G.R. No.

149380 July 3, 2002

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and AURORA ROSARIO A. ORETA,
Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during
the 14 May 2001 national elections. The canvass of the election returns yielded ninety two thousand and sixty-two
(92,062) votes for petitioner while respondent obtained seventy two thousand eight hundred sixty-two (72,862) votes,1 or
a difference of nineteen thousand two hundred (19,200) votes. On 22 May 2001 petitioner was proclaimed duly elected
representative by the District Board of Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oath of office, he assumed the
post at noon of 30 June 2001.2

On 1 June 2001 respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-
027. The protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and anomalies in one thousand three hundred eight (1,308) precincts
of the Malabon-Navotas District.3

Issue:

WON the SC has jurisdiction over the election protest case?

Ruling:

Yes, the SC has jurisdiction.

. While the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress,16 this regime however does not bar this Court from entertaining petitions where
the threshold of legitimate review is breached. Indeed, it is well-settled that judicial guidance is appropriate where
jurisdictional issues are involved or charges of grave abuse of discretion are presented in order that we may vindicate
established claims of denial of due process or correct veritable abuses of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than
the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.17

That this Court may very well inquire into jurisdictional issues concerning the HRET may be inferred from Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, of the Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government". Previously, we have taken cognizance of certiorari proceedings where the rules of procedure of the
HRET, as in the instant case, were involved. Garcia v. Ang Ping18 involved the requirement of cash deposit in addition to
filing fees under Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules. In Loyola v. HRET19 we explained the import of a general denial under
Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Lazatin v. HRET20 affirmed the power of
the HRET to set its own prescriptive periods for filing election protests. We explored in Arroyo v. HRET21 the suppletory
applicability of the rules of evidence to the HRET rules to adjudge the correct number of votes for each of the two (2)
competing congressional candidates.

The instant petition is intricately related to the election protest filed by respondent Oreta with the HRET where the
integrity of the election proceedings in one thousand three hundred and eight (1,308) precincts of the Malabon-Navotas
congressional district is attacked as having been grossly manipulated to distort the people's will. This is a serious charge
which if true would taint the assumption of petitioner as congressman of this district. In view of the delicate nature and the
gravity of the charge, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure, in conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must
be taken seriously. Indubitably these rules affect not only the inherent fairness of the proceedings below, a matter of due
process, but equally important, influence the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate, our
democratic ideal.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY et. al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Facts:

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998,
the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which
had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc
further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.
[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation
of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who
should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations [8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other
party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-
ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would
thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional [9] seats must be filled
up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the
52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. Consequently,
several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or
writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two
per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

Issues:

1. WON the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons
be filled up completely and all the time?

2. WON the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Ruling:

1. The twenty percent allocation is a mere ceiling.

The pertinent provision [15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as
follows:

“Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.”

A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared
therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It
however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more
than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning
party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion
of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

“(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.”

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a “mathematical
impossibility,” suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement
rests in Congress. [17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law
through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as
practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law
as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise
void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all
times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
2. Yes, these requirements are constitutional.

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. [21] But to have meaningful representation, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-
list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" [22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the
law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. [23]

As for the three seat party limit, Commissioner Monsod had this to say: “We suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also
wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and
enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty.”

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each
qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-
seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how
large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

3. The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members
of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by
the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the
most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats.
Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered
only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first
party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the
first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the
ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of
mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could
result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation
is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages
obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
 The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales [27] that a fractional membership cannot be converted
into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a
violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than
what it is entitled to x x x.”

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did
not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it
to a given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes

of first party Proportion of votes of

-------------------- = first party relative to

Total votes for total votes for party-list system

party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the
total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than
six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat
or a total of two seats.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. The formula in simplified form, is written as follows:

No. of votes of

Additional seats concerned party No. of additional

for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to

party No. of votes of the first party

first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:
 No. of votes of

Additional seats ABA No. of additional

for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to

party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party

first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats321,646

for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since

party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the
other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other
qualified parties as well.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,

vs.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES et. al.

Facts:

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of
these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the
number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a
separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes
observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in
the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed
Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still
other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but
denied those of several others in Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, saying thus:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme
will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the
number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some
of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties” and that said certified list be accordingly
amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and
that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

The Comelec heard the case but due to various delays, Ang Bagong Bayani got dissatisfied and filed a Petition 9 before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-
extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. The two cases were thereafter consolidated.
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to
the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded
political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations." 29

Issues:

1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

2. Whether or not only the 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations can be represented under
party-list system.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785." 16

Ruling #1:

Yes, the political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in
the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to
give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
34

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system:"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.

Ruling No. 2:

Yes, only the marginalized groups can be represented in the party-list system.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5
of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of
the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program
of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of
the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system.

Ruling No. 3

Yes, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or
the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of
all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply
with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they
are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA
7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is
to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose
Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going
to represent a particular district x x x."61
Brillantes vs. Yorac

Facts:

Petitioner Sixto Brillantes questioned before the SC the designation of then President Cory Aquino to then Associate
Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Comelec in lieu of the appointment of Chairman Hilario Davide
being the Chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the 1989 coup de etat attempts.

Brillantes, anchored his petition on Art. IX Sec. 1 of the Constitution, which states that “In no case shall any member of
the Comelec be appointed or designated in temporary or acting capacity. He also alleged that Yorac is not even a senior
member of the Comelec.

