GARCIA vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279)  Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances,
FACTS: but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
 Resolution vs. Ordinance
 In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the
municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases o RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a temporary effect
Conversion Development Act of 1992.
 May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. In the said petition, they o ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in
set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they include their municipality with SSEZ. general.
 Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission, which prompted the
petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the
 Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong
required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution.
by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.
 Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Morong, wrote a letter to the
Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter
productive and futility.
 July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is “merely a
resolution” and not an ordinance
 July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the
authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. POEA (166 SCRA 533)
FACTS:

ISSUE: Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an initiative?
(i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?)
HELD: Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
 Private respondent’s husband, Vitaliano Saco, was the chief officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages with the POEA under EO No. 1985 and Memorandum Circular No. 2. Thus, she was hereby
awarded the sum of P192, 000.
 The owner of the vessel, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI), argued that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the
husband wasn’t an overseas worker but a domestic employee and consequently, his widow’s claim should have been filed with SSS,
subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.

 In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power:

ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum circular issued by the POEA on which they based their decision in favor of private respondent,
a valid delegation of legislative power?
1. ORIGINAL- possessed by the sovereign people
2. DERIVATIVE- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED.
 One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the
legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of people’s initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power
RATIO:
to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
 COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and  Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.” Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and to determine how the law may be enforces, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
appropriate subjects of local initiatives.  There are 2 accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
1. COMPLETENESS TEST- the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegates the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
o LOCAL INITIATIVES- legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly 2. SUFFICIENT TEST- there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
initiative.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delagate, who is not allowed to step into the
 The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a
legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The
 The principle of non- delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the Government but is especially
law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.
important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. Thus the delegation of
 Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the power of initiative
the legislative has become the rule and its non- delegation the exception.
may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law,
 The reason for the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
resolution or ordinance.
directly with the myriad problems demanding it attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
 sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary.
 Reasons for delegation of legislative powers are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. Delegated power to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the stature is called power of subordinate legislation.
 With such power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are
known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Thus, Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued
by the POEA, is an exercise of administrative regulation wherein the POEA is mandated to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to fair and equitable employment practices.
 It was also contended that ESLI has been denied due process because of POEA’s Memorandum sustained and applied it as
an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with 2 basic powers,
1. quasi- legislative- enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations
2. quasi- judicial- enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.
Such arrangement cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights in the ANG TIBAY vs CIR case are
observed.
 Whatever doubts regarding the rights of the parties are resolved in favor of private respondent under the
principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)
FACTS:
 COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections.
 April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted
from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that
latter’s nominees not be proclaimed
 April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Regisration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
 April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785
 May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections
2. Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
HELD: This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on
the qualifications of the party- list participants.
RATIO:
[for issue # 1]
 Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party- list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties.
 Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the House of Representatives may “be elected
through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
 Under sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party- list system.
 During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian Monsod pointed out that the participants in the
party- list system may “be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao.
o Comm. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party- list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a
chance to parties that consistently place 3 rd or 4th in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress and consequently,
have a voice in the Assembly.
 RA 7941 provides us with the definitions of the following:
o POLITICAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
o SECTORAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens belong to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Art.
6 Section 5(2) of the Constitution, which includes labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and
those added by RA 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals.
o SECTORAL ORGANIZATION- a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns
o COALITION- an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral perties or organizations for election
purpose.
[for issue # 2]
 The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the
party- list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
 Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations
2. The party- list representatieves shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the
party- list. For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party- list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
o Said provision on the party- list system is not self- executory and is thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite
the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves:
 The key words in this policy are “proportional representations”, “marginalized and underrepresented” and “lack of well-
defined constituencies”
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as
exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of the law.
  The party- list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Sec. 5.
 The persons nominated by the party- list candidate organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties”
 LACK OF WELL- DEFINED CONSTITUENCEY refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests
identified with the “marginalized and underrepresented”
 Role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are “marginalized and
underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party- list, Filipino- style
 Intent is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
 Thus the policy of the implementation of the law will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, to become members of the House of Representatives.
 Sec 5 of RA 7941 demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party list system.
The Party- list System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
