ATO vs Sps.

Ramos

The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner (ATO) because it is an agency of the
State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA thereby
correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing
a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its
sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. The SC further
observes that the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim
for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s property.

(Function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.)

Caltex vs Custom Arrastre

The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function, is undertaken as an incident to
its governmental function, there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity. The Bureau of Customs, is part of Department of Finance, with no personality of its
own apart from that of the national got. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff fees. To his function, arrastre is a
necessary incident. Hence, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Mobil vs Custom Arrastre

The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and
damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary,
because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs.

Republic vs Feliciano

The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No.
3844. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which
under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be
sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. ). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of
State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Sayson v Singson

Issue: W/N collection by the respondent is valid through a mandamus suit filed against the petitioners
Answer: No. The respondent’s cause of action is a money claim against the government for the payment
of the balance of the spare parts cost. Even if the claim is valid, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce
the collection of such claim against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. . The suit
disguised as mandamus is actually a suit against the State which cannot be entertained without the
consent of the State. The respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribes the conditions under which money claims
against the government may be filed. It is provided in the said act that all claims on settlements shall be
decided within 60 days by the Auditor General. Furthermore, appeals on decision must be submitted in
writing, within 30 days from receipt of such decision, to the President of the US, or President of the
Philippines, or Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity.

It is further held that for consent from the state to be secured, the State may require certain
administrative proceedings to be had and exhausted. The appeal by the party aggrieved can be brought
to the judiciary only after the consent has been made. However, in the case at bar, there was no ruling
from the Auditor General. Even if a ruling was obtained, the proper court for the appeal should have
been the Supreme Court. The Court of First Instance could not legally act on the matter.

Republic vs Purisima

The SC held that a contract entered into by the Rice and Corn Administration stipulating that in the
event of breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a money claim against the
RCA, a govt entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA had no authority to bind the
government to be sued. Only a statute could.

Meritt vs Government

The SC said that the State is only liable for acts of its agents, officers and EEs when they act as special
agents within the meaning of Art 2180 and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital
was not such agent. In this case, the Philippine General Hospital, did not yet have a separate legal
personality from the govt. It should further be noted that the plantiff was allowed to sue by virtue of a
special law but was unable to hold the defendant govt liable since the injuries were caused by a regular
driver of the govt and not a special agent.

Shell vs Jalos
Issue: Can shell invoke state immunity, as agent of the Republic of the Philippines?
No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is
just a service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas
reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in
the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell
has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law.

Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government
for the purpose of transacting business with third persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of the
Philippine government but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural
Gas Project; it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for claims even without the State’s consent.
And as evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38, the Phil.
Government recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.

PNB vs CIR

Since the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation had the capacity to be sued, any judgment against
it could be enforced by a writ of execution, and its funds could even be garnished.

As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government
owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation.

SSS vs CA

The property of one Socorro Cruz was foreclosed due to the negligence of the regular employees of SSS
in mistaking her account, which was updated, with that of another Socorro Cruz, which was in arrears.
The SC, in granting nominal damages to the claimant, seemed to be saying that SSS could have invoked
the defense of Art 2180, which it did not. The separate opinion of Makasiar enunciated this (Note:
Consent to be sued includes actions based on quasi delicts even though committed by regular
employees and not by special agents). So the rule, it seems, is that a government entity can be sued for
tort, but if it is, it can invoke the defense that it acted through it regular employees and not special
agents.

Having accepted the late payments of monthly installments, the SSS could not suddenly and w/o prior
notice to the couple apply for extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgage. There was negligence on the
part of SSS when it mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was
called to error but it refused to acknowledge its mistake. SSS should, thus, be held liable for nominal
damages. Under its charter, the SSS can sue and be sued. So, even if assuming that SSS enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit provision of the
enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of
the SSS, although it does not thereby concede it liability.
The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. SSS own organic act specifically
provides that it can sue and be sued in court.

RAYO VS CFI
*regarding flooding – ANGAT Dam

The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be
sued in any court under its charter. National Power Corporation, as a government owned and controlled
corporation, has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any
court, NPC can sue and be sued for tort.

FAROLAN VS CTA

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained
with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay
for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious
that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically
applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own,
the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is
invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs
performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary
function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.

RP vs Sandiganbayan

In the present case, the private respondents intervened in Civil Case No. 0025 merely to unite with the
defendants therein in resisting the claims of petitioner, as plaintiff, and for that reason asked for no
affirmative relief against any party in their answer in intervention. In other words, this is not a case
where the private respondents take the initiative in an action against petitioner by filing a complaint in
intervention or a complaint. As observed by respondent Sandiganbayan:

In intervening, Palanca and his co-stockholders have for their purpose to exclude the BREDCO lots and
stocks or, at least, their 35% interest in the BREDCO project from any possible judgment directing
reconveyance of the alleged ill-gotten wealth to the plaintiff. They do not pray for damages against the
latter. In effect, they occupy a defensive position as regards those shares of stock or interest. The fact
that they interjected themselves into his litigation at their own initiative does not alter the essential
nature of their intervention."