The Solicitor General, however, contended that the designation made by the President should therefore be sustained for
reasons of administrative expediency to prevent disruption of the functions of the Comelec.

Issue:

WON the President may appoint an acting or temporary Comelec chairman?

Ruling:

No, the President may not appoint an acting or temporary Comelec chairman.

The SC emphasized that the members of the Constitutional Commissions are independent, thus, they are not under the
control of the President in the discharge of their respective functions. The choice of a temporary chairman is not within
the discretion and cannot be exercised even by the President.

The Court further noted that the situation of having no Acting Chairman in the Commission can be handled by the
members themselves without the participation of the President.

Also, in choosing the Acting Chairman, members of the Comelec would most likely have been guided by the seniority
rule, as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, the choice and the basis thereof were for them and not
for the President to make.
Bulaong vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose M. Bulaong and private respondent Luis R. Villafuerte were candidates for Provincial Governor of
Camarines Sur in the elections held on May 11, 1992, private respondent being, at the time, the incumbent Governor.
Petitioner was proclaimed elected by the Provincial Board of canvassers. A total P184,654 votes were credited to him,
against 155,359 votes for private respondent

On July 9, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest, alleging fraud and other irregularities in 594
precincts located in 10 municipalities and one city (Iriga City) of Camarines Sur. He prayed that a revision of the ballots
and other election documents and their technical examination be ordered, that the results of the elections be annulled and
that he be declared the duly elected Governor of Camarines Sur

On motion of private respondent the Commission on Elections ordered the revision of the ballots to be held in
Manila. Petitioner questioned the order but this Court, on March 31, 1993

The revision of ballots in 594 precincts resulted in a reversal of the results. Private respondent Luis R. Villafuerte
received 171,577 votes, while petitioner Jose M. Bulaong received 170,361

Petitioner then filed a motion for the technical examination of the election documents alleging that there had been
tampering of the ballots between the time the ballot boxes were brought to Manila and the time the revision began. His
motion was granted by the Commission in its order of March 14, 1994, which limited the period for the examination to
one month. Petitioner failed to make an offer of his evidence

Petitioner had been given, at first, a period of 30 days (April 4 to May 4, 1994) and, then, 25 more days (from
May 17 to June 10, 1994) for the technical examination of election documents. Altogether he was given 55 days to
complete the technical examination of election documents. Despite this, however, he still wanted further extension.
petitioner's motion for a further extension of the time within which to complete the technical examination of ballots was
denied by the commission.

ISSUE:

The issue in this case is whether the Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion for a further extension of the time within which to complete the technical examination of ballots.

HELD:

NO, As the above recital of facts shows, petitioner had been given sufficient time to prove his allegations. The
grant of further extension to him would be inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, especially given the
proximity of the May 1995 elections. Petitioner's request to have his witnesses examine and identify the ballots appears to
be actually an attempt to circumvent the first order dated June 7, 1994 which denied his motion for additional time to
finish the technical examination of the ballots and other election documents. Petitioner had been given, at first, a period of
30 days (April 4 to May 4, 1994) and, then, 25 more days (from May 17 to June 10, 1994) for the technical examination
of election documents. Altogether he was given 55 days to complete the technical examination of election documents.
Despite this, however, he still wanted further extension

Consequently, the Commission proceeded to rule on the offer of evidence of private respondent, even as it gave
petitioner another chance to present his evidence. For this purpose it reset the hearing on June 27. Still, petitioner was in
no position to present his evidence. At his request he was allowed to present the affidavits of witnesses. He was granted
15 days (June 27-JuIy 12, 1994). In. addition, he was granted another period of 15 days (July 12-July 27, 1994) within
which to make an offer of evidence and submit his memorandum. But again he failed to present his evidence. There is no
basis for his allegation that he was "practically forced" to agree to submit the affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their
testimonies, considering that it was his own failure twice to present them which "forced" him to agree to submit instead
their affidavits. It was, therefore, contrary to his own undertaking for him to demand later that his witnesses be first
allowed to view, examine and identify the ballots before they gave their affidavits, or that they be allowed to testify.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the Commission did not commit any abuse of its discretion in issuing its
order of June 7, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for further time to have a technical examination of the ballots, its order
of June 27, 1994 requiring petitioner to submit the affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their oral testimonies and its order of
July 7, 1994, denying "with finality" petitioner's request for his witnesses to examine the election documents or to testify
personally at a hearing.
ERNI vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner-protestee Benjamin R. Erni was proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers as the duly elected mayor
of Tagaytay City in the May 11, 1992 elections, with 4,811 votes against 4,365 votes garnered by his opponent, herein
respondent-protestee Francis N. Tolentino.

Respondent Tolentino filed an election protest, 1 questioning 1,141 ballots out of 1,808 ballots-cast in favor of
petitioner protestee in 14 out of 78 actual precincts in Tagaytay City. He prayed that a revision of the ballots be ordered
and that he be declared the duly elected mayor of Tagaytay City.