 RA no. 7941 “does not limit the participation in the party- list system to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society”
 It contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Sec. 6 of RA no. 7941 may participate in the
elections.
 The assertion of the OSG that the party- list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
disregards the clear statutory principle. Its claim that even the super- rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit
of the paty- list system.
 The OSG’s position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense.
 While the mega- rich and overrepresented are numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented.
 Allowing the non- marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party- list system would
not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalize and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it.
 The party- list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
 This Court, therefore cannot allow the party- list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented.
[for issue # 3]
 What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents
therein and all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party- list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
o The court deems it proper therefore to remand the case to the Comelec to determine after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations comply with the requirements of law.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)
FACTS:
 Motion for proclamation filed by various party-list participants.
 4 unique parameters of the Philippine party system:
o 1st, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
o 2nd, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-
list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives. chan robles virtual law library
o 3rd, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
o 4th, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.
 June 26, 2001; the Court promulgated a decision requiring Comelec to commence hearings following the guidelines stated in the said
decision. They are also directed by the court to start the hearing of those who look like they have garnered a certain number of votes
to qualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice. Finally, the
May 9, 2001 resolution refraining comelec from declaring any winner shall remain in force until after the comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance.
 July 27, 2001; Comelec recommended certain parties have passed the 8 point guideline and certain parties disqualified.
 Aug 14, 2001; court issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party
list election.
 Aug 24, 2001; court again issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as winning party list
groups.
 Jan 29, 2002; court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance
Report. Thus, court lifted the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim apec and cibac as winners. To summarize, after the Court had accepted
and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners:
BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz),
APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).
 Comelec amended its Compliance Reports by adding 4 more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to
the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.
 Nov 25, 2002; OSG contended that NCIA is not a qualified party under the july 27, 2001 report.
ISSUE: Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates
that should be proclaimed winners? Does the clause "total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast for
qualified party-list candidates?
DECISION: Having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified
participants are declared elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
RATIO:
 Comelec made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. COCOFED and BUHAY are qualified. Comelec report on BUHAY was
merely anchored on conjectures or speculations. On COCOFED, the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority
an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1988. The primary purposes of
COCOFED's Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance
for industry development from private or governmental sources, this statement does not by itself constitute such substantial
evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government.
 The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list
system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during
the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates
is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The votes
for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the
Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure
 representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold
for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
 To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. The Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list
candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants that were approved in our January
29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED).
 The court found that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN]
FACTS:
 Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1 st district of Leyte.
 Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1 st district of Leyte, filed a petition for Petitioner’s
disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for residency.
 Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed “____ years and seven months”.
 Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. This was not accepted for it was filed out of time.
 It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution:
1. Finding the private respondent’s Petition for Disqualification meritorious
2. striking off petitioner’s Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995
3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy
 Even the MR to COMELEC was denied.
 Petitioner’s reasons for the change:
o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos who was then the
representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career.
o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace.
o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was
sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes.
 Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.
HELD:
1. Qualification on 1 yr residency
 No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election
law, residence is synonymous to domicile.
 In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Court’s concept of domicile is to mean an individual’s “permanent home”.
 She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she got married, the husband
has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died.
It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption.
Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile.
 An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
 To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
 The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue.
2. Qualification on 1 yr residency
 The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution
 Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it
would have clearly indicated it.”
 Mandatory vs. Directory provision
o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing
the letter of the law
o Statute is construed to be merely directory when “the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.”
DOMINO VS. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS (310 SCRA 546)
FACTS: Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of May 6, 1998 of the Second
Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Juan Domino disqualified as candidate for representative of Sarangani in May 11, 1998
elections and the Decision of May 29, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO’s motion for reconsideration.
On March 25, 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Sarangani, indicating that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one year and two months immediately preceding the election. On March
30, private respondents Narcisio Raglifo Jr, Eddie Java, JuanBayonito Jr, Rosario Samson and Dionisio Lim filed with the COMELEC
petition to deny due course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that Domino is not a resident much less a registered
voter of Sarangani. They had substantiated evidences which include: the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent wherein he claims he
have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one year and 2 months and that he is a registered voter of Sarangani;
Voter’s Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 indication registration in Balara, QC. Respondent’s Community Tax Certificate dated Jan
15, 1997. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3 rd district if QC where he stated his residence in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years, 5 months an d that he is a registered
voter in Balara QC; a copy of the application for transfer of registration records due to change of residence and copy of the sworn
application for cancellation of voter’s previous registration.
For his defense, Domino maintained that he had compled with the one year residence requirement and that he has even residing in
Sarangani since Jan1997 he showed a copy of the contract lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and respondent as Lessee executed
