first question before Us refers to the admissibility
of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police
and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. xxx.
xxxx
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule
just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c)
that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in
the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire
were not within the personal knowledge of the officers
who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such
facts, however, acquired by them through official
information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not
acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so. [emphases ours]
The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the
officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis
of their own personal observation of the facts reported but
merely on the basis of the complainants affidavits, is
hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot rely on it.
Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules
While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the
Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license
to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision
of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies
upon must, at the very least, be substantial. that:
In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
Dumapis,36 we ruled that:
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural
rule should not be construed as a license to disregard
certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence
presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility
for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
Conclusion
With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the
NBI/Progress report being hearsay evidence, the only
question that remains is whether the respondents
conduct, based on the evidence on record, amounted to
grave misconduct, warranting their dismissal in office.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer.37 The misconduct
is considered as grave if it involves additional elements
such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proven by
substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.38
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to
establish the elements of grave misconduct.1âwphi1 To
reiterate, no substantial evidence exists to show that
Erederos and Mendoza received collected payments from
Alingasa Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly
anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the
affidavits of the complainants and the NBI/Progress
report, which are both hearsay.
With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial
evidence showing that she personally demanded the
payment of ₱2,500.00 – a crucial factor in the wrongdoing
alleged – we find that the elements of misconduct, simple
or grave, to be wanting and unproven.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby
AFFIRM the assailed decision dated November 22, 2005
and the resolution dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149, 83150 and 83576.
SO ORDERED.
S/SGT. ELMER T. VERGARA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision
dated October 31, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in Criminal Case No. 86163, convicting him of
robbery, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara GUILTY beyond peradventure of
doubt of the crime of Robbery defined and penalized under
Art. 294, No. (5), in relation to Art. 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years of prision correcional, as minimum, to Eight (8)
years and Twenty-One (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P106,000.00; to suffer all the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto; and, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 19, 1991, an information charging S/Sgt. Elmer
Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y Abrera, PC and Leonido
Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band was filed by the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutors Office with the RTC of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The information reads:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with John Doe, whose true identity and present whereabout is
still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another,
armed with high powered handguns, with intent of gain, by
means of violence and intimidation employed upon the person
of one Catherine F. Manalo, an employee of J & E Manalo
Construction Co., Inc., who was then aboard a private car, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and divest from Catherine F. Manalo the payroll money
amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo
Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2)
pendants, 18K valued at P17,000 belonging to Catherine F.
Manalo, to the damage and prejudice of J & E Manalo
Construction Company, Inc. and Catherine F. Manalo in the
aforementioned amounts of P89,000.00 and P17, 000.00
respectively.
Contrary to law.[2]
Although all the suspects were brought into police custody,
petitioners co-accused managed to extricate themselves from
police control and remain at large. Only petitioner was left to
face the charges. On May 21, 1993, he was arraigned. With the
assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Following the pre-trial conference on August 20,
1993, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by
private complainant who testified in court. As found by the
court a quo:
xxx
On October 27, 1990, during the police line-up at the San Juan
Police Stationshe positively identified herein accused Elmer
Vergara as the armed man who pointed the gun at her after he
approached the left side of the car and wearing an army
fatigue uniform with black hat and who got her car keys,
thereafter, she executed another statement implicating
accused Elmer Vergara as one of the four armed men who
robbe[d] her.
On March 16, 1994, during the hearing of the case, she
(Catherine F. Manalo) again pointed to accused Elmer Vergara
to be one of the robbery/hold-up gang members (HULIDAP),
who took the payroll money of the J & E Manalo Construction
Co., Inc., and her gold necklace, his participation being that of
the person who pointed the gun at her and got the keys to her
car; she remembered him to be about 56 to 57 in height, with
dark features, chubby and heavily built.[3]
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any participation in
the offense. The trial court summed up his defense as follows:
Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on his identity as
one of the perpetrators of the robbery hold-up in
questionClaiming innocence, he presented evidence showing
that he was at some other place during the occurrence of the
robbery. His alleged presence at the Pacita Complex at San
Pedro, Laguna, being a member of the narcotic operatives
engaged in a surveillance of a suspected drug pusher, was
corroborated by no less than the team leader Captain, now
Major Christopher Laxa. Major Christopher Laxa was definite
in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was physically present
inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex, San Pedro
Laguna, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 19,
1990 and, that he did not leave the area from the time of their
arrival at around 1:00 oclock in the morning until 11:30 oclock
in the evening.[4]
The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and
disregarded petitioners alibi. On March 29, 1995, it convicted
Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in the information,
however, but of robbery as defined and penalized under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As explained by the trial
court:
Under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code a robbery shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band when more than
three armed malefactors (underline supplied) take part in its
commission. The prosecutions evidence demonstrates that
only three (3) in the group were armed, although there was
another member inside the car at the time of the commission.
However, there is no indication that the person inside the car
was armed. Conceding in gratia argumenti, therefore, that the
group of the accused Elmer Vergara was composed of more
than three (3) malefactors, the evidence disclosed that only
three (3) were armed, and hence, the crime cannot be
considered to have been committed by a band and does not
come within the purview of Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Code, which requires more than three (3) armed malefactors
to constitute the crime of robbery committed by a band.[5]
In convicting petitioner for robbery, the trial court stated:
Both the defenses of negative identification and alibi are
unavailing. Contrary to these protestations, complainant
Catherine Manalo had a vivid recollection of the identity of
S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara as the person who accosted her on the
left side of the car or at the drivers seat and who poked a gun
at her neck and was also the one who took the key from the
ignition. It was a clear day, 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, and
the probability of a poor recollection is nil. Catherine Manalo
was able to see Sgt. Elmer Vergara while on board the Gallant
(sic) Sigma Car when it was trailing her car and also at the time
it was passing her car until her path was blocked and the three
(3) armed malefactors disembarked. She had sufficient time to
recollect the faces of the persons who approached the car and
their respective positions. There is no reason to doubt her
unerring testimony that she was able to positively remember
and then later on identified the robbers. Between the positive
declaration of Catherine Manalo and the denial of accused
Elmer Vergara, the former deserves more credence,
notwithstanding minor inaccuracies as to the height and
weight and styling of the hair of accused Elmer Vergara.
xxx
Conceding the fact that accused Elmer Vergara was in San
Pedro, Laguna, it is not physically impossible for him to have
gone to Pasig, Metro Manila, considering that he had an
available means of transportation. The distance between San
Pedro, Laguna where the accused claimed he was at the time
the robbery took place, and Pasig, Metro Manila, where the
crime was committed, is less than an hour drive by car and can
easily be reached by one who, like the accused Elmer Vergara,
had a car available to him.[6]
Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18318, on the
sole issue of whether or not petitioner committed the crime
charged against him. The appeal was anchored on two
grounds: (1) the alleged dubious identification of Vergara by
the private complainant, and (2) failure of the trial court to
appreciate Vergaras alibi that he was on an intelligence
mission in San Pedro, Laguna at the time the alleged robbery,
specially in view of the corroboration of his alibi by his
commanding officer.
Finding no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals affirmed Vergaras
conviction. The appellate court said:
In the case at bench (sic), the prosecution had proven the
identity of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt
through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Villanueva
and Manalo. Appellant failed to controvert the testimony of
prosecution witness Villanueva that accused-appellant was
pointed to by witness Manalo out of nine (9) persons. Thus,
the trial court had no reason to consider the identification
made by witness Manalo in the police station as one that
stemmed from a suggestive identification procedure used by
the police.
The trial court was correct in regarding the difference in height
as a minor matter. What is vital is that the witness recognized
accused in the line-up and reiterated her identification of
accused-appellant in open court. In the absence of ill-motive
on her part to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the trial
court is correct in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of witness Manalo.[7]
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March 26,
1997.
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner now submits to this Court
the following sole assignment of error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINANT CATHERINE MANALO THAN THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE ACCUSED AND HIS WITNESS AND CONSEQUENTLY
FURTHER ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]
The issue of whether or not the guilt of the accused had been
proven beyond reasonable doubt hinges, in our view, on the
credibility of witnesses presented by the prosecution and the
defense. Crucial in this regard is the identification made by the
complaining witness, Catherine Manalo, of the petitioner, Sgt.
Elmer T. Vergara, as one of the malefactors.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the contradictions in
Catherine Manalos testimony are not mere minor
inconsistencies. According to petitioner, while private
complainant below described him as around 56-57 tall,
weighing about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military haircut; in
truth, he is only 53-1/2 tall, tips the scale at less than 150 lbs.,
and had long hair at the time of the incident. Given these
discrepancies, petitioner insists that private complainant
below must have been referring to another person and not to
him.
Basically, petitioners contention raises questions of facts,
which traditionally fall within the province of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. After reviewing the records of this
case, we find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial
court of all the pieces of evidence submitted before it,
particularly as its findings and conclusions had been affirmed
by the appellate court.