The revision of ballots was conducted from May 24, 1993 until June 3, 1993. On June 9, 1993 the committee
submitted its final report to the First Division. 2

After adding the results of the 14 contested precincts to the ballots in the 64 uncontested precincts, the First
Division found respondent-protestant Tolentino to have garnered a total of 4,264 votes (365 + 3,899), and petitioner-
protestee Erni to have obtained a total of 3,661 votes (167 + 3,494). On the basis of these results the Commission's First
Division issued a resolution on January 28, 1994,

DECLARING protestant Francis N. Tolentino as the lawful and duly elected Mayor of Tagaytay City having
garnered a total of 4,264 votes as against the 3,661 votes of the protestee or a margin of 603 votes;

Petitioner-protestee filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commission en banc. He insisted that, their
revision, the groups of contested ballots cast for him were substituted with fake ones, which the entries were allegedly
made to appear as having been made by only one person in order to substantiate the specific objection of respondent-
protestant. Petitioner-protestee contended that the First Division erred in denying his motion for a technical examination
of the ballots to determine possible substitution of the ballots before the examination and in relying solely on the
testimonies of the members of the Revision Committee in ruling on the integrity of the ballots.

On July 25, 1994, the Commission en banc rendered its decision, denying petitioner-protestee's motion for
reconsideration. It found that the ballots which had been examined by the First Division were the same ones which had
been revised and that there was "sufficient reason to believe that there was no substitution after revision, contrary to the
allegation of the protestee." 10 Hence this petition for certiorari and a supplemental petition later filed.

Petitioner contends that there should have been an examination of the ballots by government handwriting experts.
He contends that in interviewing the chairpersons of the Boards of Election Inspectors in order to determine the
genuineness of their initials and the signatures on the contested ballots and having document examiners of the
Commission examine the genuineness of the revisor's initials, without giving petitioner-protestee the opportunity to
participate in the investigation, the Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion.

ISSUE:

WON the Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion by not giving petitioner-protestee the
opportunity to participate in the investigation,

HELD:

NO! Petitioner-protestee claims that he was denied due process, because the Commission en banc interviewed
twelve BEI chairmen and ordered the ballots examined by document examiners without giving him the opportunity to
cross-examine the parties concerned.

What happened is that in view of the manifestation of petitioner-protestee's counsel that he had no direct evidence
to prove how the substitution of ballot had allegedly been done, the Commission decided to conduct its own investigation.
The investigation was more an internal process designed "to clear doubts regarding the integrity of the people in the
Commission and the entire Commission itself." 13 The Commission had the power to make such investigation. In
Peñaflorida v. Commission on Elections, 14 petitioner alleged that the Commission committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in conducting "fingerprint taking" and thereafter directing examiners to make a comparative examination of the
thumbprints taken with those on the election returns without the presence of the parties. Rejecting the petitioner's
contention, this Court held that the steps taken were "actually part of the decision-making process to which the parties
"[were] not, as a matter of right, entitled to be present during the examination nor to confront the experts on the result of
their work." 15 Indeed, the BEI chairpersons were teachers who were deputies of the Commission under its supervision
and control, and there was no reason why it could not call them to identify the signatures on the contested ballots

With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered to determine
whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the
Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestee's request. The rule is settled
that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts. 11

Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the handwriting
on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient, 12 although as already stated, the Commission en
banc asked the chairpersons of twelve Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) to examine the ballots and see if the
signatures, initials and markings thereon were theirs. The twelve did as required and later affirmed that the signatures,
initials and markings were theirs.
GUIEB vs FONTANILLA

FACTS:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of 9 May 1994. the former was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. The latter then seasonably filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

The MTC, rendered a decision confirming the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the
private respondent.

The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The case was
assigned to Branch 42 thereof.

RTC, reversed the decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and declared the private
respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes over the petitioner.

On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend Execution. 10
This motion was, however, denied 11 on the ground that the writ, having been hand-carried by the private respondent to
the office of the sheriff, must have already been implemented and, therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same has
become moot and academic.

On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that in the presence of a
barangay kagawad and barangay residents, he enforced the writ and proclaimed the private respondent as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan

ISSUE:

WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the decision of the
MTC.

HELD:

The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the decision of
the MTC.

Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of the Constitution, 13 it is the COMELEC, and not the
Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by
courts of limited jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. 14 In Flores vs. Commission on Elections, 15 this Court struck out as unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6679 vesting upon the Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over such cases.

The private respondent should have appealed the decision of the MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC should not
have given due course to the appeal; and the RTC should have dismissed outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

In accepting the appeal and deciding the case on its merits, the respondent judge manifested either ignorance or
palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and decision. It must be noted that a judge is presumed to
know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the laws; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. 16 Canon 4 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be "studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent
judge were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional provision and decision, he would have cut short the journey of
a very simple case and put an end to the litigation. What this Court stated in Aducayen vs. Flores 17 deserves reiteration:
 Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts, which
according to the Constitution refer to all those outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the discharge of their
judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules.

Moreover, while it becomes hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum of effort
should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray awareness of well-settled
and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case, then resort to us would be less frequent. That way our time could be
devoted to questions of greater significance. Not only that, there would be on the part of party litigants less expense and
greater faith in the administration of justice, if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly
be accused of an apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Such an indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The
situation thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent approach to the discharge of judicial functions to avoid the
imputation that there is on the part of a number of judges less than full and adequate comprehension of the law.
RELAMPAGOS vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.

The petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of
six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.

The Court ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

Respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such
jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election
for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by
the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697
became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection
thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go
beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of
the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

It is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the
context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems
quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality
resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.
 Sahali vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Sadikul Sahali and Hadja Jubaida Matba were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in Tawi-
Tawi in the elections of May 1998. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor
of Tawi-Tawi.