in January 15, 1997, copy if the application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence, CTC of the notice of
approval of Application.
On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of Sarangani for lack of the one year residence requirement a likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy He negates all his protestations that he established residence in SAranganias early as Jan 1997. He lacks one year residence
requirement.
On May 11, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046 ordering that the cast votes for Domino be counted but to
suspend proclamation of winning since the resolution disqualifying him has not yet become final and executor.
On September 15,1998 Lucille Chionbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes was allowed by the Court
to intervene. Intervenor asks the court to uphold Domino’s disqualification and to proclaim her as the representative of Sarangani.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the judgment of MTC of QC declaring the petitioner as resident of Sarangani, not QC is final
2) Whether or not petitioner resided in Sarangani, one year preceding the elections
3) Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition
DECISION: the petition is DISMISSED
RATIO: The COMELEC has the jurisdiction to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of
candidacy that will include the residence of the candidate. A decision in an exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters, even if
final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. The MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared Domino a
resident of Sarangani.
The term residence as used in law means the same thing as domicile which imports not only intention to reside but also personal
presence in the place. Three rules must be born in mind,1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; 2) when once
established, it remains until new one is acquired; 3)a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile requires not just bodily presence but also a declared probable intent to make it one’s fixed abode. The lease contract entered
in Jan 1997 does not support a change of domicile. Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is further that he was a
qualified candidate strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC. Domino still falls short of one year residency requirement.
The COMELECunder Sec 78 Art 9 of the Omnibus Election Code has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy and continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment or disqualification is rendered before the
election and the candidate facing the disqualification received the highest number of votes.
It is now settled that the candidate who received the second highest number of votes MAY NOT BE PROCLAIMED WINNER in case the
WINNER IS DISQUALIFIED. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief.
DOMINO V. COMELEC (310 SCRA 546)
FACTS: This is a special civil action in the Supreme Court where a petition for certiorari is filed. Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was elected
as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections, and won over the petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27,
1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the US. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippines Citizenship through repatriation.
After losing in the May 1998 elections, petitioner Bengson III filed a case of Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI Sec. 6 of the Constitution, which reads:
“No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day
of the election is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.”
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Bengson III argue that HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, (1)
when it ruled that the private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact the fact that he has ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part; (2) when it considered the private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship; (3) when it dismissed the petition despite the fact
that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. He also asserts that respondent Cruz may
no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation, based from Article IV Sec. 2 of the Constitution, which expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: YES. Petition is dismissed.
RATIO: There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization, which results to the 2 kinds of citizens – the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person, who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have been Filipino citizens through naturalization where an
applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship become executory only after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to the a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipinos who lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Repatriation, on the other hand, may
be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in WW II; (3) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipina woman to an
alien, and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. In the case
at bar, respondent Cruz, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
a son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in decision, the term “natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III Sec. 4 of the
1973 Constitution where there are two categories of Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. However, in the present Constitution, those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: “those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. Consequently, under the present constitution, there are two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e. did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through the naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639)
FACTS:
These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioners, Sixto
Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district
of Northern Samar in the May 1987 congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said
district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the
basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however,
denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
On the issue of jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It
has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an
unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
On the issue of citizenship
The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from
China. The respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the
same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt
twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary education in Samar, went to Manila to
acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities
were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware
business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino.
Respondent Ong’s situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority” are citizens of the
Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: “Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens”. There is no dispute that the respondent’s mother was a natural born Filipina
at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The
aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to
correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women.
The petitioners also argue that the respondent’s father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of
citizenship.
On the issue of residency
The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the
said place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1) respondent Ong is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declared a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
RATIO:
On the issue of jurisdiction
In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degree of judicial intervention
should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same – manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on
the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On the issue of citizenship
In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized. According to jurisprudence that defines “election”, the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. There is no doubt in
this case about respondent Ong’s being Filipino when he turned 21.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. An attack on person’s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the
respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process, as he has already been laid to rest and that he has
no opportunity to defend himself.
Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of his father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent “chose” to be a Filipino when he came of age. At
that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the respondent were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship.
The same issue on natural-born citizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the respondent Ong, which
is another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of residency
The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlier definition of the word “residence” which regarded it as having
the same meaning as “domicile”. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the
respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he always had the animus
revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or that of a
friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified.
DIMAPORO VS. MITRA JR. (202 SCRA 779)
FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimapatro was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur in 1987 and
thereafter took his oath of office, performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges of being an elected Representative. On
January 15, 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Regional Governor of ARMM.
COMELEC informed the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps (respondents) of Dimapatro’s filing. The respondents excluded the
name of Dimapatro from the Roll of Members of the House of Reps pursuant to Sec. 67, Article 9 of the Omnibus Election Code. He was
then excluded from all the proceedings of the House of Reps; was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and
disbanded; his office suite was occupied by another.
Petitioner lost in the ARMM elections. He wrote a letter to respondent Speaker and expressed that he intends to resume performing his
duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He failed to regain his seat in Congress. Thus, petitioner filed this petition praying
that the decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps be reviewed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 67, Article 9, of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution?
2. Whether the respondent Speaker and/or Secretary CAN exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the House of Reps, thereby
preventing him from exercising his functions as congressman, and depriving him of his rights and privileges as such?
HELD:
1. Yes. Sec. 67, Art. 9 of BP Blg 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation fall within the
term “voluntary renunciation” of office enunciated in Par. 2, Sec 7, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Its constitutional basis remains
written in the 1987 Constitution that once an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term as expressed in Sec 7, Article 6 of the Constitution. Thus, even when the provisions
concerning the shortening of the terms of congressmen were omitted in the 1987 Constitution, the said issue is still covered by
Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Petitoner’s filing of COC is an act of resignation and he is presumed to be aware of the existing laws. The Speaker and/or Secretary of
HR are/is authorized to exclude the petitioner from the Roll of Members since they are the administrative heads who perform
ministerial functions including the removal of the petitioner’s name. The mere act of filing the COC for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held and it is not necessary that the other position be
actually held since the said filing is an act of voluntary resignation.
ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the
Congress.
FACTS: Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP candidate to the support given by
defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the independent LP candidate which divided the LP
votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia “sabotaged” and “double-crossed” the LP,
its official candidate would have won.
On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of
Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of
the formal request was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon
Valencia’ appointment to the Cabinet.
Two-page press release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on the
front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public
offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain
serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then filed the present civil action
against Valencia.
Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and that they were made in
good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character.
Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its
publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel.
Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix
substituted her husband as plaintiff-appelle.
ISSUE: Whether the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as a qualified privilege communication?
HELD: Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where malice in law is presumed because
they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly
and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had the
defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of
its Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendant-appellant’s claim of defensive libel is likewise
rejected because his argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another
libel is based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antonino’s act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged communication
because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same
were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on Appointments.
Judgment affirmed.
JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the
Congress.
FACTS: Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called
three operational plans under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an
insidious plan or a massive political build-up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already
been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their
control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as
already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge.
An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter.
The trial court dismissed this complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?
2. Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?
HELD: No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for
any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesn’t fall into this category. The said expression
refers to utterances made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter
was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general
circulation, thus ipso facto he wasn’t performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee.
No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in
a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the
petitioners to entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)
FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary
while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee
hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend
the sessions in Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?
HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesn’t free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution
provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6
years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section
11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if
the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment
has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him
a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The
accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a
few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isn’t reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.
Instant motion is denied.
PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)
FACTS: On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat was
among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said electioj
on the ground that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim Batasang
Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides that:
SEC 11. ART VIII
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel …. or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Govenrment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or conrolled corporation during
his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called on account of his office.
Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervaention. SEC
granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervenor of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor General supported
the allowing of the intervention. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating the Constitution.
HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is reversed and set aside.
RATIO: Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares. He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested
election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat as
valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and
circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the
client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in indirection which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention of Assemblyman in
SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11. Art. VIII of the Constitution.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)
FACTS:
 Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the
respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco.
 Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against
the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did
not immediately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started,
Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelino’s follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of
Avelino’s group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct broke out
in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino’s follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to