In this case, petitioner has been convicted on the basis of the
positive identification made by private complainant below. As
the Court of Appeals stressed, petitioner was categorically
identified by the private complainant not just once, but twice,
as one of the armed men who robbed her. The first time was
during the police line-up of nine (9) persons on October 27,
1990 and the second time was during her testimony in open
court. The records show that private complainant had no
motive to falsely testify against petitioner. We agree with the
lower courts that the discrepancies in the private complainants
description are not decisive. Her description was based on
visual estimates, which cannot be expected to be
perfect. What is decisive is that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified as one of the robbers, not just once but
twice, by private complainant, Catherine Manalo. Her
recollection of his description might suffer from imperfection
regarding his height, weight and personal appearance. But we
note less. Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of crime have
a penchant for seeing the faces and features of their attackers,
and remembering them.[9] That some variance as to
petitioners height and weight might exist in her recollection, in
comparison to his statistical measurement does not destroy
her credibility. That the trial court found this variance
inconsequential does not render its findings on the credibility
of witnesses erroneous. Such findings are accorded great
respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
alter the decision or affect the result of the case.[10] Here, the
important thing is that complaining witness Catherine Manalo
identified the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery twice, without any presumptions or suggestion from
the police at the line-up or the court at the trial.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to contradict
his alibi. He submits that the prosecution failed to prove that
he had a car available to him, or that he drove one from San
Pedro, Laguna to Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioner further
insists that the trial courts finding that the place where the
crime was committed is less than an hours drive by car and can
easily be reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car
available to him, is erroneous and unsupported by the
evidence on record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from
San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila, because it is
capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is
already of public knowledge, especially to commuters.[11] We
find no error in the trial courts finding that it was not
impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime,
despite his alibi that he was engaged in intelligence work in San
Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October 19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to
prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have
been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.[12] It is essential that
credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime be presented to
establish an acceptable alibi.[13] Petitioner failed to meet this
test. While petitioner could have been working as intelligence
agent in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 21, 1990, contrary
to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have
been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission
of the crime.
Petitioners insistence that he had no vehicle available to him
is not supported by the testimony of his own commanding
officer who testified in petitioners defense, to wit:
FISCAL: CROSS EXAMINATION:
Q: Mr. Witness, what mode of transportation did you take in
going to Laguna in (sic) October 19, 1990.
A: We used cars.
Q: What vehicle?
A: Toyota Corona 78 model and a Galant, old model.
Q: And in what particular vehicle did you yourself used?
A: Toyota Corona and another car as a back-up vehicle.
xxx
Q: Who arrived ahead, your car or the car of the accused?
A: We arrived together because we traveled not far with each
other, we maintained the distance of three to five meters,
mam.
Q: How many were you?
A: Normally, up to nine members of the team, but in that
operation I think, seven or six members, mam.
xxx
Q: Who were the companions of Vergara where he was riding?
A: It was Sgt. San Jose who was driving the car, together with
Sgt. Magno and Sgt. Rubi.
Q: How about you, who were your companions?
A: I was with the other car, with a civilian driver, and I cannot
recall anymore whom I was with at the time.[14]
Nor was his commanding officers corroborative testimony of
much help in sustaining petitioners alibi, as shown by the
following:
FISCAL:
What is your basis that Vergara was with you at about 3:00 in
the afternoon of October 19, 1990?
A: What do you mean basis? His physical presence in the area
is my basis, mam, that he was there.
Q: Do you keep an attendance record or attendance book of
the members of the team?
A: We do not normally do it once we left for an operation, we
believe it is not necessary to account every minute every hour
of the operation, so long as we are in the area, target area and
every body (sic) is posted on our designated position, as soon
as the signal is already given then thats the time we will
respond or arrest the guy, but I can say that Sgt. Vergara never
left the place until the 21st of October, he was there in Pacita
Complex, mam.
Q: In other cases where you conducted surveillance do you
maintain a logbook?
A: The log book is filled up only, I mean we do the logging prior
and after the operation, thats the time we placed the
preparations or extent of our operation, thats the time we
entered this in the log book and when we returned from the
operation, we also registered about the result of the
operation.
xxx
Q: You do not likewise keep a call or make a roll call or keep
attendance record?
A: It is automatic mam, everytime, during the operation we see
to it that all the persons were in the area at the time we
registered ourselves in the logbook.
Q: In your team, who in particular is assigned to keep track of
the attendance?
A: Being the team leader, I am the one in charge to keep the
movements of every members (sic) of the team, but when I left
on 19th October proceeding to Makati, I specifically gave
instructions to maintain the operation and see to it that they
have new informations (sic) or new development of the case
they have to call me by radio so that I can come back in the
area, that was the instruction to the assistant team leader
whenever I left the area.
Q: So I understand that you do not go with the members of the
team during the whole period or duration of the surveillance.
A: Sometimes, mam, there are instances. In that particular
instance I left my men at about 1130 in the evening of
19th October, I left my team and back again in the early
morning of 20 October.[15]
There were far too many glaring lapses in the testimony of
petitioners corroborative witness for petitioners alibi to be
given much weight, thus:
Q: And what was that particular mission in San Pedro, Laguna
on October 19, 1990?
A: We were supposed to conduct a buy-bust operation with
the aid of our informant, an errand boy of the subject pusher.
Q: Do you know the name of that informant?
A: I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: And in what particular place in Laguna was this suppose(d)
surveillance that you will conduct?
A: I cannot recall the name of the street but I know the place,
but the street name and the exact number I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: What place?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: What is the number?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: Who was the subject?
A: It was a certain alias German, mam.
xxx
COURT:
Is a certain Nicasio Custodio y Abrera a member of your team?
A: I think during that time.
xxx
COURT:
On October 19, 1990, will you recall if he was with you?
A: I cannot recall, your honor.[16] This case is about the Ombudsmans authority to conduct
preliminary investigation in a forfeiture case where the
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of
petitioner allegedly amassed ill-gotten wealth before February
time and place be strictly complied with by the defense,
25, 1986.
meaning that the accused must not only show that he was
somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
The Facts and the Case
committed.[17]

In the light of private complainants positive identification of

petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the latters defense
of bare denial and alibi must necessarily fail, as her positive
testimony overrides his negative testimony.[18] Alibi is a weak
defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive
identification of the accused.[19] Further, an alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the petitioner by a credible
witness who has no motive to testify falsely.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, G.R. No. 161602
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged
unlawfully acquired property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case 0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife
Agnes Sison Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc.,
R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island
Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.[1]
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss
the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the action; c) prematurity; d) prescription;
and e) litis pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on March 10,
2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

- versus - ABAD,
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for
VILLARAMA, JR., * preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings. [2] They
claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding
PEREZ,** and filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first
conducted a previous inquiry similar to preliminary
MENDOZA, JJ.
investigations in criminal cases before the filing of the case
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN pursuant to Section 2 of the law.[3]

(THIRD DIVISION) and THE Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, In its Comment[4] on the motion, the Republic pointed out that
the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a
Respondents. July 13, 2010 preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820[5] and
issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the
endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
------- x

On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a

DECISION resolution,[6] denying the Romualdezes March 31, 2003
motion. It also denied by resolution on December 3, 2003 their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.[7] Thus, the
ABAD, J.: Romualdezes filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayans rulings and
prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until
another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.

The Question Presented
The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in
OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law
in forfeiture cases.
The Ruling of the Court
The Romualdezes point out that the Office of the Ombudsman
should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since
its authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth
cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February 25,
1986 and not before that date.[8] Since the Romualdezes
acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case
as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to
conduct the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the
absence of a prior valid preliminary investigation, the
forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.
In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the
Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their
absence. The spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in
the United States when that investigation took place. They
were thus denied their right to be heard in that investigation.
But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out,
quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Ombudsman has
under its general investigatory powers the authority to
investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth
had been amassed before February 25, 1986. Thus:
Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the
Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his
correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper
action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after
February 25, 1986. Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is
without authority to initiate such forfeiture
proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority
to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the
aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory
power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No.
6770.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
And, although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the
preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the
action in Civil Case 0167 in line with the Courts ruling in the
above-cited Republic and other cases that followed.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes claim that
they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they
had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in
OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that
investigation had been sent to their last known residence at
the time it was conducted.[11] The Republic categorically insists
that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the
Romualdezes.[12]
Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left
the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA
revolution of February 1986 and so could not take part in the
proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court
characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced
upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also
said that such was the case only until things shall have
stabilized.[13] The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that
the peoples ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February
2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political
situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes
had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served
on them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not
deny having received.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the
investigation of the Romualdezes cases when they did not
show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known
residence. As the Court held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require as a
condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in
the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for
as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an
opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is
accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block
attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the
prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by
employing dilatory tactics.[14]
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the
conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M.
