See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/313868867

E. M. Forster’s ‘The Machine Stops’: humans, technology and dialogue

Article  in  AI & Society · February 2017

DOI: 10.1007/s00146-017-0698-3

CITATIONS READS
2 2,161

2 authors:

Ana Zimmermann W. John Morgan

University of São Paulo University of Nottingham; Cardiff University
16 PUBLICATIONS   27 CITATIONS    118 PUBLICATIONS   516 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Rural sustainability in the new era of China's urbanisation and agrciultural modernisation View project

Leverhulme Emeritus Fellowship: UNESCO and the Cultural Cold War View project

All content following this page was uploaded by W. John Morgan on 05 November 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Author's Personal Copy
AI & Soc
DOI 10.1007/s00146-017-0698-3

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

E. M. Forster’s ‘The Machine Stops’: humans, technology

and dialogue
Ana Cristina Zimmermann1 · W. John Morgan2,3,4 

Received: 14 June 2015 / Accepted: 11 January 2017

© Springer-Verlag London 2017

Abstract The article explores E.M. Forster’s story The
Machine Stops (1909) as an example of dystopian litera-
ture and its possible associations with the use of technol-
ogy and with today’s cyber culture. Dystopian societies are
often characterized by dehumanization and Forster’s novel
raises questions about how we live in time and space; and
how we establish relationships with the Other and with
the world through technology. We suggest that the fear
of technology depicted in dystopian literature indicates
a fear that machines are mimicking the roles that humans
already play in relational encounters. Our relationship with
machines frequently suggests a classical “I-it” situation.
However, a genuine dialogue is where there is no master
and where communication and understanding are achieved
through the encounter and through openness to difference
and to change. The article examines the ways machines and
automata are imagined and become part of lived human
existence, in the light of Martin Buber’s philosophy of
W. John Morgan—Honorary Professor at School of Social
Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK
Ana Cristina Zimmermann
ana.zimmermann@usp.br
W. John Morgan
MorganJ74@cardiff.ac.uk
1 tronic buttons. Bodily functions are reduced to the essen-
School of Physical Education and Sport, University
of Sao Paulo/Brazil, Av. Prof. Mello Moraes, 65 - Cidade
Universitaria, São Paulo 05508-030, Brazil
2
School of Education, University of Nottingham, Nottingham,
UK
3
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales,
UK
4
Wales Institute of Social & Economic Research & Data, 46
Park Place, Cardiff, Wales CF10 3BB, UK
dialogue and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of percep-
tion and otherness. The problem seems to be how everyday
technological interfaces can change the way we first per-
ceive the world and the possibility that with certain types
of mediation there is a loss of connection with the Other.
It is argued that understanding dialogical conditions could
help turn the relationship with technology into something
more humane. Literature such as Forster’s is considered as
an example of such a dialogical condition, suggesting ways
of dealing with human dilemmas by exploring the field of
possibilities.
Keywords Dystopian literature · Technology · Dialogue ·
Phenomenology
1 The Machine Stops
1.1 Introduction
“Imagine if you can:” is our invitation from E.M Forster
to picture a future where humans are connected with each
other through technology; but without physical encoun-
ters; and far from struggling with the natural environment.
In this fictional world people live in individual rooms in
which all needs are satisfied through the clicking of elec-
tial lower requirements necessary to sustain life. In brief,
human life is managed by “the machine” which makes eve-
rything easy, comfortable, and risk-free. This is the start-
ing point of a nightmarish literary journey which questions
choices and emerging ideas about human development. The
world imagined by this novel may be a powerful spring-
board for exploring important dilemmas that we face today.

