the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
IN POLITICAL LAW
2018
By Professor Noel T. Tiampong
Q: What is political law?
A: Political law is that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operations of the governmental organs of the
State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of
its territory.1
Q: What is a constitution?
A: In the Philippine context, as in the United States, a constitution is a
written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited, and defined, and by which these powers
are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and
useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. 2
Q: What are the three essential substantive parts of a good written
constitution?
A: The three essential substantive parts of a good written constitution
are known as the constitution of liberty, the constitution of
government, and the constitution of sovereignty. 3
Q: What do you mean by the supremacy of the Constitution?
A: The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land must defer. No act shall be valid, however
nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The
Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the
mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong,
1 3
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.
2 4
Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States 64 (1893); I Schwartz, The Powers of
the Government 1 (1963).
by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation
of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power. 4
Q: Can you explain the prospects of the Constitution.
A: The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the
root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of the
edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of a dream that must
take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but
slowly “in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,” where it will in
time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally
achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the
goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It
must grow with the society it seeks to restructure and march apace
with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming
a petrified rule, a pulsing living law attuned to the heartbeat of the
nation.5
The 1987
Constitution of the Philippines
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that
shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law
and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.
Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 397.
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 11.
5
Isagani A.Cruz, A Quintessential Constitution, San Beda Law Journal, April 1972.
1
Q: What are the purposes for the preamble?
A: The preamble is not a source of power or right for any department
of government6 for its purpose is only to introduce, i.e., “to walk
before,” the Constitution. It also indicates the authors of the
Constitution, it enumerates their primary aims and aspirations, and
it is useful as an aid in the construction and interpretation of the
text of the Constitution.
Q: How are the provisions of the Constitution generally interpreted?
A: In case of the doubt, the provisions of the Constitution should be
interpreted as self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.7
Q: What is a state?
A: A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an
independent government organized for political ends to which the
great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. 8
Q: What are the elements of a state?
A: The elements of a state are: people, territory, government, and
sovereignty.
Q: What do you mean by people?
A: People refers simply to the inhabitants of the state. 9
Q: What do you mean by territory?
A: Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by
the people of the state.10
Q: What do you mean by government?
A: Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will
of the state is formulated, expressed, and realized.11
6 9
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 22 (1905).
7 10
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459, 15
February 2011. See also Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82 (1987).
8 12
Garner, Introduction to Political Science, page 41.
Q: What do you mean by sovereignty?
A: Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in
the state by which the state is governed.12
Q: Can you distinguish “nation” from “state”?
A: The nation is only a racial or ethnic concept but the State is a legal
concept.
Q: Can you distinguish “state” from “government”?
A: The government is the agency or instrumentality through which the
will of the State is formulated, expressed, and realized. The State
is the principal while the government is its agent.
Q: Can you distinguish “nation” from “people”?
A: The people are more comprehensive and less cohesive than the
nation. Starting from an amorphous group of individuals inhabiting
the same territory, the people may develop and share certain
characteristics and interests, such as a common language, a
common religion, and a common set of customs and traditions that
will unite them into the more closely-knit entity known as the nation.
Malcolm defines a nation as “a people bound together by common
attractions and repulsions into a living organism possessed of a
common pulse, a common intelligence and inspiration, and
destined apparently to have a common history and a common
fate.”
Q: Can you distinguish between de facto and de jure government?
A: A de jure government has rightful title but no power or control, either
because it has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet
actually entered into the exercise thereof. A de facto government,
on the other hand, is a government of fact, that is, it actually
exercises power or control but without legal title.
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 14.
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 15.
11
Pointdexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 250.
Garner, Political Science and Government, 238, 170.
2
Q: Can you distinguish “government” from “administration”?
A: The government is distinguished from administration, which is a
group of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for
the time being. The administration runs the government, as a
machinist operates his machine. Administration is transitional
whereas the government is permanent.
Q: Can you define the Government of the Republic of the Philippines?
A: Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms
of local government.13
Q: What are the characteristics of sovereignty?
A: Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, absolute,
indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible. 14 (Code: PECA-III)
Classification of Sovereignty
Legal and Political
Internal and External
Q: How is sovereignty classified?
A: Sovereignty may be legal or political, internal or external.
Q: What do you mean by legal sovereignty?
A: Legal sovereignty is the authority which has the power to issue final
commands.
Q: Who is the legal sovereign in the Philippines?
A: The Congress of the Philippines is the legal sovereign in the
Philippines.
13
Section 2(1), Administrative Code of 1987.
Q: What do you mean by political sovereignty?
A: Political sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the
sum of the influences that operate upon it.
Q: Who constitute the pollical sovereign in our country?
A: The political sovereign in our country are the different sectors that
mold opinion.
Q: What do you mean by internal sovereignty?
A: Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to control its
domestic affairs.
Q: What do you mean by external sovereignty?
A: External sovereignty, which is the power of the State top direct its
relations with other States, is also known as independence.
Belligerent Occupation
Rufffy v. Chief of Staff
Laurel v. Misa
Q: What is the effect of a belligerent occupation to the sovereignty of
a state?
A: During a belligerent occupation, sovereignty is not deemed
suspended although acts of sovereignty cannot be exercised by
the legitimate authority.
Q: What is the effect a belligerent occupation on the political laws of
the occupied territory?
A: There being no change of sovereignty during a belligerent
occupation, the political laws of the occupied territory are merely
suspended, subject to revival under the jus postiliminium upon the
end of the occupation.
Q: What is the effect of a belligerent occupation on the non-political
laws of the occupied territory?
A: Non-political laws of the occupied territory are deemed continued
unless changed by the belligerent occupant since they are
intended to govern the relations of individuals as among
14
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
3
 themselves and are not generally affected by changes in regimes
or rulers.15
Q: Does the suspension of political law during a belligerent occupation
affect all citizens?
A: The rule suspending political laws affects only civilian inhabitants
of the occupied territory and is not intended to bind the enemies in
arms.16
Q: During a belligerent occupation, are all political laws suspended as
far as civilians are concerned?