PACETE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With the adoption of automated election system in our
country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the
law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system
wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading
the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate
printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name
on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous
manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the
official ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such
nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of
the bona fide candidate?
The Case
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s
under Rule 65 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31,
2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails COMELEC
Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in
favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose
names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of
candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office
of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong;
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be
rendered granting the instant Petition and:
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor
of the disqualified nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz
be counted and tallied in favor of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela
Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116; and
(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique
where the Petitioner’s Election Protest is pending to proclaim
as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes after the votes in
favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted
and tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela
Cruz.
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption
into office of Private Respondent if Petitioner is proclaimed as
the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2
Factual Antecedents
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and
was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of
Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed
her certificate of candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the
ticket of the National People’s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently,
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of
candidacy4 for the same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare
Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put
the election process in mockery and to cause confusion among
voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s
surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very
strong candidate for the said position having been elected as
member of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket
of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and
third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is an
unknown in the political scene with no prior political
experience as an elective official and no political party
membership. Being a retiree and having no known business,
Aurelio has no sufficient source of income but since the 2007
elections petitioner’s opponents have been prodding him to
run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow
confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong.
Petitioner further cited Aurelio’s miserable showing in the
previous local elections when he ran and garnered only 126
and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and
barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November
2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC,6 petitioner
asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate
Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for
the position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and
cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty
position in Bugasong.
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate,
however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of
Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the
COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor,
including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete,
appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as follows:
VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA O 2. DELA O 3. PACETE,
CRUZ, Aurelio CRUZ, John Lloyd M.
N. Casimira "BINGBING"
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NP)
(NPC)
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent
Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying, among other things, that
COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s
name from the Official List of Candidates for the position of
Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election
paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010
elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can
no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections,
the COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in
favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No.
884411 listing the names of disqualified candidates, including
Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, as follows:
1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the
certified list of candidates; and
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted
upon.12 (Emphasis supplied)
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local
elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio’s name remained in
the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner
insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in
her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No.
8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of
Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following results of the
voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd
M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the
MBOC of Bugasong.14
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the Province of Antique an election protest praying for (1)
the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2)
the annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-
Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only
thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioner’s 6,389 votes, petitioner
contends that she would have clearly won the elections for
Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or
added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner
insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as
against the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a
directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes
instead of counting the same in favor of petitioner in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the
COMELEC’s First Division gravely abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because
there is no substantial difference between the previous
manual elections and the automated elections conducted in
2010 to justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued
in 2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate
who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment
where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that
of the bona fide candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the
assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly
recognized the substantial distinctions between and among (a)
disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose names
are similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance
candidates who do not have similar names with those of the
bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who had voluntarily
withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a result of the
failure of the COMELEC’s First Division to make these
important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that
applies to disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all
other candidates whose certificates of candidacy had been
cancelled or denied course, petitioner’s right to due process
was clearly violated, and only made possible the very evil that
is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to consider the
votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but count them
in favor of the bona fide candidate.
Respondents’ Arguments
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity
with respect to its exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored
rule is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that
the party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law
as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In
this case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of
the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the equal
protection clause and due process of law without any basis.
On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends
that there is a substantial distinction between a manual
election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated
election governed by Resolution No. 8844. While the votes for
the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted
in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule
for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors
which changed the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in
automated elections now contain the full names of the official
candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was
presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and
voted for that candidate, regardless of whether said candidate
was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names
of the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in
manual elections when these were only listed in a separate
sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, the voter’s
intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to
the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under
Section 211, Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply
only to elections where the names of candidates are
handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the
automated election system where the counting of votes is
delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines,
pre-proclamation controversies, including complaints
regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of
misreading the names of the candidates written, were flaws
which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to
the purpose of our election laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not
limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all persons
of the same class even in succeeding elections, and covered all
disqualified and nuisance candidates without distinction.
Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due
process. For public office is not a property right and no one has
a vested right to any public office.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner
cannot validly claim the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the
rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also
cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Court’s
ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when
read together with Section 72, are understood to mean that
"any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification
has already been declared final regardless of the ground
therefor, shall be considered stray."
Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4,
2010, COMELEC caused the publication of Resolution No. 8844
in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There
was thus an earnest effort on the part of COMELEC to
disseminate the information, especially to the voters in
Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on
the official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor.
Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of
Aurelio’s candidacy and the consequences that will obtain
should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and
Aurelio bear different first names, female and male,
respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a
massive voter education during the campaign period,
emphasizing to her supporters that she was given the
corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the
voters should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots
because in case of error in filling up the same, they will not be
given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those
who voted for petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly
shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots,
which was attached to the petition, petitioner in effect would
want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there
is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.18
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country, its factual
findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on
matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered
with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.19 In this case,
Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened
existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of
declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate, especially
in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same
surnames as those of bona fide candidates.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed on COMELEC when it issued Resolution No.
8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in
Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions
of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation
and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading
and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to
be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its
rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the
following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election
is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
xxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been
disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray and
shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC 20 where
this Court, construing the above provisions, stated:
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear
legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the second
placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to
declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race should
be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72
thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
xxxx
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean
that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of
the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec
misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to
disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by
conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for
disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that
Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a
final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent
with the other provisions of the election code. 21 (Emphasis
supplied; italics not ours)
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground
for disqualification, the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as
stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to
Section 72 of the OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all
disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69
(nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown
to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of
candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in
Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to
influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing
electoral functions, election campaign overspending and
soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the
OEC or Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or
deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under
Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules
and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought
not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68"
petition. They are different remedies, based on different
grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed
before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned
a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand,
can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40
of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course
to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda
v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who
is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a
candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under
Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the same
manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what
COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72
that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered
stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been
cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled
certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less
to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the
candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated
as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should
these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or
denied due course be considered stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality
of resolutions or decisions in special action cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the
commission en banc or division, particularly on special actions
(disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials
on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action
cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it
is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission
on disqualification cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by
the Supreme Court;
xxx
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance
candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has
the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance
candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes
cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and
tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are
hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis supplied)25
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such under a final judgment was applied
by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC26 where the name of the
nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname
with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on
election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision
to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his
motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days
after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for
mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman
was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are
not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the
will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent
confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday, this Court
also considered those factual circumstances showing that the
votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the
legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not
have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that
the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the
action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate
for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of
determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however,
not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also
been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and
other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the
COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate.27
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,28 this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to
count them in favor of the bona fide candidate
notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was
issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against
a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the
bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of
names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates the same. It
may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution
declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued
before and not after the elections, with the electorate having
been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably,
however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly
present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial
number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over
five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the
invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome
private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the recount.29
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before
the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No.
4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered
stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing
of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in
the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of
petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We
observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of
election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will
of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the
electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona
fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant
number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname.
Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the
probability of votes lost in this manner. While political
campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the
electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the
ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates
persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated
voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections
will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of
candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the
apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant
circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x x x 30
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to
amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating
those changes brought about by the new automated election
system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions
between manual and automated elections validly altered the
rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or
nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez
III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case
at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only
to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in
the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that,
especially in local elections, political rivals or operators
benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on
petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential
nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners
try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write
the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election
woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.31
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by
similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had
already been rectified by the new voting system where the
voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of
their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine
days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the
names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified
List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of
disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official
candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the
votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the
same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier
discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69
of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify
under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation
of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a
candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and
Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were
properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio
because COMELEC published the same before election day. As
we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive
knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the
votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in
names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates
remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted
or eliminated, even under the automated voting system
especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the
oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the
bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer
ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.1âwphi1
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is
more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had
demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of
nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates
and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to
be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during
elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and
the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC
Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that
the votes cast for candidates listed therein, who were declared
nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have
been either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes
cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May 10,
2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela
Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her total garnered
votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent
John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner.