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
 Author's Personal Copy
The Machine Stops (Forster 1947), first published in
1909, is remarkable for the author’s prescience about the
possibilities and dangers facing humanity in the future. The
story seems very close to us in its themes and it is not diffi-
cult to understand Forster’s warning about a world domi-
nated by hyper-mediated, meretricious contacts. A sentence
such as: ‘She knew several thousand people, in certain
directions human intercourse had advanced enormously’ is
an example. It is suggestive of today’s Facebook and Twit-
ter trends with their superficial attraction as contemporary
forms of human contact. The anonymity and disembodied
nature of such exchanges also mean that they are open to
verbal abuse. There are also phrases such as: “….be
quick… I am wasting my time” and claims about being
“always busy” that are current nowadays and allow our
ready identification with the narrative. The story follows
the attempts to communicate between a son and mother,
which describes their condition in a human civilization that
lives isolated, under the ground1, and without physical con-
tact. The alternative that Forster implies is one that recog-
nizes humanity’s need for actual bodily experiences: “I
want to see you not through the machine…” This is the
appeal from Kuno to his mother Vashti at the beginning of
the story. It has been observed that literature, and indeed art
in general, shows that when humanity encounters the pos-
sibilities and implications of its own science, it usually
faces the imponderables of passions and instincts associ-
ated commonly with embodiment (Novaes 2003). Here we
explore Forster’s story as a pioneering example of dysto-
pian or, as some prefer, anti-utopian literature which illus-
trates this.
It has been argued that the story represents: “….the
first full-scale emergence of the twentieth-century anti-
utopia {which} begins the series of ‘admonitory satires’
that includes Zamyatin’s We, Huxley’s Brave New World,
and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.” (Hillegas 1967: 82).
Forster, later to be recognized as one of the greatest mod-
ern English writers, was then a young Edwardian intel-
lectual concerned with human moral behaviour, tempered
by secularist beliefs (Trilling 1964). According to Seegert
(2010: 34) “….the story is also distinctively modernist in
its quirky attunement to the alienation of a technologically
mediated subject so completely divorced from nature that
it doesn’t even realize that it is alienated anymore.” This
enables us to consider how, through science and technol-
ogy, we engage with the natural and animal world and
with our fellow humans, how we understand and use our
personal embodiment, the significance of Otherness and
the possibilities of dialogue. The article focuses on how
1
Reminiscent of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, first pub-
lished in 1864 (2004).
13
AI & Soc
machines and automata are imagined and become part of
lived human existence, using the perspectives of Buber’s
philosophy of dialogue and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy. We suggest that the fear of technology shown in dys-
topian literature indicates also a fear about the roles that
humans already play in relational encounters. Literature, in
this case, explores different ways of dealing with this fear
and the questions it raises. In Foster’s story Kuno reminds
his mother that the Machine was not made by a god: “Men
made it. Great men, but men.” It stresses our historical
condition and the power we have to change our reality. We
argue that the understanding of dialogical conditions could
help turn the relationship with technology into something
more humane.
1.2 Dystopian literature, technology and cyber culture
Fiction is another reality which makes it possible to explore
different universes through the genre of science fiction
(Parrinder 2000). It moves between the reality of daily life
and the realm of “what might be.” One of its functions is
to explore human dilemmas and a free literature, as a form
of art, is not committed to science with its aspiration to
exact knowledge or truth. Instead, through imagination, it
explores human reality, its possibilities and consequences.
“Fiction then, from Rabelais and Cervantes to Grass
and Goytisolo and Gordimer, is another way of questioning
truth as we strive for it through the paradox of a lie. That lie
can be called the imagination. It can also be seen as a par-
allel reality. It can be observed as a critical mirror of what
passes for the truth in the world of convention” (Fuentes
2005: 5).
When we consider Forster’s story, our main question is
not how literature anticipates reality, but what we feel about
this possible world. The concept of utopia, such as in Pla-
to’s Republic (1994), written around 380 BC, More’s Uto-
pia (1967) first published in Latin in 1516, and Andreae’s
Christianopoli (2007), first published in Latin in 1618, has
persisted in the human imagination through the dystopian
or anti-utopian literature we have noted. However: “Such
literature remained, nonetheless, indicative of humanity’s
profound concern with its ethical condition, and with the
fundamental struggle between evil and good in the socie-
ties it tries to build and to sustain” (Morgan and Guilherme
2014: 30). Utopian and dystopian literatures both raise
questions about humanity’s place in a world which does
so much to construct itself. The modern cinema also pro-
vides some outstanding examples of the utopian and dys-
topian debate, such as Lang’s Metropolis (1926), Chaplin’s
Modern Times (1936) Wilcox’s Forbidden Planet (1956),
itself based on Shakespeare’s seventeenth century night-
marish fantasy The Tempest (2000), Kubrick’s 2001: A
Space Odyssey (1968), Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), and
 Author's Personal Copy
AI & Soc
Stanton’s Wall-E (2008). The fascination with and fear
about technology are seen also in the “Humans” Sci-fi tel-
evision series (Reuters 2015). As does literature, such films
and drama before it explore changes in society brought
about by technology; and the possibilities of remaining
human when challenged by the necessity of extreme inter-
action with intelligent machines (Tucherman 2006). Such
communication mediated by machines, fear of human con-
