BSC Thesis Imke Straaten

Framing
the Arab Spring

Analysing the Muslim Brotherhood, April 6th Movement and
Kefaya on mobilisation strategies and age differentiation

Bsc Thesis International Development Studies (YSS‐82812)

Department of Rural Sociology (RSO)
Imke Straaten
910407810130

Supervisor Dr. Ir. Joost Jongerden
July 2013

Acknowledgements

This BSc thesis fits in obtaining the diploma of the bachelor International Development Studies at the
Wageningen University. I specialized myself in the sociological aspects of development issues. During
my study I became interested in the social issues of the Islam culture in the Middle East. This was
partly enforced by reading books about suppression of women in the Middle East, like “Not without
my daughter” from Betty Mahmoody, as well through the actual new images of the protests in the
Middle East onwards 2010. Therefore I decided to deepen myself herein and commit my bachelor
thesis to this culture.
I would like to take the opportunity to thank a few people for their guidance and support during the
realization of this report. First, my thanks go to dr. ir. JP (Joost) Jongerden for his proper guidance,
easy communication and the useful feedback. Due to his advice and practical tips this bachelor thesis
had successfully been finished. I also would like to thank my roommates and friends for their advice
regarding the structure of the thesis and the plan of action.

Imke Straaten

Wageningen, July 2013

2 | F r a m i n g t h e A r a b S p r i n g

Abstract
Two years after the start of the Arab Spring there has been much written and said about the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. The literature has shown that the Arab Spring is much
explained through framing. This framing is done on the basis of dichotomies. The dichotomies which
could be noticed in the literature are online vs. offline, public vs. dictator, religious vs. secular, old vs.
young, man vs. woman, national vs. international and poor vs. rich. This literature study shall
examine to which extent dichotomies have sufficient explanatory power to assert the Arab Spring.
Therefore the central research question is: How is the Arab Spring framed and to which extent these
frames remain while analyzing events in the Arab Spring?
The report provides a new perspective on existing literature by reflecting on the Arab Spring. The
report consists out of two parts. The first part will demonstrate in which way the Arab Spring is
framed. A content analysis shows whether the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old have
sufficient explanatory power to assert the “Arab Spring”. This content analysis is supported by a case
study, the second part of the report. The case study analyzes the mobilization strategies and age
differentiation of social movements in the Arab Spring. Three Egyptian social movements are central
in the case study: the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement and Kefaya.
After analyzing three social movements I can conclude that mobilization occurs as well through
online and offline processes as by young and older people. The old have the knowledge and
experiences to contact the right connections to influence politics. In contrast, the youth dare to
express their dissatisfaction and start the revolution. Both generations exchange knowledge through
the media they are used to. By using more traditional media the older ones could spread information
offline to peers. By using social media the younger generation could spread information online to
peers. Therefore online and offline media and young and old need each other to reach the whole
population and to proceed the revolution. There are blurred lines between the extremes of a
dichotomy and therefore no clear dichotomies. The case study analysis shows that the dichotomies
online vs. offline and young vs. old do not face enough explanatory power to assert the Arab Spring.
Keywords:
Arab Spring, dichotomies, mobilization strategies, age differentiation, Muslim Brotherhood, April 6th
Movement, Kefaya.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7

Chapter 2 – Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

2.1. Research Objective………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
2.2. Concepts………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
2.2.1. Framing……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
2.2.2. Dichotomy…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 9
9
2.3. Research Question……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
2.4. Scientific and Societal relevance…………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
2.4.1. Scientific relevance……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
2.4.2. Societal relevance……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

2.5. Research Strategy……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
2.6. Method of Data Collection…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
2.6.1. Phase 1: Proposal………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
2.6.2. Phase 2: Mapping……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
2.6.3. Phase 3: Description of Dichotomies…………………………………………………………………………. 11

2.7. Method of Data Collection Case Study………………………………………………………………………………… 12
2.7.1. Phase 4: Case Study…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12
2.7.2. Phase 5: Case Study Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
2.7.3. Phase 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

Chapter 3 – Background…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13

3.1. Prelude……….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13
3.2. The Term “Arab Spring”………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 14
3.3. Mapping the Arab Spring…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15

Chapter 4 – Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17

4.1. People vs. Dictator………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17
4.2. Poor vs. Rich……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 18
4.3. Religious vs. Secular……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 18
4.4. National vs. international……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 19
4.5. Man vs. Women…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
4.6. Old vs. Young………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 21
4.7. Online vs. Offline…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 21

Chapter 5 – Deepening……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23

5.1. Deepening the Dichotomy Online vs. Offline……………………………………………………………………….. 23

5.1.1. New Media……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
5.1.1.1. Facebook…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
5.1.1.2. Smart Phones…………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
5.1.1.3. Blogs…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 24

5.1.2. Expansion of the Internet…………………………………………………………………………………………. 24
5.1.3. New Media and the Government…………………………………………………………………………….. 24
5.1.4. Traditional Media……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25

5.1.5. Reliability of new and traditional media………………………………………………………………….. 26
5.1.6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 26

5.2. Deepening the Dichotomy Young vs. Old……………………………………………………………………………. 27

5.2.1. Demographic characteristics……………………………………………………………………………………. 27
5.2.2. Population characteristics and violence…………………………………………………………………… 29
5.2.3. Dissatisfaction among youth……………………………………………………………………………………. 29
5.2.4. Generation differences…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 30
5.2.5. Population policy……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 30
5.2.6. The Arab Spring is controlled by the old…………………………………………………………………… 31
5.2.7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 31

Chapter 6 – Case Study…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 33

6.1. Social Movements………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33

6.1.1. The Muslim Brotherhood…………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
6.1.1.1. History…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 33
6.1.1.2. Public Profile………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
6.1.1.3. Membership Network………………………………………………………………………………….. 34
6.1.1.4. Mobilization Means……………………………………………………………………………………… 35
6.1.1.5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 36

6.1.2. The April 6th Movement…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
6.1.2.1. History…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 37
6.1.2.2. Public Profile………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37
6.1.2.3. Membership Network………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
6.1.2.4. Mobilization Means……………………………………………………………………………………… 37
6.1.2.5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 38

6.1.3. Kefaya………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 39
6.1.3.1. History…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 39
6.1.3.2. Public Profile………………………………………………………………………………………… 39
6.1.3.3. Membership Network…………………………………………………………………………………. 40
6.1.3.4. Mobilization Means……………………………………………………………………………………. 40
6.1.3.5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41

6.2. Conclusion Case Study…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41

Chapter 7 – Case Study Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 44

Chapter 8 – Discussion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 47

Chapter 9 – Conclusion..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48
9.1 Final Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 48
9.2 Limitations……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 50
9.3 Further research…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 51

Chapter 10 References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 52


Table of Figures
Figure 1 15
Figure 1 provides a map. This map shows the involved countries in the Arab uprisings. The
countries are located in the Middle East and in the North of Africa. Therefore people speak of
the ‘MENA‐countries’

Figure 2
Figure 2 provides a map. This map shows the recent political situation of the involved MENA‐ 16
countries in the Arab Spring.

Figure 3 28
Figure 3 provides a population pyramid of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen in 2011.

Figure 4 29
Figure 4 provides an overview of the youth unemployment as percent of total unemployment
in the Middle East and North Africa.

Figure 5 43
Figure 5 provides an overview of three Egyptian social movements. The movements are
compared to each other on the basis of history, public profile, membership network and
mobilization strategies.

Figure 6 46
Figure 6 elaborated social movements on the basis of the dichotomies online vs. offline and
young vs. old.


Chapter 1 – Introduction
This chapter provides a short situation description, describes the central focus of the
research and presents the structure of the report.
On December 17 2010 the 26‐year‐old Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouaziz set himself on fire. It
was a personal act of resistance, however, his action unleashed a popular uprising. The revolutionary
wind hit about to seventeen countries including Egypt, Libya and later on Syria. In all these countries
we have seen a somehow resistance against the regimes. However, the course, size of the resistance,
the reaction of the regimes and the consequences of the protests differ per country. The unexpected
happened: dictators like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi were forced by the people to resign. The
suicide of Mohamed Bouaziz action is described by most of the authors as the beginning of the "Arab
Spring". A concept that can be defined as twelve months of large‐scale violence and opposition to
the ruling authorities in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Two years after the start of the Arab Spring there has much been written and said about the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Opinions on the course of the Arab Spring vary widely.
The literature has shown that the Arab Spring is much described, explained or characterized through
framing. This framing is done on the basis of dichotomies. The dichotomies which could be noticed in
the literature are online vs. offline, public vs. dictator, religious vs. secular, old vs. young, man vs.
woman, national vs. international and poor vs. rich.
The central focus is on mobilisation strategies and age differentiation in the Arab Spring. To analyze
these two central aspects in the Arab Spring I will examine three Egyptian social movements. So by
using a case study, which will describe the mobilization strategies and age differentiation of three
Egyptian social movements, I will analyze whether the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs.
old could face enough explanatory power to assert the Arab Spring.
My report is carefully constructed to answer my final research question. The report starts with a
methodology chapter in which the research strategy and the method of data collection are
explained. Following this, there are five informative chapters. Chapter three introduces the situation
in the Middle‐East and North Africa. The term “Arab Spring” is explained and two maps of the
concerned countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and their actual political situation, are
attached. Chapter four is a descriptive chapter. Different frames and characteristics of these frames,
which could assert the Arab Spring, are introduced and described. Chapter five provides more
information and statements of the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old. This chapter
answers the questions whether or not the Arab Spring could be caused by online social media and
young people. Chapter six introduces a case study which includes a comparison of three social
movements, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement and Kefaya. The comparison
takes place on the basis of the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old. Chapter seven
includes an analysis of the case‐study. In this chapter is analysed whether or not the dichotomies
online vs. offline and young vs. old could actually assert the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North
Africa. The report is ended successively with an discussion, conclusion and a bibliography.

Chapter 2 – Methodology
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the research strategy. It describes the
choice of data sources and the method of data collection. In section 2.1 the research
objective is mentioned. In section 2.2 the most important concepts are
operationalized. Section 2.3 provides the research question. Hereupon, section 2.4
explains the scientific and societal relevance of the research objective. Section 2.5
describes the research strategy of the literature review. In section 2.6 and 2.7 the
method of data collection for the literature review and the case study are explained.
2.1 Research objective
The aim of this literature review is to gain insight and understanding concerning the characteristics of
the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring is often framed in the literature on the basis of certain dichotomies.
The literature review analyses through which dichotomies the Arab Spring is framed. The central
focus is on mobilisation strategies and age differentiation in the Arab Spring. To analyze these two
central aspects in the Arab Spring I will examine three Egyptian social movements. Due to this case‐
study could be assessed whether or not the dichotomies have sufficient explanatory power to clarify
the Arab Spring.
2.2 Concepts
According to the research objective we can determine two important concepts which are central to
this Bsc‐thesis. This section operationalize the concepts “framing” and “dichotomy”.
2.2.1 Framing
The way you explain or clarify the Arab Spring depends on how you look at the Arab Spring. Meaning
is central to framing. Framing takes place on the basis of frames. Van Gorp (2004, p. 16 in Camp,
2012) defines a frame as a "steadfast, meta‐communicative message that the structuring concept
indicates that a news gives coherence and meaning". So a frame determines how you look at the
Arab Spring and what the Arab Spring means for you. Frames ensure that events and objects have a
meaningful interpretation. This is possible by emphasizing certain elements in the literature, while
other elements are omitted.
Framing is defined as "the process in which a frame on the one side in the production of news
message determines which elements from the observed reality are selected, excluded or emphasized
and on the other side pa context for interpretation of the situation provides” (Van Gorp, 2004, in
Camp, 2012 – p. 16). Framing provides insight into how media present certain subjects to their
audience. Framing also provides more insight into what effects these media messages carry with
them (Lecheler & the Vreese, 2011 in Camp, 2012). Framing of foreign conflicts, including the
revolutions of the Arab Spring, could determine the way the public and policymakers causes,
consequences and the importance of the conflict perceive and where diplomatic and material
resources will be deployed (Evans, 2010 p. 209 in Camp, 2012).

2.2.2 Dichotomy
A dichotomy is the division into two non‐overlapping structures or concepts. In this literature review
a dichotomy is seen as two extremes of each other, in other words two contrasts or opposites of
each other. Dichotomies are a way of framing the Arab Spring and are central to this literature
review. Dichotomies are statements of others to certify the Arab Spring. Dichotomies are based on
findings of others and arise through discussion in the literature. The below mentioned dichotomies
are a personal interpretation of the ongoing discussions between authors in the literature. According
to this personal interpretation I operationalized the dichotomies. This means that other researchers
could probably notice different dichotomies or interpretate and operationalize them in another way
than I did.
The literature has shown that the Arab Spring is framed on the basis of the following dichotomies:
old vs. young, online vs. offline, religious vs. secular, man vs. women, national vs. international, rich
vs. poor and public vs. dictator. Due to time constraints I will only deepen the dichotomies online vs.
offline and young vs. old. The concept “deepening” is often used in this report in relation to the
dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old. “Deepening” is the process wherein a more detailed
explanation of two dichotomies is provided, namely the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs.
old. In other words, the concept “deepening” is used to clarify a focus on two dichotomies.

2.3 Research question

The above leads to the central research question of this literature review:

How is the Arab Spring framed and to which extent these frames remain while analysing
events in the Arab Spring?

The central research question will be answered by three sub questions and a case study. The three
sub questions include subsequently: 1) Which frames with regard to the Arab Spring can be
distinguished? 2) What characterizes these frames? and 3) To which extent match the characteristics
of the frames to the characteristics of the Egyptian social movements? Sub question three could only
be answered after a case study analysis. Below, the case study and its contribution are described.