The counting of votes, canvassing of returns and consolidation of results of the elections were conducted using
the Automated Election System.

But before the petitioner resume to office, the COMELEC promulgated a minute resolution to direct the
immediate manual recounting of ballots in the province of Tawi-Tawi; and in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the
proclamation as a logical consequence of the manual counting. Pleadings were filed by Matba and Abubakar Jr. saying
that there are some problems encountered during election: 1) inability of the machines to read the ballots properly; 2)
inability of the ballots to reject spurious and excess ballots; 3) material discrepancies of figures appearing in various
election documents, such as the election returns, municipal certificates of canvass, statement of votes per precinct and
municipality, and the provincial certificate of canvass. Needless to say, these material discrepancies resulted in the
proclamation of losing candidates. 4) cases of several candidates not obtaining any vote in the precinct where they are
registered and where they voted; 5) absence of any entry in the statements of votes in some forty (40) precincts of Tawi-
Tawi involving the position of president down to municipal councilors.

Petitioner brought this special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of COMELEC Minute Resolution
and likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
COMELEC from implementing or executing the assailed Resolution. Petitioner contends that he was not notified of the
filing of this and he was not afforded an opportunity to answer the petition, thereby he was denied his constitutional right
to due process. Petitioner maintains that his right to assume the office of governor of Tawi-Tawi constitutes property right
within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. He argued that the Minute Resolution is also void ab
initio inasmuch as no pre-proclamation controversy was filed during the canvassing, and there can be no suspension of the
effects of a proclamation or a recounting of ballots where there is no pre-proclamation controversy.

The COMELEC stressed that the instant petition was premature because it was filed before the assailed Minute
Resolution became final. The petition was subsequently rendered moot and academic when the COMELEC issued the
Minute Resolution.

The Court agrees with Matba but Congressman Jaafar from Tawi-tawi wrote a letter to COMELEC contending
that the Commission was misinformed and misled into promulgating the assailed Minute Resolution. Congressman Jaafar
alleges that the May 1998 elections in Tawi-Tawi were generally clean, honest and peaceful. The votes were casted (sic),
machine counted and canvassed. The winning candidates were duly proclaimed and have taken their respective oath of
office prior to the promulgation of said questionable Resolution; that the counting of votes were done through the
automated counting machine which was pre-tested a few days before the election by Comelec technicians and conducted
in the presence of representatives of all political parties.

The same machine were used (sic) in the counting of votes by municipalities also in the presence of the Military,
Police, Namfrel, Comelec and representative of all parties concerned that led to the proclamation of the winning
candidates for various positions; that the recommendation of Mr. Idlana Mangona to conduct a manual recount because of
system failure and/or total breakdown of the machine should not be used solely as a basis in promulgating said Resolution
because Mr. Mangona was not the Comelec-In-Charge of the province during the elections, neither is he in the position to
technically attest to the defectiveness of the counting machine. Atty. Alloden Dalaig of the Comelec Central Offices was
the one assigned as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) and designated Comelec-In-Charge for the
entire Province of Tawi-Tawi; that the questioned Resolution triggered by the unsworn letter request of Matba and
Abubakar, defeated gubernatorial and congressional candidates, respectively, should not have been given due course
considering that the same was not even calendared much more part of the agenda of the Commission of June 29, 1998;
and lastly and more important of all, the undersigned and other wining candidates were not given due notice and allowed
to present their side thereby depriving them of their right to be heard by the Commission, a clear violation of their
Constitutional right to due process.
 COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra resolved the case by issuing a Memorandum inquiring and
seeking clarification as to whether the COMELEC En Banc will order the Executive Director to implement Minute
Resolution which resolved to direct the immediate implementation of the assailed Minute Resolution, considering that
there was still pending petition for certiorari filed by Congressman Jaafar before the Supreme Court to annul the Minute
Resolution. Later, after this Court issued the status quo ante order, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution,
namely, Minute Resolution No. 98-2828, which provides that the Commission in issuing Min. Res. 98-2145 corrected
itself, thus Minute Resolution 98-1959 and Min. Res. 98-2106 were never implemented and therefore at the time the status
quo ante order was issued by the Supreme Court, the prevailing situation was that Sadikul Sahali was the duly proclaimed
winning candidate for Governor in Tawi-Tawi as well as other proclaimed local candidates as of May 13, 1998. With this,
it was clarified that Sahali and other proclaimed local candidates are duly elected officials of Tawi-Tawi at the time
referred to in the status quo ante order by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC should be charged of grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

No, the petitioner had failed to prove that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
jurisdiction.

RATIONALE:

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of, only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit:
(a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.

The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.

It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible
by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 Velayo vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for mayor of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers constituted to canvass the election
results was composed of Linda Sandoval as Chairman, Eduardo Pancho as Vice Chairman and Eustaquita Tolentino as
member.

On May 12, 1998, the canvass of election returns started. Private respondent orally sought the exclusion of the
two election returns. The first election return was objected on the ground that it is incomplete and contains material
defects and the other was objected on the ground of material defects and that it does not contain the thumbmarks of
official watchers.

The Board denied the objections and continued with the canvass. The private respondent filed a petition for the
annulment of certain election returns illegally canvassed and for suspension of canvass of election returns pending
substitution of the challenged members. The board denied the prayer to suspend the canvass there being no valid here
being no valid and compelling reason to do so and the request for disqualification. The still proclaimed Velayo as Mayor
for Gapan. Then another case was filed by the private respondent seeking the disqualification of the board of canvassers
and to restrain the proclamation of Velayo.

