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SAT, OCT 6, 2018

Report Spotlights
Drug Traffic at
Santos Port, Brazil’s
Drug Policies
Written by Lloyd Belton* - JULY 20, 2016

Brazil PCC

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The port of Santos, Brazil

The United Nations’ 2016 World

Drug Report’s finding that Brazil is
the most frequent country of
departure for cocaine going to
African, Asian and European
markets has refocused attention on
Santos, the country’s largest port,
and raised questions about the
effectiveness of Brazil’s overall drug
policy and enforcement measures.

Despite being the principal

transatlantic shipping point for
cocaine, the recent report from the
United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) notes that Brazil
only accounted for 7 percent of
South America’s cocaine seizures
from 2009 to 2014.

Santos Port: The PCC’s

Drug Tra3cking
Backyard

Santos port, located in São Paulo

state, is a crucial link in South
America’s principal drug trafficking
transit routes, with estimates
suggesting that as much as 80
percent of cocaine arriving in
Europe transits through this
regional shipping hub.

In Santos, a network of small drug

trafficking groups linked to the First
Capital Command (Primeiro
Comando da Capital – PCC), one of
Brazil’s largest organized crime
groups, traffic cocaine, marijuana,
and methamphetamines to Europe,
Africa, and Asia.

SEE ALSO: PCC News and

Profile

From its base in São Paulo, the PCC

oversees a large percentage of drug
trafficking from production areas in
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and
Bolivia, to supply both domestic and
international markets. Drugs first
transit through various Brazilian
states like Mato Grosso, Mato
Grosso do Sul, and Amazonas,
before ending up on the streets of
Brazil’s major cities or being
trafficked abroad via the country’s
ports. The PCC reportedly traffics
around 40 tons of cocaine a year
worth approximately $60 million
primarily through Santos port.
‘Ndrangheta, the Calabria-based
Italian mafia group, is reportedly
one of the PCC’s most important
international commercial partners.

PCC Power Continues to

Grow
Despite various police operations
against the PCC and smaller drug
trafficking groups operating in
Santos and further up the supply
chain, drug trafficking remains a
major problem at the port. However,
drug trafficking at Santos port
seemingly dipped following a federal
police sting in March 2014, in which
23 PCC-linked drug traffickers were
arrested and 3.7 tons of cocaine
seized.

Last year, only 1.5 tons of narcotics,

including cocaine and
methamphetamines, were seized by
authorities at the port, compared to
roughly four tons in 2013 and 2014.
It is unclear whether this is
attributable to a decrease in drug
trafficking via Santos port, or
alternatively, less effective drug
enforcement and screening
measures. As the data from the
UNODC report was collected
between 2009 and 2014, it likely
does not factor in the impact of the
2014 federal police sting, rendering
the verification of the effectiveness
of police operations premature.

The way in which port

operations in Brazil are
structured and organized
 renders them a soft target
for groups like the PCC that
retain significant financial
muscle, local influence, and
can rely on a network of an
estimated 11,000 members.

Nevertheless, drug shipment

seizures continue to be reported on a
regular basis at the port. In a recent
raid in June, federal police seized
700 kg of cocaine concealed in a
shipping container bound for
Belgium. Furthermore, the PCC
appears to have significantly
expanded its reach in Brazil despite
numerous security operations
against its illicit activities.

According to an Estadão de São

Paulo report, PCC now has a
presence in all 27 Brazilian states, in
addition to bases in Argentina, Peru,
Colombia and Venezuela. In
addition, a recent Folha de São
Paulo report highlighted how the
PCC joined forces with the Rio-
based Red Command (Comando
Vermelho) to oust a rival drug
trafficking group that controlled the
drug trade from Paraguay to Brazil.

Growing Bolivia-Brazil
Cocaine Trade Feeding
Santos
The growing Brazil-Bolivia border
drug trade has recently come under
increased scrutiny, particularly as
Bolivia provides one of the closest
and direct sources of cocaine for
drug-traffickers at Santos port.
According to an El Deber report,
Bolivia’s Santa Cruz department,
which lies adjacent to the Brazilian
states of Mato Grosso and Mato
Grosso do Sul, is currently the
dominant cocaine-producing and
trafficking area in that country.

Brazilian and Bolivian authorities

recently launched a new
multinational drug enforcement
agency tasked with combating the
cross-border drug trade. In late
June, this produced results when a
joint Brazilian-Bolivian police
operation dismantled a drug
trafficking group moving
approximately two tons of cocaine a
month from Puerto Quijarro in
Santa Cruz to Santos via Mato
Grosso do Sul state. The group
reportedly relied on a fleet of 70
trucks to transport the drugs to the
port.
Corruption and Bribery
at Port Facilities
Corruption is a key facilitator for the
PCC drug shipments out of Santos
port. The way in which port
operations in Brazil are structured
and organized renders them a soft
target for groups like the PCC that
retain significant financial muscle,
local influence, and can rely on a
network of an estimated 11,000
members. A large percentage of drug
trafficking at Santos port involves
the smuggling of cocaine and other
drugs into cargo ship containers or
into the ship storage compartments
themselves.