A: No, the law on treason although decidedly political in character is
still effective as far as civilians are concerned.17
Change in Sovereignty
People v. Perfecto
Macariola v. Asuncion
Vilas v. City of Manila
Q: What is the effect of the change of sovereignty on the political laws
of the former sovereign?
A: Where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign are not merely suspended but abrogated.
Q: What is the effect of the change of sovereignty on the non-political
laws of the former sovereign?
A: Non-political laws, by contrast, continue in operation, for the reason
that they regulate private relations only, unless they are changed
by the new sovereign or are contrary to its institutions.
State within a State
Q: What is the international law concept of “association”?
A: An “association” is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
15
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285.
16
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875.
17
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence.18
Q: Is the concept of “association” recognized under the present
Constitution? Explain your answer.
A: The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.19
Q: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) containing the following provisions: The
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is expanded
into an entity to be known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE). The entity is given the capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries. GRP commits to ensure the
BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies. GRP also continues to be responsible
over external defense. BJE has the right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the
bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain. Is the creation of the BJE in accordance with
law and the Philippine Constitution?
A: The MOA is contrary to law and the Philippine Constitution. BJE is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
18
C.I. Keitner and W.M. Reisman, FREE ASSOCIATION: THE UNITED STATES
EXPERIENCE, 39 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1 (2003).
19
Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
4
 Convention,20 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, b. Those defined in the treaty concluded between the United
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other States and Spain on November 7, 1900, which are not defined
states. The act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status in the Treaty of Paris, specifically the islands of Cagayan, Sulu
which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation and Sibuto;
for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
c. Those defined in the treaty concluded on January 2, 1930,
between the United States and Great Britain, specifically the
Turtle and Mangsee islands;
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY d. The island of Batanes, which was covered under a general
statement in the 1935 Constitution;
Q: What are the components of a territory?
e. Those contemplated in the phrase “belonging to the Philippines
A: The components of a territory are: the terrestrial domain, the
by historic right or legal title” in the 1973 Constitution.
maritime or fluvial domain, and the aerial domain.
Q: What does UNCLOS mean?
Q: What is the National Territory of the Philippines?
A: UNCLOS means United Nations Convention on the Law of the
A: The national territory of the Philippines is defined in Section 1 of
Seas.
Article I of the Constitution as follows:
Q: What is meant by territorial
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
sea?
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories
A: Territorial sea or territorial
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
waters, as defined by the
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
1982 UNCLOS is a belt of
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
coastal waters extending at
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
most 12 nautical miles from
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
the baseline (usually the
of the Philippines.
mean low-water mark) of
a coastal state. The territorial
Q: What territories are covered by Article I of the Constitution?
sea is regarded as the
sovereign territory of the state,
A: The definition in Article I of the Constitution covers the following
although foreign ships (both
territories:
military and civilian) are
allowed innocent passage
a. Those ceded to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris
through it; this sovereignty
of December 10, 1898;
also extends to the airspace
over and seabed below.

20
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.

5
Q: How are straight archipelagic baselines drawn?
A: Straight archipelagic baselines are drawn by joining the outermost
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago
provided that within such baselines are included the main islands
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area
of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.21
Q: What is the maximum length of the baselines?
A: The length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a
maximum length of 125 nautical miles.22
Q: What is the limit of the territorial waters?
A: 12 nautical miles from the baselines.
Q: What is the right of the state over territorial waters?
21
Article 47, paragraph 1of UNCLOS III.
22
Article 47, paragraph 2 of the UNCLOS III.
A: Under Article 2 of the UNCLOS, the state may exercise sovereignty
over territorial waters.
Q: What are included in the internal waters of the Philippines?
A: When we say internal waters, we mean internal waters under the
Archipelagic doctrine which is contained in Article I of the
Constitution stating that “the waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breath and dimensions,
from part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”23
Q: What is the limit of the contiguous zone?
A: 24 nautical miles from the baselines.
Q: What is the right of the state over its contiguous zone?
A: Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, the state may exercise jurisdiction
to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone.
Q: What is the limit of the exclusive economic zone?
A: 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
Q: What is the right of the state over its exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf?
A: Under the UNCLOS, the state may exercise the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
23
Second sentence of Section 1, Article I of the Constitution.
6
What is a republic
Essence of republicanism
Purpose of a republican government
Q: What is a republic?
A: A republic is a representative government, a government run by
and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people
govern themselves directly.
Q: What is the essence of republicanism?
A: The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the
selection by the citizenry or a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and
discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, “at all times be accountable to the people” they are
sworn to serve.
Q: What is the purpose of a republican government?
A: The purpose of a republican government is the promotion of the
common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
Will of the people
Rule of majority Art. VI, Sec. 16
Plurality -highest
Minority – Sandiganbayan PD 1606
Villavicencio v. Lukban
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
. Dizon v. Phil. Ryubus Command, 81 Phil. 286 (1948); cited in Agpalo, Public International
25
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
Ichong v. Hernandez
Q: What is the effect of entering into treaties with other states on the
sovereignty of the state?24
A: By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have
a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute
nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide
to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree
to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute
jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial
surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a
reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same
privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale that the
Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution.25 Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.26
Q: How can international law become part of the sphere of domestic
law?
A: In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Health Secretary, 27
the Supreme Court said that International law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have force of domestic
law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
26
Law, 222-223 (2006).
27
G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265.
7
Q: How can generally accepted principles of international law become
part of the law of the land?
A: In Mijares v. Ranada,28 the Supreme Court said that “generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations,” specifying
examples “renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,
the principle of sovereign immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty
and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others.”
Agustin v. Edu
– early warning device
– 1968 Vienna Convention
Magallanes v. Ermita
– UNCLOS III
– RA 9522
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts
and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
national territory. full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life
for all.