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province
of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the
parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERARIN ET AL VS CA AND
CECILIA TADIAR,
GR NO. 159328
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the May 21, 2003 Decision1 and the July 17, 2003
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71372. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 2 in Civil Case No. 34633 and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 6617,4 while the questioned CA
Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar
(Celia) filed with the MTC of San Fernando, La Union a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners
Heirs of Antonio Feraren. In said Complaint, Celia alleged that
she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200 square
meter parcel of land located in the poblacion of San Fernando
City in La Union; that on September 21, 1960, the said lot was
sold by their father to the spouses Antonio and Justina Feraren
(Spouses Feraren) on pacto de retro; it was stipulated that the
right to repurchase may be exercised within ten years; on
August 31, 1970, Celia and her co-heirs re-acquired the subject
property; thereafter, the lot was leased on a month-to-month
basis to the Spouses Feraren who have constructed a
residential house thereon; that sometime in March 1992, Celia
and her co-heirs informed the Spouses Feraren of their
intention to terminate their lease contract; the Spouses
Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them their house or buy the
subject lot, which offers were declined by Celia and her co-
heirs and, instead, allowed the Spouses Feraren to continue
renting the property; after the death of Antonio in 1995,
herein petitioners requested Celia and her co-heirs to extend
the lease until June 30, 1997 and even volunteered to
temporarily vacate the said property; Celia and her co-heirs
agreed and they did not even increase the rentals;
nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with their
commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to stay
within the premises of the subject property and refused to
vacate the same notwithstanding repeated demands from
Celia and her co-heirs.5
In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-
square-meter portion of the lot being claimed by private
respondent is their property; even before the Spouses Feraren
entered into a contract of sale with pacto de retro with the
father of Celia, the former were already in possession of the
remaining portion of the subject property on the strength of a
lease contract executed in their favor by the latter in 1949;
their construction of a residential house on the subject
property was by virtue of a right granted under the said
contract of lease; petitioners were very much willing to vacate
the disputed lot but only upon payment of the value of all the
improvements that they have legally introduced as builders in
good faith on the said lot, which includes the house presently
standing thereon as well as the concrete fence surrounding the
said house; in the alternative, they offered to buy the parcel of
land subject of the complaint.6
For failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement,
the MTC, in its Order7 dated November 3, 2000, directed them
to submit their position papers and other evidence within ten
(10) days from receipt of a copy of the said Order.
Private respondent did not file a position paper.
On the other hand, petitioners filed their Position Paper 8 on
March 15, 2001. Petitioners alleged therein that their parents
are builders in good faith having built their house on the lot in
question during the time that they were the owners of the
disputed lot.
On June 15, 2001, the MTC rendered its Decision dismissing
the complaint for unlawful detainer. The trial court gave
credence to petitioners' contention that their parents built the
house in controversy on the subject lot while they were the
owners of the said lot. As such, the MTC held that as long as
private respondent refuses to reimburse petitioners of the
value of the improvements they have introduced on the lot in
question, they (petitioners) may not be compelled to vacate
the same.
On appeal, the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, in its
Decision dated January 28, 2002, affirmed in toto the
judgment of the MTC.
Private respondent then filed a petition for review with the CA.
On May 21, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by
the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union in Civil
Case No. 3463 and the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of La Union in the same case are
both REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the respondents not entitled to reimbursement
for the cost of their residential house built on the land owned
by the petitioner; and
2. Directing the respondents to vacate the premises and
restore possession thereof to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA based its Decision on its finding that the subject
residential house was built during the time petitioners' parents
were lessees of the lot in question.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the CA via its Resolution dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PETITIONERS ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWER THAT
THEIR RESIDENTIAL HOUSE WAS CONSTRUCTED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE LEASE CONTRACT AND NOT DURING THE 10-
YEAR PERIOD WHEN THE LOT WHERE IT STOOD WAS SOLD
UNDER PACTO DE RETRO TO THE PETITIONERS' PARENTS AS
SHOWN BY UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA
UNION.10
Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house
presently standing on the subject parcel of land is different
from the house built on the same lot in 1949. Petitioners insist
on their claim that the house built at the time that their
parents were lessees of the subject property in 1949 was
demolished to give way to the construction of the present
house which was erected sometime in the late 1960's when
the said lot was then owned by their parents by virtue of
the pacto de retro sale executed in the latter's favor on
September 21, 1960.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the
present petition are essentially questions of fact. It is
fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed with
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall, as a general
rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in
and considered by the tribunals below.11 However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.12
In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are
contrary to those made by the CA. The RTC affirmed the
findings of the MTC that the subject house which is presently
standing on the disputed parcel of land was built at the time
that the ownership of the said lot was in the name of
petitioners' parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that the
abovementioned house was constructed when petitioners'
parents were in possession of the lot in question as lessees.
Thus, this Court's review of such findings is warranted.
A careful review of the records and the evidence presented in
the instant case shows that the CA did not commit error in
finding that the house in question was built at the time
petitioners' parents possessed the subject lot as lessees.
Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' Position
Paper and the affidavits of its witnesses should not have been
considered by the trial courts since these were filed beyond
the 10-day reglementary period required under Section 10,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure.13 Petitioners do not dispute the
appellate court's finding that they submitted their position
paper and affidavits more than three months after the
deadline set by the abovementioned rules. In this regard, this
Court, in Teraña v. De Sagun,14 held as follows:
x x x By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP [Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure] is to “achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination” of the cases they cover, among
them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. To achieve
this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit[s] certain motions
and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion
for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other
paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions
cannot be allowed, we believe it illogical and incongruous to
admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we would
then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is
for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development
Corporation v. Florentino [G.R. No. 134222, September 10,
1999, 314 SCRA 197], albeit on the issue of late filing of an
answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that “[t]o admit a
late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very
mischief that the rules seek to redress.”
The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by
the RSP is due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The
law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally
dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by
this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and
inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the
enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to
resolve the ejectment case quickly. x x x15
As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a
motion asking the trial court to admit their position paper
which was belatedly filed. Indeed, the record is barren of any
evidence to show that petitioners, at least, tried to offer any
explanation or justification for such delay. They simply ignored
the Rules. This Court has previously held that technical rules
may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to
benefit the deserving.16 Moreover, rules of procedure do not
exist for the convenience of the litigants. 17 These rules are
established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of
our judicial system.18 They are not to be trifled with lightly or
overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking "substantial
justice."19 In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly
held that, while the rules of procedure are liberally construed,
the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays,
and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.20 In the instant case, petitioners' complete
disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure only shows that they are not deserving of
their relaxation. Hence, the MTC erred in admitting
petitioners' position paper and taking the same into
consideration in rendering its judgment.
In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that
petitioners' statement in their Answer, that their parents built
the subject residential house as lessees under the authority
given to them by private respondent's father in their contract
of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial admission. Under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,21 petitioners may not
contradict this judicial admission unless they are able to show
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. In the instant case, petitioners'
subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their house was
built during the time that their parents were the owners of the
disputed lot is a direct contradiction of their judicial admission
in their Answer. However, petitioners failed to prove that such
admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. Hence, they may not contradict the
same.
Aside from the abovementioned admission made by
petitioners in their Answer, there is nothing in the said Answer
which claims that the subject house was constructed when
petitioners' parents were the owners of the disputed lot.
Neither was there any allegation nor even a hint that a house
was first built on the lot in question in 1949 and that the same
was demolished in the late 1960s to give way to the
construction of the house which is presently standing on the
disputed lot.
Thus, it appears from all indications that petitioners' claims
and allegations in their Position Paper contradicting their
admission in their Answer are mere afterthought subsequent
to realizing that they could not recover the full value of the
house based on their acknowledgment that the same was
erected at the time that their parents were lessees of the
disputed parcel of land.
At this juncture, it would not be amiss to reiterate that the
rights of a lessee, like petitioners in the present case, are
governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the
property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements
at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall
not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be
entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the
principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them
by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying
one-half of the value of the improvements that the lessee
made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, and which have not altered the form and
substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may
remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse.22
It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private
respondent prayed for the demolition of petitioners'
residential house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus,
clear that privaterespondent does not want to appropriate the
improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to
reimburse to them one-half of the value of their house. The
sole right of petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove
the improvements without causing any more damage upon
the property leased than is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183446
PEREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic) primarily assails the 17 January 2008
Resolution[1] issued by public respondent Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, in Civil Case No. 0022,[2] the dispositive and Jose Campos (Campos). On 12 February 1987, the PCGG
portion of which states: also issued a Writ of Sequestration and Freeze Order over the
shares of the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive) and its
officers in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway) as well as the
shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Republic's motion for execution is
Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI), the
GRANTED [IN PART]. The Court hereby ORDERS:
corporation organized by Menzi, Campos, Cojuangco, Zalamea
and Rolando Gapud, to serve as holding company for their
(a) PHILTRUST BANK to deliver to plaintiff Republic of the
shares of stock in Liwayway, Menzi and Company, Inc., Menzi
Philippines the proceeds from the sale of the 198,052.5
Agricultural, Inc., Menzi Development Corporation and M and
Bulletin shares sold by defendant HMHMI to Bulletin
M Consolidated, Inc. The Writs of Sequestration issued against
Publishing Corporation that is now under Philtrust Bank Time
the Liwayway and Bulletin shares as well as the PCGG's then
Deposit Certificate No. 136301, in the amount of
declared intent to vote the sequestered shares in Bulletin were
P19,390,156.68, plus interest earned;
challenged by Liwayway, US Automotive and Bulletin in the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed
(b) Defendant Estate of Hans Menzi, through its executor
before this Court as G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126.[4]
Manuel G. Montecillo, to surrender for cancellation the
original eight (8) Bulletin Certificates of Stock in his possession,
Following Campos' lead in waiving his rights over 46,620
i.e., Certificates Nos. 312, 292, 314, 131, 132, 293, and 313,
Bulletin shares in favor of the Republic, Zalamea also waived
which are part of the 212,425.5 Bulletin shares subject of the
his rights over 121,178 Bulletin shares in favor of the Republic
Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 79126 dated April 15,
on 15 October 1987. PCGG then sold the shares of Zalamea
1988; and
and Campos in favor of Bulletin, which thereafter appears to
have offered a cash deposit in the sum of P8,174,470.32 for
(c) Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, with respect to the
Cojuangco's remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares.[5] Together
46,626 Bulletin shares in the name of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
with the interests thereon, the amount was proposed to
and pursuant to Alternative 'A' provided for in the Resolution
either: (a) standby as full payment of Cojuangco's shares upon
of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988, in G.R. No. 79126,
a final judgment declaring the Republic the owner of said
to execute the necessary documents in order to effect the
shares; or, (b) be returned to Bulletin upon a final judgment
transfer of the ownership over these shares to the Bulletin
declaring Cojuangco as true owner thereof. In the 15 April
Publishing Corporation in accordance with the agreement it
1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126, this Court
entered into with the latter on June 9, 1998.