Traffickers reportedly also smuggle

drugs onto container ships anchored
in the bay using speedboats, and are
often aided by corrupt crew
members.

One of the principal vulnerabilities

in Santos is that cargo can be stored
for several months in privately
managed export storage sites known
as Recinto Especial para Despacho
Aduaneiro de Exportação
(REDEXs). There are over 47 of
them in Santos alone, each managed
by a different company. A lack of an
overarching authority and weak
information sharing among REDEX
authorities is likely exploited by the
PCC and other drug trafficking
groups.

According to some reports,

corruption and bribery is
commonplace among officials and
employees working at these
facilities. In the 2014 federal police
sting, an official working at a
REDEX facility in Santos was
arrested for allegedly supplying PCC
leaders with information on ship
arrival dates, routes, and types of
cargo. The investigation also
revealed that complicit port workers
and customs officials were paid
$1,500 for facilitating the movement
of drugs onto container ships. In
March 2016, two port security
guards were arrested and charges
with facilitating drug trafficking at
the port.

Collusion between corrupt police

officers and drug traffickers is also a
significant problem at the port. In
late June 2016, police arrested 13
members of a PCC-linked drug
trafficking gang operating in the
area. They reportedly operated with
the complicity of several military
police officers and potentially a local
authority councilor.
InSight Crime Analysis
Sources consulted by InSight Crime
confirmed that transnational drug
trafficking continues largely
unabated at Santos port, and that
the PCC remains the dominant
player. A port security manager
working at Santos who asked to
remain anonymous told InSight
Crime that drug trafficking is back to
the same levels witnessed prior to
the 2014 federal police sting. He
noted that “current investment in
security at the port is hampered by
bureaucratic requirements, and, in
practice, is not sufficient to counter
the drug trafficking threat.”

Regarding corruption and bribery

practices within the REDEXs, the
port security official noted that
“while it is hard to prove that it
exists, there is definitely a feeling
that it is there, particularly among
security guards that handle the
containers.”

Beyond private security enforcement

in Santos’ REDEXs, questions need
to be asked about Brazil’s overall
enforcement capabilities. In Brazil,
drug enforcement is decentralized
and convoluted. Each of Brazil’s 27
states has one or more drug
enforcement bodies, some larger
and better-financed than others. For
example, São Paulo state’s drug
enforcement institution, the
Department of Narcotics
Investigations (Departamento de
Investigações sobre Narcóticos –
DENARC), is well-financed and is
considered more effective than
many other state-level drug
enforcement units, albeit not free of
corruption.

Either way, it is clear that

Brazil’s drug enforcement
agencies and policies
require a fundamental
overhaul to reduce
bureaucracy and increase
both internal and external
cooperation.

In addition, the General Office for

Narcotics Prevention and
Repression (Coordenação-Geral de
Prevenção e Repressão a
Entorpecentes/DF – CGORE/DF) is
a federal police unit charged with
overseeing drug enforcement on a
national level. And the navy
regularly conducts surveillance and
raids. A lack of cooperation between
the various drug enforcement units
is one of the major flaws in Brazil’s
national drug enforcement strategy.

As such, the July launch of the inter-

institutional Brasil Central Seguro
drug enforcement operation in six
states produced immediate results
and demonstrated the potential
effectiveness of national-level
cooperation on drug enforcement.
The Michel Temer interim
government has indicated that
additional national-level drug
enforcement operations are likely,
with the new minister of Social
Development, Osmar Terra, recently
calling for increased border control
and stricter penalties for drug
trafficking.

SEE ALSO: Brazil News and

Profiles

However, rather than increasing

enforcement, policy think tanks like
The Brazilian Platform for Drug
Policy (Plataforma Brasileira de
Política de Drogas – PBPD) continue
to question the effectiveness of the
Brazilian government’s so-called
“war on drugs.” In an email
correspondence with InSight Crime,
PBPD Coordinator of Institutional
Relations Gabriel Santos Elias said
Brazil’s “war on drugs has failed
because it’s essentially based on
repression, without focusing enough
on education and prevention, as well
as the general health of drug users in
Brazil.”

Over and above cooperation among

the various state-level drug
enforcement agencies, Elias pointed
out that there is a fundamental
conflict in strategy between the
National Drug Policy Secretariat
(Secretaria Nacional de Política de
Drogas – SENAD), the federal
government drug policy institution
which “traditionally defends a more
integrated approach to Brazil’s drug
policies,” and “the security forces
who suppress drug use without
understanding SENAD’s policies.”

Noting that no country has ever

successfully applied enforcement to
reduce drug use or trafficking, Elias
and the PBPD advocate for Brazil to
pursue a policy based on regulation
and education in cooperation with
both the regional and international
communities.

Either way, it is clear that Brazil’s

drug enforcement agencies and
policies require a fundamental
overhaul to reduce bureaucracy and
increase both internal and external
cooperation. As long as Brazil’s drug
policy enforcement hinges on a
disjointed and decentralized system,
and jars with the increasingly pro-
regulation policies espoused by
some regional neighbors, groups like
the PCC are likely to continue to
expand their national and
international reach.

*Lloyd Belton is a political and

country risk analyst at the
consulting firm S-RM.

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