15) G.R. No.

131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU

LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and
ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.

What constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting

officers?

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section

5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an
"actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest.8

16) G.R. No. 152889

ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR. in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents.

The basic issue propounded by petitioner is whether a pending resolution

of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a
finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court,
including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.

The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the

determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent
implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer
the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment
on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.1avvphi1 It must be
emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend
proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest
in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of
arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to
the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the implementation of
the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of
the petition for review that he filed citing the following directive contained
in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular:

xxxx
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending
resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. 32

The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at

the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a
remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must
hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court
whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the
warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial
prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier
ruling33 of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court,
as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. In
the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised his judicial
discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the
implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA was
correct when it found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of
the trial judge's discretion in issuing the challenged orders.

Neither does this Court find any applicability of the cases cited by the
petitioner to the instant case.

17) G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

There was no valid arrest of petitioner when he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation. He was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.11

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of
the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front"
of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.

There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i)
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be

inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is

not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact,
the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents
of his pocket.18

18) G.R. No. 109287 April 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y
CLOFAS alias "STEPHEN PO y UY" or "TOMMY SY" and PAUL LEE y
WONG alias "PAUL LEUNG", accused- appellants

NO, what has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant
Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have
been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the
unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his
arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence obtained
thereby; he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before
this Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on
constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and
recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including, particularly, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases such as People
vs. Malasugui and De Garcia vs. Locsin.

19)
A.

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting

armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail
if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival
of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing
and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. (Umil, et al., vs. Ramos, et al.)

B.

The “plain view doctrine” is usually applied where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes upon an incriminationatory object (People v. Musa, 217 SCRA
597).

Requisites: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; 2) the evidence was accidentally discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately
visible; and d) “plain view” justified the seizure of the evidence without
any further search (People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003).

C.

“Stop – and – frisk is defined as the particular designation of the right of

a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him
for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to
conclude that criminal activity may be afoot (Terry v. Ohio).

Requisites: a) that there is a person who manifests unusual and

suspicious conduct; b) that the police officer should properly introduce
himself and make initial inquiries; c) that the police officer approached
and restrained the person in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapon; and d) that the apprehending officer must
have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapon or contraband concealed about him People v. Sy Chua, G.R.
Nos. 136066 – 67, February 4, 2003)

D.
Citizen’s Arrest -
Method of arrest by private person. When making an
arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of
the intention to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless the
latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists
before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
E.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial

Authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall
be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of twelve (12) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent, and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

20) G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY

FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

A.) The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a

crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat. 60 In
Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the
existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted. In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence
of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the
submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62

Probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of

arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence,
before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based
on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

The arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section

5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances
pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest. The probable cause to justify
warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts.65

B.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap
from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of
information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the
element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated
facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period
of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement
of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.

This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police
officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a
very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would
have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

21) G.R. No. 204589 November 19, 2014

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest

determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and
the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence
to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.

In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delicto arrest nor the stop-
and-frisk principle was applicable to justify the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny
of the factual backdrop of this case shows that the search and seizure on
Sanchez was unlawful.

A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of

Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed.25

Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest
prior to the conduct of the search.