tact, of emotional engagement, bodily weakness, frontiers
of time and space blurred by virtual interaction are ele-
ments present in Forster’s novel that also figure in our cur-
rent scientific debates.
In the introduction to the 1947 edition of his collected
stories Forster wrote that The Machine Stops was: ‘….a
counterblast to one of the heavens of H. G. Wells.” (Forster
1947: vii; cited in; Hillegas 1967: 86). As Hillegas argues:
“Certainly it is in spirit and detail an inversion of the future
seen by Wells in A Modern Utopia. The controlling prin-
ciple for this inversion is Forster’s humanism.” (Hillegas
1967: 87). Forster explores the possibilities and conse-
quences of living in a world in which humanity’s depend-
ence on technology threatens the essence of what it means
to be human.
As we have noted, Forster proves remarkably prescient
about what has been made reality during the 20th and early
twenty-first centuries, especially through digital technol-
ogy. Individuals may now experience virtual reality using
devices which allow the exploration of imaginary worlds
in a very immersive and convincing way. However, is this
merely a recreational attempt to escape from everyday life
or is it already a new human reality? This question has
stimulated debate about whether virtual-reality is empow-
ering and communicative or dangerously addictive and
isolating (McGonigal 2015). The designers and the manu-
facturers of digital games, not unsurprisingly, have a very
positive view of their products and their contribution to
creating a desirable future (McGonigal 2011). Such games
are more than escapist entertainment, and are also exam-
ples of a popular science which contributes solutions to the
practical problems of every-day life. For example, in health
care, general well-being, and in terms of individual inde-
pendence, computers and associated machines are empow-
ering, notably for those with disabilities.
As for the human body, according to Stern (2006), Mary
Shelley’s novel Frankenstein (1818) reflects a dilemma
between dystopian anxieties and utopian ideals brought by
new medicine: “Utopian optimism about the capacity of
medicine to liberate and strengthen human beings is thus
closely wedded to dystopian fear about medicine’s potential
to reduce, objectify and ultimately commodity humankind”.
(Stern 2006:63) He reflects on how close utopia and dysto-
pia are which has parallels with how we face technology
in human life. The contemporary excitement about virtual
reality for instance, reawakens the philosophical problem of
the mind-body relationship, first posed in the modern era
by Descartes, and which remains one of the most intrac-
table problems in philosophy. That said, the human body
is considered by some to be an obstacle, obsolete, and
even surpassed by new technologies. For the cybernaut the
physical body is considered a prison when compared with
virtual bodies which are immune to illness, to physical
disabilities and, most importantly, to death (Breton 2003).
However, more recent empirical research especially in
cognitive science brings an impetus to the rejection of the
mind-body dualism (Wilson and Foglia 2015). In this con-
text, the notion of “embodied mind” (Varela et al. 1991) is
inspired by the phenomenological tradition of the French
philosopher Merleau-Ponty that considers the body as
both a lived, experiential structure and as the milieu of cog-
nitive mechanisms. Such a view also supports studies of the
development of smart and interactive technology.
1.3 The development of artificial intelligence
Early attempts to develop artificial intelligence focussed
on human capacity for thinking. In 1950 the English math-
ematician Alan Turing suggested replacing the question
“can machines think?” by a game in which three partici-
pants talked by text. In this test, also known as “the imi-
tation game”, if a machine could play as satisfactorily as
a human person, it would demonstrate a sufficient condi-
tion for thinking (Turing 1950). Turing, believed that this
problem: “….has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp
line between the physical and intellectual capacities of a
man.” (1950: 434). As Guo (2015: 3) points out, Turing’s:
“….specific understanding of human identity also indicates
a scientific reconceptualization”, with the human mind
abstracted into a series of symbolic operations, studied and
modelled as mechanical instead of emotionally embodied
superior beings. In his pioneering efforts towards intelli-
gent machinery Turing investigated continually the sense
of self. Subsequent research and developments in comput-
ers science have continued to provoke self-reflection: rais-
ing questions such as what it means to be alive, to think,
to have emotions. As Guo comments: “….it is the sense of
who and what we are that is constantly reconceptualized
reflectively and creatively” (Guo 2015:7).
As we have noted, technologies of immersion in virtual
reality are developing constantly and in different directions,
bringing more complexity in terms of human engagement.
It is possible to comprehend machines and robots being
developed as ever more humanized versions, inspired by a
philosophical tradition that sees mind and body as insepa-
rable (Turkle 2011). There are robots that are supposed to
understand human emotions, and which are capable of car-
ing for the elderly and for children (Vincent 2014; Byford
13
 Author's Personal Copy
2015); cuddling robots used as pets (Hudson 2013); and
robots which play games, music; and are more than sim-
ply useful things, but considered almost partners. Although
questionable, it has long been common for people to con-
sider even their radio, television or music player as per-
sonal company. The robot or the machine is now often seen
to represent in human reality what Karel Ĉapek (2014)
imagined in his famous play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal
Robots), first published in 1920, a contemporary satire on
the then apparently wholesale and confident acceptance of
scientific materialism.
In practice, contemporary every-day life is full of rela-
tionships mediated by the interface between humans and
machines. At the same time the threats or benefits of tech-
nology represent an expansion of what we now think about
humanity. Machines and super computers continue to rep-