Article VII, Section 18
– Commander in Chief Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions guarantees full respect for human rights.
provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
People v. Lagman protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
– had a father, no military leanings, shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
does not wish to kill or be killed conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
People v. Zosa of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
– fatherless, had a mother receive the support of the Government.
and 8 brothers to support
Meyer v. Nebraska – German

28
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 327.

8
Pierce v. Society of Sisters – Private Schools
People v. Ritter – Pedophile
Cabanas v. Pilapil
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
DepEd v. San Diego
Virtouso v. Municipal Judge
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.
It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
29
Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, En Banc, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011.
30
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Q: Is Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution referring to the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the capital of public utilities self-
executing?
A: Yes.29
Q: In the operation if a public utility, how much of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens?
A: Sixty percent (60%).30
Q: What do you mean by the term “capital”?
A: Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate
to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no
voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to
vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock that can vote in the election of directors. 31
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development
and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
31
Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011, En Banc.
9
 Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building. Basis - Cases
Kawanakoa v. Polybank
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Syquia v. Almeda Lopez
De Haber v. Queen of Portugal (unduly vex the peace of nations)
Q: What is local autonomy?
A: Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local Actions - Cases
government structure instituted through a system of Garcia v. Chief of Staff
decentralization. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate Sanders v. Veridiano
making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal Ruiz v. Cabahug
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal Fernando v. Festejo
corporations euphemistically to “small republics.”32 Santiago v. Republic

Q: How autonomous should a local government unit be? Forms of Consent to be Sued
A: The local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. 33 (1) Express
Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby a. General Law (Act No. 3083)
decentralized, enabling especially the peripheral local government b. Special Law (Merritt v. Gov’t. of the P.I.)
units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also Note: Republic v. Purisima, Amigable v. Cuenca
with their own resources and assets.34 CA 327 and PD 1445

(2) Implied
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for a. Files an Action asking for affirmative relief
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
But not in Lim v. Brownell
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public b. Enters into a proprietary contract
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. U.S.A v. Guinto
But not in U.S.A. v. Ruiz
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its Suits Against Agencies
transactions involving public interest. a. Charter
Bermoy v. Phil. Normal College
Doctrine of State Immunity Palafox v. Prov. of Ilocos Norte
Torio v. Fontanilla
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3) Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan

32 34
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93252, En Banc, 5 August 1991. Alvarez v. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, En Banc, 31 January 1996, citing Pimentel, Jr.,
33
Local Government Code, Section 2. Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development, 1993
Edition, p. 4.

10
b. Function
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro
Note:
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association
Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA
Liability
Republic v. Villasor (AFP)
PNB v. Pabalan (PVTA)
Merritt v. Gov’t of the P.I.
Q: What is the doctrine of state immunity?
A: It means that the State may not be sued without its consent. 35 The
doctrine of non-suability is based not on any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends.
Q: Is this doctrine available to foreign states insofar as they are sought
to be sued in the courts of the local state?
A: Yes, this doctrine is available to foreign states insofar as they are
sought to be sued in the courts of the local state. 36
Q: What is the reason why other states can also invoke the doctrine
of state immunity?
A: Other states can invoke the doctrine of state immunity because of
the principle of sovereign equality of states, under which one state
cannot assert jurisdiction over another state for this would be in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.
Q: Instead of suing the Republic of the Philippines, the plaintiff sues
the officer of the government who is supposed to discharge the
responsibility or grant the redress demanded. Can the action now
be considered as a suit not against the State?
35
Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution.
36
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
A: In this case, it must be determined if the State is the real party in
interest, that is, that the claim if proved will be the direct liability of
the State and not merely of the officer impleaded. If this is shown,
the action can be dismissed as a suit against the State unless its
immunity had been previously waived.
Q: Garcia filed a claim against the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines for damages for injuries he sustained while
undergoing military training as required by law. Is the action a suit
against the State?
A: The suit is actually a suit against the State although filed against
the Chief of Staff in his personal capacity since it would need an
appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment if the claim
were allowed.37
Q: Two American employees of the Subic Naval Base sued its
commanding general and the director of special services for
damages for allegedly defamatory remarks made by the
defendants. Is the action a suit against the state?
A: The defendants were being sued as officers of the United States
Government. As they have acted on behalf of that government and
within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the
defendants, personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming
that trial can proceed and it is proved that claimants have a right to
the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not
by the defendants in their personal capacity but by the United
States Government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment,
viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.38
Q: Are all suits directed against a public officer necessarily suit against
the State?
A: No. There are many instances when a public officer may be sued
in his official capacity without the action being considered as a suit
against the State. In cases where, assuming a decision is
37
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120.
38
Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88.
11
 rendered against the public officer impleaded, enforcement thereof
will not require an affirmative act from the State, such as the
appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the judgment, then
those actions are not considered as suits against the State.
Q: Suppose an action is filed against a public officer to require him to
do a duty mandated by law, or to restrain him from performing an
act alleged to be unconstitutional, or to recover from him taxes
unlawfully assessed or collected,39 would any of these be
considered a suit against the State?
A: No. These actions are not suits against the State as they would not
require an appropriation of the needed amount for the satisfaction
of the judgment.
Q: Suppose an action is filed against the Director of Public Works who
took over without authority property belonging to the plaintiff and
constructed thereon a public irrigation canal. Is this a suit against
the State?
A: The action for the recovery of the land or its value was properly filed
against the defendant in his personal capacity and is therefore not
covered by the doctrine of State immunity. 40
Q: The plaintiff sued the government for revocation of a donation on
the ground of failure of the defendant to comply with the stipulated
conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of its consent
to be sued. Decide on the motion to dismiss.
A: The motion should be denied. The suit can prosper because it
does not involve money claim against the State as what the plaintiff
is seeking is the return only of the property donated. 41
Q: Suppose an action is filed against a public officer for recovery of
title or possession of property and in addition a claim for the
recovery of damages, such as accrued rentals. Is this a suit
against the State?