The literature shows that the Arab Spring is often framed in dichotomies. Through a deepening
process the focus will become on the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old. These two
dichotomies will be related to mobilization strategies and age differentiation in the Arab Spring. To
analyze these two central aspects I will examine the events of three Egyptian social movements
namely the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement and Kefaya. The case study analyzes the
mobilization strategies and age differentiation of three Egyptian social movements in the Arab
Spring. By using a case study I will analyze whether the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs.
old could face enough explanatory power to assert the Arab Spring. So it is in the context of social
movements, that mobilization strategies and age differentiation are examined.

2.4 Scientific and societal relevance

2.4.1 Scientific relevance
As said, there has been written by different people in many different ways about the Arab Spring.
This literature review provides a new perspective on existing literature by reflecting on the Arab
Spring from a case study. Within this literature review the focus will be on mobilization strategies
and age differentiation of social movements. A content analysis shows whether the frames have
sufficient explanatory power to assert the “Arab Spring”.
2.4.2 Societal relevance
The Arab Spring could barely not been think away out of the daily news and social lives. The societal
relevance of the Arab Spring concerns therefore the role social media could play in mobilization
processes in times of crisis.
2.5 Research strategy
As described in the introduction, this section describes the research method. There are several
research methods possible for empirical research. Research can be carried out in two ways:
quantitative and qualitative. Yin (1994 in Graveland‐Vlieger, 2005) distinguishes five different
research methods namely: (1) experiment, (2) survey, (3) case study, (4) historical analysis and (5)
archive analysis. Yin indicates that the research method is dependent of the type of research
question and the focus on historical or temporarily events.
This Bsc‐thesis contains a qualitative research. To answer the central research question and the sub
questions, there will initially be done a literature review and subsequently a case study. Therefore
this Bsc‐thesis can be divided into two main parts. The first part will demonstrate in which way the
Arab Spring is framed. The concept of “dichotomy” will be exemplified in more detail. Therefore a
literature study of scientific and non‐scientific articles is done. The second part exists out of a case
study analysis. By using a case‐study, which compares three Egyptian social movements, I will analyze
whether or not the frames online vs. offline and young vs. old have sufficient explanatory power to
clarify events in the Arab Spring.

In this paper, a case study is used because this is suitable to analyze certain protests and riots
including their consequences . The case study is an appropriate method for doing analytical research
because it is characterized as a method that profound and creates opportunities for observing and
describing several (specific) research phenomena (Laurila, 1997, Eisenhardt, 1989, Braster, 2000 in
Graveland‐Vlieger, 2005) In addition, the case study is an ideal research strategy in this thesis,
because the research has the following characteristics in line with the case study: the analysis will
take place over a longer period, there are no control options, it uses existing data and data collection
methods, there is a qualitative analysis of the empirical variables and there are several levels of
analysis (Braster, 2000 in Graveland‐Vlieger, 2005). Research seeks not only to examine certain
phenomena, but in fact to understand them within a certain context. Therefore a case study is a
suitable research method.


2.6 Method of data collection literature review

2.6.1 Phase 1: Proposal
My literature began with writing a proposal. In this proposal I outlined the main points of my
literature. The proposal served as guidance to stay sharp and critical during the reading of the articles
and so to avoid a certain “blind spot”.
2.6.2 Phase 2: Mapping
Step two was to identify events and actors in the Arab Spring which were considered to be as
important. For this I started reading the book by Jan Eikelboom. He described chronologically the
Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. While reading I underlined important names, places,
or events. Besides, I also used the NOS New Dossier on the Middle East and references to online
programs on www.aljazeera.com, the website of an independent television station in Qatar, to form
an image of the uprisings.
Through scientific online databanks such as Web of Science, Google Scholar, merip.org and J‐Stor and
non‐scientific online databanks, like Google, I tried to find more about the people, places and/or
events that were mentioned in the books, programs and new files. This made it possible to chart
important events, places, social movements, names and persons related to the Arab Spring.
Terms which I used to map the Arab Spring included: Arab Spring, Chronology Arab Revolution, Social
Movements, Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda, Kefaya, Social Media, April 6 Youth Movement,
Generation Gap, Tahrir, Bangazi, Islam, Religion, Self‐organization and Mobilisation. The names
mentioned in the new files and in the book written by Jan Eikelboom were also conducted to
research: Dorothy Parvaz, Tawakul Karman, Ahmed Maher, Waleed Rashed, Asmaa Mahfouz, Kareem
Amer, Mohammed Bouazizi, Kaheld Mohamed Said, Wael Ghonim, Seif El Islam Hamed, Gerbert of
Aa, Mohamed ElBaradei, Samir Kassir and Esraa Rashid.
2.6.3 Phase 3: Description of dichotomies
This part answered two sub questions: first, “Which frames with regard to the Arab Spring can be
distinguished?” and second, “What characterizes these frames?”
The literature review was a retrospect of the Arab Spring and was determined by a content analysis
of previously written literature. This content analysis started with defining a dichotomy and identify
the characteristics of the dichotomy. This analysis was executed from an actor‐oriented approach.
This means that I tried as much as possible different groups of people to be addressed, because they
all have an different viewpoint with regard to the Arab Spring.
The dichotomies were selected in scientific and non‐scientific articles, documentaries and weblogs.
Through reading them, I tried to visualized the dichotomies. While reading I underlined important
processes and standpoints, and add critical comments. This latter was important to analyse whether
or not there were possible other explanations of the Arab Spring. Once I read all articles with regard
to the dichotomies I started re‐reading and I tried to negate the dichotomies by using other articles.

For the description of dichotomies I used both scientific and non‐scientific articles. The latter group
of sources consisted mostly of articles written by Dutch (online) newspapers as the Volkskrant and
NRC Next. By using Google I tried to find the non‐scientific (newspaper) articles. The keywords for
this phase of the literature review were the founded dichotomies: online vs. offline, public vs.
dictator, religious vs. secular, old vs. young, man vs. women, national vs. international and poor vs.
rich. I associated these terms with the terms of the mapping component including social media,
generation gap, social movements, feminism, mobilization, networking and self‐organization.
2.7 Method of data collection case study

2.7.1 Phase 4: Case study
Much of this literature study consisted out of a case study. According to the literature it seemed that
social movements played an important role in the Arab Spring. Therefore the case study contained a
description and comparison of three social movements: the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th
Movement and Kefaya. Due to time constraints, I was only able to focus on these three Egyptian
social movements.
These three social movements were mostly named in the literature, therefore they were selected as
the most prominent social movements in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. The data for the
case study were obtained from various scientific articles, weblogs, news magazines, books and
magazines. These sources I searched online and I used the same search terms as elsewhere. While
reading the literature, I underlined interesting, contrasting, valuable and meaningful information and
related them to the context in which they were written. After reading, I re‐read the articles. Writing
was, next to a literature review, a research technique.
2.7.2 Phase 5: Case study analysis
This part analyzed to which extent the dichotomies young vs. old and online vs. offline could clarified
the actions and course of the social movements. On the basis of the case study, existing frames of
the Arab Spring were assessed. In the end I analyzed whether the dichotomy online vs. offline and
young vs. old were legitimate explanations for the uprisings in the Middle East.
2.7.3 Phase 6: Conclusion
In this last part the previous literature review and the case study analysis were combined. All the
different parts of the literature came together in the conclusion. Therefore the main research
questions “How is the Arab Spring framed and to which extent these frames remain while analysing
social movements?” could be answered.

Chapter 3: Background
This chapter introduces in section 3.1. the situation in the Middle East and North
Africa onwards 2010. Besides the term “Arab Spring” is explained in section 3.2 and
in section 3.3 maps of the Arab Spring are provided.
3.1 Prelude
On December 17 2010 the 26‐year‐old Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in
the town Sidi Bouzid. It was a personal act of defiance but his action sparked huge public anger, mass
demonstrations and protests against the government of Zine al‐Abidine Ben Ali. Tunisia managed to
turn off the government of Ben Ali.
The speed in which the government in Tunisia was overthrown was a starting signal for the other
Arab countries to start also a revolt against their regimes (Anderson, 2011 in van Leeuwen, 2012).
The revolutionary wind hit about to twenty countries in the Islamic Middle East and North Africa
(MENA – countries). These MENA – countries include Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Egypt, Yemen,
Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Syria and Palestine. Hereby I refer to figure 1 and figure 2 in section 1.3. In all these countries there is
somehow a resistance against the regime. However, the course, size and consequences of the
resistance and the reaction of the regime differ per country. Nevertheless, the unexpected
happened: dictators were resigned by the people.
The causes and course of the uprisings differ per country. Nevertheless, there could be identified
some common causes of the Arab revolution wave. Causes appear to had mostly a political,
economic, gender and demographic nature. Similarly, the role of social media and social movements
cannot be underestimated. Citizens ask for democracy, free elections, human rights, employment
and resignation of oppressive regimes, more political freedom, less corruption, less unemployment
and less lack of food. They tried to achieve this through demonstrations, civil disobedience, internet
activism, protest camps, riots, strikes and self‐immolation.

The opinions differ whether or not the Arab Spring was a success. On the one side, the Arab Spring
shows that protesters could reshape national and regional politics and that people can take over
power en herewith inspire other people. For now, the number of ousted dictators is three: Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen resign all off as
leader. In other countries the disturbances did not lead to the resignation of the ruling regimes.
Sometimes the uprisings were brutally beaten down (as in Bahrain), in other cases, the government
introduced a number of reforms (as in Morocco or Lebanon). Especially, Syria was characterized in
the first half of 2012 by constant uprisings and violent conflict (van Camp, 2012) and the conflict still
goes on. The economy of Tunisia find oneself officially in a recession in the summer of 2011.
Thousands of disappointed young people tried to reach Europe in rickety boats. Only a few were
directly benefited from the revolution (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 186). The euphoria about the struggle
for freedom turned into disappointment and pessimism, through the continued violence and
radicalism.


3.2 The term “Arab Spring”
The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa are captured under a lot of names. The most
mentioned term is “Arab Spring”. This terms symbolizes a new beginning. Other names for the "Arab
Spring" are "Arab Revolution", "Islamic Revolution" and / or "Islamic Spring” or “Islamic Winter”.
These names are assigned due to the electoral success of Islamist parties in response to the protests
in many Arab countries.
Nevertheless, in this report both the terms “Arab Spring” and “Arab Revolution” will be used to refer
to twelve months of large‐scale violent and nonviolent protests, riots, civil wars and uprisings against
the ruling authorities in several countries in the Middle East. These terms are selected because of, in
my opinion, their positive scintillation in contrast to the term “Islamic Winter”. I prefer a positive
approximation. The term “Islamic Winter” is often associated negative in the new images.
The term "Arab Spring" was first used in 2005 to define the protest in the Arab region. In 2011 the
term “Arab Spring” was reintroduced by Marc Lynch in an article in the Foreign Policy Magazine, an
American political journal (6‐1‐2011). The title of the article was: “Obama’s Arab Spring” (Klootwijk,
2012). Lynch takes a rather skeptical attitude towards the uprisings in the Middle East. He does
initially not believe that changing the fundamentals of the regime in name of the democracy would
result in an effective change in society (Lynch, 2011 – American Political Journal). Soon after, the
term was used by the (Western) media. “Spring” also refers to previous revolutions in the Arab
world. In the Arab world, one speaks of the “Nahda”, more capable to describe a period of
renaissance than a period of revolutions (Klootwijk, 2012).
The term “Arab Spring” is a generic term, and includes many events in many countries and
wandering through time. I consider the Arab Spring as a series of events, or as a series of practices.
These practices together are known under the name “Arab Spring”. All of them have their own
causes and course. The straw that broke the camel was the self‐immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi.
The spark hit quickly and fears to go to the streets disappear. There was an emergence of a "If they
can do it, we can do it too" ‐ feeling.
According to Zemni (2013) the spectacular events at the beginning of 2011 in Egypt, Tunisia and
other countries such as Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco and Jordan should only be viewed as
(temporary) highlights in a process that is already for many years going on and often remained
under the radar of mainstream media. The Arab Spring is about long‐term revolutionary processes,
who faces periods of ebb and flow. It is not a matter of seasons, but of years (Eikelboom, 2011 – p.
188). We should not expect that countries in the Middle East could change in a snap. It took Western
countries also centuries. The Arab Spring needs a long‐term breath (Aarts & Luyten, 2011), which
means that we have to be more patient before we actually could notice the consequences of the
uprisings and decide whether or not the Arab Spring was a success (Sheikh, 2011). For sure
something has changed fundamentally and the clock cannot be reversed (Zemni, 2013). People know
how the situation also could be and do not let them be longer suppressed. New political leaders
seem to have to deal with an empowered population that is no longer afraid to go to the streets.
Although dictators who had power for decades were dropped and an unknown political openness is
created, it could take a long time before the results of the Arab Spring become actually tangible. The
process that Mohammed Bouaziz started could not be stopped anymore. The Arab Spring is a new
beginning with an unknown end.

3.3 Mapping the Arab Spring
Fig. 1 This map shows the involved countries in the Arab uprisings. The countries are located in the Middle East and in the North of Africa. Therefore people
speak of the ‘MENA‐countries’.

Retrieved on 29‐5‐2013 via <<http://www.topomania.net/maps/183/startmap?msi=beff6cba02c32b8469596a75b8ff6bb9&destination=mapinfo/De%20Arabische%20Lente>>
Fig. 2 This map shows the recent political situation of the involved MENA‐countries in the Arab Spring.

