G.R. No.

220889,
July 05, 2017
People vs Marlon Belmonte, Enrile Gabay, and Noel Baac
TIJAM, J.:

Facts:

On or about September 1, 2007, in Pasig City, the accused, armed with a gun, conspiring
and confederating together with one Noel Baac who is still at-large and all of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did take, steal, and divest from complainants, have carnal
knowledge with AAA, against her will and consent, which is aggravated by the
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape

Ruling:

The CA correctly noted that the imposable penalty upon accused-appellant should have
been death considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was alleged in the
Information and proven. The rest of the assailed CA Decision STANDS.
G.R. No. 219885
July 17, 2017
People vs. Augusto F. Gallanosa
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

Facts:

The defense alleged that on 6 November 2002, Dante stood outside Medel's house and
challenged him to come out of the house. When Medel failed to come out, Dante started
throwing rocks at Medel's house. Annie Grace, who was inside the house, went outside
and ran towards the house of Onto, Medel's uncle. Onto opened the door of his house
and Annie Grace went inside. Thereafter, Dante ran after Onto and tried to stab him, but
missed.

Appellant arrived at the scene and was also attacked by Dante. Appellant, after evading
the knife attack, stabbed Dante with a bolo. Nonilon came and punched appellant. When
appellant ran away, Nonilon threw rocks at him and ran after him. Nonilon tried to hit
appellant with a piece of wood, but appellant was able to stab him first with his bolo.
Appellant later surrendered to Emilio Castedades, a barangay tanod, and appellant was
then brought to the police station, where Castedades turned over appellant's bolo to the
police.

Issue:

Whether appellant was able to prove self-defense to acquit him in the two counts of
murder.

Ruling:

There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming self-
defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and imminent
threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense.
In Criminal Case No. 1631, the victim, Nonilon, was stabbed by appellant five times which
caused Nonilon's death. When appellant started attacking Nonilon, the latter was already
in a kneeling position with his hands raised, indicating a position of surrender. However,
appellant still hacked Nonilon, hitting him on his left forearm. Thereafter, appellant
stabbed Nonilon four more times on the right and left chest. Clearly, even if there might
be unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon at the start, it already ceased when Nonilon
ran away and when appellant caught up with him. Nonilon, who was already kneeling with
his hands raised, was quite helpless when appellant started stabbing him. At that
moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which amounts to actual
or imminent threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of unlawful aggression
is already lacking in this case. Appellant's claim that Nonilon tried to stab him first with a
knife was belied by the testimony of another defense witness who stated that Nonilon was
armed only with a piece of wood which he picked up while running after appellant. Even
appellant's wife testified that she only saw Nonilon throwing stones at her husband.
Appellant's wife never testified that Nonilon was armed with a knife.
G.R. No. 210615
July 26, 2017
People vs. Abenir Brusola
LEONEN, J.:

Facts:
The prosecutor’s version of the events was that Joanne, one of the children of Abenir and
Delia would occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed restless when
she suddenly saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. Joanne yelled, “Tay” and
tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. He said he saw a man in the bathroom with
Delia.
On the defendant’s version, he asked Delia if she was going somewhere, she said it was
none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom and while inside, he heard people
talking outside and looked out through a crack in the wall. He saw a man and Delia kissed,
while the latter told the man, “Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya”. Abenir picked up
the maso, went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir
attacked the man who used Delia as a shield, which caused her death. Abenir voluntarily
surrendered and reported the matter to the Barangay Officials.

Issue:

Whether or not Abenir is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Ruling:

The trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are mitigating
circumstances in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
The presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the
proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

-...

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

....

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
G.R. No. 222561
August 30, 2017
People vs. Dominador Udtohan
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

Dominador Udtojan is the paternal uncle of AAA, the victim, who is a minor of 11 years
old. AAA together with her mother lives with the accused. Udtohan buys bananas
everyday and AAA helps him in selling banana cue as she was still on vacation from
school. While on their way to buy bananas, by means of violence and intimidation and
with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, had sexual intercourse with said
victim against her will and consent. Later in the evening, at the house of accused, he
molested AAA by caressing and touching her vagina. The accused vehemently denied
the accusations against him and claimed that the charges were fabricated by AAA's
mother. Trial court convicted the accused of statutory rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of statutory
rape.

Ruling:

Yes. Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period.