A: Inasmuch as its allowance would require the government to
appropriate the necessary amount for the satisfaction of the
judgment, the action is a suit against the State. 42
39
Houston v. Hormes, 252 U.S. 569; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378.
40
Festejo v. Fernando, 50 O.G. 1556.
41
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294.
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued either expressly or impliedly.
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued expressly?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued expressly either through a
general law or through a special law.
Q: May the State give its consent to be sued expressly through a
lawyer?
A: No. The express consent of the State to be sued must be given in
a duly enacted statute and may not be given by a mere counsel of
the government.43
Q: Do we have a general law whereby the State has expressly given
its consent to be sued?
A: Yes. We have Act No. 3083 declaring that “the Government of the
Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.”
Q: How does a party file a suit against the State?
A: Under Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1445, a claim against the government must first be filed
with the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within sixty
days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the
State with its consent.44
Q: The plaintiff sued the government for recovery of the value of her
property which had been converted into public streets without
payment to her of just compensation. Suppose the plaintiff failed
to previously file he claim with the Commission on Audit as required
by law, may the action be dismissed for failure to comply with the
law?
42
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
43
Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470.
44
P.D. No. 1445, Sections 49-50.
12
A: No. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law
at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it
have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. If
there were an observance of procedural regularity, plaintiff would
not be in the said plaint they are now.
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued impliedly?
A: The State is deemed to have given its consent to be sued when (a)
it files a complaint asking for an affirmative relief or (b) when it
enters into a proprietary contract.
Q: Suppose the government files a complaint in intervention for the
purpose of recovering a vessel. Is the State deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit?
A: Yes. The government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting a
claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a
vessel.45
Q: The Philippine government, as successor in interest of the United
States to the properties being claimed from the latter, filed a
complaint in intervention to join the defendant in invoking the
doctrine of State immunity to secure the dismissal of the action.
Is the Philippine government in doing so deemed to have waived
its immunity from suit?
A: No. As the Philippine government was not asking for any
affirmative relief from the plaintiff but had intervened only for the
purpose of resisting the claim, the Supreme Court held that no
implied waiver of immunity could be assumed.46
Q: The United States, through its Engineering Command in the U.S.
Navy, had entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the repair of
45
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060, 30 September 1950.
46
Lim v. Brownell, 107 SCRA 345.
wharves in Subic Bay. For the failure of the United States to
comply with the contract, plaintiff filed a action against it or pay
damages. The United States moved to dismiss invoking its non-
suability. Rule on the issue.
A: The state may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.47 In this case, the
United States is not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Q: Is the United States Government considered to have waived its
immunity from suit if it engages in a restaurant business or
operates a barbershop?
A: Yes. These are proprietary acts (jure gestionis) not governmental
acts (jure imperii).48
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued when it is acting
through government agencies?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued through the charter of the
government agency or, in the absence thereof, if the government
agency is performing a proprietary function.
PROBLEM:
TESDA is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government directly attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment. One of its functions is to “develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification
in the country.” To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-
printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to
trainees who have passed the certification process. It entered into
47
United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487.
48
U.S.A. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644.
13
 a contract of with PROVI for the printing and encoding of PVC
cards. According to PROVI, TESDA’s liability amounts to
P39,475,000.00. But TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00,
leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00. Despite the two
demand letters that PROVI sent TESDA, the outstanding balance
remained unpaid. PROVI subsequently filed with the RTC a
complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has
effectively waived its immunity when it entered into a contract with
PROVI for a commercial purpose. According to PROVI, since the
purpose of its contract with TESDA is to provide identification PVC
cards with security seal which TESDA will thereafter sell to TESDA
trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial transactions not
incidental to its governmental functions.
TESDA’s response to this position is to point out that it is not
engaged in business, and there is nothing in the records to show
that its purchase of the PVC cards from PROVI is for a business
purpose. While TESDA admits that it will charge the trainees with
a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only to recover
their costs and is not intended for profit.49
Q: If you were the judge, would you entertain the case?
A: No, the case should be dismissed because TESDA is immune from
suit. Being an unincorporated instrumentality of the government,
the test for its suability is on the function that it performs. The fact
that TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not
characterize the transaction as industrial or business; the sale,
expressly authorized by the TESDA Act, cannot be considered
separately from TESDA’s general governmental functions, as they
are undertaken in the discharge of these functions. Along this line
of reasoning, the Supreme Court held in Mobil Philippines v.
Customs Arrastre Services:50
“Now, the fact that a non-corporate government
entity performs a function proprietary in nature does
49
Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009.
50
G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.
not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to
its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby
of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity.”
Q: Assuming that TESDA may be sued and subsequently damages
are awarded in favor of PROVI, may the funds of TESDA be
garnished?
A: Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with
PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s
funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject
of a writ of garnishment or attachment. TESDA funds, being
sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the
government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public
officials. The Supreme Court specifically spoke of the limits in
dealing with this fund in Republic v. Villasor51 when it said:
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935
Constitution is now made explicit in the revised
charter. It is therein expressly provided, ‘The State
may not be sued without its consent.’ A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense, from such a basic
concept, is that public funds cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of
Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego,
such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the
opinion of Justice Teehankee:
The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution' and that the power of the
51
G.R. No. L-30671, 28 November 1973, 54 SCRA 84.
14
 Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. [Emphasis supplied.]
The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine in Traders Royal
Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,52 where it said:
The NMPC’s implied consent to be sued
notwithstanding, the trial court did not have the power
to garnish NMPC deposits to answer for any eventual
judgment against it. Being public funds, the deposits
are not within the reach of any garnishment or
attachment proceedings. [Emphasis supplied.]
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
52
G.R. No. 68514, 17 December 1990, 192 SCRA 305.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to
have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines,
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they
shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
15
 ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
Q: What are the two tests to determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power?
A: The two tests are (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test.
Q: When is a delegation considered complete?