prevent Tanada’s privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged
the gavel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona, Clarin, David,
and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidad’s resolution
no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced
resolution no. 67 entitled “Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honourable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate.” Resolution no. 67 was approved.
ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RATIO: The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the
power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the
majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the
departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement.
OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)
FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House
Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against
the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him
for 15months.
ISSUES: Whether his suspension was constitutional
HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed
RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the
purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are
disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.
The question of whether Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the house knows best.
On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was issued,
the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.
UNITED STATES VS. PONS (34 PHIL. 725)
FACTS: Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were convicted of the crime of illegal importation of opium. It was alleged in the
information that the accused, conspiring together, plotting among themselves did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country and import and introduce in the City of Manila 520 tin cans containing 125 kgs of opium. Each
were found guilty of the charged. The accused appealed, but Beliso withdrew his appeal and the judgment has been final to him. On
appeal, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1941 was on
February 28; that the Act 2381, under which Pons must be punished was not passed or approved on the 28 th but on March 1 of that
year; that the same is null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused may be convicted under Act 2381.
2. Whether the adjournment of the legislature be proved by legislative journals or by extraneous evidences.
DECISION: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
RATIO: Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the
Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. Under Rules 15 and 16 of Legislative Procedure of Philippine Commission “the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated in the journal.” Furthermore, on page 793 of the Commission
Journal, it is stated that:
“The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippines. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Philippine Legislature adjourned sine die.”
The Courts of the Philippines are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is, and to enable them to determine whether the legal
requisites as to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative
journals. When the legislative journal show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous
respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
In the instant case, the journal says that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and
the court did not err in declining to go behind the journals.
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes”
(actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198.
This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the
House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for
a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the
sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the
session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and
6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National
(Gavel) Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the different from urea and formaldehyde
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the ISSUE: Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. HELD: Denied the petition.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
RATIO: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and approved by
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and formaldehyde is
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)
on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a
FACTS: Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240.
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be.” On
October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22
ISSUES:
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent
tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) senators.
1. Whether RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members
2. Whether the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House. thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This
mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was
denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep.
ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process require the mass
Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is that, after
disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunal’s Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There
being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?”
ISSUE: Whether a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
Constitution
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of
the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in
HELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.
accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was
REASONS: Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal
shown.
composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of
to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable indication that the “legislative component”
than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no
CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347)
other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
FACTS: There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines
senators.
issued Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical
The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-
Co., Inc, engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
the production of its products and has paid the margin fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to to
unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank
of the Members of the Tribunal.
issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the money on the ground that the exemption granted by the
Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse
Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA.
himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and
The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide:
impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices.
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
X X X
LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)
XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11,
1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the
case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27,
petitioner was proclaimed the winner.
Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did
not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office.
On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on January 25, 1988.
On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Court’s decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on
February 8.
ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondent’s protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code:
A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest.
Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed...within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these
rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may
be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation.
Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET
ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRET
over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the
respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions
constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.
DAZA V. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496)
FACTS: From the May 1987 elections, Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a
representative of the Liberal Party (LP).
In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives (HR). 24 members of the LP shifted to LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with 159 members and leaving only 17
members with the former.
HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of
Luis Singson.
The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for Daza and Singson from serving in the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional
HELD: Yes. Petition Dismissed
RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of, among others, 12
members of the HR elected by the House on the basis of proportional representation. Since there was a shift in the number of members
of the LP to maintain proportional representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when
COMELEC granted the registration of LDP as a registered political party, LDP is qualified to have seats in the CA maintaining proportional
representation.