Retrieved on 29‐5‐2013 via <<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/Arab_World_Protests_Map_As_of_2.17.11.png?uselang=nl.>>

Chapter 4 – Literature review
This chapter provides an overview of the different dichotomies to which the assert of
the Arab Spring is described in the literature. Successively from section 4.1 until
section 4.7 the dichotomies people vs. dictators, poor vs. rich, religious vs. secular,
national vs. international, man vs. women, young vs. old and online vs. offline are
described.
4.1 People vs. Dictator
Since the end of 2010, protests emergence between citizen and their ruling regimes in various
countries of North Africa and the Arab world (van Leeuwen, 2011 in Camp, 2012). The literature
reveals that political motives seems to prevail initially the uprisings. The dichotomy people vs.
dictator could be derived from the discussion between authors whether or not the Arab Spring could
be clarified based on the fact that the people and the dictator are diametrically opposed or that
there are blurred lines between the two parties.
For some the Arab Spring is above all related to the notion that people unite and resist against
political abuse of power through the state, lack of political freedom and corrupt elections. The level
of organization of the protesters was always quite low. This is not surprising since the government
thwart the development of adult opposition for many years (van Leeuwen, 2011). This seems to fit
the dictatorial regimes pursued in countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA – countries),
where leaders govern their country with an iron hand, do not tolerate denial and favour themselves
and their families (Camp, 2012). Patronage and personal linkages proceed corruption. Political
frustrations were compounded by an inability to express themselves in a tightly controlled police
state, political corruption and the inability of the state to provide a solution to social and economic
problems (Al‐Momani, 2011). Onwards 2010 the population was united and protested (together with
the military) against the dictator, with general requirements of freedom and dignity. They ask
collectively for a social revolution, for freedom of expression and opportunities to participate in
politics for the general population.
Others argue that there is a division among the people, among the government and among the
military. They argue that some people and military do actually side with dictators like Mubarak, Ben
Ali and Kadhafi (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 80, 83). According to them there cannot be indicated a clear
dichotomy between people and dictator. They state that people and army are not united but each
strive for their own requirements. This is also agreed by Jan Eikelboom (2011 – p. 82) who states that
especially the army sits between two fires: on the one hand the people that demand a direct resign
of Mubarak and on the other hand the Americans, who award their former protégé an honorable
aggression‐free retreat. The army split up: one part sided with the people, the other part remain as a
gang of the dictator. In the end, it was then still the military who forces Mubarak to abdicate.
Despite the threat of chaos and violence, people try to continue to boldly stand up for their political,
economic, social and cultural rights. However, authoritarianism is far from disappeared from the
region. Nevertheless, the disappearance of a wall of fear has led to a huge diversity of voices
expressing different views on the political future (Zemni, 2013). This refers to the notion of political
pluralism which made public debate possible. Although it remains in the end unclear who has the

real power. Perhaps no one (Eikelboom, 2011 p. 110). The complexity of mutual relationships and
associated political motives and stakeholders is clearly described in the next statement: “From a
distance, and especially afterwards a war seems often not so complicated. There are two sides fighting
with each other, one wins and the other loses. But if the fight is still working, and you are part of it, a war
is especially still confusing” (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 123).
4.2 Poor vs. Rich
A second cause of the Arab uprisings seems to be socio‐economic in nature. The dichotomy poor vs.
rich could be derived from the notion that the poverty of the general population seems to contrast
sharply with the wealth of the national elites.

To clarify this sharp contrast between the rich elite and poor population, I give an example of the
distribution of wealth in Egypt. Egypt’s GDP is $216 billion, while Mubarak’s personal wealth is one‐
third of the country’s GDP, or $70 billion! The country’s sovereign debt is at 80% of GDP or about
$165 billion, of which external debt is $30 billion; Mubarak’s personal wealth could help solve the
debt problem. Per capita income in terms of real GDP is $2,160, the second lowest in the Arab world
just above Yemen, that is because Mubarak and a small percentage of Egyptians own most of the
wealth (Kofas, 2011).

The sharp contrast in wealth distribution in combination with rising food prices, high rates of
unemployment, falling revenues from tourism and exports and a general lack of prosperity ensures
the collapse of many citizens in deep poverty (Camp, 2012). Poverty is an inability to secure basic
human needs, in particular water, food, clothing and shelter‐necessities. In Egypt, for example, 70%
of Egyptians employed in privatized sectors, lived in poverty (Zemni, 2013). The wealth of the
national elites resulted from their privileged ties with the West, the European Union, The United
States and the International Monetair Funds, and processes of liberalization and privatization (Zemni,
2013 ). The general population believed that political leaders have made too much wealth for
themselves and their families and did too few to meet the needs of the general population (Engelen
& Puschmann, 2011). Partly on the basis of the revolution in the Middle East were the economic
downturn and rising social inequality. According to Karim Sgaïer (2012), the revolutions in the
Middle‐East seems to be fuelled by individual desires for a better economic future including more
prosperity, employment and equal opportunities more than pure idealism, community involvement
or the achievement of social ideas.

4.3 Religious vs. Secular

The dichotomy religious vs. secular could be derived from the discussion between authors whether
the Arab Spring is religious in nature or secular in nature (clarification: non‐religious causes like
economic deprivation, political freedom and suppression of human rights).

Different religious groups like Islamic and Christians groups seems to play an important role in the
politics in the Middle East (de Groot, 2011). Islamic imams knows this and some of them seems to
encourage demonstrations against the regime. The literature shows that protesters frequently use
the name of Allah and religious terms such as the words: “God is great” (de Groot, 2011 – p. 4). In
name of God people do everything that is possible to win. People hope that God may grant them the

victory (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 130, 138). They ask God to force the departure of the regime. People
seems to fall back on faith in especially hard times.

After the resign of Mubarak in Egypt on February 11 2011 we see that the army temporarily will lead
the country (Zemni, 2013). Subsequently, the "moderate political Islam", the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, won the elections. They obtain 37% of the votes, which actually means
that 63% of the people did not choose for them. The rise of political Islam following the Arab Spring
has worried many that the democratic achievements of the revolution could be lost. In Egypt and
Tunisia alike, citizens are once again taking to the streets. But this time they are opposing Islamism
(Steinvorth, 2012).
Abbink et al. (2012) argues that the Arab uprisings were initially not the work of Islamic parties but of
young, urban, and more educated groups. Religion as such was not the main mobilizing factor.
In the end, the primary purpose of the population is still to abdicate the regime. The moderate
political Islam has to make alliances, compromises, and play the game of democracy. So it seems to
be more about political conflicts and not so much about religious conflicts (Zemni, 2013).
However it seems to be that politics and religion are interwoven after the resign of dictators. This can
be supported by the rise of religious political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood, who would like to
reign on religious pretenses.
4.4 National vs. International

For some the Arab Spring is above all related to the interests of international stakeholders. Others
emphasize that the Arab Spring is more related to national policies executed by dictatorial regimes.
Here we could extract the dichotomy national vs. international which could explain the state of the
Arab uprisings.
According to van Leeuwen (2011), many Western countries turned a blind eye, to human rights or
democratic freedoms, to countries in the Middle East that were considered as a political or economic
ally. The purpose of this is to secure stability in the region and therefore their access to oil,
containment of terrorism and limiting migration. Western governments supported dictators for many
years and covered mass violations of human rights with the cloak of geopolitical love (Zemni, 2013).
The democratic deficit in the Arab world is connected to a foreign hegemony (Van Camp, 2012). As
long as the protest of the people in the Middle East echoed not too loudly in the (inter‐)national
media, Western leaders such as former U.S. President Obama continued to support dictatorial
leaders. Once the protests persisted and there was a call to act from the home country and the
international community, the international leaders chose the side of the insurgents, and they asked
the leading regimes to resign (Van Camp, 2012).
On the other side authors argue that the international stakeholders only allow national policies, but
not formulate them (Abbink et al., 2012) . Besides not all countries in the Middle East are important
for international stakeholders. So international stakeholders are only influencing national policies in
those countries in the Middle East and North Africa which will facilitate them (van Leeuwen, 2011).
The actual thoughts and actions of the regime itself oppress their population which causes
dissatisfactions and fury who forces the Arab Spring. Eikelboom (2011 – p. 127) agrees and gives an
example of Libya. Although Libya is currently again a more or less normal market economy again,

which means that the income and expenditures are more or less equal to each other, the
consequences of Kadhafi’s remarkable economic policy and years of international isolation are still
noticeable (Van Camp, 2012). All free services and subsidies provided by Kadhafi’s government,
made the Libyans spoiled and lazy (Samuel, 2013) This suggests that national policies are as
important, and maybe more important, as the interest of international stakeholders.
Many of the above causes were already present for quite some time in the Arab countries.
Demographic factors and technological progress seem to be the decisive factors for the unrest in the
Middle East. Therefore the dichotomies man vs. women, young vs. old could and online vs. offline
can be identified in the literature.
4.5 Man vs. Women
The dichotomy man vs. women could be derived from the discussion between authors whether or
not gender equality seems to be a significant issue in the “Arab Spring”. For some the Arab Spring is
above all related to the emergence of self‐conscious and combative women at the front who strives
for equal rights (Sjoberg & Whooley, 2011). Others, for example Engelen & Puschmann (2011),
emphasize that the gender equality as cause of the Arab Spring is exaggerated, because men and
women both protested on the street and women did not face inferiorities in terms of education and
work opportunities compared to men.
Some authors described the “Arab Spring” as an “Arab Spring for Women” (Al‐Saeid, 2012). Women
seems to play a prominent role in the uprisings according to the literature. The involvement of
women went beyond direct participation in the protests and included leading and organizing
protesters and cyber activism. Across the region women occupy in public spaces and became more
visible. Women enter to the streets and feel that they really can make a difference. Also in Libya,
Bahrain, Syria and Yemen women participated in demonstrations (Fédération Internationale des
Droits de l'Homme, 2012). They experience a heightened self‐awareness. Female activists wanted to
let the outside world know that women are also important.

On the other side authors, like Engelen & Puschmann (2012) argue that we could find both men and
women on the barricades. In Tunisia and Egypt, women and men protested shoulder to shoulder.
Besides, according to Engelen & Puschmann (2011) women in the Middle East and North Africa are
hardly inferior to men in terms of education. They control a key role in the decline of fertility,
marriage and endogamy (marriage between cousins) and face an increase in literacy (Engelen &
Puschmann, 2011). Moreover, they compete more and more with men in the labor market. Besides,
in many Arab countries the fertility among highly educated women already dropped to around the
replacement level in the cities and their average marriage age moves today between 26 and 34
instead of below their twenties.

Nevertheless, there is a real risk that female participation will be taken away. The liberation of Libya
does not necessarily mean the liberation of women. At the start of the uprisings, men and women
were going together to the streets, but it would not take long before a separate women block was
designed for the demonstrations in Benghazi. The women were hidden from the view by wooden
partitions (Eikelboom, 2011). The obtained ‘equal’ rights for women constantly encounters
opposition and are too easily reversed. Women rights are firstly sacrificed by politicians, who want to

remain power (Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, 2012). Women have historically
faced discrimination, sexual violence and harassment. This continued during the uprisings and many
activists hoped the Spring would boost women's rights, but its impact has not yet matched
expectations. Nevertheless, women continue fighting, assuming that their role and influence in
society would improve after the fall of the dictatorships. The question remains whether their
suffering is scarified and if they actually did face equal rights after the protests in the Middle East.

4.6 Old vs. Young
Age seems to play an important role in the Arab Spring. The dichotomy old vs. young could be
derived from the discussion between authors whether or not the Arab Spring has a demographic
cause.

According to Hoffman & Jamal (2012) young people seems to play a prominent role in the uprisings
in the Middle East. Eikelboom (2011 – p. 115) describes in his book that “a boy climbs a pole and
takes down the portrait of Kadhafi. No one dared this to do in the past 42 years”. Unlike previous
generations, the new cohort will no longer lead a life of humiliation, injustice and frustration (van
Camp, 2012). The younger generation no longer wants that everybody lives severally. The new young
people are more critical with regard to the dictatorial regimes and are more connected with the rest
of the Arab world and the international community as a whole than any generation that preceded it.
They seems to be highly optimistic about what ordinary citizens can do.
However, according to Sgaïer (2012) the reality is that these modern youths were only part of the
revolutionaries. The revolutions were worn by a wide section of the population. Besides young
people, also older worn the uprisings. It is argued that the presence of large numbers of well‐
educated young people, not necessary unleashes a rebellion. The youth motivates the crowd but still
have nothing to say in the end. The presence of a ‘ youth bulge’ is one of the roots of social unrest,
perhaps even a catalyst, but not the comprehensive statement (Engelen and Puschmann, 2011).
4.7 Online vs. Offline
Many attributed this new spirit to the rise of social media in the Arab World. For some the Arab
Spring is above all related to online activities. Others emphasize that the Arab Spring is more related
to offline activities. The dichotomy online vs. offline could be derived from the discussion between
authors if the Arab Spring was a “Facebook Revolution” (Huang, 2011) or a “ People’s revolution”
(Flanagan, 2011).

In this literature review online activities intend activities through social media like Facebook,
Youtube, Twitter and MySpace. On the one hand it is believed that the riots would have been
impossible without new media like Facebook and Twitter. Thanks to the online world youth came
initially in contact with other parts of the world, where they saw that democracy was possible and
also was further developing (van Camp, 2012). Social media facilitate access to information,
exchange of ideas and enhance political participation by the creation of ties between individuals.
Hereby a civil society or a public sphere is created which seems to stimulate more democracy.
According to Huang (2011), we could notice that facebook usage increased in the Arab region.