directed, among others, the PCGG to accept the cash deposit
offered by Bulletin for Cojuangco's shares, subject to the
Defendants Estate of Hans Menzi and HMHMI's motion is
foregoing alternative conditions.[6]
GRANTED. The Court hereby ORDERS PHILTRUST BANK:
On 29 July 1987, in the meantime, the Republic instituted a
To pay the Estate of Hans Menzi, through its Executor, Manuel
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
G. Montecillo and Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc.,
and damages against President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Yap,
the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
Cojuangco, Zalamea and Atty. Manuel Montecillo
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY
(Montecillo). Docketed as Civil Case No. 0022 before the
SEVEN PESOS and 76/100 interests thereon from said date of
Sandiganbayan, the complaint essentially alleged that Yap
February 28, 2002, until the whole amount is paid.
acted as the Marcos Spouses' dummy, nominee or agent in the
appropriation and concealment of shares of stock of domestic
SO ORDERED.[3]
corporations like Bulletin. Cojuangco and Zalamea were
likewise alleged to have acted as the Marcos Spouses'
dummies, nominees or agents in illegally acquiring Bulletin
shares to prevent their disclosure and recovery. In the
The Facts amended complaint the Republic filed on 10 March 1988,
Cojuangco was joined as an actor instead of a mere
collaborator of Zalamea who was later dropped as defendant
On 22 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good
from the case in view of his assignment of his 121,178 Bulletin
Government (PCGG) issued a Writ of Sequestration over the
shares in favor of the Republic as aforesaid. The Republic went
shares of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Yap (Yap)
on to amend its complaint for a second time on 17 October
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) in the Bulletin
1990, to implead as defendant respondent Estate of Hans
Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), together with those of their
Menzi (the Estate), through its Executor, Montecillo. [7]
nominees or agents, among them, Ceasar Zalamea (Zalamea)

On 2 April 1992 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[8] lifting
the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG. This was
questioned by the Republic through a petition
for certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No.
107377. In a Resolution dated 16 July 1996, the Court reversed
and set aside the assailed resolution and referred the case
back to the Sandiganbayan "for resolution of the preliminary
question of whether there is prima facie factual basis for
PCGG's sequestration order."[9] It was pursuant to the
foregoing resolution that the Sandiganbayan went on to
conduct hearings on the matter and, later, to issue the
Resolution dated 13 April 1998, discounting the factual bases
for PCGG's sequestration order and granting the Estate's
motion to lift the writ of sequestration over the shares of
stock, assets, properties, records and documents of
HMHMI.[10] Dissatisfied with the Resolution and the
Sandiganbayan's 26 August 1998 denial of its motion for
reconsideration,[11] the Republic filed the petition
for certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 135789.[12]
On 31 January 2002, the Court rendered a decision in G.R. No.
135789, dismissing the Republic's petition on the ground that
the Sandiganbayan had the authority to resolve all incidents
relative to cases involving ill-gotten wealth and that the court's
appellate jurisdiction over the graft court's decisions or final
orders is limited to questions of law.[13] On 4 March 2002,
Philtrust Bank (Philtrust) filed a motion to intervene in G.R. No.
135789, alleging that the writ of sequestration, which was the
subject matter of the case, covered the following time deposits
maintained with it by HMHMI, to wit:
Time Deposit Certificate Date of Certificate Original Deposit
136301 3/03/86 P19,390,156.68
162828 4/18/88 24,102,443.85
162829 4/18/88 5,826,683.26
In addition to its being allowed to intervene in the case,
Philtrust prayed for the consignation of the proceeds and
interests of the foregoing TDCs as well as its release from its
obligation pertaining thereto.[14] Alongside the Republic's
motion for reconsideration of the 31 January 2002 Decision in
G.R. No. 135789, Philtrust's motions were, however, denied
for lack of merit in the 20 November 2002 Resolution the Court
issued in the case.[15] The motions subsequently filed by the
Republic as well as the Estate and HMHMI for the deposit of
the Philtrust-tendered sums with, respectively, a government
bank or their own account were noted without action in the
Court's Resolution dated 22 January 2003.[16]
In the meantime, the following issues were identified for
resolution at the pre-trial conducted in Civil Case No. 0022, to
wit: (a) whether or not Menzi's sale of his 154,470 Bulletin
shares in favor of US Automotive was valid and legal; and, (b)
whether or not the Bulletin shares registered in the names of
Yap, Cojuangco, Zalamea, Menzi, his Estate or HMHMI were ill-
gotten.[17] After a protracted litigation, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Decision dated 14 March 2002,[18] the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are the ill-
gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos spouses:
A. The 46,626 Bulletin shares [part of the 214
block] in the name of defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., subject of the Resolution of
the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in
G.R. No. 79126.
Pursuant to alternative "A" mentioned therein, plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG is hereby
declared the legal owner of these shares, and is further
directed to execute, in accordance with the Agreement which
is entered into with Bulletin Publishing Corporation on June 9,
1988, the necessary documents in order to effect transfer of
ownership over these shares to the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation.
B. The 198,052.5 Bulletin shares [198 block] in
the names of:
No. of Shares
Jose Y. Campos 90,866.5
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. 90,877
Cesar C. Zalamea 16,309
Total 198,052.5
which they transferred to HM Holdings and Management, Inc.
on August 17, 1983, and which the latter sold to Bulletin
Publishing Corporation on February 21, 1986. The proceeds
from this sale are frozen pursuant to PCGG's Writ of
Sequestration dated February 12, 1987, and this writ is the
subject of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 31,
2002 in G.R. No.135789.
Accordingly, the proceeds from the sale of these 198,052.5
Bulletin shares, under Philtrust Bank Time Deposit Certificate
No. 136301 dated March 3, 1986 in the amount of
P19,390,156.68 plus interest earned, in the amount of
P104,967,112.62 as of February 28, 2002, per Philtrust Bank's
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Consign the Proceeds of
Time Deposits of HMHMI, filed on February 28, 2002 with the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135789, are hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
2. Ordering the defendant Estate of Hans M. Menzi
through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo, to
surrender for cancellation the original eight Bulletin
certificates of stock in its possession, which were
presented in court as Exhibits 1 to 3 and 21 to 25
(Certificate Nos. 312, 292, 314, 131, 132, 291, 293,
313, respectively), which are part of the 214,424.5
Bulletin shares subject of the Resolution of the
Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in G.R. No.
79126.
3. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are not
the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos
spouses:
a. The 154,472 Bulletin shares [154 block] sold by the
late Hans M. Menzi to U.S. Automotive Co., Inc., the
sale thereof being valid and legal;
b. The 2,617 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant
Emilio T. Yap which he owns in his own right; and
c. The 1 Bulletin share in the name of the Estate of
Hans M. Menzi which it owns in its own right.
4. Dismissing, for lack of sufficient evidence, plaintiff's
claim for damages, and defendants' respective
counterclaims.
