AKBAYAN vs.
Aquino – Re: JPEPA dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought
(July 16, 2008)
[V1.0]
Facts:
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in
Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation
and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for
mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a
comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and
services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on
investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments
to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate
hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last
November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas,
heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic
benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental
and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about
the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The
discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue
concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that
touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for
mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as
taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this
case and take cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation
to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and
full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is
justified in denying access thereto.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its
ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs.
Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal
to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has
been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and
thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document
has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however,
the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they
impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and
Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not
be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers
with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.”
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine
offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of
greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware that behind
the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our
people's right to information against any abuse of executive
privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its
endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege,
should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the
point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise
thereof.”
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino – Re: JPEPA
(July 16, 2008)
[V2.0]
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to
be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event
the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics
which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition,
dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business
environment, and general and final provisions.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the
right to information.
b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents
applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim
of privilege.
d. Whether the Respondents’ failed to claim executive privilege on
time.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
1. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought
must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public
concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. ‘Public concern’
like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact definition. Both
terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement,
it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public
concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information
and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information
is covered by the right to information, a specific “showing of need”
for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however,
the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by the same,
then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must
show that that the information is vital, not simply for the
satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and
reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-
making.
2. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can
be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need
determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted
the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the
competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the
relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence,"
"the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government,"
and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong
and “sufficient showing of need”. The arguments they proffer to
establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of
this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a
matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is
a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need
shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners
have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to
meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making
unless the initial offers are also published.
4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time
only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that
the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the House
Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver
thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from
the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were
mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained
from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces
tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged
request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the
same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from
issuing subpoenas to executive officials – out of respect for their
office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that
such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests,
they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
Estrada v. Desierto; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(353 SCRA 452) – (356 SCRA 108)
[V1.0]
Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was
elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his
popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson,
a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November
13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the
senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger
that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces
and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government.
Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries
and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement
that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared
that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was
transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A
copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act
as President
Ruling:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid
resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation
is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long
as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the
cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on
the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of
Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During
the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition,
the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time
were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of
the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is
merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate
Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also
passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-
President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of
inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question
is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by
the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
Estrada v. Desierto; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(353 SCRA 452) – (356 SCRA 108)
[V2.0]
Facts:
 This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency of the
Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor Joseph
Estrada.

What actually happened:
o May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an
overwhelming lead. Arroyo is elected as Vice-
President.
o October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit”
Singson starts publicly accusing Estrada and his
family of receiving jueteng payoffs.
o October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singson’s accusations
resound in both the Senate and House of
Representatives, mainly through opposition
members / members of the Minority.
o October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign,
including Department of Social Welfare and
Development Secretary Arroyo. Estrada’s allies in
the Majority defect to the other camp. Past
presidents and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for
Estrada’s resignation.
o November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar
transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
o November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process
formally starts, with 21 Senators as judges, and
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
presiding.
o December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the
Impeachment trial proper. Presentation of evidence.
On January 11, 11 senators vote against the opening
 of “the second envelope,” which allegedly contains
evidence to prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret
bank account worth 3.3 billion pesos under the name
“Jose Velarde.” These 11 outnumbered the 10
senators who wanted to have the envelope opened.
o January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the
impeachment proceedings, postponed indefinitely.
o January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA
in a mass movement calling for Estrada’s resignation
(dubbed the “EDSA II Movement”).
o January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support
from Estrada, and more members of the Executive
branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a snap
election for President “where he would not be a
candidate.”
o January 20, 2001: Estrada’s and Arroyo’s advisers
start negotiations on a “peaceful and orderly transfer
of power,” only to be cut short by Arroyo’s
oathtaking as the 14th President of the Philippines.
That same day, Estrada and his family leave
Malacañang. Estrada releases a statement which
said that he was leaving Malacañang “for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation.” He also sends a letter to both chambers
of Congress saying that he “[is] unable to exercise
the powers and duties of [his] office.”
o January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution
recognizing and expressing support for the Arroyo
presidency. Other countries expressed the same.
o February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is
nominated by Arroyo to be her Vice-President
o February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83
terminating the Impeachment Court.
What the parties to this case did:
o February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ or preliminary
injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from
continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed
against him (OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, 1754-1758),
supposedly until his term as President is over.
o February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this
time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He
wanted to be confirmed as the “lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines” and Arroyo only as temporary / acting
president until he is able to resume his duties.
o February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to
Estrada’s consolidated petitions.
1. Petitioner’s Arguments:
• He has not resigned as President yet,
and so Arroyo’s presidency was void
since the position was not vacant at
the time she was sworn in.
• He is only temporarily unable to fulfill
his duties as President, and that he is
merely on leave.
• Given the above arguments, Estrada is
still President, especially since he was
never impeached, and he thus enjoys
Presidential Immunity from all kinds of
suit.
• The Ombudsman has to stop the
investigation since he had already
developed a bias against him (Estrada)
from the “barrage of prejudicial
publicity on his guilt.”
2. Respondents’ Argument:
• The cases pose a political question (“
‘the legitimacy of the Arroyo
administration’ ”) and are therefore
out of the Court’s jurisdiction,
especially since Arroyo became
president through people power, and
has already been recognized as such
by other governments. They compare
the present case with Aquino’s
“revolutionary government” (Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines v.