On the other side, people believe that the Arab Spring was a so‐called “people’s revolution”. It is
believed that these new communication uprisings only would have stimulated the mobilization and
networking to expand. They argue that the role of Facebook and Twitter in recent Arab uprisings has
been ‘ exaggerated’ (Flanagan, 2011) and that offline activities are still important for the progress of
the uprisings. In this literature review offline media intend conversations with taxi drivers,
conversations in coffee houses and the use of more traditional media like television, radio and
mobile phones. There is a discussion whether or not everybody has access to internet and which role
the government fulfil herein. This seems to have consequences for the reliability of online media.


Chapter 5 – Deepening
This chapter provides in section 5.1 more information and statement about the
dichotomy online vs. offline and in section 5.2. more information and statements
about the dichotomy young vs. old.
5.1 Deepening the dichotomy online vs. offline
This section deepens the dichotomy online vs. offline in relation to the onset and the course of the
Arab Spring. As mentioned in chapter two, the question remains whether the Arab Spring could more
be attributed to online activities, or to offline activities. This section questions the extent to which
social media actual played a decisive role in the Arab Spring.
5.1.1 New media
In describing the dichotomy online vs. offline it is important to distinguish new media and traditional
media. In this Bsc‐thesis new media are seen as “online social media”. “New media” or “Web 2.0” or
“Social Networking Sites” (SNS) are terms that are used for various forms of electronic
communication which allow people to contact each other. These forms of electronic communication
are made possible inter alia by computers and smart phones. Characteristic of this electronic
communication are the digital transmission of information and the use of satellites. New media have
the ability that people can communicate quickly and that information is immediately worldwide
available. The user has the opportunity to easily place information on the internet. Examples of new
social media Facebook, Twitter and Youtube(Klootwijk, 2012). Protesters use these media to upload
initially blogs. The use of these media is relatively cheap and easy in access due to the use of
smartphones (Klootwijk, 2012).

Facebook, and other Social Networking Sites are defined by Boyd and Ellison (2007 in Faris, 2008) as
sites that have three general features. First, SNS’s allow their users to construct a profile, available
either to everyone on the web, every member of the site, or only to their friends on the site itself.
The second feature of an SNS is that it allows users to build a network of ‘friends’ or connections to
other users. In other words they allow you to take your existing social network and publicly articulate
it. The third feature is the ability to browse your own connections or friends and those of other
people in the system.
5.1.1.1 Facebook
With the availability of the Arabic version in 2009, Facebook has become the third most popular
social networking site (SNS), after Google and Yahoo. 20 of the 22 Arab countries are currently
involved in the Facebook society (Shapiro, 2009). In particular, by the beginning of 2011, Facebook
has attracted more than 21.31 million users across the Arabic countries. By October, 2011, Facebook
has spread to more than 33.07 million Arab users (Al Omoush, Yaseen & Alma’aitah, 2012)
5.1.1.2 Smartphones
According to data from the CIA, seventy million of the 83 million inhabitants of Egypt have a mobile
phone (CIA, 2012) . About 7% of the Egyptian population has a smart phone (Klootwijk, 2012).

Especially the use of smartphones among journalists increased in the Middle East. Most of the
journalist are carrying smartphones because of the image quality of the camera. Smartphones
changed the way info is collected, packaged and transferred for mass contribution. Due to the use of
smartphones, also known as ‘powerful internet‐ready cell phones’ protesters can offer first‐hand
reports using their smartphones, which are connected to Twitter, Facebook and Youtube (Duffy,
2011).
5.1.1.3 Blogs
The protest are related to the rise of blogs (Klootwijk, 2012). Internet is the only place where young
people can express their protest. They did this initially through blogs. Internet bloggers found online
a refuge where they finally could exchange their ideas freely. They contributed to some extent to be
liberalization of the media. Many of the bloggers know each other. Via internet bloggers came into
contact with other protesters, movements and organizations. They took knowledge and learned from
experiences of others (Dalia, 2011). The protesters met as well offline during protests as well as
during meals, or iftars (meal after sunset) during the Ramadan (Dalia, 2011). Through internet the
plans and tactics of insurrection could rapidly get spread in the days prior to the protest.

5.1.2 Expansion of the internet
The increased use of the new media was only possible through the expansion of the internet. About
one in nine Egyptians has access to internet (Shapiro, 2009) . The internet’s expansion in access to
information and exchanges of ideas is enhancing political participation and a civil society (Hague &
Loader, 1999; Kamarck & Nye, 1999; Locke, 1998 in Lim, 2012). Most internet use occurs at public
terminals, schools, and Internet cafes, and not inside the home. The flourishing of Internet cafes has
helped expand Internet access (Klootwijk, 2012).

Nevertheless, the internet is not for everyone. About the geographical dispersion is nothing knows,
but it is know that the internet only reach for about 24,5 % of the Egyptian population in 2010. This
means 20.136.000 internet users (Dalia, 2011). Therefore the user base seems to be too small. As for
reaching publics at home, the internet lags far behind other means of communication. The Internet
in the Arab world is less widespread than for example the use of mobile phones (Klootwijk, 2012).
70% of the population is under the age of 34. Therefore it is logical that much of the internet use is
concentrated among young people. Young people blog, Facebook and Twitter about the events they
experience (Klootwijk, 2012).
5.1.3 New media and the government
A 2010 report by Reporters without Borders (in Dalia, 2011) , shows that the use of the Internet to
protest against the regime is not without risk. When the internet began to spread, it became
increasingly clear that it could pose a threat to the authorities. The government takes measures to
control online activities. By introducing laws, media became legally under the yoke of the
government. Through control of physical infrastructures of the internet like key cables, servers and
internet providers the governments actually could control the internet (Bluekens, 2012). The
government increased restrictions on domestic and foreign news outlets, making it extremely
difficult to spread uncensored news (Ali & Fahmy, 2013). In January 2011 Mubarak’s regime

disconnected the internet and captured some bloggers. Before Twitter and Facebook were already
disconnected.

Nevertheless, the disconnection of the internet had remarkably little effect: demonstrations
continued and satellite TV continued to report the demonstrations. This is probably possible because
the TV‐basis is located outside the country and therefore outside the direct control of the regime.
The internet did not seemed to play a crucial role in the creation of protests (Bluekens, 2012).
Therefore there could be made some comments on the degree of government control. The internet
has been relatively late introduced in the Middle East. Therefore governments are less experienced
in effectively controlling the internet (Bluekens, 2012). Besides, there are several ways to avoid an
internet blockade. People substituted internet for SMS communication. Some people knew to use
some old‐fashioned dial‐up connection to maintain their internet access. Furthermore it was due
some software possible to circumvent the restrictions. For example, Google introduced a “speak to
tweet” service, whereby recorded voicemails were automatically converted into Twitter messages.
So there still seems to be a battle for control over the internet between the state and technically
skilled activists.

5.1.4 Traditional media
Traditional media are seen as media before the Internet age (Klootwijk, 2012) and includes cable
television, radio, newspapers, magazines and books for the masses. Also mobile phones and satellite
TV fall under the heading of traditional media (Klootwijk, 2012). Approximately about two thirds of
the population has a satellite TV. In this Bsc‐thesis traditional media are seen as “offline media”.
As said before, the internet still only reach for about 24,5% of the Egyptian population in 2010
(Dalia, 2011). The role of the internet should not be underestimated, but a revolution could not be
attributed to only one single factor. Therefore it seems to be that also other media could be driving
forces behind political changes. One of those driving forces is the mobile phone. Of the adult
population 95% has access to mobile telephony (Klootwijk, 2012). The importance of mobile
telephony is also agreed by Zied el Heni, a Tunisian blogger and activist who argues that “Although
social media facilitated the revolution, our mobiles were our weapons” the use of social media is
exaggerated. Besides, Bowman (2008 in Ali & Fahmy, 2013) found that traditional media continue to
be in control when it comes to information dissemination. They continue to have a strong role in the
gatekeeping of social media content. Bowman examined how traditional journalists are adapting
their professional practice to incorporate online news sites that allow citizens to become a part of
the news‐making process.
Besides mobile phones and satellite TV, in Egypt taxi drivers and coffee shops in Cairo played a
significant role disseminating information about the Tahrir protests. It is argued that taxi drivers were
as important as Facebook in spreading the word to potential demonstrators (Lim, 2012).
Traditional media seems to continue to maintain the hegemony by being a major source of
information for citizens. To illustrate this point more clearly in this context, I will give an example in
which offline media activities activate online media activities:

Wael Ghonim is a thirty year old Egyptian male who lives in Dubai. He is head of marketing for

Google and understand its impact. He works for the opposition in his spare time. He established and
controlled the Facebook page "We are all Khaled Said" (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 34). His appearance on
Dream TV1 led to the increased publicity of his Facebook page (Heaven, 2011 in Ali and Fahmy, 2013).
Ghonim’s story appeared to fit within many traditional news routines and narratives of news
organizations in the region. The Facebook page ‘We are all Khalled Saeed’ and the images of Saeed
became an icon, gained a stronger following, once Al‐Jazeera and other traditional news
organization selected and broadcasted them.
5.1.5 Reliability of new and traditional media
Some techno‐dystopian scholars see the Internet as posing a threat to democracy through the ways
in which governments and corporations use it to manipulate users and legitimize their identities
(Barber, 1996; Fox, 1994 in Comunello & Anzera, 2012). News sources tend to focus on countries or
events in which they have interests. Meanwhile, social media give everyone a platform to share their
experiences and thoughts. Every individual could raise his voice to be heard. However, the internet
put both production and consumption in the hands of the user. The threshold to publish online is
low. Therefore, in this context, the internet use can be referred as ‘clicktivism’ or ‘slacktivism’:
without significant effort protesting out of your office (Bluekens, 2012).

5.1.6 Conclusion
The increased Facebook use in the Middle East agreed that social media played a decisive role in the
Arab Spring. By using smart phones people record demonstrations and spread images and videos
through Twitter, Facebook and Youtube (Flanagan, 2011).
However, the internet in the Arab world is less widespread than for example satellite TV and mobile
phones. Also offline media and activities could be driving forces behind political changes. This is also
agreed by the fact that the disconnection of the internet and social media had little effect on the
progression of the demonstrations. SMS communication, dial‐up connection and a ‘speak to tweet’
service are examples of offline media who seems to play an important role in the Arab Spring.
Traditional offline media maintain. Taxi drivers and coffee shops were as important as Facebook in
spreading the word to potential demonstrators. Social media facilitated the revolution, but mobile
phones were the weapons.
Newspapers, online media, groups and bloggers link to each other. This creates a network of
information. Thereon, for example, Dream TV picked and connect these movies, texts and images
from the internet for reports on the satellite TV. The (Egyptian) uprising succeeded to connect the
political activism in the real world to with cyber activism in the virtual world (Dalia, 2011). The
interaction of different media contributed to the final resign dictators. So the impact of Internet,
satellite TV and mobile telephony on the Arab revolution are difficult to analyze separately.

1
Dream TV is an Arabic satellite television channel headquartered out of Media Production City, Egypt. Dream TV was the
first Egyptian private television channel, and now offers two channels on Nilesat: Dream TV 1 and Dream TV 2.

The online information blocking done by the government only reinforces more and more a search to
find new ways of offline communication. As Twitter and Facebook no longer fulfil their information
role, taxi drivers become very important. They spread the word face‐to‐face. Therefore information
networks could remain. Online and offline activities are re‐influencing each other. This is also proven
by the fact that offline media attention of Wael Ghonim increased the popularity and use of online
social media.

So in tandem with others like satellite TV and mobile phones, the Internet could be one factor
creating a dynamic of change that is helping to erode the legitimacy of traditional authority
structures in terms of family, society, culture/religion, and also the state, thus creating pressure for
reform (Hofheinz, 2012). Nevertheless, online and offline activities cannot influence society without
each other. The Arab Spring is caused by a coherent whole that reinforces each other. If offline
nothing happens, people have nothing to talk about online and vice versa. This is also clarified by a
quote of Lim (Zhuo, Wellman & Yu in Lim, 2012 – p. 232): “It is an oversimplification to frame the
Egyptian revolt exclusively as either a ‘Facebook revolution’ or a ‘people’s revolution’. People and
social media could not be detached from each other.” Therefore a complex sociotechnical system was
created not only between social media and the more traditional media, but also between mediated
and face‐to‐face networks (Lim, 2012).
5.2 Deepening dichotomy young vs. old
This section deepens the dichotomy young vs. old in relation to the onset and the course of the Arab
Spring. Ass tens of millions of teenagers and twenty‐somethings have shaken the political order in
the Middle East (Zill, 2012), age seems to play an important role in the Arab Spring. In reports on the
Arab Spring it is often argued that the revolution was mainly the success of highly educated, modern
youth. They provided the revolution. The question is whether young people actually have been the
driving force behind the revolution and whether or not the Arab Spring has a demographic cause.
5.2.1 Demographic characteristics
According to the literature, the population development of the Middle East and North Africa in
general could be characterized by three main features.

First, an increased life expectancy. The life expectancy in the Arab World increased in the 20th
century due to successful control of epidemic diseases. While in 1950 only about 76 million people
lived in this part of the world, the population increased in the Arab world to a small 360 million in
2010 (Engelen and Puschmann, 2011).
Second, the Middle East is characterized by a young population. Figure 3 on the next page shows the
population pyramid of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen in 2011. Difference between the countries can be
notices. On average Tunisia has relatively the oldest population and Yemen has relatively on average
the youngest population, but compared to countries outside the Arab world the populations are still
relatively young (Fuller, 2004). The youth population in the Arab world is growing expeditiously. 60%
of the population in the Middle East is under 30 years old, twice the percent of North America. 30%
of the people in the Arab world today are under the age of 25 (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). 35.1% of the
population in the Middle East is even younger than 15 years, in Western Europe this is 16.1% (Fuller,
2004).