SO ORDERED. [19]
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Republic,
Cojuangco and the Estate filed the petitions for review
on certiorari which were respectively docketed and
consolidated before this Court as G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487
and 154518. In the 23 November 2005 Decision rendered in
said consolidated cases, however, the Court affirmed the
Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002 Decision, upon the following
findings and conclusions: (a) as the proven owner thereof, the
Estate validly sold the 154 block of Bulletin shares to US
Automotive, with the indorsement and delivery of the stock
certificate covering the same; and, (b) the evidence on record
shows that the 198 block of Bulletin shares as well as the
46,626 shares registered in the name of Cojuangco which
formed part of the 214 block of Bulletin shares were ill-
gotten.[20] Subsequent to the 24 January 2006 denial of its
motion for partial reconsideration of the foregoing
decision,[21] the Estate, alongside HMHMI, filed a Joint
Manifestation dated 28 February 2006. The Joint
Manifestation called the Court's attention to the fact, among
others, that the motion for the release of the proceeds of the
TDCs they filed in G.R. No. 135789 was merely noted without
action, on the ground that the matter would be better
ventilated and addressed in the consolidated cases. In view of
the fact that the issues pertaining to the TDCs were not
addressed in the Court's 23 November 2005 Decision,[22] the
Estate and HMHMI sought the grant of the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. The Clerk of Court be instructed to cause the delivery of the
three (3) Certificates of Time Deposit with the attached
allonge, on file with the docket of G.R. No. 135789 to the
Philtrust Bank or to its counsel of record;
2. An order be issued requiring the Philtrust Bank to pay to
herein Joint Movants the proceeds of the sale in 1984 of
154,472 Bulletin shares to the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc.
deposited with the Philtrust Bank admitted to be due as of
February 28, 2002 and the proceeds of the sale of Menzi shares
in the Liwayway Publishing, Inc. to the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation, both covered by Certificates of Time Deposits
admitted to be due as of February 28, 2002, plus legal interest
thereon from March 1, 2002 until paid.
3. It is further prayed that such other reliefs be granted as to
this Honorable Court may seem just and
equitable.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
The Joint Manifestation filed by the Estate and HMHMI was
not, however, acted upon by this Court which went on to issue
an Entry of Judgment certifying the finality of the 23 November
2005 Decision in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518.[24] On
29 November 2006, the Republic filed its motion for the
execution of the Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002 Decision and
prayed for Philtrust's delivery of the sums covered by the
decision as well as the PCGG's 12 February 1987 Freeze Order
which included the sums covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829.[25] Claiming that only the proceeds of TDC No. 136301
were declared forfeited in favor of the Republic in the decision
sought to be executed, the Estate and HMHMI also filed their
motion for execution dated 5 December 2006, praying that
Philtrust be ordered to render an accounting of TDC Nos.
162828 and 162829 and, thereafter, to deliver in their favor
the principal thereof, together with the stipulated and legal
interests they have, in the meantime, earned.[26]
On 16 January 2007, the Republic filed its Comment on the
motion for execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, arguing
that said movants' claim of entitlement to the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829 was bereft of any basis. Calling
attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation that the
Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. No. 135789, the Republic
maintained that said TDCs could not have covered the
proceeds of the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US
Automotive since the same had been already received by the
Estate and, per the testimony elicited from Montecillo, were
deposited with the Equitable Bank and used to pay estate
taxes due the Estate.[27] On 25 January 2007, the Estate and
HMHMI also filed their Manifestation with Comment, asserting
that only the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared ill-
gotten in the decision sought to be executed; hence, it
necessarily followed that all the other sequestered HMHMI
assets including the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829
were not ill-gotten.[28]
On 26 January 2007, Yap filed his comment on the motions for
execution filed by the Republic as well as the Estate and
HMHMI. Maintaining that the Republic had yet to effect the
transfer of ownership of the 46,626 shares in favor of Bulletin
pursuant to the 14 March 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 0022,
Yap also averred that the Estate had not yet surrendered for
cancellation the original Bulletin certificates of stock in its
possession which formed part of the 214 block of Bulletin
shares subject of this Court's 15 April 1988 Decision in G.R.
Nos. 77422 and 79126. Likewise claiming that TDC Nos.
162828 and 162829 were not covered by the decision sought
to be executed, Yap insisted that the Estate had already
received the proceeds of TDC No. 130052 covering the sale of
the 154 block of Bulletin shares to US Automotive.[29] In
support of this assertion, Yap submitted copies of TDC No.
130052 in the sum of P24,969,200.09, Montecillo's offer of
surrender of said TDC in exchange for full payment of said
principal and the interests thereon, as well as the manager
checks and vouchers purportedly evidencing Philtrust's
payment thereof in April 1989.[30]
In its 21 February 2007 Reply to Yap's Comment on its Motion
for Execution, on the other hand, the Estate disavowed
receiving payment of the proceeds of TDC No. 130052 on the
ground that, at the time of the supposed payment in April
1989, the assets of HMHMI which consisted of TDC Nos.
136301, 162828 and 162829 had already been
frozen. Contending that its continued possession of the
original of TDC No. 130052 was ineluctable proof of the non-
payment of the proceeds thereof, the Estate argued that
Philtrust's attempt to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos.
136301, 162828 and 162829 with this Court in G.R. No. 135789
was an admission that its liability therefor remained valid,
subsisting and enforceable. While conceding that the delivery
of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was not
covered in the decision sought to be executed, the Estate
asserted that the Sandiganbayan's 18 April 1995 Resolution
invalidating the PCGG's Freeze Order of HMHMI's assets was
affirmed by this Court in the 31 January 2002 Decision in G.R.
No. 135789.[31]
On 17 January 2008, the Sandiganbayan issued the first
assailed resolution, partially granting the Republic's motion for
execution by ordering Philtrust's delivery of the proceeds of
TDC No. 136301 and the Estate's surrender of the original 8
Bulletin certificates of stock which were part of the 212,425.5
shares subject of this Court's 15 April 1988 Decision in G.R.
Nos. 77422 and 79126. In accordance with the same decision,
the Republic was additionally ordered to effect the transfer of
Cojuangco's 46,626 shares in favor of Bulletin, subject to
Alternative "A" stated therein. Likewise granting the motion
for execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, the
Sandiganbayan directed Philtrust to pay in their favor the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. Brushing aside the
documents attached to Yap's comment for lack of proper
authentication and non-presentation at the trial of the case on
the merits,[32] the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:
x x x. While it is appropriate to order Philtrust Bank to deliver
all amounts covered by this Court's March 14, 2002 [D]ecision,
the same cannot be said of those covered by the February 12,
1987 sequestration order of the PCGG. The records of this
case reveal that the said sequestration was already lifted by
this Court on April 13, 1998. This was affirmed by the Supreme
Court on January 31, 2002. Plaintiff Republic's motion for
reconsideration was denied on the ground that it had been
mooted by the Sandiganbayan's decision of March 14, 2002
that declared certain shares as ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses.
As correctly argued by defendants Estate and HMHMI, the
issue of the propriety of the sequestration order was already
subsumed in the said Sandiganbayan decision. While it is true
that neither the Sandiganbayan decision nor the Supreme
Court's of November 23, 2005, affirming this Court's verdict
categorically declared the proceeds of CTD Nos. 162828 and
162829 as not ill-gotten, the only logical and, to stress, legal
conclusion is that said assets came to exist as a result of a
legitimate activity or enterprise and, therefore, not ill-gotten
at all. Putting it differently, the lifting of the sequestration or
freeze order confirmed the legitimacy of these assets.