A: A delegation is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.53
Q: When is a delegation considered to have sufficient standard?
A: There is sufficient standard when the limits of the delegate’s
authority have been specified, the legislative policy has been
announced, and the conditions under which the delegate’s power
is to be implemented are identified.54 (Code: LPC)
Q: What are some of the recognized sufficient standards?
A: Some of the sufficient standards recognized by the Supreme Court
are “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”55
Q: May Congress delegate the power to create a province?
A: No, Congress cannot delegate the power to create a province. 56
Q: What is the reason why Congress cannot delegate the power to
create a province?
A: A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that “each province shall have at
53
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965), cited in Abakada Guro v. Purisima, En Banc,
G.R. 166715, 14 August 2008.
54
See Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 Edition, page 97, cited in Abakada Guro v.
Purisima, En Banc, G.R. 166715, 14 August 2008.
least one representative.” The creation of a province other than by
Congress will detract from the constitutional principle that the
power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to
Congress.57
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five
years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term of which he was elected.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
55
Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214, 19 September
2006, 502 SCRA 295, cited in Abakada Guro v. Purisima, En Banc, G.R. 166715, 14 August
2008.
56
Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
57
Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
16
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Q: Explain the two steps before a party or organization can join
electoral contests?
A: To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the
two-step process of registration and accreditation. Registration is
the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
elections laws; accreditation on the other hand, relates to the
privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified
registered parties.58
Q: Explain how is the 20% party-list representatives in the total
membership of the House of Representatives computed?
A: In BANAT v. Comelec,59 the Supreme Court declared that in
determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
58
Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651.
59
G.R. No. 179271, En Banc, penned by Justice Carpio, 21 April 2009.
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.
Q: Can major political parties participate in the party-list system? If
so, give reasons and examples.
A: Yes. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. Read together,
R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal
Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista
Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.60
60
BANAT v. Comelec, En Banc, G.R. No. 179271, penned by Justice Carpio, 21 April 2009.
17
Q: Explain the qualifications of party-list nominees?
A: The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section
9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must
at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the
party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity” as there is no financial status required in the law. It is
enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Q: Are elected officials considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy?
A: No, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of
61
Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA
503.
62
Quinto and Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010.
candidacy. Section 14 of the Fair Election Act repealed Section 67
(i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials)
of the Omnibus Election Code.61
Q: Are appointive officials considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy?
A: Yes, appointive officials are considered ipso facto resigned from
their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy.
Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.62
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Q: Is there a specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district?
A: No, there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.63
Q: Must the population of a city be increased by another 250,000 in
order to be entitled to an additional district?
A: No. While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city
to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.64
63
Aquino III v. Comelec,En Banc, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 640. See
also Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
64
Aquino III v. Comelec, En Banc, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 641. See
also Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
18
 (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Q: What is reapportionment?
A: Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation. 65
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member
of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Q: Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and
served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When
Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was
then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification
for violation of the three-term limit rule. Is Capco disqualified?
A: Finding for Capco, the Supreme Court held that for the
disqualification rule to apply, “it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
65
Bagabuyo v. Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008).
66
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec and Jose T. Capco, Jr.,September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA
157, cited in Abundo, Sr. v. Comelec, en banc, 688 SCRA 149, 169
also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.” There was, the
Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco “was not
elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law” when a permanent vacancy
occurred in that office.66
Q: Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-
2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component
city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of
elective officials. Is Latasa qualified to run as mayor of Digos City
in the 2001 elections?
A: No, Latasa is disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City in the 2001
elections as he will be violating the three-term limit rule for the
following reason: The very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. He never
ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief
executive of Digos.67
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on
the second Monday of May.
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase.
67
Latasa v. Comelec, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, cited in Abundo
Sr. v. Comelec, en banc, 688 SCRA 149.
19
 Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and
business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law,
and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call
a special session at any time.
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House
shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place
than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Q: Is the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a political question?
A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the selection of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators is not a
political question. The choice of these members did not depend
20
 on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations.68
Q: Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
have the jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list
nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office?
A: Yes, the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, “elected members” of
the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted
upon was their party. 69
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Q: Is the apportionment among political parties the seats to which
each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments a
political question?
A: No, the issue is justiciable, “even if the question were political in
nature,” since it involved “the legality, not the wisdom, of the
manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.” [Daza v. Singson,70
Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.71 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 72]
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of
68
Cited in Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, 18 November 1998
69
Bello v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 59.
70
180 SCRA 496, 21 December 1989.
all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books
shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Q: When must the rules of procedure in inquiries in aid of legislation
in the Senate be published?
A: The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it
or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years
for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.73
71
187 SCRA 377, 12 July 1990.
72
214 SCRA 789, 20 October 1992.
73
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
21
Q: Is it sufficient to publish the rules of procedure in booklet form and
make them available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senate’s internet web page?
A: No. The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by
the Senate.74
Q: Is the invocation of the provisions of the of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, correct to support
a claim of valid publication of the rules of procedure of the Senate
through the internet?
A: R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.75
Q: Does the pendency of the cases in court bar the Congress from
conducting inquiries in aid of legislation?
A: A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings
have different purposes.76 On one hand, courts conduct hearings
or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of
a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and
involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely
74
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc, G.R.
No. 170338, 23 December 2008 consolidated with Ranada et al. v. Senate, G.R. No. 179275.
75
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc, G.R.
No. 170338, 23 December 2008 consolidated with Ranada et al. v. Senate, G.R. No. 179275.
76
Cited in Regis Romero II v. Senator Jinggoy Estrada et al, En Banc, G.R. No. 174105, 2 April
2009.
and effectively;77 and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation,78 albeit
the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going
judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid
of legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v.
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
(Standard Chartered Bank)79 provides the following reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which
the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal
or administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––
[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce
it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information––which is not infrequently true–
–recourse must be had to others who possess it.
77
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
78
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 168; citing W. Keefe & M. Ogul, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 20-23 (4th ed., 1977).