resent the wish to extend human capacities and, conse-
quently, reduce struggle and suffering. It is the search for
Utopia again. For example, exoskeletons and smart-devices
such as the new Apple Watch represent a desire to amplify
capacities through different levels of interface between
humans and machines. However, as we see a trend towards
developing an “humanity” through technology which sim-
ulates emotions and creativity, it is possible to visualize a
parallel automation and alienation of humans. We incorpo-
rate already the rhythms and standardization of machines
in our daily lives as a consequence of an industrialized
and bureaucratized world, as Charlie Chaplin’s film satire
“Modern Times” illustrated.
Moreover, it is possible that high-tech mediated rela-
tionships interfere in the development of perception of and
human sensibility to the Other. As Sherry Turkle, who has
spent over three decades studying the way people inter-
act with machines, comments: “….we expect more from
technology and less from each other.” (Turkle 2011: 295).
Despite the huge evolution of games and digital tools
exploring new ways of communication or networks, the
simplification of relationships through or with computers
and robots is shaping us as well and may lower expecta-
tions of relationships with our fellow humans.As Turkle
says: “We are tempted, summoned by robots and bots,
objects that address us as if they were people. And just as
we imagine things as people, we invent ways of being with
people that turn them into something close to things.” (Tur-
kle 2011: 224). In a similar way, Vallor (2014) pays atten-
tion to the risk of moral deskilling as part of the ambiguous
impact of new technologies in information and communi-
cations. She highlights three areas where moral skill and
practical wisdom could be compromised: the impact on
soldiers of the use of military drones and other autono-
mous weapons systems; the realm of moral attention of
the new media practices of multitasking; and the impact
on practices of human caregiving by  the  potential offer
13
AI & Soc
of social robotics. Such issues reveal the social impact of
technology on human relationships and are of great ethical
significance.
However, as some critics point out, eliminating all
machinery from our lives and returning to the “naked
man”, as suggested by The Machine Stops, is a naïve and
problematic solution. We are now immersed in technol-
ogy and we must not forget how naturalized everyday
human and technological interfaces have already become
(Seegert 2010). Literature explores how machines became
part of our lives and suggests a need to recover our human-
ity through reconsidering our embodiment and our physi-
cal and emotional encounters. Research on computers and
robotics also focusses increasingly on understanding the
consequences of interaction between humans and machines
and among humans through new devices. Brassac (2006)
highlights the contribution of a dialogical view of com-
munication to addressing the relationship between artifi-
cial intelligence and society and the way computer-based
devices are designed. Such elements suggest the impor-
tance of a better understanding of the notion of corporeal-
ity. Furthermore, it is valuable to explore how individuals
make and sustain authentic relationships with the natural
world, including other sentient beings, as well as with their
fellow humans, which brings us to the notion of dialogue.
1.4 The lived-body and perception
The Machine Stops focuses on the consequences of exces-
sive dependence on machinery and the human body is
represented first as a “swaddled lump of flesh”. For Kuno,
a main character in the story, the exploration of a differ-
ent world begins with him being made aware of his body.
Forster reminds us that our body is the first way through
which we establish a relationship with the world: “Man is
the measure. .... Man’s feet are the measure for distance,
his hands are the measure for ownership, his body is the
measure for all that is lovable and desirable and strong”
(Forster 1947). There are many philosophical approaches
to this but none are free of difficulties. Contemporary dis-
courses reinforce old debates and represent the dilemma
of Cartesian dualism (Murray and Sixsmith 1999) that we
have noted. In Passions of the Soul, published originally
in 1649, René Descartes (1989) compares the human body
with an automaton, a machine that moves by itself like a
watch, a metaphor which is still very apt. Indeed, the idea
of the human body as a machine or as an object is found
more generally in Western science (Hogen 2009). Using
a different approach, the French anthropologist Marcel
Mauss (1992) points out that the body is our first and most
natural technical object. But it is not a simple object; and
he argues that cultural factors also shape our bodies and our
behaviour, crucial when we consider the interface between
 Author's Personal Copy
AI & Soc
humans and machines. The French philosopher Gabriel
Marcel (2007) also points out the possibility of an instru-
mental use of our body, but in one dimension only. Human
corporeality carries the mystery of being and having. He
suggests that incarnation is a key element in thinking about
being. “Of this body, I can neither say that it is I, nor that it
is not I, nor that it is for me (object).” (2007:11–12). Mar-
cel (2007) emphasizes our engagement with the world and
criticises a detachment or alienation, supposed by science.
From another perspective, the English anthropologist Mary
Douglas (1988) highlights the human need for distinct
boundaries. She analysed the ideas of pollution and taboo
in different cultures and found that ambiguity and change
are uncomfortable as they may be linked with insecurity
and weaken of our perceptions of life. It is interesting that,
for Douglas, the human body is a special element which
represents both order and disorder, with its boundaries
especially dangerous. However, if we use a phenomeno-
logical approach, uncertainty makes it possible to recognise
our ambiguity as a human being and opens up the possibil-
ity to learn from this experience.
Nowadays, the human body has a strong presence in the
social imaginary and in the mass media. On the one hand it
highlights our corporeality, but paradoxically it also indi-
cates objectification, which opens the way to social prac-