Fig. 3 Population pyramid Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen in 2011
Retrieved on 10‐6‐2013 via << http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/02/yemens‐revolt‐wont‐be‐like‐egypt‐or‐
tunisia/#.Ubn1L5ydBGw>>

A third characteristic of the population in North Africa and the Middle East is that they face higher
rates of joblessness . Youth employment rates are as high as 70,4% in some areas. This is also shown
in figure 4. Therefore it is no surprise that a recent study found that about 70% of youth in the Arab
world wanted to leave the region. Nevertheless, only a few can travel, therefore emigration is just a
frustrating dream (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012).
Fig. 4 Youth unemployment as percent of total unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa.
Retrieved on 10‐6‐2013 via << http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/27/creating‐jobs‐for‐youth‐in‐middle‐east‐towards‐
improved‐development‐model/8ksh>>

5.2.2 Population characteristics and violence

The German scientist Gunnar Heinsohn has presented a theory about the relationship between
demography and armed conflict. He claims that social unrest, terrorism and revolutions can be
explained through history by a specific composition of the population. If 15‐ to 24‐year old constitute
20% of the total population, there is a so‐called “youth bulge”, a youth surplus, which provokes
violence among young men (Engelen & Puschmann, 2011) .

5.2.3 Dissatisfaction among youth

The presence of a relative young population places huge demands upon the economy for the
provision of jobs. The dissatisfaction among the younger generations is based on lack of resources
provided by the government. Even while the state has allocated greater funds to education in
general, the growth of the youth population places even higher demands on these resources. As a
result, large numbers of students are not receiving education at a high enough level to prepare them
for the demands of more complex societies (Fuller, 2004). The state has been unable to meet the
rising demand. Limited prospects for employment translate into an inability to afford housing and
complicate even the possibilities of marriage. Oftentimes, housing is insufficient and too expensive
to meet demands. The sexual frustrations emerging from this situation, in already socially strict
societies, creates also greater volatility among youth (Fuller, 2004).

Alongside the economic concerns, the youth is also quite frustrated with the political circumstances
in the region. The lack of freedoms and abundance of political oppression has left a potentially
dynamic youth population feeling rather sullen (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). The political and economic
dissatisfaction of the youth bulge are expressed by Ragui Assaad (in Hoffman & Jamal, 2012 – p.2) :
“The region is facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged fifteen to twenty‐nine comprise the
largest proportion of the population. These young people, frustrated with the lack of jobs, have been
at the forefront of anti‐government protests. So demographics, simply by having a larger number of
people who are very frustrated at their inability to turn their education into productive jobs, has really
exacerbated the problems”.
Despite the sharp increase in population there has also been a substantially rise in the standard of
living and in the education of the younger generations. Furthermore, more and more young people
in the Arab world attend college or university. Nevertheless, the odds to find a job did not
correspondingly increased (Engelen & Puschmann, 2011).The leaders of the revolution seems not to
be starving slim dwellers for Cairo, Tunis, Tripoli or Damascus, but are unemployed academics who
believe that the current political leaders have made too much for themselves and their families and
did too few to meet the needs and concerns of the people (Engelen & Puschmann, 2011).

5.2.4 Generation differences
One can note that the emerging force of Arab youth is articulated by the development of
communication technologies in the MENA countries. Arab youth have triggered online activism and
online participation for many years now, challenging all practices of censorship (Allagui & Kuebler,
2011). Information technology permits youth to be better informed, not only about their own
countries, but also about regional and international developments than older generations (Fuller,
2004). Crucially, social media allows youth to overcome and bypass political repression. Thus, the
youth population appears to be more highly engaged in political and social affairs (Hoffman & Jamal,
2012). Although the youth generation has more access to the Internet than their older counterparts,
the internet access for youth in the region is still quite low in comparative perspective.
According to Hoffman & Jamal (20 12) the current youth generation is on average less religious, more
educated, more likely to be unemployed, more likely to protest and less likely to vote than older
cohorts. They have found that the youth (18‐24 years old) tend to identify closely with traditional,
religious and familial ties. Young Arabs generally seem to be more supportive of political Islam than
their older counterparts, and tend to support Shari’ a law more than do older citizens. Despite their
high unemployment rates, the Arab youth are both more satisfied with their countries’ economic
conditions and more optimistic about future economic prospects.
If the current generation of Arab citizens closely resembles older generations, then we might not
expect them to differ greatly in their political outcomes; but if difference emerge between birth
cohorts, then it is conceivable that these revolutions – if responsive to the protestors – could lead to
significant political change (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012).
5.2.5 Population and policy

However, the existence of a large youth population is not in itself automatically a negative element
for any society. In well‐functioning societies, a youthful population can add to the vigor and

productivity of society: Western Europe, for example, with its aging population, could benefit
immensely from a higher percentage of youth. But if societies lack the social infrastructure to
integrate, employ and care for a growing population, the potential demographic benefits of a
youthful population instead become a serious drain on the resources of the state and form a
dangerously unstable element in the society. The reality is that in nearly all of the Middle East, the
social infrastructure is poorly developed, ill‐equipped to cope with the increase in a youthful
population and lacks policies that are responsive to new social requirements.

Thus, this “youth bulge” has alarming implications across Middle Eastern societies and governments,
adversely impacting upon government planning and placing new stains upon socio‐economic
conditions, Still, decades later, this same youth bulge will place new demands on health services as
this group ages and requires social security (Fuller, 2004).

5.2.6 The Arab Spring is controlled by the old

When the Arab Spring was born, it had a young face. On the streets it were 20‐ and 30‐somethings
who hit the pavement to demand change in the face of tear gas and bullets. They were launched as a
new, internet‐sawy generation fed up with the archaic dictators of the past (Dickinson, 2011).
But 10 months later, the revolution has aged. In the first democratic election since the turmoil began,
Tunisia has elected a greying political class. More than half the candidates for the new Constituent
Assembly to draft a new Constitution over the next year were over 46 years old. And the leaders of
the three most successful parties are all over 65 years old. Two of these men even lived in exile in
France for 20 years, removed from the hard reality that spurred revolution (Dickinson, 2011).
It’s often said revolutions eat their children, but rarely has it been such a feast (Dickinson, 2011). On
the streets of Tunis and across the Middle East, the young revolutionaries have been taken aback. A
movement that spread on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube is today being run by a generation that
lived without computers most of their lives (Dickinson, 2011).
“The people on the streets in January all went back to their normal live because other people came
back from Paris started talking on behalf of the people” , argues Moez Ali, a founder of the newly‐
created Union of Independent Tunisians for Liberty. “We who made the revolution were not
organized to keep control of it” (Dickinson, 2011).
5.2.7 Conclusion
In this section, we assessed whether or not the Arab Spring has a demographic cause by examining
the characteristics of the current youth generation in the Arab world in comparison with older
counterparts (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012).
The population in North Africa and the Middle East is characterized by rapid population growth and a
relatively young population. Heinsohn argues that a youth bulge could lead towards a violent society.
The info technology permits youth to be better informed regional, national as well international.
Social media allows youth to overcome and bypass political repression. So the youth population
appears more to be highly engaged in political and social affairs. Due to these two arguments the
youth could let arise the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring is described as a youth rebellion driven by discontent about unemployment and
dissatisfaction to dictatorial regimes (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). However, the presence of a youth
bulge in itself is not a problem. It's the way the state deals with it, the policies they implement and
the facilities they provide. If the latter do not meet the demand of the population then there could
arise dissatisfaction. So only if societies lack the social infrastructure to integrate, employ and care
for a growing population, the potential demographic benefits of a youthful population instead could
become a serious drain on the resources of the state and form a dangerously unstable element in the
society.
This section deepened the dichotomy young vs. old in relation to the onset and the course of the
Arab Spring. To conclude, both young and old contribute to the onset of the Arab Spring. The youth
was not the only driving force behind the revolution. The policy executed by the government might
as well be important in mobilizing the current youth cohort. Thereof we can conclude that the Arab
Spring did not have only a demographic cause. It was the interrelation between the youth’s
dissatisfaction and decisiveness and the executed government policy who onset the Arab Spring.
According to Dickinson (2011) we can conclude that the Arab Spring was started by the young but
controlled by the old. Therefore there is no dichotomy young vs. old. Both age cohorts seem to play
their own role in the Arab Spring. The old have the means, knowledge and experience to influence
politics. They have knowledge of offline politics. In contrast, the youth is dared to express their
dissatisfaction and started the revolution. Without the decisiveness of the youth cohort, the
revolution would probably not have been started. However, the old took over and the revolution
aged. The young revolutionaries have been taken aback. It could be argued that the younger
generation could online influence politics and the older generation could offline influence politics.
Therefore young and old needed each other, and their capacities, to form together one block against
the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.


Chapter 6 – Case study
This chapter includes a case study. This case study describes in section 6.1. the
characteristics of three social movements, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, the April
6 th Movement and Kefaya. Section 6.2 concludes the findings of section 6.1.
6.1 Social Movements
The Arab Spring has sparked an enormous political consciousness. This is accompanied by a loss of
fear to go to the streets and unite (Zemni, 2013). In the wake of a massive popular fury different
forms of organization received a new impulse and seized the opportunity to present themselves
(again) to the outside world. Social movements are organized responses to political and
socioeconomic conditions by groups of persons who feel excluded, harbour a sense of unfairness,
and feel unable to pursue satisfactory resolutions to their perceived problems (Tarrow, 1994 in
Scruggs et. al., 2013). Social movements are important for any political system. Due to protesting,
social movements could pressure authorities and directly influence the political system (Klootwijk,
2012).

6.1.1 The Muslim Brotherhood

6.1.1.1 History

The Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al‐Ikhwan al‐Muslimeen hereafter abbreviated as MB)
is Egypt's oldest and largest Islamist organization. The MB was founded by the schoolteacher Hassan
al‐Banna in Egypt in 1928 (Samuel, 2013). In its first twenty years it gained about half a million
members in some two thousand branches (Zahid & Medley, 2006). Their aim is to Islamize society
through the promotion of Islamic law, values, and morals. This is also reflected in their slogans such
as “Islam is the solution” and “Quran is the law”. They opine that the only solution to the social and
political degeneration of Egypt would be the restoration of Islam as a guiding principle for the state
and its inhabitants. By reintroducing the Sharia, to replace the secular law and political institutions,
Egypt would be restored to its former glory (Johnson, 2012). The MB asks for a gradual change that
has to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses
(Abeb‐Kotob, 2009).

The MB is considered to be the world's most influential Islamist organization, with numerous
branches and affiliates. It is "the mother of all Islamist movements”, says Shadi Hamid, a Middle East
expert at the Brookings Institution's Doha Center (Johnson, 2012). The MB sees themselves as a
democratic organization as it claims or rather seeks to use democratic procedures to pursue
undemocratic ends. This movement aims to participation, not to domination (Wickham, 2011).
6.1.1.2 Public profile
The Muslim Brotherhood is known by the population due to some characteristics. They combine
religion, political activism and social welfare in its work (Johnson, 2012).

First, many members were involved in co‐operative and charitable community work (Zahid &
Medley, 2006). Therefore the MB is known as a social organization. They strive for social justice,
economic prosperity and political harmony. The party lays great emphasis on collective community
and committed from the beginning of its establishment for the socially disadvantaged of society. This
is possible through an extensive network of social services such as free education, health and training
(Samuel, 2013). Besides they run numerous institutions, including hospitals, schools, soup kitchens,
banks, businesses, foundations, day care centers, thrift shops, social clubs, and facilities for the
disabled (Johnson, 2012). Members were engaged in these programmes of good works at the same
time as encouraging and monitoring each other as regards the precepts of personal morality laid
down in Islamic Law (Shari’a).
However the MB is also known from the political field. The MB has also a larger political vision (Zahid
& Medley, 2006). The Arab Spring eliminated some of the old regimes in MENA‐countries which
allowed the MB to rise their political power (Adam, 2013). In the last three decades, the Brotherhood
increased its advancement into the political mainstream through alliances with other opposition
parties and through members running as independents for parliament. In this way, the Brotherhood
won 88 seats ‐ 20% of the total ‐ and is now making it the largest and most important opposition bloc
in the Egyptian parliament (Johnson, 2012).

Late April 2011, the MB announced to have established the Freedom and Justice Party.
Therefore they could participate the Egyptian parliamentary elections (Volkskrant, 30‐4‐2011,
Munson, 2001). As the most organized opposition group following the ouster of former President
Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the Brotherhood became the country's dominant political force, winning a
near majority of seats in the post‐revolution parliament, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi,
became president (Johnson, 2012). The constitutional reforms under President Morsi tighten the
social relationships. The Egyptian people, who once were united in its rejection of Mubarak, became
divided into a pro‐and anti‐government camp. Over the heads of the ordinary Egyptian population
rage a battle between youth and ruling elite, conservative and progressive forces, governments and
public, police and protesters and between army and the Muslim Brotherhood (Samuel, 2013).
6.1.1.3 Membership network
The Muslim Brotherhood internal cohesiveness and ideological rigidity derives from its highly
selective membership process and recruitment system. Local members scout for recruits at
virtually every Egyptian university. These recruiters begin by approaching students who show
strong signs of piety. Certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood are supposed to meet and
befriend new students and engage them in very normal, non‐political activities such as football,
tutoring or things that appeal to everyone. The Brotherhood also targets children for recruitment,
starting around age nine. It focuses on Muslim Brothers' kids in particular. The MB’s recruitment
system guarantees that only those who are deeply committed to its cause become full members,
meanwhile, its pyramid shaped hierarchy ensures that these members dutifully execute the aims of
its national leadership at the local level (Adam, 2013).