79
G.R. No. 167173, 27 December 2007, 541 SCRA 456, 471-472.
22
Q: What must appear in an invitation in an inquiry aid of legislation
under Section 21 of Article VI or in a request for appearance under
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution?
A: In Senate v. Ermita, the Supreme Court ruled that the invitations
should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the subject
of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.”
Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under
Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be
so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and
by virtue of the express language of Section 22. 80
Q: Distinguish between the right of Congress or any of its committees
to obtain information in aid of legislation and the people’s right to
public information.
A: In Senate v. Ermita, the Supreme Court declared that:
“There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people
to information on matters of public concern. For one,
the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the
right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen.”81
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected
by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense,
that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
80
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
81
Cited in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
82
Philcomsat v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 611.
Q: May a person invited as resource person to a legislative inquiry in
aid of legislation invoke the right to counsel?
A: The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person
under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a
crime, and therefore attaches only during such custodial
investigation. Resource persons invited to a legislative inquiry
cannot therefore validly invoke the right to counsel. 82
Q: What are the two (2) kinds of executive privilege?
A: The two (2) kinds of executive privilege are (a) the presidential
communications privilege and (b) the deliberative process
privilege.83
Q: What does the presidential communications privilege include?
A: The presidential communications privilege pertains to
“communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential.” 84
Q: What are the elements of the presidential communications
privilege?
A: The elements of the presidential communications privilege are as
follows:
1. The protected communication must relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power”;
2. The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President;
3. The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
83
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
84
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
23
 by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 85
Q: What does the deliberative process privilege include?
A: The deliberative process privilege includes “advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” 86
Q: Distinguish presidential communications privilege and deliberative
process privilege.
A: Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making
of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to
decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s
unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety,
and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-
deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege.87
Q: Cite some instances where the Executive may withhold documents
as falling under executive privilege?
A: The Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets, identity of government informers in some
circumstances, and information related to pending investigations.
An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign
relations.88
Q: May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?
85
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
86
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
87
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
A: Yes, the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice.89
Q: What is the remedy of Congress if a military officer refuses to
appear before it?
A: Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer.90
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
88
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
89
B/Gen. Gudani v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, En Banc, 15 August 2006.
90
B/Gen. Gudani v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, En Banc, 15 August 2006.
24
 (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Q: The Court is being asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine
91
277 SCRA 268, 14 August 1997.
and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as a
Republic Act, was properly approved by the legislative body.
Petitioners are claiming that certain procedural rules of the House
had been breached in the passage of the bill. They aver further
that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules is a
violation of the Constitution itself. Should the Court entertain the
petition?
A: The Court should dismiss the petition, because the matter
complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House,
with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated in Arroyo v. De
Venecia that:91
“It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints,
real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would
be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x
x x In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.”
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections
at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House
25
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose
for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act
or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Q: May the president be sued during his incumbency?
A: In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Supreme Court declared that
indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and
why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of
26
 harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. x x x. 92
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner,
as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the
President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end
at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to
the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
92
G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224-225.
93
Macalintal v. PET, 7 June 2011, En Banc, 651 SCRA239, 250, 253.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Q: Petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive
Department, cannot create the Philippine Truth Commission, the
Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal in the absence of an act of the legislature. Is Petitioner’s
contention correct?
A: No, Petitioner’s argument is not valid. A plain reading of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc.93
Q: What is the doctrine of necessary implication?
A: Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the conferment of
additional jurisdiction includes the means to carry it into effect.94
94
Macalintal v. PET, 7 June 2011, En Banc, 651 SCRA239, 250.
27
 Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following
oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously
fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice
to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me
God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries
of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not
be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any
other emolument from the Government or any other source.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume
office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act
as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall
act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall
have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-
elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall
have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently
disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who
is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President
shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,
or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President,
the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in
case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President.
He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall
nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within
seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and
a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty
days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the
Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against
any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before
the date of the next presidential election.
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
28
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately,
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall
be informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge
of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during
such illness.
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice and other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
95
G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154.
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption or re-assumption of office.
Q: Distinguish between appointment and designation.
A: In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.,95 the Supreme Court distinguished
between the terms appointment and designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism
is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation
may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise
involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
29
 temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security
of tenure on the person named.96
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Q: Is the prohibition against midnight appointments under Section 15
of Article VII of the Constitution applicable to appointments of
Members of the Supreme Court?
A: The prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not apply to the Members of the Supreme Court. 97
Q: Did the framers of the Constitution intend the prohibition against
midnight appointments under Section 15 of Article VII of the
Constitution to be applicable to appointments in the Judiciary?
Why?
A: No. The framers of the Constitution did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.98
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
96
G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154, 158-159.
97
De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.
98
De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Q: Distinguish ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting
capacity.
A: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments
in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.99
Q: May the President appoint department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session?
A: Yes, the President may appoint department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session. The office of a department
secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. The
essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office.100
99
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY 772 (1996) cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, penned by Justice Carpio, G.R. No.
164978, En Banc, 13 October 2005.
100
See Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., G.R. No. 93711, 25 February 1991, 194 SCRA 390, cited in
Pimentel v. Ermita, En Banc, penned by Justice Carpio, G.R. No. 164978, 13 October 2005.
30

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Q: What is command responsibility?
A: “Command responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject
to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this
sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity.101
Q: Does the doctrine of command responsibility apply in an amparo
proceeding?
A: The doctrine of command responsibility is not applicable in
an amparo proceeding but it does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be
impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—
but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.102
Q: In relation to an amparo proceeding, what is responsibility?
A: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance.103
Q: In relation to an amparo proceeding, what is accountability?
A: Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
101
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, 13 December 2012 citing the opinion of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010, 613
SCRA 233.
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.104
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
102
Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 211, cited in
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, 13 December 2011.
103
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, 606 SCRA 598.
104
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, 606 SCRA 598.