The petitioner was not given a copy of any case they have filed. The COMELEC en banc issued a questionable
resolution stating that Velayo’s proclamation as Mayor is annulled and that the Board of Canvassers of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija is directed to convene immediately, exclude Precincts 44A, 44A2 and 50A & 50A1 and immediately proclaim the
winning candidate for mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Also, they are directed to immediately inform the Commission of
their action. The Commission proclaimed private respondent Natividad as Mayor because the action of the Board in
proclaiming Velayo as the winning candidate for mayor in Gapan is illegal for violation of Section 20(a) to (i) of R.A.
7166 and Section 244 of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, the petition for certiorari was filed by Velayo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did
not dismiss respondent Natividad's Motion for Reconsideration, excluded the votes cast in some precincts as
manufactured and contrary to statistical probabilities without the required notice and hearing consistent with due process,
and dismiss the proclamation of the petitioner through Republic Act No. 7166.

HELD:

Yes,the Solicitor General agreed with the petitioner and opined that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it issued the impugned resolution.

RATIONALE:

First, the private respondent Natividad said that the filing for motion for reconsideration was within the 5-day
reglementary period, but the court did not agree with this for he cannot count the date from the 5-day reglementary period.
Secondly, Respondent COMELEC failed to be faithful to section 3 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that "all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily after due notice.”

The records would show that petitioner Velayo was not furnished any copy of private respondent’s petition and
the only copy he received was the en banc resolution annulling his proiclamation which constitutes denial of due process.
Third, The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that pre and post proclamation proceedings should be resolved
summarily but not ex parte. In the case at bar, petitioner's proclamation as Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers was not only summarily annulled by the COMELEC.
 It was annulled ex parte, solely on the basis of the evidence presented by private respondent, absolutely depriving
petitioner an opportunity to present his rebuttal evidence. This ex parte annulment of petitioner's proclamation is null and
void for being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. Fourth, Republic Act No. 7166 introduced several
electoral reforms and some of them relate to the disposition of pre-proclamation controversies.

Among others, it provides that pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass must
be disposed of summarily by the COMELEC on the basis of the records and evidence adduced in the Board of
Canvassers. Lastly, the respondent COMELEC annulled the proclamation of petitioner Velayo on the basis of new and
additional evidence submitted by the private respondent. These new and additional evidence were not presented before the
Board of Canvassers. Petitioner Velayo was not furnished these evidence and given the chance to refute them.

Respondent COMELEC's resort to the doctrine of statistical improbability is flawed. As observed by petitioner
Velayo, from experiences in past elections, respondent COMELEC should be aware that it is possible for one candidate or
even a few candidates to get zero votes in one or a few precincts. The bare fact that a candidate for public office received
zero votes in one or two precincts can not adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically
improbable. A no-vote for a particular candidate in election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence
that those election returns were prepared under "duress, force and intimidation.

The court warned that the doctrine on statistical improbability must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being
taken lest in penalizing the fraudulent and corrupt practices, which indeed is called for, innocent voters become
disenfranchised, a result which hardly commends itself. This specially applies to the case at bar where respondent
COMELEC's ruling is premised on questionable affidavits of private respondent's witnesses, and election returns which
appear to be regular on their face. Moreover, the doctrine of statistical improbability involves a question of fact and a
more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte involves a question of fact and a more prudential approach
prohibits its determination ex parte.

The Resolution of the respondent COMELEC (en banc) was SET ASIDE, the proclamation of private respondent
Ernesto Natividad is declared NULL and VOID and COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE petitioner Arthur V. Velayo
as Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, effective immediately upon receipt of the Court’s decision.
 Coquilla vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution of COMELEC ordering the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001
elections and the order of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Teodoro Coquilla was being complained by his contender Neil M. Alvarez seeking to cancel his
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for
only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Petitioner was
voted for and received the highest number of votes against private respondent. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was
proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office.

The COMELEC granted the private respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy to the wit:

Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from
the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the
U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance
with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections
65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of
a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected.

All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since
1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May
14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the
Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year
residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections.9

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30,
2002. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

A) Whether or not the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner and

(b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of
petitioner.

RATIONALE:

With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should be dismissed
because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro
forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the
running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, of the
COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this
petition. Since the petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed
late and should be dismissed. But private respondent’s contention has no merit.
 As to the second issue, as stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondent’s petition for
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were
canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for
and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been
rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.
Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy,
which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.

In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified
 BERNARDO vs. ABALOS

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of a resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dismissing the complaint for vote buying filed by petitioners against respondents.

Petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal
complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and
Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC.

The complaint alleged that the Abalos conspiring with Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera,
both officials from Mandaluyong Federation of Public School Teachers. That the Abalos sponsored, arranged and
conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers,
registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon Province.

The Director4 of the Law Department of the COMELEC conducted a preliminary investigation. All the private
respondents filed separate counter-affidavits with prayer to dismiss the complaint.

On November 1998, the Director of the Law Department submitted his findings to the COMELEC En Banc
recommending that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC acted with apparent grave abuse of discretion in issuing a resolution dismissing the
complaint "for insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case,

HELD:

The petition must fail. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level.
Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1,
Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:

"Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed.