tices such as slavery, pornography, and prostitution. The
improvement of control and attention in relation to the
human body demonstrates even more uncertainty. Richard-
son (2010) claims that robotic creation is a mimetic pro-
cess. According to her, humanoid robots are extensions of
human psychosocial bodies and, despite the fact that some
robots have massive capacities of memory or strength, they
fail in what are very simple tasks for humans (see “DARPA
Robotics Challenge 2015” commented on by Dalton 2015).
We still do not understand fully the complexity of the liv-
ing body in the world, which explains the failure of some
machines to imitate human behaviour convincingly; and
also the failure to explain human corporeality in terms of
mechanical metaphors. Our lived-body is much more than
machinery, not only because of specific performance, but
also because a human being is complex, changing con-
stantly through interaction with the world and with the
Other. There remain also questions about the Human
Machine, from the implant of plates and screws to sophisti-
cated artificial organs, bombs, and prosthetics. But, the fun-
damental problem in thinking about the body as a machine,
as proposed by Descartes, is the way we understand corpo-
real schema. As we have noted, the human body is not sim-
ply the sum of its parts and our interaction with the world
is much more complex than cause-effect laws. Yet, technol-
ogy responds to the demand for improved performance and
highlights the instrumental view of the body. For instance,
more and more para-athletes have hybrid bodies made up
for high performance. The design of prosthetics, in this
case, does not intend to reproduce shape and manner of
human body, but to amplify performance (Kim 2004).
However, our lived-body, as a being engaged with the
world, brings to life the objects around it. We extend our
corporeality to the objects that take part in our human pro-
jects; in the same way athletes incorporate sportive equip-
ment (Merleau-Ponty 1962). As it is alive, the body is much
more conscious of itself than the individual may think. We
do not need to command it or interpret signs objectively for
it to deal with the world in everyday life. It organizes itself
in space and time. On the other hand, we can also think
about the body in the way we think about things. How-
ever, if our body is merely an object, then who speaks for
it? We cannot say that our body is one of our qualities like
an accessory; instead our corporeality is the starting point
for all our qualities, “it is that by which there are objects”
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 105). Consequently, the ambiguity in
which we live in relation to our body allows us to live in a
perceptive world that is also ambiguous. It is not enough to
say “I am my body” to make clear our place in the world. I
do not say me and my body, I cannot think about myself as
distinct from my body, even though I say: this is my body.
This confusing relationship with our corporeality is also
the point from which Gabriel Marcel thinks about our rela-
tionship with the world when he says: “The primary object
with which I identify myself, but which still eludes me, is
my own body.” (Marcel 2007: 163). Our body is neither
object nor subject, but is a mode of presentation. Hence,
we cannot reduce our body to its instrumental possibilities.
It indicates what I am and the way I am, our personal exist-
ence (Schrag 1988). Our condition is not that of an objec-
tive body, but a living body which inhabits space and time
and so reconfigures them (Merleau-Ponty 1962).
A phenomenology of corporeality makes it possible to
understand that the body does not disappear into cyber-
space or is replaced by the use of apparatus: corporeal-
ity is instead redefined (Ortega 2007). The lived-body is
the point of reference of a being-in-the-world (Merleau-
Ponty 1962). We are able to extend bodily boundaries to
include devices and technology, while this indicates how
difficult it is to determine objective boundaries for the
body. The human body does not represent a thing but an
attitude; it is the presentation of a subject (Merleau-Ponty
1962). Merleau-Ponty proposes also that perception, our
connection with the world, does not come from the world
or from our intimate elaboration of it. Perception comes
from our experience of participation in the world. Hence,
the way we perceive the world is not an innate ability but
is acquired. It is not a passive reaction to the world. Our
‘gaze’, for instance, extends bodily boundaries, inter-
rogates and touches the world with all our senses. “The
gaze gets more or less from things according to the way
13
 Author's Personal Copy
in which it questions them, ranges over or dwells on
them”. Perception is acquiring a certain style of perceiv-
ing, a new use of one’s own body; our experiences enrich
and reorganize the way we perceive the world (Merleau-
Ponty 1962: 177). Such an understanding of perception
helps us comprehend the complexity of our dialogical
condition.
Therefore, we learn ways of inhabiting space and time
through living the world, which is not exterior to our body,
but integrated with our existence. Merleau-Ponty (1962)
distinguishes between spatiality of position and spatiality
of situation, which helps us think about virtual relation-
ships. Spatiality does not refer to a position in a geometri-
cal space, so the world is not a space for displacement, but
a space that extends through our actions and the meaning
elaborated by us and others (Bicudo 2009). Merleau-Ponty
argues that we have the power to reckon with any possible
environment or, as Romdenh-Romluc says, we are able to
“imbue a possible or imagined environment” with bodily
significance, because we are able to access our motor-skills
in relation to that represented environment (2007: 56). It
is possible to conceive different horizons as a background
against which to orientate our actions. We extend our cor-
poreality according to the projects in which we are engaged,
but it is our presence in the world and the relationships
made there that provide the elements for such extension. It
is important to consider this complexity as it leads to the
notion that we learn how to see the world through seeing
it. It is necessary to exercise our vision, which means also
that the type of mediation can enrich or impoverish such
