CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1

 Reyes vs. Torres 379 SCRA 368

 Gachon vs. De Vera 274 SCRA 540

RULE 2

 Swagman vs. CA 455 SCRA 175

 Santos vs. Santos-Gran GR No. 197380, October 5, 2014

RULE 3

 Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. vs. Dela Cruz 464 SCRA 591
 Moldes vs. Villanueva 468 SCRA 697
 Central Bank vs. Banco Filipino GR No. 173399, February 21, 2017

RULE 4

 Jao vs. CA 382 SCRA 407

 Sps. Devena vs. Sps. Piquero 454 SCRA 672
 Polytrade Corp. vs. Blanco 30 SCRA 187
 Ang vs. Ang GR No. 186993, August 22, 2012
 GACHON VS. DE VERA

Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and injunction

Facts:
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted as
correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible entry 3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara
against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial
Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August
25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio
Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September
4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. 4 On
September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under
the Rule on Summary Procedure. 5 On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the
summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, 6 which was
attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an
amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case
submitted for resolution. 7 On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 8 Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC 9 issued a decision 10 resolving the
complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, 11 Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the
amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed for, a
temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.

Issue:

I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied strictly
or liberally.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Application of statutory construction:

The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately
depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would
follow from construing it one way or the other.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.

Ruling:
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to
the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff . . .

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: . . .

Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present ejectment
suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the same property and
parties. We are unable to find basis for this charge.

For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and
circumstances; and the actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 35 Suffice
it to say that an action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause of action than that in an
ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership of a certain portion of the property
which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the
right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth
by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's
possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 36 It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not
a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
SWAGMAN VS. CA & CHRISTIAN (455 SCRA 175)

FACTS:

Christian filed an action for the recovery against Swagman Hotels alleging that the latter failed to pay its
loans as evidenced by the 3 promissory issued in favor of the hotel. According to Swagman, Christian had
no cause of action, because the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. The trial court
declared that the first two promissory notes date August 7, 1996 and March 14, 1996, while were not yet
due on February 2, 1999, had matured on the course of the proceedings. It cited Sec. 5, Rule 10, in which
a complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without objection. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Had there been a cause of action?

RULING:

NONE.

Sec. 5 Rule 10 of the ROC, may only apply where if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.

In the instant case, there was no cause of action when Christian had commenced the suit on February 2,
1999. The debts were demandable only after 3 years as evidenced by the promissory notes. Since from the
beginning there was no existence of a cause of action, Sec. 5 Rule 10 of the ROC cannot operate the cure
the defect of respondent’s complaint. DISMISSED.

INCIDENTS:

RTC held that there was no Novation. The modification of the interest from 12% to 6% was merely
secondary to the principal agreement itself which was payment of the loans. Therefore, the change being
incidental, no novation occurred. CA affirmed.

SC, there was partial novation, the modificatory type, and not the extinctive type as the obligation to pay
remains in force.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS vs. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN
G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014

FACTS:

On January 9, 2006, petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (petitioner) filed a Complaint for annulment of sale
and revocation of title against Gran. It was alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the registered owner
of three (3) parcels of land prior to their transfer in the name of Gran; (b) she has a second husband by the
name of Lamberto with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take care of
Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that the latter
was petitioner’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto
succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran; (e) despite diligent
efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were
transferred to Gran sometime in November 2005. For her part, Gran filed a Motion to dismiss,contending,
inter alia, that (a) the action filed by petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written contract must
be brought within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time
of registration of the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended
Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were
not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth. RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the
Complaint for its failure to state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale sought to be nullified
– an "essential and indispensable part of *petitioner’s+ cause of action" – was not attached. It likewise
held that the certificates of title covering the subject properties cannot be collaterally attacked and that
since the action was based on a written contract, the same had already prescribed under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code. CA sustained the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint but on the ground of
insufficiency of factual basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint should be sustained.