6.1.1.4 Mobilization means
Through the use of media outlets, the MB proclaims their visions and ideologies to the Egyptian
public in different fields such as political issues, economics issues, social issues and religious issues.
The written literature shows that the main official media outlets of Muslim Brotherhood group and
Freedom and Justice party are Misr 25 television satellite channel, Ikhwanonline Internet website,
and Freedom and Justice Newspaper (Ibrahim, 2013).

The protesters and demonstrators who led Egypt's revolt on the 25th of January were young, liberal,
and linked‐in. One of them was Wael Ghonim. He is an Egyptian, in his thirties and lives in Dubai. He
is head of the marketing department for Google. In his leisure time he has (online) been active for
the opposition. Therefore he opines that: "Our revolution is like Wikipedia. Everyone contributes in
some, but the names of all those people do you not know. Everyone contributed little bits and pieces"
(Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 75).

The number of Facebook users increased from approximately 900.000 in January 2009 to nearly 5
million in late 2010 (The Telegraph, 2009; Wright, 2011 in Lim, 2012). Social media like Facebook
were used to protest. This is agreed by Wael Ghonim, who created the Facebook page “We are all
Khaled Said” (Eikelboom, 2011 – p. 34) on the occasion of the death of Khaled Said3. This group was
created to bring the death of Khaled Said into public attention (Lim, 2012). We are all Khaled Said
quickly became the most popular dissident Facebook group in Egypt. Its administrator called on
followers to go to the streets of Alexandria and Cairo to protest Said’s brutal murder. And so they
did. Large numbers took to the streets carrying posters juxtaposing pictures of a smiling Khaled Said
in a grey sweatshirt with a hood and of his battered corpse. From June to August 2010, the group
held five silent protests involving thousands of Egyptians (Wright, 2011 in Lim, 2012). Said's death at
the hands of police gave new momentum to calls for political change in Egypt.

The movement created online a basis for a mass political offline action. The story of Khaled Said can
be read as a culmination of the longstanding online campaign against torture, waged on blogs such
as Wael Abbas’s Egyptian Awareness, Nael Atef’s Torture in Egypt, and Bloggers Against Torture.
However, the critical new important element introduced by the ‘‘We are all Khaled Said’’ movement
was a strong symbolic representation, an iconic figure to for fight against the authorities. The story
and images of the torture of Khaled Said personified the injustice and brutalities of the Mubarak
regime and thus intensified the emotion of the oppositional movement (Eltahawy, 2010 in Lim,
2012).

3
Khaled Said was an handsome, educate, middle‐class young Egyptian businessman and amateur blogger who posted a
video online of police involved in a drugs deal (Chick, 2010 in Lim, 2012). On 6 June 2010, a 28‐year‐old Said was seized by
the Egyptian police, beaten and murdered on the streets. (Wright, 2011 in Lim, 2012). The police had initially claimed that
Said was involved in drug dealing and that his death was drug‐related. Online sources suggested a different story (Wright,
2011 in Lim, 2012). Pictures of his mutilated body appeared online and instantly went viral. This spark ignited the Egyptian
revolution, prompting protests all over the country and eventually bringing down the dictator Hosni Mubarak. Khaled has
become a symbol for those fighting for their freedom.


During the uprisings in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood has turned to the blog as a medium
for challenging the government’s detainment of a number of its members. The Muslim Brotherhood
blogging phenomenon took root after the mass arrest of Al‐Azhar students and Muslim Brothers,
which resulted in the formation of a website and a number of blogs in February 2007. The style of
these blogs, which rely on video clips, interviews, and photographs to uncover government abuses of
the Brotherhood, resemble that of more liberally minded bloggers (Lerner, 2010).

6.1.1.5 Conclusion

Following the above description, we can conclude that the Muslim Brotherhood strives to Islamize
society through the promotion of Islamic law, values and morals. Besides they strive to the creation
of a collective community. Hereby, they could penetrate into the whole society.
In the last three decades, the Brotherhood increased its advancement into the political field through
the establishment of the Freedom and Justice party. Nevertheless, the constitutional reforms under
(their) President Morsi tighten the social relationships. For the first time, the fault lines are running
across through families. Children are demonstrating against their parents and vice‐versa.
The Muslim Brotherhood is characterized through a strong internal cohesiveness. This derives from
its highly offline selective membership process and recruitment system. Through already existing
networks and contacts new, extremely dedicated members are selected.

The main official media outlets of Muslim Brotherhood group and Freedom and Justic party are Misr
25 television satellite channel, Ikhwanonline Internet website, and Freedom and Justice Newspaper.
Besides the MB spread their ideology into society through their institutions. This seems to show that
both offline and online media are used to spread the word. During the uprisings in the Middle East,
the MB mostly used blogs as a medium for criticizing the government. Through this, bloggers seems
to create online a basis for mass political offline action. The protesters and demonstrators who led
Egypt's revolt on the 25th of January were young, liberal, and linked‐in. Everyone was able to
contribute little bits and pieces. Nevertheless, they need someone or something to fight for. In case
of the MB, this was Khalid Said. He became an iconic figure to fight for, against the authorities.
Relative to other social movements this a critical new important element introduced by the “We are
all Khaled Said” movement.

In the literature is not explicitly emphasized that the MB is driven by the youth. The Islamic norms
and values seems to be pursued through the older generations. On the other side, the Facebook
usage increased. Social media like Facebook were used by youth to protest against the abuse of the
government. This seems to show that the youth plays an important role in spreading the word –
through the use of social media ‐ towards others in the community. As regards the dichotomy young
vs. old we could notice that it seems that only after the takeover of president Morsi, parents and
children come to be opposed to each other. This was not the case before.


6.1.2 April 6 Movement
6.1.2.1 Course

The April 6 Movement is an Egyptian Facebook group who fill an important role in the Egyptian
opposition against the Mubarak regime. Members coalesce around a few issues including free
speech, economic stagnation and government nepotism. The group was founded in 2007 in response
to the regeneration of the Egyptian labor movement (Wright, 2011 in Lim, 2012). Organized labor
had once been an important force but was repressed in Egypt for a long time. The leading figures
behind the movement are the, at that time in their twenties, founders Asmaa Mahfouz, Ahmed
Maher, Waleed Rashed and Mohammed Adel.
While it differed in strategy, this youth movement was very much rooted in the earlier Kefaya
movement. Several leaders of this youth movement had been part of Kefaya. Ahmad Maher began
his political engagement in 2005 by joining Kefaya as one of the Youth for Change organizers. Waleed
Rashed also had been involved in the earliest wave of Kefaya protests. Mohammed Adel worked with
the Kefaya movement since 2005. In 2008, he started working for the Media committee of the April 6
Movement. Since 2009 he is the spokesman of the movement (Nicoducaire, 2007 in Lim, 2012).

6.1.2.2 Public awareness
On March 23, 2008, Maher and friends created the April 6th Youth Movement’s Facebook group to
support the workers in the Egyptian industrial city El‐Mahalla El‐Kubra (Kirk, 2011 in Lim, 2012), who
were planning to strike on 6 April 2008 to protest against low wages and high food prices (Frontline,
2011). Members of the group were arrested, nevertheless the group remained active as a discussion
platform where members organized a number of demonstrations. A call for a demonstration on
January 25, 2011 led to a series of protest in Egypt in 2011. The April 6 Youth movement picked Jan.
25 2011 as their protest date because it’s a public holiday: Police Day (Frontline, 2011)
The Facebook group invited about 300 people to join its Facebook page. Within a day it had 3000
members and within a few week, 70.000 people had joined the call for strikes across Egypt in support
of the Mahalla’s workers (Frontline, 2011) (Shapiro, 2009). Most of them were young and educated
Egyptians, whom mostly had never been involved in politics before.
6.1.2.3 Membership network
The April 6th Movement is characterized by an online membership network. Through Facebook, the
April 6 Movement had transformed the oppositional movement to be more inclusive and the
embrace a participatory culture (Lim, 2012). Many young Egyptians joined the group, not because
they were political minded, but because they were curious or because friends asked them to join.
Some joined simply because clicking is easy and it was trendy to be in the group (Lim, 2012).

When labor strikes were quashed, the leaders turned to the Internet as an alternative vehicle for
mobilizing dissent (Wright, 2011 in Lim, 2012). The April 6th Movement carried on the effective use
of blogs, YouTube, e‐mails, and text messages to mobilize. The two important tools it added were

Facebook and Twitter. This makes the April 6th Movement one of the very first Egyptian (opposition)
groups strategically employing Facebook for social movement (Lim, 2012). Therefore, in March 2008
the group became the most dynamic anti‐Mubarak movement. Through Facebook the April 6
Movement made effort to stage a general nationwide strike (Shapiro, 2009). The April 6 Movement
tries to organize street protests, hundreds of young people from the April 6 group participated in
these demonstration. Some of which were coordinated on Facebook. The question remains if online
commitments become visible in offline activities. This is also agreed by Mona Elthaway (in Frontline,
2011): “In the absence of any viable opposition to the Mubarak regime, April 6 became that place
where young people could go. More importantly, it was able to take them off the virtual space and
into the real world. Because that really was the challenge: that it wasn’t just limited to those who
‘LIKE’ them”.

As with any groups on Facebook, members can post comments or share news articles, videos or
notes on the group’s communal “wall”. The wall of the April 6 group is constantly being updated with
new posts, and the talk is often heated and intense. This makes the April 6 Youth Movement the one
with the most dynamic debates (Shapiro, 2009). Besides, the April 6th Youth Movement had also
learned about the use of Twitter In September 2010, they utilized the ‘‘#orabi2010’’ hash tag to
recruit and mobilize the Orabi (‘‘No to succession’’) demonstrations to protest President Mubarak’s
plan to hand power to his son Gamal (Lim, 2012). The April 6 Movement was the first Egyptian
opposition group who used Twitter to protest
6.1.2.5 Conclusion
Following the above description, we can conclude that the April 6 Movement is an Egyptian Facebook
group who fill an important role in the Egyptian opposition against the Mubarak regime. The group
was founded in 2007, so compared to the MB it is an relatively young movement. On March 23,
2008, the leaders created the April 6th Youth Movement’s Facebook group to support the workers in
the Egyptian industrial city El‐Mahalla El‐Kubra. Most of the members were young and educated
Egyptians, whom mostly had never been involved in politics before. Through Facebook, the April 6
Movement became more inclusive and embrace a participatory culture. It was easy to become a
member. The April 6 Movement coordinated some of their demonstration on Facebook and used
Twitter to protests. The Facebook wall of the April 6 group is constantly being updated with new
posts, and the talk is often heated and intense. Members are constantly in contact with each other.
This makes the April 6 Youth Movement the one with the most dynamic debates.

The original impetus for the strike lay with the besieged Mahalla textile workers, but it seems only
with the bridging and amplifying capabilities of Web 2.0. that a textile strike could be turned into a
national event (Lim, 2012). In other words, April 6th was the day when organizing tool met political
reality to create elements that were strong enough to form storm clouds on the regime’s horizon
(Faris, 2008). Looking back, the Arab Spring did not seems to occur with premeditation. Basically 20‐
somethings, decided to create a facebook page in support of the workers. They did not go out to plan
to make a movement. They created this page, and all of a sudden it started attracting followers
(Frontline, 2011).

To conclude, it seems to be clear that the April 6th Movement is founded and driven by youth. The
elderly are disregarded. Facebook and Twitter were the most important social media which are used

in the protests. Therefore the April 6th Movement did successfully introduce a new tactic into the
landscape of activism in Egypt. It seems that they do not use traditional media, like the Muslim
Brotherhood. In the end the April 6th Movement reach at least online unexpected successes.

6.1.3 Kefaya

6.1.3.1 History
Kefaya is the unofficial name of the Egyptian Movement for Change. Kefaya, the Arabic word for
“enough”, reflects the movement’s opposition to President Hosni Mubarak’s plans to turn over the
government to his son (Osman, 2010 – p. 136 cited out of Wikipedia). Kefaya is a pressure group that
incorporates a variety of other political groups (Al‐Youm, 2011). The movement strives for a change
in Egypt, including an end to corruption and a fair political system.
Kefaya was founded in November 2004 in anticipation of the 2005 presidential elections by 300
intellectual Egyptian from various ideological background (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2010 in Lim, 2012). George Ishaq became general coordinator of the movement, which had
by then gained the support of thousands of Egyptians. Protests resumed in 2005. Kefaya started to
hold protests in working‐class neighbourhoods and poorer governorates. In January 2007, the
intellectual Abdel Wahab al‐Meseiry was chosen as general coordinator for the movement,
succeeding Ishaq. He remained in his position until he died on 3 July 2008. He was followed by
journalist Abdel Halim Qandil. The movement continued to be active until 2008, when it joined also
mass protests at Mahalla al‐Kubra, where on 6 April factory workers staged a strike. Thousands of
Egyptians across the country participated in the strike out of solidarity with the workers. In January
2011, the movement chose Islamist journalist Magdy Ahmed Hussein as its general coordinator.
Another coordinator, Mohamed al‐Ashqar, was selected as a successor (Al‐Youm, 2011).
6.1.3.2 Public profile

Kefaya is publicly known from the meeting which was held on December 12, 2011. The event had
been organized solely to demand resignation of president Mubarak. With it’s simple message,
‘enough’ Kefaya was able to mobilize and embrace a diverse group including judges, lawyers,
journalists, writers, workers, farmers, women, the youth, and even children (Oweidat et al., 2008 in
Lim 2011). Surrounded by riot police, between 500 and 1000 activists gathered on the steps of the
High Court in Cairo (Lim, 2012). They remained mostly silent and taped over their mouths a large
yellow sticker emblazoned with “Kefaya!” (El‐Ghobashy, 2005 cited out of Wikipedia). Their banners
read, "No to power inheritance," “Down with Hosni Mubarak" and "The Egyptian Movement for
Change... Kefaya” (Al‐Youm, 2011).