31
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released.
Q: For purposes of exercising his calling out power, should the
President first make a declaration of a state of rebellion?
A: For the purpose of exercising the calling out power, the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of
rebellion.105 The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” 106 Nevertheless,
it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. 107
Q: Is the concurrence of (a) actual invasion or rebellion and (b) public
safety required in the exercise of the calling out power of the
President?
A: The concurrence of two conditions, namely (a) an actual invasion
or rebellion, and (b) that public safety requires the exercise of such
power are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. 108
Q: What are the two (2) requirements needed for the exercise by the
President of the power to declare martial law or suspend of the
privilege of habeas corpus?
A: In the exercise of these two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely (a) an actual invasion or
rebellion, and (b) that public safety requires the exercise of such
powers.109
Q: May a local chief executive exercise the calling out power?
105
Sanlakas v. Reyes, 159085, 3 February 2004.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA
81.
A: No, a local chief executive is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. The calling out
power contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President.110
Q: May a general who has retired from service be proceeded against
for violation of the Articles of War?
A: Yes, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers
cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against
him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has
been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated.111
Read Lagman v. Medialdea G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 on
Martial Law in Mindanao.
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter
of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision
on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government
or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the
effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be
provided by law.
109
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA
81.
110
Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482.
111
Abadilla v. Ramos, No. L-79173, 7 December 1987, 156 SCRA 92 cited in B/Gen. Gudani
v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, 15 August 2006.
32
 Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
Q: What is a treaty?112
A: Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
treaty as “an international agreement concluded between states in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.” 113 International agreements
may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not
require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and
deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. 114
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the
contracting states concerned,115 as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers.116 Neither, on the
domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution.117 Authorities are, however, agreed that one is
distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the
concurrence-requirement aspect.118 As has been observed by US
constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an
executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the
Senate, and the people;119 a ratified treaty, unlike an executive
112
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
113
Executive Order No. 459, dated November 25, 1997, contains a similar definition.
114
B.A. Boczek, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 346 (2005).
115
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138587, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 2000 citing Richard
Erickson, “The Making of Executive Agreements by the US Department of Defense,” 13
Boston U. Intl. L. J. 58 (1955); Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 Ohio St. L.J., p. 4; see
also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 301 (1987), which states that “[t]he
terminology used for international agreements is varied. Among the terms used are: treaty,
convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration,
concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, memorandum of
understanding, and modus vivendi. Whatever their designation, all agreements have the same
legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate
otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.)
116
Id. at 489; citing 5 Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 395; cited in USAFE
Veterans Association Inc. v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil. 1030, 1037 (1959).
agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment.120
Q: Does “exchange of notes” fall into the category of inter-governmental
agreements?121
A: Yes, an “exchange of notes” falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,”122 which is an internationally accepted
form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty
Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has
many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties
being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of
the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories
of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is
frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or,
sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval. 123 In
another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive
agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes
being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action.124 On the other hand, executive
agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form
of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” 125
117
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 77 S. Ct.1230.
118
In the US constitutional system, it is the legal force of treaties and executive agreements on
the domestic plane.
119
Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 224 (2nd
ed., 1996).
120
Prof. Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements – Reply, Yale Law Journal, June
1945; cited in Justice Antonio T. Carpio’s Dissent in Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. Nos. 175888,
176051 & 176222, February 11, 2009, 578 SCRA 438.
121
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
122
Harris, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 801 (2004).
123
Official Website of the UN <http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp.>; cited in Abaya v.
Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720.
124
Abaya v. Ebdane.
125
Id.; citing The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts by Francis Sayre.
33
Q: Who has the power to enter into treaties?126
A: By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the
President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. 127 The Constitution
vests in the President the power to enter into international
agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required
concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated,
executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence,
her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would
put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter
into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by
long practice.128 In Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary,129 the Supreme Court stressed that the power to ratify
a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role relative to the
ratification of a treaty is limited merely to concurring in or
withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-
making power of the President is his or her prerogative to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latter’s
consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it. 130 This
prerogative, the Court hastened to add in Bayan Muna v. Alberto
Romulo,131 is the President’s alone and cannot be encroached
upon via a writ of mandamus.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty
days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of
its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
126
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
127
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138587, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 2000.
128
Id.; citing Commissioner of Customs.
129
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622.
130
Id. at 637-638; citing Cruz, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (1998).
131
G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Q: What is judicial power?
A: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.132
Q: What are the pillars of limitations/requisites of judicial review?
A: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement (locus standi); (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.133 (Code: ALEL)
Q: What do you mean by “actual case or controversy”?134
132
Second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
133
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 35;
and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003) cited in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 7 December 2010.
134
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
34
A: An actual case or controversy is a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.135
Q: When is a case or controversy ripe for adjudication?
A: A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 136
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture.137
Q: What does locus standi mean?
A: Locus standi means “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.”138 Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result”139 of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.”140
Q: What is the “direct injury test”?
A: In Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman, the United
States Supreme Court declared that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a
general interest common to all members of the public. In People
v. Vera, our Supreme Court ruled that person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.141
Q: What are the exceptions to the stringent requirement of the “direct
injury test”?
135
Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998.
136
Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428 (1998).
137
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 901-902 (2003).
138
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
139
Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475; citing Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
140
Ibid.
141
Cited in Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October
2008.
A: The following are the exceptions: taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue (Code:
TVCL), provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must
be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing
of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4)
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.142
Q: What is the requirement for a citizen’s suit to be entertained? 143
A: In Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.144 the Supreme Court expounded on
this, thus: When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.145
Q: Senators Pimentel, Angara, Enrile, Ejercito-Estrada, Estrada,
Lacson, Lim, Madrigal, and Osmena are questioning before the
142
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in
Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008; Gunsi,
Sr. v. The Honorable Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23 February
2009 (580 SCRA 70, 76).
143
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
144
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 45.
145
Id. at 136-137.