The presumption of law, albeit disputable, include[s] regularity
and fairness of private transactions; adherence to the ordinary
course of business; and compliance with pertinent laws. The
prosecution had the burden to introduce evidence to overturn
said legal presumptions and to prove that the assets under
consideration originated from some illicit source if only to
sustain the government's claim therefor. This Court and the
Supreme Court found the prosecution miserably failed to do
so, and their respective rulings, having attained final and
executory status, are now, under well-established
jurisprudence, "immutable and unalterable." Hence, the
assets could not possibly be legally awarded to the State. It is
but just then that the funds covered by CTD Nos. 162828 and
162829 be returned to HMHMI under whose name they were
deposited. There subsists no rational, legal or equitable basis
to further withhold said assets from the evident owner
thereof.[33]
Dissatisfied with the foregoing disposition, the Republic filed
its motion for partial reconsideration, insisting that the sums
covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 could not have
referred to the proceeds of the sale of the 154 block of Bulletin
shares which, at the trial of the case on the merits, Montecillo
admitted to have deposited with the Equitable Bank and used
to pay the estate taxes due from the Estate. The Republic
argued that this Court's affirmance of the lifting of the writ of
sequestration ordered by the Sandiganbayan was not fatal to
its cause and could not be construed as justification for the
release of the proceeds of the TDCs to the Estate and
HMHMI.[34] Maintaining that the Republic's motion for partial
reconsideration was pro-forma, the Estate and HMHMI also
filed their opposition, on the ground that a forfeiture of the
proceeds of the subject TDCs in favor of the former would be
tantamount to an alteration of a decision that has long
attained finality.[35]
In compliance with the Sandiganbayan's 17 January 2008
Resolution, on the other hand, Philtrust filed a manifestation,
alleging that, upon the Republic's surrender of the original of
TDC No. 136301, it was ready to release three manager's
checks in the aggregate sum of P162,245,963.71 representing
the principal and interests for said TDC.[36] With respect to the
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829, however, Philtrust
invoked Article 1256 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
filed a motion to consign the six manager's checks it issued to
cover said TDCs' principals and interests in the aggregate sum
of P199,391,416.51. Against Philtrust's allegation that it had
the original copies of TDC No. 130052, Montecillo's letter and
the check vouchers evidencing the payment Yap earlier
asserted in his comment on their motion for execution,[37] the
Estate and HMHMI filed their comment, contending that said
documents were irrelevant and inappropriate to the resolution
of the pending motions and incidents. Aside from the fact that
Philtrust was not a party to the action, the Estate and HMHMI
argued that the bank had already recognized them as the
payees of the subject TDCs in the motion to intervene it earlier
filed in G.R. No. 135789.[38]
While the Republic interposed no objection
thereto,[39] Philtrust's motion for consignation was opposed by
Montecillo, in view of the fact that the Sandiganbayan's 17
January 2008 Resolution had already directed the payment of
the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the
Estate and HMHMI.[40] On 22 May 2008, the Sandiganbayan
issued the second assailed Resolution, denying the Republic's
motion for partial reconsideration for lack of merit, on the
ground that the argument raised in support thereof had
already been weighed and passed upon in its Resolution of 17
January 2008. Absent any finding that the proceeds of the
subject TDCs were ill-gotten, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
lifting of the sequestration or freeze order over the same
confirmed the legality of the provenance thereof. [41]
The Issue
On 21 July 2008, the Republic filed the petition at
bench[42] which it subsequently amended, in view of Philtrust's
9 July 2009 release of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI at the instance of
respondents Sandiganbayan Sheriffs Reynaldo Melquiades
and Albert dela Cruz. In urging the nullification of the assailed
Resolutions dated 17 January 2008 and 22 May 2008, [43] the
Republic argues that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING PHILTRUST BANK TO
PAY THE ESTATE OF HANS MENZI, THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR[,]
MANUEL G. MONTECILLO[,] AND HANS MENZI HOLDINGS
AND MANAGEMENT, INC., THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN AND 76/100
(P156,826,937.76) PESOS, REPRESENTING THE PROCEEDS OF
THE TIME DEPOSIT CERTIFICATE NOS. 162828 AND 162829
AND ALL ACCRUED LEGAL INTEREST THEREON.[44]
On 2 September 2008, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring
the Estate and HMHMI as well as the Sandiganbayan and
respondent Sheriffs to file their comment on the amended
petition. In said resolution, the Court also granted the
Republic's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the return and re-deposit of the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829 which had, in the meantime, been
released by Philtrust to the Estate and HMHMI.[45]

The Court's Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
In seeking the reversal of the assailed resolutions, the Republic
argues that the Estate and HMHMI's claim of entitlement to
the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 is bereft of
factual and legal bases. In support thereof, the Republic once
again calls attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint
Manifestation filed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518 in
which the Estate and HMHMI supposedly asserted that the
proceeds of the subject TDCs were those of "the sale in 1984
of 154,472 Bulletin shares to the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc.
deposited with the Philtrust Bank admitted to be due as of
February 28, 2002." It is argued that the falsity of this claim is
evident from: (a) Montecillo's testimony on record that the
proceeds of said sale were deposited with Equitable Bank and
used to pay the estate taxes due from the Estate; and (b) Yap's
19 January 2007 Comment on the motions for execution filed a
quo which showed that the proceeds of the same sale were
deposited with Philtrust under TDC No. 130052 which had, in
turn, been already paid in April 1989. The Republic ultimately
argues that the lifting of the writ of sequestration over
HMHMI's assets does not automatically mean that the Estate
and HMHMI are entitled to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828
and 162829 since the provenance thereof has yet to be
actually litigated before and submitted for judgment by the
Sandiganbayan.[46]
At the outset, it bears pointing out that the 28 February 2006
Joint Manifestation the Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. Nos.
152578, 154487 and 154518 prayed that Philtrust be required
to pay them not only the proceeds of the sale of 154,472
Bulletin shares to the US Automotive but also "the proceeds of
the sale of Menzi shares in the Liwayway Publishing, Inc. to the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation, both covered by the
Certificates of Time Deposits admitted to be due as of February
28, 2002, plus legal interest thereon from March 1, 2002 until
paid."[47] This Court's 23 November 2005 Decision in G.R. Nos.
152578, 154487 and 154518 affirmed the validity of the sale of
said 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive in the following
wise:
x x x. Atty. Montecillo's authority to negotiate the transfer and
execute the necessary documents for the sale of the 154 block
is found in the General Power of Attorney executed by Menzi
on May 23, 1984 which specifically authorizes Atty. Montecillo
"[T]o sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over upon such
consideration and under such terms and conditions as he may
deem proper, any and all stocks or shares of stock, now
standing or which may thereafter stand in my name on the
books of any and all company or corporation, and for that
purpose to make, sign and execute all necessary instruments,
contracts, documents or acts of assignment or transfer."
Atty. Montecillo's authority to accept payment of the purchase
price for the 154 block sold to US Automotive after Menzi's
death springs from the latter's Last will and Testament and the
Order of the probate court confirming the sale and authorizing
Atty. Montecillo to accept payment therefor. Hence, before
and after Menzi's death, Atty. Montecillo was vested with
ample authority to effect the sale of the 154 block to US
Automotive.
That the 154 block was not included in the inventory is
plausibly explained by the fact that at the time the inventory
of the assets of Menzi's estate was taken, the sale of the 154
block had already been consummated. Besides, the non-
inclusion of the proceeds of the sale in the inventory does not
affect the validity of the legality of the sale itself.[48]
Despite the validity of the sale, however, the Republic correctly
argues that the funds deposited under TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829 could not have been sourced from the 1984 sale of
154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, considering that the
evidence on record indicates that the proceeds thereof had
not been deposited with Philtrust and had already been
expended for the estate taxes due from the Estate. No less
than its Executor, Montecillo, made the following admissions
during the trial of the case on the merits:
ATTY. JASO:
And also Atty. Montecillo you sold to U.S. Automotive
q.
the 154,472 shares of the Bulletin am I correct?
Of the Bulletin, it is owned by Hans M. Menzi and
a.
registered in his name.
Showing to you a document which is a Re[ceipt] dated
q. May 15, 1985, can you tell the Honorable Court if you
had issued that document before?
Yes is this Exhibit 1, Yap in the preliminary hearing dated
a.
May 15, 1985 I signed for the estate as its executor.
AJ DE LEON:
xxxx
W[ere] the proceeds of that also deposited in the
q.
Phil[t]rust account you just mentioned?
a. No Your Honor that is an estate. surrender of said TDC in exchange for the full payment of its
principal and interest; and (c) the 7 April 1989 manager's
q. No the proceed[s] of the sale of 154,000?
checks issued by Philtrust in payment of the TDC's
No Your Honor that was sold in 1985. The account with P24,969,200.09 principal and P1,776,788.90 interest, the
a. receipt of which was duly acknowledged by
Phil[t]rust was opened in 1986.
Montecillo.[54] Yap's claim, as well as the existence of the
The purchase price of 154,476 shares of Hans Menzi sold foregoing documents was significantly affirmed by Philtrust in
q.
to U.S. Automotive where was it deposited? its 17 March 2008 motion to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos.
162828 and 162829.[55] Considering that TDC No. 130052 was
As I remember correctly, it was deposited to Equitable
issued in its name,[56] the Estate was clearly out on a limb in
a. Bank Corporation because that was the depository bank
claiming that the payment of the proceeds thereof in 1989 was
of the [E]state, Your Honor.
not possible since supposedly, at the time, HMHMI's assets
xxxx had already been frozen pursuant to the writ of sequestration
issued by the PCGG.[57]
AJ DE LEON:

You are saying that the deposit of this purchase price of While they could not have come from the proceeds of the 1984
154,476 shares of Hans Menzi to U.S. Automotive was sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, there is, on
deposited at Equitable Bank and was also subject of the other hand, ample showing in the record that the deposits
sequestration? under TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were sourced from sale by
the Estate and HMHMI of their Liwayway shares. In the
a. No sir, it was use[d] to pay the estate tax.[49] amended petition at bench, the Republic very distinctly
asserted that the funds covered by the subject TDCs are
actually the proceeds from the sale of shares of stock of
Having been made by their executor during the trial of the case
Liwayway and not of Bulletin.[58] Aside from the proceeds of
on the merits, these declarations are binding, at least insofar
the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, as earlier
as the Estate is concerned. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 of
noted, the Estate and HMHMI had, in turn, prayed for the
the Revised Rules on Evidence, an admission, verbal or written,
payment of the proceeds of the Estate's sale of Menzi's shares
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
in Liwayway in the Joint Manifestation they filed in G.R. Nos.