Aquino).
Issue:
Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave,
which makes Arroyo just an Acting President. (Whether Estrada
resigned from his position)
Ruling:
Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements
that must be present to consider someone to have resigned: first,
the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of relinquishment. Both
elements were evident in Estrada’s actuations before he left
Malacañang, and so he must be considered to have resigned.
o Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance
on the issue), the Court found that Estrada’s acts to
be tantamount to his resignation.
o For intent: the Court mainly used Angara’s Diary,
“Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” in order to
intuit Estrada’s intent. The Diary, which was
published in a major publication, described Estrada’s
acts following the massive withdrawal of support by
former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada is quoted to
have proposed a snap election of which he would not
be a part. He was also shown to have conceded to
the idea that he had to resign.
o For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated
five.
a. Estrada acknowledged Arroyo’s oath-taking as
President of the Republic.
b. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency
for the sake of peace but did not say that he
would return or that he was leaving only
temporarily. He did not specify what kind of
inability it was that prevented him from
discharging his presidential duties at that
time.
c. He thanked the people for the opportunity to
serve them. The Court took this as a “past
opportunity.”
d. He also said he was ready for any future
challenge, and the Court took to mean “a
future challenge after occupying the
[presidency].”
e. He called on his supporters to join efforts at
reconciliation and solidarity. The Court said
that these would not be possible if Estrada
refuses to give up the presidency.
o Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned
as a matter of law, since Section 12 of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits the
resignation or retirement of any public officer
pending a criminal or administrative investigation for
any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the
Revised Penal Code’s provisions on bribery. The
Court interpreted this provision according to the
intent of the lawmakers, and that is that the
provision was included supposedly to “prevent the
act of resignation or retirement from being used …
as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a
pending criminal or administrative case against him
and to prevent his prosecution under [RA 3019]…”
Estrada therefore cannot invoke this provision to
violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 - May 3, 2006
(Pres. Proclamation No. 1017)
• "Take Care" Power of the President
• Powers of the Chief Executive
• The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature
FACTS:
These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017
(declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are
pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state
of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting
PP 1017.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the
President the power to enact laws and decrees
• If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional
RULING:
“Take-Care” Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: “The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the
primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to
formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath
or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he
will, among others, “execute its laws.” In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers
attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under
the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause:
“to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
“decrees”?
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book
III of E.O. 292. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to
those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
same category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that “the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws
through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to
enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore,
cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs
laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 – November 10, 2003
[V1.0]
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The
complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint
was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was
on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 – November 10, 2003
[V2.0]
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Fuentabella, which
directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada held an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
in accordance with Section 3 (2) of Article XI of the Constitution,
which provides the substantial rules in initiating impeachment
cases.
The House on Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint, or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentabella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by the abovementioned House
Resolution.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint was unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”
On their comments on the petitions, respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker De Venecia and/or its co-
respondents, submitted a Manifestation asserting the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
The Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, also
filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact,
adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it.
Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a “Petition for Leave to Intervene,”
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by the Court on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and the Court in a
“constitutional deadlock” and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination. Several motions for intervention were filed and
were granted thereafter.
Issue:
Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;
and whether or not it should be exercised by the Court at this time.
Ruling:
The matters will be discussed in seriatim.
1. Judicial Review
The Supreme Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Sec. 1, Art. VII of our present
1987 Constitution, the second paragraph of which states:
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
Citing the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court
expounded on the power of judicial review stating that “…in cases
of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof… when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them…”
This “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of
powers” of the different branches of the government and “to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels” is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”
“The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government… The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government… And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.” (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission)
Ensuring the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by “any branch or instrumentalities of
government,” former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner
Roberto Concepcion, in his sponsorship speech, even states that
such power “…is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.”
2. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
The court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
a. Standing
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest and transcendental importance.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-
interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
Standing is a special concern of the constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence, the question is whether such
parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
On the other hand, the question as to “real-party-in-interest” is
whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’”
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners asserts a violation of the personal rights of
the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of
the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing in this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that pubic money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.
As for the legislator, the Court allowed him to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
his office.
An association has legal personality to represent its members,
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests. In class suits filed in behalf
of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment
in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the
class whether or not they were before the court.
With respect to motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court of an officer thereof. While intervention is not
a matter of right, the courts may permit it when the applicant
shows facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.
In this case, the Court granted motions to intervene except that of
intervenor Soriano, who asserts an interest as a taxpayer but failed
to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suit. In
praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to
allege that the act of petitioners would result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to
any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member
of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
b. Ripeness and Prematurity
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture.” Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was
done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise the issue of the validity of the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by 12th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e. the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, has been complied with.
c. Justiciability
Political questions are “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner: “…The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers.
The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political
law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits. This Court thus
now applies this standard to the present controversy.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes
into the merits of the second impeachment complaint. More
importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such
a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
On the other hand, issues regarding the constitutionality of
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, as a result thereof, barring the
second impeachment complaint under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution, constitute the very lis mota or crux of the instant
controversy.
3. Conclusion
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far
as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.
The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions
for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for
the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental
law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-
cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-
face with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court’s
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass
upon that problem head on.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government.
The Court, therefore, held sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001, are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which was filed
on October 23, 2003, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.