HELD:
GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES (214 SCRA 789)
FACTS: In the May 1992 elections, senate composed of the following members with their respective political affiliations and their
1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.
respective number of proportional representatives in the Commission on Appointments (CA).
2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Court’s “extraordinary jurisdiction.”

Political Party Membership Proportional Representatives in CA

REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973 Constitution, Section 250 of the
LDP 15 7.5
Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa
NPC 5 2.5
or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa has
already been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective LP-PDP-LABAN 1 0.5
Electoral Tribunals.
Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunal’s Power: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, Sen. Tolentino proposed that for the 12 available seats in the CA, 8 seats be given to LDP, 2 for NPC, 1 for LAKAS-NUCD and 1 for LP. It
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters was approved.
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word “sole” Sen. Guingona, Jr. files a petition to prohibit the Senate President Gonzales to recognize Sen. Romulo (LDP) and Sen. Tanada (LP) as
emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained members of the CA.
originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power ISSUE: Whether appointment of Romulo and Tanada were constitutional
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to
fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. HELD: No. Appointments of Romulo and Tanada are null and void.
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that 12 senators are to be appointed in the CA by proportional representation
itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature however, it was not expressly stated that the 12 seats must be filled in order for CA to function. CA can function even if only 10 senators
and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and are elected as long as the quorum exists. The election of Romulo and Tanada violates the proportional representation clause of Sec 18
the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction Art VI since 0.5 of a representative do not count as 1.
  October 29, 1949: 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating Php 1,500,000 were delivered to Arnault.
o That same day, Arnault opened a new account in Burt’s name with the Philippine National Bank where he
ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO (87 SCRA 29) deposited the two checks aggregating Php 1,500,000
FACTS: o On the same occasion, he drew on the same account 2 checks
 One check for Php 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc.
 Another check for Php440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
 It was the desire of the Senate to determine the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000
Buenavista Estate
o Feb 27, 1950, Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estate
Original owner: San Juan de Dios Hospital Deals.
Jan 1, 1939 to Jan 1, Philippine Gov’t has the option to purchase this property for Php3,000,000 within this period o A special committee was created by the said resolution to work on the investigation
1964 if the Philippine Gov’t will not purchase this property, it will be disposed in court on June 21, 1944  Arnault refused/ don’t want to mention who was the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000 because
But if Philippine Gov’t will opt to purchase the said property, they'll pay the owner the sum of Php3,000,000 o His answer might be used against him. Also, he said that it is his constitutional right to refuse to incriminate
himself. According to him, such question violates his right as a citizen to have privacy in his dealings with other people.
o “I don’t remember the name; he was a representative of Burt” “I am not sure; I don’t remember the name”
June 29, 1946 San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the property to Ernest Burt for Php 5,000,000 who made a down payment of  Without securing a receipt, he turned over the Php440, 000 to a certain person, a representative of
Php 10,000 and agreed to pay Php 500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of Php Burt, in compliance with Burt’s verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do
500,000 each with the negations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times
Failure to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of Php 10,000 and before he gave him the money on Oct. 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again 2 or 3 items. The last time being in
would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Dec, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39-40 years old, bet. 5’2- 5’6.
 Senate deliberated and hereby committed the petitioner to the custody of the Sergeant- at- Arms and imprisoned until “he
Latter part of Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Buenavista Estate for Php shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom
October, 1949 4,500,000. Php 1,000,000 was paid to Burt through his attorney- in- fact in the Philippines, the Assoc. Estates he gave the Php 440,000.
Inc. represented by Jean L. Arnault for BUENAVISTA ESTATE