35
 Supreme Court the constitutionality of the President’s appointment
of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is
in session. While the other petitioners are members of the
Commission on Appointments, the following are not: Senators
Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal. Do Senators Pimentel,
Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal have the legal standing to question the
constitutionality of said appointments?
A: No, Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal have no legal
standing to question the constitutionality of said appointments. The
Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises
its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
Considering the independence of the Commission on
Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim
standing in the present case as members of Congress. Thus, on
the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission
on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-
Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the petition. This is in
contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who,
though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as
members of Congress, possess no standing in the present
petition.146
Q: What is a moot and academic case?147
A: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground
of mootness.148
Q: Sinsuat filed a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation
of the certificate of candidacy of his opponent Gunsi claiming that
the latter is disqualified. While the case was still pending, Sinsuat
was proclaimed winner so that the Comelec second division issued
a resolution dismissing the petition as the same had become moot
146
Pimentel v. Ermita, penned by Justice Carpio, G.R. No. 164978, En Banc, 13 October 2005.
147
Gunsi Sr. v. Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23 February 2009, 580
SCRA 70, 76; (2) Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, En Banc, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA
308.
148
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in Province
of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
and academic. The proclamation of Sinsuat was, however, later
annulled by the Comelec second division. It issued a resolution
clarifying that its first ruling dismissing the petition has become
ineffective because Sinsuat’s proclamation had been annulled.
Thereupon it ruled that Gunsi is indeed disqualified. Gunsi filed a
motion for reconsideration but the Comelec en banc denied it.
When the case was filed before the Supreme Court, the term of
office of Sinsuat, for which position Gunsi was declared by
Comelec to be disqualified, had already expired. May the Supreme
Court still exercise jurisdiction?
A: The expiration of term is a supervening event which renders this
case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.
As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.149 The rule, however, admits of
exceptions. Thus, courts may choose to decide cases otherwise
moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; third, the constitutional
issue reaised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evasive of review.150 None of the foregoing obtains in
this case.151
Q: Bautista was appointed Undersecretary of the DOTC and later
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Following
the resignation of the MARINA Administrator, Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of MARINA
Administrator, in a concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Funa filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
designation alleging that the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants are
prohibited by the Constitution from holding any other office or
149
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in Province
of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
150
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489,
171424, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
151
Gunsi Sr. v. Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23 February 2009, 580
SCRA 70, 76
36
 employment. During the pendency of the petition, Bautista was
appointed MARINA Administrator. May the court still entertain the
issue considering that the case has become moot and academic
because of the appointment of Bautista as MARINA Administrator
and her relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport?
A: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.152 However, the Supreme Court held in
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma153 that supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
bar, and public.154 As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to
enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable or repetition yet evading review. 155 In the present case,
the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The
question of the constitutionality of the President’s appointment or
designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-charge
of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment.
Q: After more than three years from the first time the “Hello Garci”
tapes were played, former Comelec Commissioner Garcillano
implores from the Supreme Court the issuance of an injunctive writ
152
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, citing Province
of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 129;
Vda. de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, 23 March 2004, 426 SCRA 91; Paloma
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145431, 11 November 2003, 415 SCRA 590; Royal Cargo
Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA
21; and Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 10 May 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
153
G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 756.
154
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 756 citing
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 757; and
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 522; 384 SCRA 152, 177 (2002).
155
Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, 13 October 2005, 472 SCRA 587, 593, citing
Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 438; Gil v. Benipayo,
to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape
recordings and from including the same in their committee report.
He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. May an injunctive writ be issued?
A: No. It must be noted that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the “Hello Garci”
inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by
the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these
events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot
and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 156
Q: Ordinarily, when the case has become moot and academic there is
no more actual case or controversy. What are the exceptions to
the “moot and academic” principle?
A: In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,157 the Court held that the “moot and
academic” principle not being a magical formula that automatically
dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if it finds that (1) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution;158 (2) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved;159 (3) the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;160 and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. 161 Another exclusionary
circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary
cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer.
Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the
G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (Unsigned Resolution) ; Chief Supt. Acop v. Secretary
Guingona, Jr., 433 Phil. 62; 383 SCRA 577 (2002), Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 342 Phil. 184;
277 SCRA 409 (1997) and Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467; 276 SCRA 501 (1997).
156
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc,
G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008.
157
G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
158
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
159
Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001).
160
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
161
Albaña v. Comelec, 478 Phil. 941 (2004); Chief Supt. Acop v. Guingona Jr., 433 Phil. 62
(2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
37
 challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal
of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the
case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays
for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the
violation.162 (Code: GEFC)
Q: What are political questions?
A: Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.163
Q: What is the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
A: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in
the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and
effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.”164
Q: What are the elements of enforced disappearances?
A: The following are the elements of enforced disappearances
AARR: (1) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty; (2) that it be carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (3) that it be followed by the State
or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and (4) that the intention for such
refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.165
162
US v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); US v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn, 166 U.S.
290, 308-310 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963); Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations
for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
163
Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-
15, En Banc, March 2, 2001.
164
Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 618.
165
Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 618.
38

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue
. integrity, probity, and independence.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of
age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of
the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector
for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
39
 (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments
as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall
provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties
as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative function.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation
before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion
of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon
the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements
shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the
opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and
the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary.
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
40
 Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
166
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459, 15
February 2011.
167
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 927 (2003).
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
Q: What does the term “initiate” mean?166
A: In Francisco v. House of Representatives, 167 the Supreme Court
declared that the term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action
to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on
the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Q: Must the rules on impeachment be published?168
A: Not necessarily. “Promulgation” must thus be used in the
context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general
must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense
168
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459, 15
February 2011.
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 was to be used.169 Since the Constitutional Commission did not
restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to
deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It
is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Supreme
Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation
beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution
intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have
stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than
“promulgate,” there is no other single formal term in the English
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it
being published.

oOo

169
Marcos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239 (1951).

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