learning; and consequently the way we explore the world
and develop our capacities. So, we should think about the
kind of devices and mediated experiences we have and the
understanding of humanity they carry. It is possible, even
probable, that the machines we create “do not capture all
nuances”, as Forster’s story explains, especially if we still
do not know all the nuances to which we are ourselves
subject.
If our connection with the world is mediated strongly we
may lose part of its complexity. As the modes of contact
change, so changes the experience itself and “because all
contact must be mediated somehow, it does not follow that
no value distinctions can be made between different modes
of mediation” (Seegert 2010: 45). Mediated ways of meet-
ing allow different levels of complexity, and some may not
be as complex and challenging as face-to-face meetings in
uncontrolled environments. Despite mediation, being-in-
the world is related to our openness to other beings. The
Other brings surprise, difference and even discomfort
since we need to deal with questions for which there are no
ready-made answers. But this is what gives us the oppor-
tunity to go beyond what we already are. It is not avoid-
ing dilemmas, but how we deal with them that shows our
13
AI & Soc
human potential through dialogue; and exploring our dia-
logical condition helps us understand its power.
1.5 Dialogue and its possibilities
In E. M. Forster’s story, “People never touched one
another.” We can consider this a metaphor for dialogue.
Although there is some appeal to humanize machines, our
relationship with them frequently suggests a classical “I-It”
situation. The relation I-It is a subject-object relationship
and can be between man and objects, but also between
human beings when one takes the place of the object. It is
an objective relationship in which one uses the Other instru-
mentally. I-It is an experience of knowledge, utility and
causality (Buber 1972: 2002). However, a genuine dialogue
is achieved through an “I-Thou” relationship in which there
is no superior and where there is openness to difference and
to change. This includes the possibility and willingness to
touch one another. Buber (2002) describes the attitude of
perceiving the Other as “becoming aware”. It means to give
the status of knowledge to someone or something that does
not come from an objective way of understanding. It is not
communication in the traditional sense of sender—mes-
sage—receptor. What is most important is what arises from
the relationship. It is not an inner process or a simple reac-
tion to an external stimulus, it is an encounter. The rela-
tion I-Thou is a relation of openness, directness, mutuality
and presence. It can happen at any moment between fellow
humans, but also with animals, plants, objects, art-works,
and so on. It is impossible to anticipate or predict what will
happen; it is a process only possible in relationship. Guil-
herme and Morgan (2009: 567) emphasize that: “Buber
rejects any sort of sharp dualism between the I–Thou and
I–It relation; that is, for Buber, there is always an inter-play
between the I–Thou and the I–It, rather than an either/or
relation between these foundational concepts”. A primary
word I-It is in accordance with Mankind’s will to be power-
ful and to master objects and knowledge. This attitude will
be disruptive if such mastery robs humans of the reality of
their own I: “… without It man cannot live. But he who
lives with It alone is not a man.” (Buber 1972: 34).
A problem with technology seems to be how everyday
interfaces can change the way we first perceive the world;
and the possibility that with certain types of mediation
there is a loss of connection with the Other (Seegert 2010).
For instance, Breton (2003) points out that the cyberspace
is an imaginary, but nonetheless real world, where the fron-
tiers are blurred and the Other exists through the interface
of communication, but without a physical body. The rela-
tionship with the world is obliterated by the relationship
with data. It is a relatively simplified world in which it is
possible to experience countless different situations without
compromising oneself. Meetings through different devices
 Author's Personal Copy
AI & Soc
usually use simplified symbols, often with a preponderance
of visual or of sonority signs. These virtual worlds, most
of the time, may be lived without any great consequences.
Physical encounters, on the other hand, require the respect
of very complex social rules, an effort towards what is
appropriate for approaches, the understanding of emotions
and expressions, empathy as well as sympathy. In sum, it is
a very complex mode of communication that involves our
whole sensorial body. So, in a controlled or limited envi-
ronment this possibility of creation is eliminated from the
beginning. However, we cannot click on a “new life” solu-
tion each time the “game is over” in our actual life.
Virtual and physical meetings are both real and bring
consequences, but they are very different from each other.
A virtual meeting may protect one from the unexpected,
but the unexpected is also what brings us the possibility of
learning and of enhancing ourselves. Some studies already
show the increasing difficulty of making strong connections
among humans, considering the fragility of relationships
through virtual networks in the consumer age (Bauman
2003). For example, in her research on the use of technol-
ogy (2011) Turkle, found many examples of children ask-
ing for more attention from their relatives, or adults, and
complaining of loneliness despite their numerous virtual
friendships. However, some users of virtual connections
describe it as easier and safer than having actual meetings,
as they do not need to deal with “real faces” and can leave
the conversation at any moment, without meaningful con-
sequence. This may also be seen in people’s readiness to
engage in abusive behaviour through virtual communica-
tion which they would be reluctant or cautious to do in a
physical encounter. In a virtual world people are perform-
ing a character or an avatar, while computers or mobile
devices are not a substitute for opening a dialogue with all
the nuances a face-to-face encounter encourages. In Tur-
kle’s research (2011) most youths preferred texting instead