HELD:

YES. A judicious examination of petitioner’s Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently state a
cause of action. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts
which would warrant an action for nullification of the sale and recovery of the properties in controversy,
hence, rendering the same dismissible. While the Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered
owner of the subject properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would show the
basis of that assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the root of petitioner’s title or copies
of previous certificates of title registered in her name. Instead, the certificates of title covering the said
properties that were attached to the Complaint are in the name of Gran. Indeed, while the facts alleged in
the complaint are hypothetically admitted for purposes of the motion, it must, nevertheless, be
remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded
in the complaint as well as to inferences fairly deductible therefrom. Verily, the filing of the motion to
dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint does not hypothetically admit allegations of which the
court will take judicial notice of to be not true, nor does the rule of hypothetical admission apply to
legally impossible facts, or to facts inadmissible in evidence, or to facts that appear to be unfounded by
record or document included in the pleadings. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the
rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law.
General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of
law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public
policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. Hence, by merely stating
a legal conclusion, the Complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the
relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause
of action, as correctly held by the RTC. As to the issue of presecription: 1âwphi1 To determine when the
prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, the plaintiff’s possession of the disputed
property is material. If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference
point being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. On the other hand, if the real
owner of the property remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him and in such case, the action for reconveyance would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. In the case at bar, a reading of the
allegations of the Complaint failed to show that petitioner remained in possession of the subject properties
in dispute. On the contrary, it can be reasonably deduced that it was Gran who was in possession of the
subject properties. The filing of the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC on January 9, 2006 was
obviously beyond the ten-year prescriptive period, warranting the Amended Complaint’s dismissal all the
same.
LOTTE PHIL VS. DELA CRUZ

Facts: Upon termination of service contract between 7J Maintenance and Services and Lotte Inc,
RESPONDENTS (EMPLOYEES) were asked to wait for work however, they were never called to return
to work.

Aggrieved, they filed a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J for ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, regularization,
and benefits.

LA- DECLARED 7J as employer and found the latter GUILTY of illegal dismissal.

** RESPONDENTS-EMPLOYEE APPEALED to NLRC to include LOTTE AND be declared as

DIRECT EMPLOYEER, that 7J IS A LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR.

NLRC- denied MR

CA – (certiorari) REVERSED and set aside the ruling of NLRC. HELD that LOTTE is the real employer,
7J labor only.

LOTTE- Argued that 7J should be impleaded in the CA as INDISPENSABLE PARTY. THAT petition
before CA was DISMISSIBLE for failure to comply SEC 3 RULE 46 of CP

ISSUE: Whether 7J is an indispensable party

Ruling: YES

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory.

ITC, 7J is an indispensable party because it will be affected with the outcome of the case. The Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents IN CONTRAST with
CA’S decision. CLEARLY, 7J is a co-party and EMPLOYEE-RESPONDENTS failed to include it in the
petition before the CA.
MOLDES VS. VILLANUEVA

Facts: Spouses Mollet were owners of three parcels of land situated at Taguig. They were survived by
their daughter Romana Mollet. On March 17, 1965, a deed of extrajudicial settlement with quitclaim
covering the three lots was executed by Gelardos, Dullavins, Villanuevas, and Moldes (GREAT
GRANCHILDREN), that Dullavin and Villanuevas WAIVED their respective shares in favor to
Gelardos, and that MOLDES waived their respective shares as well.

VILLANUEVAS filed a complaint with the RTC- MAKATI against Moldes to annul the DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTELEMENT WITH QUITCLAIM. They alleged that the deed was tainted with
fraud (3 who were not heirs were included) and they had never relinquished their rights over their
inheritance (illiteracy and minor)

DEFENDANDTS: Denied fraud and argued it has prescribed > 20+ years

RTC- DEED was VOID and Defendants never even filed it in the ROD, AN ACT GIVING DOUBT to its
validity

CA- AFFIRMED RTC with modification

** Petition to SC via Certiorari; was granted on the ground that PLAINTIFFS failed to implead
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

RULING:

SEC. 7 RULE 3 of ROC: Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties-in-interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Commissioner Domingo v Scheer, the Court held that JOINDER of indispensable parties IS
MANDATORY.

ITC, the plaintiffs failed to implead THE OTHER HEIRS of the deceases and implead other signatories
of the deed who were deeded shares in the property.