ISSUES:

1. The Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Tambobong Estate Php 440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to
Original owner: Philippine Trust Company answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
2. Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May
May 14, 1946 Philippine Trust Company sold this to Burt for Php 1,200,000, who paid Php 10,000 and promised to pay Php
18, 1950
90,000 within 9 months and the balance of Php 1,100,000 in 10 successive annual installments of Php
3. Petitioner invokes the privilege against self- incrimination.
110,000 each

Feb. 14, 1947 9 month period expired without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards
HELD: The petition must be denied.
RATIO:
Sept. 4, 1947 Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the estate to RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION by [for issue #1]
an absolute dead of sale in consideration of the sum of Php 750,000

February 5, 1948 Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Bert for the resolution and cancellation of his
contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of Php
90,000 within the period of 9 months
CFI of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt’s certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of
the Rural Progress Administration.
 Subject of the inquiry was the questionable expenditure of the Government of Php 5,000,000 of public funs. Thus, it’s been
decided that it’s within the jurisdiction of the Senate.
 Power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry/
investigation
 Once an inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right
against self- incrimination.

Latter part of the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Tambobong Estate for the o Also, once the jurisdiction is conceded, the SC cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of
October, 1949 sum of Php 500,000, which was all paid to Burt through his other attorney- in- fact, the North Manila Congressional discretion
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault for the TAMBOBONG ESTATE. o Inquiry should be within the jurisdiction, material/ necessary for the exercise of a power vested by the Congress
and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry
  The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry
 The ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be
correct.
 The investigation had not been completed, because due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet
determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution no. 8
o The bills recommended by this committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved
pending the completion of the investigation.
o Those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the
investigation is finished
 This atmosphere of suspicion must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to
compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000 and answer
the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person
[for issue #2]
 Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session
and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. Exercising the power to punish for contempt is enables
the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
 Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committee charged with the
duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function.
 There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally
be exerted as in the present case.
 By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function,
and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his
liberty until he shall have answered them.
o This power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved.
 Also, it’s an absurd, unnecessary and vexatious procedure if we are to hold that the power to punish for contempt
terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding
sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed.
[for issue # 3]
 The ground upon which the witness’ claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety.
 His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. It’s also unbelievable that he gave Php440,000 to a person unknown to him
 Since according to the witness himself, the transaction was legal, and that he gave the Php440, 000 to a representative of
Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, court can’t find a basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name
of that person might incriminate him.
 Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt assuming
that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
 It is the witness’s clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere and truthful testimony before a competent authority.
 The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen’s obligation; consistent of course with is right under the Constitution.
GARCIA VS. MATA (85 SCRA 208)
FACTS: Eusebio Garcia is a reserve officer on active duty of the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on
15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain.
On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of
accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600
took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; Petitioner’s reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and
such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings; From 15 November 1960 up to the
present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant
General. The petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the
respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active
commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to
him from the time of his reversion to inactive status basing his allegations on Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is constitutional.
HELD: Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines provides:
“After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be
called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except
those whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall
be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least
ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be
reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request ; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active
commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall
not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of
reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve
officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this
Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of
certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose
of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to
the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.”
The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein,
and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the
Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1
of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision
contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly
connected with that subject. if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating
to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative
and of no effect.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was declared as
unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is
as though it has never been passed. Petitioner no longer having legal basis for such claims, his petition was denied.
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA (148 SCRA 208)
FACTS: Petitioners, who filed petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction questioning the constitutionality of
the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 as concerned citizens of the Philippines, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of
the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and general
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Petitioners claim that it is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution.
2. Whether the Judiciary may encroach with the exercise of functions of the legislative and executive departments.