of calling as it does not take too much time and there is no
necessary further commitment. In other words, they are in
control of a conversation which keeps a distance between
them and the Other. It reminds us again of the desperate
attempt for dialogue between Kuno and his mother: “‘I
have called you before, mother, but you were always busy
or isolated. I have something particular to say.’ ‘What is it,
dearest boy? Be quick. How could you not send it by pneu-
matic post?’” (Forster 1947).
Technology has increased our possibility of making ini-
tial contact with each other through new facilities and possi-
bilities. However it should not replace actual meetings, that
cannot be controlled or edited. Moreover, it is when we are
surprised and hesitate that we need to be creative, which is
the richness of dialogue. In such dialogue we face not only
the potential of surprise from the Other, but we need the
Other to learn how to deal with our own ambiguity. Being
among people is challenging and this kind of encounter
brings novelty to us. Again Vallor suggests: “….that what-
ever defects new social media may suffer, they are likely
more often mirrors of existing cultural sources of moral
apathy, and abdication of critical inquiry, than they are
causes”. However this mirroring “may amplify the damage
to our capacities as independent practical reasoners”. (Val-
lor 2012: 197). Deeper and constant reflection on the chal-
lenging and nurtured character of human relationships is
necessary. An emotional connection is a challenge; it needs
work, engagement, care about the Other, and nourishment.
Developing friendship or a marriage for instance involves
living the encounter with all the complexity and expressiv-
ity that it requires. It is necessarily a dialogical relationship
and the struggle that comes with dialogue is also its power.
This is why: “Pay me a visit, so that we can meet face to
face and talk about the hopes that are in my mind” is an
appeal for human commitment and dialogue from Kuno to
his mother.
1.6 Conclusion
The cultural world we create is the condition of both our
constraint and of our freedom. It is possible to argue that,
as we extend our corporeality to objects around us, a world
hyper-mediated by technology will also change the way
we perceive the world. On the other hand, our relation-
ships depend also on openness to encounter, mutuality and
exchange. Furthermore, each decision brings unexpected
consequences to which humans respond with fresh solu-
tions that modify the problems. So: “….there is no situation
without hope, no choice which terminates these deviations,
or which can exhaust man’s inventive power and put an end
to his history” (Merleau-Ponty 1973: 23). In a similar way,
when considering Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogical
education and its potential for conflict resolution, Morgan
and Guilherme (2014: 37) raise the prospect of hope:
“Humanity may not be able to find earthly perfection,
but it can find improvement that will make its lot more
civilised and therefore more bearable. This is achievable
through a humanistic education that provides the capacity
of living in co-operation and harmony with one another,
as well as the knowledge and skills necessary to material
improvement and its sustainability. These are the links
that connect aspiration and hope, through education, to the
prospect of a better, utopian future; even if, like  the hori-
zon, it can never be reached finally.”
Forster’s story remains relevant to us as it consid-
ers human distress and fears for the future. It is a fiction,
but the author’s intention is to share with us an emotional
truth which anguished him and by extension humanity.
The understanding of human challenges, choices, limits,
consequences, possible new starting points, is one of the
13
 Author's Personal Copy
functions of literature and of art in general. Humanity’s
fear of machinery may represent the anguish of dealing
with the extension of human questions. Forster’s story is
a classic example of how to confront such human dilem-
mas. In a similar way, facing this new reality of advanced
technology is another way to learn about ourselves as we
create machinery, computers, and robots according to our
expectations. We extend our range of possibilities through
technology, but we do not know necessarily know how to
deal with the consequences that accompany this. We sug-
gest that understanding the possibilities and consequences
of authentic dialogue helps us make the relationship of peo-
ple through technology more humane. The challenge made
by Forster at the beginning of his story: “Imagine if you
can” - is a key to understanding the capacity we have as
humans to find solutions to unanticipated problems.
References
Andreae JV (2007) Christianopolis: an ideal of the 17th century.
Cosimo, New York (trans. by F. Emil Held, 1916)
Bauman Z (2003) Liquid love: on the frailty of human bonds. Polity,
Cambridge
Bicudo MAV (2009) O estar-com o outro no ciberespaço. ETD—
Educação Temática Digital 10(2):140–156
Brassac C (2006) Computers and knowledge: a dialogical approach.
AI Soc 20:249–270
Breton D (2003) Adeus ao corpo. In: Novaes A (ed) O homem-
máquina: a ciência manipula o corpo. Companhia das Letras,
São Paulo, pp 123–138
Buber M (1972) I and Thou. Charles Scribner & Sons, New York
(trans. by W. Kauffman)
Buber M (2002) Between Man and Man. Routledge, London
Byford S (2015) This cuddly Japanese robot bear could be the
future of elderly care. The Verge, April 28. http://www.thev-
erge.com/2015/4/28/8507049/robear-robot-bear-japan-elderly.
Accessed 5 June 2015
Ĉapek K (2014) R.U.R. - Rossum’s Universal Robots. The University
of Adelaide Press, South Australia (Play trans. by D. Wyllie)
Chaplin C (1936) Modern Times. Film, United Artists, USA, 87 min
Dalton N (2015) In the event of robot apocalypse, just wait for a
system crash. In: The conversation Jun 16 2015. http://thecon-
versation.com/in-the-event-of-robot-apocalypse-just-wait-for-
a-system-crash-43357?utm_medium=email&utm_campaig
n=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+June+17+2015+-
+2978&utm_content=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+J
une+17+2015+-+2978+CID_adb7fab9b26383cd4ef6c5901a9
7bd9a&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=In%20
the%20event%20of%20robot%20apocalypse%20just%20