It suffices to state that, as already stated, in intervening in Civil Case No. 0025, private respondents
merely joined the defendants therein in resisting the claims of petitioner, as plaintiff, and that they
asked no affirmative relief against any party in their answer in intervention. They do not appear to have
any controversy with the defendants, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al

Private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case No. 0025 is not, therefore, a suit or counter-suit
against petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

By filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability. As
already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant’s claim
over the possession of the vessel in question.

The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the
possession of the vessel in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said intervention, claiming to have a better right to the possession of
the vessel by reason of a valid and subsisting contract in its favor, and of its right of retention, in view of
the expenses it had incurred for the repair of the said vessel. As counterclaim, defendant demanded of
the intervenor to comply with the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel pursuant to the provisions of
the charter contract.

It was ruled that Froilan's violations of the conditions of the contract of sale in his favor did not
automatically deprive him of his right of ownership of the vessel, which passed to him upon execution of
the contract, but merely gave rise to the Shipping Administration's right either to foreclose the
mortgage or rescind the contract by court action. As the Shipping Administration failed to avail itself of
any of these remedies, Froilan's right of ownership remained unaffected. And the subsequent
resolutions of the Cabinet, restoring him to his rights under the said contract, reaffirmed the same.

As it is by the concerted acts of defendants and intervenor Republic of the Philippines that appellant was
deprived of the possession of the vessel over which appellant had a lien for his expenses, appellees
Froilan, Compañia Maritima, and the Republic of the Philippines3are declared liable for the
reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by law, with legal interest from the
time of disbursement

LIM VS BROWNELL

The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the
Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the
state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government
and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government.

Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect, waived its right of
non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with
the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason
asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed. On the other hand,
plaintiff in his original complaint made no claim against the Republic and only asked for damages
against it for the use of the property when the complaint was amended. In its answer to the amended
complaint, the Republic "reproduced and incorporated by reference" all the affirmative defenses
contained in the answer of the defendant Attorney General, one of which, as already stated, is that
the lower court had no jurisdiction over the claim for rentals because of lack of consent to be sued.
Clearly, this is not a case where the state takes the initiative in an action against a private party by
filing a complaint in intervention, thereby surrendering its privileged position and coming down to the
level of the defendant — as what happened in the case of Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al.
95 Phil., 905 cited by plaintiff — but one where the state, as one of the defendants merely resisted a
claim against it precisely on the ground, among others, of its privileged position which exempts it
from suit..

MALONG VS PNR (Philippine National Railways)

The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized." The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation. Like any private common
carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise.

: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR
which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become
immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code
on common carriers

FONTANILLA VS MALIAMAN

*regular driver of NIA bumped and killed son of appellee

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government.
It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is
irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law
and is liable for actions of their employee

SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC

*Petitioner donated a land to Bureau of Plant Industry w/Condition

IMPLIED CONSENT IS GIVEN WHEN IT ACCEPTS A CONDITIONAL DONATION

No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided
in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the
government through the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying
with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to
not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so
advances.

AMIGABLE VS CUENCA

Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of
title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government,
the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to
recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In
addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen.

Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, “Where the government takes
away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

VIGILAR VS AQUINO

No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The court said that it would be the apex of injustice
and highly inequitable if the respondent is not duly compensated for actual work performed and
services rendered, where both the government and the public have received benefits from the project
and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor.

TORIO VS FONTANILLA

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate

function of the municipality?
. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority
to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one.
Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not
to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive
test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for
public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town
fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the
right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their
acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies.
Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,
employees, or agents.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela"
stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent
superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting
within his assigned tasks.

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for
the death of Fontanilla?

The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The
legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that
a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing
it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa
aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or
gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that municipal councilors directly
participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO

YES. The Court held that the Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. In
Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic envoy (a
representative government who is sent on a special diplomatic mission) shall be granted immunity from
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property.

The DFA certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity
rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

While the said lot was acquired and bought in the ordinary cause of real estate business, its acquisition
and disposal were not made for profit but claimed that it acquired the said property for its mission or
the Apostolic Nunciature of the Philippines.

Besides, the act of selling the land concerned is non-proprietary in nature, or is not covered by a
patent or trademark. The transfer and disposal of property are likewise clothed with a governmental
character as the petitioner did not buy and sell the land for gain but merely because they cannot evict
the said squatters in the property.

US VS RUIZ

*Ruiz did not win the bidding

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

USA VS GUINTO