**IOW, ALL PARTIES TO THE DEED ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

***A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.
CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDATORS VS. BANCO FILIPINO
G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017

Facts:

Monetary Board of the then Central Bank (CB) allowed Banco Filipino under MB Resolution No.223 to
operate as a savings bank. However the CB issued MB Resolution No. 955 placing Banco Filipino under
conservatorship after granting the latter’s loan applications worth billions of pesos. Respondent bank filed
with the RTC Makati a Complaint against the CB for the annulment of MB Resolution No. 955.
Thereafter, on 25 January 1985, the CB issued MB Resolution No. 75 ordering the closure of Banco
Filipino and placing the latter under receivership. The Resolution stated that since respondent had been
found to be insolvent, the latter was forbidden to continue doing business to prevent further losses to its
depositors and creditors.

Pursuant to the recent development, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to Admit Attached
Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the three consolidated cases — Civil Case Nos. 8108, 9675, and
10183 —before the RTC. In its Amended/Supplemental Complaint, respondent bank sought to substitute
the CB-BOL (Central Bank Board of Liquidators) for the defunct CB and its MB. Respondent also aimed
to recover at least P18 billion in actual damages, litigation expenses, attorney’s fees, interests, and costs
of suit against petitioner and individuals who had allegedly acted with malice and evident bad faith m
placing the bank under conservatorship and eventually closing it down in 1985.

The trial court, through an Order granted the Motion to Admit filed by Banco Filipino and accordingly
admitted the latter’s Amended/Supplemental Complaint. Consequently, the CB-BOL was substituted for
the defunct CB in respondent’s civil cases, which are still pending with the RTC.

More than 10 years from the enactment of R.A. 7653, Banco Filipino again filed a Motion to Admit
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil cases before the RTC.

Banco Filipino’s Motion to Admit its Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was opposed by the CB-
BOL based on the following grounds:

Banco Filipino’s Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was not supported by a board resolution that
authorized it to file the amended or supplemental complaint.

The second supplemental complaint raised new and independent causes of action against a new party –
the BSP – which was not an original party.

The second supplemental complaint was violative of the rule on the joinder of causes of action, because it
alleged those that did not arise from the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties – as
opposed to those alleged in the complaint sought to be amended or supplemented – and differed from the
causes of action cited in the original Complaint.

The admission of the second supplemental complaint would expand the scope of the dispute in the
consolidated civil cases to include new causes of action against new parties like the BSP, resulting in a
delay in the resolution of the cases.
RTC granted the Motion to Admit Complaint

PC-BOL filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86697. It
questioned the propriety of the RTC’s Order admitting Banco Filipino’s Second Amended/Supplemental
Complaint and committing grave abuse of discretion in the process. Reiterating the grounds stated in its
Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioner contended
that the complaint consisted of, among others, an improper joinder of parties and other issues that were
entirely different from those raised in the original complaint.41

CA affirmed in toto the trial Court’s Order. The appellate court ruled that the old CB continued to exist
and remained a defendant in the consolidated civil cases, albeit under a new name: CB-BOL.

It also ruled that, pursuant to R.A. 7653, the BSP was the successor- in-interest of the old CB. Further,
with the transfer of assets from the CB to the BSP during the pendency of the subject civil cases, the latter
now became a transferee pendente lite. Therefore, the CA concluded that there were no new parties
impleaded in the civil cases when the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was admitted by the
trial court.

Issue

Whether the RTC erred in admitting Banco Filipino’s Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the
consolidated civil cases before it.

Ruling

Yes. 1.) The second amendment of theComplaint and second supplemental pleading were improper; 2.)
The amendment/supplement violates the rules on joinder of parties and causes of action.

Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to amend their pleadings (a) by adding or
striking out an allegation or a party’s name; or (b) by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or
rectifying a mistaken or an inadequate allegation or description in the pleadings for the purpose of
determining the actual merits of the controversy in the most inexpensive and expeditious manner.

The prevailing rule on the amendment of pleadings is one of liberality, with the end of obtaining
substantial justice for the parties. However, the option of a party-litigant to amend a pleading is not
without limitation. If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the
complaint, amendment is not allowed. If no right existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit
cannot be maintained, even if the right of action may have accrued thereafter.