case does not require proof. It may be made: (a) in the
152578, 154487 and 154518.[59] In his 17 July 2006 Comment
pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial
on the foregoing Joint Manifestation, Yap likewise maintained
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or
that TDC No. 162828 covers the proceeds of the sale by
(c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of
HMHMI of its shares in Liwayway in favor of US Automotive
the case.[50] When made in the same case in which it is
and that TDC No. 162829 covers about half of the proceeds of
offered,[51] "no evidence is needed to prove the same and it
the Estate's sale of its Liwayway shares in favor of Liwayway
cannot be contradicted unless it is shown to have been made
itself.[60] With Menzi's sale of his Bulletin shares to US
through palpable mistake or when no such admission was
Automative already discounted as the origin of the funds
made."[52] The admission becomes conclusive on him, and all
deposited under the subject TDCs, this confluence of the
proofs submitted contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith
parties' assertions and/or admissions lends credence to the
should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
Republic's position that they were sourced from the sale by the
adverse party or not.[53] Absent any showing in the record that
Estate and HMHMI of their Liwayway shares.
the above-quoted declarations were made by Montecillo
through palpable mistake, the Republic correctly argues that
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that no
they are binding upon the Estate which, for said reason, is
grave abuse of discretion is imputable against the
precluded from claiming that the funds deposited under TDC
Sandiganbayan for denying the Republic's motion for
Nos. 162828 and 162829 came from the 1984 sale of Bulletin
execution, insofar as it related to the delivery in its favor of the
shares to US Automotive.
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. By the Republic's
own admission, after all, the validity of the transfer and/or
At any rate, it further appears that part of the proceeds of the
legality of ownership of Liwayway shares was not litigated in
sale of the subject Bulletin shares to US Automotive which had
Civil Case No. 0022[61] since the issues identified for resolution
been deposited with Philtrust, had also been maintained by
at the pre-trial of the case only included the ownership and
the Estate under TDC No. 130052 and not TDC Nos. 162828
transfer of the Bulletin shares therein identified.[62] Not having
and 162829. In his Comment on the motions for execution
been litigated upon, factual and legal issues concerning said
filed a quo by the Republic as well as the Estate and HMHMI,
Liwayway shares were, therefore, understandably not
Yap claimed as much and submitted copies of: (a) TDC No.
determined in the 14 March 2002 Decision subsequently
130052; (b) Montecillo's 6 March 1989 letter offering the
rendered in the case by the Sandiganbayan and, for that
matter, in the 23 November 2005 Decision this Court rendered
in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518. Unsuccessful in
seeking the release of said funds in G.R. No. 135789 after this
Court rendered the 31 January 2002 Decision affirming the
Sandiganbayan's dissolution of the writ of sequestration
issued by the PCGG,[63] the Estate and HMHMI had, in fact,
revived the issue of their entitlement to the proceeds of the
subject TDCs when they filed their 28 February 2006 Joint
Manifestation in said consolidated cases.
Considering the finality of this Court's 23 November 2005
Decision affirming the Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002
Decision in Civil Case No. 0022, we find that the Estate and
HMHMI correctly argue against the disposition of the proceeds
of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Republic by
means of the writ of execution the latter sought a quo. Having
been sourced from the disposition of said Liwayway shares,
the proceeds of the subject TDCs cannot be released in favor
of the Republic without varying the decision sought to be
executed which, as admitted, did not make any determination
regarding the validity of the ownership of the same shares
and/or the legality of the transfer thereof. It is a matter of
settled legal principle that a writ of execution must adhere to
every essential particular of the judgment sought to be
executed.[64] The writ cannot vary or go beyond the terms of
the judgment and must conform to the dispositive portion
thereof.[65] Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of
execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or, for that
matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.[66]
Even more fundamentally, the award of the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829 sought by the Republic would be
tantamount to an alteration of the decisions rendered by the
Sandiganbayan and this Court, which have already attained
finality. Except for clerical errors and in cases of void
judgments and nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party,[67] nothing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.[68] It cannot, therefore, be
gainsaid that such a judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land.[69] The reason is grounded on the fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must
be final at some definite date fixed by law.[70] "Otherwise,
there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role
of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality."[71]
Gauged from the procedural antecedents of the case,
however, the above-discussed principles do not apply to the
Sandiganbayan's grant of the release of the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and
HMHMI. While it is true that the latter filed a motion for
execution ostensibly seeking the enforcement of the 14 March
2002 Decision rendered in the case, the release of the
proceeds of the subject TDCs in their favor is clearly justified
by the earlier lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the
PCGG over the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and
documents of HMHMI. In compliance with this Court's 16 July
1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 107377 requiring the
determination of the factual basis for the same writ of
sequestration,[72] the record shows that the Sandiganbayan
conducted hearings on the matter and, based on the evidence
presented, issued a Resolution dated 13 April 1998, lifting the
writ of sequestration thus issued for lack of factual
basis.[73] Together with the 21 August 1998 Resolution denying
the Republic's motion for reconsideration thereof, the lifting
of the writ of sequestration ordered by the Sandiganbayan was
affirmed in the 31 January 2002 Decision rendered by this
Court in G.R. No. 135789.[74]
Over the years, the Estate and HMHMI had, of course,
unsuccessfully prayed for the release of the proceeds of the
subject TDCs in their favor. Pursuant to the 24 March 2003
Resolution issued in G.R. No. 135789, HMHMI's motion for the
release of the checks Philtrust issued for the principals of and
interests on TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was noted without
action on the ground that the matter "should be ventilated and
addressed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518.[75] Acting
on the Urgent Motion and Manifestation to the same effect
filed by the Estate and HMHMI in the same case, the Court
issued an extended Resolution dated 6 October 2003,
reiterating its earlier action on the ground that the resolution
of said consolidated cases was "intimately related to the
propriety of any disbursement of the funds in the hands of
Philtrust Bank."[76] The 3 November 2003 Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution/Delivery of Properties Subject of
Sequestration which the Estate filed with the
Sandiganbayan[77] was, on the other hand, noted without
action in said court's Resolution dated 9 March 2004 on the
ground of loss of jurisdiction, in view of the pendency of said
appeal before this Court.[78]
Despite this Court's 31 January 2002 affirmance of the lifting
of the writ of execution of the PCGG's sequestration order, the
record shows that the Republic made no move towards the
inclusion in Civil Case No. 0022 of the issues pertaining to the
legality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and/or the
validity of the transfers thereof. Not having been addressed in
the 14 March 2002 Decision rendered in the case, said issues
were, consequently, not likewise tackled when said decision
was affirmed in the 23 November 2005 Decision this Court
subsequently rendered in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and thereof and subsists only until ownership is finally judicially
154518. With the issuance of an entry of judgment in said determined,[87] it stands to reason that, upon its dissolution,
consolidated cases,[79] it further appears that the Court no the property sequestered should likewise be returned to its
longer acted on the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation filed owner/s. Indeed, sequestration cannot be allowed
by the Estate and HMHMI, for the purpose of seeking the interminably and forever, if it is to adhere to constitutional due
release of the proceeds of, among others, TDC Nos. 162828 process.[88]
and 162829.[80] Be that as it may, however, it cannot be
gainsaid that, by the time the Republic commenced the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
petition at bench on 21 July 2008, more than five years had Sandiganbayan's assailed Resolutions dated 17 January 2008
already elapsed since the decision in G.R. No. 135789 attained and 22 May 2008 are, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto. The 2
finality on 13 December 2002.[81] September 2008 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in the case is likewise DISSOLVED.
Given the finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration
issued by the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the SO ORDERED.
Republic to allege and prove the illegality of the ownership of
the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of the transfers thereof,
we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted
for ordering the release of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in
favor of the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in
the form of a provisional remedy, sequestration is merely
"intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or
dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to
conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial
determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the
property was in truth ill-gotten."[82] While it is true that the
lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to
the main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the
sequestered property is not ill-gotten,[83] it cannot be over-
emphasized that there has never been a main case against the
Liwayway shares as would justify the Republic's continued
claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged
withholding of the proceeds thereof from the Estate and
HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of
a resort to other ancillary remedies since the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction over sequestration cases demands that it should
also have the authority to preserve the subject matter of the
cases or put the same in custodia legis,[84] this is unavailing to
the Republic since, by its own admission, the Liwayway shares
were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022.

Like the remedies of "freeze order" and "provisional takeover"

with which the PCGG has been equipped, sequestration is not
meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any
right to his property and vest the same in the sequestering
agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be
done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by
law.[85] These remedies "are severe, radical measures taken
against apparent, ostensible owners of property, or parties
against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima
facieindications of having amassed 'ill-gotten wealth,'
indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual
facts in accordance with the judicial procedures of the
land."[86] Considering that sequestration is not meant to
create a permanent situation as regards the property subject