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;

Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules
intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission.

Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory, " it bears stressing that
the purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it.11 If the error is
immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse.
But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a
recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners' complaint expressly states that no supporting affidavits were submitted by the complaining witness14
to sustain their charge of vote buying. Suffice it to state that the absence of such supporting affidavits shows the frailty of
petitioners' complaint. Indeed, it is vulnerable to dismissal.
 SABDULLAH MACABAGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAMAEL SALACOP

FACTS:

Petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had a
lead of 198 votes over private respondent Jamael M. Salacop.

Private respondent filed a petition against petitioner and the proclaimed vice mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur,
for the alleged fact that there was a massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting
procedures in some precincts and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of
Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in those
precincts a sham and a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity.

In support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto photocopies of random Voters Registration
Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and deceit that allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits
tending to prove that serious irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts. The
petitioner denied the material and averred that it is a pre-proclamation controversy.

The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and issued an order directing the Election Officer of
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the
questioned precincts for technical examination.

After its examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded that there was
convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four (4) precincts that necessitated a technical
examination of the original copies of the VRRs and their comparison with the voters’ signatures and fingerprints.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in issuing the assailed
Order.

RATIONALE:

Before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of two
(2) conditions must be established, namely: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by
law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; (b) the votes cast would affect the
result of the election. The Court declared in Ricardo Canicosa vs. Commission on Elections, et al., that there are only
three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:

x x x (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.

In sum then, the grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the COMELEC are those for a
regular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy nor is such petition one for annulment of the
elections or for a declaration of failure of elections in the municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should
have ordered the dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is correctible by the
special civil action for certiorari.
Faelnar vs People

Facts:

Petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Guadalupe, Cebu City for the may 1997 local elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament,
dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNAR'S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30,
1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner by Antonio Luy.

The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the
campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner denied
participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the
same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth.

The complaint was investigated by an election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner. On the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a case
against for violation of sec. 80, in relation to sec. 262, of the Omnibus Election Code, and sec. 50 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2888, in relation to sec.12 of Republic Act No. 6679.

In its Resolution No. 97-3040 the COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of
Antonio Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against
petitioner and was formally charged in a criminal offense in the RTC.

Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the case, contending that
Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately executory and could no longer be
reconsidered. In support of his claims, petitioner cites Rule 13, sec. 1(d) and Rule 34, sec. 10 of the Rules of Procedure of
the COMELEC. The motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the election
laws, immediately final and executory.

Ruling:

No, the contested resolution was not final and executory.

Rationale:

Rule 13, sec. 1(d) relied by the petitioner was taken from the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which has
already been amended.

Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. — The following pleadings are not allowed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .

The 1993 Rules of Procedure now provides:

Rule 13. — Prohibited Pleadings.

Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. — The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; . . .
(Emphasis added).

Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en
banc is allowed in cases involving election offenses. Thus the reconsideration of the resolution is allowed.

With regards to Rule 34 sec. 10, it only governs appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City
Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an appeal but
a resolution of the COMELEC itself in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of election
offense cases.

if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating
officer prepares a report upon which the Commission's Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en
banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of
probable cause. Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is unavailing.

However under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is
allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal
or motu proprio, may review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
Salva vs Makalintal

Facts:

Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of
Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections
9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires. On the other hand, Resolution No. 345
affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas.

Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San
Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

Petitioners Elpidio Salva et. al, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit
against the COMELEC et. Al. before the RTC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997,
both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998 with
prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.

Their motion was denied by the RTC and ruled that that they have no jurisdiction over it because any petition or action
questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.

Petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by the Supreme Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the RTC. Conducting a plebiscite pursuant to an Ordinance is
ministerial in nature.

COMELEC however allege that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review or reverse its resolution because RTC
does not have jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin COMELEC from implementing its Resolution.

Ruling:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin COMELEC from implementing its Resolution.

Rationale:

Section 7, Article IX A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers.
 The issuance of a resolution of the Comelec is a ministerial duty that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of
its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let
alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and
duties of party litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final
order reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts.
Consolidated Case of:

Fornier vs Comelec, Tecson vs Comelec and Veles vs Poe

Facts:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in Fornier vs Comelec initiated a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Both presented evidences in support of their claim but COMELEC denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court. Later on the other two cases were consolidated with this case.

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of the said case and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before
it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

Issue:

Whether or not FPJ is a Filipino Citizen and thus is allowed to run for presidency.

Ruling:

Yes, FPJ is a Filipino Citizen and is thus allowed to run for presidency.

Rationale:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

To know whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or not it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.

That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

(guys pede nyo ring I add ditto yung tungkol sa DNA test at testimony ng tita ni FPJ, d ko na isinama sobrang haba kasi,
pero kung meron kau original case pede rin nyo iadd yun (n_n)

*the two other cases were dismissed by the supreme court dahil dumeretso sila nagfile sa supreme court.
Mercado vs Manzano

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent as winner was suspended in view of
a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Comelec said that Mamaril misrepresented
himself as natural born citizen on the account that he was an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigrations.

In his answer to the petition, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.

Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion was opposed by private
respondent. the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice
mayor of the City of Makati.

It was because respondent was born and raised in America for 6 years and when his parents (both Filipino)
brought him to the Philippines they registered him as an alien in the Bureau of Immigrations. It must be realized that he
did not loose his Filipino citizenship and when he was at the age of majority he registered himself to vote and be voted
upon the succeeding years of his career.