In the instant case, the causes of action subject of the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint only
arose in 1994 well after those subject of the original Complaint. The original Complaint was based on the
alleged illegal closure of Banco Filipino effected in 1985 by the defunct CB and its MB.

On the other hand, the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint stemmed from the alleged oppressive
and arbitrary acts committed by the BSP and its MB against Banco Filipino after respondent bank was
reopened in 1994. Since the acts or omissions allegedly committed in violation of respondent’s rights are
different, they constitute separate causes of action.

In its Comment on the present Petition, Banco Filipino contends, as the RTC and the CA similarly ruled,
that the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint does not alter the substance of the original demand,
change the cause of action against the original defendants, or seek additional or new reliefs.

This contention is, however, belied by a closer examination of the Second Amended/Supplemental
Complaint, in which respondent asks the Court to order the defendants to pay, among others, actual
damages of at least P18.8 billion “as a consequence of the acts herein complained of.

The “acts complained of”‘ cover not just the conservatorship, receivership, closure, and liquidation of
Banco Filipino in 1984 and 1985, but also the alleged acts of harassment committed by the BSP and its
MB after respondent bank was reopened in 1994. These acts constituted a whole new cause of action. In
effect, respondent raised new causes of action and asserted a new relief in the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint. If it is admitted, the RTC would need to look into the propriety of
two entirely different causes of action. This is not countenanced by law, as explained in the preceding
paragraphs.

The second supplemental pleading was improper

Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to supplement their pleadings by setting
forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented.

However, the option of a party-litigant to supplement a pleading is not without limitation. A supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. Its usual function is to set up
new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the kind of relief sought with respect to the same subject matter
as that of the original complaint.

In Leobrera v. CA that a supplemental complaint must be founded on the same cause of action as that
raised in the original complaint. Although in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings &
Development Corporation, the Court clarified that the fact that a supplemental pleading technically states
a new cause of action should not be a bar to its allowance, still, the matter stated in the supplemental
complaint must have a relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading. That is, the matter
must be germane and intertwined with the cause of action stated in the original complaint so that the
principal and core issues raised by the parties in their original pleadings remain the same.

In the instant case, Banco Filipino, through the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, attempted to
raise new and different causes of action that arose only in 1994. These causes of action had no relation
whatsoever to the causes of action in the original Complaint, as they involved different acts or omissions,
transactions, and parties. If the Court admits the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint under these
circumstances, there will be no end to the process of amending the Complaint.
For these reasons, whether viewed as an amendment or a supplement to the original Complaint, the
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint should not have been admitted.

The amendment/supplement violates the rules on joinder of parties and causes of action.

Moreover, the admission of the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint is inappropriate because it

violates the rule on joinder of parties and causes of action. If its admission is upheld, the causes of action
set forth therein would be joined with those in the original Complaint. The joinder of causes of action is
indeed allowed under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court; but if there are multiple parties, the
joinder is made subject to the rules on joinder of parties under Section 6, Rule 3. Specifically, before
causes of action and parties can be joined in a complaint involving multiple parties, (1) the right to relief
must arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and (2) there must be a question of law or
fact common to all the parties.

In the instant case, Banco Filipino is seeking to join the BSP and its MB as parties to the complaint.
However, they have different legal personalities from those of the defunct CB and its MB: firstly, because
the CB was abolished by R.A. 7653, and the BSP created in its stead; and secondly, because the members
of each MB are natural persons. These factors make the BSP and its MB different from the CB and its
MB. Since there are multiple parties involved, the two requirements mentioned in the previous paragraph
must be present before the causes of action and parties can be joined. Neither of the two requirements for
the joinder of causes of action and parties was met.

First, the reliefs for damages prayed for by respondent did not arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions. While the damages prayed for in the first Amended/Supplemental Complaint arose from the
closure of Banco Filipino by the defunct CB and its MB, the damages prayed for in the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint arose from the alleged acts of oppression committed by the BSP and
its MB against respondent.

Second, there is no common question of fact or law between the parties involved. The acts attributed by
Banco Filipino to the BSP and its MB pertain to events that transpired after this Court ordered the
respondent bank’s reopening in 1994. These acts bear no relation to those alleged in the original
Complaint, which related to the propriety of the closure and liquidation of respondent as a banking
institution way back in 1985.