The meeting on December 12 was the first public appearance of Kefaya during the Arab Spring.
Although the protesters in those days were few, their protests were remarkable because they gained
heavy media coverage outside Egypt. It was the first time since the 1970s that Egyptians had raised
banners demanding the resignation of a president (Al‐Youm, 2011).

To summarize, amid the political disarray, a new generation of Egyptians holds the promise for
transforming politics in Egypt. They have found a home and an instrument in Kefaya. Unique Egyptian
circumstances have shaped their experiences, aspirations, and vision for the future. Kefaya’s
significance lies in its transformative potential as a broad political force that is uniquely suited to the
needs of the moment in Egypt. For more than a decade, a group of activists and intellectuals have
interacted across ideological lines to reach a common ground. Kefaya emerged as one manifestation
of these efforts and as an important illustration of the possibilities of this new politics. While such
collaborative work across ideological lines is not unique in democratic experiences around the world,
Kefaya represents the first successful effort of that sort in modern Egyptian politics (Shourbagy,
2007).
6.1.3.3 Membership networks

As said, Kefaya successfully exploited information technology. It allowed unconditional membership
in its organization and on its Web site. Members were able to anonymously post their grievances
online (Caten, 2005 in Oweidat, 2008).

The Kefaya movement also informed and inspired the emergence of youth activism online on
Facebook and Twitter starting in 2008 (Lim, 2011). This process was amplified by Youth for Change
within Kefaya. This group was intentionally created to reach the younger generation via the internet
and connect them with the Egyptian society at large by routinely linking online activism with street
activism (Oweidat et al., 2008 in Lim, 2012).

The initial success of Kefaya resulted from the strategic use of information and communication
technologies (Oweidat et al., 2008 in (Lim, 2012). Kefaya used four primary means of
communications. First, it contacted its members and the general public by using electronic messages.
Second, it published advertisements online and in independent media outlets. If possible it published
banners and caricatures (political cartoons) on its own website and on those of supporting bloggers.
Fourth, it gathered audiovisual and photographic documentation of sexual and physical harassment
by state security oﬃcers (Oweidat, 2008)

From the beginning, Kefaya was a protest movement which manifest itself as well online as offline
(Klootwijk, 2012). For example, the offline street protests in Cairo and Alexandria in 2005 and 2006
were organized to a significant degree online (Lim, 2012). Kefaya was the first oppositional
nonpartisan movement that had neither a physical nor a permanent meeting place. It spread news,
hosted online forums, and coordinated activities through its main Website HarakaMasria.org and
through MisrDigital.com, which hosted “Egyptian Awareness”, the country’s first independent digital
newspaper. The Kefaya website was popular because it allowed members and sympathizers to
anonymously post their complaints about the government. This interactive format invited users to
engage with likeminded individuals and foster a sense of online community and networking (Lerner,
2010 ). This in turn contributed to a shared sense of purpose, which is a critical factor in mobilizing
protest (Bogad, 2005 in Lim, 2012).


Besides, mobile phones and the internet enhance the movement’s capacity to coordinate activity,
respond to challenges, and allow the movement to become less dependent of mainstream media in
reaching the public (Lim, 2004; Van de Donk et al., 2004 in Lim, 2012).

Kefaya is most known of using blogs. The birth of Kefaya coincided with the beginning of blogging era
in Egypt. Prior to 2005, there were only about 40 bloggers in Egypt. Wael Abbas, a human rights
activist and one of the key figures of the Kefaya movement in the 2011 Egypt revolt, was one of them.
He blogged about government repression, human rights abuses, and corruption, on MisrDigital.com
in February 2005 (Lim, 2012).By 2005, the number of bloggers had increased to about 400 and by
September 2006 they jumped to more than 1,800 (Radsch, 2008; Zuckerman, 2006 in Lim, 2012).
Blogs were especially used to mobilize street protests and provide reports from the streets
countering the state‐controlled media interpretations of the protests (MIT TechTV, 2011 in Lim,
2012). The emerging blogosphere created a space in which the inner circle of blogger‐activists could
deliberate freely among themselves (Radsch, 2008, p. 8 in Lim, 2012).

6.1.3.5 Conclusion

Following the above description, we can conclude that Kefaya reflects the movement’s opposition to
President Mubarak’s plans the government to his son. Kefaya emerged as one manifestation of these
efforts and as an important illustration of the possibilities of this new politics (Shourbagy, 2007).
With it’s simple message, ‘enough’ Kefaya was able to mobilize and embrace a diverse group
including judges, lawyers, journalists, writers, workers, farmers, women, the youth, and even
children. The initial success of Kefaya resulted from the strategic use of information and
communication technologies. It spread news, hosted online forums, and coordinated activities
through its main website. The interactive format of the website invited users to engage with
likeminded individuals and foster a sense of online community and networking.
As well as the MB, Kefaya used blogs. These were especially used to mobilize street protests and
provide reports from the streets countering the state‐controlled media interpretations of the
protests. Kefaya was able to use the internet as tool for mobilizing followers into traditional forms of
protest. The organization was able to motivate individuals to move beyond passive or anonymous
online participation. The Kefaya movement also informed and inspired the emergence of youth
activism online on Facebook and Twitter starting in 2008. Here too, their aim is linking online
activism to street activism. The Kefaya movement was able to mobilize a diverse group. This seems
to show that it was not explicitly driven by youth. Everybody was able to join. Besides, there was an
intern department who focuses only on youth mobilization. It’s strength lay in the creating of an
online community and network. It used the internet as tool for mobilizing followers to the streets.
Here too, online calls seems to enforce offline activities. They are interwoven.
6.2 Conclusion case‐study

This section included a case study of three (Egyptian) social movements: The Muslim Brotherhood,
the April 6th Movement and Kefaya. A summary of the findings can be find in figure 5. Due to this
case study we could compare the three social movements.


In the past, protest movements were hard to organize in Egypt because of the existence of a law,
which grants police and security forces discretionary power to arrest and detain anyone without
charge and bans mass assemblies. Since 2010 social movements communicate through media and
recruit through the same media. Carroll en Ratner argue (1999 in Klootwijk, 2012): “In other words,
movements make strategic use of the media for various counter‐hegemonic purposes which include
critique of existing social and material conditions, disruption of dominant discourses, codes and
identities, and articulation of alternatives, whether in the form of new codes, identities and ways of
life or progressive state policies.” So social movements use media to get the attention of politicians
they criticize (Klootwijk, 2012)

In all three movements, it is clear that the social networks facilitated by social media have become a
key ingredient of contemporary social movements. Social media provides connections within and
between movements and individuals. Thence, the size of the movements could increase. For
example, Facebook facilitated the expansion of the oppositional movement beyond strong network
ties to include individuals with weaker ties to the movement and to each other (Lim, 2012). Social
networks are crucial for mobilization.

Social media are not simply neutral tools to be used or adopted by social movements, but rather
influence how activists form and shape the social movements (Lim, 2012). Social media afforded
opposition groups the means to shape repertoires of contention, frame the issues, propagate
unifying symbols, and transform online activism into offline protests (Lim, 2012). Nevertheless the
presence of social media is not enough, injustices that provoke shared resentment and anger are
often necessary to overcome barriers of fear and trigger actual participation in collective action and
social movements (Yang, 2007 in Lim, 2012). The death of Khaled Said was just such a trigger.

Social movements depend on social networks and social networks are crucial for mobilization.
Mobilization depends on contact. People mobilize to the streets due to the flow of network to which
people belong: networks of friends, family, work, school and others of interest (such as the media).
For example through blogging, unconnected individuals with different ideologies and backgrounds
were brought together. Organization through social networks plays an important informational and
organizational role (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). Members of networks created revolutionary content on
their mobiles and digital media, and they distributed this same content to their friends, families, and
members of other networks. This content distribution reached the mainstream media and satellite
channels, some of whom, for example Al‐Jazeera, played an important role in redistributing this
content to the majority of the people who had no access to the internet. This is also argued by Lim
(2012) who says that the intermodality, the overlapping of networks of various media, is necessary
for a social movement to move beyond its online following to a larger audience (Lim, 2005 in Lim,
2012).


Fig. 5 Comparison of three Egyptian social movements

History Public profile Membership network Mobilization means

The MB is founded in Egypt in The MB is known as a social The MB knows a highly selective Mobilization takes place both
Muslim Brotherhood 1928 by Hassan al‐Banna. It is organization which combines offline membership recruitment through offline (like Misr 25 and
the Mother of all Islamist religion, political activism and process of young and old the Freedom & Justice
movements. Aim is Islamization social welfare. It is the most Egyptians. Only those who are newspaper) and online activities
important opposition party
of society through participation. deeply committed to the MB (like Facebook and blogs).
and launched the Freedom & may join.
Justice party.

The April 6th Movement is The April 6th Movement is The April 6th Movement faces Mobilization takes place
April 6th Movement founded in 2007 in Egypt by known as a Facebook group to an online membership through internet and the use of
Asmaa Mahfouz, Ahmed Maher, support the textile workers. recruitment system. Young and blogs, Youtube, e‐mails and text
Waleed Rashed and Mohammed They introduced 25th of educated Egyptians invite and messages to mobilize. Through
Adel in response to the January, a national free day, as asked each other to join the Facebook and Twitter street
regeneration of the Egyptian their protest day. group. protests were organized.
labor movement.

Kefaya was founded in Egypt in Kefaya is publicly known from Kefaya manifest themselves Mobilization takes place both
Kefaya 2004 by 300 intellectual the meeting which was held online and offline but does not through offline (like mobile
Egyptians in anticipation of the on December 12, 2011. search actively for new telephony) and online activities
2005 presidential elections. members. Their transformative (their website). Through
George Ishaq was the first capacity reach a wide audience. blogging Kefaya mobilizes street
general coordinator of the protests.
movement.


Chapter 7 – Case study analysis
Due to the case study we could analyze in which way the dichotomies online vs.
offline and young vs. old are relevant to the course of social movements in the Arab
Spring. Besides, there is analyzed in which way mobilization is expressed.
Freedom of speech and the right to assemble were in the past limited in Egypt, which since 1981 has
been ruled by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party under a permanent state‐of‐emergency‐ law
(Shapiro, 2009). The toleration of organised opposition was always quite low in the Middle East and
North Africa due to the dictatorial regimes of the governments. Therefore the conditions for
establishment of organized opposition were not easy in the Middle East in the past. Onwards 2010
the population started to unite actively and protests without taking the regime any longer into
account.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement and Kefaya are three different Egyptian social
movements. Based on the case study we can conclude that the three movements faces different
history, strategies for member recruitment, differences in public profile and use different
mobilization means to spread the word. These differences are summarized in figure 6. Nevertheless
we could also see some general similarities.
First, the youth started the revolution by using new communication technologies. By using social
media like Facebook and Twitter, individuals make themselves, their interest, friends and
connections visible to the outside world. This outside world includes on the one side an international
community and on the other side a national and regional community, including unknown nationals,
friends, and family. Social media provide space for the formation and expansion of networks.
Detection of equally minded ensures connectivity. Due to social media, networked individualism has
been identified as the main social operating system in contemporary societies. The individual had
become the primary unit of connectivity between ties and networks. Facebook allowed users to
speak freely to each other and encouraged to form groups. It became an indispensable platform for
social interaction and dissent for the youth. Besides, blogs have also contributed to the online spread
of the word and the creation of information networks.
Second, the use of social media was facilitated by the expansion of the internet and the introduction
of smart phones. The latter changed the way information was collected and spread. The young,
intellectual population was 24/7 online connected to each other and could therefore share pictures,
movies and experiences immediately. So social media stimulated the online mobilization of social
movements. Social media helped all three movements for political change to expand the sphere of
participation, especially by reaching the country’s unemployed and disaffected youth.
Third, most of the social movements were online driven by youth. As well Kefaya as the April 6th
movement show how young people led the way in growing wave of social upheaval. Nevertheless
the young population did not have the power to actually change the political field. They had to less
knowledge and right connections to act effectively into the dictatorial regime. Therefore the youth
could be seen as “bureaucrabeets”. This fanciful concept refers to a young, relatively unknown
generation. Unknown in sense of connections into and understanding of the bureaucracy of the
dictatorial regime. The youth dispose of perseverance and persuasion, but they do not dispose of

vigor. There is definitely a will but due to lack of political experiences they do not know which way
they should take to actual reach their goals.
Fourth, the youth started the revolution online but the older generations controlled the revolution
offline. By using the more traditional media, like mobile phones and satellite TV, they could spread
information offline to peers. The older ones were mostly reachable through the traditional media
and face‐to‐face contacts like a conversation in a coffee shop and or with a taxi driver. The older
generation did mostly not know how to use online media like Facebook and Twitter, therefore they
could be seen as “digibeets”. So the more traditional media were as important as the new online
media, because they reached the population cohort who were mostly not reachable through online
media. Nevertheless it was the older generation who did have the knowledge and connection to
acted effectively into the dictatorial regime. Due to their life experience, they understood the history
of the dictatorial regime better than the younger generation and knew how to handle efficiently.
To conclude, mobilization occurred as well through online as offline processes. Through this process
both generations could exchange knowledge, provided by the media they are used to. So in the end
both age cohorts are reachable, whether it is through online or offline media, the word is spread and
heard. Therefore I argue that as well offline (traditional) media as online (social) media facilitated
(information) networks and therefore facilitated the Arab Spring. They are both needed, otherwise a
part of the population will not be reached with information and knowledge. It could be argued that
online and offline activities are re‐influencing each other.
Therefore it is out of the question that there is a dichotomy online vs. offline and young vs. old. You
could better seen those as interacting extremes, with an overlapped area in between. Both extremes
cannot exist without each other. Online and offline media and young and old need each other to
proceed the revolution. Both age cohorts contribute on their own way and act based on their roles
altogether. Without any interaction between the four extremes the revolution would not faced any
progress. Based on the case study I conclude that the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old
should not be clearly separated. Young and old used online and offline media to form together one
block against the dictatorial regime.