Now Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari regarding the Comelec’s Ruling. He , contends that through sec.
40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has “commanded in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing
dual allegiance to hold local elective office.”

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is allowed to hold office although he has dual citizenship.

Ruling:

Yes, respondent is still allowed to hold office.

Rationale:

In including sec. 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, sec. 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
 Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition
is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

“Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control.”

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner’s contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is
petitioner’s contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching
the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
SARMIENTO v. COMELEC

Facts:

Before the court are 9 special civil actions for certiorari jointly resolved which seek to set aside the Resolutions of
COMELEC in the following Special Cases (SPC).

The COMELEC in SPC No. 92-266 granted the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac,
Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return.

Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that,
inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any
of its Divisions.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it resolved the appeals without referring
to the Divisions

Held: Yes, COMELEC acted grave abuse of discretion when it resolved the appeals without referring to the Divisions

Ratio:

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
(Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all
such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not
have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance

A party aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall,
within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of canvassers, file with the Commission a
verified appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five (5) days from its
promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the
Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the Commission en banc. Thereafter, the
Clerk of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification.

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved
the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said
resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.

However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. However, the said section provides also that proceedings
may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears
meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued
by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.

The instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular election protests. If the
winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been
proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before
the COMELEC and of the petitions before the Court.

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS (MBC) OF GLAN v. COMELEC

Facts:

Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during the May 2001 elections,
sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Glan, Sarangani
and to recall the proclamation of petitioners, as duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Glan, Sarangani,

Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case on the grounds that: a) after the original and second MBC had
resigned, the third MBC was illegally constituted as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary are not qualified under
the Omnibus Election Code; b) the canvassing proceedings, which were initially held in the Session Hall of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of Danao Province, contrary to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3848; c) the Secretary of the MBC failed to record the minutes of the canvassing proceedings since the
start of the canvass; d) neither Benzonan nor her representatives were notified of the last three days of the canvassing
proceedings and, consequently, they were not able to participate therein; e) a substantial number of the election returns
had been tampered with or falsified; and f) the MBC had falsified the certificate of canvass votes.

COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding that, based on the evidence presented, the canvass of votes had
been conducted in a place other than the previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified.
Thus, the proclamations of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of the election returns
was ordered.

Petitioners then filed the present petition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
prohibitory injunction.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction over the case

Held: No, the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction over the case

Ratio:

The COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in the first
instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission and any decision by the Commission en banc as regards
election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
 It is important to clarify that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be
first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise
of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then, upon
motion for reconsideration, en banc.

It is clear that the case is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the MBC, including the
falsification of election returns and certificate of canvass, were alleged to be in issue.

Also undisputed is the fact that Benzonan filed her pre-proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc
and that the case was subsequently decided by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. As aforestated, the COMELEC en banc is
without jurisdiction to decide cases involving these types of controversies in the first instance.

The petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the COMELEC en banc was hereby declared null and void and set
aside, and the COMELEC is directed to assign the case to a division.
AQUILES REYES v. RTC of ORIENTAL MINDORO and COMIA

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the position of the member of Sangguniang Bayan
of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.

Comia moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in
favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that there was another candidate (Epitacio
Reyes) bearing the same surname. However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC)
proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning candidate with 7,205 votes. After two days, petitioner took
his oath of office.

Comia filed an election protest before the trial court alleging:

a. That in the Statement of Votes by City/Municipality or Precinct, the total number of votes garnered by him is only 858
votes, when in fact and in truth, after reviewing and correcting the computation of the actual votes garnered the total votes
to be counted in his favor is 915 votes;

b. That the MBC and the Election Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, after having been informed of the said
discrepancies, manifested in the presence of Municipal Trial Court Judge Leynes that it was an honest mistake committed
in the computation and the addition of the total number of votes.

7. That after correcting the total number of votes garnered by the him, it appears now that the total votes cast in his favor
in all precincts is 7,233 votes which is more than 28 votes over the total of 7,205 votes garnered by Reyes, who was
proclaimed as Elected Sangguniang Bayan Member.

Reyes filed a motion to dismiss private respondent's petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the
reglementary period of ten days from proclamation. The trial court denied his motion.

MBC filed its answer in which it admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only
858 votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. Consequently, the trial court rendered its decision
annuling the proclamation of Reyes and declared Comia as the eighth winning candidate.

Reyes filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member of that body
and prohibit it from further recognizing private respondent.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. The
appellate court cited Supreme Court Circular 28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple petitions involving the same
issues.

Reyes then brought the present action contending that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division
committed a grave abuse of discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by Comia despite
the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after his proclamation, and the second i.e., the COMELEC's First
Division, by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC’s First Division by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest despite the fact
that it was filed more than 10 days after petitioner’s proclamation and the trial court by dismissing petitioner’s appeal
from the decision of the trial court for the late payment of appeal

Held: No, the COMELEC’s First Division and the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Ratio:

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC, contends that the filing of the petition, without petitioner first
filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution because
under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it
follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC
is fatal to his action.

Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc
that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari."

As provided for by Rule 22 §9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the appeal may be dismissed upon motion
of either party or at the instance of the Commission upon failure to pay the appeal fee.