The only common factor in all these allegations is respondent bank itself as the alleged aggrieved party.
Since the BSP and its MB cannot be joined as parties, then neither can the causes of action against them
be joined.

WHEREFORE, the Petition of the CB-BOL is GRANTED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 January 2006 and Resolution dated 27 June 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86697 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased Spouses
Ignacioand Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.Private respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of Quezon City over theestate of his parents. Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he beappointed as special
administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner moved
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not
reside inQuezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary
evidence showing that hisdeceased parents were residents of Angeles City, Pampanga.Private respondent
Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided inpetitioner’s house
as shown in the death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay
inQuezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be deemed conclusive
evidence of thedecedents’ residence.The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Perico. The CA
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. Hence,this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

Held:

Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or
letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death.

The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence or domicile. In
thecase of Garcia-Fule vs CA , it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi termini “actual residence”
as distinguishedfrom legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning the personal,actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place andactual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legalresidence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicilerequires bodily presence and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time is required; however,the
residence must me more than temporary.

In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents’ have been living in Quezon City at the time of their
death andsome time prior thereto, and as was also shown in the death certificate presented by private
respondent. Thus, the venuefor the settlement of the decedents’ intestate was properly laid in the Quezon
City.
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, vs. SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO

Facts:

Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a house and lot in Parañaque City. The
petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement in which the former sold the property to the latter for P940,250.00 payable in six (6)
installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property.

It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents
upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be
dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners.

On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the
respondents with the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession
and damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of
the respondents as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the
purchase price of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash
despite demands therefor.

Issue:

Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.

Held:

After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court does not apply.

---------------------------------

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. --

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein;

Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:

Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts
of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties reside

-------------------------------

ITC, above provision does not apply because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one
cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay
the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the
possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents.

The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and occupation of the
property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account
of the aforestated breach of contract of the respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action,
and are not independent or separate causes of action. The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the
MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the premises
subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real action.

As such, the action (real action) should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located,
namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Since the
petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue
was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
POLYTRADE CORP. VS. BLANCO

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a suit before the CFI Bulacan on 4 causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide
delivered by planintiff to defendent.

Defendant: improper venue since accdg. to their agreement, it may only be sued in the courts of Manila.
Cites Sec. 3 of Rule 4: venue may be stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of the parties the
venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another."
CFI Bulacan ruled in favor of plaintiff.

Issue: Whether venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance
— and this is one — provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff."

In the first 2 causes of actions, no stipulation where the venue particularly is, thus the general in Section
2 (b), Rule 4, governs: properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's residence.

As to the other 2, the stipulation "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties
merely consented to be sued in Manila. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals
to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4.
ANG VS. ANG G.R. NO. 186993 – AUGUST 22, 2012

Facts:

Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners).
The respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the
latter the loan amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However,
despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.

The petitioners sent the respondents demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding debt.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan
obligation. Thereafter, the petitioners who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of
America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige
Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents.
Thereafter, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money
with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.

The petitioners maintain that their complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents may
be filed in the RTC of Quezon City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they insist that
Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the case below and can
prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case, the petitioners assert, the said complaint for
collection of sum of money may be filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the
RTC of Quezon City.

On the other hand, the respondents assert that the petitioners are proscribed from filing their complaint in
the RTC of Quezon City. They assert that the residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative, is
immaterial to the determination of the venue of the petitioners’ complaint.

The respondents, therefore, moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners on the
grounds of improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the petitioners’ action was
improperly laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of
the place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while
the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the
complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

WON the complaint of the petitioners must be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Held:

Yes.

The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as
it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where
to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2)
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant
must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be
filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.

In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd.,21 this Court held that there can be no election as
to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such
case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides

ITC, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in
Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners’ complaint against the respondents may
only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The
petitioners, being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of
the filing of their complaint.

In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the
Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants and their witnesses by affording
them maximum accessibility to the courts. And even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the
convenience of the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to him, it should not
be construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.

Meanwhile, Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest ITC. Thus, his residence is immaterial to the
venue of the filing of the complaint.