Fig. 6 Social movements elaborated on the basis of the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old

Online vs. Offline Young vs. Old

The MB knows an offline selective recruitment system. The MB was founded in 1928. Out of the three, the MB is the
Muslim Brotherhood Both, offline and online media are used to spread the word. oldest social movement in this case study.
The demonstrators who led the revolution in Egypt on the 25th
Examples of offline media, the more traditional media, are Misr
of January were young, liberal and linked‐in. Through the use of
25 and the Freedom and Justice newspaper. Everyone is able to social media youth spread the word toward others in
contribute little bits and pieces. The MB mostly used blogs and community and started the revolution. Young and old worked
Facebook to organize online mass political action to the streets. together against the dictatorial regime. The young created
online networks, where the old controlled the movement’s
offline recruitment system and pursue Islamic norms and values.

Initially the movement started as a Facebook page to support The April 6th Movement was founded in 2007. Out of three, it is
April 6th Movement textile workers. There was no plan to compose a social the youngest social movement in this case study.
movement. There was no premeditation. The April 6th Members are young and educated. Most of them had never
movement uses online social media like Facebook and Twitter been involved in politics before. The movement was founded
to mobilize protests. The strikes, organized by this movement, and driven by the youth.
were definitely not possible without the capabilities of Web
2.0. They reach unexpected online successes.

Kefaya used the internet as mobilizing followers into traditional Kefaya was founded in 2004 by 300 intellectual Egyptians from
Kefaya forms of protests. They strive to mobilize people beyond the various ideological backgrounds. The movement incorporates a
passive online anonymous participation. Through blogs they variety of political groups. There is no distinction made between
want to link online activism to street activism. young and old. They are one. Nevertheless, there is one
department into the movement which support online youth
activism.

Chapter 8 – Discussion
This chapter provides an interpretation of the results. It compares the findings of the
case study to the findings of the literature review.
If we compare the case study analysis to the previously conducted literature review, there could be
noticed some consensuses and differences. First I will describe the consensuses and thereafter the
differences between the case study and the literature review.

Supported by the literature review and the case study there can be concluded that the use of social
media indeed stimulated the online mobilization of social movements. The Arab Spring was started
by a disaffected youth generation through the use of new communication technologies. By the use of
social media like Facebook and Twitter and the writing of blogs, networks were created. These
networks were indeed used to exchange information. New media, and in particular Facebook, were
indeed used to easily place information online. However, new media were not the only driving force
behind the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Also traditional media contributed to the
expand of networks. Through the networking process the sphere of participation expand. It could be
argued that the youth is indeed politically more conscious. In the literature review there is mostly
focused on the effect of the re‐influencing of or interaction between offline and online media in the
spread of information. Here, it is argued that offline and online activities stimulate each other. The
case‐study proves indeed that offline and online activities, like Blogs, could stimulate mobilization,
whether or not this is offline and online.

However, there are also some differences between the literature review and the case study. The
literature made a distinction between offline and online media and between young and old. The
case‐study shows that most of the social movements were indeed online driven by youth. Although
the youth started the revolution it was controlled by the older generation. The older ones did have,
in contrast to the youth, the knowledge and connections to act effectively into the dictatorial
regimes. In contrast, the younger ones did have more knowledge about the effective use of social
media. Besides, Dickinson (2011) argued that a movement that spread on FB, Twitter and Youtube is
today being run by a generation that lived without computers most of their lives. In contrast, the
case study shows that the youth did not disappear at all. It could be concluded that young and old
need each other, and their capacities, to proceed the revolution. The case study shows that older
people initially stayed on the background during the revolutions but that the younger ones wanted
to be seen. Visible or invisible, young and old need each other to proceed the revolution. Therefore
the distinction made in the literature review between young and old is not justifiable. Besides, the
case study proves that there is less attention to the use of mobile phones and smart phones. In
contrast, in the literature the role of mobile phones, as traditional media, is emphasized in the offline
mobilization. Both young and old contribute to the onset of the Arab Spring. The youth was not the
only driven force behind the revolution. The policy executed by the government might as well be
important in mobilizing the current youth generation. In this case, there could be made a distinction
between young and old. However, this distinction is made in the framework of public vs. dictator. In

the framework of mobilization and social movements young and old worked together against the
dictator.

Chapter 9 – Conclusion
This chapter provides in section 9.1 the final conclusion of the report. In section 9.2
the limitations of the research are mentioned. This chapter concludes with some
advice for further research.
9.1 Final conclusion
The suicide action of Mohamed Bouaziz on December 17 was described by most of the authors as
the beginning of the "Arab Spring". The Arab Spring could be described as twelve months of large‐
scale violence and opposition to the ruling authorities in several countries in the Middle East and
North Africa. Two years after the start of the Arab Spring there has much been written and said
about the uprisings. The literature showed that the Arab Spring was much explained on the basis on
dichotomies. Hereby framing played an important role. This framing was done in terms of public vs.
dictator, poor vs. rich, religious vs. secular, national vs. international, man vs. women, old vs. young
and online vs. offline.
For some the Arab Spring is above all related to the notion that people united and resisted against
political abuse of power through the state, lack of political freedom and corrupt elections. Others
argued that there were blurred lines between the people, among the government and among the
military. This discussion revealed the first dichotomy, namely public vs. dictator.
The dichotomy poor vs. rich could be derived from the notion that the poverty of the general
population contrasted sharply with the wealth of the national elites. The sharp contrast in wealth
distribution in combination with high rates of unemployment and a general lack of prosperity
ensured the collapse of many citizens in deep poverty, which led to huge feelings of dissatisfaction.
After the resign of dictators different movements wanted to lead the countries. Different religious
groups seemed to play an important role in the politics. Nevertheless, religious groups had also to
make compromises with other political parties. The discussion about the nature of the Arab Spring
revealed the dichotomy religious vs. secular.
Some people argue that the Arab Spring was related to the interests of international stakeholders.
Western governments supported dictators for many years. Others argue that the Arab Spring was
more related to national policies executed by dictatorial regimes. This discussion revealed the
dichotomy national vs. international.
For some authors the Arab Spring was related to the emergence of self‐conscious and combative
women who strived for equal rights. Others emphasized that gender equality as cause of the Arab
Spring was exaggerated. Men and women were both able to protest and women did not face
inferiorities in terms of education and work opportunities. This discussion revealed the dichotomy
man vs. women.
The dichotomy online vs. offline could be derived from the discussion between authors if the Arab
Spring was a “Facebook Revolution” or a “People’s revolution”. The increased Facebook use in the
Middle East agreed that social media did play a decisive role in the Arab Spring. By using smart
phones people recorded demonstrations and spread images and videos through Twitter, Facebook

and Youtube. This was only possible due to the expansion of the internet. However, the internet is
less widespread than for example satellite TV and mobile phones. So also offline media and activities
were driving forces behind political changes. The online information blocking done by the
government only reinforced more and more the search to find new ways of offline communication.
Hereby taxi drivers and coffee shops seemed to play an important role in spreading the word.

Age seemed to play an important role in the Arab Spring. The population in the Middle East and
North Africa was characterized by a relative young population. Some argued that the presence of a
certain ‘youth bulge’ was one of the roots of social unrest, perhaps even a catalyst. Others argued
that the presence of large numbers of well‐educated young people, not necessary unleashed a
rebellion. The youth motivated the crowd but still had nothing to say in the end. The dichotomy old
vs. young derived from the discussion between authors whether or not the Arab Spring had a
demographic cause.
In the wake of a massive popular fury new forms of organization arose in the public sphere in the
Arab World. In this report social movements were seen as part of the Arab Spring. By using a case
study, which compared the mobilization strategies and age differentiation of three Egyptian social
movements, I analysed whether the dichotomies online vs. offline and young vs. old faced enough
explanatory power to assert the Arab Spring.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement and Kefaya were three different Egyptian social
movements. Based on the case study I concluded that these movements faced a different history,
used different strategies for member recruitment, faced differences in public profile and used
different mobilization means to spread the word. Nevertheless I also noticed some general
similarities in mobilization strategies and age differentiation.
In all three movements it became clear that social networks facilitated by social media had become a
key ingredient of contemporary social movements. Social media provided connections within and
between movements and individuals. The youth started the revolution by using new communication
technologies, like social media as Facebook and Twitter. Social media provided space for the
formation and expansion of networks. Due to social media, networked individualism could been
identified as the main social operating system in contemporary societies. Social movements were
depended on social networks. So social networks were crucial for mobilization. Mobilization was
depended on contact, contact was obtained through networks. Networks enforced the exchange of
information. Members of networks created content on their mobiles, and then distributed this same
content to the networks they belonged. The young, intellectual population was 24/7 online
connected to each other and could therefore share pictures, movies and experiences immediately.
So social media stimulated the online mobilization of the youth. In fact, it was the interaction of
different media which finally resigned dictators. Online and offline activities were re‐influencing each
other. Online and offline activities could not mobilize the society without each other. The Arab Spring
was caused by a coherent whole that reinforces each other. So due to the intermodality, the
overlapping of networks of various media, it was possible to move people online and/or offline.
Therefore applied if offline nothing happened, people had nothing to talk about online and vice
versa.

I concluded that mobilization occurred as well through online and offline processes as by young and
older people. Both age cohorts seemed to play their own role in the Arab Spring. The old had the
knowledge and experiences to contact the right connections for influence politics . Due to their life
experience, they understood the history of the dictatorial regime and knew how to handle efficiently.
In opposite, the older generation did mostly not know how to use online media like Facebook and
Twitter, therefore they could be seen as “digibeets”. In contrast, the youth dared to express their
dissatisfaction and started the revolution. Without their decisiveness, the revolution would probably
not had been started. However, the young population did not have the power to actually change the
political field. They had to less knowledge and right connections to act effectively into the dictatorial
regime. Therefore the youth could be seen as “bureaucrabeets”. The Arab Spring was started by the
young but the old took over and the revolution aged. Nevertheless, young and old needed each other
to form together a block against the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Both
generations exchanged knowledge, provided by the media they were used to. By using the more
traditional media, like mobile phones and satellite TV, the older ones could spread information
offline to peers. So the more traditional media were as important as the new online media, because
they reached the population cohort who were mostly not reachable through online media. By using
social media, like Facebook and blogs, and smart phones the younger generation could spread
information online to peers. So both age cohorts were reachable, whether it was through online or
offline media, the word was spread and heard. Therefore I argued that as well offline (traditional)
media as online (social) media facilitated (information) networks and therefore facilitated the Arab
Spring. Therefore both kinds of media were needed, otherwise a part of the population would not be
reached with information and knowledge.
The case study analysis showed that there were blurred lines between the dichotomies online vs.
offline and young vs. old. Therefore it is out of the question that there was a dichotomy online vs.
offline and young vs. old. You could better seen those as interacting extremes, with an overlapped
area in between. Both extremes of a dichotomy could not exist without each other. Young and old
used online and offline media to form together one block against the dictatorial regime. Without any
interaction between the four extremes the revolution would not face any progress. Online and
offline media and young and old need each other to proceed the revolution.
The final answer to the central research question of this report is that in case of the dichotomies
online vs. offline and young vs. old, dichotomies do not face enough explanatory power to assert the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore the dichotomies online vs. offline and young
vs. old do not remain while analysing social movements.
9.2 Limitations
From the executed research in this thesis some limitations and additions could be notices. This will
be discussed in this section. An important prerequisite for doing good research was the validity and
quality of the research method. Any research method has its limitations, so also this Bsc‐thesis. First
of all contained the selection of social movements in this thesis only a small portion of the general
mobilization and unification process in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring. So it
could be possible that with a different composition of the case study, this means a different selection
of social movements, the main question is answered in a different way.

Another limitation was the fact that I did not pay attention to possible manipulation of the non‐
scientific articles by for example the government, television stations, social media and social
movements. Information could be provided with a certain aim. This means that the provided
information could possibly not be totally objective. A third restriction was the fact that the selected
dichotomies are a personal interpretation of the literature. It is possible that I read the literature
premeditated. Others could argue that there does not exist a certain dichotomy. Nevertheless I stand
by my choice for the selection of the dichotomies.

9.3 Further research
This section provides a recommendation for further research. Islamic movements are likely to gain
more presence in the public decision‐making sphere. Such movements also strive to strengthen
Islamic identity rather than a purely national identity across the region. While reading the articles I
noticed blurred line between religion, politics and social movements.
The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization, is active in many countries throughout
the Middle East and seeks to govern according to Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood has had the
longest continuous existence of any contemporary Islamist group. It was initially not established as a
political party but as an religious association that aimed to cultivate pious and committed Muslims
through preaching, social services, and spreading religious commitment and integrity by example.
So especially in case of the Muslim Brotherhood it became clear that a movement who based itself
initially on religious values, later on focused on the political field through the establishment of a
Freedom & Justice party. It seems to be that there could be made a distinction between a political
and a religious Islam. The question remains whether politics are a religion, or religion is a politic. Due
to lack of time I could only deepen myself into the dichotomy online vs. offline and young vs. old in
relation to social movements. Therefore I recommend further research to the dichotomy religious vs.
secular in relation to the social movements and the course of the Arab Spring.

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