Petitioner is, however, estopped to raise this question now. He did not only appeal from the decision of the trial
court to the COMELEC, but he also filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. He should not
be allowed to file the present petition just because he lost in those cases. Hence, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
LOZANO v. YORAC

Facts:

Petitioner and Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal
funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa.

The case was referred to the Law Department of respondent commission by the Second Division composed of
Commissioner Haydee Yorac as presiding officer and Commissioners Flores and Dimaampao as members for preliminary
investigation of the criminal aspect. With this, Binay filed his counter-affidavit

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac
and Africa, he also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac
denied the motion for inhibition.

The COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists
why the case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second Division."

Petitioner Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac because she postponed motu proprio
a hearing set on the ground that she will study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied.

COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides that petitions for disqualification filed
prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not resolved before
the elections shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall submit its report to the
Commission en banc.

Petitioner filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioner Yorac for
having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of respondent commission expressing her
opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular courts of the offense of vote buying before he could be
disqualified.

In the resolution which is assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for disqualification and the
criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay. During the promulgation of judgment, petitioner asked that
the same be suspended until after the resolution of the legal issues raised involving constitutional and jurisdictional
questions.

The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in another resolution on the ground that
"pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling
of the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, and therefore not allowed under the Rules.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding Binay guilty of vote-buying
contrary to evidence presented by petitioner and in referring the case to the Commission en banc without the unanimous
vote of all the members of the Second Division.

Held: No, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Ratio:

COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 issued by the commission en banc on November 3, 1988 is the applicable law in
this disqualification case.

Contrary to petitioner's submission that said resolution has been repealed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the resolution which appears to be inconsistent with the
procedural rules issued by the COMELEC.

Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of respondent
commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner
of disposing of the same had not been uniform.

Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050, petitioner had filed several motions with the Second
Division asking for the referral of the disqualification case to the Commission en banc. After the COMELEC en banc
issued Resolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion for the referral of the case to the Commission en banc,
specifically invoking Resolution No. 2050. In the words of petitioner in his said motion, under the aforesaid resolution,
"once the petition for disqualification is forwarded to the Law Department, the case is deemed en banc because the report
is submitted En banc by the law Department." Petitioner having invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc is
now estopped from questioning the same after obtaining an adverse judgment therefrom.

Thirdly, Commissioner Flores, who opined that the disqualification case should first be resolved by the Second
Division, has since then clarified his position after he was reminded that Resolution No. 2050, which he had admittedly
"completely forgotten" had "laid down a definite policy on the disposition of disqualification cases contemplated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The
COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as
between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.

No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The
traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented
by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to
influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far.
Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires
more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or,
at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying.

The court is convinced that the evidence presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case, do not warrant such finding.

ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
Facts:

Before t h Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the COMELEC en banc Resolution approving the issuance of
a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents and representatives from conducting such exit
surveys.

It was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make exit survey of the vote during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcast
immediately.

The respondent contends that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it has not authorized or
deputized Petitioner to undertake the exit survey and that it is a violation of the constitutional provision regarding the
secrecy of ballots.

On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the holding of the exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits that COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion and grossly violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

The Solicitor General seeks to dismiss the petition due to mootness and prematurity.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion

Held: Yes, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

Ratio:

The issue is not totally moot.Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked, the Court has
resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom.

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted
for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually
through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations,
the electorate voted.

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The
freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by
the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. It
represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open.While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.

The COMELEC asserts that the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the
electoral process. Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable.

First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as
much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled.

Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered
from polled individuals.

Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls.

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid
and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may
be brought about by exit surveys.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector
has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP v. FERRER

Facts:

In preparation for the national elections, the Commissioners of the COMELEC issued an INVITATION TO BID
CALL No. 127 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting
booths with specifications and descriptions.
 Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the petitioner,
Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing
Company, (Acme for short).

The respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the
proceedings taken pursuant to the said Invitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the
sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is
also heavy — 51 kilos in weight.

The Committee instead “recommended” that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the
voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the
final award be made."

Ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC Commissioners, and after that,
the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract
to Acme.

Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, and also applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order denied the writ prayed for.

Public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action. The Judge dismissed the case and denied motion for
reconsideration of Filipinas.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC
dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and
Acme to enjoin them from complying with their contract

Held:

1. Yes, the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit involving the award of contract of COMELEC.

2. No, Filipinas has no cause of action against the COMELEC and Acme to enjoin them from complying with their
contract.

Ratio:

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the
said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in
character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by
certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.

The COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, dated September 16, 1969, expressly stipulates —

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REJECT ANY OR ALL BIDS; TO WAIVE ANY
INFORMATION THEREIN; OR TO ACCEPT SUCH BID AS MAY IN ITS DISCRETION BE CONSIDERED MOST
REASONABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS

14. THIS CALL FORBIDS IS NO MORE THAN AN INVITATION TO MAKE PROPOSALS AND THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT ANY BID, NOR SHALL THIS CALL FOR BIDS BY
ITSELF CONFER A RIGHT TO ANY BIDDER TO ACTION FOR DAMAGES OR UNREALIZED OR EXPECTED
PROFITS UNLESS THE BID IS DULY ACCEPTED BY THERE SOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS.

Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder may have the right to demand damages, or
unrealized or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid, although
recommended for award of contract by the bidding committee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect
appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no cause of action.