wait%20for%20a%20system%20crash. Accessed 17 Jun 2015
Descartes R (1989) The passions of the soul. Hackett Publishing
Company, Indianapolis
Dostoevsky F (2004) Notes from underground. Everyman’s Library,
London (trans. by R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky, 1864)
Douglas M (1988) Purity and danger: an analysis of the concepts of
pollution and taboo. Ark Paperbacks, London
Forster EM (1909) The machine stops. Oxford and Cambridge
Review
Forster EM (1947) The Collected Tales of E. M. Forster. Alfred A.
Knopf, New York
13
AI & Soc
Fuentes, C. (2005) In praise of the novel. In: Fifth International
Literature Festival Berlin, Sept 6. http://www.literaturfestival.
com/intern/reden/fuentes-engl/view. Accessed 6 Jun 2015
Guilherme A, Morgan WJ (2009) Martin Buber’s philosophy of
education and its implications for adult non-formal education.
Int J Lifelong Educ 28(5):565–581
Guo T (2015) Alan Turing: artificial intelligence as human self-
knowledge. Anthropol Today 31(6):3–7
Hillegas MR (1967) The future as nightmare: H. G. Wells and the
Anti-utopians. Oxford University Press, New York
Hogen A (2009) Cartesian bodies and movement phenomenology.
Sport, Ethics and Philos 3(1): 66–74
Hudson A (2013) ‘A robot is my friend’: can machines care for the
elderly? In: BBC technology. http://www.bbc.com/news/tech-
nology-24949081. Accessed 5 Jun 2015
Kim JH (2004) Cibernética, ciborgues e ciberespaço: notas sobre
as origens da cibernética e sua reinvenção cultural. Horizontes
Antropológicos 10(21): 199–219
Kubrick S (1968) 2001: a space odyssey. Film, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, UK/USA, 160 min
Lang F (1926) Metropolis. Film, UFA paramount pictures, Ger-
many, 153 min
Marcel G (2007) Being and having. Read Books, Cambridge
Mauss M (1992) Techniques of the body. In:   Crary J, Kwinter S
(eds) Incorporations. Zone 6, New York, pp 455–477
McGonigal J (2011) Reality is broken: why games make us better
and how they can change the world. Jonathan Cape, London
McGonigal J (2015) Personal Journal. In The Wall Street Journal.
Tuesday, April 28:25
Merleau-Ponty M (1962) Phenomenology of perception. Routledge,
London
Merleau-Ponty M (1973) The crisis of understanding. In Adven-
tures of the dialectic. Northwestern University Press, Evan-
ston, pp 9–26 (trans. by J. Bien)
More T (1967) Utopia. In: Greene JJ, Dolan JP (eds) The essential
Thomas More. New American Library, New York (trans. by JP
Dolan)
Morgan WJ, Guilherme A (2014) Buber and education: dialogue as
conflict resolution. Routledge, Abingdon
Murray CD, Sixsmith J (1999) The corporeal body in virtual real-
ity. Ethos 27(3): 315–343. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1525/eth.1999.27.3.315/pdf. Accessed 24 Jan 2011
Novaes A (2003) O homem-máquina: a ciência manipula o corpo.
Companhia das Letras, São Paulo
Ortega F (2007) Corporeidade e biotecnologias: uma crítica fenom-
enológica da construção do corpo pelo construtivismo e pela
tecnobiomedicina. Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 12(2): 381–388
Parrinder P (ed.) (2000) Learning from other worlds: estrangement,
cognition and the politics of science fiction and utopia. Liver-
pool University Press, Liverpool
Reuters (2015) Sci-fi TV series ‘Humans’ breathes new life
into robot debate. Reaney, P Jun 26. http://www.reuters.
com/ar ticle/2015/06/26/us-television-humans-idUSK-
BN0P628720150626. Accessed 27 Jun 2015
Richardson, K. (2010) Disabling as mimesis and alterity: making
humanoid robots at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Etnofoor 22(1): 75–90
Romdenh-Romluc K (2007) Merleau-ponty and the power to reckon
with the possible. In: Baldwin T (ed) Reading merleau-ponty:
on phenomenology of perception. Routledge, Abingdon
Schrag CO (1988) The lived body as a phenomenological Datum.
In: Morgan WJ, Meier L (eds) Philosophic inquiry in sport,
reprinted from Metaphysical Journal (1952). Human Kinetics,
Champaign
Scott R (1982) Blade runner. Film, Warner Bros, USA, 116 min
 Author's Personal Copy
AI & Soc
Seegert A (2010) Technology and the fleshly interface in Forster’s
“The Machine Stops”: an ecocritical appraisal of a one hundred
year old future. Journal of Ecocriticism 2(1):33–54
Shakespeare W (2000). The Tempest. In: Vaughan VM, Vaughan AT
(eds), William Heinemann, London
Shelley MW (1818) Frankenstein: Or, The Modern Prometheus.
Lackington, Hughes, Harding, Mavor, and Jones, Wordsworth,
London
Stanton A (2008) Wall-E. Film, Walt Disney, USA, 98 min
Stern M (2006) Dystopian anxieties versus utopian ideals: medi-
cine from a Frankenstein to the visible human project and body
worlds. Sci cult 15(1):61–84
Trilling L (1964) E. M. Forster. New Directions, New York
Tucherman I (2006) Fabricando corpos: ficção e tecnologia. Comuni-
cação, mídia e consumo 3(7): 77–92
Turing AM (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind,
New Series 59(236): 433–460. http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/2251299. Accessed 18 Jan 2016
Turkle S (2011) Alone together: why we expect more from technol-
ogy and less from each other. Basic Books, New York
Vallor S (2012) Flourishing on facebook: virtue friendship & new
social media. Ethics Inf Technol 14:185–199
View publication stats
Vallor S (2014) Moral deskilling and upskilling in a new machine
age: reflections on the ambiguous future of character. Philosophy
and Technology, 1–18. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%
2Fs13347-014-0156-9. Accessed 18 Jan 2016
Varela F, Thompson E, Rosch E (1991) The embodied mind: cogni-
tive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge
Vincent J (2014) Japanese ‘robot with a heart’ will care for the elderly
and children. The independent, Thursday 05 June. http://www.
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/japanese-robot-
with-a-heart-will-care-for-the-elderly-and-children-9491819.
html. Accessed 6 Jun 2015
Waterfield R (1994) Plato: republic. Translated, with notes and an
introduction. Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford
Wilcox FM (1956) Forbidden planet. Film, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
USA, 98 min
Wilson RA, Foglia L (2015) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Winter 2015 Edition), in: Zalta EN (ed) Embodied cogni-
tion URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/
embodied-cognition/. Accessed 18 Jan 2016
13