HELD:
1. The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
Section 16 authorizes the President to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices; however, first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment. Indeed, such provision in question is null and void.
2. The law provides the doctrine of Separation of Powers as well as Checks and Balances to ensure that no abuse of power shall take
place. Therefore, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and
ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers,
it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA 506)
FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the
Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the
President and vetoed some of the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other
expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme
Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.)
The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of
Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway
Authority.
ISSUE: Whether the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
HELD: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation
for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be
vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s.
Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law.
Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to
guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not
alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of
modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings.
According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed,
Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation
act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)
FACTS: Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the constitutionality of presidential veto of section 55.
Section 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989:
Sec. 55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by congress: no
item of appropriation recommended by the president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to article VII, section 22 of the
constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized
for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the presided in the budgetshall be
deemed to have been disapproved by congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act.
Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill into law but vetoed 7
special provisions and section 55 which is a general provision. The reason of the president in vetoing such section is because it violates
Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the constitution. Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the constitutional and statutory authority of the
president, but also the senate president, speaker of the house, chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. Feb 2, 1989; congress mentioned in a resolution that the veto by the president of section 55 is unconstitutional which
means section 55 will be in effect. April 11, 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision was vetoed by the
president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990. Instead of section 55, such provision was located in section 16 of the
said bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the “use of savings” appears in section 12, separate and apart from section
55; whereas in the 1990 appropriations act, the “use of savings” and the vetoes provision have been comingled in section 16 only, with
the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or restriction.
The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:
 1. The president’s veto power does not Cover provisions, that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec 55 (FY 89) and sec 16
(FY 90) because they are provisions
2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but instead veto the entire bill
3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions
4. The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5) of the constitution has to be provided for by law, which means the congress
has also the power to determine restrictions
The veto power of the president can be found in article 6, section 27, of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the veto by the president of section 55 of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its counterpart section 16 of
the 1990 appropriations bill, which are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without effect.
public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation
of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time
of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Herein,
inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to Senator Zulueta at the time RA 920 was
passed by Congress, or approved by the President, and the disbursement of said sum became effective on 20 June 1953 pursuant to
Section 13 of the Act, the result is that the appropriating sough a private purpose and hence, null and void.
The land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by the Congress for
that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government, made over 5 months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for
the purpose of giving a “semblance of legality” to the appropriation, does not cure the basic effect. As a result, a judicial nullification of
said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

DECISION: Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is constitutional.

RATIO: The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also overlooks the constitutional
mandate that such provision is only limited in its operation to some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in article 6 section
25 (2) of the constitution.
The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the executive. The
legislative has the affirmative power to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he
may defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the
president is constitutional and does not hamper with the legislative function.
Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or restriction of an appropriation while allowing the
appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some
matter which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a
connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures.
With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are held to be inappropriate conditions. They are general law measures more
appropriate for separate legislation. They do not show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that
section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president.
If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of congress as stated in article
6, section 27 (1) of the constitution.

PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL 331)

FACTS: Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted an action for declaratory relief, with injunction, assailing the approval
of the Republic Act No. 920, entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works” and the Donation made by Jose Zulueta, who at the
time of the passage and approval of the said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item (Section 1 c[a]) for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals (the projected and planned subdivision roads, which
were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Antonio Subdivision was a private property of
Zulueta. Zulueta “donated” said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of RA 920, on the condition that if the
Government violates such condition the lands would revert to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned
the validity of the donation and the Constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not for a public purpose.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the item in RA 920 is constitutional.

2. Whether the donation made by Zulueta was valid.

HELD: It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. The
right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for