As stated above, when the victim of rape or acts of lasciviousness is below twelve (12)
years old, the offender shall be prosecuted under the RPC, provided that the penalty for
lascivious conduct shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Statutory rape is
committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her
consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of
free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. The
testimony of AAA showed that the she was able to establish with clear and candid detail
her age at the time of the incident, the identity of accused-appellant, her relationship with
him, and the specific bestial acts committed by him.
G.R. No. 218575
October 4, 2017
People vs. Francis Ursua
PERALTY, J.:

Facts:

AAA, the biological daughter of accused-appellant Ursua, then 14 years of age, was
allegedly raped by the latter three times from January 16 to January 18, 2006. On the
following day, AAA left their house and went to her grandfather, CCC to whom she told
what happened. Charges of qualified rape was charged against Ursua.
In his arraignment, Ursua pleaded not guilty and denied having any carnal knowledge
against AAA. Ursua claimed that AAA filed the cases against him because he prevented
her from going to CCC. The reason being that she became especially close to her
godfather. Whenever he fetched her, he oftentimes saw him embracing her and that
sometimes she was sitting on his lap. Due to the prohibition, AAA would leave the house
whenever they were asleep. They would wake up without AAA and just see her already
at CCC's place.

Issue:
Whether or not the act is aggravated under Art. 15 of Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Considering that the victim was 14 years old at the time of the commission of sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and there being no mitigating circumstance
to offset the alternative aggravating circumstance of (paternal) relationship, as alleged in
the information and proved during the trial of Criminal Case No. 134834-H, Ursua is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime
and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication
and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the
offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
G.R. No. 222561
August 30, 2017
People vs. Jonathan Tica
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

On 2008, Jonathan Tica agreed to sell to Eduardo Intia some sea shells that the latter got
from the sea. However, Intia did not return to give the proceeds of the seashells. When
they met later, Tica confronted him and had commotions and physical fight. The day
after, Tica was at the seashore washing his slippers when he saw Intia running towards
him to attack. Upon seeing, Tica tried to evade by swimming towards the sea. Intia chased
him and was able to catch him and stabbed him that resulted to his death. Tica admitted
killing Intia, but put up the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Issue:

Whether there is a valid self-defense.

Ruling:

What actually transpired in the present case is not an act of self-defense but an act of
retaliation on the part of Tica. These two concepts are not the same. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
injured by the accused.17 "When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists,
the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even would the former aggressor.
To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the
extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful
aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the
offender."18 Undoubtedly, Tica went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries to Intia, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased the night before.

Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from Intia, the means employed
by Tica was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack
that he sought to prevent. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. 19 It
must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted,
and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.20 In this
case, Intia was unarmed when he allegedly attacked Tica. 21 Considering that Tica is taller,
had a bigger body built, and younger than Intia,22 he could have simply engaged him in a
fistfight. Instead, using his own knife,23 Tica chose to fatally stab Intia about six times,
which caused the victim's eventual death. We have held in the past that the nature and
number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which
disprove a plea of self-defense.
G.R. 223114
November 29, 2017
People vs. Jonas Pantoja
MARTIRES, J:

Facts:

Jonas Pantoja was charged for killing the victim, with treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, who was 6 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
which is an act also considered to be cruelty against children. Pantoja claimed the
defense of insanity to be exempt from criminal liability. It further contends that even
assuming his insanity was not sufficiently proven, the Court should convict him of
homicide only because the defense has proven that he has an illness which diminishes
the exercise of his willpower without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts.

Issue:

Whether Pantoja has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to exempt
him from criminal liability and, in the negative, whether his mental issues constitute
diminished willpower so as to mitigate his liability and to lower the penalty.

Ruling:

The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance, requiring

defendant to prove it with clear and convincing evidence. A person acting under any of
the exempting circumstances commits a crime but cannot be held criminally liable
therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the complete absence of
intelligence or free will in performing the act. The defendant who asserts it is, in effect,
admitting to the commission of the crime. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to
defendant, who must prove his defense with clear and convincing evidence.

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. For the defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that
defendant’s insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding,
the commission of the crime.

Since no man can know what goes on in the mind of another, one’s behavior and outward
acts can only be determined and judged by proof. Such proof may take the form of opinion
testimony by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; by a witness who
has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness’ own
perception of the accused; or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. In the instant case, the proof proffered by Pantoja is insufficient to sustain
his defense of insanity.

Considering that the victim in this case was only six (6) years old, treachery attended his
murder. Even if the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower were to be
considered in Pantoja’s favor, it cannot be a basis for changing the nature of the crime
nor for imposing a penalty lower than that prescribed by law. The presence of mitigating
circumstances does not change the nature of the crime. It can only affect the imposable
penalty, depending on the kind of penalty and the number of attendant mitigating
circumstances.